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Ukrainians in Indian jail involved in drone attack on Myanmar passenger plane – report

RT | September 4, 2026

Six Ukrainians and an American currently in prison in India were allegedly involved in a drone attack on a civilian aircraft in neighboring Myanmar, India’s anti-terrorism agency told a Delhi court.

The seven, described as mercenaries, were arrested by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in March from different cities in India while trying to fly out of the country.

The Indian government “has received credible information indicating the involvement of certain Ukrainian and US nationals in a drone attack on a civilian aircraft in Myanmar,” the agency told a Delhi court on August 19 while seeking to interrogate two from the group – Ukrainian Viktor Kaminskyi and American Matthew VanDyke – in prison.

The court granted the agency permission for the interrogation. The details of the court filings were reported by the Indian Express on Friday.

The agency said 14 Ukrainians entered India on tourist visas on different dates and flew to Guwahati in the northeastern state of Assam, where they traveled to the state of Mizoram without the required permits, and entered Myanmar illegally to conduct a “pre-scheduled training on drone warfare, drone operations, assembly, and jamming technology” for ethnic armed groups fighting the military government.

Burmese news outlets reported that a drone struck an ATR-72-600 aircraft of Myanmar National Airlines, which was preparing to depart from Myitkyina Airport to Mandalay, on February 20. The plane, which carried passengers at the time of the attack, suffered damage to its nose, mid-fuselage, and tail sections. It is not clear if the NIA was referring to the same attack.

The drone was a first-person view drone (FPV) of the type that is widely used in the Ukrainian conflict. The mercenaries were arrested on March 13 after they crossed back into India.

The NIA said many of the ethnic armed groups in Myanmar are also known to support certain banned Indian insurgent groups with weapons, military hardware, and training.

The agency earlier claimed it found that several consignments of drones from Europe were delivered by the accused to individuals and groups in Mizoram. The arrested mercenaries also allegedly confessed that they were in contact with and helped in the activities of “unknown terrorists carrying AK47 rifles.”

The agency said it wants to confront Kaminskyi and VanDyke with certain witness statements to “unearth the larger conspiracy” in the case, details of the other suspects, and the masterminds of the operation.

It said data extracted from devices seized from them contained images, videos, voice samples, among other things, which have to be corroborated with direct questioning.

Soon after their arrest, Ukraine rejected “any insinuations regarding the possible involvement of the Ukrainian State in supporting terrorist activities” and demanded that India release its nationals.

VanDyke, the American, is the founder of Sons of Liberty International, which provides military training in conflict zones. He has reportedly been involved in other conflicts, including fighting with Libyan rebels in 2011.

The court in July allowed him special food items and a cook after he complained that the “spicy and oily” prison meals affected his health, but it rejected his request for treatment at a private hospital, and to communicate with his family in the US.

September 4, 2026 Posted by | War Crimes | , | Comments Off on Ukrainians in Indian jail involved in drone attack on Myanmar passenger plane – report

West trying to draw India into ‘games’ against China – Lavrov

RT | September 3, 2026

Western countries are trying to draw India into a confrontation with China by pushing a more military role for the Quad grouping, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said at the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in Vladivostok.

Lavrov said India feels “very uncomfortable” in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) grouping, arguing that the US and Japan have sought to add a military component to it.

“They are conducting maritime security exercises and are keen to draw our Indian friends into games against another great friend of ours – the People’s Republic of China,” Lavrov said.

The Quad grouping of India, the US, Japan, and Australia focuses on cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Its activities cover areas ranging from trade and critical technologies to maritime security, with the four countries also taking part in the annual Malabar naval exercise.

At a meeting hosted by India in May, Quad foreign ministers launched a maritime surveillance initiative aimed at increasing information sharing and maritime domain awareness. India is also due to host the grouping’s next Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission, intended to improve interoperability and knowledge-sharing.

Lavrov linked the grouping to what he described as a broader Western effort to weaken the central role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by creating smaller blocs in the region.

He said Western countries are also trying to establish a “second Quad,” comprising the US, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines – instead of India – with the aim of fragmenting ASEAN unity.

The four countries already cooperate in a separate defense format, sometimes referred to as the SQUAD. Their defense ministers agreed last year to deepen maritime and air activities and strengthen what they described as regional deterrence and response capabilities.

Lavrov has raised similar concerns before. In May last year, he accused NATO of trying to draw India into ”anti-China intrigues,” while calling for the revival of the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral format.

India has pushed back against suggestions that participation in the Quad is directed against Beijing, saying it pursues an independent foreign policy based on national interests.

Lavrov also accused NATO of seeking to expand its presence and infrastructure in Asia. The US-led military bloc has stepped up cooperation with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand in areas including maritime security, cyber defense, and emerging technologies.

September 3, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Sinophobia | , , , , | Comments Off on West trying to draw India into ‘games’ against China – Lavrov

The Bishkek Declaration: What the SCO Signed, and Why India’s Name on It Matters

By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | September 2, 2026 

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation closed its 26th heads-of-state summit in Bishkek on September 1 with a joint statement — the Bishkek Declaration — timed to the bloc’s 25th anniversary and signed by the leaders of all ten member states: Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and the host, Kyrgyzstan. It is a long anniversary text, adopted alongside some 28 other outcome documents and amendments to the SCO Charter, and its language on the war in Iran is unambiguous. But the single most consequential fact about the declaration is not what it says. It is whose signature sits on it. Narendra Modi’s India — a Quad member, a US strategic partner, and a country the same declaration implicitly defends against Washington’s tariffs — put its name to a text condemning American and Israeli military action, mourning a dead Iranian supreme leader, and rejecting the sanctions architecture the United States has built. That signature is the story.

What the declaration says

On the war, the SCO condemned the military strikes on Iranian territory that it said caused numerous civilian casualties and significant damage to Iran’s economy, characterizing those strikes as violations of international law and the UN Charter that created serious risks to international peace and security. It expressed condolences on the death of Supreme Leader Seyyed Ali Khamenei — killed earlier in the war — reaffirmed support for Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for the conflict to be resolved solely through political and diplomatic means. It extended the point to Gaza, calling a comprehensive and just settlement of the Palestinian question the only path to stability in the region.

On sanctions, without naming the United States, the members opposed “unilateral coercive measures” inconsistent with UN and WTO rules and damaging to the global economy — language that simultaneously covers US sanctions on Iran, Western sanctions on Russia, and the tariff pressure on India. On the nuclear question, they upheld Iran’s position directly, affirming every member’s “inalienable right” to peaceful nuclear energy and declaring that measures restricting that right are contrary to international law.

The rest is familiar SCO scaffolding, weightier for the anniversary: an open, non-discriminatory multilateral trading system; implementation of the SCO economic and energy cooperation strategies to 2030; a push to reform global governance toward a multipolar order that “excludes bloc-based and confrontational” methods; responsible use of artificial intelligence; and the ritual condemnation of the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, with a pointed line that “double standards” in counterterrorism are unacceptable. Pakistan takes the rotating chairmanship for 2026–27 and will host the 2027 summit in Islamabad.

From the Knesset to Bishkek: the anatomy of a reversal

To read India’s signature as simple hedging understates it. Six months earlier, Modi had planted India firmly in the opposite camp — and the Bishkek text reverses, almost line for line, the position he took in February.

On February 25–26, 2026, Modi made a state visit to Israel: the first Indian prime minister to address the Knesset, honored with the Speaker’s Medal as the first foreign leader to receive it, presiding over the elevation of the India–Israel relationship to a “special strategic partnership” with 27 bilateral outcomes and a defense co-production track. Two days after he left, on February 28, the US and Israel opened their war on Iran. India’s response was conspicuous silence: it did not condemn the strikes on Iranian sovereignty, and it did not condole the killing of Iran’s supreme leader. New Delhi zeroed out its Chabahar port funding in the 2026–27 budget under US pressure, let bilateral trade with Iran collapse, and offered only a muted, “humanitarian” reaction when an Iranian frigate returning from joint exercises with India was sunk near Sri Lanka. Commentators summarized the moment cleanly — Modi had put India firmly in the Israel–US camp — while critics at home called it a strategic surrender. Among India’s BRICS and SCO partners, Russia, China, and Iran above all, the tilt bred real distrust.

What turned India back was oil. India imports roughly 85 percent of its fuel and draws a large share of its crude and LNG through the Strait of Hormuz. Under the 50 percent US tariff wall — half of it levied explicitly to punish Russian-crude purchases — New Delhi had spent early 2026 trimming Russian imports and leaning on Gulf suppliers, a quiet alignment with Washington. The Iran war detonated that arrangement: Hormuz disruption tightened supply, prices surged, the rupee came under pressure, and Modi was reduced to urging citizens to conserve fuel. With Gulf barrels suddenly unreliable and Washington’s tariffs making the alignment costly anyway, India turned back to discounted Russian crude out of straightforward energy necessity. As one analysis put it, the energy shock reordered India’s alignments — the tilt toward Washington of a few weeks earlier giving way to a familiar, interest-driven return to Moscow.

Modi was working two constituencies at once, and they pulled opposite ways. The influential Indian-American diaspora he has assiduously courted aligns comfortably with a pro-US, pro-Israel posture; against it stood the roughly ten million Indians in the Gulf and a domestic opinion for whom the image of India embracing Israel mid-war became a live political liability the opposition worked hard. Energy security and the Gulf-and-domestic pull won.

Seen against that arc, the Bishkek signature is the visible completion of a U-turn. The declaration made India condemn the strikes it had refused to condemn in February and mourn the supreme leader it had refused to mourn. The signature therefore reads less as conversion than as correction — an interest-driven snap back to the multi-aligned center after a six-month experiment in the Israel–US camp proved too expensive.

This is where strategic autonomy, not alignment, becomes the only coherent description, and the distinction matters for anyone tempted to call the SCO a consolidated anti-US front. India will lean toward Washington and Jerusalem when the terms are right and swing back toward Moscow and the Global South when its energy and standing require it, bending each forum to its own positions rather than adopting anyone’s line. Modi spent the Bishkek summit proving the point even as he signed the consensus: he demanded an end to “double standards” on terrorism in language every observer read as aimed at Pakistan, then sitting at the same table and about to take the SCO chair; he insisted connectivity projects respect sovereignty and territorial integrity, India’s standing refusal to bless China’s Belt and Road and the corridor it runs through territory India claims; and he pressed Putin directly to move from endless war toward a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine rather than echo Moscow.

And the timing is not incidental. India hosts the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi on September 12–13 — ten days after Bishkek — as BRICS chair for 2026, with Putin confirmed and Xi and Pezeshkian expected. A chair cannot antagonize the leaders it is about to receive, so part of the Bishkek signature is simply the housekeeping of a host keeping its room intact before its own showcase. Yet India deliberately themed its BRICS presidency around resilience and cooperation — a framing chosen to keep the focus on delivery rather than confrontation. The tell is in the gap: India signed a confrontational SCO text while steering its own BRICS summit deliberately away from confrontation. The New Delhi declaration on September 13 will be the better test of where India actually stands, and whether the correction that began at Bishkek holds.

The energy weight behind the declaration

A bloc’s communiqué is worth as much as the material power behind it, and on oil the SCO’s ten members carry more weight than the “regional talking shop” framing suggests. Taken together, and using the most recent 2026 figures, the member states produce on the order of 21 to 23 million barrels per day of crude and condensate — roughly a fifth of world output. Set against OPEC’s crude production of about 27 to 28 million barrels per day, the SCO membership produces somewhere near 80 percent of what the entire OPEC cartel pumps.

SCO member Crude + condensate (approx., 2026)
Russia ~10.9 million bbl/d
China ~4.3–5.0 million bbl/d
Iran ~3.3 million bbl/d (war-depressed)
Kazakhstan ~1.8 million bbl/d
India ~0.7 million bbl/d
Others (Uzbekistan, etc.) ~0.2 million bbl/d
SCO total ~21–23 million bbl/d

Four caveats sharpen rather than soften the picture. First, Iran sits in both camps — it is the only country that is both an SCO member and an OPEC member — so the two blocs are not cleanly separable; strip Iran out to avoid double-counting and the SCO membership still produces roughly two-thirds of OPEC’s volume. Second, Russia alone, at nearly 11 million barrels per day, produces about 40 percent as much as all of OPEC combined and is the gravitational center of the SCO’s energy weight. Third, the figures are unusually soft this year because the war has curtailed Iranian output and repeatedly throttled Gulf flows through Hormuz — crude and liquids transiting the strait fell from about 21.6 million barrels per day before the conflict to under 5 million in the second quarter of 2026 — so actual regional production has swung well below capacity. Fourth, and most telling, several of OPEC’s Gulf heavyweights — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait — are not SCO members but SCO dialogue partners, drawn into the organization’s orbit since 2023. The bloc that just defended Iran and condemned the US-Iran war is steadily accreting the very Gulf producers on whom OPEC depends.

The deeper asymmetry is that OPEC is a supply cartel, while the SCO spans both ends of the oil market. Its members include not only Russia, Iran, and Kazakhstan on the production side but China and India — the world’s largest and third-largest crude importers — on the demand side. No other grouping contains both the sellers and the biggest buyers of oil under one roof, and the declaration’s commitments to an SCO energy cooperation strategy to 2030, a proposed SCO Energy Consortium, and expanded settlement in national currencies are early scaffolding for exactly that: a producer-consumer bloc that could, over time, price and clear a meaningful share of Eurasian energy trade outside the dollar and outside OPEC’s writ. That ambition is nowhere near realized. But it is the material fact that gives an anniversary communiqué more heft than its boilerplate would suggest.

The Bishkek Declaration is, on its face, a predictable statement of Eurasian grievance: condemn the strikes on Iran, defend Iran’s nuclear rights, reject Western sanctions, call for a multipolar order. What lifts it above boilerplate is the combination of the signatory and the substance behind it. India signed a text that condemns the very strikes on Iran it pointedly declined to condemn in February, when Modi was in the Knesset — not because it has changed sides, but because a six-month tilt toward Israel and Washington collided with an energy shock and a tariff wall, and snapping back to the multi-aligned center became the rational course. The anti-coercion language now shields India too, and a BRICS summit India must host in ten days makes keeping the room intact its own necessity. And the bloc doing the signing controls something close to four-fifths of OPEC’s oil output, both of Asia’s giant import markets, and a growing roster of Gulf dialogue partners. The declaration’s rhetoric is cheap. The energy and demographic weight standing behind it is not.

September 3, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , | Comments Off on The Bishkek Declaration: What the SCO Signed, and Why India’s Name on It Matters

SCO leaders sign Bishkek Declaration against ‘western unilateralism’

The Eurasian bloc condemned the US war on Iran as Washington widens secondary sanctions on Tehran’s trading partners

The Cradle | September 1, 2026

Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) adopted the  Bishkek Declaration on 1 September, marking the organization’s 25th anniversary and setting out a joint position on West Asia, global security, and economic cooperation.

The 10-member Eurasian bloc used the anniversary text to press for a “representative, democratic, and equitable multipolar world order,” rejecting bloc-based and confrontational approaches to international affairs.

Member states opposed unilateral coercive measures, such as banking restrictions, asset freezes, and secondary sanctions on third-country firms, that contradict the UN Charter and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. They also condemned the unlimited buildup of global missile defense systems, calling attempts to secure one state at the expense of others unacceptable.

The declaration reiterated the bloc’s condemnation of the unprovoked US-Israeli attacks on Iranian territory, which have stretched on for 6 months and caused significant economic damage and disruption to global energy and shipping markets.

Member states called the attacks a violation of international law and the UN Charter that created “serious risks to international peace, security and stability.”

On Palestine, the declaration stated that a comprehensive and just settlement of the Palestinian question is the only possible route to peace and stability in the region.

Member states committed to expanding the use of national currencies in mutual settlements and backed reforms of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to increase developing-country representation.

The declaration noted progress toward establishing an SCO Development Bank during Kyrgyzstan’s chairmanship, with leaders also supporting Iran’s expedited entry into the SCO Interbank Consortium.

Eight of the 10 SCO member states – Belarus, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – reaffirmed support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while India declined to join the statement.

Chinese President Xi Jinping called on members to build “universal security” and prevent external interference in the internal affairs of states.

Meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines, Xi said unpredictability in the international situation had risen sharply and that Beijing was ready to work with Moscow to advance a multipolar order and reform of global governance.

Putin told the summit that national currencies now account for more than 98 percent of Russia’s trade payments with SCO partners, and named expanded intra-bloc trade as a priority.

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov opened the meeting, saying member states account for over 40 percent of the world’s population and about a quarter of global GDP, and that the organization had grown from a border security mechanism into a global actor.

The summit convened six months into the US war on Iran, and four and a half years into the war in Ukraine, with Washington also pursuing trade disputes with China and India, and threatening to impose secondary sanctions on any country or company trading with Tehran.

Beijing, the main purchaser of Iranian crude, said it would firmly defend its interests.

September 1, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on SCO leaders sign Bishkek Declaration against ‘western unilateralism’

India’s anti-terror agency to question jailed Ukrainian mercenary

RT | September 1, 2026

India’s federal anti-terror agency will interrogate a Ukrainian and an American who were arrested in March for allegedly entering the country’s restricted areas without permits, and crossing over into neighboring Myanmar to provide training to armed groups.

A Delhi court on Monday allowed the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to interrogate Ukrainian Viktor Kaminskyi and American Matthew VanDyke on September 2 and 3.

Both men are currently in Delhi’s Tihar jail. The two, along with five other Ukrainians – Petro Hurba, Taras Slyviak, Ivan Sukmanovskyi, Marian Stefankiv, and Maksim Honcharuk – were arrested from three different cities while trying to fly out of the country.

It is not immediately clear why the NIA is interrogating only two from the group. The agency earlier recorded voice samples of all the arrested individuals.

Soon after their arrest, Ukraine rejected “any insinuations regarding the possible involvement of the Ukrainian State in supporting terrorist activities” and demanded that India release its nationals.

The NIA earlier reportedly found evidence that multiple consignments of drones from Europe were delivered by the accused to individuals and groups in the northeastern Indian state of Mizoram, where they crossed into Myanmar.

Myanmar insurgent groups are reportedly linked to rebel outfits in India’s northeast region – drawing the attention of Indian agencies to the group’s activities.

VanDyke is the founder of Sons of Liberty International, which provides military training in conflict zones. He has reportedly been involved in conflicts in the past, including fighting with Libyan rebels in 2011.

His family and lawyers said on Sunday that a Delhi court rejected their request – citing his deteriorating health – to allow him treatment at a private hospital, and to communicate with his family in the US. In July, the court allowed him special food items and a cook after he complained that the “spicy and oily” prison meals affected his health.

The family said the US ambassador to India, Sergio Gor, briefed Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio about Van Dyke in May.

In a statement posted on X, Sons of Liberty demanded “urgent US diplomatic intervention” to bring VanDyke home.

September 1, 2026 Posted by | Deception, War Crimes | , , | Comments Off on India’s anti-terror agency to question jailed Ukrainian mercenary

India’s reluctance to confront US over Chabahar attacks exposes contradictions in its Iran policy: Journalist

Press TV – July 26, 2026

India’s continued reluctance to openly challenge Washington despite the recent US attacks on Iran, including the strategic coastal city of Chabahar, has exposed the contradictions at the heart of New Delhi’s foreign policy, says an Indian journalist and foreign policy analyst.

Speaking to the Press TV website, Sanjay Kapoor, founder and editor of Hardnews magazine and president of the Editors Guild of India, said India’s approach towards Chabahar has never been independent of US policy on Iran, noting that New Delhi has consistently calibrated its engagement with the strategic Iranian port around Washington’s broader regional strategy.

“India decided to take up the Chabahar project only after then US President Barack Obama had signed the JCPOA and there was a global attempt to normalise ties with Iran,” Kapoor said.

He noted that India, like many other countries, had also severed its energy relationship with Iran after Washington instructed New Delhi to stop purchasing Iranian oil, underscoring India’s willingness to accommodate American concerns over the Islamic Republic.

“India also cut energy ties with Iran after the US told New Delhi to stop buying Persian oil. In other words, India has been mindful of US concerns on Iran,” he stated.

Kapoor said the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government in New Delhi has simultaneously cultivated close strategic relations with Israel, a policy that has further aligned India’s foreign policy with that of Washington.

“Besides, this BJP government has been close to Israel also, which ensures that New Delhi stays close to the US and its foreign policy,” he told the Press TV website.

His remarks follow the recent US aggression against southern Iran, during which the port city of Chabahar was also targeted, raising questions over the future of India’s flagship connectivity project in the region and whether New Delhi can continue portraying the port as a strategic priority while avoiding direct criticism of US attacks on Iranian territory.

Located on Iran’s southeastern coast, Chabahar has long been regarded as India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, allowing it to bypass Pakistan while providing Tehran with an important regional trade hub.

India has invested in developing the Shahid Beheshti terminal of the port, viewing Chabahar as a counterweight to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Deep historical ties have not translated into strategic consistency

Despite India’s cautious approach in recent years, Kapoor told the Press TV website that relations between Iran and India rest on centuries of historical, cultural and religious interaction.

He pointed out that India is home to the world’s second-largest Shia population after Iran, adding that religious links between the two countries continue to shape people-to-people relations.

He also referred to Imam Khomeini’s old ties with his hometown, Lucknow, the capital of northern India’s biggest state, Uttar Pradesh.

“There is continuous interaction between the Shia clergy in India with their counterparts in Iran and Iraq,” he noted, adding that Iran has traditionally viewed India differently from many other countries, pointing to the longstanding cultural affinity between the two civilizations.

“Iran also never saw India as a foreign country. They also perceive Kashmir in India as Iran-e-Sagheer (little Iran),” he said, referring to the Muslim-majority Himalayan region of Kashmir in northern India.

Kapoor argued that successive governments in New Delhi believed these deep-rooted ties would allow India to preserve its relationship with Tehran even while strengthening strategic cooperation with Washington.

“The Indian government under the BJP always believed that they will manage substantial ties with Iran like they managed the Chabahar Port,” he stated.

However, he maintained that New Delhi ultimately regarded alignment with the United States as the more pressing strategic priority.

“For whatever reason, they thought they had more compelling reason to align themselves with the US. They believed that Iran could wait,” Kapoor remarked.

According to the veteran journalist, India’s reluctance to publicly support Iran stems less from hostility towards Tehran than from its determination to remain aligned with Washington’s geopolitical ambitions.

“Their reluctance to support Iran openly is due to their desperation to be on the right side of the US,” he stressed.

He believes Indian policymakers expect the current regional situation to evolve and remain confident that New Delhi’s long-standing doctrine of strategic autonomy will eventually enable it to restore any damage to bilateral relations.

“They believe that what’s happening is transitory and the final outcome will look different from now. Their resort to strategic autonomy in their foreign policy will give them a chance to make up with the Iranian government,” Kapoor said.

US attacks have exposed the fragility of India’s Chabahar strategy

Kapoor said Chabahar was originally conceived as a stable alternative to Iran’s other major ports, making it particularly attractive to India when Tehran offered New Delhi the opportunity to develop the Shahid Beheshti terminal.

“Chabahar was meant to be away from the ferment that used to be in Bandar Abbas. It was expected to be stable and peaceful. That was the unique selling point of Chabahar when its terminal, Shahid Beheshti, was offered to India by the government of Iran,” he said.

However, he said the recent US attacks around the port have fundamentally altered those assumptions.

“For some strange reason, Chabahar is facing the ire of US attacks. They have misiled and bombed the port.”

Kapoor questioned New Delhi’s claim that Indian infrastructure at the port escaped damage during the attacks.

“The Indian government says Indian infrastructure has not been lost due to the attack. That’s saying a bit much,” he added.

The senior Indian journalist noted that New Delhi invested approximately $120 million in the Shahid Beheshti terminal but deliberately limited further investment because US sanctions made financing increasingly difficult.

According to Kapoor, Russian government sources have previously indicated that Moscow helped India overcome funding shortages for the project on several occasions.

Despite maintaining its presence at Chabahar for years, Kapoor argued that New Delhi never fully embraced the project.

“Despite soldiering on for many years, India always remained a reluctant partner,” he said.

Kapoor said many Iranian experts have long argued that Tehran deliberately preserved Chabahar as an opportunity for India despite having other potential partners.

“As many Iranian experts told me, Tehran had kept Chabahar for India,” he told the Press TV website. “They argue that if they had wanted, they could have given the port to Pakistan, China or even Russia.”

He said India’s strategic calculations changed significantly after the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, removing one of the principal reasons behind New Delhi’s investment in the Iranian port.

“India thought Chabahar had become untenable after the US left Afghanistan,” he said.

Rather than engaging with Afghanistan’s new Taliban-led government, Kapoor said India shifted its focus to alternative connectivity initiatives backed by Washington and several of its regional partners.

The journalist believes India’s regional priorities have increasingly shifted away from Chabahar towards the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a US-backed connectivity initiative linking India with Europe through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israeli-occupied territories and Mediterranean countries such as Greece and Italy.

“India did not want to negotiate with the Taliban and happily became part of IMEC, which promised a lot, including a seat on the G7 high table,” he stated.

Kapoor recalled that speculation briefly emerged in Indian media about reviving New Delhi’s engagement with Chabahar following the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Tehran and Washington. However, he said those expectations quickly faded once the ceasefire broke down and US attacks on Iran resumed.

India depends on Afghanistan and Washington’s calculations

Asked whether the long-term success of Chabahar ultimately depends on Iran’s stability and sovereignty, Kapoor said New Delhi’s strategic calculations extend beyond developments inside Iran.

“Chabahar’s stability depends, in India’s estimation, on who controls Afghanistan and on how the US perceives the port,” he noted.

He explained that India’s primary motivation for investing in Chabahar was never limited to commercial interests alone but centred on gaining direct access to Afghanistan while bypassing Pakistan.

According to Kapoor, changes in the regional geopolitical landscape have complicated those calculations.

“My contention may not square with the views of others, but India would only make a pitch for Chabahar if it doesn’t elicit a hostile response from its (Persian) Gulf partners and that’s only possible if Washington is backing India to help Afghanistan as well as support against Pakistan,” he said.

He argued that Pakistan remains a central factor in India’s strategic thinking, noting that the evolving military balance in South Asia following the recent war against Iran has further complicated New Delhi’s decision-making.

“After the recent war in West Asia, there has been a shift and Pakistan is better off militarily. What happens next will impact India’s policy towards Chabahar,” he remarked.

To Kapoor, India’s future investment in the port will depend primarily on the trajectory of Iran-US relations and Pakistan’s regional position.

“To sum up, India will invest in Chabahar if the US builds working relations with Iran and Pakistan is on the defensive due to this.”

Relations with Israel carry long-term risks

Kapoor said India’s growing partnership with Israel inevitably raises questions in Iran about the future direction of bilateral relations.

“Ordinarily, the trust that India and Iran enjoy should get eroded after PM Modi was in Tel Aviv just days before the war broke out,” the Indian journalist stated.

“The moot question that Iran should ask itself is whether India is a friend or a foe,” he added, pointing to the numerous interactions between Indian and Israeli leaders in recent years.

He added that despite increasing strategic cooperation with Israel and close ties with Washington, India has so far managed to preserve working relations with Iran.

According to Kapoor, New Delhi appears confident that it can maintain relations with “both sides” without suffering major diplomatic consequences.

July 26, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Comments Off on India’s reluctance to confront US over Chabahar attacks exposes contradictions in its Iran policy: Journalist

Ex-Indian envoy: US showed ‘scant regard’ for India in attack on Iranian frigate

Press TV – July 24, 2026

Former Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal says the US attack on the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena near Sri Lanka demonstrated Washington’s disregard for India’s sensitivities, warning that the war with Iran has expanded beyond West Asia into India’s immediate maritime neighborhood.

“The sinking of the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena by a US submarine in the Indian Ocean has brought the widening conflict with Iran into India’s immediate maritime neighborhood. This is no longer a distant West Asian crisis,” Sibal wrote on X on Friday.

Sibal said the circumstances gave the incident both moral and diplomatic significance for New Delhi.

“That fact gives the episode a moral and diplomatic dimension that cannot simply be ignored. The United States has shown scant regard for Indian sensitivities in carrying out this action so close to our shores,” he said.

Warning that the consequences extend beyond the immediate attack, Sibal said the war between major powers will inevitably spread beyond West Asia into regions vital to India’s interests.

“The larger issue is the progressive spread of the conflict beyond West Asia. Escalation between major powers does not remain geographically contained. It inevitably spills into regions that are vital to India’s security and economic interests,” he wrote.

He added: “Stability in the Indian Ocean, freedom of navigation, and uninterrupted energy flows are not abstract concerns for India. They are core national interests. Any sustained disruption in these waters will have direct and serious consequences for us.”

Sibal said New Delhi now faces the challenge of preserving its strategic autonomy while balancing ties with both Washington and Tehran.

“India now faces the difficult task of preserving its strategic autonomy while managing relations with both Washington and Tehran. Conflicts between other powers that reach our maritime neighborhood leave us with fewer good options and greater exposure,” he wrote.

“The central question is how India protects its interests when the wars of others begin to unfold in its own extended neighborhood. This is no longer a hypothetical problem. It has arrived.”

Sibal also criticized the Indian government following the sinking of the IRIS Dena, writing that, “If India had not invited the Iranian warship to participate in the exercise, it would not have been in that area.”

Referring to the Milan 2026 multinational naval exercise, he said, “Participating ships were not allowed to carry any ammunition,” adding that the Iranian frigate “was unarmed at the time.”

He also said that “the US submarine attack appears to have been planned in advance because Washington was aware of the Iranian warship’s participation in the exercise.”

The IRIS Dena was returning from the Milan 2026 multinational naval exercise, hosted by the Indian Navy with the participation of 72 countries, when it was attacked by a US submarine in the Indian Ocean near Sri Lanka.

Sri Lankan authorities said 32 Iranian sailors were rescued, while the fate of 140 others remained unknown. Iranian media reported that 80 sailors were killed in the attack.

July 24, 2026 Posted by | War Crimes, Wars for Israel | , , | Comments Off on Ex-Indian envoy: US showed ‘scant regard’ for India in attack on Iranian frigate

India to collect voice samples of arrested Ukrainian and US mercenaries

RT | July 3, 2026

India will collect the voice samples of six mercenaries – five Ukrainians and a US national – who were arrested in March by the National Investigation Agency (NIA), New Delhi’s anti-terror agency.

Together with another Ukrainian, they were arrested in March; all have been charged with aiding insurgent groups in neighboring Myanmar and providing them with weaponry.

The six were presented before a Delhi court on Friday amid heavy security, and were told they would remain in custody until August 1. They consented to have their voices recorded.

The court will decide the date for collecting voice samples on Saturday, when the remaining Ukrainian will be presented before it.

The NIA is also seeking an extension of the investigation period to 180 days under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, India’s primary anti-terrorism legislation.

The probe focuses on the alleged illegal entry of the mercenaries into the Indian border state of Mizoram, where foreign nationals are required to obtain a special permit, as well as their subsequent illegal crossing into Myanmar.

The Ukrainian men in custody are Petro Hurba, Taras Slyviak, Ivan Sukmanovskyi, Marian Stefankiv, Maksim Honcharuk, and Viktor Kaminskyi; three were detained at Delhi’s airport, while the others were taken in by the NIA in Lucknow. Matthew Aaron VanDyke, the US citizen, was arrested at an airport in the coastal city of Kolkata.

The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, at the time of their arrest, demanded the immediate release of its citizens and access to them, claiming there were no “established facts proving the involvement of the said Ukrainian citizens in unlawful activities on the territory of India or Myanmar.”

It also accused Indian and Russian media of publishing “distorted interpretations of the available facts.”

But reports at the time indicated that the Indian intelligence agencies were on the trail of the suspects after gathering significant inputs, likely from Interpol or with help from foreign intelligence agencies.

Mizoram’s chief minister, Lalduhoma, alleged last year that “thousands” of Western mercenaries linked to Kiev had crossed over to Myanmar via his state.

The chief minister of the neighboring state of Manipur, N. Biren Singh, suggested in 2024 that authorities suspected the involvement of foreign mercenaries in the violence in the state, referring to combat forces linked to Myanmar. At that time, New Delhi announced it would fence the entire 1,643 kilometer (1,020-mile) border with its neighbor to the east.

July 3, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, War Crimes | , , , | Comments Off on India to collect voice samples of arrested Ukrainian and US mercenaries

India signals rethink over West Asia

By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | June 13, 2026 

Make no mistake, Modi Government is squarely blaming the US for the attack on ships in Strait of Hormuz killing seven Indian sailors. Protests have been lodged with the US charge d’affaires twice in 3 days, the second demarche being in notably harsher tone despite the news trickling from the Persian Gulf region,  Pakistan and US that an MOU has been all but negotiated for signature lifting the American naval blockade of Iranian ports.

The salience of the Indian demarche lies in the following directions: 

1. The US was provoking Delhi, which has resolutely pushed back — Washington’s silence in rebutting the Indian accusation  is deafening. 

2. There is no interest whatsoever in Delhi to adopt a median line apportioning blame between DC and Tehran (contrary to what some Indian newspapers have prioritised). 

3. Stemming from the above, it sands to reason that Delhi has begun a comprehensive review of its tilt toward the US-Israeli axis and the earlier short-sighted delusional thinking that Abraham Accords would be the gateway to peace in West Asia.

4. Conceivably, the door opens — now that it is a matter of time before sanctions against Iran are lifted — for a full-throttle engagement of Iran which is going to be a towering presence in the geopolitics of our region, that would, hopefully, correct the distortions that crept into India’s foreign policy strategies in West Asia during the past decade.

5. No doubt, this is a major diplomatic shift on India’s part. World media has taken note. The foreign policy establishment is adjusting with alacrity in real time — an extraordinary spectacle in itself, to put it mildly, considering the manifest reluctance to indulge in public diplomacy critical of American moves — to the new imperatives of conducting a ‘transactional relationship’ with the US that take into account not only the domestic sentiments but also the global situation as well as the humiliating defeat — arguably, the most far-reaching defeat in the modern history— of the Americans in West Asia. 

6. Finally, most important, Opposition leader Rahul Gandhi’s stance on West Asian developments seeking a course correction to the illogical pro-US tilt in India’s foreign policies stands  vindicated, which in turn would necessitate a jettisoning of unilateralism in foreign policy moves and a return to the process  of consensus-making, which had served India’s interests historically and used to be integral to the country’s political culture and civilisational traits.

June 13, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on India signals rethink over West Asia

Disliking Israel, a Popular Opinion across the World

By Adam Dick | Peace and Prosperity Blog | June 6, 2026

The Israel government has done a lot to earn dislike through bringing death and destruction on a vast scale. People are seeing Israel’s attacks in the last few years on Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, and beyond as using destructive force that is not just defensive and focused on military targets. General annihilation is seen as a clear objective.

Americans have had special reason to become aware of reasons to dislike Israel given that the United States government has been working as a coconspirator, funding and otherwise assisting Israel’s mayhem. Indeed, a new Pew Research Center poll of the views of people across 36 countries found that in America 60 percent of queried individuals have a very or somewhat unfavorable opinion of Israel, while only 37 percent have a somewhat or very favorable opinion of Israel.

Still, Americans, compared with other people questioned across the world, come in as less critical of Israel than most. The figures for median views of people in the 36 surveyed countries came in at a 67 percent unfavorable view of Israel and a 25 percent favorable view.

In each of the 36 surveyed countries where people were questioned, the opinion regarding Israel tilted negative except for in India and three African nations — Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria — where the positive opinion regarding Israel came in on top.

June 6, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, War Crimes | , , , , , , | Comments Off on Disliking Israel, a Popular Opinion across the World

India-Israel-UAE: An Alliance of Many Anxieties

By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – May 27, 2026

The I2U2 — that much-heralded “West Asian Quad” of India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States — is gathering dust. Launched with fanfare in July 2022 and billed as a transformative framework for regional integration, it has produced little of consequence since its inaugural summit.

Progress stalled through 2024, and its April 2025 revival dialogue in New Delhi was notably described as the first convening of the group in almost two years. Without sustained American engagement, the scaffolding has simply collapsed. What remains, however, is something more durable and more troubling: an informal troika of Israel, the UAE, and India, joined not by shared ambition but by a shared phobia.

Three States, One Obsession

Strip away the diplomatic pleasantries, and the organic glue binding Jerusalem, Abu Dhabi, and New Delhi is strikingly similar: each government perceives political Islam — in its domestic and regional expressions — as a foundational threat to its survival. For the UAE, the enemy has a name: the Muslim Brotherhood. Abu Dhabi under Mohammed bin Zayed has treated Brotherhood-affiliated movements as an existential menace to dynastic stability. The Emirati government’s sweeping crackdown on al-Islah, the Brotherhood’s local affiliate, was driven by the calculation that political Islam of any kind is fundamentally threatening to government security. The UAE formally designated the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation in 2014, backed the military coup in Egypt, led the 2017 blockade of Qatar, and as recently as January 2025, blacklisted eleven individuals and eight UK-based organisations linked to Brotherhood networks. This is not counterterrorism policy in any conventional sense; it is a preemptive war on political pluralism dressed in security language.

India’s version of the same anxiety plays out along the Hindu-Muslim fault line. Anti-Muslim sentiment has intensified systematically since 2014. India’s 200 million Muslims — the world’s third-largest Muslim population — have faced demolitions of homes, discriminatory citizenship legislation, and a political atmosphere. The BJP government has systematically reframed domestic Muslim political life as a security threat, deploying counterterrorism law against peaceful dissent. If the UAE fears a Brotherhood-style capture of the state, India fears the democratic agency of its own largest minority.

Israel’s specter is Palestine. More precisely, it is the impossibility of indefinitely suppressing Palestinian political self-determination without a cost to legitimacy. For all three governments, the language of “counterterrorism” functions as a tranquilizer: it sedates domestic dissent, silences international criticism, and transforms political opponents into security threats. This shared grammar of repression is the true foundation of the troika.

While tackling these internal and regional threats remains a key imperative, the most recent push to revive the alliance, even without Washington being a formal member, is Iran and the still ongoing Iran war.

From Phobia to Alliance: Iran as the Accelerant

If political Islam is the ideological glue, Iran is what has now hardened this informal troika into something resembling a war coalition. Following the US-Israeli strikes on Iran that began on February 28, 2026, the theoretical alignments of the Abraham Accords era became operational reality. Iran retaliated by targeting Gulf infrastructure, firing some 550 ballistic and cruise missiles and more than 2,200 drones at the UAE, making it the most targeted country in the region, including Israel. In response, Israel did something unprecedented: it deployed an Iron Dome battery, Israeli troops to operate it, and reportedly also its cutting-edge Iron Beam laser defence system and Spectro surveillance technology to Emirati soil. The Financial Times reported that Israeli military personnel on the ground in Gulf states were “a not insignificant number”. Emirati officials, reflecting on who came to their defence, reportedly said: “It was a real eye-opening moment. To see who our real friends are.”

The Abraham Accords, signed in 2020, were partly motivated by a shared perception of the Iranian threat. What the 2026 conflict has done is strip away all residual ambiguity about what that means in practice. The UAE allowed its territory and airspace to be used by Israeli and American forces for strikes on Iran, according to Iranian officials. The Israeli Air Force carried out strikes in southern Iran during the war to neutralize short-range missiles threatening Gulf states. Abu Dhabi and Jerusalem are no longer strategic partners in aspiration; they are military partners in fact. The dream project of dismantling Iran as a regional power, long whispered in the corridors of both capitals, is now an open agenda.

It is in this context that Prime Minister Modi’s May 15, 2026 visit to Abu Dhabi — his eighth trip to the UAE in twelve years — must be read. The visit produced a raft of agreements: $5 billion in Emirati investment pledges, a long-term LPG supply deal, ADNOC access to India’s strategic petroleum reserves, and — most significantly — a formal Framework for the Strategic Defence Partnership covering defence industrial collaboration, cybersecurity, intelligence sharing, maritime security, and joint military exercises. Modi also chose to publicly condemn the Iranian attacks on the UAE and pledged India’s support in maintaining regional peace — a significant departure from the studied neutrality New Delhi had maintained for years. The visit came one day after India had hosted Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who had openly accused the UAE of being “directly involved” in the US-Israeli war on Iran. The juxtaposition was not accidental; it was a signal about the direction of India’s foreign policy.

Silence Is No Longer a Strategy

For years, India’s position in this triangular relationship was one of studied ambiguity. New Delhi deepened ties with Israel and the UAE while maintaining functional relations with Iran and nominally adhering to the principle of strategic autonomy. That posture is now collapsing under the weight of events.

The contradiction at its heart is Chabahar. In May 2024, India signed a ten-year agreement to operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal, committing $120 million with a further $250 million credit line. This was to be New Delhi’s only viable overland and maritime gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi has called it a “golden gate” for India’s connectivity ambitions. Yet the US ended its special sanctions waiver for Chabahar in September 2025, and India has been reduced to exploring a temporary transfer of its stake back to Iran to avoid American penalties. Strategic autonomy, it turns out, survives only on American sufferance. Meanwhile, any Indian military technology that reaches the UAE now enters a security ecosystem that includes Israel — meaning India’s new defence partnership with Abu Dhabi is, in practice, an indirect alignment with Tel Aviv.

India now faces a reckoning that its political class has been deferring for years. As the region moves from cold confrontation to hot war, the space for equidistance evaporates. Every arms deal, every investment pact, every public statement condemning Iranian strikes while maintaining silence on Gaza and the West Bank narrows the gap between partnership and complicity. The troika that fear built has a peculiar logic: states drawn together by what they dread at home — Muslim political power in its various forms — will inevitably be pulled toward a shared agenda abroad. For India, the path ahead is less a clear choice than a delicate negotiation — with its own pluralistic traditions, with its new partners in the Gulf and Israel, and with a neighbourhood that offers no easy answers. What happens next will depend not on grand declarations, but on the quiet, unglamorous work of balancing interests without losing sight of the human cost at home.

Salman Rafi Sheikh is a research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.

May 27, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Islamophobia, Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , | Comments Off on India-Israel-UAE: An Alliance of Many Anxieties

Sanctions Backfire: Why Pakistan Now Buys Chinese Weapons Instead of American Ones

Sputnik – 25.05.2026

Pakistan now receives up to 80% of its military imports from China — a striking reversal of the Cold War era, when the United States served as Islamabad’s primary arms supplier.
How and why did this happen? The key reason was US sanctions, retired Pakistan Air Force Captain Sultan M. Hali told Sputnik.

During Pakistan’s conflicts with India in 1965 and 1971, the United States imposed sanctions on both sides — but Pakistan was more affected since it relied heavily on Western equipment. China stepped in to help at that critical moment.

In the post-Cold War period, repeated US sanctions again disrupted Pakistan’s access to critical hardware.

Beijing, by contrast, offered technology transfer — a step Western suppliers rarely take, and when they do, it comes with a web of restrictive conditions.

Pakistan has now inducted a wide spectrum of Chinese systems, including fighter jets, air defense systems, early warning aircraft, frigates, and submarines.

May 25, 2026 Posted by | Timeless or most popular | , , , | Comments Off on Sanctions Backfire: Why Pakistan Now Buys Chinese Weapons Instead of American Ones

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