Qatar says Hamas honored its ceasefire obligations, calls for action against Israel
Palestinian Information Center – August 4, 2026
DOHA – Qatar’s foreign ministry has urged the international community to press Israel to honor its Gaza ceasefire commitments, affirming that Hamas has met all obligations under the agreed roadmap.
During a news conference held in Doha on Tuesday, spokesman for the foreign ministry Majed al‑Ansari confirmed that Hamas fulfilled its first‑phase commitments of the agreement, including the release of Israeli prisoners.
Ansari accused Israel of shirking its ceasefire obligations by maintaining strikes and restricting food, medical, and shelter aid into Gaza.
Ansari said that 2.4 million Palestinians in Gaza, among them 1.5 million displaced people, endure dire humanitarian conditions as Israel maintains tight restrictions on the entry of food, medicine, and other vital needs.
The spokesman said that Doha urges global actors to press Israel to abide by the ceasefire deal to pave the way for the launch of reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip.
He noted that Israel has not yet announced an official position on the roadmap for the next phase of the agreement, which includes an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the disarmament of Hamas.
Fars: US evacuates bases in Qatar and UAE, satellite images show
Al Mayadeen | July 25, 2026
Iranian news agency Fars reported, citing satellite imagery, that the United States has evacuated two military bases in the UAE and Qatar.
According to the agency, US forces evacuated Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE and Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.
Fars said satellite images from Sentinel-2, dated July 24, 2026, showed the evacuation of the US military base in the UAE. The agency said five US military aircraft had been stationed at Al Dhafra three days earlier, while the satellite images showed that they had since been evacuated.
US reportedly evacuates Al Dhafra Air Base
Al Dhafra Air Base is located south of Abu Dhabi and hosts the US Air Force’s 380th Air Expeditionary Wing. It is considered a key strategic hub for reconnaissance, aerial refueling, and air defense operations, as well as a major center supporting military operations in the region and providing intelligence coverage across West Asia.
Fars also reported that satellite images showed Washington had fully evacuated Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.
Al Udeid Air Base is located west of Doha and is considered the largest US military base in West Asia. It hosts the forward headquarters of US Central Command (CENTCOM) and the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing.
The two bases played a key role in US military operations during the latest US aggression against Iran, which began on February 28 and resumed more than three weeks ago.
Destruction of fighter jets at Azraq base and acknowledgment of casualties
The developments coincided with the release earlier on Sunday of additional satellite images documenting the destruction of a military aircraft hangar inside Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, also known as Azraq Air Base, in Jordan, which hosts US forces.
Earlier today, the IRGC conducted a simultaneous missile and drone strike against the US base in Azraq, Jordan, targeting fighter shelters and a large parking ramp, according to the IRGC’s Public Relations Office.
In a statement, the IRGC reported that the operation was carried out in the early morning hours as part of the 20th wave of Operation Nasr 2. The strike was launched in response to the US aggression the previous night, the statement said.
“With a crushing and simultaneous missile and drone attack on the fighter shelters and a large parking ramp at the American base in Azraq, Jordan,” the IRGC said, “at least two American fighter jets and three American aircraft were completely destroyed while inflicting major damage on a number of others.”
The strikes came shortly after a series of successive attacks launched by Iranian armed forces against US bases in the region, including Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, where the US side acknowledged the deaths of two American soldiers and the loss of another.
Earlier, US network Fox News reported that at least 13 American soldiers had been injured as a result of recent Iranian attacks targeting US bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan.
Damage in Erbil and fires at a Kuwaiti power station
As part of the simultaneous Iranian attacks, footage circulated showing a fire breaking out at a Kuwaiti power station following an Iranian strike.
Additional footage and satellite images also showed the extent of damage inflicted on the US military base in the city of Erbil, the capital of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, after it was targeted by Iranian missile strikes.
In this context, media outlets reported that US officials acknowledged that Iran’s missile capabilities had undergone significant qualitative development, enabling them to effectively bypass US interception and defense systems deployed across the region.
The officials explained that Tehran now possesses advanced missiles capable of traveling at extremely high speeds and maneuvering during the final phase of their trajectory before striking their designated targets.
It is worth noting that Tehran maintains that it harbors no hostility toward the peoples of the region, stressing that its strikes are aimed at US bases in response to repeated US aggression on Iranian territory that has killed and wounded civilians, including women and children.
No route around Hormuz: Why West Asia’s pipeline alternatives fall short
The rush to bypass Hormuz leads back to the same problem: Every alternative route remains hostage to war, rival chokepoints, or political disputes.
By Hussein Askary | The Cradle | July 23, 2026
“The only alternative to the Strait of Hormuz is the Strait of Hormuz.”
This blunt assessment, offered by an Iraqi expert in a recent interview, captures the central weakness in the rush to revive old pipeline schemes and promote new ones across West Asia. Since Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz after Israel and the US launched their second war against it in February 2026, the region has been flooded with proposals for alternative oil-export routes.
Washington has encouraged these plans, while several governments have presented dormant or unfinished pipelines as strategic solutions. Yet the closer one looks at geography, markets, costs, capacity, and security, the clearer it becomes that most of these projects cannot substitute for Hormuz.
Even if oil bypasses the strait, it still faces the rival chokepoint of Bab al-Mandab, where the Ansarallah-aligned armed forces have declared a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia and attacked Saudi tankers.
These expensive detours will remain exposed unless security in the Persian Gulf itself improves. Until the war on Iran ends and an inclusive regional security architecture is established, Iranian and Yemeni missiles and drones can reach the pipelines and loading terminals built to evade them.
Asia still runs through Hormuz
The first reason is straightforward. The Strait of Hormuz is the natural outlet of the Gulf energy system. In 2024, oil flows through the strait averaged about 20 million barrels per day (bpd), roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. The International Energy Agency (IEA) describes it as one of the world’s most important oil transit chokepoints.
Most of this oil is not heading west. About 80 percent of the oil moving through Hormuz is destined for Asia, with China, India, Japan, South Korea, and other Asian economies as the principal buyers. The pattern is even clearer for liquefied natural gas (LNG).
The US Energy Information Administration estimated that 83 percent of LNG moving through Hormuz in 2024 went from Persian Gulf exporters to Asian markets, especially China, India, and South Korea.
This market reality matters because many proposed alternatives send oil away from its main customers. Pipelines to the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, or the Levant may appear useful on a map, but they often move Gulf crude farther from Asia rather than closer to it.
Commercially, building multibillion-dollar infrastructure to move oil westward, only to redirect it by sea toward Asian markets, is inefficient. If Hormuz is open, the direct route remains cheaper and faster. If it is closed by war, the underlying problem is not a lack of pipelines but the collapse of regional security.
Old routes, unresolved disputes
The older pipeline options illustrate the point. The Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline once carried Iraqi oil across Syria to the Mediterranean. Built in the early 1950s, it had genuine strategic value in its time but has been largely inactive since it was damaged during the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Washington is now backing efforts to revive the route, with US companies expected to play a role. Yet the project still requires extensive reconstruction and years of work before it can provide meaningful export capacity.
Estimates for a full restoration and expansion to around 700,000 bpd run as high as $8 billion. It cannot answer an immediate crisis in Hormuz, and if regional peace is restored before completion, the commercial case for reviving it weakens sharply.
The Iraq–Turkiye pipeline faces a different but equally serious problem: politics. The route through the Kurdistan region to Turkiye’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan was repeatedly interrupted by disputes among Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Ankara, and international oil companies.
A 2023 arbitration ruling against Turkiye over unauthorized Kurdish exports led to a two-and-a-half-year shutdown. Flows resumed in September 2025, and exports have continued, but the route still depends on fragile agreements over contracts, payments, federal authority, and revenue sharing.
Its limited throughput and political vulnerability prevent it from becoming a structural replacement for a maritime passage that normally carries a vast share of the world’s seaborne oil.
The Iraqi pipeline in Saudi Arabia, known as IPSA, is another example of strategic nostalgia. Built in the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq war, it was designed to move Iraqi crude from the Basra region to the Red Sea.
It stopped operating after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia expropriated it in 2001. Reopening the line would therefore require a Saudi–Iraqi political settlement over ownership and control, as well as a major technical assessment after decades of disuse. In other words, IPSA is not an available alternative; it is a diplomatic and engineering problem dressed up as a solution.
The proposed Basra–Aqaba pipeline is even more controversial. Its advertised purpose is to move Iraqi oil from southern Iraq to Jordan’s Red Sea port of Aqaba, bypassing Hormuz. Yet it has faced intense objections inside Iraq because of its projected cost, uncertain financing, and questionable strategic value.
Since much of Iraq’s crude is sold to Asian customers, sending it westward to Aqaba would add distance and complexity rather than solve the basic market problem. The pipeline would also move Iraqi exports closer to another zone of instability, including the Israeli military sphere and the wider Red Sea security environment.
A bypass route that merely exchanges one security risk for another is no solution. Iraq’s severe fiscal pressures also leave Baghdad poorly placed to finance such an expensive project, while international investors are unlikely to embrace it without strong political and security guarantees.
Bypasses within missile range
The existing Saudi and Emirati bypasses are more credible but still limited. Saudi Arabia’s East–West Pipeline, or Petroline, moves crude from the eastern oil region to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline carries oil from Habshan to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman.
These systems reduce exposure to Hormuz for Saudi Arabia and the UAE and have become important national energy-security assets. But they cannot replace the strait for the region as a whole. They offer little to Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Iran, or most Iraqi exports, and they do not solve the LNG problem, especially Qatar’s dependence on Hormuz.
The IEA estimates that only 3.5 to 5.5 million bpd of spare pipeline capacity is available to bypass the strait. Neither Yanbu nor Fujairah are immune from attack; regional conflict has already shown the vulnerability of ports, tankers, and energy infrastructure.
The crisis pipelines cannot solve
This is why the alternative pipeline debate is misleading. It treats the closure of Hormuz as a logistical puzzle when it is primarily a political and security crisis. If the Persian Gulf remains militarized and unstable, no pipeline network can fully protect exports.
Pipelines cross vulnerable territory, depend on political agreements, and terminate at ports that can also be threatened. If Gulf security improves, however, Hormuz will almost certainly reopen because this serves the interests of producers and Asian consumers alike.
Once that happens, the commercial rationale for many alternative pipelines will fade. Why spend tens of billions of dollars duplicating a natural route with unmatched capacity and direct access to the main buyers?
The more honest conclusion is that alternative pipelines may offer limited resilience for individual states, but they are no strategic replacement for Hormuz. They are costly, slow, politically fragile, geographically inefficient, and in some cases obsolete before construction begins.
The answer to the crisis is a security arrangement that keeps the Persian Gulf open, prevents attacks on shipping, and restores normal trade through the strait.
Under such an arrangement, oil and LNG would continue to flow mainly to Asia by the most direct and economical route. Hormuz will remain indispensable, while the grand pipeline alternatives amount to expensive insurance policies against a crisis that only diplomacy and regional peace can resolve.
Iran’s New Onslaught on US Gulf Bases Exposes Devastating Success of Spring Counterstrikes
Sputnik – 17.07.2026
Iran’s March drone and missile attacks disabled numerous critical US radars and forced it to “expend a significant portion of their air and missile defense stockpiles,” military expert and CAST security think tank senior research fellow Yuri Lyamin told Sputnik.
Lyamin pointed out, for example, that “the AN/TPY-2 radar in Jordan destroyed by Iranian strikes in March, was part of the American THAAD missile defense system battery providing cover for American bases in Jordan against medium-range ballistic missiles. The destruction of the radar effectively rendered the THAAD battery inoperable, as it’s used to detect and track targets and guides interceptor missiles to them.”
Fast forward the present, and Iran is freely targeting US barracks, logistics bases and Air Force facilities in Kuwait and Bahrain using Arash heavy drones.
Lack of effective resistance on the US’ part signals that whatever efforts the Pentagon took to restore regional capabilities (like transferring THAAD from South Korea) proved insufficient, Lyamin says.
“Iran is currently primarily targeting various US bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan. The combination varies daily, as the US operates multiple bases [in these countries]. The selection of specific targets depends both on the pre-defined target list at these bases, and on operational intelligence,” Lyamin says.
“Relentless Iranian attacks on US-operated bases in the region generally complicate US operations against Iran that rely on them, and force the US to expend significant forces and resources to protect them. I’d even say that some of the bases nearest to Iran are now causing more problems for the US than they’re worth. For example, Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar was the largest US airbase in the region, but now the US has been forced to evacuate most of its aircraft because it’s too dangerous to keep them there.”
Arash drones have a range up to 2k km, variable warhead weight (up to 260 kg), and versions with advanced optoelectrical and other homing heads “for high-precision target engagement.” They are the Iranian Army’s long-range strike tool – distinct from the IRGC’s Shahed series of UAVs.
Sitting ducks: Why the US security umbrella no longer protects the Gulf?

By Dr Mustafa Fetouri| MEMO | July 16, 2026
In Kuwait alone—less than 150 kilometres across the Gulf from Iran—the United States maintains a major military hub of approximately 13,500 personnel spread across installations such as Camp Arifjan and Ali Al Salem Air Base. To its south, Saudi Arabia hosts roughly 2,700 U.S. troops, centered at Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj. Elsewhere in the Gulf, every state hosts either a US military presence or provides access and defence cooperation under bilateral agreements: Qatar houses more than 10,000 personnel at CENTCOM’s sprawling forward headquarters at Al Udeid; Bahrain hosts around 9,000 personnel at the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet; the UAE accommodates approximately 3,500 personnel at Al Dhafra while providing deep-water naval access at Jebel Ali; and Oman offers strategic port and airfield access under bilateral agreements, despite having no large permanent US troop presence.
Beyond the Gulf monarchies, Washington maintains approximately 2,500 troops in Iraq and around 900 in northeastern Syria under Operation Inherent Resolve. To Iran’s northwest, the US operates from Incirlik Air Base in Türkiye— a NATO logistics and intelligence hub too. Until its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, American forces also maintained a major military presence along Iran’s eastern frontier, supported for two decades by extensive supply routes and intelligence cooperation through Pakistan. Although the US lies nearly 10,000 kilometres from Iran, it has constructed an unparalleled regional military architecture of permanent bases, rotational deployments, naval facilities, pre-positioned equipment, access agreements, and security partnerships that stretches from the Eastern Mediterranean across the Gulf to the western Indian Ocean. Combined with the military capabilities of close allies—including Britain, France, and Türkiye—this network almost literally surrounding Iran from all sides. The common thread underpinning this posture has long been the protection of regional partners, the safeguarding of global energy routes, and the defence of US strategic interests.
Yet, this foundational premise has collapsed under the weight of the US-Israeli war on Iran, which has fundamentally transformed the entire regional security landscape. This “war of choice” has exposed how a security arrangement once marketed as an ironclad insurance policy has devolved into a primary strategic liability.
Rather than serving as an effective deterrent, large and static American military installations now act as strategic liability—drawing Iranian retaliatory strikes while denying host states true autonomy or the promised protective shield.
The Gulf states have discovered, at a heavy price, that they are trapped in an impossible paradox: their sovereign territory serves as a staging ground for military operations they were never consulted about—at least that is what they say publically –instantly transforming their critical infrastructure, oil facilities, and urban centers into high-priority targets. Compounding this vulnerability is the stark geopolitical reality that while Washington may eventually pivot away or withdraw—much as it did from Afghanistan—Iran is a permanent neighbour that is going nowhere.
Beyond the immediate threat of missile strikes, the presence of these US installations directly undermines the core national strategies of the Gulf monarchies. Mega-development projects and economic diversification plans—from Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 to Dubai’s global trade hubs—rely entirely on an image of absolute regional stability, investor confidence, and open maritime transit. By hosting forward US bases, host nations inadvertently tie their economic futures to Washington’s military posture, creating an environment of perpetual crisis. Furthermore, defending these expansive American footprints forces host militaries to consume their own finite air-defense interceptors and defense budgets to guard US assets rather than securing their own national borders.
At the same time, while almost all Gulf States have, at least publicly, refrained from taking direct offensive action against Iran to avoid total escalation, they recognise that they are already viewed as passive participants in the wider conflict.
Maintaining this precarious balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult against rising domestic anti-war sentiment, as public anger over regional devastation steadily erodes the host governments’ domestic credibility.
For Washington, this massive network of forward-deployed bases has produced a profound strategic paradox. What was designed to project uninhibited American power now ties US freedom of action to the political consent of cautious host nations. When host governments impose strict sovereignty restrictions—refusing permission for US forces to launch offensive sorties or intelligence missions against regional adversaries from their soil—the Pentagon finds its multi-billion-dollar installations functionally sidelined during critical military surges. Instead of providing seamless operational flexibility, these fixed, highly vulnerable outposts transform into costly “imperial entrapment” liabilities: requiring thousands of US troops, high-end missile defense batteries, and constant naval escort deployments simply to protect the bases themselves, rather than executing broader strategic objectives or enabling Washington’s long-sought pivot to the Indo-Pacific. With the conflict between the US and Iran reigniting, Trump is demanding that the Gulf states pay once again to protect the Strait of Hormuz—a vital transit route that never closed until the war was started by Trump, not Iran.
This strategic calculus becomes infinitely more complex when factoring in Israel’s role in the regional security outlook. In recent years, certain Gulf states—most notably the UAE—operated under the premise that normalization and closer security alignment with Israel via the Abraham Accords would yield a net security dividend. Yet, this belief was never shared across the Gulf; nations like Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia maintained a far more cautious, sceptical stance toward Tel Aviv. The outbreak of the US-Israeli war on Tehran on February 28 utterly shattered any illusion that an Israeli-linked security architecture could bring regional stability. Instead, it exposed deep internal fault lines among the entire region. Reaching a collective, long-term security understanding with Iran was already a formidable challenge; doing so now, in the wake of a devastating conflict that forced Gulf States into the crossfire, is immensely more complicated. Moving forward, no regional framework can hold if it relies on a anti-Tehran pact anchored in Washington and Tel Aviv while ignoring the permanent reality of Iranian geographic power.
Ultimately, the fallout from the US-Israeli war on Iran exposes a fundamental reality that Washington and its regional allies can no longer ignore: the entire Middle Eastern security architecture must be fundamentally re-evaluated.
The core dilemma facing the region is that no collective security arrangement can ever be viable or effective if it seeks to exclude Iran—an indispensable, geographically permanent power armed with increasingly sophisticated offensive, defensive, and asymmetric capabilities.
Moving forward, any stable regional order must not only account for Tehran’s military leverage, but also accommodate its non-negotiable strategic demands. This includes addressing governance and transit rights over the vital Strait of Hormuz—through which one-fifth of global oil flows—and reaching a durable, pragmatic framework on its nuclear program. Regardless of the final outcome of ongoing US-Iran negotiations, the lesson for the Gulf is clear: true security cannot be built on an external garrison model that marginalizes the region’s principal indigenous power.
OSINT data, Sat images show damage at US bases after Iranian strikes
Al Mayadeen| July 12, 2026
Iran’s retaliatory operation against US military positions across the region has inflicted damage on several strategic facilities, with satellite imagery privately acquired and later published by multiple OSINT accounts on X showing impacts at major US bases in Qatar, Bahrain, and Jordan following a wave of ballistic missile and drone strikes.
The strikes, launched in response to renewed US aggression against Iran and escalating military activity in the region, targeted key nodes of the US military presence, including air bases, naval infrastructure, radar facilities, and drone operations centers.
Iranian missiles penetrate defenses, strike Al Udeid Air Base
Satellite imagery indicates that Iran’s missile and drone strikes reached Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, one of the largest US military installations in West Asia and a central hub for American air operations.
According to the account, Egypt’s Intel Observer (@EGYOSINT), enhanced Sentinel-2 imagery shows damage to a hangar inside the base, with impact marks visible on the upper rear section of the structure. Additional ground disturbances and suspected burn scars were also identified across multiple areas of the facility.
Further imagery analysis revealed additional strike locations near US military accommodation buildings and other sections of the base, suggesting that the Iranian barrage reached multiple points within the installation.
The reported impacts highlight the ability of Iranian long-range strike systems to penetrate heavily protected military zones and reach critical US infrastructure despite the presence of advanced air defense systems in the region.
US Navy’s Bahrain headquarters struck
Iranian projectiles also reportedly struck a facility inside the US Navy’s 5th Fleet headquarters at Naval Support Activity Bahrain.
Satellite imagery identified damage to a warehouse located within the naval complex, marking a direct hit against a key command and logistics hub responsible for supporting US maritime operations throughout the Gulf.
The strike came amid heightened tensions surrounding naval movements in the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran has repeatedly warned against actions it views as threatening regional security.
MQ-9 drones in Jordan’s Prince Hassan Air Base targeted
Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that its forces struck Jordan’s Prince Hassan Air Base with multiple ballistic missiles, targeting command-and-control infrastructure and facilities used to house US MQ-9 Reaper drones.
Satellite imagery from the base showed significant damage, including a destroyed hangar and widespread disturbances across the aircraft apron, where military assets are typically stored and maintained.
Imagery analysts also identified signs of burning and continued activity at the site following the strike, raising questions over the status of assets stationed at the facility.
The base has been associated with US unmanned aerial operations, including the deployment of advanced surveillance platforms, making it a key target in Iran’s strike campaign.
Possible MQ-4C destroyed in Jordan
A costly mystery is unfolding at Jordan’s Prince Hassan Air Base. After Iran targeted the base, analysts noticed that the facility is home to the US-made MQ-4C Triton, a $240 million high-altitude surveillance drone that had reportedly been moved there from Al Dhafra Air Base due to its proximity to Iran.
According to an OSINT X account, MenchOsint (@MenchOsint), the IRGC said it struck MQ-9 drone hangars, but satellite imagery later appeared to show damage to a drone facility, with smoke still visible after the strike. While there is no confirmation yet, speculation is growing that a rare MQ-4C Triton may have been destroyed, which would represent a significant loss.
For now, the fate of the Triton remains unconfirmed, but the strike has raised questions about whether Iran managed to hit one of the US military’s most advanced surveillance assets.
Volkswagen’s planned defence deal with Israel blocked by Qatari investors
MEMO | July 10, 2026
Volkswagen’s plans for a defence partnership with Israel’s Rafael have been vetoed by the German automaker’s Qatari investors, media reported Friday, Anadolu reports.
Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund, Volkswagen’s third-largest shareholder, rejected management’s proposal to manufacture missile components and military vehicles at the company’s Osnabruck plant, the Bild newspaper reported.
The move comes after Volkswagen CEO Oliver Blume said in March that the company will stop manufacturing Volkswagen Group vehicles at Osnabruck starting in 2027 and confirmed talks with several defence firms about shifting the plant for military vehicles production. Blume provided no further details at the time.
The proposal has sparked significant controversy within Germany. Volkswagen employees, peace activists and opposition politicians have criticised the plan, arguing the automaker should focus exclusively on civilian production. The Osnabruck Peace Initiative (OFRI) has organised multiple protests in recent months urging Volkswagen to abandon any defence contracts.
Germany’s opposition Left Party called Volkswagen’s planned cooperation with Israel’s state-owned Rafael Advanced Defence Systems “unacceptable,” citing the Netanyahu government’s ongoing military campaigns across the Middle East, accusing it of war crimes and genocide against Palestinians in Gaza.
Türkiye sells S-400 systems to undisclosed Gulf state
Al Mayadeen | July 10, 2026
Türkiye has sold its S-400 air defense systems to an unnamed Gulf country, with the announcement expected to be made on Friday.
Turkish newspaper, Hürriyet journalist Abdulkadir Selvi reported that an informed source told him Ankara finalized the sale of its S-400 systems after a deal was approved overnight on Friday.
He added that the speculated buyers are either the UAE or Qatar, noting that the information will remain unknown until an official statement is made.
Selvi noted that the US assets in the UAE being targeted by retaliatory Iranian strikes during the war on Iran were a cause for wanting an increased air defense presence. He added that the attacks “crippled the UAE’s tourism-based system,” adding that it “has been trying to acquire alternative defense systems” after the Iranian retaliation.
He also brought up the Israeli attack on Qatar last year as a significant reason why Doha may want new air defense systems, as Qatar’s Patriot missile system did not activate during the attack on the Hamas officials in the capital city due to “Israel” being coded as a friendly country.
“Qatar learned from this shock attack that it was unprotected against Israel,” Selvi said.
The Hürriyet journalist reported that regardless of which Gulf state the S-400 goes to, Türkiye seeks to gain freedom from US sanctions from the sale.
Ankara is currently a target of the American sanctions package, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which mandates penalties for entities that participate in “significant transactions” with the Russian defense or intelligence sectors.
The sale of the Russian-made S-400 systems could give Türkiye the break it needs to relieve itself of these sanctions that have barred it from the F-35 fighter jet program.
It is worth noting that US President Donald Trump signaled at returning Türkiye to the F-35 fighter jet program after a years-long ban, which caused tears in the relationship between Ankara and Washington.
Saudi, Qatari-flagged tankers damaged near Hormuz after US threatens Iran
The Cradle | July 7, 2026
A Saudi-flagged crude oil vessel and a Qatari tanker were damaged on 7 July after being struck by projectiles in the Strait of Hormuz, multiple reports have confirmed.
Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker Al-Rekayyat was “struck overnight and its engine room set on fire,” maritime sources told Reuters, adding that “a Saudi crude oil tanker has also been damaged.”
“Mayday … This is vessel Al-Rekayyat, LNG vessel Al-Rekayyat. We are being hit by drone on port side, top of engine room. Status: engine room fire and full of smoke. Unable to assess further damage,” the ship’s captain said in a recorded radio call heard by Reuters.
The ship was disabled and called for help, but the crew was unharmed, according to the report.
Iranian state television reported that an LNG ship was hit off the coast of Oman after “ignoring warnings.” Responsibility has yet to be officially claimed by Tehran.
According to Reuters, the Saudi oil tanker Wedyan was damaged in the same area – near Oman’s coast, close to the Strait of Hormuz.
The Wedyan vessel’s last position was inside the Persian Gulf on 3 July. Riyadh has not commented.
“Iran’s military fired at least two missiles at commercial ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz,” US officials told Axios.
Nevertheless, the US government has not officially commented on the incident.
The latest escalation near the strategic waterway comes after Iranian officials responded to new threats from US President Donald Trump.
“Negotiations on final deal will not commence if threats continue. Honor your signature,” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned on Tuesday, coinciding with a massive funeral for the country’s late supreme leader Ali Khamenei.
A day earlier, Trump threatened to “finish the job” and “knock down” bridges and energy sites across Iran.
In recent days, Iran has doubled down on its right to jointly manage the strait with Oman. The waterway is effectively under Iranian control.
Last month, a shipping corridor connecting the US and Oman via the Strait of Hormuz was launched, prompting Tehran to call it a breach of Clause 5 of the MoU.
Tehran has since announced that it has reached a deal with Oman on the management of the strait.
Since the MoU was signed, the illegal US blockade has largely ceased, and the Strait of Hormuz has been partially reopened by Iran.
However, Washington has continued to violate the MoU through multiple attacks on Iran, and a failure to rein in Israel’s brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing and occupation in Lebanon.
Israel sold advanced defense systems to Qatar, Saudi Arabia: Report
The Cradle | June 28, 2026
Israel has sold advanced defense systems to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, including sophisticated missile defense systems to protect the Qatari royal family and components for advanced fighter jets, Haaretz reported on 28 June.
Citing documents and photographs, the left-liberal Israeli paper revealed that Israeli Elbit Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries have sold hundreds of millions of shekels’ worth of missile defense systems and helmets for advanced F-15 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
The sales occurred even though both Gulf monarchies have refrained from joining the Abraham Accords and have no formal diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.
Haaretz writes that when Qatari ruler Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani flew to Iran last year, his private jet was equipped with an air defense system manufactured by Israel-based Elbit Systems.
A photograph of the Qatari emir’s arrival in Algeria in March 2024 clearly showed an Elbit defense system installed on the underside of his aircraft.
The Qatari royal fleet consists of 11 aircraft, including two Boeing 747s and an Airbus A340-500, all equipped with Elbit’s C-MUSIC system, known in Israel as Magen Rakia.
The C-MUSIC system detects the launch of a heat-seeking surface-to-air missile and emits an infrared beam that disrupts the missile’s ability to lock on to the aircraft.
It is especially effective against shoulder-fired missiles known as MANPADS.
The cost of the deal with Qatar is unknown. However, it likely exceeds $200 million, given the value of similar deals with European countries and NATO.
Elbit and other Israeli companies also produce parts for Qatar’s US-supplied F-15 fighter jets.
According to a US Defense Department contract with Boeing, Israeli companies were awarded subcontracts worth $150 million to $250 million to supply advanced parts and systems for the Qatari F-15s.
Elbit subsidiaries, Elbit America and Cyclone, were awarded contracts, along with Collins Elbit Vision Systems, a joint venture with RTX.
Among the items provided by the Israeli weapons firms to Doha is the advanced JHMCS combat helmet, which projects flight data onto the visor, allowing the pilots to visually lock on to a target and fire a missile at it.
Elbit also supplied AN/AVS-9 night-vision goggles for Qatar’s F-15 warplanes.
Additional contracts to provide equipment for the Qatari F-15 program were awarded to Israel Aerospace Industries, TAT Technologies, and Beth-El Industries.
Official State Department documents and photographs also reveal that Saudi Arabia received 462 advanced JHMCS combat helmets and 462 AN/AVS-9 night-vision goggles produced by Israeli firms for its own F-15 warplanes.
IRGC Navy rejects new Strait of Hormuz shipping routes
Al Mayadeen | June 25, 2026
Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy has warned that safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz is only possible via routes announced by Iran, rejecting newly declared navigation lanes and insisting that vessels coordinate directly with Iranian naval authorities.
In a statement issued in the name of the IRGC Navy, Tehran said that “some authorities” had recently announced new shipping routes in the strategic waterway “without informing or coordinating with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” saying the move is “unacceptable and completely dangerous.”
The statement stressed that the only authorized passage routes through the Strait of Hormuz are those designated by Iran, warning that navigation outside these channels is “very dangerous and prohibited.”
“All vessels are warned to strictly avoid any navigation outside the notified routes,” the IRGC Navy said, adding that coordination via Channel 16 with Iranian naval forces is mandatory and that “violator vessels will be dealt with.”
The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow maritime chokepoint linking the Gulf to the Arabian Sea, remains one of the world’s most sensitive shipping corridors, with competing claims over navigation management and maritime safety procedures.
Regional diplomatic efforts underway
The warning comes amid renewed diplomatic activity involving Gulf states, Iran, and regional mediators aimed at reshaping maritime governance in the strait.
On Wednesday, Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani arrived in Muscat for talks with Omani officials on launching a new round of negotiations involving Iran, Iraq, and Gulf Arab states on the future management of the waterway, according to Reuters, citing a diplomat briefed on the discussions.
The proposed talks are reported to be separate from ongoing Iran-US negotiations and existing de-mining arrangements. According to the same source, Gulf states are expected to push for the removal of transit fees, while Iran may propose alternative charges linked to environmental, navigation, and security services.
The initiative is said to stem from a recent memorandum of understanding calling for structured discussions between Iran, Oman, Gulf states, and Iraq on maritime governance in the strait, with Pakistan floated as a potential mediator.
Separately, broader regional reconciliation talks are expected to be held in Riyadh involving Iran, Gulf Arab states, and other regional actors.
Oman announces new shipping lanes
Earlier on Wednesday, Oman announced the establishment of two temporary shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz, positioned north and south of the existing lane, in coordination with the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
Under a phased operational plan, vessels will be grouped and contacted individually with navigation instructions, including designated routes and departure timings. Oman’s maritime authorities said shipmasters remain responsible for conducting independent risk assessments, and vessels are required to keep Automatic Identification Systems active while reporting hazards to the Oman Maritime Security Centre.
Oman also confirmed that no transit tolls would be imposed on ships passing through the strait, in line with understandings reached in recent Iran-US discussions.
Joint Iran-Oman framework
The developments follow earlier agreements between Iran and Oman to establish a joint committee tasked with discussing the future management of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
The committee is part of broader consultations between Tehran and Muscat aimed at enhancing maritime safety, coordinating navigation rules, and addressing associated services and costs in line with international law and sovereign rights of coastal states.
Both sides have previously reiterated their commitment to keeping the strait open for international navigation while maintaining sovereignty over territorial waters, underscoring the strategic importance of continued coordination to ensure stability in the waterway.
Iran, Saudi FMs hold phone talks as Persian Gulf states rethink US ties
Press TV – June 24, 2026
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Saudi counterpart Prince Faisal bin Farhan have held a phone call to discuss regional developments, as Persian Gulf Arab states recalibrate their approach toward Tehran in the wake of the US-Israeli war that exposed the limits of American power.
Araghchi on Wednesday briefed the Saudi minister on the latest progress in implementing bilateral agreements and the ongoing negotiations following the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed on June 18.
The two top diplomats underscored the importance of maintaining diplomatic channels, strengthening joint cooperation to support regional stability, and achieving positive and sustainable outcomes.
The call came as French news agency AFP said Saudi Arabia is expected to host talks aimed at repairing relations between Iran and Persian Gulf countries following the US-Israeli war on Iran.
It cited a diplomat familiar with the arrangements as saying Wednesday that a regional summit was being planned in Riyadh and could also include other neighboring countries, but no date had yet been set.
The meetings would be separate from the ongoing negotiations between Iran and the United States, the diplomat added.
CNN, citing a senior Persian Gulf diplomat, reported that leaders are increasingly contemplating a future in which the US plays a much smaller role in the regional security architecture, with a possible framework involving a regional non-aggression pact with Iran.
According to Hasan Alhasan, senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “From the Arab states’ perspective, the Iran war is a disastrous turning point for the regional security order.”
The war, which began on February 28, exposed vulnerabilities in the Persian Gulf states’ security model, which is heavily dependent on the nearly 40,000 US troops stationed in the region and American-made air defense systems.
“The US security guarantee is no longer reliable in the way they thought it was,” one analyst at Chatham House told The New York Times.
Washington’s approach is increasingly perceived as selective and heavily centered on Israel’s security interest.
A classified CIA analysis found that US allies in the Persian Gulf are divided over their approach to Iran. According to the assessment, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain prefer continued pressure on Tehran, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait now support negotiations.
Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, noted that the UAE and Bahrain “made themselves frontline states against Iran” through the Abraham Accords and “now they’re in too deep and cannot extract themselves out of it”.
The Saudis, Parsi added, “were at the highest levels pushing for this war. They have come to regret it”.
Adding another layer of complexity is a widening gap between Arab governments and Arab public opinion over Iran.
According to a report by The Economist cited by DID Press, growing anger toward Israel and dissatisfaction with US policies have fueled increasing sympathy for Tehran across parts of the Arab world.
Despite sustained efforts by several Arab governments to reinforce anti-Iran narratives, recent developments have altered perceptions among sections of Arab society.
The report identifies two major drivers behind this shift: anger toward Israel, as many Arabs increasingly view Iranian actions against Israel as a legitimate response to regional military operations, and religious and cultural ties, particularly among Shia communities across the Persian Gulf.
The report concludes that sectarian narratives no longer resonate as strongly as in previous years, and that many Arabs increasingly view Iran as more assertive and resilient than several Arab governments.
Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani traveled to Muscat on Wednesday to initiate talks between Iran, Persian Gulf states, and Iraq on the future operation of the Strait of Hormuz.
The discussions aim to implement a provision of the MoU requiring Iran and Oman to hold talks with other Persian Gulf states on the future management of navigation and maritime services.
Earlier on Wednesday, Oman announced two temporary routes north and south of the existing shipping lane to facilitate safe passage of vessels departing the region, in coordination with the International Maritime Organization.
The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of global oil and liquefied natural gas normally transits, was heavily disrupted after the United States and Israel launched their war on Iran on February 28.
