Saudi Arabia’s path to normalization with Israel threatens a regional rupture
By Fouad Ibrahim | The Cradle | October 24, 2025
On 17 October, US President Donald Trump told Fox News, “I hope to see Saudi Arabia go in, and I hope to see others go in. I think when Saudi Arabia goes in, everybody goes in.” The statement was calculated to reignite Washington’s normalization push and reassert Riyadh’s place at the heart of the US-Israeli regional alliance plan.
Trump is determined to complete the regional realignment he initiated in 2020 with the signing of the Abraham Accords. Including Saudi Arabia would crown his foreign policy legacy and fundamentally alter the Arab political order. But the costs may be steeper than the gains.
The 2023 near-deal that faltered
In the months preceding Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, US-mediated talks between Riyadh and Tel Aviv were approaching a breakthrough. The kingdom sought US security guarantees, access to advanced weapons systems, and backing for its civilian nuclear ambitions. The Israeli side, eager for regional legitimacy, saw in Riyadh a historic opportunity.
But Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October 2023, and Tel Aviv’s ensuing carpet-bombing of Gaza, derailed the entire process. Saudi officials were forced to retreat in the face of overwhelming public outrage across the Muslim world.
Trump’s renewed confidence, however, suggests the framework forged before the war was never truly discarded. It has merely been shelved, pending a more favorable political climate.
Saudi Arabia is not just another Arab state. Its symbolic weight derives from a rare trifecta: custodianship of Islam’s two holiest sites, vast oil wealth and economic clout, and considerable political leadership of the Arab and Islamic mainstream.
If the kingdom normalizes ties with Tel Aviv, a domino effect across Arab and Muslim nations could follow. For Israel, this would be the ultimate regional prize. For Washington, it would cement an American-led bloc from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, aimed squarely at containing both Iran and China.
What could drive normalization forward?
Despite the political fallout from Gaza, several factors continue to draw Riyadh toward normalization. Both Saudi Arabia and Israel view Iran and the Axis of Resistance as their primary regional adversaries.
This strategic alignment has not been fully undone by the 2023 China-brokered thaw between Tehran and Riyadh. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 plan to diversify its economy sees potential in Israeli sectors like defense technology and cybersecurity.
Trump’s preference for transactional diplomacy means a grand bargain offering defense pacts, nuclear cooperation, or substantial investment flows could appeal to Saudi ambitions. And within the kingdom, a younger, globally attuned population may be less ideologically opposed to normalization – if it is presented as part of a broader modernization drive.
However, polls conducted by the Washington Institute before and after 7 October 2023 show a different inclination. Surveys in December indicated that a majority of Saudis oppose normalizing ties with Israel.
Strategic and moral hazards
Normalization is not without peril. On the contrary, its very success could destabilize the region.
Any Saudi–Israeli deal that sidelines Palestinian rights would be seen as a betrayal of the kingdom’s religious mandate and leadership role. The devastation in Gaza has reignited pan-Islamic solidarity, and any Saudi alignment with Tel Aviv while Palestinians endure siege and bombardment could shatter the kingdom’s legitimacy in the wider Muslim world.
The Axis of Resistance – particularly Iran, Hezbollah, and Ansarallah – would seize on the normalization to portray it as an alliance of apostates and occupiers, fueling more intense and frequent confrontations. By committing to a volatile US-Israeli partnership, Riyadh risks entanglement in wider conflicts, undermining its strategic autonomy and exposing itself to blowback it cannot control.
The security dimension: A trilateral axis
If normalization ushers in a US–Israel–Saudi security architecture, the implications for West Asia would be profound. Tel Aviv would contribute intelligence and military prowess, Washington would provide oversight and guarantees, and Riyadh would bankroll the venture.
But this alliance would be read in Tehran as yet another encirclement strategy, prompting the Islamic Republic to accelerate its missile and nuclear capabilities. The region could slide into an arms race that undermines development, drains budgets, and magnifies the risks of miscalculation.
Moreover, such a pivot could unravel Saudi Arabia’s recent diplomatic gains – including its rapprochement with Iran, Iraq, and Oman-mediated talks with the Sanaa government in Yemen – and alienate its Eurasian partners like China and Russia. The net result could be diminished regional influence and increased dependence on the west.
Domestically, too, the kingdom would face challenges. Clerical critics and nationalist voices could depict normalization as ideological surrender. The government would find itself more reliant on US and Israeli backing to suppress dissent, exacerbating its internal vulnerabilities.
In this sense, the very security guarantees sought through the trilateral axis could paradoxically generate new forms of insecurity – both internal and regional – making the kingdom’s stability increasingly contingent on external actors and volatile power dynamics.
Economic integration
Economic incentives are central to the normalization pitch. Saudi–Israeli integration could unlock massive investment flows and tech partnerships in fields ranging from Artificial Intelligence (AI) to renewables.
Yet this alignment risks reinforcing structural dependencies. Israeli firms, backed by western capital and technological superiority, would dominate the value chains. The Saudi economy could shift from oil dependency to digital subordination.
Further, such a move could sour ties with China, currently Riyadh’s largest trading partner. Over-alignment with the US–Israel axis might jeopardize the kingdom’s multi-vector strategy and reduce its diplomatic room to maneuver.
Even the promise of modernization may ring hollow if perceived as elite enrichment at public expense. The economic corridor could become a tool of inequality, modernizing infrastructure while leaving social contracts untouched.
Economic integration can bring regional prosperity if fair and balanced, but without safeguards, it risks reinforcing dependency and fueling conflicts.
Surveillance state: Normalization’s dark underbelly
One of the least discussed aspects of normalization is cyber collaboration. Israel’s role as a global surveillance hub and Saudi Arabia’s deep pockets could converge to create a formidable digital control grid.
Such a system – integrating spyware, predictive policing, and AI surveillance – would strengthen the US-led intelligence grid across West Asia, enhancing early-warning systems, missile defense coordination, and digital containment of the Axis of Resistance.
It could also extend the reach of western intelligence into theaters such as Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Red Sea. In practical terms, the alliance could evolve into a regional integrated military and intelligence system encompassing command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance – underpinned by joint data centers, AI-driven threat analysis, and shared satellite networks.
However, this integration would carry profound ethical and political implications. The same tools designed to deter external threats could easily be repurposed for internal control. By combining Israeli-developed spyware, predictive policing algorithms, and US-supplied surveillance hardware, the Saudi government would vastly expand its capacity to monitor dissent, pre-empt protests, and neutralize political opposition.
The normalization process could thus serve as a legitimizing cover for what might become the most sophisticated surveillance apparatus in the Arab world.
Regionally, a Saudi–Israeli cyber partnership would alarm neighboring states, particularly Iran and Qatar, which would perceive it as a threat to their own sovereignty and national security. The likely response would be the acceleration of rival cyber alliances, possibly involving Russia, China, or Turkiye – ushering in a new digital Cold War in the Persian Gulf.
In the long term, the fusion of surveillance technology and political authority poses a deeper civilizational question: Can the Arab world’s quest for security coexist with the preservation of freedom and privacy? If the digital frontier becomes another instrument of domination, the promised “technological peace” may end up securing governments, not peoples – turning the dream of innovation into the architecture of control.
Riyadh’s choices: Three possible trajectories
The Saudi leadership now faces three broad options. First, conditional normalization, where recognition of Israel is tied to measurable progress on Palestinian statehood and sovereignty. Given Tel Aviv’s accelerated settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank, this appears increasingly unrealistic.
Second, incremental engagement (soft normalization), involving quiet cooperation below the threshold of formal recognition that gradually lays the groundwork for future deals.
Third, strategic hedging, in which Riyadh continues to balance between US pressure and regional diplomacy, keeping normalization in reserve as a bargaining chip.
Between realpolitik and regional rupture
Trump’s statement has reignited the debate over the kingdom’s path forward. The immediate gains of normalization – security assurances, economic incentives, and prestige – are tempting. But the long-term consequences could be corrosive.
To join the Abraham Accords while Gaza remains in rubble will irreparably damage Saudi Arabia’s credibility as a leader of the Islamic world. It could sever the kingdom from the Arab street, provoke resistance retaliation, and entrench a neocolonial security order.
Unless normalization is tied to justice for Palestine, it will be remembered not as peace, but as betrayal.
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