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Anthony Aguilar: The Point of No Return Has Been Reached

Dialogue Works | November 17, 2026

Matt Bracken: Nothing Can Stop This Now

Dialogue Works | November 17, 2026

November 17, 2026 Posted by | Video, Wars for Israel | , | Comments Off on Anthony Aguilar: The Point of No Return Has Been Reached

EU risks investor exodus over Russian assets – Euroclear chief

RT | November 13, 2026

The EU risks driving investors and their money out of Europe over plans to use frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine, Euroclear CEO Valerie Urbain has warned.

The bloc has frozen around €210 billion ($232 billion) in Russian central bank assets since 2022, most of it held at Belgian-based Euroclear. While the EU has already diverted profits from the funds to Ukraine, it has stopped short of seizing the assets outright over legal concerns. Moscow has condemned both measures as theft.

In an interview with Belgian newspaper Le Soir published on Friday, Urbain said previous debates over the assets had already unsettled international investors.

“I have noticed that many investors followed last year’s debates and are now wondering whether Europe is still capable of respecting the rule of law,” she said.

Urbain warned of a “reputational risk” that could lead to “some deposits leaving Europe,” stressing that investor confidence depends on legal certainty and the protection of assets.

She also rejected proposals to transfer the frozen funds to the EU or another entity without accounting for Euroclear’s obligations.

“You cannot simply ‘transfer’ the assets and forget about the liabilities. That would create an enormous imbalance and lead to Euroclear’s bankruptcy,” she said.

Urbain explained that Russian securities had matured into cash under sanctions, leaving Euroclear liable to repay Moscow around €185 billion – more than 80% of its balance sheet. Transferring both assets and liabilities would still carry legal risks, she added.

Belgium has repeatedly resisted confiscation proposals. Last month, Prime Minister Bart De Wever said he did not expect the European Commission to revive the plan, although individual member states could still push for it. EU leaders instead agreed last December to borrow €90 billion jointly to support Ukraine.

In May, a Moscow court awarded the Russian central bank around €200 billion in damages in a lawsuit against Euroclear. Earlier this month, Belgian newspaper L’Echo reported that the bank had sought a court order to seize documents from Euroclear’s Brussels headquarters over alleged coordination with EU institutions on sanctions.

Urbain also warned of possible retaliation, including the confiscation of Euroclear assets in Russia and countries friendly to Moscow.

The European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund have previously raised concerns that seizing Russian assets could undermine financial stability and confidence in the euro.

Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) issued a similar warning in September, saying confiscation would damage Europe’s standing among major investors, including China, India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Singapore.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has accused Western nations of “outright robbery,” declaring that trust in them has been “completely lost.”

November 13, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Progressive Hypocrite | , , , , , , | Comments Off on EU risks investor exodus over Russian assets – Euroclear chief

Yemeni forces make major advances, complete Aden encirclement

Press TV · November 13, 2026

Yemen’s Armed Forces have managed to make major advances against Saudi-backed militants south of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, officially completing the encirclement of Aden Province.

Reports said on Friday that the Yemeni forces reached the coastal strip connecting Aden to Lahij Province.

Saudi-sponsored mercenaries in the areas of al-Suqiya and Ras al-Ara were given two options, surrender and face capture, or withdraw without their weapons, the reports added.

The advances come as Saudi fighter jets have carried out dozens of airstrikes to prevent the Yemeni forces from cementing their gains.

On Thursday, fierce clashes erupted along several fronts near Kharaz Camp, which is considered one of the main military support bases for Saudi-backed militants and houses a large number of warehouses containing various types of weapons.

Mohammad al-Farah, a member of the Ansarullah political bureau, announced that the Yemeni forces continue to advance in Lahij while Saudi-sponsored elements are experiencing confusion and disarray in their ranks.

Major General Ahmed al-Turki, a commander of Saudi-backed militants left the frontline without coordination, according to recent reports. Mahmoud al-Subaihi, a member of the so-called presidential leadership council, departed Aden for Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia waged a devastating war on Yemen in March 2015, but it failed to reinstall a Riyadh-friendly regime there. In 2022, the kingdom agreed to a ceasefire with Ansarullah, but maintained its land, sea, and air blockade of the country.

A few months ago, Yemen launched operations in response to illegal Saudi airstrikes and announced a maritime blockade in retaliation for the 12-year inhumane siege of the country by the kingdom.

Since then, Yemen’s Armed Forces have pushed back Saudi-backed militants and taken control of several areas, strengthening control over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a strategic maritime passage between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

November 13, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , | Comments Off on Yemeni forces make major advances, complete Aden encirclement

Trita Parsi: Trump’s Swiss Cheese Iran Plan & U.S. Break with Israel?

Glenn Diesen | November 12, 2026

Trita Parsi is the co-founder and Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Follow his excellent Substack: https://tritaparsi.substack.com/

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 Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen

00:00 The Current State of the Iran War
02:55 Escalation Risks and Political Dynamics
06:11 The Swiss Cheese Scenario
08:54 Iran’s Response and Regional Implications
11:51 The Dilemma of U.S. Sanctions
15:06 The Future of U.S.-Iran Relations
18:08 The Multipolar World and Sanctions Efficacy
20:56 Israel’s Position and Regional Stability
23:49 The Saudi-Yemen Conflict and U.S. Involvement
26:58 The Shift in U.S. Foreign Policy
29:50 Conclusion and Future Outlook

November 12, 2026 Posted by | Video, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Trita Parsi: Trump’s Swiss Cheese Iran Plan & U.S. Break with Israel?

The ‘Gaza Treatment’: How Media Headlines Obscure Who is Bombing Yemen

By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle | November 10, 2026

As Saudi airstrikes are increasingly inflicting civilian massacres across Yemen, the corporate media are employing various rhetorical tricks to downplay the atrocities. A very similar playbook to that utilized to downplay the Gaza genocide is now being used to cover up war crimes in Yemen.

On Friday, Saudi airstrikes targeted a packed marketplace in the Waziyah area of Yemen’s Taiz Province. Yemen’s Health Ministry reported that the initial death toll was 30 killed and eight wounded, all of whom were civilians. The footage released of the incident showed the extent of the crime that had been committed.

Then, on Saturday, Saudi fighter jets bombarded residential homes in the village of al-Shariya within the Bani Hashish district, located to the east of the Yemeni Capital City of Sana’a. Not only did the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) bomb civilian homes in the village, but it also launched double-tap strikes that impacted the first responders. At least 44 civilians were killed, with another 40 having been left wounded. Of those killed, 21 were children and another 10 were women.

While the corporate and mainstream media have all but ignored the daily bombings targeting civilian infrastructure and populated urban areas, these massacres were too big not to merit articles.

“Airstrikes on a market in southwestern Yemen kill at least 30, Houthis say”, reported the Associated Press on the Friday massacre, mirroring the language of using “Hamas says” to undermine the authenticity of the event. Al-Jazeera meanwhile ran with the headline “Yemeni gov’t forces, Houthis trade blame for deadly strikes on Taiz market”.

Both reports cite officials within what they called Yemen’s “Internationally Recognized Government” claiming that no airstrikes were carried out in that location. While AP does mention that the “Yemeni Government” officials it is citing are Saudi-backed, Al-Jazeera fails to do the same. What is striking about this, however, is that both fail to mention the simple fact that it was Saudi Arabia’s air force that was responsible; nobody blamed Yemeni forces.

Also, why would a so-called “Internationally Recognized Government” be speaking on behalf of and claim to have precise knowledge of a foreign country’s air strikes? In the past, some corporate media outlets have even gone as far as labeling Saudi bombings as airstrikes carried out by a “Yemeni Air Force” belonging to the Saudi-backed forces, although no such thing exists.

There is, of course, no evidence presented to suggest that the Ansarallah-led Yemeni Armed Forces – what the AP and Al-Jazeera incorrectly call “the Houthis” – had carried out this massacre. In fact, the area struck was under the Sana’a-based government’s control; there is extensive documentation of the event, all suggesting Saudi airstrikes.

However, the next day’s massacre was simply undeniable, as the actual Saudi airstrikes were recorded as they struck residential buildings, killing 44 civilians near Sana’a. Yet, the BBC produced the headline “Houthis say at least 33 killed in Saudi air strike”. The British-State Broadcaster even manages to fail in correctly implementing the English language, as air strikes, and not a single “air strike”, were carried out.

You will also see across the mainstream media the phrase “Houthi-run Yemeni Health Ministry”. This language is eerily similar to the “Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry” propaganda that the public has been subjected to for over three years now. However, in Yemen the phrase is not even at least partially accurate; there is no political movement or entity calling itself “the Houthis”; instead, it is Ansarallah that they are describing.

At least Hamas is actually the real acronym for the movement that has governed Gaza since 2007. In Yemen, left is right and up is down when it comes to the corporate media’s coverage. This is so much the case that the news that the public is consuming on the issue barely even resembles what is transpiring inside the country.

Take, for example, this Reuters headline, explaining how the Saudi-Yemen ceasefire was broken in July earlier this year: “Houthis fire missiles at Saudi Arabia, breaking years of calm.”

Not only does the article title suggest that it was Ansarallah that was responsible for breaking the ceasefire, but it also does so while embedding the video of the Saudi airstrikes that actually ended the ceasefire inside the article. This leaves no doubt as to the intentions of Reuters here; they simply lied in favor of promoting the Saudi narrative.

When Reuters covered the civilian massacre committed near Sana’a on Saturday, its headline began with “Houthi-run health ministry says…”.

Here I have provided examples from some of the most trusted and reputable news sources in the English-language media, all of which exhibit a level of bias that greatly distorts the reality in Yemen.

Even the insistence on calling Ansarallah “the Houthis” is not a measure taken against IS by the mainstream media. Take Al-Jazeera in Arabic and English as an example here; both use “the Houthis”, yet for IS they have avoided using the pejorative acronym “Daesh” to describe them.

In Arabic, Al-Jazeera calls them “Dawleh al-Islamiyyeh” or “Tanzeem al-Dawleh”. In other words, IS has been afforded more favorable terminology to describe them than Ansarallah.

It suffices to say that the reporting on Yemen has been utterly dreadful, not just since July, but for well over a decade now. The reason why such propaganda persists is that there is little popular objection to it.

– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.

November 10, 2026 Posted by | Mainstream Media, Warmongering | , | Comments Off on The ‘Gaza Treatment’: How Media Headlines Obscure Who is Bombing Yemen

Nima R. Alkhorshid: U.S. Military Bombs Multiple Targets on Iran’s Qeshm Island

Dialogue Works | November 8, 2026

November 8, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Video, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Nima R. Alkhorshid: U.S. Military Bombs Multiple Targets on Iran’s Qeshm Island

Thousands of Syrian troops set to join Saudi war on Yemen

Al Mayadeen| November 7, 2026

Thousands of Syrian troops are reportedly preparing to deploy to Yemen under a military arrangement with Saudi Arabia, potentially opening a new phase in the conflict and expanding Riyadh’s efforts in its aggression on Yemen.

Yemeni officials cited by AFP on Saturday said hundreds of Syrian personnel had already been deployed near the Saudi-Yemeni border, while additional forces were expected to arrive in stages. The reported agreement provides for an initial contingent of approximately 3,000 troops, with the overall deployment potentially exceeding 10,000.

A source from Yemen’s Aden government told AFP that Damascus and Riyadh reached an agreement on sending the initial contingent to participate in operations against the Yemeni Armed Forces.

“The Syrian side and the Saudi side agreed to send around 3,000 troops to fight against the Houthis,” the source said, requesting anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter.

Three separate Aden-aligned Yemeni sources and a defense official confirmed to the news agency that Syrian personnel had already arrived on both sides of the border. However, the full scale and operational details of the deployment have not been officially announced by the Syrian or Saudi governments.

Initial Syrian contingent reportedly includes officers and specialists

A source at the Aden-aligned Defense Ministry told AFP that the first phase would involve approximately 3,000 Syrian fighters, including officers and military specialists. The agreement reportedly provides for more than 10,000 personnel in total, with additional forces to be sent in subsequent stages.

The same source said Syrian and Saudi technical teams from the two countries’ defense ministries were in Riyadh finalizing arrangements for the participation of Syrian forces in aggressions against Yemen.

According to another Aden-aligned source, Syrian personnel already positioned near the Yemeni side of the border are involved in drone operations targeting the group.

The reported deployment is backed by a formal agreement between the Syrian and Saudi defense ministries, providing a legal framework for military cooperation. The arrangement was approved during Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to Riyadh this week, when the two countries signed several cooperation agreements, including a defense deal.

The agreement marks a significant development in relations between Riyadh and Damascus, particularly as Saudi Arabia seeks to consolidate its position in Yemen following the collapse of the truce over the summer.

Saudi Arabia seeks foreign military support

Riyadh has been seeking assistance from regional and international partners to fight against Yemen as the Yemeni Armed Forces retaliatory operations have cause significant damage inside the kingdom. The YAF have expanded their control along Yemen’s Red Sea coastline and stepped up retaliatory attacks on Saudi territory, vessels, and infrastructure.

The retaliatory strikes have also raised concerns over Saudi Arabia’s economic diversification plans and the security of strategic energy facilities. According to the AFP report, strikes on Riyadh forced the airport to close for two weeks following Ansar Allah’s retaliation.

The arrival of Syrian troops would make them the first clearly named foreign ground forces to join the war on Yemen since fighting escalated over the summer.

Other countries have also signaled or provided military assistance. Egypt’s parliament approved President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s request to authorize defensive military support for Saudi Arabia if Riyadh formally requests it.

France has deployed troops to protect the Yanbu oil terminal, a key Saudi energy facility, following a visit by French President Emmanuel Macron to Riyadh last month. The UK government also announced in October that it would deploy fighter aircraft to assist Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile, Syria’s top diplomat said last week that Damascus was considering joining a regional defense alliance involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan. The pact was signed in Mecca in August and stipulates that an attack against one member is to be considered an attack against all three.

Neither Pakistan nor Turkey has announced military operations against the Yemeni Armed Forces.

Yemen conflict enters another phase of escalation

The renewed war on Yemen followed the collapse of a truce established in 2022 after Saudi Arabia targeted the Sanaa airport. Since the summer, Yemeni Armed Forces has imposed a maritime blockade targeting Saudi Arabia for its blockade on Yemen, launched operations against vessels and facilities linked to hostilities, and announced control of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline.

The Syrian deployment would add a new dimension to the war, bringing Damascus into a military effort alongside Riyadh and other countries supporting the Aden-based government.

The Syrian military itself faces significant organizational challenges. AFP reports that its ranks comprise a collection of armed groups, many of them extremist formations, that participated in the foreign-backed coup and overthrow of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. The composition and capabilities of any force sent to Yemen could therefore have implications for the nature of its role in the conflict.

November 7, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , | Comments Off on Thousands of Syrian troops set to join Saudi war on Yemen

Jared Kushner’s Diplomacy for Hire

By Philip Giraldi | Unz Review | November 7, 2026

Many observers of the highly dysfunctional President Donald J Trump administration have noted how a major contributing factor for the foreign policy disasters might well derive from the appointment of two real estate billionaires personally linked to the president as its top negotiators. That Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner had no diplomatic experience right from the beginning the presumption should have been a given that they would be managed and consistently out-maneuvered by their counterparts from other countries. That Kushner possessed unique access to Trump and might be inclined to give him bad advice in return for business “favors” also should have been reckoned by Congress and the national media.

In fact, there have been a lot of good reasons to be most particularly suspicious of son-in-law Jared Kushner given his history of shady business dealings. Indeed, any concerns have proven to be valid with one only needing to cite the complete failure of the two presidential special emissaries judging by their involvement in the so-called peace negotiations relating to the conflicts in Russia-Ukraine and in the Middle East. In both cases, the situation seen from a perspective of US actual interests, has deteriorated in spite of clear evidence that other parties to the negotiations were seeking a solution. Kushner, an unashamed Israel Firster, like his partner in crime Witkoff, did everything he could to protect war criminal Israel and those Arab states considered to be friends and was ineffective in dealing with the Russians, who rightly do not trust him. Kushner’s family is meanwhile extremely close to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who used to stay at the Kushner family home in New Jersey some years ago when he was in the US. The Kushner family foundation has also been funding Israeli settlements on the Palestinian West Bank, which is illegal, all of which makes Jared a ridiculous choice as US designated negotiator.

Kushner is, of course, married to Donald Trump’s daughter Ivanka, who converted to Judaism which is how he was able to step up into his White House designated position. He also was and is a business partner of the president and his family. Reckoned altogether, it has meant that Jared Kushner has been able to exploit his status with the White House to take steps to enrich the Trump family as well as himself and his own family through both connivance and manipulation of his interlocutors in the foreign policy world, most particularly in the Gulf States.

To cite only one example of how politics, Israeli interests and the profit motive all come together one only has to review Kushner’s glowing account of the splendor of a future redeveloped Riviera style resort, quite likely to be named after Trump and featuring a gilded statue of the president, constructed on the rubble remains of old Gaza that will cover or otherwise dispose of tens of thousands of Palestinian bodies. It is a developer’s dream that is too disgusting to contemplate and is the mark of the man, unfortunately. Kushner’s participation in Trump’s phony Board of Peace has been little more than a cover story giving Netanyahu license to kill coming from America’s president, a man also owned by Israel, who believes that the only real thing that matters is ignoring his responsibilities as president and manipulating his position to make money, lots of it!

Jared Kushner has apparently inherited genes that make him acquisitive beyond all reason. His father Charles is currently serving as Trump appointee US Ambassador in France, where he speaks no French and is constantly complaining about antisemitism in the country. He was previously convicted and served nearly two years in prison more than a decade ago in a felony tax fraud case that grew into a bizarre tale involving sex tapes including the hiring of a prostitute. Kushner had hired the woman to seduce his brother-in-law who was testifying against him over the fraud charges, arranging to record a sexual encounter between the two and send the tape to his sister to force the relative to back off. Charles subsequently received a full pardon from Trump after contributing heavily to the Trump presidential campaign and was subsequently given the ambassadorial post.

Real estate mogul Jared followed in his father’s footsteps to include possible involvement in the aftermath of the 2018 murder and dismemberment of US resident Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul by Saudi agents when he reportedly became the White House’s most ardent defender of the Saudi monarchy in exchange for an offshore substantial dollar bank account arranged by Riyadh. As a result the murder of an American resident by the Saudis was never seriously challenged.

And Jared has also been in the news lately over a not-altogether-legal scheme involving the Rothschild banking dynasty that was coordinated with corrupt local officials to acquire an island offshore of Albania to develop into an Adriatic Sea luxury resort. Local people were revolted by the development itself and the corruption involved and turned out in their tens of thousands to protest, forcing the government to back down on the deal.

Corruption might be Jared’s middle name! Beyond the development projects erected over both environment devastation and a mountain of dead bodies, the tragedy of Jared Kushner is his destruction of his slice of US foreign policy out of deference to Trump and his own family interests, which also meant making billions of sometimes insider trading generated dollars as part of the process. A new book by Matthew Cole on his perfidy has just appeared entitled “Princes and Thieves.” There have also number of articles on it and related issues, one of which by Charles P Pierce in Esquire magazine bore the possibly appropriate title “Jared Kushner Is the Worst Thing to Ever Happen to This Country, Maybe the World” subtitled “A new book reveals the extent of his shady dealings in the Middle East.”

The book makes the claim that Jared Kushner conducted something like diplomacy for profit without regard for actual American interests, behavior that might be regarded as treasonous by many. Also considering that Jared was privy to intelligence secrets through his White House access, one might reasonably argue that he shared such information with his “investors” from the Persian Gulf and Israel, meaning that he was engaged in espionage. A major revelation is how he and several United Arab Emirate leaders conspired during Trump’s first term in office to establish a $2 billion in slush funds as part of a plan to influence US foreign policy in the region. Kushner’s ties to Gulf money have also drawn scrutiny more recently. After leaving the White House in 2020, his private equity firm, Affinity Partners, received a $2 billion investment from a Saudi sovereign wealth fund led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, a deal that has drawn scrutiny from ethics watchdogs. Affinity has also invested in an Israeli weapons manufacturer, making one question his sincerity in “negotiating” to bring a peace settlement with the Palestinians.

Jared Kushner certainly knew then and knows now that any efforts made by him to shape US policy that came from a foreign government that had provided him with money would make him an agent of a foreign power and require his registration under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938. The act requires citizens who lobby in that fashion to declare themselves and the country they are working for to the Justice Department. Once registered, the individual or group would be required to observe complete transparency over the sources of its income and it political contacts with foreign officials. It is presumed that Kushner might be investigated and charged by the new Congress that will be installed as a consequence of the recent election regarding any number of crimes but even if it does happen in the next two years he will likely be pardoned by Trump.

What does Jared Kushner have to say about his behavior? Inevitably, he has denied the claims made in the Cole book, though he has refused to be interviewed on the subject. His lawyer has promised lawsuits however and has already filed one against Vanity Fair, which published an article by Cole on the subject. The book’s claims are in fact supported by descriptions of the access of Cole’s often anonymous sources in his notes, citing, for example, “a confidential source with direct knowledge” and “author interview with source who attended the meeting.” What is already known confirms that Kushner’s key relationship initially, beyond that with Israel, was with the UAE’s president, Mohammed bin Zayed (widely known as MBZ). It developed after the first election of Donald Trump in 2016, with Kushner being identified as the key player supported by the substantial secret bank account to be able to influence the new president on Middle Eastern policy. Per Cole, four senior officials from Trump’s first term, including two national security advisers, stated to him that they knew of no presidential approval for Kushner to have access to any foreign government’s bank accounts which means the UAE relationship was secret right from the beginning.

A highly respectable source that has been plausibly identified by Pierce in his article relating to the Kushner-UAE relationship is, perhaps surprisingly, Dutch government intelligence. “Sometime in late 2017, the Netherlands Defense Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) made a startling discovery: A General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) operative, a dark web hacker specializing in stolen bank data, was traveling to the UK for an espionage mission. When the Russian national arrived in England, the Dutch informed him that he had two options: he could work for them against the GRU, or the British would arrest him. Once in UK government custody, the operative would be charged with espionage. If convicted, he would spend years in a British prison. The Russian chose to change his employer. Later that year, the Russian operative gave the Dutch spies access to one of the GRU’s most sensitive assets. Located in Rostov, Russia, the GRU’s hacking and cyber team operated a remote server on which they stored some of their bounty. During their search through these secret files, the Dutch found something astonishing: screenshots of Jared Kushner’s iPhone. As they monitored Kushner’s phone, they discovered he used it to log in to a UAE bank account. By the time the Dutch spies had visibility into the phone, the account had received hundreds of millions of dollars from a bank in Azerbaijan. Their initial assessment was that the bank account was affiliated with the government there.”

The connivance between MBZ and Kushner in what was to follow, whatever its provenance, would represent what must surely be the worst case ever of US foreign policy being managed clandestinely without any regard for the Constitution, the established federal government bureaucracy, nor both the president and Secretary of State, neither of whom were aware of the relationship. In this case, Cole demonstrates how Kushner worked with the UAE to determine US policy across the Middle East and, in return, he was given full access to “slush fund” bank accounts set up for that purpose. Beyond the UAE, it is believed that Kushner used the money to cultivate relationships and come to secret agreements with Israel, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Some of the money was apparently also used to establish friendly regimes in Egypt, Yemen, Qatar and Libya. One major objective was to support the rise of Mohammed bin Salman as crown prince of Saudi Arabia and, ultimately, the normalization of relations between Israel and many of the Muslim powers, the so-called Abraham Accords.

As it turned out, the UAE’s expectations were borne out by what followed. Trump did indeed make Kushner his senior adviser with a broadly conceived brief that included the pursuit of a final settlement in the Middle East that would benefit both Israel and the UAE. Kushner benefited from the development in that he was able to operate without any oversight while having access both to top secret information and the ear of the president, all of which was financed by what was in practice unlimited dollar accounts coming from the Saudis and the Emirates.

And one should not ignore what was in it for Israel. Israel-firster Kushner, for his part, gained the support of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as his arrangement with MBZ produced results for Jewish State in terms of the Gulf States often noted failure to align with the Palestinians as Israel moved to takeover both Gaza and the West Bank. Kushner was also able to manipulate Trump, a relatively easy task as both he and the president were already largely dominated by Netanyahu. Interestingly, Kushner and his family as well as several Trumps, including the president, were also getting rich as a side benefit while allowing US foreign policy to be largely influenced and even controlled by several foreign powers.

November 7, 2026 Posted by | Book Review, Corruption, Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism | , , , , , , | Comments Off on Jared Kushner’s Diplomacy for Hire

Broke Princes: Saudi Arabia’s Powder Keg

Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – November 3, 2026

November 3, 2026 Posted by | Video, Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Comments Off on Broke Princes: Saudi Arabia’s Powder Keg

Iran Weathering The Storm, But Saudi Arabia Is Sinking

By Brian McGlinchey | Stark Realities | November 2, 2026

While the disastrous US-Israeli attempt to impose regime change on Iran has commanded the world’s attention, most people are oblivious to the rising probability that regime change is instead coming to a major US and Israeli partner: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Owing to financial strains, demographics, military failures, and simmering domestic discontent, it may only be a question of magnitude. That is, will Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) be removed by fellow members of the House of Saud, or will the 94-year-old kingdom collapse altogether? Most likely, we’ll see both things happen in fairly rapid succession.


To understand why Saudi Arabia is in danger of falling apart, it’s important to first understand what’s been holding it together since Ibn Saud united a land of many tribes into a huge new state in 1932:

  • Power-sharing across the branches of the Saudi royal family. Traditionally, authorities were shared among many senior princes, with their ministries providing each with a base of power and a well of patronage to tap. Major decisions were made by consensus, consistent with the Islamic principle of shura, which is expressly encouraged by the Quran.
  • The integration of the Wahhabi religious establishment into Saudi government. Wahhabism is an austere and puritanical variant of Sunni Islam that arose in central Arabia in the 18th century and came to dominate it. In exchange for the Wahhabists’ bestowing of religious legitimacy on the monarchy, the Wahhabi religious authorities — or ulema — were given authority to guide schools, run charitable entities and enforce social norms.
  • Tribal loyalty given in exchange for patronage and influence. The Arabian peninsula is home to dozens of tribes, with histories stretching back several hundred years or more. Their acquiescence to rule by the House of Saud has been secured via ongoing consultations and by government jobs, subsidies and contracts. Tribes have helped maintain internal peace by recognizing the monarchy’s authority, and by acting as mediators of disputes, and negotiators of access to tribal land and resources.

Everything changed when MBS became crown prince in 2017, as he radically concentrated power and decision-making in his own hands and those of a tight circle of trusted allies, to the detriment of the tribes and other members of the royal family. More than just a political maneuver, this was a bona fide revolution against the arrangement that had hitherto ensured the House of Saud’s survival.

In one of his first moves, MBS rounded up hundreds of Saudi royals and top business leaders and imprisoned them in the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton hotel. Most of them were reportedly abused, both psychologically and physically. Seventeen were hospitalized, and a major general died in custody. Faced with corruption accusations, detainees secured their freedom by forking over $107 billion, according to the claims of Saudi officials.

MBS also provoked the Wahhabi ulema, as he undertook an agenda of liberalization and Westernization aimed at improving Saudi Arabia’s image and keeping the country’s youth content. These moves included allowing women to drive cars, ending the requirement for traveling women to have male guardians, relaxing women’s dress codes, re-opening cinemas after a decades-long ban, and allowing rock concerts and art festivals. He also stripped the Saudi religious police of their investigation and arrest powers, shifting the overseers to an advisory role.

“He has offended virtually every constituency of the royal family,” Chas Freeman, former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, said on Judging Freedom. “He’s also offended the reactionary religious establishment, so he’s made a hell of a lot of enemies.”


MBS’s concentration of power isn’t entirely self-serving. His power grab was driven in part by a sense of urgency as Saudi Arabia stares down a looming financial disaster, which is rooted in the nature of the Saudi state, and exacerbated by its demographics.

Like many other states in the region, Saudi Arabia is an example of a rentier state — a state that derives the great majority of its revenue from sale of resources to other countries, rather than from the taxation of domestic economic and entrepreneurial activity.

In rentier states, the relationship of the people and the government is far different from the norm. Instead of relying on the citizenry as a source of funding, rentier states use their resources to distribute money to the citizenry. “The state doesn’t need its citizens to work hard and pay taxes. It needs them to stay content,” explained The Marrow in a video report on Saudi Arabia’s challenges.

Rentier states are put in danger when revenue becomes insufficient to sustain the flow of money to the people. For Saudi Arabia, two variables have been moving in dangerous directions: the population has grown by leaps and bounds since the 1970s, and oil revenues haven’t kept up.

Saudi Arabia now has an extraordinarily young population: Nearly two-thirds of Saudi citizens are under age 30. In a typical state fueled by economic activity, a large, youthful population can be a great asset. In a rentier state, it’s a liability — one that strains the government’s ability to keep them financially secure, with the failure to do so carrying the risk of dangerous discontent.

A primary means by which the Saudi government has distributed wealth — and prevented idleness that facilitates mischief — is government employment. As of 2016, an extraordinary two-thirds of employed Saudis held government jobs, and their salaries consumed 40% of the kingdom’s budget.

Government jobs’ domination of a market becomes a self-sustaining phenomenon. Private industry struggles to hire workers who’d prefer the lower demands, higher pay and greater job security of a government job. That, in turn, inhibits the growth of a private sector that could reduce the need for a large and costly public sector.

Recognizing the need to completely re-engineer the Saudi economy and relieve its reliance on oil money, MBS in 2016 unveiled “Vision 2030,” with a goal of spurring private-sector investment and employment, and improving the quality of life for Saudi citizens.

Many of MBS’s visions were the stuff of science fiction. A huge ski resort in the desert. A gigantic cube-shaped skyscraper in Riyadh as voluminous as 20 Empire State Buildings. A city for nine million people called “The Line,” comprising two parallel buildings 1,640 feet tall, 660 feet wide and stretching a staggering 110 miles.

One by one, Vision 2030 projects meant to dazzle the world have gone dim as the 2030 due date grows closer. The ski resort, which was supposed to host the 2028 Asian Winter games, has been put on ice. The Line has been suspended, leaving only a few kilometers of construction and a 70-mile-long trench. The colossal cubic skyscraper has been halted after initial excavation and installation of foundation pilings.

The curtailing of those ambitions reflects an irony embedded in the kingdom’s predicament: Its quest to end its dependence on oil revenue itself depends on oil revenue. Since the announcement of Vision 2030, oil prices haven’t cooperated.


As MBS’s grand visions evaporate, they’re increasingly regarded as wasteful vanity projects that have only worsened Saudi Arabia’s situation. Questions about his judgment aren’t confined to economic matters — his military decisions have been even worse.

After his appointment as Saudi defense minister in 2015, MBS immediately sought to establish his military credentials by intervening in Yemen’s civil war, which had seen that country’s Saudi-allied government ousted from the capital by Ansar Allah, a Zaidi Shia group widely referred to as “the Houthis.”

It was an enormous failure. Even with refueling, arms and other assistance provided by the United States, the Saudi intervention failed to defeat Ansar Allah. It also inflicted enormous damage on Saudi Arabia’s reputation, as bombings routinely caused mass casualties among Yemeni civilians, and a Saudi blockade created one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters.

Saudi Arabia finally joined a truce in 2022. Despite his earlier humiliation, MBS stirred things back up again in July of this year, violating the truce by bombing an airport in Yemen’s capital to prevent a Yemeni delegation from landing in an Iranian jet, after attending the funeral of Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei.

What followed has been devastating to Saudi Arabia. Ansar Allah retaliated, declaring the imposition of a blockade on Saudi Arabia to counter the Saudi blockade on Yemen. Furthering their ability to make good on that promise, Ansar Allah unleashed an offensive in which they rapidly seized the remainder of Yemen’s west coast, positioning their forces to easily threaten Saudi shipping entering the Red Sea via the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Worse, Ansar Allah has taken the battle into Saudi territory, repeatedly inflicting damage on oil and gas facilities. Iraqi Shia militias joined them in that endeavor, shutting down the east-west pipeline that Saudi Arabia had been using as an alternative to the Iranian-blockaded Strait of Hormuz. Ansar Allah has also struck Saudi airports. In the worst such attack, a Yemeni cruise missile hit a passenger terminal at Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport, killing 13 people, wounding more than 300, and causing a weeks-long closure. President Trump has compounded MBS’s ongoing military humiliation by refusing his repeated pleas for US forces to rejoin the war on Ansar Allah.

The destruction resulting from MBS’s renewal of the war in Yemen comes on top of damage caused by Iran, which has deemed any country that hosts US forces as fair targets for retaliation. Some analysts predict it will take seven to 10 years to replace all the specialized oil and gas equipment and fully restore production.

The physical damage from missiles and drones will be hard enough to repair, but the most enduring damage may have been inflicted on Saudi Arabia’s reputation as a safe place to visit and to open businesses — directly undercutting the kingdom’s quest to attract foreign investment and remake its economy.

In a vivid illustration of such damage, Ansar Allah’s attacks recently forced the postponement of Saudi Arabia’s annual Future Investment Initiative, which is hosted by the kingdom’s Public Investment Fund. First held in 2017 and nicknamed “Davos in the Desert,” the highly-anticipated October event was poised to bring major-corporation CEOs — including the leaders of JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Blackrock — to Riyadh. Major sports events, such as F1 races, have also been cancelled or postponed, and the E-Sports World Cup was moved from Riyadh to Paris.

“MBS has staked everything on Vision 2030, the promise that Saudi Arabia will become a global hub for business, tourism, sport and investment,” writes former CIA intelligence analyst Larry Johnson. “Every one of those businesses depends on one thing: the perception that the kingdom is safe. The Houthis are attacking that perception directly.”

As bad as the military situation is for Saudi Arabia and MBS, it may get far worse. As Ansar Allah continues to expand its control of Yemen — where the group already has the capital and territory in which 70 to 80% of Yemenis live — there’s growing wariness the group could retake three provinces from southwest Saudi Arabia that were historically part of Yemen, but were annexed by Saudi Arabia in 1934.


With Saudi Arabia facing increasingly dire circumstances, MBS could be targeted for removal by those who see him as incapable of steering the kingdom out of peril. There are Saudi precedents for that. Faulted for extravagant personal spending and poor management of the kingdom’s finances, King Saud al Saud saw his powers reduced in the late 1950s. Then, in 1964, he was dethroned in a bloodless coup organized by his younger brother, Crown Prince Faisal, who became king.

Eleven years later, King Faisal was himself removed from power — in bloody fashion. In 1975, after returning from a trip to the United States, he was shot to death by his nephew Prince Faisal bin Musaid, who was apparently outraged by the king’s drive to Westernize and liberalize Saudi Arabia. Revenge was also thought to be a factor, as the prince’s brother was killed in 1966 amid a violent protest of the introduction of television to the kingdom.

In October, there were reports that MBS was moving from bomb shelter to bomb shelter beneath heavily-guarded palaces. “[Supposedly] for fear of a Houthi assassination,” Alistair Crooke told Judge Napolitano. “Actually, what he’s frightened of is an assassination by one of his own family or a military officer.”

“There’s a long history in the Arab world of the overthrow of monarchy,” Freeman noted. “It’s facilitated because Islam, in the Holy Quran, is actually very much against monarchy.”


As Saudi Arabia’s condition weakens, its political and economic landscape has become fertile ground for countless seeds of discontent:

  • Vision 2030 construction projects have forced thousands from their homes and granted compensation that many say is far too little.
  • Government jobs have lost some of their luster; pay raises are harder to come by, and limits on overtime and annual leave have been imposed.
  • Citizens who were accustomed to a largely tax-free existence are getting a taste of non-rentier-state life: In 2018, Saudi Arabia adopted a 5% Value Added Tax and later tripled it to 15%.
  • Saudi royals — which number between 15,000 and 25,000 — have seen their perks and stipends reduced, forcing many of them to sell homes, yachts and art to raise cash. Princes who were subjected to abuse at the Ritz-Carlton and the confiscation of their assets are likely yearning for revenge.
  • Resentments are growing over uneven financial treatment. Crooke offers an illustrative example of two military officers working side by side: one, a highly-placed tribal member who isn’t well-paid, the other a royal of the same rank whose income is padded by a stipend.
  • Military cohesion and operational efficiency has been impaired by the silo-ization of the various service branches — which is meant to reduce the ease with which a coup could be mounted. “[MBS] has divided the military, set them against one another, [and] used the National Guard to keep an eye out for any disaffection within the army,” explained Crooke.
  • Though often characterized as a Sunni country, Saudi Arabia has a significant Shiite minority, accounting for about 12% of the population. Critically, they’re concentrated in two important areas: Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Region, which is the center of the kingdom’s oil production, and Saudi Arabia’s southwest corner, adjacent to the Shiite population in northwest Yemen, where Ansar Allah rules.
  • The kingdom faces reputational damage and a major financial hit that’s likely to arise in a US civil suit in which victims of the 9/11 attacks are building an overwhelming case that Saudi government officials aided the Al Qaeda plotters.
  • MBS’s marginalization of the Wahhabi religious establishment holds great peril. Clerics may no longer tell their followers to ignore the lavish royal lifestyles that violate the core tenets of Wahhabism, setting the stage for a radical Islamic insurrection.

Saudi Arabia isn’t alone among Middle East countries in facing the likelihood of major upheaval. Other Gulf rentier states are similarly exposed, and Kuwait could vanish via conquest by Iraqi Shiite militias. As Crooke recently said on Daniel Davis Deep Dive, “People just do not see the huge geopolitical shifts that are taking place today. The Middle East is going to change. You will not recognize it in two years’ time.”

November 3, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , | Comments Off on Iran Weathering The Storm, But Saudi Arabia Is Sinking

Taking the Houthis at Their Word: The Bill Saudi Arabia Doesn’t Want to Read

By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | November 1, 2026 

Riyadh has a simple method for dealing with Houthi claims. It announces that its air defenses intercepted something, says nothing about everything else, and hopes the world changes the subject. Aramco, a company that publishes its quarterly earnings to the decimal point, suddenly develops a vow of silence whenever someone asks whether its refineries are on fire.

So let me try something different. For the length of this column, I am going to ignore the Saudi government and Aramco entirely and take Ansar Allah’s military spokesman, Brigadier General Yahya Saree, at his word. Not because Saree is a paragon of precision. Military spokesmen everywhere, including in Washington, inflate their results. I do it because the exercise tells you what the Houthis believe they are doing, what they are aiming at, and what Saudi Arabia stands to lose if even half of it is true. Since October 10, the answer is: quite a lot.

The target list

Between October 10 and October 29, Saree issued at least eight statements claiming strikes inside the kingdom. Read them together and a pattern jumps out. This is not random harassment. It is a campaign against three things: the capital, the oil export chain and the air bases that run the war in Yemen.

Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport appears in seven of those statements, on October 10, 11, 12, 19, 24, 26 and 29. Saree has declared it a “military target” and told airlines and travelers to stay away. The Houthis have also claimed King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, Abha airport three times and Najran airport three times.

On the energy side, the Houthis claim to have hit Aramco’s Yanbu complex three times, the East-West pipeline and its pumping stations twice, the Ras Tanura refinery twice, the Rabigh refinery twice, and the Abqaiq processing plant, the Shaybah oil field and Aramco’s headquarters in Dhahran once each. Ghawar, the largest oil field on earth, was reportedly on the October 10 list as well.

And on the military side, they claim the King Khalid Air Base at Khamis Mushait four times, a military headquarters in Najran, transport aircraft at Najran airport, a “Saudi navy task force camp,” radar sites at Jabal al-Hisn, Jabal al-Rahmah and Bir Askar, and, twice, the Saudi Ministry of Defense in Riyadh. Read that last one again. The Houthis claim they have twice hit the building from which the Saudi war in Yemen is run.

Every link in the chain

Here is the part that should keep Saudi oil ministers up at night. Look at the energy targets on a map, and you realize the Houthis are not just hitting oil facilities. They are claiming to hit every single link in the one supply chain Saudi Arabia has left.

With the Strait of Hormuz closed to normal traffic, the kingdom’s exports depend on a single route. Crude comes out of Ghawar and Shaybah in the east. It is processed at Abqaiq, which has a capacity of 7 million barrels a day and is the heart of the entire Saudi oil system. It is then pushed 1,200 kilometers west across the desert through the East-West pipeline, which has been running at its full 7 million barrels a day since March, by a string of pumping stations. And it is loaded onto tankers at Yanbu on the Red Sea, which was shipping about 5 million barrels a day of crude.

The Houthis claim to have hit the fields at the beginning, Abqaiq at the processing stage, the pumping stations in the middle and Yanbu at the exit. That is not a target list. That is a flowchart. My friend Karl Miller, who watches this closely from the region, told me weeks ago that four of the 11 pumping stations on that pipeline had been severely damaged and were not functioning. The Houthis’ latest claims suggest they intend to finish the job.

Running the numbers

So what is this worth? Brent was trading near $115 a barrel on October 28, the day after the Houthis claimed Ras Tanura. Let’s do some arithmetic.

If the claimed strikes on the pipeline, the pumping stations and Yanbu have cut the Red Sea exports in half, Saudi Arabia is losing roughly 2.5 million barrels a day. At $115, that is about $290 million a day, or around $8.6 billion a month. If Yanbu were shut entirely, the loss would be about $575 million a day, more than $17 billion a month. Those are not rounding errors, even for a country that has been known to buy a football club on a whim.

Then add the refineries. Ras Tanura has a capacity of about 550,000 barrels a day. Rabigh has roughly 400,000. Yanbu is home to three more. Take the claims at face value and the Houthis have struck plants representing well over a million barrels a day of refining. That is not merely lost revenue for Aramco. It is diesel, jet fuel and gasoline that the world, already short of all three, can’t buy from Saudi Arabia, and that Saudi Arabia may have to import for itself. A petrostate buying refined products from abroad is the energy equivalent of a bakery buying bread at the supermarket.

And then there is Abqaiq. We have seen this movie before. In September 2019, a drone and missile strike on Abqaiq and Khurais knocked out 5.7 million barrels a day, half of Saudi production, overnight. If the Houthis’ October 29 claim against Abqaiq is even partly true, they don’t need to hit anything else. Abqaiq is the chokepoint inside the chokepoint.

The real damage is political

The oil losses are serious, but they are temporary. Pipes get welded. Refineries restart. The political damage to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is far harder to repair.

MBS has staked everything on Vision 2030, the promise that Saudi Arabia will become a global hub for business, tourism, sport and investment. Every one of those businesses depends on one thing: the perception that the kingdom is safe. The Houthis are attacking that perception directly, which is why the capital’s airport is the most frequent name on their list. You can’t sell Riyadh as the Dubai of tomorrow when the Houthis are telling the world’s airlines not to land there. King Khalid Airport was closed from October 11 to October 18. The day after it reopened, Saudi Arabia postponed the Future Investment Initiative, the “Davos in the Desert” that BlackRock’s Larry Fink and JPMorgan’s Jamie Dimon were supposed to attend, until 2027. Nothing says “open for business” like canceling your flagship business conference.

Then consider the military claims. Saudi Arabia signed a $142 billion arms package with Washington in May 2025, the largest in history, on top of decades of Patriots, F-15s and everything else money can buy. If Saree is to be believed, the Houthis, a movement that controls the poorest country in the Arab world, have repeatedly struck the main air base in the south, the radar network that is supposed to see them coming and the Defense Ministry in the capital. That is a humiliation that no amount of PR can hide. It raises an awkward question in every Gulf capital: what exactly did all that money buy?

It also explains the diplomatic scramble I wrote about last week. Riyadh’s new allies in Pakistan and Turkey have made it clear they will not cross into Yemen. Saudi Arabia’s defense minister flew to Tehran. There are reports, unconfirmed by Riyadh, of a $1 billion down payment to buy calm. Countries that are winning wars do not send their defense ministers to the other side’s patron with a checkbook.

The fine print

In fairness, I said I would take Saree at his word, and his word has a curious feature. On October 31, after the Saudi-led coalition said it had shot down a Houthi drone over Medina, Saree indignantly denied it. The Houthis, he said, had “not carried out any operation directed towards the Saudi interior.” So Ansar Allah will happily claim the Defense Ministry, Abqaiq and the Riyadh airport, but it draws the line at the holy cities. That isn’t modesty. It’s message discipline. The Houthis want the Muslim world to see a war against the House of Saud, not against Islam’s holiest sites.

Which brings me to the bottom line. Even if Saree is exaggerating by half, and he may be, Saudi Arabia is now fighting a war it cannot win on the ground, cannot stop from the air and cannot afford to keep losing at the pump. The Houthis don’t have to destroy Aramco. They only have to convince the world’s airlines, insurers and investors that the kingdom is a war zone. On present evidence, they are doing a pretty good job of it.

Somewhere in Riyadh, an Aramco spokesman is drafting another statement that says nothing. In Sanaa, Yahya Saree is drafting another target list. I know which one I’d read first.

November 2, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , | Comments Off on Taking the Houthis at Their Word: The Bill Saudi Arabia Doesn’t Want to Read

Regional security runs through Tehran

By Peiman Salehi | The Cradle | October 28, 2026

The presence of Saudi, Turkish, and Pakistani officials in Tehran on 26 October reflected a growing recognition that Iran cannot be excluded from any serious regional security arrangement. Despite the US–Israeli war against Iran, Tehran remains central to the region’s military and political balance.

For Riyadh and its partners, the meeting also exposed the limits of the Mecca defense pact, particularly as Saudi Arabia faces renewed confrontation with the Ansarallah-aligned Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF).

Much of the speculation surrounding the four-country meeting centered on what Iran might be expected to surrender, particularly its relationship with Sanaa. Such expectations rested on the assumption that Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan had established a regional security order into which Iran was now seeking admission, with Tehran potentially offering concessions over Yemen in return.

Yet the political and military circumstances that brought the participants to Tehran suggest a different calculation. Iran has withstood sustained American and Israeli attacks, while Saudi Arabia and its partners have struggled to contain the YAF’s military operations. Any agreement that disregards these realities risks reproducing the confrontations it seeks to resolve.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry had identified Israel’s expansionist policies, Lebanon, and the US war against Iran among the subjects for discussion. Yemen was absent from the announced agenda and the subsequent press statement.

Ali Bagheri, deputy secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said the gathering also served to congratulate Mohsen Rezaei, the council’s newly appointed secretary, and discuss regional security, including opposition to foreign interference, particularly by Washington. According to information obtained by The Cradle, Yemen was not discussed during the meeting.

On the morning of 27 October, a day after the talks, Rezaei met Yemen’s ambassador, Ibrahim Mohammad al-Dailami, in Tehran. Rezaei praised Yemen’s defense of Gaza and its confrontation with Israel, while the ambassador thanked him and the Iranian government for their positions.

The encounter came amid speculation that Tehran’s diplomatic engagement with Riyadh might come at the expense of its relationship with Sanaa. By publicly reaffirming those ties immediately after the summit, Iran signaled its intention to pursue regional diplomacy while maintaining its existing alliances.

Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of Iran’s conservative daily Kayhan, wrote in a 27 October editorial that “Yemen’s revolutionaries are allies of Islamic Iran.” He warned that the visiting delegations might seek to create the impression that Tehran was distancing itself from Sanaa, offering Washington and its allies “breathing room, however brief” by encouraging expectations of an imminent settlement.

The Mecca pact’s limits

Iran has good reason to approach the Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani framework, commonly known as the Mecca pact, with caution. The agreement brings together three states with substantial military capabilities and extensive relations with Washington, raising questions about whether their security cooperation could eventually be directed against the Axis of Resistance.

For Riyadh, Yemen remains a central concern. Years of confrontation with the YAF have demonstrated Sanaa’s ability to impose high military and economic costs beyond Yemen’s borders. Saudi Arabia’s renewed campaign has again brought its energy infrastructure and military installations within range of Yemeni retaliation, exposing the limits of the kingdom’s reliance on foreign military protection.

In Tehran, closer military coordination among the pact’s members could be seen as an attempt to contain the Axis of Resistance at a time when American security guarantees are becoming increasingly uncertain.

Iran’s participation in talks with the pact’s members carries no commitment to join their alliance. Tehran has made no such announcement, while Rezaei’s explanation of the summit emphasized the establishment of security through regional cooperation, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and an end to outside interference.

These objectives leave considerable differences between the participants. Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan maintain security relationships with Washington, while Iran regards the American military presence as a principal source of regional instability. Their respective positions on armed resistance movements, Israeli aggression, and the obligations of any collective defense arrangement also remain unresolved.

The meeting produced a brief press statement confirming the participants’ intention to continue their dialogue, without setting out binding commitments. Rezaei indicated that further meetings would follow, suggesting that the four governments were exploring the foundations of a wider regional accommodation.

The initiative itself emerged from Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran the previous week, according to information obtained by The Cradle. Iranian officials also confirmed Pakistan’s proposal, describing the gathering as an opportunity to advance regional security arrangements based on shared interests and mutual trust.

Riyadh’s security dilemma

The Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani alliance combines considerable military resources, diplomatic influence, and strategic relationships. Its effectiveness, however, depends on the willingness of its members to confront threats that may carry very different consequences for each country.

The limited assistance Pakistan and Turkiye have provided during the renewed confrontation between Yemen and Saudi Arabia illustrates these constraints. Although both countries have pledged support for Riyadh, their involvement has fallen short of the decisive intervention that might alter the military balance with the YAF.

Kayhan was more scathing in its assessment, accusing Turkiye and Pakistan of having “milked Saudi Arabia and done nothing.”

Saudi Arabia’s own account of the visit was more restrained. In a statement following the meeting, Riyadh said the talks formed part of efforts to de-escalate tensions, encourage diplomatic solutions, and support mediation by Qatar and Pakistan. It also reaffirmed the Mecca pact’s role in promoting regional security and stability.

Islamabad and Ankara have also sought to limit their military involvement. Turkish officials have ruled out offensive operations against Yemen, while Pakistan has denied reports that its aircraft carried out strikes on Yemeni forces. These restrictions expose the distance between the pact’s collective defense commitments and its members’ willingness to enter a wider war.

The continuing Yemeni operations against Saudi targets have consequently strengthened the argument for direct engagement with Tehran. Riyadh must weigh the costs of further confrontation against the possibility of reaching an understanding with Iran, whose regional relationships and military capabilities remain central to the wider balance of power.

Despite the damage inflicted during the war, Tehran has retained the ability to influence the course and costs of regional confrontation. Its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz and its capacity to retaliate against military infrastructure have complicated Washington’s efforts to impose a settlement on its own terms.

These developments have strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position, although translating military endurance into a durable security arrangement will require more than the recognition of its regional weight. Tehran must also demonstrate that cooperation with its neighbors can reduce the likelihood of renewed war without undermining the relationships that have helped it withstand external pressure.

For Saudi Arabia, the lesson is equally significant. Its security cannot be guaranteed indefinitely through military partnerships that exclude one of the region’s principal powers, particularly when those partnerships have struggled to prevent attacks on Saudi territory.

Yemen cannot be traded

The suggestion that Tehran might trade its relationship with Ansarallah for concessions from Riyadh overlooks the movement’s independent political interests and roots in Yemen. Ansarallah’s resistance to Saudi intervention grew out of a prolonged struggle over the country’s political future, during which its ties with Iran deepened.

The two sides share important strategic interests, but Yemen’s military and political decisions cannot be reduced to directives from Tehran. The YAF’s intervention in support of Gaza, its confrontation with Israel, and its continuing war with Saudi Arabia reflect calculations shaped by Yemen’s own circumstances.

Iran’s regional relationships have also evolved through years of confrontation with Washington and Tel Aviv. The Islamic Republic’s resistance to American and Israeli pressure has become inseparable from its wider regional security calculations, particularly as the war has intensified the threats facing its allies.

Sanaa has paid a substantial price for its military and political positions, enduring years of bombardment, blockade, and attempts to dismantle its authority. Ansarallah’s survival has given it considerable influence over Yemen’s future, making any settlement negotiated without its participation unlikely to produce lasting results.

The assumption that Tehran could simply secure Yemeni compliance also underestimates the political consequences of such an arrangement. The Sanaa government would have little reason to accept an agreement that disregards its security interests or leaves Saudi military pressure intact.

Rezaei’s meeting with the Yemeni ambassador therefore served an important political purpose. As Tehran opened discussions with the Mecca pact’s members, it reaffirmed a relationship whose continuity remains important to the wider Resistance Axis.

Israel’s declining leverage

The summit’s joint statement made no reference to Israel, but Rezaei’s subsequent account of the talks placed Israeli military operations among the issues discussed. He said the participants had emphasized ending Israeli attacks and securing Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine.

Before Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Saudi–Israeli normalization was a serious diplomatic prospect. Washington sought to advance Israel’s integration into a regional security and economic framework that would strengthen its position while isolating Iran and its allies.

The wars that followed have disrupted those calculations. Israel’s military campaigns across West Asia, alongside the American war against Iran, have exposed the risks associated with a regional order built around Israeli military superiority and US security guarantees.

Rezaei’s public emphasis on Israeli aggression reflects the changing circumstances in which the talks took place. Riyadh has not formally adopted his characterization in the joint statement and maintains its longstanding relationship with Washington, but Saudi security concerns have increasingly brought it into direct contact with Tehran despite years of hostility.

The contrast with 2017 is especially revealing. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) then threatened to take the confrontation inside Iran, reflecting Riyadh’s confidence in its ability to challenge Tehran through regional pressure and military alliances.

Nearly a decade later, Saudi officials are in Tehran discussing regional security with the same government Riyadh once threatened to attack. Years of confrontation have failed to break Iran’s regional influence, while Washington’s ability to shield its allies from another war is increasingly in doubt.

Yemen’s ability to remain a consequential military actor despite years of Saudi-led operations has also shaped this reassessment. Its continued resistance has demonstrated the limits of attempts to impose regional arrangements through military force.

Tehran’s next move

The summit’s lasting significance will depend on whether the participating governments can translate their discussions into practical security arrangements. Iran has an opportunity to advance its longstanding position that West Asia’s security must be determined by the countries of the region, without dependence on foreign military intervention.

Such an arrangement would require Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan to recognize Iran’s security concerns and its existing alliances. Tehran would also have to address its neighbors’ security concerns without compromising those relationships.

The presence of all four countries in Tehran suggests that these questions are now receiving serious attention. Rezaei’s subsequent meeting with Yemen’s ambassador also indicated the basis on which Iran intends to participate: regional cooperation alongside continued support for its established allies.

Any regional agreement must also account for Yemen and the other members of the Axis of Resistance. Their military and political weight cannot be ignored, nor can their futures be decided through negotiations between Tehran and its neighbors.

Iran has emerged from the war with its regional alliances intact and greater room to negotiate. The question now is whether Riyadh and its partners are prepared to reach an understanding with Tehran that recognizes those alliances rather than seeking to dismantle them.

October 29, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Regional security runs through Tehran