India’s reluctance to confront US over Chabahar attacks exposes contradictions in its Iran policy: Journalist
Press TV – July 26, 2026
India’s continued reluctance to openly challenge Washington despite the recent US attacks on Iran, including the strategic coastal city of Chabahar, has exposed the contradictions at the heart of New Delhi’s foreign policy, says an Indian journalist and foreign policy analyst.
Speaking to the Press TV website, Sanjay Kapoor, founder and editor of Hardnews magazine and president of the Editors Guild of India, said India’s approach towards Chabahar has never been independent of US policy on Iran, noting that New Delhi has consistently calibrated its engagement with the strategic Iranian port around Washington’s broader regional strategy.
“India decided to take up the Chabahar project only after then US President Barack Obama had signed the JCPOA and there was a global attempt to normalise ties with Iran,” Kapoor said.
He noted that India, like many other countries, had also severed its energy relationship with Iran after Washington instructed New Delhi to stop purchasing Iranian oil, underscoring India’s willingness to accommodate American concerns over the Islamic Republic.
“India also cut energy ties with Iran after the US told New Delhi to stop buying Persian oil. In other words, India has been mindful of US concerns on Iran,” he stated.
Kapoor said the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government in New Delhi has simultaneously cultivated close strategic relations with Israel, a policy that has further aligned India’s foreign policy with that of Washington.
“Besides, this BJP government has been close to Israel also, which ensures that New Delhi stays close to the US and its foreign policy,” he told the Press TV website.
His remarks follow the recent US aggression against southern Iran, during which the port city of Chabahar was also targeted, raising questions over the future of India’s flagship connectivity project in the region and whether New Delhi can continue portraying the port as a strategic priority while avoiding direct criticism of US attacks on Iranian territory.
Located on Iran’s southeastern coast, Chabahar has long been regarded as India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, allowing it to bypass Pakistan while providing Tehran with an important regional trade hub.
India has invested in developing the Shahid Beheshti terminal of the port, viewing Chabahar as a counterweight to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Deep historical ties have not translated into strategic consistency
Despite India’s cautious approach in recent years, Kapoor told the Press TV website that relations between Iran and India rest on centuries of historical, cultural and religious interaction.
He pointed out that India is home to the world’s second-largest Shia population after Iran, adding that religious links between the two countries continue to shape people-to-people relations.
He also referred to Imam Khomeini’s old ties with his hometown, Lucknow, the capital of northern India’s biggest state, Uttar Pradesh.
“There is continuous interaction between the Shia clergy in India with their counterparts in Iran and Iraq,” he noted, adding that Iran has traditionally viewed India differently from many other countries, pointing to the longstanding cultural affinity between the two civilizations.
“Iran also never saw India as a foreign country. They also perceive Kashmir in India as Iran-e-Sagheer (little Iran),” he said, referring to the Muslim-majority Himalayan region of Kashmir in northern India.
Kapoor argued that successive governments in New Delhi believed these deep-rooted ties would allow India to preserve its relationship with Tehran even while strengthening strategic cooperation with Washington.
“The Indian government under the BJP always believed that they will manage substantial ties with Iran like they managed the Chabahar Port,” he stated.
However, he maintained that New Delhi ultimately regarded alignment with the United States as the more pressing strategic priority.
“For whatever reason, they thought they had more compelling reason to align themselves with the US. They believed that Iran could wait,” Kapoor remarked.
According to the veteran journalist, India’s reluctance to publicly support Iran stems less from hostility towards Tehran than from its determination to remain aligned with Washington’s geopolitical ambitions.
“Their reluctance to support Iran openly is due to their desperation to be on the right side of the US,” he stressed.
He believes Indian policymakers expect the current regional situation to evolve and remain confident that New Delhi’s long-standing doctrine of strategic autonomy will eventually enable it to restore any damage to bilateral relations.
“They believe that what’s happening is transitory and the final outcome will look different from now. Their resort to strategic autonomy in their foreign policy will give them a chance to make up with the Iranian government,” Kapoor said.
US attacks have exposed the fragility of India’s Chabahar strategy
Kapoor said Chabahar was originally conceived as a stable alternative to Iran’s other major ports, making it particularly attractive to India when Tehran offered New Delhi the opportunity to develop the Shahid Beheshti terminal.
“Chabahar was meant to be away from the ferment that used to be in Bandar Abbas. It was expected to be stable and peaceful. That was the unique selling point of Chabahar when its terminal, Shahid Beheshti, was offered to India by the government of Iran,” he said.
However, he said the recent US attacks around the port have fundamentally altered those assumptions.
“For some strange reason, Chabahar is facing the ire of US attacks. They have misiled and bombed the port.”
Kapoor questioned New Delhi’s claim that Indian infrastructure at the port escaped damage during the attacks.
“The Indian government says Indian infrastructure has not been lost due to the attack. That’s saying a bit much,” he added.
The senior Indian journalist noted that New Delhi invested approximately $120 million in the Shahid Beheshti terminal but deliberately limited further investment because US sanctions made financing increasingly difficult.
According to Kapoor, Russian government sources have previously indicated that Moscow helped India overcome funding shortages for the project on several occasions.
Despite maintaining its presence at Chabahar for years, Kapoor argued that New Delhi never fully embraced the project.
“Despite soldiering on for many years, India always remained a reluctant partner,” he said.
Kapoor said many Iranian experts have long argued that Tehran deliberately preserved Chabahar as an opportunity for India despite having other potential partners.
“As many Iranian experts told me, Tehran had kept Chabahar for India,” he told the Press TV website. “They argue that if they had wanted, they could have given the port to Pakistan, China or even Russia.”
He said India’s strategic calculations changed significantly after the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, removing one of the principal reasons behind New Delhi’s investment in the Iranian port.
“India thought Chabahar had become untenable after the US left Afghanistan,” he said.
Rather than engaging with Afghanistan’s new Taliban-led government, Kapoor said India shifted its focus to alternative connectivity initiatives backed by Washington and several of its regional partners.
The journalist believes India’s regional priorities have increasingly shifted away from Chabahar towards the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a US-backed connectivity initiative linking India with Europe through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israeli-occupied territories and Mediterranean countries such as Greece and Italy.
“India did not want to negotiate with the Taliban and happily became part of IMEC, which promised a lot, including a seat on the G7 high table,” he stated.
Kapoor recalled that speculation briefly emerged in Indian media about reviving New Delhi’s engagement with Chabahar following the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Tehran and Washington. However, he said those expectations quickly faded once the ceasefire broke down and US attacks on Iran resumed.
India depends on Afghanistan and Washington’s calculations
Asked whether the long-term success of Chabahar ultimately depends on Iran’s stability and sovereignty, Kapoor said New Delhi’s strategic calculations extend beyond developments inside Iran.
“Chabahar’s stability depends, in India’s estimation, on who controls Afghanistan and on how the US perceives the port,” he noted.
He explained that India’s primary motivation for investing in Chabahar was never limited to commercial interests alone but centred on gaining direct access to Afghanistan while bypassing Pakistan.
According to Kapoor, changes in the regional geopolitical landscape have complicated those calculations.
“My contention may not square with the views of others, but India would only make a pitch for Chabahar if it doesn’t elicit a hostile response from its (Persian) Gulf partners and that’s only possible if Washington is backing India to help Afghanistan as well as support against Pakistan,” he said.
He argued that Pakistan remains a central factor in India’s strategic thinking, noting that the evolving military balance in South Asia following the recent war against Iran has further complicated New Delhi’s decision-making.
“After the recent war in West Asia, there has been a shift and Pakistan is better off militarily. What happens next will impact India’s policy towards Chabahar,” he remarked.
To Kapoor, India’s future investment in the port will depend primarily on the trajectory of Iran-US relations and Pakistan’s regional position.
“To sum up, India will invest in Chabahar if the US builds working relations with Iran and Pakistan is on the defensive due to this.”
Relations with Israel carry long-term risks
Kapoor said India’s growing partnership with Israel inevitably raises questions in Iran about the future direction of bilateral relations.
“Ordinarily, the trust that India and Iran enjoy should get eroded after PM Modi was in Tel Aviv just days before the war broke out,” the Indian journalist stated.
“The moot question that Iran should ask itself is whether India is a friend or a foe,” he added, pointing to the numerous interactions between Indian and Israeli leaders in recent years.
He added that despite increasing strategic cooperation with Israel and close ties with Washington, India has so far managed to preserve working relations with Iran.
According to Kapoor, New Delhi appears confident that it can maintain relations with “both sides” without suffering major diplomatic consequences.
Ex-Indian envoy: US showed ‘scant regard’ for India in attack on Iranian frigate
Press TV – July 24, 2026
Former Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal says the US attack on the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena near Sri Lanka demonstrated Washington’s disregard for India’s sensitivities, warning that the war with Iran has expanded beyond West Asia into India’s immediate maritime neighborhood.
“The sinking of the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena by a US submarine in the Indian Ocean has brought the widening conflict with Iran into India’s immediate maritime neighborhood. This is no longer a distant West Asian crisis,” Sibal wrote on X on Friday.
Sibal said the circumstances gave the incident both moral and diplomatic significance for New Delhi.
“That fact gives the episode a moral and diplomatic dimension that cannot simply be ignored. The United States has shown scant regard for Indian sensitivities in carrying out this action so close to our shores,” he said.
Warning that the consequences extend beyond the immediate attack, Sibal said the war between major powers will inevitably spread beyond West Asia into regions vital to India’s interests.
“The larger issue is the progressive spread of the conflict beyond West Asia. Escalation between major powers does not remain geographically contained. It inevitably spills into regions that are vital to India’s security and economic interests,” he wrote.
He added: “Stability in the Indian Ocean, freedom of navigation, and uninterrupted energy flows are not abstract concerns for India. They are core national interests. Any sustained disruption in these waters will have direct and serious consequences for us.”
Sibal said New Delhi now faces the challenge of preserving its strategic autonomy while balancing ties with both Washington and Tehran.
“India now faces the difficult task of preserving its strategic autonomy while managing relations with both Washington and Tehran. Conflicts between other powers that reach our maritime neighborhood leave us with fewer good options and greater exposure,” he wrote.
“The central question is how India protects its interests when the wars of others begin to unfold in its own extended neighborhood. This is no longer a hypothetical problem. It has arrived.”
Sibal also criticized the Indian government following the sinking of the IRIS Dena, writing that, “If India had not invited the Iranian warship to participate in the exercise, it would not have been in that area.”
Referring to the Milan 2026 multinational naval exercise, he said, “Participating ships were not allowed to carry any ammunition,” adding that the Iranian frigate “was unarmed at the time.”
He also said that “the US submarine attack appears to have been planned in advance because Washington was aware of the Iranian warship’s participation in the exercise.”
The IRIS Dena was returning from the Milan 2026 multinational naval exercise, hosted by the Indian Navy with the participation of 72 countries, when it was attacked by a US submarine in the Indian Ocean near Sri Lanka.
Sri Lankan authorities said 32 Iranian sailors were rescued, while the fate of 140 others remained unknown. Iranian media reported that 80 sailors were killed in the attack.
India to collect voice samples of arrested Ukrainian and US mercenaries
RT | July 3, 2026
India will collect the voice samples of six mercenaries – five Ukrainians and a US national – who were arrested in March by the National Investigation Agency (NIA), New Delhi’s anti-terror agency.
Together with another Ukrainian, they were arrested in March; all have been charged with aiding insurgent groups in neighboring Myanmar and providing them with weaponry.
The six were presented before a Delhi court on Friday amid heavy security, and were told they would remain in custody until August 1. They consented to have their voices recorded.
The court will decide the date for collecting voice samples on Saturday, when the remaining Ukrainian will be presented before it.
The NIA is also seeking an extension of the investigation period to 180 days under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, India’s primary anti-terrorism legislation.
The probe focuses on the alleged illegal entry of the mercenaries into the Indian border state of Mizoram, where foreign nationals are required to obtain a special permit, as well as their subsequent illegal crossing into Myanmar.
The Ukrainian men in custody are Petro Hurba, Taras Slyviak, Ivan Sukmanovskyi, Marian Stefankiv, Maksim Honcharuk, and Viktor Kaminskyi; three were detained at Delhi’s airport, while the others were taken in by the NIA in Lucknow. Matthew Aaron VanDyke, the US citizen, was arrested at an airport in the coastal city of Kolkata.
The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, at the time of their arrest, demanded the immediate release of its citizens and access to them, claiming there were no “established facts proving the involvement of the said Ukrainian citizens in unlawful activities on the territory of India or Myanmar.”
It also accused Indian and Russian media of publishing “distorted interpretations of the available facts.”
But reports at the time indicated that the Indian intelligence agencies were on the trail of the suspects after gathering significant inputs, likely from Interpol or with help from foreign intelligence agencies.
Mizoram’s chief minister, Lalduhoma, alleged last year that “thousands” of Western mercenaries linked to Kiev had crossed over to Myanmar via his state.
The chief minister of the neighboring state of Manipur, N. Biren Singh, suggested in 2024 that authorities suspected the involvement of foreign mercenaries in the violence in the state, referring to combat forces linked to Myanmar. At that time, New Delhi announced it would fence the entire 1,643 kilometer (1,020-mile) border with its neighbor to the east.
India signals rethink over West Asia
By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | June 13, 2026
Make no mistake, Modi Government is squarely blaming the US for the attack on ships in Strait of Hormuz killing seven Indian sailors. Protests have been lodged with the US charge d’affaires twice in 3 days, the second demarche being in notably harsher tone despite the news trickling from the Persian Gulf region, Pakistan and US that an MOU has been all but negotiated for signature lifting the American naval blockade of Iranian ports.
The salience of the Indian demarche lies in the following directions:
1. The US was provoking Delhi, which has resolutely pushed back — Washington’s silence in rebutting the Indian accusation is deafening.
2. There is no interest whatsoever in Delhi to adopt a median line apportioning blame between DC and Tehran (contrary to what some Indian newspapers have prioritised).
3. Stemming from the above, it sands to reason that Delhi has begun a comprehensive review of its tilt toward the US-Israeli axis and the earlier short-sighted delusional thinking that Abraham Accords would be the gateway to peace in West Asia.
4. Conceivably, the door opens — now that it is a matter of time before sanctions against Iran are lifted — for a full-throttle engagement of Iran which is going to be a towering presence in the geopolitics of our region, that would, hopefully, correct the distortions that crept into India’s foreign policy strategies in West Asia during the past decade.
5. No doubt, this is a major diplomatic shift on India’s part. World media has taken note. The foreign policy establishment is adjusting with alacrity in real time — an extraordinary spectacle in itself, to put it mildly, considering the manifest reluctance to indulge in public diplomacy critical of American moves — to the new imperatives of conducting a ‘transactional relationship’ with the US that take into account not only the domestic sentiments but also the global situation as well as the humiliating defeat — arguably, the most far-reaching defeat in the modern history— of the Americans in West Asia.
6. Finally, most important, Opposition leader Rahul Gandhi’s stance on West Asian developments seeking a course correction to the illogical pro-US tilt in India’s foreign policies stands vindicated, which in turn would necessitate a jettisoning of unilateralism in foreign policy moves and a return to the process of consensus-making, which had served India’s interests historically and used to be integral to the country’s political culture and civilisational traits.
Disliking Israel, a Popular Opinion across the World

By Adam Dick | Peace and Prosperity Blog | June 6, 2026
The Israel government has done a lot to earn dislike through bringing death and destruction on a vast scale. People are seeing Israel’s attacks in the last few years on Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, and beyond as using destructive force that is not just defensive and focused on military targets. General annihilation is seen as a clear objective.
Americans have had special reason to become aware of reasons to dislike Israel given that the United States government has been working as a coconspirator, funding and otherwise assisting Israel’s mayhem. Indeed, a new Pew Research Center poll of the views of people across 36 countries found that in America 60 percent of queried individuals have a very or somewhat unfavorable opinion of Israel, while only 37 percent have a somewhat or very favorable opinion of Israel.
Still, Americans, compared with other people questioned across the world, come in as less critical of Israel than most. The figures for median views of people in the 36 surveyed countries came in at a 67 percent unfavorable view of Israel and a 25 percent favorable view.
In each of the 36 surveyed countries where people were questioned, the opinion regarding Israel tilted negative except for in India and three African nations — Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria — where the positive opinion regarding Israel came in on top.
India-Israel-UAE: An Alliance of Many Anxieties
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – May 27, 2026
The I2U2 — that much-heralded “West Asian Quad” of India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States — is gathering dust. Launched with fanfare in July 2022 and billed as a transformative framework for regional integration, it has produced little of consequence since its inaugural summit.
Progress stalled through 2024, and its April 2025 revival dialogue in New Delhi was notably described as the first convening of the group in almost two years. Without sustained American engagement, the scaffolding has simply collapsed. What remains, however, is something more durable and more troubling: an informal troika of Israel, the UAE, and India, joined not by shared ambition but by a shared phobia.
Three States, One Obsession
Strip away the diplomatic pleasantries, and the organic glue binding Jerusalem, Abu Dhabi, and New Delhi is strikingly similar: each government perceives political Islam — in its domestic and regional expressions — as a foundational threat to its survival. For the UAE, the enemy has a name: the Muslim Brotherhood. Abu Dhabi under Mohammed bin Zayed has treated Brotherhood-affiliated movements as an existential menace to dynastic stability. The Emirati government’s sweeping crackdown on al-Islah, the Brotherhood’s local affiliate, was driven by the calculation that political Islam of any kind is fundamentally threatening to government security. The UAE formally designated the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation in 2014, backed the military coup in Egypt, led the 2017 blockade of Qatar, and as recently as January 2025, blacklisted eleven individuals and eight UK-based organisations linked to Brotherhood networks. This is not counterterrorism policy in any conventional sense; it is a preemptive war on political pluralism dressed in security language.
India’s version of the same anxiety plays out along the Hindu-Muslim fault line. Anti-Muslim sentiment has intensified systematically since 2014. India’s 200 million Muslims — the world’s third-largest Muslim population — have faced demolitions of homes, discriminatory citizenship legislation, and a political atmosphere. The BJP government has systematically reframed domestic Muslim political life as a security threat, deploying counterterrorism law against peaceful dissent. If the UAE fears a Brotherhood-style capture of the state, India fears the democratic agency of its own largest minority.
Israel’s specter is Palestine. More precisely, it is the impossibility of indefinitely suppressing Palestinian political self-determination without a cost to legitimacy. For all three governments, the language of “counterterrorism” functions as a tranquilizer: it sedates domestic dissent, silences international criticism, and transforms political opponents into security threats. This shared grammar of repression is the true foundation of the troika.
While tackling these internal and regional threats remains a key imperative, the most recent push to revive the alliance, even without Washington being a formal member, is Iran and the still ongoing Iran war.
From Phobia to Alliance: Iran as the Accelerant
If political Islam is the ideological glue, Iran is what has now hardened this informal troika into something resembling a war coalition. Following the US-Israeli strikes on Iran that began on February 28, 2026, the theoretical alignments of the Abraham Accords era became operational reality. Iran retaliated by targeting Gulf infrastructure, firing some 550 ballistic and cruise missiles and more than 2,200 drones at the UAE, making it the most targeted country in the region, including Israel. In response, Israel did something unprecedented: it deployed an Iron Dome battery, Israeli troops to operate it, and reportedly also its cutting-edge Iron Beam laser defence system and Spectro surveillance technology to Emirati soil. The Financial Times reported that Israeli military personnel on the ground in Gulf states were “a not insignificant number”. Emirati officials, reflecting on who came to their defence, reportedly said: “It was a real eye-opening moment. To see who our real friends are.”
The Abraham Accords, signed in 2020, were partly motivated by a shared perception of the Iranian threat. What the 2026 conflict has done is strip away all residual ambiguity about what that means in practice. The UAE allowed its territory and airspace to be used by Israeli and American forces for strikes on Iran, according to Iranian officials. The Israeli Air Force carried out strikes in southern Iran during the war to neutralize short-range missiles threatening Gulf states. Abu Dhabi and Jerusalem are no longer strategic partners in aspiration; they are military partners in fact. The dream project of dismantling Iran as a regional power, long whispered in the corridors of both capitals, is now an open agenda.
It is in this context that Prime Minister Modi’s May 15, 2026 visit to Abu Dhabi — his eighth trip to the UAE in twelve years — must be read. The visit produced a raft of agreements: $5 billion in Emirati investment pledges, a long-term LPG supply deal, ADNOC access to India’s strategic petroleum reserves, and — most significantly — a formal Framework for the Strategic Defence Partnership covering defence industrial collaboration, cybersecurity, intelligence sharing, maritime security, and joint military exercises. Modi also chose to publicly condemn the Iranian attacks on the UAE and pledged India’s support in maintaining regional peace — a significant departure from the studied neutrality New Delhi had maintained for years. The visit came one day after India had hosted Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who had openly accused the UAE of being “directly involved” in the US-Israeli war on Iran. The juxtaposition was not accidental; it was a signal about the direction of India’s foreign policy.
Silence Is No Longer a Strategy
For years, India’s position in this triangular relationship was one of studied ambiguity. New Delhi deepened ties with Israel and the UAE while maintaining functional relations with Iran and nominally adhering to the principle of strategic autonomy. That posture is now collapsing under the weight of events.
The contradiction at its heart is Chabahar. In May 2024, India signed a ten-year agreement to operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal, committing $120 million with a further $250 million credit line. This was to be New Delhi’s only viable overland and maritime gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi has called it a “golden gate” for India’s connectivity ambitions. Yet the US ended its special sanctions waiver for Chabahar in September 2025, and India has been reduced to exploring a temporary transfer of its stake back to Iran to avoid American penalties. Strategic autonomy, it turns out, survives only on American sufferance. Meanwhile, any Indian military technology that reaches the UAE now enters a security ecosystem that includes Israel — meaning India’s new defence partnership with Abu Dhabi is, in practice, an indirect alignment with Tel Aviv.
India now faces a reckoning that its political class has been deferring for years. As the region moves from cold confrontation to hot war, the space for equidistance evaporates. Every arms deal, every investment pact, every public statement condemning Iranian strikes while maintaining silence on Gaza and the West Bank narrows the gap between partnership and complicity. The troika that fear built has a peculiar logic: states drawn together by what they dread at home — Muslim political power in its various forms — will inevitably be pulled toward a shared agenda abroad. For India, the path ahead is less a clear choice than a delicate negotiation — with its own pluralistic traditions, with its new partners in the Gulf and Israel, and with a neighbourhood that offers no easy answers. What happens next will depend not on grand declarations, but on the quiet, unglamorous work of balancing interests without losing sight of the human cost at home.
Salman Rafi Sheikh is a research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.
Over 50 countries continued to arm Israel during genocide of Palestinians in Gaza: Report
The Cradle | May 23, 2026
An Al-Jazeera investigation published on 23 May revealed that military-grade products from at least 51 countries and self-governing territories kept entering Israel even after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a provisional ruling over the genocide of Palestinians in Gaza.
In January 2024, the UN’s top court ordered Israel to take all measures to prevent genocidal acts in Gaza. By then, Israel’s brutal bombing of Gaza had killed more than 26,000 Palestinians, most of them women and children.
However, countries across the globe continued to provide weapons and military assistance to the Israeli military, the Al-Jazeera report found.
Using Israeli Tax Authority (ITA) import data, customs records, and freedom of information requests, the Al-Jazeera investigation found the military-related goods were shipped to Israel from countries across Europe, Asia, North America, and South America, including from many that have signed the genocide convention.
In some cases, the military supplies originated from countries that had publicly imposed arms embargoes on Israel or had at least partially suspended arms supplies to the country.
According to the ITA data, Israeli arms imports increased after the ICJ ruling, in particular munitions imports.
The five biggest military suppliers to Israel—namely the US, India, Romania, Taiwan, and the Czech Republic—all boosted their shipments of military equipment to Tel Aviv following the ruling.
ITA data showed that 2,603 consignments of military-related goods valued at $885 million were sent to Israel between October 2023 and October 2025. Of those, $805 million worth came after the January 2024 ruling.
The consignments included ammunition, explosive munitions, weapons parts, and armored vehicle components.
According to Stephen Humphreys, professor of international law at the London School of Economics, there was “ample evidence that countries arming Israel may be complicit in international crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
“The most recent ‘ceasefire’ did not change this,” stated Gerhard Kemp, a professor of criminal law at the University of the West of England.
Since the ceasefire reached in October 2025, Israel has continued killing Palestinian civilians in Gaza and creating conditions of life that could destroy the group in whole or in part, Kemp said.
This indicates that states still have an obligation to stop supporting Israel’s war on Palestinians in Gaza, which has now killed at least 72,000 people. Tens of thousands more remain buried under the rubble of buildings Israel has bombed.
“Some states have a very narrow understanding of the duty to prevent genocide and are waiting for a judicial determination that there is a genocide in Gaza,” Kemp said. “But the ICJ will likely take several years to make such a determination. The better view is to look at domestic legal obligations … and international legal obligations and legal tools triggered by available evidence.”
Though the ICJ has not issued its final ruling, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory published a report in September 2025 concluding that Israel “committed a genocide against the Palestinians in Gaza.”
The UN report asserts that “states are obliged to take steps to ensure the prevention of conduct that may amount to an act of genocide … including the transfer of weapons that are used or likely to be used by Israel to commit genocidal acts.”
IRGC Navy coordinates safe passage of another 35 ships through Strait of Hormuz
Press TV – May 22, 2026
The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) has announced that it coordinated the transit of another 35 ships through the Strait of Hormuz in the past 24 hours.
“Over the past 24 hours, 35 ships, including oil tankers, container ships, and other commercial vessels, passed through the Strait of Hormuz, after obtaining permission, [and] with the coordination and security protection of the IRGC Navy,” the Public Relations Office of the IRGC’s Navy said in a statement on Friday.
The passage came on top of 31 vessels—including oil tankers, container ships, and other commercial ships—that passed through the strait in the previous 24 hours, the IRGC Navy announced on Thursday.
The Iranian authority controlling the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf has defined the supervisory management zone of the waterway, announcing on Wednesday that movement through the strategic corridor requires coordination and a permit.
The zone is “the line connecting Mount Mubarak in Iran and southern Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates, on the eastern side of the strait, extending to the line connecting the end of Qeshm Island in Iran and Umm Al Quwain in the United Arab Emirates, on the western side of the strait.”
Iran shut down the Strait of Hormuz to its enemies and their allies following the latest US-Israeli aggression against the country.
According to a new Reuters report, the IRGC plays a central role in a new multi-layered transit system that gives preference to ships linked to allies such as China and Russia, while other vessels may require government-to-government arrangements or payments to pass.
The IRGC reviews an affiliation document supplied by a ship owner or operator and during the process they may want to physically inspect the ship, the news agency said.
“The affiliation check is to identify if the vessel has any connection to the US or Israel,” a European shipping source told Reuters.
The IRGC requires ship owners to disclose details including the value of the ship’s cargo, the flag, its origin and destination, the registered owner and manager, and nationalities of the crew, according to documents sent to shipping industry sources by Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority.
The vetting is carried out by Iranian state institutions including the Ports and Maritime Organization, the Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade, the national shipping organization, and the security overseer of the Supreme National Security Council, according to the report.
Ship owners’ willingness to deal directly with Iran shows the degree to which the strait is under the Islamic Republic’s control, Danny Citrinowicz, a former Israeli intelligence officer who specializes in Iran research and analysis, told Reuters.
“The straits will be blocked or opened up only by the approval of the Iranian government,” said Citrinowicz. “Some will get through because of political alliances, others will have to pay, others will be turned back. This is the new norm.”
Bilateral arrangements for passage include an additional step: Countries contact Iran’s foreign minister to request permission. The minister forwards these to the Supreme National Security Council.
A decision is then made and communicated to the relevant bodies, including the IRGC which then provides the coordinates and instructions needed for safe passage.
Other countries have worked out different arrangements. Among them is India, which imports about 90% of its oil needs and about 50% of its gas, much of which passes through Hormuz.
New Delhi uses its embassy in Tehran to liaise with Iranian authorities, including the IRGC and the Iranian navy, which vets ships India wants to sail out of the Persian Gulf, according to an Indian shipping ministry official cited by Reuters.
“The Indian navy also told us that if the Iranians ask you to stop, then you should stop. If they ask you to move, you should move,” the report said, “And we’ve been following those instructions.”
Italian port authorities halt Israel-bound shipments of ‘military-grade steel’ from India
The Cradle | May 19, 2026
Italian authorities are holding three shipments suspected of carrying military-grade steel from India to Israel after activists from the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement and No Harbour for Genocide (NHB) exposed their contents, Middle East Eye (MEE) reported on 18 May.
According to the activists, the shipments amount to roughly 806 tonnes of military-grade steel and could be used to manufacture up to 17,458 artillery shells for the Israeli army.
They said the cargo originated from R L Steels & Energy Limited in Aurangabad and was destined for IMI Systems, now known as Elbit Systems Land, in Ramat Hasharon.
Three consignments transported by the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) are being held in Gioia Tauro and Cagliari, while another three were reportedly rerouted toward Sri Lanka after activists began tracking the vessels.
“We are seeing now a flood of military supplies from India to Israel,” Ilham Yaseen, military embargo coordinator with BDS, told MEE.
She called for pressure “to stop these supplies from reaching Israel and to hold the far-right Indian government and any complicit Indian company accountable for their complicity in Israel’s atrocity crimes.”
A spokesperson for NHB said the steel was heading to “the Ramat Hasharon ammunition plant, which has no civilian output. It’s all military production. We know this 100 percent.”
Activists say the deliveries underline India’s growing role in supplying Israel during its wars in Gaza and Lebanon, particularly as demand for 155mm artillery shells has surged.
The activists also accused shipping firms of obscuring routes and destinations to avoid scrutiny, after Spain reportedly blocked one vessel from docking, Greek dockworkers refused to unload cargo, and Italian authorities later detained three shipments for possible inspection.
On 6 February, dockworkers from more than 20 ports across Italy, Greece, the Basque Country, Morocco, and Turkiye carried out coordinated action under the banner “Dockworkers Don’t Work for War,” aiming to disrupt arms shipments and oppose the use of civilian ports for war logistics.
Italy’s Unione Sindacale di Base said the action sought to “ensure that European and Mediterranean ports are places of peace, free from any involvement in war.”
Francesco Staccioli of USB warned, “If we don’t take this step, all our other demands will be crushed under war.”
Across Europe, since the genocide in Gaza was launched in October 2023, court rulings, national bans, dockworker actions, and rail blockades have worked to obstruct Israeli military shipments.
Despite this, many European states continue to facilitate arms transfers to Israel, with Germany approving $7.8 million in arms exports during the first weeks of the US-Israeli war on Iran, despite lawyers pursuing German officials for aiding Israel’s genocide in Gaza through weapons deliveries.
Most recently, Israeli media reported that dozens of cargo planes transported ammunition through US military bases in Germany, as Washington and Tel Aviv intensified preparations for possible renewed attacks on Iran.
How Israel moved Hermes 900 drone production to Serbia to hide from Iranian missiles
By Ivan Kesic – Press TV – April 25, 2026
The Israeli regime has quietly embarked on an effort to relocate production of its most important long-range strike drone – the Hermes 900- outside the occupied territories.
In Serbia, it has found its latest and most controversial partner. The strategy is simple: protect Tel Aviv’s supply chain from Iranian ballistic missiles.
On March 7, 2026, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić made a cryptic announcement. Serbia, he said, would soon open a factory for “the most serious drones in the world” with a foreign partner from the Israeli regime.
By early April, reports had uncovered the full scope of the deal. Elbit Systems – the largest military company in the occupied territories and a firm repeatedly named by UN experts as profiting from the ongoing genocide in Gaza – had agreed to establish a joint drone production facility in Šimanovci, just thirty kilometers west of Belgrade.
The factory, which could begin operations as early as late April 2026, is designed to produce two types of unmanned aerial vehicles, including a long-range model capable of flying at altitudes exceeding six kilometers.
While most media attention has focused on the emerging arms race between Serbia and Croatia, a far more consequential story has gone largely unreported.
What makes this deal particularly significant is not merely the technology transfer or the financial terms, but the strategic logic driving it.
The Israeli regime, having suffered devastating losses of its Hermes 900 fleet during the recent US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran, is desperately seeking to diversify its production base – outside the reach of Iranian retaliation.
Serbian factory: Details of the 2026 agreement
The joint venture agreement between Elbit Systems and Serbia’s state-owned Yugoimport SDPR gives the notorious Israeli arms company a controlling 51 percent stake, while the Serbian partner holds the remaining 49 percent.
According to documents obtained by some journalists and confirmed by two independent sources close to the military industry, the factory will produce two distinct drone types.
The first is a short-range model with a high payload and rotary wings, designed for tactical reconnaissance and strike missions in confined operational environments.
The second is far more advanced: a long-range model, faster and capable of operating at altitudes exceeding six kilometers, making it suitable for deep-penetration surveillance missions well beyond Serbian borders.
A source familiar with the deal described the long-range drone as “more advanced” than the Pegasus, a combat reconnaissance drone that Serbia already produces domestically.
“It has a higher flight altitude and greater operational autonomy,” the source explained. “The essence of the whole story is the transfer of technology, because our engineers will also work on it. This drone is actually the crowning glory of the entire project.”
Experts from Utva, an aircraft factory owned by the SDPR, will also be involved in the production process, a clear indication of significant investment in local technical expertise.
The planned site of the factory has itself become a source of controversy: a facility owned by Pink Media Group, the media empire of Željko Mitrović, a businessman with close ties to Vučić’s ruling party.
Following the publication of investigative reports, Pink Media Group issued a denial, claiming that neither Mitrović nor any entity associated with him had participated in negotiations or leased any facility for the project.
However, the denial did not address the documentary evidence or the two independent sources that confirmed the arrangement. The question of the factory’s precise location remains unresolved.
Serbian-Israeli cooperation: Weapons, spyware, and political connections
The drone factory agreement is merely the latest chapter in a rapidly deepening relationship between Belgrade and Tel Aviv that encompasses weapons trade, intelligence technology, political consulting, and diplomatic alignment.
The value of ammunition and weapons exports from Serbia to the Israeli regime has increased by an astonishing 42 times since 2023, reaching 114 million euros by the end of 2025, according to available evidence.
The vast majority of these exports were conducted through Yugoimport SDPR, the same state-owned company now partnering with Elbit on the drone factory.
Beyond conventional weapons, the partnership extends into the shadowy realm of surveillance and espionage technology.
Serbian authorities have used forensic products purchased from the Israeli company Cellebrite to unlock and extract data from mobile devices belonging to journalists and social media activists.
A new spyware tool designated “NoviSpy” has been deployed to infect these devices, enabling the Serbian internal security service to monitor and suppress critical voices.
The methods employed bear the unmistakable signature of Israeli technology and training. The personal connections between the two regimes run deep.
Asaf Eisin, an Israeli consultant, has been described as the main architect of Vučić’s victorious election campaigns.
His role extends beyond mere political consulting; he is widely considered Vučić’s secretive strategist, providing the Serbian president with the kind of sophisticated campaign management techniques developed in the occupied territories.
The Serbian opposition has characterized Eisin as an “agency for winning elections,” and his track record across multiple political campaigns in the Balkans supports this assessment.
In September 2024, while the Israeli regime faced increasing international isolation over its genocidal actions in Gaza, the regime’s president, Isaac Herzog, paid an official visit to Belgrade, meeting with top Serbian officials.
The timing was significant: the Israeli regime was under diplomatic pressure worldwide, yet Vučić welcomed Herzog as a gesture of solidarity.
Foreign policy analysts noted that Serbia saw this as an opportunity to demonstrate its alignment with Washington’s closest West Asian ally, a calculated move to curry favor with the incoming Trump administration.
This alignment was formalized in September 2020 through the Washington Agreement, in which Serbia committed to opening a chamber of commerce office and a state office in Jerusalem al-Quds.
The move was hailed in Tel Aviv as “an important and courageous step,” while critics noted that it placed Serbia firmly on the side of the occupation and against Palestinian sovereignty.
The United Arab Emirates, which normalized relations with the Israeli regime in 2020, has emerged as a significant investor in Serbia, while also serving as a conduit for technology transfer and military cooperation.
The connection to the UAE, brokered through the same Washington Agreement, has created an axis that runs from Abu Dhabi through Tel Aviv to Belgrade.
This triangular relationship has allowed Serbia to access advanced defense technologies while providing the Israeli regime with a European production and logistics hub.
Elbit Systems: A company surrounded by global controversy
Elbit Systems, the Israeli military firm at the center of the Serbian drone factory deal, has accumulated a staggering record of international controversies spanning human rights violations, financial divestment campaigns, grassroots activism, and legal challenges.
The company generates approximately 90 percent of its revenue from military activities and is deeply integrated into the Israeli regime’s military apparatus, making it a focal point of criticism amid the ongoing genocide in Gaza or the occupied West Bank.
One of the longest-running controversies concerns Elbit’s involvement in infrastructure tied to the Israeli occupation, particularly the surveillance systems installed along the separation wall in the occupied West Bank.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion in 2004 declaring the wall contrary to international law, yet Elbit continued to supply technology for its operation.
This triggered early international backlash. In 2009, Norway’s sovereign wealth fund divested from Elbit, with the finance minister stating at the time: “We do not want to finance companies that contribute so directly to violations of international humanitarian law.”
Similar decisions followed from Danish and Swedish financial institutions.
The Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement has made Elbit a primary target, noting that the company’s technology contributes directly to horrendous human rights violations against Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied territories.
These campaigns have achieved tangible results. HSBC withdrew its investment from Elbit in 2018 after the company acquired IMI Systems, which manufactures cluster munitions.
In 2026, a major Canadian investment arm divested from Elbit following sustained protests over its role in supplying equipment used in the Gaza genocide.
A UN Special Rapporteur report published in June 2025 listed Elbit among companies profiting from the genocide in Gaza. The report specifically mentioned drones developed and supplied by Elbit, describing how they operate alongside warplanes during bombing campaigns, used to monitor Palestinians and gather intelligence on targets.
The report concluded that “drones, hexacopters and quadcopters have become ubiquitous killing machines in the skies over Gaza.”
Direct action activism has targeted Elbit facilities worldwide. In the United Kingdom, groups such as Palestine Action have broken into and occupied Elbit-linked sites. The 2024 Filton facility break-in caused significant damage and led to arrests and high-profile court cases.
In 2025, Elbit closed a UK facility after sustained protests, a symbolic victory for activists demonstrating that reputational and military costs can affect even large arms firms.
In Spain, a steel shipment linked to Elbit’s subsidiary IMI Systems was canceled following protests. In France, the government barred Israeli military firms, including Elbit, from displaying offensive weapons at the Paris Air Show in 2025, citing the genocide in Gaza.
In 2025, a NATO-affiliated procurement agency barred Elbit from contracts due to a corruption investigation, suggesting that the company’s liabilities extend beyond activist campaigns into formal military-sector governance.
Meanwhile, in North Macedonia, Elbit’s involvement in “Safe City” surveillance systems has raised concerns about mass surveillance, transparency, and potential misuse, extending the ethical debate beyond armed conflict into civil liberties and digital rights.
Hermes 900: Capabilities and role in the aggression against Iran
The Hermes 900 unmanned aerial vehicle, produced by Elbit Systems, has proven to be the most important drone in the Israeli regime’s inventory for long-range strikes, and its performance during the recent US-Israeli aggression against Iran demonstrated both its strategic value and its acute vulnerabilities.
As a medium-altitude, long-endurance platform, the Hermes 900 can remain airborne for over 30 to 40 hours, operating at high altitudes that allow it to monitor vast areas without requiring frequent refueling.
This endurance is enhanced by satellite communications, enabling beyond-line-of-sight control and real-time data transmission across distances that would be impossible for ground-controlled systems.
The drone’s long-range capability made it particularly suitable for surveillance missions far from Israeli-occupied territories, including monitoring Iranian military infrastructure and tracking the movements of the Axis of Resistance forces throughout the region.
The Hermes 900 is equipped with sophisticated intelligence-gathering systems, including electro-optical and infrared sensors, synthetic aperture radar, and signals intelligence tools.
These allow it to detect troop movements, missile systems, and communication signals, even at night or in poor weather conditions.
Crucially, the Hermes 900 can designate targets using laser systems and relay precise coordinates, enabling fighter jets or other platforms—including long-range cruise missiles—to conduct strikes based on the intelligence it gathers.
This targeting capability made the drone a critical component of the regime’s aggression against Iranian infrastructure during the war that began on February 28, 2026.
The cost to the Israeli regime was still catastrophic. The largest number of Israeli drones shot down during the recent aggression were of the Hermes 900 type—approximately 20 units, with several more downed in 2025.
No official figure exists for how many Hermes 900 units the Israeli regime originally possessed, but estimates place the number in the dozens, somewhere between 25 and 50.
Some military analysts estimate that the attrition rate for the Hermes 900 fleet may have exceeded 80 percent during the unprovoked war of aggression.
The blow was so severe that the Israeli Air Force reportedly avoided deploying its remaining units over Iran for extended periods, effectively ceding the skies to Iranian air defenses and forcing Tel Aviv to rely on less capable platforms.
This degradation of Israel’s most important long-range surveillance and targeting asset represented a strategic victory for Iran’s air defense network, which had demonstrated the ability to detect, track, and destroy even the most advanced unmanned platforms.
Strategic logic: Foreign production as a hedge against Iranian retaliation
The timing of Serbia’s drone factory agreement with Elbit Systems is not coincidental.
The contract was signed in August 2025, a month and a half after the first US-Israeli aggression against Iran, when it became clear to Tel Aviv that Iranian ballistic missiles could threaten domestic production facilities.
The Israeli regime has since been insisting on peripheral supply chains, offering its clients relatively outdated surveillance technologies while using the arrangement to secure aircraft platforms for new aggressions throughout the region.
This strategy is not new. According to military analysts, the Israeli regime agreed to cooperate with India on Hermes 900 production as early as 2018 through a joint venture between Adani Defence & Aerospace and Elbit Systems, with a dedicated UAV facility in Hyderabad becoming operational in December 2018 for producing components.
By approximately 2020, this facility had expanded to assembling and exporting Hermes 900 units, making India the first production site outside the occupied territories.
Military analysts estimate that India produced approximately 20 of the estimated 50 Hermes 900 drones in the Israeli fleet, meaning that nearly 40 percent of Tel Aviv’s long-range unmanned surveillance capability was manufactured outside the occupied territories, a significant hedge against the vulnerability of domestic production facilities to Iranian retaliation.
In 2024, India formally fielded its own version, the Drishti-10 Starliner, with the first indigenously assembled unit delivered to the Indian Navy in January 2024.
The Swiss experience with Hermes 900 production has been far less successful, offering a cautionary tale for Serbia. Switzerland acquired the drones in 2015 but required extensive modifications through the Swiss partner RUAG to enable safe operation in civilian airspace.
The integration of a detect-and-avoid system proved extremely difficult, leading to repeated delays that pushed full operational capability to around 2029.
Some delivered drones could not meet expected performance standards, and one notable incident involved structural issues that caused a drone to break apart during testing.
The Swiss government was forced to scale back its requirements, abandoning certain advanced features while costs continued to rise.
Parliamentary committees raised doubts about whether RUAG and Elbit could fix ongoing problems, with some officials discussing potential cancellation.
For a neutral country like Switzerland, the deal also sparked debate about whether such partnerships compromise neutrality or align the country too closely with foreign military-industrial interests.
Brazil’s experience offers a different set of challenges. While the Hermes 900 is assembled locally through AEL Sistemas, a Brazilian subsidiary of Elbit, the program has been plagued by technical reliability issues.
Multiple crashes have occurred, including one during the 2024 floods in Rio Grande do Sul when a drone used in rescue operations crashed due to a technical problem.
In March 2026, another Hermes 900 crashed during a military exercise in Mato Grosso do Sul, reportedly leaving the Brazilian Air Force with only one operational unit at the time.
These incidents have raised concerns about fleet fragility and whether Brazil is over-reliant on a complex foreign system that it does not fully control.
Even with local assembly, critical components, software, and maintenance expertise remain tied to Israeli suppliers, creating a structural dependency that critics argue limits Brazil’s technological sovereignty.
Serbian gamble: Risks and domestic opposition
Within Serbia, the drone factory agreement has generated significant controversy.
Military observers point out that Elbit will retain complete control over intellectual property, meaning that while Serbian workers may assemble drones, the country will not gain the ability to independently produce or replicate the systems.
Petar Vojinović, an aviation analyst, explained that the most likely arrangement gives Elbit control over sales and intellectual property, with Yugoimport merely participating in production and collecting revenue percentages from sales.
“It is expected that Elbit will retain complete control over the intellectual property,” he noted.
“Thus, Elbit’s intellectual property will be protected, and Serbia will most likely not be able to produce or replicate the drones that will be manufactured.”
Other analysts emphasized that the key issue is knowledge transfer, arguing that If part of the development and production occurs in Serbia, it means training personnel, access to technology, and the possibility of further development without complete dependence on partners.
The political dimension of the deal has also drawn sharp criticism. UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese, during a visit to Serbia in March 2026, described Serbia as “one of Israel’s strongest and most determined allies, without any shame.”
Serbian civil society organizations have raised concerns that by hosting an Elbit production facility, Serbia could become a legitimate military target in any future conflict involving the Israeli regime.
Unlike Croatia, which has secured its position through NATO and EU membership, Serbia remains outside both alliances, lacking the protective umbrella that would deter potential retaliation.
The Serbian people are widely critical of their authorities, with many claiming that officials are reaping lucrative commissions from such controversial agreements.
The fact that the factory may be located on property associated with a media mogul closely tied to the ruling party has only intensified suspicions about corruption and self-dealing.
While Vučić has portrayed the deal as a triumph of Serbian diplomacy and technological advancement, critics see it as a risky alignment with a pariah regime that could expose Serbia to diplomatic isolation or worse.
