Poland and Bulgaria put brakes on Ukraine weapons funding
RT | November 14, 2026
Poland has refused to bankroll further purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine, citing its own military spending and budget deficit. Fellow NATO member Bulgaria has also refused to take part in a €70 billion European aid package and says it will no longer supply weapons and ammunition from its stockpiles.
Prime Minister Donald Tusk said on Friday he notified the NATO secretary-general that Poland “will not be contributing any money to the PURL [Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List] project at this time… because we spend a great deal on our own armaments.” He also cited Poland’s “high deficit.”
Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev also stated on Friday that his country can no longer provide financial assistance to Ukraine, citing Bulgaria’s budget deficit.
“We will not provide any more weapons and ammunition from the Bulgarian Army’s stocks,” he added.
Radev has also ruled out Bulgarian participation in an additional €70 billion funding package requested by Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky from his EU backers. He warned that continued spending on the conflict at the expense of EU citizens is fueling social tensions and political instability across the bloc.
The PURL was launched in July 2025 after US President Donald Trump refused to give Kiev a blank check, and now also includes several non-NATO contributors, with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand among them.
According to a US government oversight report released this week, 27 NATO allies and partners pledged around $6.8 billion to the scheme by the end of September, with $4.9 billion already transferred to the US Treasury.
Poland has been among Ukraine’s staunchest supporters since the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022. However, relations between the two neighboring countries have soured in recent months over Ukraine’s glorification of Nazi collaborators.
The dispute centers on the official honoring of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its militant wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which massacred Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia during World War II.
Warsaw regards the killing of an estimated 100,000 Poles in the regions – which are now largely part of modern-day Ukraine – as genocide.
The UPA and OUN collaborated with Nazi Germany during the 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, in May, Zelensky granted an elite Ukrainian special operations unit the honorary title ‘Heroes of the UPA’. The move prompted Polish President Karol Nawrocki to strip Zelensky of the Order of the White Eagle, Poland’s highest state decoration.
Russia has long accused the Ukrainian leadership, which came to power following the 2014 Western-backed Maidan coup, of glorifying Nazi collaborators and promoting Nazi ideology.
Russia has also criticized Western governments for turning a blind eye to the honoring of WWII-era Ukrainian nationalist militants while continuing to support Ukraine. It has also argued that Western weapons deliveries only serve to prolong the conflict without changing the outcome, while increasing the risk of a direct military confrontation between NATO and Russia.
Coup d’état in Poland
By René Zittlau | Forum Geopolitica | November 5, 2026
The European elites can no longer find responses to the consequences of their policies that are legitimate under the rule of law. The result is a breach of the law—and even a coup, as recently occurred in Poland.
Introduction
Europe is sinking ever deeper into political, economic, and social processes that, until just a few years ago, were perceived in Western Europe as “normal” aspects of life in countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In recent weeks, for example, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany—and this list is by no means exhaustive—have witnessed acts of arson and looting whose brutality came as a shock to many citizens. Political elites were quick to look everywhere for the causes, but not within their own way of conducting politics, which is completely detached from the will of the people. The blame was placed on everyone else: migrants, clans, random troublemakers, radical leftists, radical rightists, and—not to be forgotten—Russia. …
Of course, this kind of search for causes does not stand up to an honest assessment of the situation. Europe has been in a massive crisis for years, one that has now engulfed all areas of life.
Wrong political decisions led to political crises. These were inevitably followed by an economic collapse unprecedented since 1945. The blame lay—and still lies—with, who would have thought, Putin. It was he who guided Chancellor Scholz’s hand in shutting down Nord Stream. Not to mention other “hybrid” attacks on the peace-loving NATO and EU West.
The Shift from Quantity to a New Quality
The constant denial of well-known causes of crises inevitably exacerbates them. Poland has now reached a new, previously unknown level of crisis. However, the events surrounding the Polish Constitutional Court cannot be viewed in isolation, as Poland plays a central role in the plans of the EU leadership. These events are part of a dramatic escalation of the EU-wide political crisis and have reached a new level in Warsaw.
Occasionally, the Western media refers to a “coup d’état,” as here or here. The quotation marks are intended to underscore the impossibility of such a development rather than to be taken as a direct quote. A critical, objective examination of the events in Poland, however, would at the very least have to compare the events to the definition of a coup d’état—something that is consistently omitted.
“A putsch or coup d’état (often from the French coup d’état [ˌkudeˈta]) is an illegal, usually violent, and surprise action carried out by members of the military or paramilitary organizations and/or a group of politicians with the aim of seizing or retaining power in the state.” – Wikipedia.
Was that the case in Poland? Why would anyone do that? Who would have an interest in it?
Let’s recap. On October 30, 2026, Polish Constitutional Court Justice Anna Korwin-Piętowska ordered Constitutional Court President Bogdan Święczkowski to immediately suspend his official duties for one month. She issued the same order for Vice President Bartłomiej Sochański and declared herself the new head of the court. In other words, the subordinate declared her superiors removed from office.
As far as is known, she did so on the instructions of Prime Minister Donald Tusk.
However, a Polish prime minister has no authority whatsoever to intervene in this manner. Tusk’s actions were therefore unlawful—or, as described in the definition above, “illegal.”
To enforce his directive and support Anna Korwin-Piętowska, Prime Minister Tusk deployed the police against the Constitutional Court. He thus used his power to deploy armed forces against a constitutional body. His actions therefore met another criterion of the definition: “… mostly violent and surprise actions by members of the military or paramilitary organizations…”.
Did Donald Tusk also have the “… goal of seizing power in the state or retaining it for himself”?
All the events described took place during a long-planned trip abroad by Polish President Karol Nawrocki to Senegal. Furthermore, the operation took place on the eve of an important national holiday, All Saints’ Day. Tusk knew that at that time, a great many people—especially those from Warsaw—would be on their way to visit their families. The timing of the operation thus appears to have been well-planned. When Nawrocki was informed of the events in Warsaw during his outbound flight, he immediately returned to Poland. Upon arrival, he went directly to the Constitutional Court, where he forcefully gained access—pushing past police barricades and even confronting Constitutional Court justices loyal to Tusk. What we’re talking about here is an attempt to deny the president of a country access to the very institution that embodies the constitution. These scenes speak volumes about the individuals and their backers who caused this national crisis.
A Look Back
In 2023, parliamentary elections were held in Poland. The current Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, had until then been one of the most prominent and influential EU politicians and, in his actions, an extremely loyal follower of EU President von der Leyen. In 2023, one could not help but get the impression that Tusk had not been sent to Poland by the EU leadership to become Poland’s prime minister, but rather, above all else, to advance the interests of the EU. In his election campaign, he focused on the following priorities: ending the power of the “Law and Justice” (PiS) party, restoring the rule of law, and normalizing relations with the EU in accordance with the EU’s wishes. The latter involved, in particular, rolling back the PiS government’s judicial reforms. This referred, among other things, to the manner in which judges were appointed to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, as well as the replacement of those judges who did not conform to EU expectations. It should be noted that while the judicial reform implemented by the PiS government was not to everyone’s liking, it had been carried out in accordance with Polish law.
The results of the 2023 elections were as follows:
Party/Alliance – Share of the vote Seats – Comparison with the Last Election
- Law and Justice (PiS) 35,38 % – 194 – Minus 41 Seats
- Citizens’ Coalition (KO) 30,70 % – 157 – Plus 23 Seats
- The Third Way (Trzecia Droga) – 14,40 % – 65 – New to Parliament
- New Left (Lewica) – 8,61 % – 26 – Minus 23 Seats
- Confederation (Konfederacja) – 7,16 % – 18 – Plus 4 Seats
Voter turnout, at 74.4 percent, was the highest since 1990.
Tusk remains the leader of the “Civic Coalition” to this day and, in 2023, formed a coalition government together with the “Third Way” and the “New Left.” However, all his efforts to reverse the judicial reform were thwarted by then-President Andrzej Duda. Duda either sent the bills—drafted by Tusk for this purpose—back for review or refused to sign them.
The new Prime Minister Tusk thus pinned his hopes on a victory by Rafał Trzaskowski in the 2025 presidential election. However, Trzaskowski, deputy chairman of Tusk’s “Civic Coalition” party, suffered a surprising and very narrow defeat at the hands of the current president, Karol Nawrocki, who is closely aligned with the PiS.
Kandidat – Political Party Support – Share of the vote
- Karol Nawrocki – Supported by the “Law and Justice” (PiS) party – 50,89 %
- Rafał Trzaskowski – Supported by the ruling “Citizens’ Coalition” (KO) – 49,11 %
The European Dimension of the Scandal
As previously mentioned, Tusk was a highly influential politician in Brussels until 2023. Given the EU’s aggressive policy toward Russia and the role assigned to Poland in that context, the ongoing uncertainty surrounding the Polish Constitutional Court has a significant European dimension. After all, a court inclined to make its own decisions independently, without EU influence, is certainly capable of producing surprises.
It is therefore entirely conceivable that the script for this Polish drama was not written exclusively in Warsaw. This is because the judicial reforms demanded of Poland by the EU are by no means welcomed everywhere in Poland. The PiS certainly has its own vision for Poland, independent of the EU.
Bartłomiej Sochański, the vice president of the Constitutional Tribunal—who is unpopular with the EU—served as the reporting judge in the landmark ruling of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal on October 7, 2021 (Case No. K 3/21). In this ruling, the Court held that certain interpretations of the EU Treaty by the European Court of Justice were incompatible with the Polish Constitution.
In his oral explanation, Sochański essentially argued that the Polish Constitution ranks above the EU Treaties in the national hierarchy of norms. EU law takes precedence over ordinary Polish laws only to the extent that Poland has expressly transferred corresponding powers to the EU. EU institutions may not act outside the scope of the powers transferred, and the European Court of Justice cannot override the Polish Constitution through its case law.
Conclusion
The consequences of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s actions are significant. A country that was already politically divided even before this crisis has been pushed even deeper into crisis. The country’s three most important constitutional institutions—the government, parliament, and the president—view one another with deep mistrust.
The head of government attempted to strip the president of his powers in constitutional matters. As in many other countries, however, the Polish president has a decisive vote on constitutional issues.
In the wake of Tusk’s failed attempt to reshuffle the Constitutional Tribunal, parts of Parliament are calling for the prime minister’s resignation and early elections. A forced resignation by Tusk would come at an inopportune time for EU leadership. After all, a victory by the EU-critical PiS would be anything but impossible. The PiS under Jarosław Kaczyński would likely bring Poland closer to the U.S. than to the EU. But what would the EU’s policy toward Russia look like if Poland were to align itself more closely with the U.S. than with Europe? Implementing an aggressive EU policy toward the East is inconceivable without Poland, neither economically nor militarily. And politically, a Poland led by the PiS would be a disaster for Ukraine. Party leader Kaczyński stated clearly that Ukraine “cannot join the EU with the baggage of Banderaism” and announced that he would “do everything to prevent this” if Ukraine does not stop glorifying the perpetrators of the Volhynia massacre. The PiS has already submitted a corresponding draft parliamentary resolution calling on the government to block Ukraine’s EU integration process.
I repeat the question I posed above:
Did Donald Tusk also have the “… goal of seizing power in the state or retaining it for himself”?
In court, criminal liability is assessed based on the following four questions:
Did the defendant have a motive for the crime? Did he have the opportunity to commit the crime? Did he have the means to do so? And finally: Did he have the intent to commit the crime?
Poland Is the Symptom and Europe Is the Patient
By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | November 1, 2026
The midnight brawl at Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal is not a Polish problem. It is the local flare-up of a continental disease. Across Europe, when voters pick the wrong candidate, the establishment reaches for a judge, an intelligence service or the EU’s checkbook, and calls the result “defending democracy.” The Journal of Democracy wrote the textbook. Warsaw is the teaching hospital.
The article
In December 2023, two months after Donald Tusk’s coalition pushed Law and Justice (PiS) out of power, Jarosław Kuisz and Karolina Wigura of Kultura Liberalna published a how-to guide in the Journal of Democracy. The title says it all: “How to Dismantle an Illiberal Democracy.”
Consider the provenance. At the time, the Journal was the flagship publication of the National Endowment for Democracy, the outfit that does in daylight what the CIA used to do at night. It split from NED this year after DOGE cut off NED’s funding in 2025, and it is now independent and partnered with Stanford’s CDDRL. In 2023, though, this was the democracy-promotion establishment telling Warsaw how to clean house.
The argument, stripped of its footnotes:
- Poland needs a “second wave” of transitional justice to deal with PiS “violations of the rule of law.”
- Avoid vague treason charges. Prosecute specific acts: the 2015 Constitutional Tribunal appointments, the 2020 attempt at an all-mail presidential election and the 2023 visa-for-cash scandal.
- Jarosław Kaczyński bears responsibility but will be hard to convict.
- Parliamentary investigative committees are the main tool.
- Expect resistance from the PiS-aligned presidency, Supreme Court and State Tribunal.
- Stabilize the system without breaking it.
The authors close with a disclaimer worth framing: “There is no clear roadmap… One should therefore not expect miracles.”
The critique
The defenders of democracy have written a manual for dismantling one. They don’t see the irony, and that is the most instructive thing about the essay.
Start with the word “illiberal.” It is not a legal category. It is a label handed out by people with conference budgets to governments they dislike. PiS won the 2015 and 2019 parliamentary elections outright. Yet the article treats its officials less like a defeated party and more like the communist nomenklatura of 1989, in need of a “transitional justice” process.
In fairness to Kuisz and Wigura, they are more careful than their cause. They warn against show trials and vague charges, and they admit nobody knows how to do this. But manuals are not read for their caveats. Politicians skip the footnotes and go straight to the chapter on tools.
Here is the core contradiction. PiS stands accused of capturing the courts, ignoring rulings and stacking institutions with loyalists. The cure prescribed is to purge the courts, ignore rulings and install the right loyalists. The sin becomes a sacrament when the right people commit it.
Poland, three years later: the manual in action
This week the manual left the library and went to the streets of Warsaw, escorted by riot police.
Since 2023, Tusk’s government has refused to recognize the Constitutional Tribunal and has ignored its rulings. Starting in March, parliament elected eight new judges. President Karol Nawrocki refused to swear in five of them. They held their own oath ceremony and mailed the oaths to the presidential palace, which is a new one even by Central European standards.
Then came October 30. According to Notes from Poland and ProtoThema :
- Judge Anna Korwin-Piotrowska suspended Chief Justice Bogdan Święczkowski and declared herself acting head of the Tribunal.
- Justice Minister Waldemar Żurek moved to strip Święczkowski’s immunity.
- Riot police blocked Święczkowski from entering his own court. His supporters cut through the fence with power tools.
- Nawrocki turned his plane around on the way to Senegal and, around 1 a.m., pushed his way past judges into the building. Each side accuses the other of physical aggression. Protesters outside called it a coup.
Tusk’s response, per Euronews : “In certain matters there can be no compromise.” He also warned about Russian bots, because no European crisis is complete without them.
Not everyone in the coalition is cheering. Szymon Hołownia said Poland should be ashamed and that forcing a fix only deepens the decline. Hołownia and the PSL are now attending Nawrocki’s talks. When your own partners start taking meetings with the other side, the roadmap has a pothole.
Kuisz and Wigura told us not to expect miracles. This isn’t a miracle. It’s a mirror.
The disease, not the symptom
Poland is just the case where the patient is thrashing hardest. Look at the rest of the ward and the same pathology shows up everywhere: elections treated as advisory, with the final say reserved for institutions nobody voted for.
- Romania. On December 6, 2024, the Constitutional Court annulled the first round of a presidential election after Călin Georgescu, an outsider polling in single digits, came in first. The grounds were declassified intelligence about “aggressive hybrid Russian attacks” and alleged illegal campaign financing. In March 2025 the electoral commission barred Georgescu from the rerun, while he was “the favourite in all the polls,” and the court unanimously agreed. That is one way to fix an election: hold it again without the winner.
- France. In March 2025 a Paris court convicted Marine Le Pen of embezzling EU parliamentary funds and banned her from office for five years, effective immediately. The frontrunner for 2027 was gone with one gavel. In July the appeals court upheld the conviction but cut the ban to 45 months, 30 of them suspended, so she can run after all. The judges giveth, and the judges taketh away. Either way, the judges decide.
- Germany. In May 2025, the BfV, Germany’s domestic intelligence service, branded the AfD a “confirmed right-wing extremist” party. The AfD polls at 24 to 26 percent. In February a Cologne court suspended the label, ruling the conditions for it “are not met.” Lawmakers are still pushing to have the Constitutional Court ban the party outright. Banning the party a quarter of your voters support is certainly one way to win an argument. In my old business, we called a spy agency monitoring the main opposition party something else.
- Brussels’ checkbook. The European Commission froze about €137 billion for Poland under PiS. On February 29, 2024, eleven weeks after Tusk took office, it released the money. One of its own officials conceded, “That does not mean the rule of law is fully restored and everything is fine,” and the reform plan was “still a draft ambition.” The rule of law, it turns out, is measured by who sits in the prime minister’s office. Hungary got the same treatment. Its new prime minister, Péter Magyar, promised to go to Brussels “to have EU funding released.” Message received in Budapest.
Put the cases side by side and the illness has a clear set of symptoms. Courts annul or narrow the choices on the ballot. Intelligence services rate which parties are fit to compete. Brussels pays for good behavior, defined as the right government. All of it is done in the name of protecting democracy from the people who vote in it.
That is why the Kuisz and Wigura essay matters beyond Poland. It isn’t a Polish policy paper. It is a clinical protocol for treating a voter who votes wrong, written for a continent whose elites have concluded the electorate can’t be trusted with the keys. Tusk is just the first surgeon to try it without anesthesia.
What this means for NATO
An alliance is only as strong as the governments that have to say yes. Right now several of NATO’s key European members are too busy fighting their own voters, courts and presidents to launch any foreign venture. In some cases they couldn’t if they tried.
Start with Poland, the country Washington holds up as NATO’s model member and the frontline state on Belarus and Ukraine. Under Poland’s constitution the president is the supreme commander of the armed forces. Poland’s president and its prime minister are currently accusing each other of a coup. Ask yourself who gives the order to deploy in that situation. Then ask whether a Polish soldier knows whose order to follow. A country with two constitutional courts and a commander-in-chief shoving past judges at 1 a.m. is not preparing to project power. It is trying to hold itself together.
The rest of the ward is no healthier:
- Germany is debating whether to ban the opposition party that a quarter of its voters support, and that party wants nothing to do with a war against Russia. Any German government that sends troops east hands the AfD its next election.
- France faces a 2027 presidential race in which Le Pen, whose party has long been skeptical of NATO’s integrated command, is back on the ballot. No French president facing that race will gamble on a foreign adventure.
- Romania, home of NATO’s base at Mihail Kogălniceanu on the Black Sea, is still governed under the shadow of an election its own court cancelled. Its political class has a legitimacy problem it cannot afford to aggravate with a war.
NATO runs on consensus. Every one of these governments is now weighing a foreign deployment against a domestic electorate it has spent years managing rather than persuading. When the elite’s grip at home depends on courts, intelligence services and Brussels’ money, asking voters to send their sons east is the one request it can’t risk. Sooner or later, the bill for treating the voter as the enemy comes due.
The irony is hard to miss. The project was sold as protecting democracy from the barbarians at the gate. What it has produced is an alliance whose members cannot agree with their own voters, let alone with each other. Moscow didn’t have to lift a finger. Europe’s “defenders of democracy” are doing the job for it.
The Globalists refuse to go away
Strip away the vocabulary of “rule of law” and “transitional justice” and you find a project aimed at Polish nationalism itself. PiS’s real offense was not packing a court. Plenty of governments pack courts. Its offense was putting Polish sovereignty, Catholic identity and the nation-state ahead of Brussels.
The record is consistent. Poland refused the EU’s 2015 migrant relocation quotas, and in April 2020 the European Court of Justice ruled that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had broken EU law by refusing. That July, the Commission denied twinning grants to six Polish towns over their “LGBT ideology-free” resolutions. Then came the €137 billion freeze. The message from Brussels never varied: national identity is welcome as folklore, not as policy.
To the globalist wing of the Western establishment, meaning NED, Brussels and the foundations and think tanks that orbit them, nationalism is a disease to be treated, not a view to be debated. A nation that insists on deciding what it believes, whom it admits and how it runs its own courts is “illiberal” by definition. Kuisz and Wigura simply gave that attitude a legal procedure.
Now look east, because the same people take the same attitude toward Russia, with fewer manners. NED has funded Russian civil-society groups for decades, which is why Moscow made it the first “undesirable organization” under its 2015 law. In June 2022, the U.S. Helsinki Commission held a briefing titled “Decolonizing Russia: A Moral and Strategic Imperative.” The title says the rest. Russian nationalism, like Polish nationalism, is treated not as a fact to be dealt with but as a pathology to be cured, by sanctions, regime change or, if the seminar circuit gets its way, partition.
Here is the irony I find most delicious. Washington and Brussels spent years cheering Polish nationalism when it was pointed at Moscow. Poland’s hostility to Russia was the alliance’s favorite asset. Point the same nationalism at Brussels and it suddenly becomes a threat to democracy requiring riot police. Polish patriotism, it turns out, is a weapon to be aimed, not a conviction to be respected. Poles should notice that the people eager to dismantle Russia’s sense of nationhood are the same people dismantling theirs.
That is my assessment, not the article’s. Kuisz and Wigura frame everything as restoring the rule of law, and insist that the PiS started this. Its 2015 Tribunal appointments were a power grab, and in its 2021 Xero Flor ruling the European Court of Human Rights found that a bench including an improperly appointed judge violated the right to a fair trial.
Nawrocki’s refusal to swear in the new judges is hardball too. Both camps have real legal arguments. That is exactly why riot police at midnight are the wrong way to settle it.
Even if you set motive aside entirely, judge the project by its adverse effects: a country with two rival constitutional courts and a president shoving past judges in the dark.
On NATO, a caveat. Domestic turmoil makes an offensive or expeditionary venture far less likely, but it does not mean these countries would refuse to defend their own territory. Both camps in Warsaw back heavy defense spending, and a direct attack on a member tends to unite even the most divided parliament. My argument is about appetite for adventure, not the willingness to fight at the border.
None of these caveats changes the central point. The fight in Warsaw isn’t really about judges. It is about whether a European nation may still define itself, or whether that right now belongs to Brussels, NED and the people who write manuals on dismantling democracies. Moscow got that answer years ago. Warsaw is getting it now.
Lithuania plans universal conscription
RT | October 29, 2026
Lithuania will introduce universal male conscription despite public resistance to compulsory military service, the country’s government has announced.
The Baltic state reinstated selective conscription in 2015, seven years after abolishing it. Under the new plan, the draft would be extended to all eligible men, while women would continue to serve voluntarily.
Annual recruitment will increase from just over 5,000 to around 7,500 men, President Gitanas Nauseda announced on Thursday following a State Defense Council meeting.
Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevicius described universal conscription as “necessary and inevitable.”
The decision follows similar recruitment pushes elsewhere in Europe. Poland is considering restoring compulsory service, which was abolished in 2009, and introducing a system covering both men and women. A recent poll, however, found that 53% of Poles aged 18–24 opposed reinstatement of the draft.
Germany has already introduced mandatory military registration for 18-year-old men. Enlistment remains voluntary, but parliament can activate compulsory service if recruitment falls short or the security situation deteriorates.
Berlin’s recruitment drive has met resistance, with some 45,000 people joining student protests across roughly 100 German cities and towns in September, with some carrying banners reading “We won’t fight in your wars” and “Russia is not our enemy.”
Applications for conscientious objector status reached over 12,000 between January and August, compared with 3,879 throughout 2025, according to figures reported by German media.
European officials have nevertheless continued discussing preparations for a possible war with Russia by the end of the decade. Estonian Defense Minister Martin Herem “joked” last month that if Estonia mobilized and Russia did not attack, it would be “economically more correct to attack ourselves” rather than keep troops waiting.
Moscow has repeatedly stated that it has neither reason nor intention to attack NATO countries, describing such allegations as “horror stories” intended to prepare European populations for further militarization.
Russian officials have warned that Europe’s military buildup could itself lead to confrontation and that expanding NATO infrastructure near Russia’s borders would prompt additional security measures. Moscow has stressed that it is prepared to defend itself if attacked.
Ukraine’s EU neighbors reject new plea from Kiev – Politico
RT | October 5, 2026
Poland and Romania have refused to help Kiev move millions of tons of grain – which got stuck in Ukraine following Vladimir Zelensky’s war on exports – into the EU, Politico reports, citing officials in Warsaw and Bucharest. Zelensky’s 40-day campaign resulted in Russia implementing a de facto blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, with the wider consequences of the strikes estimated at 1.5% of the country’s collapsing GDP.
Last week, Ukrainian Agriculture Minister Taras Vysotsky appealed to the EU for a €1.1 billion ($1.23 billion) allocation to improve transit capacity, which would help free large quantities of grain – Ukraine’s key source of income – trapped in the country.
The request came after Zelensky’s 40-day PR ‘pressure campaign’ on Russia, which involved long-range strikes on oil refineries and civilian infrastructure. The effort backfired, as Russia ramped up strikes on Ukraine’s military-related logistics, including the key hub of Odessa, accounting for an overwhelming majority of Kiev’s agricultural exports.
Speaking to Politico, Vysotsky described the situation as “very, very critical,” after his ministry reported the export of 2.4 million tons of agricultural products in September, just 46% of what Kiev considers the required volume.
He added that export restrictions leave Ukrainian farmers without cash needed to plant seeds now for next year’s harvest. “If the situation stays like this till spring, it could mean the decrease of even 35-40% of the planted area,” he warned.
Last month, Ukrainian officials estimated damage to infrastructure from Russian strikes at nearly $10 billion, with wider consequences amounting to around 1.5% of GDP.
While the EU as a whole is yet to give a definitive answer to the €1.1 billion request, Poland and Romania – which are crucial to facilitating Ukraine’s exports – ruled out any significant assistance.
Romanian Agriculture Minister Barna Tanczos rejected the prospect of substantially expanding capacity, telling Politico that “the interest for our own farmers remains a priority.”
Ukrainian cargo and low Danube water levels are already straining Romanian ports, he said, adding: “Everybody knows we cannot double the number of trains, we cannot double the roads, railways and port capacity. It is what it is.”
The Polish Infrastructure Ministry spokesperson said, as cited by Politico, that Poland “has no plans to introduce any changes aimed at increasing the transit of Ukrainian agricultural products.”
Before the €1.1 billion plea, Ukraine requested €220 million from the EU in grants to support farmers affected by disrupted exports, but the bloc effectively turned it down, pointing instead to existing EU mechanisms.
Agricultural trade has long been a source of friction between Ukraine and its EU neighbors. After the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, Brussels suspended duties and quotas on Ukrainian exports, which triggered massive protests from European farmers over what they saw as unfair competition. As a result, the EU introduced an ‘emergency brake’ system in 2024, allowing tariff quotas to return for sensitive products if imports exceed set thresholds.
In addition, many of Ukraine’s neighbors, including Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, maintain significant restrictions on Ukrainian imports at the national level.
‘Russophobia a national sport’ – Polish party rallies against push to war
RT | September 7, 2026
Polish protesters have accused Warsaw of whipping up anti-Russian hostility and dragging the country toward war as the government continues to arm Ukraine and deepen confrontation with Moscow.
Supporters of the Confederation of the Polish Crown party marched through Gniezno on Sunday behind a banner reading “Poland for Peace,” carrying Polish and party flags.
“They’re trying to turn Russophobia into our national sport. But we won’t give in,” activist Marta Czech told the crowd, urging “prudence” as tensions with Russia continue to rise.
Another speaker, Lukasz Pakulski, accused the authorities of frightening Poles with talk of tanks, nuclear weapons, and a wider conflict. “They are pushing us into war,” he said, declaring that “Poles stand for peace.”
The Crown is a traditionalist, Euroskeptic party founded by MEP Grzegorz Braun. It campaigns for tighter immigration controls, less power for Brussels, and Poland’s withdrawal from the EU, while opposing deeper Polish involvement in the Ukraine conflict.
The protest comes as Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s government has continued to support Kiev, arguing that Ukraine’s security is inseparable from Poland’s own. Warsaw has provided around $6.8 billion in aid to Kiev since 2022, including more than $5 billion in military assistance. Poland also hosts around 961,000 Ukrainians under temporary protection.
However, public enthusiasm for the policy has been fading, with a July poll finding that 52% of Poles opposed accepting more Ukrainian refugees, while another survey showed 67% backed deporting unemployed Ukrainian men of military age.
Another survey found 27% believed Western aid to Ukraine was too large, compared with 22% who wanted more, while opposition to Ukrainian EU membership reached a record 40%.
Relations between Warsaw and Kiev have also recently deteriorated over historical grievances after Vladimir Zelensky named a military unit after the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which Poland holds responsible for massacring up to 100,000 ethnic Poles during World War II.
President Karol Nawrocki later stripped Zelensky of Poland’s highest state honor, while other politicians have called for an end to free weapons deliveries to Kiev.
Moscow has consistently accused Warsaw of deliberately stoking anti-Russian sentiment while supporting Kiev’s war effort.
Russian officials have also highlighted the Kiev-Warsaw UPA dispute, arguing that even one of Ukraine’s strongest backers can no longer ignore Kiev’s embrace of neo-Nazi ideology and glorification of figures linked to wartime atrocities.
Pfizer Freezes Air Traffic Control Funds Over COVID Vaccine Contract Dispute With Poland, Romania
By Michael Nevradakis, Ph.D. | The Defender | July 30, 2026
A vaccine contract dispute between Pfizer and the European Union (EU) has resulted in Pfizer freezing billions of dollars in funds earmarked for air traffic control in Poland and Romania.
Eurocontrol, an intergovernmental organization that coordinates air traffic control management across Europe, notified Poland and Romania’s air traffic control agencies earlier this month that it was freezing the funds after Pfizer enforced an April court ruling in Brussels.
The April 1 ruling requires Poland and Romania to pay Pfizer about $1.5 billion and $640 million, respectively, plus interest and fees, for additional vaccine doses, per a 2021 contract signed between the European Commission — the EU’s executive branch — and Pfizer.
Poland and Romania refused further COVID-19 vaccine deliveries in 2022, citing falling demand for the shots, according to Bloomberg. Poland also cited financial pressures it was facing after taking in refugees fleeing the conflict in Ukraine.
Brussels Signal reported Poland sold or donated some of its surplus vaccine doses. According to Romanian political scientist Dragos Moldovean, “Romania was among the European countries with the lowest COVID-19 vaccination rates.”
These actions led Pfizer to sue the countries in 2023, resulting in the April 1 ruling.
In a statement provided to The Defender, the Warsaw Enterprise Institute (WEI) said that the case, which is still ongoing pending the two countries’ appeal, is being heard in Belgium because the EU’s contract is governed by Belgian law.
Polish and Romanian authorities have said they will appeal the ruling. Polish public broadcaster TVP World reported that Poland sought a delay in the enforcement of the April 1 ruling pending its appeal, but that the Belgian court rejected this request.
Dutch attorney Meike Terhorst, who is not involved in the lawsuit, called Pfizer’s actions “outrageous and unethical,” arguing that “it could potentially endanger the safety of flights to or from Poland and/or Romania” by depriving those countries’ air traffic control authorities of funding required for their operations.
Łukasz Wojdyga, director of the WEI’s Center for Strategic Studies, took a different view. He said that while Pfizer is exercising its rights under the law, which allow it to freeze the disputed funds even despite the expected appeals, the focus should be on the flaws in the EU’s contract. He said:
“Even if this form of enforcement is allowed under Belgian law, targeting the main source of funding for an institution responsible for air-traffic safety strikes me as disproportionate and irresponsible.
“At the same time, a creditor has the right to enforce a court judgment and protect the interests of its shareholders through any lawful means.
“For that reason, the main focus should not be on blaming Pfizer for pursuing its claim. It should be on how the contract was negotiated, approved, and signed in the first place.”
Some legal and policy experts who spoke with The Defender suggested that Pfizer had other options available to it rather than immediately freezing the two countries’ funds held in Belgium. Other experts suggest that the EU’s contract with Pfizer is, itself, invalid, as it was signed through a dubious and potentially illegal process.
EU hasn’t revealed Pfizer CEO text messages, despite ruling
The EU-Pfizer contract has long faced scrutiny. For Wojdyga, the central question isn’t whether Pfizer is entitled to collect what it is owed. It’s how European and national authorities allowed such a “large, expensive and one-sided agreement to be signed, leaving taxpayers to carry most of the risk.”
According to Brussels Signal, the 35 billion euro ($40 billion) contract between the EU and Pfizer “was one of the largest in EU procurement history.” It was signed amid “claims that the EU may have paid up to fifteen times the production cost per dose, raising concerns that billions in taxpayer funds were overpaid.”
There are also questions about how European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen negotiated the contract with Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla, and about potential conflicts of interest between the two parties.
Last year, the European Court of Justice ruled that the European Commission violated EU law by denying The New York Times’ request to review text messages related to the contract between von der Leyen and Bourla.
The European Commission claimed it didn’t have the text messages. But according to the ruling, the commission did not provide “plausible explanations” to justify “the non-existence or non-possession” of the documents. The commission previously claimed the texts didn’t qualify as documents, according to Politico.
In 2024, the European Court of Justice ruled that the commission’s decision to heavily redact key portions of COVID-19 vaccine contracts with pharmaceutical companies during the pandemic violated transparency rules.
In 2023, the European Parliament blocked an attempt to cross-examine von der Leyen regarding the text messages. The previous year, Bourla refused to testify before the European Parliament about the contract terms.
According to Brussels Signal, “scrutiny has been directed at potential conflicts of interest involving von der Leyen’s family,” as her husband Heiko “is the medical director at Orgenesisi, a biotech company that received EU funds and partnered with Pfizer.”
According to activist Frederic Baldan, CEO of CEBiz:
“Ursula von der Leyen, without any mandate, bypassed the committees and negotiated directly with Albert Bourla via Signal messages programmed to self-destruct. She thus circumvented the anti-corruption safeguards of her own Commission. The price increased in an inexplicable manner and the quantities ordered became insane.”
Wojdyga noted that the commission did not appeal the 2025 ruling in time, “making the ruling final.” Yet, the text messages still haven’t been released. Gheorghe Piperea, a member of the European Parliament, said that “the content of those messages remains secret to this day.”
Documents leaked in 2022 showed that U.S. and EU officials pressured European drug regulators to rush approval of Pfizer-BioNTech’s COVID-19 vaccine despite safety concerns.
According to Romanian political scientist Dragos Moldoveanu, questions remain over how the parties determined the number of doses each country would receive under the contract.
“Romania ordered 120 million doses of the vaccine, based on a ‘strategy adopted at the EU level,’ even though Romania’s population is less than 20 million people,” Moldoveanu said.
For Piperea, the EU-Pfizer contract “ought never to have existed” in the first place, because the EU took on powers it doesn’t have under the treaties of the European Union.
“The Commission violated the principle of subsidiarity that governs the shared competences of the Commission and the member states. Health policy falls within the competence of the member states, not of the Commission. The member states may be supported in these health policies, but they may not be supplanted by the Commission,” Piperea said.
This also means that if Pfizer believed the contract terms were violated, it should have sought damages from the EU, not from individual states like Romania and Poland.
However, suing the EU would have revealed “that the exceedingly narrow circle of persons who conducted the negotiations — von der Leyen … together with two or three anonymous directors from the European Medicines Agency — possessed neither the competence nor the mandate to bind the member states to payments,” Piperea said.
Wojdyga said all 27 EU governments were represented on the steering board, while the joint negotiating team with Pfizer “included the Commission and seven member states, including Poland.”
The member states were responsible for placing orders, making payments and accepting delivery under the terms of the deal.
However, “the decision-making process matters,” Wojdyga said. “Once the terms of an agreement were presented, a member state had only five working days to opt out,” after which its acceptance was considered legally binding.
He added:
“So, governments technically had a choice. In reality, they had only a few days to assess complex, multiyear financial commitments in the middle of a pandemic, under intense political pressure and amid fears of vaccine shortages. That put national governments under considerable time pressure and limited their ability to carry out a full legal, financial, and public health review.”
Baldan, who initiated a 2023 criminal case against Pfizer challenging the contract, said that in closed session, lawyers for Hungary and Poland confirmed they had “never given any negotiating mandate to von der Leyen” and that the vaccine orders were placed at the EU level and were “inexplicable” to them.
Baldan said the case resulted in a 1,000-page report by the Belgian Federal Police’s anti-corruption unit, finding that “there are sufficient elements to establish the offenses.”
However, the Belgian police handed over the investigation to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which moved to have it annulled.
“This is what allowed Pfizer to resume its civil proceedings and obtain judgments against the member states that refused to pay,” Baldan said.
Has Pfizer endangered air traffic and public safety in Poland and Romania?
Questions remain over whether Pfizer’s freezing of Poland and Romania’s air traffic control funds held by Eurocontrol will put air travel and public safety in question.
According to TVP World, the frozen funds “are critical” because they make up more than 80% of the revenue of the country’s air traffic control agency, Polish Air Navigation Services Agency (PANSA, or PAZP).
Without the funds, the agency “could quickly lose financial liquidity, making it impossible to pay hundreds of air traffic controllers, whose work is essential for every passenger aircraft taking off, landing or safely flying through Polish airspace,” Brussels Signal reported.
PANSA could also lose the ability to maintain critical infrastructure, including radar installations and communication systems. “For ordinary citizens, this could mean cancelled flights and even the closure of Poland’s airspace,” Brussels Signal reported.
Romania Insider reported that the frozen funds equate to 0.2% of its GDP, posing “a significant burden at a time when the government is attempting to reduce the fiscal deficit.”
Piperea said the April ruling “arrived at a most inopportune moment in Romania, in the midst of recession and a major budgetary deficit.”
“Pfizer places the public in danger by leaving without funds the air-traffic control agency ROMATSA, and the state budget, which is already insufficient and cannot meet pensions, allowances, indemnities for persons with disabilities, and the like.”
Wojdyga said Pfizer’s actions are legal — but raise questions.
“I would not automatically equate the freezing of funds owed to Poland’s and Romania’s air navigation agencies with an immediate threat to passenger safety. Both agencies are still operating, and both governments have said they will protect their financial stability and keep services running. Pfizer also has the right to enforce its claims through lawful means.
“That said, targeting the main source of funding for agencies responsible for air traffic safety is bound to raise concerns, especially since neither agency was a party to the vaccine contract.”
“Pfizer is unlikely to close Poland’s airspace. By targeting PAZP’s revenue, however, it has shown how a poorly designed public contract can create problems far beyond the original subject of the agreement,” the WEI wrote.
This article was originally published by The Defender — Children’s Health Defense’s News & Views Website under Creative Commons license CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Please consider subscribing to The Defender or donating to Children’s Health Defense.
US Eyes Spreading its Nuclear Footprint Deeper into Europe – Report
Sputnik – 02.06.2026
The US is weighing whether to expand NATO’s nuclear-sharing framework by inviting more alliance members to host American dual-capable aircraft—warplanes configured to deliver nukes, reports the Financial Times.
At present, the arrangement includes Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkiye and the UK.
Under its terms, the US retains full custody of the nuclear warheads, which are stored at select European bases, while allied air forces train for nuclear deterrence missions using aircraft such as the F-35, F-15, and Tornado.
The discussions are reportedly driven in part by a need to reassure European allies of Washington’s enduring commitment to NATO’s nuclear deterrent—even as the US scales back some conventional troop deployments on the continent and pushes allies to shoulder more defense responsibility.
The talks remain at an early, highly confidential stage, with no imminent decisions anticipated.
Nevertheless, nations on NATO’s eastern flank—notably Poland and several of Russia’s neighbors—have already signaled interest in a possible expansion of the nuclear-sharing deal.
Russia has repeatedly cautioned that any deployment of nuclear-capable assets close to its borders would be seen as a destabilizing factor, and a direct threat to its national security.
France’s New Nuclear Strategy to Weaken Security in Europe – Russian Foreign Ministry
Sputnik – 20.04.2026
The security of non-nuclear European countries will ultimately be weakened by France’s plans to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko said in an interview with Sputnik.
“As a result, instead of the French declaring a strengthening of the defense of their allies, to whom, incidentally, they are not promising any ironclad guarantees, the security of these countries is actually weakening,” Grushko said.
France reportedly possesses 280 nuclear warheads. Denmark has already concluded a strategic nuclear deterrence agreement with France, which is intended to complement NATO’s deterrence mechanisms. Poland is also negotiating with France to join this initiative.
In his March speech on France’s nuclear deterrence policy, French President Emmanuel Macron said that his country must strengthen its nuclear doctrine in the face of new threats. Therefore, he ordered an increase in the number of French nuclear weapons. According to Macron, France should also consider expanding its nuclear strategy to all of Europe, but must also preserve its sovereignty.
Europe’s Drone Pipeline to Ukraine Could Soon be in Russia’s Crosshairs – Analyst
Sputnik – 16.04.2026
The Russian Defense Ministry’s statement on Europe’s plan to scale up drone production for Ukraine contained an explicit warning, says military analyst Ivan Konovalov speaking to Sputnik : Europe is turning into a “strategic rear base.”
The term applies to infrastructure that, while located outside the battlefield, directly sustains combat operations.
Under this logic, European hubs supplying Ukraine with drone components, data systems, FPV drones and heavy fixed-wing UAVs are no longer a “civilian facility in a peaceful country.”
“Once the production cycle on their territory is integrated into Ukraine’s strike capabilities against Russia, the line is crossed – they become a target deep within the enemy’s operational structure,” remarks the analyst.
After Russia’s strikes dismantled Ukraine’s centralized drone production, a workaround emerged: assembly lines were set up in Bavaria and the UK, using foreign-made components, while the finished systems were marketed as “Ukrainian.”
However, European production creates a long, predictable supply chain via Poland or Romania, exposed to disruption, insurance risks, and logistical bottlenecks, says the pundit.
Large shipments are visible to reconnaissance and potentially easier to disrupt at critical junctions, he argues.
For the European economy, it will entail growing risks for cargo insurance, airspace restrictions in border regions, and potentially forced relocation of production into underground or highly dispersed facilities.
“All this is fraught with massive non-productive costs for EU taxpayers, while Russia has long adapted to counter such challenges.”
Poland rules out sending Patriot missiles to US/Israel amid war on Iran
Al Mayadeen | March 31, 2026
Poland will not provide the United States with its Patriot missile defense systems, Polish National Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz said on Tuesday, rejecting a reported US request to transfer the batteries to the Middle East.
Earlier in the day, the Rzeczpospolita newspaper reported that the United States was demanding that Poland transfer one of its two Patriot batteries to the region, where the US-Israeli war on Iran has now entered its fifth week.
“Our Patriot batteries and their missiles are being used to protect Polish airspace and NATO’s eastern flank. In this regard, nothing has changed, and we do not plan to relocate them anywhere,” Kosiniak-Kamysz wrote on X.
Security first, Poland says
The United States understands the Polish position, the defense minister claimed. “Our allies know and understand how important missions we have here are. Poland’s security is our absolute priority.”
Kosiniak-Kamysz’s position was confirmed by Polish Deputy Defense Minister Cezary Tomczyk.
“Polish Patriots remain in Poland. They have their own tasks in the country: the protection of Poland and the eastern flank of NATO,” Tomczyk wrote on X.
A pattern of allied reluctance
Poland’s refusal is not an isolated incident. Since the US-Israeli war on Iran began on February 28, Washington has struggled to rally its NATO allies behind the campaign. Several member states have reportedly refused to send naval forces to the region or allow the US to use their military bases as launch points for strikes against Iran.
President Trump has openly criticized NATO allies over their stance. In a post on Truth Social, he accused them of being “cowards” and warned that “without the United States, NATO is just a paper tiger.” He claimed NATO countries were unwilling to assist in reopening the Strait of Hormuz, describing it as a “simple military maneuver,” while complaining about rising oil prices.
Trump’s frustration reflects a broader reality: the US-Israeli war on Iran has found little support among Washington’s traditional allies. Switzerland, citing its policy of neutrality, said it will not approve weapons export licenses to the US for the duration of the conflict. France reportedly gave a “no” to joining a US-led coalition to patrol the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has warned the UK that allowing the US to use its military bases constitutes “participation in aggression.”
Poland’s decision to keep its Patriots at home, then, is one data point in a larger trend. As the war enters its fifth week with no clear end in sight, the US is finding itself increasingly isolated, unable to secure the backing of its closest allies for a conflict Washington initiated and continues to escalate alone.

