Eight Arab and Muslim states reject Israeli displacement plans for Gaza
Palestinian Information Center – September 6, 2026
GAZA – Eight Arab and Muslim countries have condemned remarks by far-right Israeli ministers Itamar Ben Gvir and Israel Katz on plans to forcibly displace Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.
The foreign ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Pakistan, Türkiye and Qatar said in a joint statement released on Sunday that such Israeli plans violate international and humanitarian law and pose a direct threat to the Palestinian people’s legitimate and inalienable rights.
The ministers voiced rejection of any Israeli attempt to displace Palestinians from or within the occupied territory, warning against transforming extremist rhetoric on forced displacement into official state policy.
The ministers warned that the displacement of Gazans would destabilize the region and derail global peace efforts, undermining US president Donald Trump’s plan to end the Gaza war, which clearly rejects forced population transfers.
The ministers stressed that Gaza is an integral part of the occupied Palestinian territories, calling for preserving the unity of Gaza, the West Bank and east Jerusalem.
They reiterated their countries’ support for a two-state solution establishing an independent Palestinian state along the June 4, 1967 lines, with east Jerusalem as its capital.
They urged the international community and UN Security Council to oppose Israeli attempts to impose a new demographic or geographic reality in the occupied Palestinian territories.
Diplomatic Scandal: Why Did the U.S. Recall Its Ambassador to Turkey?
By Alexandr Svaranc – New Eastern Outlook – August 28, 2026
The U.S. State Department has abruptly recalled its ambassador to Turkey, Tom Barrack, who also served as the President’s Special Envoy for Syria and Iraq. This sharp personnel pivot has raised numerous questions: was this decision a consequence of pressure from the Israeli lobby?
An Unconventional Diplomat
The appointment of Tom Barrack as ambassador to Turkey on May 14, 2025, was an atypical move, even by the standards of Donald Trump’s personnel policy. Barrack is not a career diplomat, but a major real estate investor. As a close associate of Trump and a key fundraiser for his campaign, he secured the post largely due to his personal loyalty to the President.
It was assumed that his proximity to the head of the White House would serve as a “safe conduct” for Barrack in the complex Middle East region. However, it turned out that Trump’s own political unpredictability does not extend to his inner circle: in Washington, the right to be eccentric remains a privilege of the President, not his appointees.
Reason for Resignation: The “Golan Question”
Journalist Laura Loomer was the first to report the ambassador’s recall on August 25. According to her information, the reason was Barrack’s imprudent remarks, which directly contradicted the official course of the U.S. administration. In an interview, the diplomat referred to the Golan Heights as “occupied Syrian territory” and criticized Israel for its “illegal settlement activity.”
These words sounded like a political démarche, especially since Donald Trump had officially recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan back in 2019, during his first term.
Lobby Influence and Political Consequences
Barrack’s position triggered an immediate reaction not only in the White House but also among influential Republicans. Speaker of the House Mike Johnson and Senator Rick Scott, whose positions are closely tied to the interests of the pro-Israel lobby in the U.S., made it clear that such statements were unacceptable.
Barrack’s attempts to justify himself—claiming his words were “taken out of context” and that he was merely discussing the historical aspect of the issue—had no effect. It became clear that clouds were gathering over the ambassador: his views on Middle East policy had diverged from the vector dictated by Washington’s strategic allies. Ultimately, the career of the “real estate diplomat” was sacrificed to interests that carry far more weight in American politics than personal friendship with the president.
In Tel Aviv and Washington, dissatisfaction is mounting over the stance of U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack following recent IDF airstrikes on the Abu al-Duhur airbase in Syria. Initially, Barrack labeled Israel’s actions an “unnecessary escalation” on X (formerly Twitter), and later, in an interview, accused Jerusalem of attempting to provoke a conflict with Turkey on the eve of the U.S. midterm elections. According to the diplomat, only Recep Erdoğan’s restraint prevented a full-scale war.
Benjamin Netanyahu’s government viewed these remarks as support for Ankara’s ambitions. The State Department, for its part, acknowledged that Barrack’s statements only deepened Israel’s perception that the U.S. is distancing itself from countering the Turkish threat. Further irritation was caused by the ambassador’s comments regarding negotiations with Lebanon on the disarmament of Hezbollah, which involved Iranian representatives.
Such coordinated criticism of Barrack is the result of efforts by the Israeli Foreign Ministry and intelligence services, leveraging the influence of the Jewish lobby in the U.S. These methods are not new: in his book By Way of Deception, former Mossad officer Victor Ostrovsky described how, in 1979, Israeli intelligence orchestrated the resignation of U.S. Ambassador to the UN Andrew Young due to his contacts with the PLO. At that time, with the sanction of Menachem Begin, a leak was arranged through Newsweek magazine. It is evident that for Mossad chief Roman Hoffman, removing the “inconvenient” diplomat Barrack was a matter of routine.
Consequences of the Ambassador’s Recall: A Shift in U.S.-Turkish Relations
The appointment of businessman Thomas Barrack as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey initially sparked skepticism within the State Department. A barrage of criticism from the political establishment and the expert community, culminating in the emergency recall of the diplomat “for consultations,” effectively sealed his resignation. Currently, the duties of the head of the diplomatic mission in Ankara are being temporarily performed by the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires.
The name of Barrack’s successor has not yet been announced, but experts believe that Marco Rubio will opt for a career diplomat to lower the political temperature surrounding the position. It is expected that the new ambassador will adhere to a firm pro-NATO and pro-Israel line, seeking to balance U.S.-Turkish relations while accounting for Israel’s interests.
Implementing such an agenda amid the acute crisis between Ankara and Tel Aviv appears extremely difficult. Washington will likely resort to harsh pressure on President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, despite his previous personal ties to Donald Trump.
For the Turkish leader, Barrak’s recall was a painful blow. Ankara saw the businessman as “its man” in the Trump administration, whose commercial background allowed for a flexible and pragmatic dialogue. Erdoğan had counted on Barrak’s support in establishing a safe zone in Syria. Now, Turkey is deprived of the unofficial US “umbrella” that protected it from Israeli airstrikes near its borders, and the prospects for modernizing the Turkish army and strengthening Ankara’s military with Washington’s support are becoming extremely uncertain.
The situation clearly demonstrates the risks of relying excessively on fickle American policy. Ankara should reconsider its diplomatic priorities. Playing a game of “giving in” to American “hawks”—for example, on the issue of arms supplies to the Kyiv regime—is fraught with serious consequences for relations with Russia. Such a course threatens Turkey not only with a weakening of its defense potential but also with significant economic losses. Specifically, the question arises: Who will compensate Ankara for the loss of Iran’s $7 billion gas market if the US imposes new anti-Iran sanctions? Given the West’s inconsistency, Turkey is unlikely to escalate relations with its northern neighbor for the sake of dubious foreign policy adventures.
Alexander SVARANTS, Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, and expert on Middle Eastern countries
Israel’s New War in Syria: Why Türkiye Is Now in the Crosshairs
By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle | August 22, 2026
What has been happening in Syria should come as a wake-up call for the Turkish leadership: as long as Israel is a major player in the region, you cannot simply compete with them without engaging in violent conflict.
Earlier this week, Israel began bombing Syrian military positions for the first time in around four months, specifically targeting an air base where Turkish military personnel are known to be present – this is not random violence; it is instead part of a concerted pressure campaign that is pushing boundaries that even the United States is not fully prepared to go along with.
Israeli air raids targeted and destroyed air strips and hangars at the Abu al-Duhur Air Base in the Idlib province of Syria, inflicting significant damage and intentionally attempting to curb efforts by Turkiye to revive the largest destroyed Syrian air force and air defense systems.
While Tehran and Moscow were the chief supporters of the former Syrian military, the country now depends on both Washington and Ankara. NATO member Turkiye has therefore taken it upon itself to try and get a military foothold inside Syrian territory, attempting to extract the maximum it can from its relationship with its neighbor.
Like Iran, Turkiye has different interests from its other major partner inside the country, but unlike the Iranians, the Turkish State is not backing resistance to Israel and instead has maintained strong economic ties with the occupying regime. However, the Israeli government does not care that Turkiye presents no military threat to it, nor are there any signs it will; it is only fixated on regional dominance and views Syria as competition.
Turkiye and Israel are both US allies, meaning that the American government will not throw its weight fully behind either side and instead play a balancing game. Yet, the Israelis evidently have much more sway over Washington and seek to crush Turkish regional influence, as they endeavor to achieve their dreams of a “Greater Israel”.
Israeli bombing attacks against military positions – with the exception of a few occasional strikes – largely halted after March, when a series of strikes were carried out. The reason behind most of the attacks carried out against positions affiliated with Damascus-aligned forces has been to send a message. This is precisely why the old Ministry of Defense was even blown to pieces and why Israel launched strikes in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace – they are demonstrating who the boss is and warning the Syrian leadership of the consequences should it step out of line.
The Syrian leadership, under the command of Ahmed al-Shara’a, or Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, has largely capitulated to Israeli demands, such as attempting to disarm Syrians in the south of the country, working to intercept arms shipments to Hezbollah, and even signing a “Joint Fusion Mechanism” with the Israelis. As part of this mechanism, it was clearly written that Syria would even pursue economic projects with the Zionist regime that continues to expand its occupation of southern Syrian lands.
The relationship between Syria, Turkiye, and Israel today is one of a tug of war. The Turkish State is attempting to help Syria revive its air force and hopes to introduce a functioning air defense system to the country, but the Israelis want Syria weak.
It is also clear why Tel Aviv is so paranoid. They know that the future of the Syrian State is not certain and they see the sentiments expressed by the fighters who have formed the new Syrian Army. They are also aware that everyone in Syria is armed and that with a different leadership, or an escalation that spins out of control, they could be in serious trouble.
During the era of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) possessed a large arsenal of strategic weapons, much of which was incinerated during the overthrow of the previous leadership in an enormous Israeli air campaign. However, what Tel Aviv feared just as much was the strength of Syria’s air defense network – regarded as one of the most sophisticated in the region.
Not only did Israel destroy the air defenses of Syria during the regime change transition in December of 2024, but what impacted the nation’s ability to defend its skies even more was the disappearance of the old air defense teams. When it comes to these sophisticated weapons, the humans operating them are just as important as the systems themselves, and it takes a long time to properly train new operators. Under the new Syrian Army, there are no experienced operators who are on hand, meaning that it will take help from their Turkish allies if they are ever going to have a functioning air defense option.
Israel is competing with Turkiye as of now, with the situation not deteriorating into direct confrontation. Although we are far from the point of anything that could resemble war between the two, the Israelis will kill Turkish soldiers and may even explore options using intelligence operatives inside Turkish territory in the future.
Ankara is clearly not willing to respond to Tel Aviv with the use of force, or even using armed factions to carry out operations in the south, despite Turkish soldiers having been killed by Israeli airstrikes in the past. At some point, Turkiye will likely be forced to make a decision to defend its interests that will involve confronting Israel.
Bear in mind that despite the rhetoric of its President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish State never even severed ties or cut off Israel’s flow of cheap gas from Azerbaijan throughout the Gaza genocide. The Israelis have interpreted the behavior of the Turkish leadership as weakness, meaning that they are going to push things to the limit, testing just how far they can go before the regional power decides to finally take concrete measures against it.
Ankara is seeking to become an international trade hub, sitting at the crossroads between Asia and Europe, benefiting immensely from the expansion of the Middle Corridor. Yet, Tel Aviv has been busy forming alliances to ensure it is a thorn in Turkiye’s side, including expanding tripartite relations with Greece and Cyprus.
What has been happening in Syria should come as a wake-up call for the Turkish leadership: as long as Israel is a major player in the region, you cannot simply compete with them without engaging in violent conflict. If Ankara seeks to truly assert its power, it must pursue confrontation and make the Israelis suffer in Syria; if it backs down and refuses to do this, it will end up feeling the consequences of its strategic mistake.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine. He contributed this article to The Palestine Chronicle.
Israel’s war minister threatens Turkey as Apache squadron moves north
Press TV – August 20, 2026
Israel has issued a veiled threat against Turkey following airstrikes on a Syrian military airbase near the Turkish border, with war minister Israel Katz warning President Tayyip Erdogan against “dragging Turkey into dangerous adventures in Syria.”
The Israeli air force has completed the transfer of its Apache helicopter squadron from southern Israeli occupied territories to the Ramat David airbase in the north—the first such move in 25 years.
Israeli military officials have acknowledged that the reorganization was prompted in part by the perceived threat from Turkey.
The strikes on the Abu al-Duhur airbase in northern Syria, about 70 km from the Turkish border, come amid mounting tension over Ankara’s role in rebuilding military capabilities of the current regime in Syria.
Israel has accused Syria of allowing Turkish troops to deploy at the base, a charge both Turkish and Syrian officials have denied.
But beyond the immediate dispute, regional analysts and Turkish officials see a broader strategic realignment where Israel now views Turkey as the primary obstacle to its expanding plans in Syria.
Israeli officials have increasingly described Turkey in terms once reserved for Iran. Regime voices in Tel Aviv have referred to Ankara as the “new Iran.”
“Turkey may become the next target,” warned one Turkish expert, cited in Japanese media.
The warning echoes a view gaining traction among international observers that Israel’s strategy in Syria has evolved to containing Turkey’s growing military and political footprint in the country.
At the heart of the dispute lies a fundamental disagreement over what kind of Syrian state should emerge from years of conflict.
“Israel sees the fragmentation of its neighbors as a security strategy,” one analysis noted.
Turkish officials have made clear that any Israeli advance toward their interests in Syria would cross a red line.
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said Israel’s interest in Syrian territory “has not disappeared” but has been temporarily set aside while Tel Aviv focuses on other priorities.
“When the time comes, they will act,” he warned. “This is a vital interest and security zone for us. We must be prepared for any situation.”
Earlier this year, Ankara and Tel Aviv held rare “technical talks” in Azerbaijan to establish deconfliction mechanisms and prevent accidental clashes in Syria.
Israeli officials made clear during those talks that any Turkish military deployment in Syria, particularly around Palmyra, would be unacceptable.
Analysts and regional observers have linked Israel’s actions in Syria to broader colonial ambitions, noting that Israeli officials have openly declared forces will remain in southern Syria “forever.”
“What Israel wants, with US support, is a submissive Syria, stripped of national identity and armed forces, under Israeli occupation—just like the Golan Heights,” wrote Abdulbari Atwan, editor-in-chief of Rai al-Youm, in a commentary on the Abu al-Duhur strikes.
Greece, Cyprus, and Israel signed a military cooperation agreement in late 2025, forming what Turkish media has dubbed an “anti-Turkish alliance.”
Syria, according to observers, is just one front in Israel’s broader plan to expand its colonial ambitions across the region.
Tel Aviv sees both Iran and Turkey as the most serious hurdles to its “Greater Israel” aspirations—a vision that envisions Israeli dominance stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates.
After dragging the US into a large-scale war which it could not afford to wage alone against Iran, observers say Israel is now positioning itself for a potential confrontation with Turkey.
Turkey denies military presence at Syrian base bombed by ‘Israel’
Al Mayadeen | August 20, 2026
Turkey’s Defense Ministry denied on Thursday that any Turkish military delegation was present at Syria’s Abu al-Duhur air base before or during Israeli attacks on the facility earlier this week, while vowing to continue “resolutely” supporting Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity.
“We state that there was no Turkish military delegation at the Abu al-Duhur airbase before or during the attack carried out by Israel against that base in Syria,” a Turkish defense ministry official told journalists, per AFP.
The ministry warned against allowing a “perception” to take hold that Israeli military aggression against neighboring countries is “routine and acceptable,” and called it essential for the international community to adopt “more concrete and effective measures” against Israeli actions it said threaten regional peace and stability.
Ankara reiterated that its efforts to protect Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to help build a “stable and secure structure” in the country, would continue. The ministry also affirmed that Turkey will continue supporting Syria’s efforts to develop its own military capability and infrastructure.
Katz, Netanyahu threaten Turkey
Earlier today, Israeli War Minister Israel Katz warned Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, writing in Turkish on X that Erdogan “is dragging Turkey into dangerous adventures in Syria” and that “Israel” will not “allow any actor to threaten its security”.
Katz added that “it would be better” for Erdogan to continue his “reality-detached, fantastical statements” against “Israel” in the Turkish parliament than to “attempt to test Israel’s resolve on self-defense”.
The statement followed remarks by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Wednesday night, who said “Israel” will not “tolerate a Turkish military presence in Syria that threatens Israel”.
Netanyahu claimed the Israeli regime had delivered its warning “crystal clear” but that Turkey “didn’t hear it loud enough, so we made sure they understood it better”, an apparent reference to an Israeli attack a day earlier on Syria’s Abu al-Duhur airbase.
Attack on Abu al-Duhur airbase
Netanyahu’s office claimed late on Tuesday that Syria was “on the verge of breaching” a security understanding with “Israel” by allowing Turkish forces to deploy at an airbase near Aleppo, accusing Damascus of ignoring repeated Israeli warnings.
The claim came after Israeli aggression hit Abu al-Duhur airbase in eastern Idlib, the first strike on that base since Bashar al-Assad’s fall in December 2024.
Syria’s Foreign Ministry called the strike “unjustified aggression” and a “dangerous escalation.”
Turkey’s Communications Directorate rejected Netanyahu’s claims, calling them “frivolous allegations” intended to “legitimize Israel’s unlawful airstrikes targeting Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Ankara said the accusations stem from Netanyahu’s push to pursue “expansionist and destabilizing policies” in the region ahead of elections.
Iraqi Kata’ib Hezbollah sets conditions to place weapons under state control
Press TV – August 18, 2026
The Iraqi Kata’ib Hezbollah resistance group has set conditions for any understanding with the Baghdad government to place all its weapons under state control, including a full withdrawal of US military forces from the country.
The group’s security chief, Abu Mujahid al-Assaf, announced in a statement on Monday that the first condition to integrate into the state’s armed forces is for US forces to completely withdraw from Iraqi soil and airspace, offer cast-iron guarantees that they would not come back, and ensure that Iraqi political and economic apparatuses will make decisions free from American sway.
The second condition, he added, is the withdrawal of Turkish forces from areas in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq, while the third one is the dissolution of the Peshmerga, which serves as the official armed forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
Assaf went on to criticize Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, saying that Iraqi anti-terror resistance groups had waited “more than a hundred days” for him to address the internal, regional, and international pressures over the issue of restricting weapons to the state, as a September 30 deadline approaches.
He asserted that Zaidi is disregarding advice from allied political factions, and is instead taking heed of demands being made by certain parties and the US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Presidential Envoy for Syria and Iraq, Tom Barrack.
The remarks came on the same day that Iraq’s four top state authorities renewed calls for the implementation of the Iraqi government’s plan to disarm the armed groups and bring weapons under state control.
In a statement following a Monday meeting in Baghdad between President Nizar Amedi, the prime minister, Parliament Speaker Haibat al-Halbousi and President of the Supreme Judicial Council Faiq Zaidan, the officials stressed the importance of strengthening and developing the capabilities of Iraq’s armed forces “across all spectra” and protecting the country and its citizens.
Successive administrations in Iraq have vowed to bolster state power and to bring all weaponry under the jurisdiction of recognized institutions.
On June 3, Sabah al-Numan, the spokesperson for the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, declared the establishment of a committee aimed at restricting weapons to state control, affirming that the committee had commenced its operations.
While several Iraqi resistance groups, such as Saraya al-Salam, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali, have agreed to integrate into the state’s armed forces, Kata’ib Hezbollah has pledged to retain “resistance weapons” and further develop its arsenal.
Russia Requests Clarification From US, Turkiye Over Plans to Supply Weapons to Ukraine
Sputnik – 15.08.2026
MOSCOW – The Russian Foreign Ministry has requested clarification from the United States and Turkiye over information released by the US Congress regarding plans to supply weapons to Ukraine, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said in a statement on Saturday.
“The Russian Foreign Ministry has requested clarifications from Washington and Ankara in connection with information released by the US Congress,” Zakharova said.
The US and Turkiye still have time to soberly assess the situation regarding plans to supply weapons to Ukraine, she said.
According to documents released by the US Congress, the arsenal is substantial, namely: 12 multiple rocket launchers and over 2,500 unguided cluster munitions for them, 47,000 cluster artillery shells of 203mm caliber, and 70 ATACMS operational-tactical missiles, Zakharova added.
Pumping new weapons would not seriously affect the course of the special military operation but causes serious damage to bilateral relations with the US and Turkiye, she said.
Attempts to use peacekeeping rhetoric while simultaneously supplying weapons to Ukraine are undermining mutual trust, especially given Turkiye’s assurances that it avoids “lethal” supplies.
Zakharova noted that the timing of the transfer of a large-scale shipment of lethal cargo to recipients in Ukraine is unclear.
“It’s worth noting that the circumstances and conditions of such a large-scale ‘transfer’ of lethal materials remain extremely contradictory. It’s unclear who initiated the re-export, how, and when the plan is to transfer the large-scale lethal cargo to recipients in Kiev,” Zakharova said.
It is also unclear what motivated the United States and Turkey to “open Pandora’s box” and prolong the Kiev regime’s agony, she said, adding that this was particularly striking given that both countries claim a special role in resolving the Ukrainian crisis and have declared a political and diplomatic settlement their priority.
“However, multifaceted damage from such supplies is inevitable. It is not only about the casualties and destruction that the authorities in Kiev are seeking to escalate, but also about serious harm to our bilateral relations with Washington and Ankara,” Zakharova said.
Zakharova highlighted that the supply of additional weapons to the Ukrainian armed forces will not affect the course of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine.
“Flooding Zelensky’s junta with ever more weapons will not be able to significantly affect the course of the special military operation in accordance with a just Russian scenario,” Zakharova said in a comment published on the ministry’s website.
The comment came amid reports of possible US-Turkish plans to supply Ukraine with a large batch of US-made weapons, including multiple-launch rocket systems, cluster munitions and ATACMS operational-tactical missiles.
The Mecca pact and the limits of a ‘Muslim NATO’
Divergent threats, US ties, and economic interests leave the collective-defense pact’s real purpose open to dispute.
By F.M. Shakil | The Cradle | August 13, 2026
The oil-rich Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, nuclear-armed Pakistan, and Turkiye, which commands NATO’s second-largest army, signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement on Friday, 7 August. The accord arrived as fighting again intensified in Yemen. Days later, the Ansarallah-aligned Yemeni armed forces (YAF) launched ballistic missiles at Marib and the Red Sea port of Mokha, the latest escalation against Saudi-backed forces.
Iran noted the turn toward regional security arrangements, saying it showed a growing recognition that security cannot be guaranteed by foreign powers. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said the accord reflected a rapidly changing understanding of security across the region.
Pakistan welcomed the accord and said the Mecca agreement stipulates that an attack on any member will be treated as an attack on all. Islamabad described it as a major step toward stronger strategic relations, regional security, and cooperation in mutual defense.
Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar called the accord a defensive document that does not target any one country. Posting on X on 9 August, Dar said it remained open to any regional state willing to commit to its founding principles.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan went further, insisting that neither Iran nor any other country was the pact’s designated target. In an online discussion, he also expressed hope that Egypt would eventually join.
Veteran Pakistani diplomat Riffat Masood offered a narrower reading. In a discussion with Saudi-American researcher Dr Hamza al-Kanani, Pakistan’s former ambassador to Iran and Norway said the phrase “an attack on one is an attack on all” applies specifically to external threats.
“It does not have any regional implications, which means that this clause would apply whenever any country signing this agreement came under attack from Israel, the US, or any external force,” she claimed.
Masood added that the article does not cover intra-regional rivalries involving Iran or the YAF.
Egypt was conspicuous by its absence from the Mecca signing ceremony, despite taking part in months of foreign minister-level consultations with the grouping.
Cairo’s apparent disenchantment rests on the belief that the military agreement is driven more by political alignment than deployable defense capability. Egypt retains positive bilateral relations with the three signatories, but is wary of joining a Saudi-led bloc that could narrow its room for maneuver across the region.
“I expect more countries will join this alliance in the future. The alliance may expand beyond the military sphere to encompass economic and strategic dimensions in the future,” Sajjad Azhar, an Islamabad-based analyst, tells The Cradle.
Riyadh looks beyond Washington
Saudi Arabia’s security partnership with Washington dates to the closing years of World War II, when oil and strategic access became bound up with US protection. But Washington’s shift toward competition with China, coupled with its uneven responses to attacks on Persian Gulf partners, has pushed Riyadh to look for additional options.
The September 2019 attack on Abqaiq and Khurais, claimed by the YAF, temporarily knocked out around half of Saudi oil production. Washington did not retaliate militarily, despite US and Saudi accusations that Iran was responsible. For Riyadh, the episode exposed the limits of the US security umbrella.
The Hamas-led Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October 2023, and the regional war that followed added to Saudi concerns. Those concerns deepened after Israel’s September 2025 attack on Doha, which targeted Hamas negotiators in the capital of a US-allied Gulf state. Eight days later, Riyadh signed a bilateral defense pact with Pakistan.
The US-Israeli war on Iran launched on 28 February 2026 further exposed Arab states to retaliation without providing them with any clear say over Washington’s war aims. According to Azhar, the conflict reinforced the sense that reliance on a single external guarantor had become increasingly dangerous:
“The attacks launched by Tehran and its allies, including the Houthis [YAF] and Iraqi Shia armed organizations [PMU], against Saudi Arabia changed the situation. In this perspective, an end to recurring Iranian threats seems to have been the main strategic purpose behind the new alliance.”
Collective defense, undefined obligations
At the signing ceremony, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan displayed copies of the Mecca agreement, but its full provisions have not been made public. Beyond the collective-defense formula contained in the joint statement, analysts still lack details on command structures, activation procedures, force commitments, and the geographical reach of the pact.
Dr Muqtedar Khan, a US-based analyst and professor at the University of Delaware, tells The Cradle that the pact rests on two pillars: a collective-defense commitment and joint deterrence and defense cooperation. The first treats an armed attack against one of the three states as an attack against all three.
“This sets up a mutual-defense duty that is similar to NATO’s Article 5, but the details about how quickly and strongly they will respond are mostly unclear,” he says. The second pillar, he adds, resembles the bilateral Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan last year.
Khan says the Mecca accord marks an important step in the region’s security evolution, showing how middle powers are seeking greater autonomy and a wider range of partnerships instead of relying almost entirely on the US:
“While it is premature to label it a fully fledged ‘Muslim NATO,’ the pact creates a new framework for collective deterrence and defense cooperation among three of the most consequential Sunni-majority states.”
Its durability and effectiveness, he says, will ultimately depend on how the parties define an “attack,” what each is prepared to do when the commitment is tested, and whether other countries join.
“For now, it functions as both a political signal of reduced dependence on external patrons and a practical platform for deeper military collaboration,” Khan says.
A pact made with Washington’s blessing?
Washington’s public response to the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement has been notably restrained.
For some observers, the pact signals that US partners want to diversify their security arrangements after a succession of regional crises exposed the limits of depending on one external guarantor.
Others argue that, if the agreement produces stronger missile defense, maritime patrols, and a wider sharing of regional security burdens, it could advance Washington’s stated goals rather than threaten them.
The pact may therefore loosen exclusive dependence on the US without displacing the vast American military architecture already embedded in the region.
Retired Pakistani diplomat Abdul Basit, who served as high commissioner to India and as Foreign Office spokesperson, argued in a television interview that the trilateral agreement had Washington’s backing.
“Without US consent, these three regional actors could not succeed in creating a trilateral defense mechanism that challenges the US’s hegemonic security apparatus in the region,” he argued.
Other analysts likewise see an implicit US role in the creation of a large regional force whose likely purpose is not confrontation with Israel but containment of Iranian influence.
Imtiaz Gul, executive director of the Islamabad-based Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), tells The Cradle that Washington’s lack of opposition suggests the coalition was formed with at least tacit US approval and a clear assurance that it would not be directed against Israel:
“This alliance doesn’t significantly deter Iran from attacking US bases in Saudi Arabia. Iran is not attacking these countries but only hitting the US bases wherever they exist. As long as these bases remain there, Iran will continue targeting them in one way or another.”
Three states, three threat maps
The pact is also burdened by conflicting threat perceptions. Pakistan and Turkiye are unlikely to enter a direct clash with Israel while maintaining close strategic ties with Washington. This has fed suspicions that the bloc was established with US backing precisely because it does not challenge the regional red lines enforced by Washington.
Gul says the alliance is no uncomplicated marriage. Its central ambiguity remains unresolved: is it primarily a political declaration, or does it impose binding military obligations on its members?
“The three countries have different threat assessments and priorities. Pakistan’s focus is mostly on India and Afghanistan, but Turkiye or Saudi Arabia will not build deterrence for Israel or India due to their strategic and commercial interests. For Saudi Arabia, the emphasis is on maintaining stability in the Gulf area and promoting economic diversification. Turkiye is seeking to sell its military hardware, even though it has obligations as a NATO member.”
Pakistan and Turkiye also stand to gain financially from the pact as both manage strained economies. Turkiye has found a lucrative regional market for drones and aircraft, while Pakistan secures badly needed Saudi financing.
In August 2023, Saudi Arabia signed a record $3 billion deal with the Turkish defense firm Baykar to procure Bayraktar Akinci unmanned combat aerial vehicles (drones).
Saudi Arabia also committed a fresh $3 billion support package to Pakistan. The funding came in addition to $5 billion in Saudi deposits previously placed with Pakistan and extended through 2028. The new support helped Islamabad repay roughly $3.5 billion owed to the UAE later that month.
“The public relations advantages for Pakistan are evident, but only time will reveal whether the alliance will yield any financial benefits that trickle down to the poor masses,” Gul remarks.
For now, the Mecca pact’s signatories have announced collective defense without revealing who would command it, which threats would activate it, or what each capital would actually risk for the others.
Until those questions are answered, the Mecca pact remains more a declaration of intent than a functioning military alliance.
Why does Turkey transfer ATACMS and will this save Neo-Nazi junta?
By Drago Bosnic | August 12, 2026
NATO member Turkey plans to transfer a massive arsenal of US-made long-range strike systems and artillery munitions to the Neo-Nazi junta forces. This includes at least 70 M39 ATACMS TBMs (tactical ballistic missiles), 12 M270 MLRSs (multiple launch rocket systems), 2,524 M26 227 mm rockets (compatible with both the M270 MLRS and the M142 HIMARS) and 47,000 M509A1 203 mm cluster-munition artillery rounds.
This will be by far the largest single transfer of NATO-sourced weapons and munitions to the Kiev regime outside the United States. It comes at a critical moment for the political West, as the Neo-Nazi junta’s ATACMS stockpiles are virtually gone after years of failures against the Russian military, both in terms of losses caused by Moscow’s world-class long-range precision strike capabilities and its no less stellar SAM/ABM (surface-to-air missile/anti-ballistic missile) systems.
With the US embroiled in its disastrous aggression against Iran, the Pentagon is unable to restock its own arsenal, let alone spare some of its missiles for the Kiev regime. Turkey’s decision to deliver these weapons and munitions comes at a critical moment for the political West, demonstrating its loyalty to NATO and its aggression against the world. Namely, arming the Neo-Nazi junta with so many weapons is a clear message to both Russia and Iran, particularly now that the latter has also been targeted by NATO’s favorite puppet regime. As previously mentioned, it also comes amid US aggression against Iran, demonstrating strategic coordination between Ankara and Washington DC. Turkish motives are certainly multifaceted. Apart from showing loyalty, it’s also gaining massive profits from (re)selling its old stockpile of US-made weapons and earning “points” for a potential return to the troubled F-35 program.
The latter is essentially an economic and financial boost to the troubled Turkish economy, which has suffered due to years of Western pressure and low-level sanctions in the decade since the failed NATO coup against Erdogan. Despite all this and Moscow’s critical role in thwarting the plot, Ankara seems to be distancing itself from the multipolar world and seeking deeper (re)integration into NATO. And while it doesn’t support the political West’s economic siege of Russia, primarily because of its own business interests, Turkey has once again emerged as one of the leading Russian adversaries within NATO, particularly in terms of weapons and munitions transfers. Not to mention its role in supporting all sorts of Islamic radicals and terrorists all across the Middle East, Central Asia and Southeastern Europe, including those who overthrew the last legitimate Syrian government.
Obviously, this was done in coordination with the political West and certain Persian Gulf monarchies, all of which were after President Bashar al-Assad for decades. Turkey’s role in destabilizing the South Caucasus and Central Asia should also be noted, particularly as it directly undermines Russian, Iranian and Chinese national security interests. This is a major challenge for the multipolar world, as it undermines stability in regions critical to BRICS and SCO. It leaves no other logical conclusion except that Turkey is deliberately coordinating its extremely aggressive foreign policy with that of the US and EU/NATO. This includes the involvement of Turkish intelligence in various insurgencies and coup attempts in Central Asia, most notably the failed color revolution attempt in Kazakhstan in early January 2022, which was prevented by joint Russian and Kazakh forces.
Ankara has also been one of the Neo-Nazi junta’s leading arms suppliers and has also played a major role in tricking Russia into fake diplomacy, such as the false promise it wouldn’t release members of the openly Nazi “Azov” battalion. All this was designed as a ruse to buy time for the political West and its favorite puppet regime. As for the latest weapons deal, perhaps the most dangerous aspect is the transfer of cluster munitions, which remain a major hazard for civilians long after fighting has ended. With the American arsenal depleted, Turkey remains one of the few major suppliers of these munitions. Unfortunately, its concern for civilian deaths is virtually non-existent, as it has a long history of using highly controversial weapons that are particularly dangerous for civilians, including white phosphorus that was regularly used by NATO-backed terrorists in Syria.
However, apart from NATO’s terrorist tendencies (hardly surprising considering its origins), can Turkish weapons, particularly the ATACMS, really change anything on the battlefield? While 70 missiles are certainly nothing to be ignored, it should be noted this is only a fraction of what the US already delivered to the Neo-Nazi junta. Namely, it supplied the HIMARS with thousands of M30/M31 GPS-guided rockets (approximately 70 km range) and at least 500 MGM-140 ATACMS ballistic missiles (range 165-300 km, depending on the variant). The Russian military’s unrivaled electronic warfare (EW) and SAM/ABM systems were instrumental in countering these weapons. Of the 500 missiles sent, at least 450 ATACMS are “missing”, which is around 25% of the entire US military’s stockpile. So far, there have been around 20 (if not even fewer) confirmed ATACMS hits on Russian positions.
If 450 were delivered to the Kiev regime and are now “unaccounted for”, is it really that difficult to calculate their actual battlefield effectiveness against the Russian military? As previously mentioned, the Neo-Nazi junta got at least 500 ATACMS, which is approximately 25% of the US Army stocks and 15% of the entire production run since 1991.
Of these, only 50 remained in the Kiev regime’s service by late 2024, meaning that the vast majority got shot down or destroyed while in storage. Even if we go out on a limb and say there have been 20 successful strikes on Russian positions, this would mean that the actual combat effectiveness of the ATACMS is 4.44%, although military reports suggest it’s even lower. In other words, these arms transfers only serve to prolong the fighting and can in no way offer any real battlefield advantages to the Neo-Nazi junta.
Drago Bosnic is an independent geopolitical and military analyst.
Israel is going all out to stop Turkey from getting F-35s
Despite the pressure, President Trump seems to be moving closer to approving Ankara’s reentry into the fighter jet program
By Fatih Kocaibiş | Responsible Statecraft | August 10, 2026
For the first time in years, Washington is discussing Turkey’s return to the F-35 program as a serious possibility.
At the NATO summit in Ankara last month, President Donald Trump said he would lift the CAATSA sanctions that the U.S. imposed on Turkey after Ankara purchased Russian S-400 missile defense systems in 2019. Trump added that he was “certainly” considering restoring Turkey’s access to the F-35 program, which was also suspended at the time..
Notably, a separate sale of American engines for Turkey’s domestic KAAN fighter jet has advanced through congressional review. Ankara is also reportedly exploring the transfer of its S-400 batteries to a Gulf state, a step Washington has demanded for years.
But the Russian system is no longer the only source of resistance. Israel argues that Turkish F-35s would, in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s words, “destroy the power balance” in the region. The phrase invokes Israel’s “qualitative military edge,” a provision in U.S. law according to which Washington cannot sell weapons to Middle Eastern states if those arms would give them capabilities on par with Israel’s own weaponry.
Yet these rules have never been formally applied to Turkey, which is, after all, a U.S. treaty ally. What is being tested is thus not only an arms sale, but whether Israel’s claim to regional primacy can restrict American policy toward a NATO ally.
How Turkey was pushed out
Turkey’s search for a long-range air defence system predates the crisis by a decade. In 2009, the Obama administration approved a sale of Patriot missile defense munitions to Turkey, but the deal broke down over questions of price, technology transfer and local production. Ankara turned to a Chinese system in 2013, cancelled it in 2015, and signed with Moscow in 2017. A late American offer in 2018 came too late to reverse the Russian deal, and the first S-400 components arrived in July 2019.
But the S-400 decision was never simply the product of a failed arms negotiation. When Turkey downed a Russian jet in November 2015, it became the first NATO member to do so since the 1950s. As pressure from Moscow mounted, Ankara had to face it largely alone. The withdrawal of American and German Patriot batteries that same winter, even though armed groups in Syria still posed a threat, hardened Turkey’s sense of exposure.
The July 2016 coup attempt turned mistrust into a political rupture, particularly given that Fethullah Gülen, who Turkish authorities accused of orchestrating the coup, was living in the United States at the time.
Russia exploited the opening, filling Turkey’s defense gap while widening the rift with its NATO allies. Turkish officials justified the purchase as an urgent requirement.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gave it a second meaning. The real issue, he said, was not to the S-400 but to Turkey acting on its own will. Elsewhere he refused to retreat, saying Turkey was “not a slave.” Repeated at rallies, Erdogan’s rallying cry about the missile defense system turned it into an emblem of strategic autonomy, making the purchase as hard to reverse politically as militarily.
This has now become a political liability for Erdogan. In Turkey today, commentators and the main opposition describe the purchase as an act of stubbornness — one that left the S-400 rusting in a hangar and wasted the $1.5 billion Turkey had already paid for the F-35 program.
Turkey remains the only participant expelled after paying in, and the six aircraft it financed were never delivered. Its air force depends on an aging F-16 fleet, with Eurofighter Typhoons serving as a stopgap. The domestic KAAN fighter is the long-term answer, but its first batch is set to fly using American F110 engines under a $700 million sale that drew organized opposition in Congress before clearing review in July.
How Israel built a case against Turkey’s return
Within 72 hours of the Ankara summit, Netanyahu took his objections to three American networks, arguing that Erdoğan was “not a friend” and could not be trusted.
The centerpiece of Israel’s case against Turkey was a remark by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Asked on CNN Türk whether Turkey was among Israel’s targets, the foreign minister said Israel had become a problem for the world and that, with these policies and this mindset, “these men have become a burden that humanity can no longer bear.” The reference to “these policies” and “this mindset” pointed to the Netanyahu government, and the same judgment about Israel’s isolation has surfaced in European capitals and at senior levels of the U.S. administration, from Trump to Vice President JD Vance.
But Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar recast the remark as dehumanizing Jews and calling for Israel’s erasure, and this framing became the dominant account in Israeli commentary. Netanyahu carried it further on Fox, telling American viewers that Fidan had said the Jewish state must basically be wiped out.
The framing slotted Turkey into an existing category, the state that denies Israel’s right to exist. But that is the language of Iranian state rhetoric, repeated by senior officials and inscribed on missiles. Turkey has never pursued such a policy; in fact, it supports a two-state solution and has recognized Israel diplomatically since 1949. Yet Israeli leaders, eager to drive a wedge into Ankara’s relationship with Washington, appear determined to cast Turkey as the next Iran.
Balance for whom?
The most revealing element of Netanyahu’s argument was his definition of the regional balance. By telling Washington that Turkish F-35s would “destroy the power balance,” he equated regional stability with continued Israeli superiority. Israel operates 48 F-35s and is contracted for 100, while Ankara’s immediate effort centers on the six aircraft it already paid for. Turkey’s return to the program would not erase Israel’s advantage; rather, it would modestly narrow an asymmetric order built around Israeli air power and freedom of action.
Israel’s concerns about Turkey are difficult to reconcile with Tel Aviv’s own increasingly preventive and attack-oriented doctrine. While Israeli officials like Netanyahu frame Turkish F-35s as evidence of “aggressive aspirations,” Israeli aircraft have struck targets in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iran, Qatar, and Gaza. In Ankara, this is seen as hypocrisy; Netanyahu’s “balance” is, in this reading, less about mutual restraint and more about preserving Israel’s air superiority and freedom to strike.
Nor are the objections unique to Turkey. Since 2008, American law has required arms sales to Middle Eastern states be certified as preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge, a standard Israel has invoked against countries including Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Nor is this only the position of Netanyahu. Naftali Bennett, his top rival in the coming election, told CNN that Israel cannot allow its Turkish “enemies” such advanced weaponry.
But applying the qualitative military edge doctrine to Turkey does not make sense for U.S. interests. Ankara is not a Middle Eastern buyer seeking parity with Israel but a NATO member whose air force anchors the alliance’s southeastern defense, and its deterrent capacity is a European security question as much as a Middle Eastern one. Extending an Israeli veto over what Washington sells its own allies would put that doctrine in direct tension with NATO’s requirements.
Israel’s concern extends beyond the military effect of a stronger Turkish air force. Despite his best efforts, Netanyahu is unlikely to easily reverse Trump’s broader opening to Ankara. By appointing his longtime associate Tom Barrack as ambassador there, Trump opened a new phase in Turkish-American relations. As Trump said when asked about Netanyahu’s opposition to giving F-35s to Turkey, “nobody tells me what we should be selling or not.”
Unless Ankara takes a step that directly threatens Israel’s security — an unlikely scenario — Trump has little incentive to abandon a relationship he finds useful. That relationship, more than the aircraft, is what Israel is working to prevent.
Fatih Kocaibis is a Turkey-based journalist and political analyst covering U.S. foreign policy, transatlantic relations, and European security, and their implications for Turkish foreign policy.
Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani military alliance shaped by fear of Israel, not Iran: Analyst
Press TV – August 9, 2026
Underlying regional calculations behind the new military alliance between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan have been shaped by fear of Israel, not Iran, says an analyst.
Speaking to the Press TV website, Anusar Farooqui, a US-based writer and commentator who is also the founder and CEO of Systematic Portfolios LLC, said the newly signed “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement” is aimed at the Israeli regime.
“The alliance politics of the Sunni Arab powers is driven by fear of Israel, not Iran,” he said.
“The Saudis and especially the Turks are very fearful of Israeli plans,” he added, noting that Israeli discussions about confronting Turkey, including talk of a possible surprise attack intended to cripple the Turkish air force, had contributed to Ankara’s concerns.
The agreement was signed on Friday in Mecca by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.
The three countries said an armed attack against any one of them would be regarded as an attack against all, while describing the pact as a means of strengthening collective deterrence and regional stability.
The agreement did not specify the practical obligations of its members. A Turkish official said it was not directed against any particular actor, remained open to other regional countries and did not replace existing bilateral or multilateral arrangements.
Farooqui said the absence of Egypt from the initial agreement was particularly significant.
“The important thing about the announcement is the conspicuous absence of Egypt,” he told the Press TV website, adding that the possibility of a Turkish-Egyptian military pact was central to understanding the regional balance.
“The Egyptian question is paramount: why has it taken a pass,” the analyst asked.
He added that such a pact would represent a much stronger counterweight to Israel and said the United States understood the implications.
“So it seems to have intervened to prevent the nightmare from happening,” he said.
Egypt’s position, however, has not been presented as permanently outside the arrangement. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said Saturday Egypt could eventually join the pact after several technical issues were resolved.
He described Egypt as Ankara’s “natural partner” and said other countries had also expressed interest in joining, although the founding members were still discussing how expansion should be handled.
The new military alliance comes amid US-Israeli destabilizing actions in the region. Since October 2023, Israel has waged a genocidal war on Gaza, invaded southern Lebanon and occupied territory in Syria, while also launching two wars of aggression with the United States against Iran that triggered massive retaliatory strikes against US and Israeli assets in the region.
Meanwhile, the regime’s bellicose agenda has raised concerns about the so-called “Greater Israel” scheme that regards Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories as well as parts of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon as part of the Zionist entity.
Israeli regime prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in October 2025 that he feels a deep connection to “this vision”, describing it as “a historical and spiritual mission.”
On the other hand, some analysts have linked the growing Turkish-Israeli rivalry to a broader contest over regional influence. Turkey and Israel have maintained diplomatic relations since 1949 and their strategic and commercial ties have survived tense rhetoric.
Yet tensions seem to have intensified recently over Gaza, Syria, energy routes, maritime issues and Ankara’s expanding regional role.
Pakistan’s position has added another dimension to the emerging security alignment.
Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said on Saturday, following the signing of the agreement, that Israel was “a threat to the entire Muslim world” and called for “a united military front” against it, while noting that the regime poses a direct threat to countries across the region.
The broader security environment has also been affected by changes in the US military posture. Washington has reportedly withdrawn warplanes and other military equipment from countries including Qatar and the United Arab Emirates following Iranian retaliatory strikes.
Asked whether the new alliance could eventually contribute to a region without US military presence and with Israel more contained, Farooqui said the current arrangement is insufficient.
“Not without Egypt,” he told the Press TV website. “The Saudi-Turkish-Pakistan pact is mostly for show. By itself, it is not an effective balancing coalition against Israel.”

