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How Iran’s two-week retaliatory strikes exposed cracks in US military architecture in Persian Gulf

By Mohammad Molaei | Press TV | October 18, 2026

The two-week exchange of fire between the United States and Iran, triggered by Washington’s attempt to force open an illegal southern corridor through the Strait of Hormuz, represented the most consequential direct military confrontation between them since the 40-day war.

The Iranian response to the unprovoked and illegal American aggression was not a chaotic escalation but a methodical, layered military campaign that drew on years of doctrinal development, weapons investment, and operational planning.

The efforts of the Islamic Republic’s armed forces, spearheaded by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) aerospace and naval branches, executed a decisive and swift response.

What unfolded was a layered operation with nine distinct but interlocking lines of effort. Each line reinforced the others. Infrastructure degradation reduced American operational tempo; area denial forced repositioning that compounded the effects of that degradation; extended-range precision strikes demonstrated that repositioning offered no sanctuary; ISR attrition blinded American targeting systems; terrorist suppression closed the land flank, while strikes on utility infrastructure imposed costs on host nations and denied services to American bases.

One can employ the open-source reporting, satellite imagery, and the observable pattern of strikes to examine each dimension of Iran’s military response in detail, and construct a coherent operational picture. It is getting exceedingly clear that the ceasefire period has very likely translated to a window for reconstitution and preparation in Iranian strategic calculus.

The primacy of solid-fuel tactical ballistic missiles

Iran’s decision to anchor its retaliatory campaign in solid-fuel tactical ballistic missiles was not accidental. It reflected a decade-long investment in a specific capability designed precisely for this kind of confrontation. Solid-fuel ballistic missiles offer decisive operational advantages over their liquid-fuel predecessors. They require no fueling time at the launch site, dramatically compressing the window between a launch order and missile departure.

This matters enormously in a sensitive environment where adversary assets, particularly MQ-9 Reaper drones and maritime patrol aircraft, are actively hunting for launch preparations.

A liquid-fuel missile requires a visible, time-consuming fueling sequence that creates a detectable signature. A solid-fuel missile can be transported, erected, and fired in a fraction of that time, often before a targeting solution can be developed and a strike authorized.

These missiles are road-mobile, launched from transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) that can disperse across Iran’s mountainous terrain, making pre-emptive targeting extremely difficult.

Having destroyed much of the air defense systems belonging to the US and its Arab allies using the older, less sophisticated liquid fuel missiles in previous wars, Iran’s strikes this time primarily relied on its tactical solid-fuel ballistic missile inventory, meaning the various variants of the Fateh family.

Simply put, the choice of solid-fuel systems reflected a calculated assessment of the adversary’s weakened interception capacity, an assessment that proved accurate.

The air defense inventory crisis

Perhaps the single most consequential factor shaping the operational environment was the state of US and allied air defense missile inventories.

The United States entered this round of military aggression with critically depleted stocks of its most capable interceptors. The Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), which arm Aegis-equipped destroyers and cruisers and provide the American Navy’s primary ballistic missile defense capability at sea, have been drawn down through a combination of expenditure in the Red Sea campaign against Yemen, the costly defense of Israel during two previous wars, and the simple reality that production rates have never kept pace with consumption.

The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which provides upper-tier defense against medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, is similarly constrained.

The decision not to employ Aegis and THAAD at full capacity was therefore a forced one. The United States simply could not spend its remaining meager inventory of SM-3 and THAAD interceptors against Iranian tactical ballistic missiles, which, while accurate and damaging, are not the only threats to American interests.

Doing so would have left the United States strategically exposed against another serious contingency in East Asia or Europe. The calculus was that American military bases had to absorb more hits to preserve the interceptors.

Moreover, the Patriot system, which bore the brunt of terminal-phase defense in recent weeks across the region, was in no better condition. Years of expenditure across Ukraine, the occupied territories, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea mission have drawn PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE stocks to extremely low levels.

The Pentagon’s response was telling. Rather than accelerating full-capability PAC-3 MSE production, it has chosen to pursue the cheaper, less capable PAC-3ACE Cost Reduction Initiative variant. More revealing still were the recent PAC-2 GEM-T orders, an older interceptor not procured by the US in decades, signaling just how severely stocks had been exhausted.

That the world’s most sophisticated air defense enterprise was compelled to resurrect a 1990s-era design to sustain basic readiness is the starkest indicator of the American munitions crisis that Iranian planners appear to have understood, measured, and exploited with precision.

The situation among Persian Gulf states was equally dire. Saudi Arabia and the UAE had expended substantial portions of their Patriot PAC-3 interceptor stocks during years of Yemeni military missile and drone attacks, and entered the 40-day imposed war with depleted inventories. The situation is even direr in Kuwait and Bahrain, with the Persian Gulf microstates effectively running out of Patriots, being forced to solely rely on American-operated systems.

PAC-3, the most capable variant of the Patriot system against ballistic missiles, has effectively been exhausted in several batteries. PAC-2, the older and less capable variant, is the only available option in certain areas against Iranian missiles, and even that missile is running low as well. The collective air defense architecture of the Persian Gulf states, which had appeared formidable on paper, has been effectively hollowed out.

Iranian operational planners were aware of these facts. The sequencing and volume of Iranian missile salvos during the exchange reflected a deliberate attempt to exploit the gap between what the defense could theoretically intercept and what it could actually intercept given real-world inventory constraints.

Iran’s multi-layered operational strategy

What distinguished Iran’s response from a simple missile barrage was its architectural coherence. Iranian planners did not merely fire missiles at American targets; they executed a phased, multi-domain retaliatory campaign with distinct operational objectives at each stage, each phase creating the conditions for the next.

The campaign can be understood as having five interlocking lines of effort: infrastructure degradation, area denial and operational displacement, precision strike at extended range, ISR and logistics attrition, and proxy terrorist force suppression.

Together, they constituted a campaign design far more sophisticated than most Western analysts had publicly credited Iran with possessing.

The overarching logic was one of progressive operational constriction. Rather than attempting to destroy US forces – an objective beyond Iran’s reach given American conventional superiority – the campaign aimed to degrade, displace, and exhaust them.

Each successful strike reduced American operational capacity; forced repositioning that consumed time and resources, and demonstrated to regional partners that proximity to American occupation forces carried real costs.

Infrastructure degradation

The first phase of the Iranian retaliatory campaign targeted the physical infrastructure of American military power in the Persian Gulf region. This was not indiscriminate bombardment. Satellite imagery and post-strike assessments revealed a pattern of targeting that prioritized specific high-value nodes: radar installations, fuel and ammunition storage facilities, maintenance hangars, and communications infrastructure.

Radar systems were a particular priority. The ability to detect, track, and target Iranian missiles and UAVs depends on a layered network of radar systems. By striking radar installations at air bases, Iran degraded the situational awareness that underpins both offensive operations and defensive intercepts. A radar that is destroyed or forced offline creates a coverage gap that cascades through the entire air defense architecture.

Before-and-after imagery of an AN/FPS-117 early warning radar installation at Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base, Kuwait, showing structural damage

Logistics infrastructure was targeted with equal deliberateness. Fuel depots, ammunition storage sites, and maintenance facilities at American bases around the Persian Gulf were struck with sufficient accuracy to cause meaningful operational disruption.

An air force that cannot fuel its aircraft, rearm them, or repair battle damage cannot sustain sortie rates. The targeting of logistics was a direct attack on the tempo of American air operations to derail the American aggression against Iranian sites and reduce the pressure on Iranian forces.

The accuracy of these strikes, achieved at ranges of several hundred kilometers, validated the operational utility of Iran’s solid-fuel ballistic missile force and demonstrated that the IRGC aerospace force had developed the targeting data, launch procedures, and quality control necessary to achieve consistent results against fixed infrastructure.

The anti-access/area denial campaign

The most strategically significant dimension of the Iranian retaliatory campaign was its systematic execution of an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy that progressively pushed American air operations out of the Persian Gulf and into increasingly distant and operationally constrained locations.

The logic of A2/AD in this context was straightforward. The closer American aircraft operate to Iran, the shorter their flight times, the larger their payloads, the less refueling they require, and the more sorties they can generate per day.

Conversely, every additional hundred kilometers of distance imposes compounding costs: greater tanker support, longer mission times, reduced payload, increased crew fatigue, and more complex coordination. By rendering the Persian Gulf operationally untenable for American air assets, Iran systematically degraded the offensive capacity of the aggressors.

The first displacement was from the Persian Gulf itself. Sustained missile and drone attacks against air bases made sustained operations from those locations unfeasible. The American response was to shift primary air operations to bases in Jordan – Al-Azraq and Muwaffaq Salti –which offered greater distance from Iranian missile systems.

Iran’s response was to extend its reach to Jordan. Multiple strikes against American bases, documented by US casualties and satellite imagery showing damaged hangars and destroyed aircraft, demonstrated that Iran had the capability to contest operations from that distance.

The retaliatory strikes destroyed American aircraft, damaged infrastructure, and forced the US war machine to reconsider the viability of Jordan as a primary operating location.

The second displacement was to the occupied territories. American air assets, including tanker aircraft critical to sustaining long-range strike operations, were pushed further west to Israeli military bases.

This displacement carried its own operational costs. The distance from Iranian targets increased further, and the concentration of American assets in the occupied territories created its own targeting opportunities for Iran, which has demonstrated both the willingness and capability to strike at extended ranges.

A particularly telling indicator of this displacement dynamic was the repositioning of the RQ-4 Global Hawk strategic reconnaissance aircraft, which had been operating from Al Dhafra in the UAE and from Jordanian facilities, to Sigonella Naval Air Station in Sicily.

The Global Hawk, with its long endurance and high-altitude sensors, is a critical ISR asset for tracking Iranian missile launches and providing targeting data. Its displacement to Sicily represented a dramatic reduction in persistent surveillance coverage over Iran and the Persian Gulf, with direct consequences for the effectiveness of American strike operations.

A qualitative leap in extended-range precision

One of the most significant revelations of the recent round of US aggression and Iran’s retaliation was the demonstrated accuracy of Iranian ballistic missiles at ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers. Previous assessments of Iranian ballistic missile accuracy had generally been skeptical about the ability to achieve consistent precision at such distances. The strikes on Jordanian targets, located well over 1,000 kilometers from Iranian launch sites, completely shattered that skepticism.

The circular error probable (CEP) – the radius within which 50 percent of strikes fall – observed in the Jordanian strikes was dramatically smaller than what Iranian missiles had previously demonstrated at comparable ranges. Strikes that hit specific buildings, specific aircraft shelters, and specific sections of structures, rather than simply landing somewhere on a base, indicated a qualitative improvement in guidance accuracy that demands explanation.

Several hypotheses present themselves, and the evidence suggests that the answer likely involves a combination of all of them. First are technical improvements. Iran may have upgraded the terminal guidance systems on its Kheibarshekan, Haj Qasem, and Fattah variants, potentially incorporating improved inertial navigation, satnav receivers, or optical terminal seekers that allow the missile to better correct its trajectory in the final phase of flight.

Second are tactical improvements. Iranian launch crews may have refined their pre-launch survey procedures, improving the accuracy of the initial position fix that the missile’s inertial navigation system uses as its reference point. Third are software improvements, which mean updates to the missile’s flight control algorithms could improve trajectory optimization and reduce the accumulated errors that degrade accuracy over long distances.

The most likely explanation is a combination of all three – a systematic program of improvement across the technical, procedural, and software dimensions of missile accuracy that had been underway for years and was now being demonstrated operationally for the first time at this range, following the experiences of the 40-day war.

The MQ-9 hunt

The MQ-9 Reaper drone occupied a central and uniquely vulnerable position in American military offensives against Iran. The Reaper is not merely a strike platform but the primary persistent ISR asset used to locate and track mobile Iranian missile launchers, particularly after the heavy attrition of similar Israeli military systems.

Without the MQ-9’s ability to loiter for extended periods, the capacity to find and destroy TELs before they fire, or to conduct battle damage assessment after strikes, is dramatically reduced.

Iran understood this dependency and targeted it systematically during this campaign. The campaign against MQ-9 assets operated on multiple levels. Ground-based air defense systems, which had previously demonstrated the ability to engage high-altitude targets, were used to engage Reapers operating over Iranian territory and adjacent areas.

But Iran also struck the ground infrastructure that supports MQ-9 operations: the maintenance facilities, fuel systems, satellite communication ground stations, and launch-and-recovery equipment that allow the aircraft to operate.

Western media reporting confirmed the destruction of a number of MQ-9 aircraft on the ground at Jordanian bases and, in a particularly striking detail, the destruction of some aircraft while still in their transport canisters before assembly.

This achievement indicates that Iran has developed targeting intelligence on the logistics chain supporting drone operations, not merely the operational bases themselves. Destroying aircraft before they are assembled and made operational is a force multiplication achievement. It eliminates capability before it can be employed, at a point when the aircraft is most vulnerable and least defended.

The cumulative effect of the MQ-9 campaign was a significant degradation of American persistent ISR coverage over Iran. This directly reduced the effectiveness of the hunt for mobile missile launchers, allowing Iranian TELs greater freedom of movement and survivability.

Suppressing proxy terrorist forces in Iraq

From the first day of the exchange, Iran conducted daily retaliatory strikes against armed terrorist groups in Iraq that had the capability and potential motivation to conduct land attacks against Iranian territory or to serve as a forward platform for American-directed operations.

This campaign was methodical and comprehensive, targeting personnel concentrations, weapons storage facilities, and command infrastructure.

Iran’s western flank, which includes the border with Iraq, represents a potential vulnerability. Armed terrorist groups in Iraq, some with historical ties to American intelligence, could in theory conduct cross-border raids, provide intelligence for American strikes, or serve as a distraction that forced Iran to divert defensive resources.

By striking these groups preemptively and continuously, Iran sought to exhaust their operational capacity before it could be brought to bear.

The daily rhythm of these retaliatory strikes was itself a message. It demonstrated that Iran had persistent targeting intelligence on these groups’ locations, that it was willing to expend munitions on this secondary campaign even while conducting the primary campaign against American forces, and that it intended to maintain pressure regardless of any ceasefire negotiations that might be underway.

The logic of reciprocity

Iran’s retaliatory strikes on electrical and water infrastructure in Kuwait represented a deliberate response that operated on two distinct logics simultaneously.

The first was reciprocity: Iran’s own civilian infrastructure had been targeted, and the strikes on Kuwaiti infrastructure were a direct signal that such targeting would not be absorbed without response to the aggressor and its facilitators.

The second was military utility. American forces in the Persian Gulf region depend on host nations’ electrical grids and water supplies for base operations. Infrastructure that serves both civilian and military purposes is, under the laws of armed conflict, a legitimate military target when the military use is substantial and the strike is proportionate.

The targeting of Kuwait’s infrastructure was also a message to Persian Gulf states more broadly. Kuwait, like Bahrain, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, hosts American military facilities and had provided varying degrees of support to American operations.

By demonstrating the ability and willingness to strike Kuwaiti infrastructure, Iran was communicating that the costs of hosting American forces were not abstract. They were concrete, immediate, and would be borne by the host nation as well as the American military.

The pillars of operational success

Iran’s two-week retaliatory campaign against American aggression and attempts to force open an illegal southern corridor through the Strait of Hormuz largely succeeded on every dimension that its operational planners had identified.

The exchange demonstrated that Iran had developed, over decades of institutional study and investment, a military capability genuinely capable of contesting American power projection in the Persian Gulf region, even after two high-intensity wars.

It demonstrated something relevant to the strategic environment of the region – that the costs of American military aggression in the Persian Gulf had increased substantially; that the infrastructure of American power projection was more vulnerable than pre-war assessments had suggested; and that Iran possessed both the capability and the operational sophistication to exploit those vulnerabilities in a systematic and disciplined manner.

October 18, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , | Comments Off on How Iran’s two-week retaliatory strikes exposed cracks in US military architecture in Persian Gulf

Bombs for Tel Aviv, Promises for Riyadh

By Muhammad Hamid ad-Din – New Eastern Outlook – October 15, 2026

The Gaza Ceasefire Is Falling Apart. And So Is the American Plan to Expand the Abraham Accords.

The Gaza Ceasefire That Is Killing Palestinians

The ceasefire in Gaza, which took effect on October 10, 2025, was supposed to stop a two-year war. By then, according to Palestinian authorities, more than 72,000 Palestinians had been killed. A year after the document was signed, the picture was no more peaceful. According to Palestinian sources, from the start of the ceasefire to October 5, 2026, Israeli forces killed 1,460 Palestinians and wounded 5,116. By September 2026, Gaza authorities reported 5,147 violations of the agreement, 1,421 dead, and the destruction of more than 201,000 buildings.

The second phase of negotiations—the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the enclave and the disarmament of Palestinian factions—stalled almost immediately. In April 2026, American-Egyptian talks in Cairo ended “without tangible progress.” Hamas links disarmament to the end of the occupation. Israel demands disarmament as a precondition for any further step. Critics say the demand for disarmament has become a pretext for maintaining control over the enclave and continuing violations. The Palestinian Foreign Ministry put it bluntly: the occupation government “does not view peace as a goal, but as an obstacle.”

Diktat Instead of Diplomacy

Against this backdrop, the Trump administration is forcing the expansion of the Abraham Accords. In May 2026, the U.S. president publicly demanded that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey join the accords. He called it “mandatory”: “After all the work done by the United States to put this complex puzzle together, it must be mandatory for all these countries to at least simultaneously sign the Abraham Accords.” Pakistan publicly refused. The others remained silent.

Washington’s main interest is Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said at the White House in November 2025: “We want to be part of the Abraham Accords. But we also want to be sure that we secure a clear path to a two-state solution.” Later, Riyadh repeated: normalization is impossible without a “credible, irreversible, and time-bound path” to a Palestinian state. The Israeli government rejects this prospect. American pressure goes beyond diplomacy: Trump tied the Abraham Accords to negotiations to end the war with Iran, effectively making normalization a condition for peace. According to Axios, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan were “caught by surprise.”

Mutual Influence: Gaza as Leverage and as an Obstacle

Gaza and the reshaping of alliances are directly connected. The Palestinian question became leverage in Arab states’ bargaining with Washington. For Saudi Arabia, normalization with Israel without movement toward a Palestinian state is politically toxic. Riyadh is using the fragile ceasefire to postpone an unpopular step. Qatar, a key mediator, took an equally tough position. Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesman Majid al-Ansari said: “If the Palestinian question remains unresolved, joining the Abraham Accords is impossible.” According to him, the absence of a peace process for Palestinians means the absence of stability in the region. Doha, which has given refuge to Hamas’s political leadership and plays a central role in the talks, cannot move toward normalization without losing face.

There is also a reverse dependency. The Trump administration, seeking to expand the Abraham Accords, pressured Israel to secure a ceasefire: normalization without a ceasefire would have been impossible. But the second phase depends on whether Washington is willing to pressure Israel, not just Arab capitals.

Bombs Instead of Peace

The result of U.S. and Israeli policy looks increasingly contradictory. Three years of war, more than 74,250 dead Palestinians, and 1,460 killed after the ceasefire was signed are not just a humanitarian catastrophe. They are a verdict on America’s strategy in the Middle East. Trump tried to push through the expansion of the Abraham Accords by linking unrelated issues: normalization with Israel, a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, and ending the war with Iran. In July 2026, he stated directly that a U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear agreement “will depend entirely on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords.” Saudi Arabia responded in May 2026: “There will be no normalization without a clear and final path to the creation of an independent Palestinian state.” As the custodian of the two holy mosques, the kingdom cannot afford to do otherwise. Qatar refused. Pakistan publicly rejected it. Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey remained silent.

Criticism of Washington goes far beyond diplomatic missteps. The U.S. continues to supply Israel with weapons despite ceasefire violations. In September 2026, the Trump administration proposed a $2.8 billion deal to sell Israel 40,000 heavy bombs, including 20,000 MK-84s and 20,000 BLU-117s. Senator Chris Van Hollen vowed to block the transfer: “Trump is sending $2.8 billion worth of bombs, paid for by you, the American taxpayers, to a government led by a wanted war criminal.” Congressman Gregory Meeks, the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, also vetoed it: “The Trump administration has not provided sufficient assurances that these weapons will be used in accordance with American and international law. Therefore, I will not approve this sale.” Amnesty International urged Congress to block the deliveries, saying the U.S. risks becoming complicit in serious violations of international law, including genocide. New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani accused Washington of “complicity with every arms shipment” to Tel Aviv.

What Next: The Results of U.S. and Israeli Policy Against the Arab Region

Washington’s paradox is that it wants to expand the Abraham Accords but continues to support the Israeli occupation, which makes normalization politically impossible for Arab states. The U.S. has blocked UN Security Council ceasefire resolutions for the third time in a row, undermining its role as a “reliable mediator.” Public opinion in the Arab world is sharply opposed to normalization. Polls show that 89% of Moroccans oppose recognizing Israel. Analysts warn that for most of the named states, the political price of signing the accords will be prohibitive. The war in Gaza has strengthened this sentiment, not weakened it.

The main question is whether the ceasefire will hold. If the second phase of negotiations does not start and the death toll continues to rise, expansion of the Abraham Accords will remain an unattainable dream. Saudi Arabia will wait. Qatar will mediate. The UAE will increase oil production. Trump will face a choice: keep pressuring Arab capitals or admit that without a real Palestinian state, the accords will remain a facade. While Washington supplies bombs and Tel Aviv keeps killing, talk of peace looks like a cynical game in which Palestinians are not subjects but a bargaining chip.

Muhammad Hamid ad-Din is a well-known Palestinian journalist.

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October 15, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism | , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Bombs for Tel Aviv, Promises for Riyadh

US Senator Murphy says Pentagon denied him entry to US base in Qatar

Al Mayadeen | October 6, 2026

Democratic US Senator Chris Murphy said Tuesday that the Pentagon had denied him access to a US military base in Qatar and refused to arrange a briefing on the US-Israeli war on Iran during his regional tour.

Speaking to journalists in Riyadh, Murphy accused the department of deliberately obstructing congressional scrutiny of the war and concealing its consequences from the American public.

“This trip confirmed for me that there is an active, unprecedented, unconstitutional effort underway to hide the costs of this war and the implications of this war from Congress and the American people,” he said, as quoted by Reuters.

Murphy urges Republicans to challenge Pentagon secrecy

Murphy called on Republican senators to confront the deliberate obstruction by the Department of War.

“I’ve never encountered anything like this in my time in the Senate and it’s part of a deliberate campaign of obfuscation that my Republican colleagues in Congress should demand an end to,” he said.

The senator said the Pentagon had denied him access to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the largest US military base in the region. The installation has come under repeated Iranian retaliatory strikes since the US-Israeli aggression against Iran began in February.

He also said the department had declined to organize a briefing on the war while he was visiting the region.

Diplomatic meetings proceed despite military restrictions

Murphy contrasted the Pentagon’s conduct with that of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, whom he credited with helping organize the trip and facilitating meetings with diplomats.

His regional discussions included talks with Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, alongside other senior Gulf officials.

Riyadh was the second stop on the senator’s tour, following his visit to Qatar.

October 7, 2026 Posted by | Deception, Wars for Israel | , | Comments Off on US Senator Murphy says Pentagon denied him entry to US base in Qatar

Qatar PM calls for Gulf security framework with Iran, says war must be ‘wake-up call’

MEMO | September 22, 2026

Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, has called for a new regional security framework that brings Gulf states and Iran together, warning that the region cannot go back to how it was before the US-Israeli war on Iran.

“Iran is our neighbour,” Sheikh Al Thani told the Qatar Economic Forum in New York on Sunday. “We have to act together responsibly as a region and to make sure that we are having good relations with Iran.” He said the region could not return to how things were before the war unless Gulf states and Iran agreed a security framework ensuring that none of them posed a threat to the others. “We are hoping this war is a wake-up call for everyone,” he added.

The Qatari premier was speaking on the sidelines of the 81st session of the UN General Assembly. His remarks came hours after reports that Washington was preparing to resume direct attacks on Iran. US President Donald Trump cut short a weekend stay at Camp David without explanation, and the State Department issued a new security alert to all US citizens in the Middle East.

The US and Israel launched strikes on Iran on 28 February, saying they aimed to bring about regime change and target the country’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Iran responded with counter-strikes on Israel, US bases in the region and military and civilian sites in Arab states, many of which host US forces.

A conditional ceasefire was declared on 8 April. In June, the US and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding brokered by Pakistan and Qatar, but its implementation has stalled over disputes about navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

Qatar has paid a heavy price. Its Ras Laffan complex, the world’s largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility, was shut down in the first week of the war after an Iranian attack. The facility has two production trains that are expected to take years to restore. This month Doha extended force majeure on LNG shipments to early November because of the continued blockade of the strait.

Speaking at the same forum, Qatari Energy Minister Saad al-Kaabi dismissed US claims that new pipeline investments could make the Strait of Hormuz irrelevant within two years. “I think this is completely wrong,” he said, adding that Qatar had decided against building pipelines and would rely solely on the strait.

Sheikh Mohammed Al Thani’s remarks echo growing calls across the Gulf for a regional settlement. Earlier on Sunday, Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the UAE president, said the region needed a “new mindset”. He called for any negotiations to end the war to include an “Iranian-Arab” element.

Doha has stepped up its diplomacy with Tehran in recent months. Last month Mohammed Al Thani made his first visit to Iran since the war began, pledging to help ease the hardships facing Iranians. “Qatar does not want the Iranian people to face difficulties while the countries of the region merely watch,” he told Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s Tasnim news agency reported. In August, he also urged his Gulf counterparts to coordinate on implementing the US-Iran memorandum. Qatar’s defence minister has held security talks with his Iranian counterpart.

Read:

Qatari, Iranian defense officials discuss regional security developments

Qatar urges Gulf coordination to implement US-Iran memorandum of understanding

September 22, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Qatar PM calls for Gulf security framework with Iran, says war must be ‘wake-up call’

Pakistan-Iran talks secure LNG shipment to Islamabad through Hormuz

Al Mayadeen | September 21, 2026

Pakistan has negotiated with Iran to secure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz for another liquefied natural gas shipment, offering some respite as the South Asian nation struggles with an energy shortfall.

The tanker, which loaded LNG from Qatar’s Ras Laffan facility in late June, crossed the strait over the weekend and is signaling that it will arrive at Pakistan’s import facility by Tuesday, according to ship-tracking data.

The passage was negotiated between government officials, said people with knowledge of the matter, and would mark the second such Qatari delivery this month. The people asked not to be named as the conversations are not public.

Pakistan relies on relations with Iran to avoid blackouts

While LNG shipments through Hormuz remain heavily disrupted, some vessels have been able to get through. Import-dependent Pakistan, badly hit by the upheaval in the Gulf due to the US war on Iran, has been leveraging its relationship with Tehran to receive several cargoes since Washington launches its war on February.

Pakistan had been considering a tender if the shipment didn’t get through Hormuz. A successful delivery, however, is preferable for the government, eager to avoid buying additional expensive shipments from the spot market, where prices have spiked to the highest level since 2022.

The South Asian nation received nearly all of its LNG from Qatar last year. The emirate is home to the world’s largest LNG export plant, which is still exporting only a very small amount through Hormuz, Energy Minister Saad Sherida Al-Kaabi said at the Qatar Economic Forum in New York Sunday.

QatarEnergy says Hormuz crisis could delay expansion projects

The crisis over the Strait of Hormuz could delay some QatarEnergy expansion projects because critical equipment is unable to reach Qatar, the company’s CEO Saad al-Kaabi said on Sunday.

Al-Kaabi said QatarEnergy was currently producing only a “very minute” volume of liquefied natural gas.

Speaking at the Qatar Economic Forum in New York, al-Kaabi said a few LNG trains under QatarEnergy’s North Field East (NFE) expansion are due to start up in 2027, with the North Field South (NFS) expansion set to begin production in 2028.

This comes as the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz continues to affect Qatar’s economy negatively, in light of the US war on Iran, which prompted Tehran to close the Strait in retaliation.

September 21, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , | Comments Off on Pakistan-Iran talks secure LNG shipment to Islamabad through Hormuz

Iran’s Plan to Shut Down AI in the Persian Gulf

GCC internet will go dark if Trump renews hostilities

By Kurt Nimmo | Another Day in the Empire | September 18, 2026

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait—are heavily invested in AI as part of a strategy to diversify away from petroleum. National AI strategies across GCC countries emphasize investment in research and development, encourage public-private partnerships, and create regulatory frameworks that support innovation. The GCC AI market size increased from USD $6.22 billion in 2025 to USD $7.60 billion in 2026. It is projected to reach USD $23.03 billion by 2034.

In April, Iran’s Tasnim news agency mentioned the submarine cables, landing stations, and data hubs in the Gulf as strategic pressure points in the conflict initiated by the United States and Israel. According to the market research company IMARC Group, subsea internet data cables in the Gulf sit at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and Africa, and damage to these networks risks connectivity losses in one of the world’s most important internet traffic zones.

The economic importance of these cable systems extends far outside internet browsing or streaming services, notes Techstory, “because financial markets, payment systems and cloud computing firms depend on uninterrupted connections between continents every second of the day. Data centers in the Gulf and Asia also depend on those same cables to connect cloud systems serving businesses around the world.” Analysts estimate that networks linked to the GCC support roughly $10 trillion worth of financial transactions daily.

Iran claims the cables are within its territorial waters and fall under its jurisdiction. Tasnim and Fars suggest Iran may charge tech companies to use the internet cables, while Ebrahim Zolfaghari, a Brigadier General and the spokesperson for Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, said that “companies like Google, Microsoft, Meta, and Amazon” will be required to “comply with Iranian law” and pay licensing fees for cable passage, with repair and maintenance rights given exclusively to Iranian firms.

The Islamic Republic cited the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which includes provisions governing submarine cables. Article 79 of UNCLOS says coastal states have the right to establish conditions for cables or pipelines entering their territory or territorial sea.

On September 2, Iran’s Kayhan newspaper urged Iran’s IGRC to disrupt or sever international fiber-optic cables to pressure the United States and its allies. “Is it not our indisputable right, in order to bring these sources of evil to their knees and cut off their lifeline, to prevent internet cables from passing through the depths of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz?” asked Kayhan editor-in-chief Hossein Shariatmadari. “This necessary measure could be carried out by seriously disrupting the cables’ operation or even cutting them.”

Iran has the ability to take out key cable networks, including the Fibre in Gulf submarine cable system, which connects Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. The Falcon Network connects Bahrain, Egypt, India, Iraq, Kuwait, Maldives, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Yemen, while the the Gulf Bridge International links Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and has onward connectivity to India, and Europe.

The Islamic Republic may decide to retaliate for the imposition of crippling sanctions which have negatively affected its economy, causing an increase in inflation and unemployment. Iran’s minimum wage stands at approximately 104 million rials, equivalent to roughly $110 US monthly. Essential commodity prices have risen sharply, with the International Monetary Fund documenting an annual inflation rate of 42.4%, according to October 2025 figures. Most estimates suggest sanctions have cost Iran approximately $60 billion each year by limiting investments in the energy sector. The sanctions have also significantly reduced Iran’s petroleum exports.

In 2023, the Iranian navy unveiled the domestically developed and manufactured Chamrosh-4 VTOL, a remotely operated drone designed for detecting, locating, and destroying both anchored and sleeping naval mines. Furthermore, Iran operates an undersea fleet of roughly 4 to 6 diesel-electric attack submarines well-suited to operate in the shallow waters of the Strait of Hormuz. In short, Iran has the ability to sabotage subsea internet data cables.

On September 17, President Trump, frustrated by the current stalemate in his war, said he faces a major decision over whether to escalate military action against Iran. “I have a big decision to make,” Trump said. “Do I want to go in and eliminate them or not? That’s a big decision. Anything can happen with me.”

Iran has given the United States an ultimatum for a period of three to four weeks, during which the United States must satisfy all Iranian demands. Failure to comply will result in severe escalation within the Strait of Hormuz and the execution of Iran’s planned preemptive military action targeting United States-backed Gulf infrastructure as well as American and Israeli assets, according to a senior Iranian official based in Tehran with direct knowledge of the situation.

The demands include $300 billion in reconstruction funds, a full release of Iran’s frozen assets of up to $120 billion, lifting of the US naval blockade, an end to war on all fronts (including Gaza and Lebanon), lifting of all sanctions on Iranian oil and gas, and acceptance of Iran’s permanent control of the Strait of Hormuz, including up to 7% transit fees.

President Trump is unlikely to accept these conditions, and as previously mentioned, may intensify military operations before the midterm elections. Should Trump choose to escalate, Iran has indicated it will heighten the intensity of its assaults against remaining American military and commercial infrastructure throughout the GCC region and West Asia.

On September 15, Amazon Web Services disclosed that Iranian drone strikes caused substantial damage to the corporation’s data facilities located in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The preceding week, officials from the UAE declared that they were modifying their AI data center initiatives in response to the strikes, thereby underscoring a critical weakness that Iran continues to leverage with considerable facility.

September 18, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Iran’s Plan to Shut Down AI in the Persian Gulf

Qatar Warns of ‘Industrial Catastrophe’ If Strait of Hormuz Remains Closed

By Kyle Anzalone | The Libertarian Institute | September 8, 2026

Qatar is warning that there will be significant global consequences if the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened soon. Iran closed the Strait in response to the war started by the US and Israel. President Donald Trump also imposed a blockade of Iranian ports.

On Monday, Qatar’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Mohammed Al-Ansari, said reopening the Strait of Hormuz remains a priority, warning that the prolonged disruption could lead to an “industrial catastrophe.”

The Strait of Hormuz has become a major issue for Trump. Before the war, the Strait was treated as an international waterway. However, after the US and Israel attacked Iran, Tehran seized control of the Strait.

Since then, Tehran has limited traffic to nations that are not participating in the war against Iran. Additionally, Iran is requiring vessels to use preapproved shipping lanes and pay a “service fee.”

Tehran says any agreement to end the conflict must recognize Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait. Iran is in negotiations with Oman to establish new protocols for ships transiting the waterway. Washington is demanding that Tehran return the Strait to its pre-war status.

The US has attempted to force open the Strait of Hormuz. The US is currently escorting tankers through the waterway in hopes of defending the vessels from Iranian missiles and drones. Over the past week, US warships and tankers were targeted by Iranian missiles and drones.

While US officials have claimed that the amount of oil exiting the Strait is close to prewar levels, monitoring agencies say only a small fraction is getting out of the Persian Gulf.

Trump has attempted to pressure US allies into joining a coalition to reopen the Strait without success. The President has recently turned his focus toward South Korea. He recently scaled back war games with Seoul, in part, because South Korea refused to aid the war against Iran.

On Tuesday, Seoul said it still had not determined if it would provide assistance to the war. “We are closely consulting with the international community, including the US, on ways to make a substantive contribution toward the swift restoration of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and peace and stability in the Middle East,” Defense Ministry spokesperson Chung Bin-na said. “No specific measures have been decided at this point.”

Iran warned South Korea that any involvement in the US war would have “consequences.”

September 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Qatar Warns of ‘Industrial Catastrophe’ If Strait of Hormuz Remains Closed

Eight Arab and Muslim states reject Israeli displacement plans for Gaza

Palestinian Information Center – September 6, 2026

GAZA – Eight Arab and Muslim countries have condemned remarks by far-right Israeli ministers Itamar Ben Gvir and Israel Katz on plans to forcibly displace Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.

The foreign ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Pakistan, Türkiye and Qatar said in a joint statement released on Sunday that such Israeli plans violate international and humanitarian law and pose a direct threat to the Palestinian people’s legitimate and inalienable rights.

The ministers voiced rejection of any Israeli attempt to displace Palestinians from or within the occupied territory, warning against transforming extremist rhetoric on forced displacement into official state policy.

The ministers warned that the displacement of Gazans would destabilize the region and derail global peace efforts, undermining US president Donald Trump’s plan to end the Gaza war, which clearly rejects forced population transfers.

The ministers stressed that Gaza is an integral part of the occupied Palestinian territories, calling for preserving the unity of Gaza, the West Bank and east Jerusalem.

They reiterated their countries’ support for a two-state solution establishing an independent Palestinian state along the June 4, 1967 lines, with east Jerusalem as its capital.

They urged the international community and UN Security Council to oppose Israeli attempts to impose a new demographic or geographic reality in the occupied Palestinian territories.

September 6, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Illegal Occupation | , , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Eight Arab and Muslim states reject Israeli displacement plans for Gaza

Qatar says Hamas honored its ceasefire obligations, calls for action against Israel

Palestinian Information Center – August 4, 2026

DOHA – Qatar’s foreign ministry has urged the international community to press Israel to honor its Gaza ceasefire commitments, affirming that Hamas has met all obligations under the agreed roadmap.

During a news conference held in Doha on Tuesday, spokesman for the foreign ministry Majed al‑Ansari confirmed that Hamas fulfilled its first‑phase commitments of the agreement, including the release of Israeli prisoners.

Ansari accused Israel of shirking its ceasefire obligations by maintaining strikes and restricting food, medical, and shelter aid into Gaza.

Ansari said that 2.4 million Palestinians in Gaza, among them 1.5 million displaced people, endure dire humanitarian conditions as Israel maintains tight restrictions on the entry of food, medicine, and other vital needs.

The spokesman said that Doha urges global actors to press Israel to abide by the ceasefire deal to pave the way for the launch of reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip.

He noted that Israel has not yet announced an official position on the roadmap for the next phase of the agreement, which includes an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the disarmament of Hamas.

August 4, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism | , , , | Comments Off on Qatar says Hamas honored its ceasefire obligations, calls for action against Israel

Fars: US evacuates bases in Qatar and UAE, satellite images show

Al Mayadeen | July 25, 2026

Iranian news agency Fars reported, citing satellite imagery, that the United States has evacuated two military bases in the UAE and Qatar.

According to the agency, US forces evacuated Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE and Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

Fars said satellite images from Sentinel-2, dated July 24, 2026, showed the evacuation of the US military base in the UAE. The agency said five US military aircraft had been stationed at Al Dhafra three days earlier, while the satellite images showed that they had since been evacuated.

US reportedly evacuates Al Dhafra Air Base

Al Dhafra Air Base is located south of Abu Dhabi and hosts the US Air Force’s 380th Air Expeditionary Wing. It is considered a key strategic hub for reconnaissance, aerial refueling, and air defense operations, as well as a major center supporting military operations in the region and providing intelligence coverage across West Asia.

Fars also reported that satellite images showed Washington had fully evacuated Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

Al Udeid Air Base is located west of Doha and is considered the largest US military base in West Asia. It hosts the forward headquarters of US Central Command (CENTCOM) and the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing.

The two bases played a key role in US military operations during the latest US aggression against Iran, which began on February 28 and resumed more than three weeks ago.

Destruction of fighter jets at Azraq base and acknowledgment of casualties

The developments coincided with the release earlier on Sunday of additional satellite images documenting the destruction of a military aircraft hangar inside Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, also known as Azraq Air Base, in Jordan, which hosts US forces.

Earlier today, the IRGC conducted a simultaneous missile and drone strike against the US base in Azraq, Jordan, targeting fighter shelters and a large parking ramp, according to the IRGC’s Public Relations Office.

In a statement, the IRGC reported that the operation was carried out in the early morning hours as part of the 20th wave of Operation Nasr 2. The strike was launched in response to the US aggression the previous night, the statement said.

“With a crushing and simultaneous missile and drone attack on the fighter shelters and a large parking ramp at the American base in Azraq, Jordan,” the IRGC said, “at least two American fighter jets and three American aircraft were completely destroyed while inflicting major damage on a number of others.”

The strikes came shortly after a series of successive attacks launched by Iranian armed forces against US bases in the region, including Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, where the US side acknowledged the deaths of two American soldiers and the loss of another.

Earlier, US network Fox News reported that at least 13 American soldiers had been injured as a result of recent Iranian attacks targeting US bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan.

Damage in Erbil and fires at a Kuwaiti power station

As part of the simultaneous Iranian attacks, footage circulated showing a fire breaking out at a Kuwaiti power station following an Iranian strike.

Additional footage and satellite images also showed the extent of damage inflicted on the US military base in the city of Erbil, the capital of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, after it was targeted by Iranian missile strikes.

In this context, media outlets reported that US officials acknowledged that Iran’s missile capabilities had undergone significant qualitative development, enabling them to effectively bypass US interception and defense systems deployed across the region.

The officials explained that Tehran now possesses advanced missiles capable of traveling at extremely high speeds and maneuvering during the final phase of their trajectory before striking their designated targets.

It is worth noting that Tehran maintains that it harbors no hostility toward the peoples of the region, stressing that its strikes are aimed at US bases in response to repeated US aggression on Iranian territory that has killed and wounded civilians, including women and children.

July 25, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Fars: US evacuates bases in Qatar and UAE, satellite images show

No route around Hormuz: Why West Asia’s pipeline alternatives fall short

The rush to bypass Hormuz leads back to the same problem: Every alternative route remains hostage to war, rival chokepoints, or political disputes.

By Hussein Askary | The Cradle | July 23, 2026

“The only alternative to the Strait of Hormuz is the Strait of Hormuz.”

This blunt assessment, offered by an Iraqi expert in a recent interview, captures the central weakness in the rush to revive old pipeline schemes and promote new ones across West Asia. Since Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz after Israel and the US launched their second war against it in February 2026, the region has been flooded with proposals for alternative oil-export routes.

Washington has encouraged these plans, while several governments have presented dormant or unfinished pipelines as strategic solutions. Yet the closer one looks at geography, markets, costs, capacity, and security, the clearer it becomes that most of these projects cannot substitute for Hormuz.

Even if oil bypasses the strait, it still faces the rival chokepoint of Bab al-Mandab, where the Ansarallah-aligned armed forces have declared a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia and attacked Saudi tankers.

These expensive detours will remain exposed unless security in the Persian Gulf itself improves. Until the war on Iran ends and an inclusive regional security architecture is established, Iranian and Yemeni missiles and drones can reach the pipelines and loading terminals built to evade them.

Asia still runs through Hormuz

The first reason is straightforward. The Strait of Hormuz is the natural outlet of the Gulf energy system. In 2024, oil flows through the strait averaged about 20 million barrels per day (bpd), roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. The International Energy Agency (IEA) describes it as one of the world’s most important oil transit chokepoints.

Most of this oil is not heading west. About 80 percent of the oil moving through Hormuz is destined for Asia, with China, India, Japan, South Korea, and other Asian economies as the principal buyers. The pattern is even clearer for liquefied natural gas (LNG).

The US Energy Information Administration estimated that 83 percent of LNG moving through Hormuz in 2024 went from Persian Gulf exporters to Asian markets, especially China, India, and South Korea.

This market reality matters because many proposed alternatives send oil away from its main customers. Pipelines to the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, or the Levant may appear useful on a map, but they often move Gulf crude farther from Asia rather than closer to it.

Commercially, building multibillion-dollar infrastructure to move oil westward, only to redirect it by sea toward Asian markets, is inefficient. If Hormuz is open, the direct route remains cheaper and faster. If it is closed by war, the underlying problem is not a lack of pipelines but the collapse of regional security.

Old routes, unresolved disputes

The older pipeline options illustrate the point. The Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline once carried Iraqi oil across Syria to the Mediterranean. Built in the early 1950s, it had genuine strategic value in its time but has been largely inactive since it was damaged during the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Washington is now backing efforts to revive the route, with US companies expected to play a role. Yet the project still requires extensive reconstruction and years of work before it can provide meaningful export capacity.

Estimates for a full restoration and expansion to around 700,000 bpd run as high as $8 billion. It cannot answer an immediate crisis in Hormuz, and if regional peace is restored before completion, the commercial case for reviving it weakens sharply.

The Iraq–Turkiye pipeline faces a different but equally serious problem: politics. The route through the Kurdistan region to Turkiye’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan was repeatedly interrupted by disputes among Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Ankara, and international oil companies.

A 2023 arbitration ruling against Turkiye over unauthorized Kurdish exports led to a two-and-a-half-year shutdown. Flows resumed in September 2025, and exports have continued, but the route still depends on fragile agreements over contracts, payments, federal authority, and revenue sharing.

Its limited throughput and political vulnerability prevent it from becoming a structural replacement for a maritime passage that normally carries a vast share of the world’s seaborne oil.

The Iraqi pipeline in Saudi Arabia, known as IPSA, is another example of strategic nostalgia. Built in the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq war, it was designed to move Iraqi crude from the Basra region to the Red Sea.

It stopped operating after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia expropriated it in 2001. Reopening the line would therefore require a Saudi–Iraqi political settlement over ownership and control, as well as a major technical assessment after decades of disuse. In other words, IPSA is not an available alternative; it is a diplomatic and engineering problem dressed up as a solution.

The proposed Basra–Aqaba pipeline is even more controversial. Its advertised purpose is to move Iraqi oil from southern Iraq to Jordan’s Red Sea port of Aqaba, bypassing Hormuz. Yet it has faced intense objections inside Iraq because of its projected cost, uncertain financing, and questionable strategic value.

Since much of Iraq’s crude is sold to Asian customers, sending it westward to Aqaba would add distance and complexity rather than solve the basic market problem. The pipeline would also move Iraqi exports closer to another zone of instability, including the Israeli military sphere and the wider Red Sea security environment.

A bypass route that merely exchanges one security risk for another is no solution. Iraq’s severe fiscal pressures also leave Baghdad poorly placed to finance such an expensive project, while international investors are unlikely to embrace it without strong political and security guarantees.

Bypasses within missile range

The existing Saudi and Emirati bypasses are more credible but still limited. Saudi Arabia’s East–West Pipeline, or Petroline, moves crude from the eastern oil region to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline carries oil from Habshan to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman.

These systems reduce exposure to Hormuz for Saudi Arabia and the UAE and have become important national energy-security assets. But they cannot replace the strait for the region as a whole. They offer little to Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Iran, or most Iraqi exports, and they do not solve the LNG problem, especially Qatar’s dependence on Hormuz.

The IEA estimates that only 3.5 to 5.5 million bpd of spare pipeline capacity is available to bypass the strait. Neither Yanbu nor Fujairah are immune from attack; regional conflict has already shown the vulnerability of ports, tankers, and energy infrastructure.

The crisis pipelines cannot solve

This is why the alternative pipeline debate is misleading. It treats the closure of Hormuz as a logistical puzzle when it is primarily a political and security crisis. If the Persian Gulf remains militarized and unstable, no pipeline network can fully protect exports.

Pipelines cross vulnerable territory, depend on political agreements, and terminate at ports that can also be threatened. If Gulf security improves, however, Hormuz will almost certainly reopen because this serves the interests of producers and Asian consumers alike.

Once that happens, the commercial rationale for many alternative pipelines will fade. Why spend tens of billions of dollars duplicating a natural route with unmatched capacity and direct access to the main buyers?

The more honest conclusion is that alternative pipelines may offer limited resilience for individual states, but they are no strategic replacement for Hormuz. They are costly, slow, politically fragile, geographically inefficient, and in some cases obsolete before construction begins.

The answer to the crisis is a security arrangement that keeps the Persian Gulf open, prevents attacks on shipping, and restores normal trade through the strait.

Under such an arrangement, oil and LNG would continue to flow mainly to Asia by the most direct and economical route. Hormuz will remain indispensable, while the grand pipeline alternatives amount to expensive insurance policies against a crisis that only diplomacy and regional peace can resolve.

July 24, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , , , | Comments Off on No route around Hormuz: Why West Asia’s pipeline alternatives fall short

Iran’s New Onslaught on US Gulf Bases Exposes Devastating Success of Spring Counterstrikes

Sputnik – 17.07.2026

Iran’s March drone and missile attacks disabled numerous critical US radars and forced it to “expend a significant portion of their air and missile defense stockpiles,” military expert and CAST security think tank senior research fellow Yuri Lyamin told Sputnik.

Lyamin pointed out, for example, that “the AN/TPY-2 radar in Jordan destroyed by Iranian strikes in March, was part of the American THAAD missile defense system battery providing cover for American bases in Jordan against medium-range ballistic missiles. The destruction of the radar effectively rendered the THAAD battery inoperable, as it’s used to detect and track targets and guides interceptor missiles to them.”

Fast forward the present, and Iran is freely targeting US barracks, logistics bases and Air Force facilities in Kuwait and Bahrain using Arash heavy drones.

Lack of effective resistance on the US’ part signals that whatever efforts the Pentagon took to restore regional capabilities (like transferring THAAD from South Korea) proved insufficient, Lyamin says.

“Iran is currently primarily targeting various US bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan. The combination varies daily, as the US operates multiple bases [in these countries]. The selection of specific targets depends both on the pre-defined target list at these bases, and on operational intelligence,” Lyamin says.

“Relentless Iranian attacks on US-operated bases in the region generally complicate US operations against Iran that rely on them, and force the US to expend significant forces and resources to protect them. I’d even say that some of the bases nearest to Iran are now causing more problems for the US than they’re worth. For example, Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar was the largest US airbase in the region, but now the US has been forced to evacuate most of its aircraft because it’s too dangerous to keep them there.”

Arash drones have a range up to 2k km, variable warhead weight (up to 260 kg), and versions with advanced optoelectrical and other homing heads “for high-precision target engagement.” They are the Iranian Army’s long-range strike tool – distinct from the IRGC’s Shahed series of UAVs.

July 17, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Comments Off on Iran’s New Onslaught on US Gulf Bases Exposes Devastating Success of Spring Counterstrikes

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