France’s Shadow War in Mali
By Freddie Ponton | 21st Century Wire | May 11, 2026
France did not really leave Mali. It changed tactics and found new hands to carry the gun. After being pushed out by a military government that turned toward Russia, China, and the wider Global South, Paris appears to have re-entered the war through Ukrainian military intelligence channels, long-standing Tuareg networks, and a battlefield configuration in which separatist rebels and Al-Qaedaʼs Sahel branch were hitting the same state enemy at the same time.
The late-April attacks in Mali said something larger about the Sahel. A former colonial power that had been shown the door was suddenly back in the frame, leaning on intermediaries and the momentum of jihadist advances to weaken a government that had chosen Russian support, Chinese weapons, and the language of anti-colonial independence over its old dependence on Paris.
Paris returns through the back door
The sequence is clear. On 25 April, coordinated attacks struck Kati, Gao, Kidal, Sévaré and other strategic points in Mali. Defense Minister Sadio Camara, one of the central figures in Bamako’s post-French realignment and often described as Moscow’s man in the junta, was killed in an attack on his residence. The capital was shaken, roads toward Bamako came under pressure, and in the north, the insurgents advanced as Russian fighters and Malian forces lost ground. Four days later, while the government was still counting its dead, Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, spokesman for the Azawad Liberation Front, or FLA, surfaced in Paris and met French security and defence representatives while demanding that Russian forces leave Mali. That alone should have set off alarms from Bamako to Brussels.
French media then supplied the missing bridge. Radio Télévision Luxembourg, RTL, reported that France was relying on French-speaking Ukrainian soldiers, including former Foreign Legion personnel, to provide operational support on the ground in Mali in coordination with Tuareg rebels. The report was explicit enough to describe a French effort to avoid direct cooperation with jihadists linked to Al-Qaeda by using Ukrainian relays instead. The same investigation recalled that at the beginning of 2025, Ukrainian military intelligence had presented a detailed plan to French authorities to help dislodge the juntas in the Sahel region and roll back Russian influence. Paris supposedly hesitated at first on security grounds. From where things stand now, the April operation feels less like an improvised response than the delayed execution of that proposal.
For readers unfamiliar with Mali, one fact matters more than any other. This is a large Sahel state that was once a core part of France’s post-colonial sphere of influence. After coups in 2020 and 2021, the new authorities pushed out French troops, challenged the old Françafrique order, and brought in Russian security support while deepening ties with non-Western partners. That made Mali a test case in Africa’s attempt to break with inherited dependency. Seen from that angle, the April offensive was more than just local tensions between armed factions. In fact, it was part of a wider struggle over who gets to decide the political future of the Sahel.
The offensive that exposed the convergence
The April 25 offensive laid bare the forces converging against Bamako. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), better known as JNIM, claimed major attacks around the south and center. The FLA and allied Tuareg formations pushed in the north. Together they created the sense of a government under siege, with one arm of the offensive squeezing the capital and another unravelling the junta’s hold on strategic northern towns. JNIM is not a vague insurgent label. It is Al-Qaeda’s official branch in the Sahel, born from a 2017 merger that brought together Ansar Dine, AQIMʼs Sahara branch, al-Murabitoon and the Macina Liberation Front under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghali, a veteran Tuareg commander now wanted by the International Criminal Court.
That reality becomes significant, especially when the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) is so often presented in softer terms, as if it were merely a separatist front pursuing legitimate local grievances. The FLA, founded in late 2024 in Tinzaouaten from a reorganization of Azawad movements, draws on a long history of Tuareg rebellions in northern Mali. Its public face is political and diplomatic, and its battlefield behaviour tells a much sharper story. In the April assault, it moved in the same strategic rhythm as JNIM, benefiting from the firepower, shock value, and confusion generated by Al-Qaeda’s Sahel network.
The north was especially revealing. Kidal, the symbolic heart of Tuareg politics and rebellion, fell back under FLA control after Russian Africa Corps contractors and Malian forces withdrew. Accounts describe negotiated departures, seized matériel, and a humiliating loss for Bamako and its Russian backers. Africa Corps units left behind vehicles and equipment while seeking safe passage out of a town they had retaken from Tuareg groups only a few years earlier. In Bamako’s orbit, meanwhile, JNIM tightened pressure with threats to block access roads and attacks designed to create the perception of a capital edging toward siege. To supporters of the insurgency, the junta looked fragile, but to anyone watching external interference, the alignment of interests was impossible to ignore.
Much of Western coverage flattened this into a familiar story about state weakness and local instability. That framing leaves out the politically explosive part. These attacks came after two years of mounting accusations from Mali and its Sahel allies that Ukraine was aiding anti-state armed factions and that France had never fully abandoned its northern networks. Put next to Ramadane’s Paris visit and RTL’s reporting on French support through Ukrainian channels, the April offensive starts to read less like a sudden collapse than the military expression of a proxy design that had been taking shape for some time.
Ukraine’s war spills into the desert
Ukraine’s place in this story is not incidental. It is one of the clearest windows into how the war with Russia has spilled into Africa. In 2024, reporting from Le Monde described Ukrainian links with northern Malian rebels and said Ukrainian operatives had trained Tuareg fighters to use drones. That reporting was reinforced by statements from Tuareg figures themselves, who acknowledged contacts with Ukrainians, and by later accounts of drone know-how and explosive FPV tactics moving into the Sahel theatre. Mali cut diplomatic ties with Ukraine in August 2024 after comments from a Ukrainian intelligence spokesman were interpreted in Bamako as an admission of involvement in the Tinzaouaten ambush that killed large numbers of Wagner and Malian personnel.
In that July 2024 ambush near Tinzaouaten, Tuareg separatists claimed to have killed 84 Wagner operatives and 47 Malian soldiers. Ukraine’s own military intelligence spokesman then boasted that its services had supplied the “essential intelligence, and not just intelligence” that made the operation possible.
Tinzaouaten already carried the shape of what came later, and showed that Russian assets in Mali could be hit through a combination of local insurgents, drone warfare, and outside intelligence support, leaving Moscow’s contractors exposed far from their main war. By 2026, those methods had grown more polished. Reports on rebels’ use of FPV systems, including fibre-optic drones that resisted jamming and adapted commercial platforms, pointed to a battlefield increasingly shaped by techniques honed over eastern Ukraine. Russian and Malian convoys were taking fire from above in areas where state air superiority had once seemed secure.
Regional coverage and Sahel sources have since pointed to Algeria as the state that might have helped make that Ukrainian support physically possible long before the April offensive. Niger had already moved into Russia’s security orbit by then, which suggests Algerian territory and networks as the only realistic corridor for covert assistance to reach Tuareg fighters in northern Mali. The same Algeria that has spent years mediating Tuareg affairs, hosting peace talks and cultivating influence over Iyad Ag Ghali’s environment, seems to be quietly repairing relations with both Paris and Washington.
For Kyiv, the logic is straightforward. Russia’s Africa Corps is both a military instrument and a geopolitical symbol, securing mining sites and political partnerships across a belt of African states. Hitting it in Mali weakens Moscow’s position abroad while demonstrating that Ukraine can impose costs on Russia beyond Europe. For France, Ukrainian projection in the Sahel has a different value; primarily because it opens a way to hurt Russia’s African network and destabilize the junta without visibly redeploying French troops or sitting down with jihadist commanders.
RTL’s report on French-speaking Ukrainian ex-Legionnaires operating as intermediaries is powerful precisely because it solves a practical problem. Paris can guide and assist operations that serve its interests while insisting that no French soldier is on the ground. The Ukrainians provide deniability, military expertise, and a shared anti-Russian mission. The Tuareg rebellion provides local cover and established terrain knowledge, while JNIM provides the battlefield weight that neither France nor Ukraine could openly supply themselves. Taken together, the result is a war in which Malian sovereignty and Russian presence are being tested by actors who will never stand behind the same podium but who are clearly useful to one another on the ground.
France’s long shadow and the new division of labour
The events of this year did not emerge in a vacuum. Across Mali and the wider Sahel, accusations that France manipulates armed Islamist-adjacent networks have circulated for years. Some claims are stronger than others, while some remain allegations. However, put together, they form a political memory that explains why Bamako and its allies quickly read the April offensive as more than a domestic insurgent wave.
French president Emmanuel Macron visits the troops of France’s Barkhane counter-terrorism operation in Africa’s Sahel region in Gao, northern Mali, 19 May 2017
One of the hardest facts in that longer history is the ransom trail. A decade ago, a major New York Times investigation found that European governments had pumped large sums into Al-Qaeda-linked groups through ransom arrangements and that France was among the major payers. French and other European hostages taken in the Sahara and Sahel were released after opaque deals in which governments denied paying, but local intermediaries and US officials said otherwise. Reporting from the same period described France as one of the champions of ransom payments to Al-Qaeda affiliates in North and West Africa. The practical outcome pointed towards networks that abducted Western nationals gained money, leverage, and survivability from transactions tied directly or indirectly to French state interests.
In Bamako, those revelations sit on top of a thicker layer of suspicion. The Malian outlet L’Aube accused Paris of effectively financing JNIM through ransom payments, alleging that France paid between 12 and 13 million euros for the release of Olivier Dubois and Jeffrey Woodke and that the money was used by the group to buy arms and ammunition. Niger‘s authorities later levelled similar charges, with General Abdourahamane Tchiani accusing France of pouring several billion CFA francs into armed groups across the Sahel and using Nigerian intelligence channels for training, equipment and financing linked to terrorism. Against that backdrop, RTL’s talk of a new hierarchy of enemies in Mali lands with much greater force. France avoids direct contact with Al-Qaeda’s men by working through Ukrainian and Tuareg intermediaries, yet accepts a configuration that strengthens the jihadists on the ground.
Then came the accusations from Mali itself. In 2021, Prime Minister Choguel Maïga told Russian media that France had created an enclave in Kidal, barred the Malian army from entering, and taken deputies of Ansar Dine’s leader to form a new armed group trained by French officers. Although those claims were denied and never fully proven in public, they reflected a widespread belief in Mali that France’s northern policy was always selective, that some armed actors were enemies only until they became useful, and that counterterrorism language had long concealed a hierarchy of interests. When RTL later explained that France now limits its operational support to Ukrainian relays to avoid direct contact with jihadists linked to Al-Qaeda, it gave that older suspicion a fresh and chilling plausibility.
A new division of labour is also coming into view across the Sahel battlefield. JNIM supplies most of the foot soldiers and carries out the suicide car bombings and complex ground assaults that the Tuareg front alone could not manage. The FLA offers a separatist banner, a political vocabulary tied to Azawad and Tuareg grievances, and a face that Western actors can present as more acceptable than open jihadism. Ukrainian intelligence, drawing on ex-Foreign Legionnaires and years of experience under fire, interfaces directly with Tuareg commanders and delivers modern drone and ambush tactics. France coordinates with the Ukrainians and leans on its long history of intelligence work with Tuareg elites, but keeps just far enough away from open jihadist contact to preserve a legal and political alibi. Algeria appears to be sitting in the background as facilitator and fixer, a state that has repeatedly handled Tuareg files, mediated peace accords, and is now edging back toward closer ties with Paris and Washington. Above all of this sits the United States, rolling out a new counterterrorism strategy that asks European allies to take more responsibility for African theatres and to shoulder more of the burden of rolling back Russian influence worldwide.
Furthermore, it is acceptable to draw parallels with Syria, which offers the clearest precedent for what is emerging in Mali, where Western powers are claiming a war on terror while tolerating or working around Al‑Qaeda‑linked formations when they serve a shared objective on the battlefield. In Syria, Western powers tolerated, rebranded or worked around Al-Qaeda-linked formations when those forces were useful against the Syrian state. Mali is not a carbon copy, but the political reflex is familiar. France appears to have accepted a battlefield reality in which its preferred anti-junta channel moved alongside, and benefited from, Al-Qaeda’s own assault on the Malian state. That is enough to strip away the moral language of the so-called war on terror and expose a pattern that keeps resurfacing whenever Western influence is under threat.
Africa pushes back against the old pattern
Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have spent the last few years trying to build a different political vocabulary for the region. Their Alliance of Sahel States, or AES, is not simply a club of juntas, and should be seen also as a rebellion against the old script in which Paris decided security priorities, Western diplomats managed legitimacy, and African governments were expected to accept permanent tutelage in exchange for nominal stability. That rebellion is messy, militarized, and far from pure, which explains why Bamako’s turn toward Russia, China, and Turkey carries such symbolic weight across the Global South.
The response to the April offensive grew from that new landscape. AES partners launched joint military actions, including airstrikes in Malian territory, after the attacks on Gao, Ménaka and Kidal. Moscow has made clear that it does not intend to abandon Bamako. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said after the April attacks that Russian forces would stay in Mali at the request of the current government and continue helping it fight extremism, terrorism and other harmful phenomena. Russian military statements added that Africa Corps units had helped prevent a change of power and inflicted irreparable losses on the attackers.
This is not a symbolic presence. Reporting has described a Russian deployment of roughly 2,000 to 2,500 Africa Corps personnel in Mali, supported by repeated shipments of armoured vehicles, artillery and electronic warfare equipment. China had already been supplying new defence systems, including short-range air defences designed to help deal with the very drones that had become a weapon of choice for jihadist and Tuareg militias. Turkey emerged as another important arms partner through the supply of combat drones to the Malian state. Each of those relationships tells the same story. Mali is trying to diversify away from Paris and anchor its survival in a more multipolar world.
Pressure is building from the other side of the chessboard. Nigeria has warned that the rebel and jihadist advance in Mali threatens the wider region and hinted that it could intervene again, echoing its role in supporting the last French military operation there more than a decade ago. Almost at the same time, Washington published a new counterterrorism strategy urging Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security, explicitly including counterterror operations in Africa. Together, those signals sketch the outline of a tomorrow in which the same states accused of secretly feeding the fire in Mali can present themselves once more as firefighters.
That is the wider fight behind the headlines. If France can return through covert channels, Ukrainian intermediaries, and a tolerated overlap with jihadist momentum, then the message to the rest of Africa is brutally simple. Expelling the old colonial power does not free a country from its reach. It only drives its methods deeper into the shadows.
The anger in Bamako, Niamey and Ouagadougou did not come from nowhere. It was built over years of lectures about democracy from governments that armed the neighbourhood, years of foreign troops sold as protection while insecurity spread, years of counterterrorism campaigns that left ordinary people poorer, less mobile, and less safe. That memory sits behind every cheer for sovereignty in the Sahel. The old order still has embassies, media networks, military bases, and intelligence contacts. What it no longer has is the automatic right to be believed.
France once marched into Mali under the guise of rescue. Now it seems to be edging back in through a side door, behind Ukrainian handlers, Tuareg envoys, and Al-Qaeda gunmen who happen to be shooting at the same enemy. If JNIM ever reaches the gates of Bamako, nobody should call it a mystery born from the desert. The road to that disaster is already being paved through a proxy system that weakens Mali in the name of saving it and then prepares to market the resulting collapse as the reason for another intervention.
What advances on Bamako today is more than JNIM and a Tuareg front. It is a proxy machinery in which Western states and their partners are willing to ride jihadist momentum, break a government they cannot control, and then market the ruins as proof that Africa still needs their protection.
UAE provides $100m for US-backed Gaza police force vetted by Shin Bet
The Cradle | May 8, 2026
The UAE has sent $100 million to US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace to fund the training of a new Palestinian police force for Gaza, the Times of Israel reported on 8 May, citing a US official and a diplomat from West Asia.
Setting up a security force to control Gaza on Israel’s behalf will reportedly allow Tel Aviv to sideline Hamas while reducing the presence of the Israeli army, which is suffering from manpower shortages.
The police force is being organized under the umbrella of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a panel of Palestinian technocrats tasked by the Board of Peace and Israel to administer the Strip.
Though the NCAG was created three months ago, its members have not yet entered the Strip, reportedly due to a lack of funding and security.
“No money is currently available,” Board of Peace envoy Nickolay Mladenovas privately acknowledged, according to a Palestinian official familiar with the matter speaking with Reuters.
The proposal envisions the new police force seizing weapons in Gaza as part of the effort to disarm Hamas.
Nevertheless, Hamas has yet to agree to disarm, as Israel has not adhered to the terms of the US-sponsored ceasefire that was signed in October 2025.
According to the ceasefire agreement, Israel was required to withdraw their forces to areas near the border, dismantle all military sites and installations, allow displaced Palestinians to return to their homes in the north of the Strip, open the Rafah crossing, and allow humanitarian aid to enter freely.
Israel has also killed over 800 Palestinians in Gaza since the ceasefire took effect.
In February, the NCAG began recruiting for the new 27,000-strong police force. Recruits will be vetted by Israel’s internal security service, the Shin Bet, according to an Arab diplomat who spoke with the Times of Israel in March.
An Emirati security firm will train the recruits in Egypt and Jordan before dispatching them to Gaza.
In February, US President Donald Trump announced $17 billion in pledges for the Board of Peace at a donor conference. He also demanded that world leaders contribute $1 billion each for a seat on the board, which he said would rival the UN.
However, the $100 million contribution from the UAE is the largest pledged amount the board has received so far. The board has not received the billions in contributions initially pledged by the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.
One source with direct knowledge of the peace board’s operations told Reuters that Washington and Tel Aviv’s war of aggression against Iran “affected everything.”
The Board of Peace is also working to establish and deploy a proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza, which is expected to include soldiers from several foreign countries. This move would enable the Israeli army to further outsource its ethnic cleansing efforts.
Indonesia, Albania, Kazakhstan, and Kosovo have each pledged troops to the ISF, but so far none have been deployed or begun training, amid fears they may have to use violence to disarm Hamas on Israel’s behalf.
The UAE has supported Israel not only in Gaza but also in its war with Iran.
The New York Times reported on Friday that the UAE has “doubled down on its alliances with Israel and the United States,” despite Iranian drone and missile strikes targeting the Emirates in retaliation for their support for the US-Israeli war on the Islamic Republic.
“There is a trust premium that Trump will do the right thing,” said Nadim Koteich, an Emirati-Lebanese commentator who is close to the Emirati government. “What suits his legacy and what suits the American interests suits us.”
The UAE has also partnered with Israel and Somaliland to create a new “strategic axis” in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea in a bid to project power into Africa and counter the Ansarallah-led Yemeni Armed Forces.
Gates-Funded ‘Big Catch-Up’ Delivers 100 Million Vaccine Doses — Including High-Risk DTP Vaccine Not Used in U.S.
By Brenda Baletti, Ph.D. | The Defender | April 27, 2026
More than 18 million children in 36 countries across Africa and Asia were vaccinated as part of “The Big Catch-Up,” a global initiative launched in April 2023 and concluded last month.
The campaign delivered 100 million vaccine doses, and included these vaccines, according to a fact sheet: Pentavalent (DTP-Hep-Hib), measles or measles-rubella, IPV, bOPV, rotavirus, PCV, MenA, and yellow fever.
The campaign included “targeted follow up to ensure that children recieved [sic] not only a first dose, but ideally all doses needed in a series.”
The fact sheet did not specify how many vaccines could be administered during a single visit, or if the campaign included any monitoring of the children for side effects or injuries.
Of the 18.3 million children vaccinated, 12.3 million “zero-dose children” had not previously received any vaccines, and 15 million had not received a measles vaccine, according to the World Health Organization (WHO).
The initiative focused on children ages 1-5 who had missed routine vaccinations.
The WHO, UNICEF and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance — backed by the Gates Foundation — launched the initiative “to address vaccination declines driven largely by the COVID-19 pandemic.”
Final figures are still being tallied, but the organizations said they were “on track” to exceed their goal of vaccinating 21 million children. They released their numbers on April 24 to kick off World Immunization Week.
Kennedy clashes with Sen. Shaheen over Gavi funding
During a U.S. Senate hearing last week, U.S. Health Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. clashed with Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.) over Kennedy’s 2025 decision to block U.S. funding for Gavi.
In a June 2025 prerecorded video for Gavi officials, Kennedy said that the U.S. funding would be withheld until Gavi “re-earned the public trust,” citing concerns over vaccine safety.
“In its zeal to promote universal vaccination, it has neglected the key issue of vaccine safety,” Kennedy said. “When the science was inconvenient, Gavi ignored the science.”
The U.S. gave $300 million to Gavi in 2024, and the Biden administration, also in 2024, had pledged over $1.5 billion to the organization over five years — funding that Kennedy has since withheld.
Shaheen praised Gavi for vaccinating 1.2 billion children during its existence and for being the “world’s leading purchaser of U.S. produced vaccines.”
Shaheen said Gavi representatives warned her that “if this funding is not released, millions of children will die.” She asked Kennedy to commit to working with her and Gavi representatives to restore the funds.
Kennedy said concerns about Gavi’s use of funds must first be addressed. Gavi funnels money to the WHO, “which we got out of because it was doing such a miserable job,” he said.
DTP vaccine injury lawsuits led to legal immunity for vaccine makers
Kennedy also told Shaheen that Gavi is distributing a vaccine with known serious side effects to millions of children when a safer alternative exists.
“Their biggest vaccine is now a DTP vaccine … an old version that was discontinued in this country because it was causing brain injury,” he said. “We discontinued it. Europe discontinued it. They’re still giving it to 161 million African and Asian children a year.”
Kennedy said he asked Gavi why they didn’t use the safer version instead — the DTaP vaccine. “They said they didn’t want to do that.”
DTP vaccines distributed in Africa typically contain the “whole-cell” pertussis vaccine to protect against whooping cough. These vaccines contain an inactivated version of the entire B. pertussis organism, most containing aluminum salts as an adjuvant and thimerosal as a preservative.
In the U.S. and other high-income countries, the whole-cell vaccine was replaced with the acellular DTP vaccine in the 1990s because the vaccine was linked to both minor and serious side effects.
The controversy surrounding whole-cell DTP vaccines drives major U.S. vaccine legislation.
In the late 1970s and 1980s, serious and widespread concern grew about the safety of the DTP shot, after many children experienced seizures, serious brain injury or death following DTP vaccination.
Between 1980 and 1986, lawsuits seeking more than $3 billion in damages were filed against vaccine manufacturers, most for the DTP vaccines made by Wyeth (now Pfizer).
After the lawsuits revealed that Wyeth knew of the risks, juries began authorizing large payouts to families of children injured by the vaccine. As the lawsuits threatened to bankrupt the vaccine insurance industry, manufacturers began to exit the industry.
Congress responded by passing the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, which established the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program — a no-fault system intended to give the pharmaceutical industry broad protection from liability while compensating children injured by compulsory vaccines.
In 1991, the Institute of Medicine concluded that evidence showed a causal relation between the DTP shot and acute encephalopathy, although scientists said there was not enough evidence to say that it causes long-term neurological damage.
DTP cheaper, possibly more effective — but linked to more serious injuries
In 1991, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration licensed the diphtheria-tetanus-acellular pertussis (DTaP) vaccine — which caused fewer side effects than its predecessor vaccine.
In 1997, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommended the DTaP vaccine over the whole-cell DTP vaccine for infants, replacing the older formulation entirely in the U.S.
At the time, the committee cited research suggesting that the whole-cell DTP vaccine was documented to commonly cause erythema, swelling and pain at the injection site, fever and other mild systemic events, as well as serious adverse events — including convulsions and hypotonic hyporesponsive episodes. The serious events occurred in 1 in 1,750 doses administered.
Acellular vaccines are not as effective against whooping cough, reportedly because immunity wanes more quickly and because the pathogen has adapted to the vaccines. They are also more expensive to produce.
Some experts argue that despite higher rates of adverse events, their higher efficacy rates make the whole-cell DTP shots better candidates for mass vaccination campaigns like “The Big Catch-Up.”
“Weighing the risk-benefit of different types of vaccines is often tricky,” said Karl Jablonowski, Ph.D., senior research scientist at Children’s Health Defense. “It involves the prevalence of the disease and access to medical care should the vaccine fail to protect, or adverse events manifest.”
Jablonowski said cost is also usually a factor, “as the least hazardous often cost the most. It is a sad state when the more vulnerable take on the greater hazard for diseases that are preventable or treatable by other means.”
This article was originally published by The Defender — Children’s Health Defense’s News & Views Website under Creative Commons license CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Please consider subscribing to The Defender or donating to Children’s Health Defense.
Mali: a new front in the Western war on multipolarism
Strategic Culture Foundation | May 1, 2026
An audacious coup attempt against the government in the West African state of Mali appears to have been thwarted by the Malian Armed Forces, supported by their Russian allies.
The surprise coup was launched last weekend when an estimated 12,000 fighters attacked at least five cities, including the capital, Bamako. Fighting continued during the past week, with most of the casualties – over 1,000 dead – suffered by the insurgents who came under heavy ground and air fire from state forces backed by Russian auxiliaries belonging to the Africa Corps.
Mali’s leader, Assimi Goïta, made a nationwide televised address appealing for calm and stating that the country’s security situation had been brought under control. He paid tribute to his defense minister, General Sadio Camara, who was killed in action on the first day of the coup attempt on April 25. The leader also acknowledged the actions of his country’s strategic partner, the Russian Federation, for helping to defeat the coup, which he condemned as “foreign-sponsored”.
For its part, the Kremlin said it would continue supporting the Malian government to restore stability and security to the country.
Both the Malian authorities and Moscow have accused Western sponsors of involvement in the insurgency. Russia’s foreign ministry claimed that Western military instructors had helped coordinate the wide-ranging attacks. There were reports of militants armed with French Mistral anti-aircraft missiles and U.S.-made Stinger Manpads. There are also unverified reports of mercenaries from Ukraine and NATO states fighting on the ground.
This is not the first time that NATO and Ukraine have been linked to destabilizing the national security of Mali. Two years ago, Mali cut diplomatic links with Kiev after a Ukrainian military intelligence official claimed that Ukrainian forces had been supplying insurgents.
In the latest uprising, the Western news media have been quick to highlight supposed military gains made by the rebels. The Western coverage has sought to portray the violence as a spontaneous challenge to the government in Bamako, which the Western media disparages as a “military junta”. The same media have also claimed that the unrest is a blow to Russia’s strategic interests in Africa. In particular, it is claimed that Moscow’s security partnership with Mali and other African states is being exposed as ineffective and weak.
Two militant groups were involved in the coup attempt this week. The Tuareg ethnic people’s liberation movement, known as the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), and an Al-Qaeda-linked jihadist group known as Jammat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Both entities had been fighting each other until recently, but now seem to have allied. Who brokered that expedient alliance?
The widespread insurgent attacks mounted against five cities covering a distance of some 2,000 kilometers also suggest that the fighters were provided with considerable intelligence and logistical support. Mali is a huge country, the sixth largest in Africa, with a land area twice that of France or Texas. Previous attacks were mainly confined to the remote northern half of the country, which is typically a desert landscape. To launch an assault on the capital in the south is a significant development. The devastating bomb attack on the defense minister’s residential compound near Bamako also suggests that there was foreign assistance.
The geopolitical background is highly significant. Mali formed an Alliance of Sahel States (AES in French) in September 2023 along with Niger and Burkina Faso. The three former French colonies ordered the withdrawal of French military forces and asserted a newfound political independence. They accused France of playing a double game by secretly supporting separatists and Islamist groups to give a pretext for French military involvement in their countries. In a further affront to French arrogance, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso pointedly turned to Russia for security assistance and, in return, have offered Russia access to key natural resources in a mutual partnership.
For centuries, France and other Western states have plundered Africa without giving anything back to the continent except new forms of economic slavery and exploitation.
Meanwhile, Russia and China have gained renewed partnerships with many African nations. A history of colonial depredation hampers neither Russia nor China. Indeed, the Soviet Union has a largely honorable legacy of supporting African independence, which many Africans acknowledge. In the contemporary context, Moscow and Beijing’s espousal of a multipolar world and cooperative development has resonated strongly with African countries.
When Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso kicked out the French neocolonial trappings three years ago, there was palpable scorn in Paris, particularly from French President Emmanuel Macron. If the Sahel alliance succeeded with Russian help, that would be a major blow to France’s national esteem and the anti-Russian propaganda narrative of the NATO bloc.
The attempted coup in Mali should be viewed in this light. It is much bigger than Mali’s internal tensions and divisions. What’s at stake is maintaining the right of political independence and sovereignty in African nations to choose their own political and developmental path. In a word: self-determination. Old colonial powers like France and other NATO members would like to turn the clock back to the former times of hegemonic control.
As many informed analysts have noted, the current conflicts in Ukraine and other places, such as Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, Latin America, Asia-Pacific, the Arctic, and so on, are not isolated aberrations. They are all part of a “new great game” for Western powers to reassert global dominance.
The Western ruling elites want to, indeed need to, confront the rising multipolar world that challenges their hierarchy of privileges and profits. Russia and China are the main targets for the Western powers to win their strategic war. The proxy war in Ukraine is part of that. So too is Washington’s aggression against Iran to cut off energy supplies to China and Asia.
The coup attempt in Mali is another site of struggle that appears to be instigated by NATO powers in their proxy war against Russia and the historic vision for a multipolar world.
There is an ominous echo of the Syria scenario, where Western powers finally overthrew a Russian ally at the end of 2024, to be replaced by jihadists whom the West backed covertly for years before that.
Given the strategic importance, Russia and China must not let this happen in Africa. The firm defense of Mali this week by the country’s leadership and armed forces, acting with the support of Russia and the mass of Malian people, indicates that Western intrigue will fail.
Sudan’s RSF leaders build Dubai property empire with UAE backing: Investigative group
Press TV – April 28, 2026
Leaders of Sudan’s so-called Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their network have amassed millions in luxury assets in Dubai, an investigation reveals, as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is accused of helping a financial lifeline for a militant group that committed genocide in the crisis-hit African country.
A detailed investigation by the Sentry, a US investigative group, showed that individuals tied to the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, have accumulated more than 20 high-end properties in Dubai worth £17.7 million.
The report further exposed a sprawling “paramilitary-industrial complex” stretching across Africa and West Asia, with the UAE functioning as a critical hub for both wealth storage and financial operations linked to the militant group.
The probe by the Sentry maintained that the UAE acted as a “safe haven” for RSF leaders and their relatives, as well as for wealth derived from smuggled Sudanese gold.
After seizing Darfur’s largest gold mine back in 2017, Hemedti and his network reportedly leveraged UAE-based companies to convert illicit gold into hard currency, taking advantage of Dubai’s booming gold trade.
“In addition to arming the militia, the UAE allows the RSF to base part of its paramilitary-industrial complex in Dubai. Our investigation shows the Dagalo family has also found a safe haven for its wealth in the Emirates,” Nick Donovan, senior investigator at the Sentry, said.
Leaked real estate records also indicate that properties linked directly to the RSF network are worth about £7.4 million, while assets held by sanctioned associates add another £10.3 million to it. Among them are luxury six-bedroom villas near Dubai’s Meydan racecourse acquired through a UAE-registered firm – Prodigious Real Estate Management Supervision Services – tied to an individual sanctioned by the United States for supplying funding and military equipment to the RSF.
According to the probe, Dagalo family members clustered in these compounds, while Hemedti’s wife purchased land worth £627,000 in the vicinity of Trump International Golf Club six months into Sudan’s war.
Sanctioned RSF-linked figure Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed is also reported to own a £516,000 apartment in Burj Khalifa.
The RSF – commanded by Hemedti and his sanctioned brothers – has been accused by both the United Nations and the US of atrocities amounting to genocide, including during an assault on El Fasher in the Darfur region.
Despite mounting evidence, the UAE, widely seen as the militant group’s chief foreign backer, “categorically rejects” claims that it has provided “weapons, funding, trainers or logistical support to the RSF.”
Citing a separate report last week, the Sentry also said that UAE-backed Colombian mercenaries played a decisive role in the fall of El Fasher.
Meanwhile, RSF-linked individuals deny any wrongdoing, insisting assets were legally obtained and commercial activities were legitimate, even as Sudan’s war drives what is now the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, with 33 million people of the country’s 50 million population needing aid and at least 19 million facing hunger.
The RSF, which has been fighting the Sudanese army over the past few years, currently controls large swathes of the country’s southwestern territories, including most of the region of Darfur.
The militants captured el-Fasher on October 26, 2025, with reports saying they massacred thousands of civilians who failed to flee the city.
A UN fact-finding mission found that RSF actions in el-Fasher show “hallmarks of genocide” against the Zaghawa and Fur ethnic communities.
Despite denials by the UAE, several reports have suggested that the Persian Gulf Arab country supports RSF militants in Sudan in a bid to get access to gold and secure control over Red Sea shipping lanes, as well as agricultural land.
Somalia bans Israeli-linked vessels from Bab al-Mandab Strait
The Cradle | April 24, 2026
The Somali government announced on 22 April that it will impose a ban on Israeli shipping passing through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, framing the move as a response to Tel Aviv’s recognition of the breakaway Republic of Somaliland.
The announcement was made by Somalia’s ambassador to Ethiopia and the African Union, Abdullah Warfa.
He warned that violations of his country’s sovereignty “would not be tolerated.”
“External meddling could lead to countermeasures, such as restricting access to the key maritime route of Bab al-Mandab,” Warfa added, according to Yemen Press Agency (YPA), Mehr News Agency, and IRNA.
The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported a day later that a cargo ship 83 nautical miles southeast of Eyl, Somalia, was approached by two small armed boats, one of which came within 600 meters of the vessel.
“Warning shots were fired and the suspicious craft returned fire. The suspicious small craft moved away and made clear of the reporting cargo ship. All crew are safe and accounted for,” the UKMTO report added.
While analysts question Somalia’s ability to enforce the ban due to limited naval capacity, they say the decision carries major political weight, potentially reshaping regional alignments and pushing Somalia toward closer coordination with Sanaa over control of the strategic chokepoint.
Late last year, Israel became the first state to recognize the breakaway Somaliland region as an independent state. Somaliland had functioned as a de facto state since declaring independence in 1991, with its own governing institutions and security structures – despite receiving no recognition from any UN member state and facing sustained opposition from Somalia.
The Somali government slammed the move along with several regional countries, including Turkiye.
Earlier this month, Somalia condemned Israel’s appointment of an ambassador to Somaliland.
The announcement comes as tensions between Tehran and Washington remain high despite the ceasefire. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and Tehran has retaliated to an ongoing US blockade and seizure of its vessels – capturing two ships this week.
Yemen’s Ansarallah resistance movement, which has threatened to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait given its close proximity, carried out several operations during the US-Israeli war on Iran.
Ansarallah recently vowed it would resume operations if the US–Iran ceasefire collapses.
“We have more serious winning cards; the US must understand that, with the help of our Yemeni brothers, the issue of the Bab al-Mandab Strait is also under consideration and action,” said Behnam Saeedi, a member of the Iranian parliament’s national security and foreign policy committee, earlier this month.
The Bab al-Mandab Strait is the passageway for approximately 12 percent of global oil and eight percent of worldwide liquefied natural gas (LNG).
Iran attacks on UAE leaves RSF militia high and dry
The Canary | March 12, 2026
Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are reportedly contributing to a rapid collapse of the genocidal so-called ‘Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) in Sudan.
The RSF, funded and armed by the UAE and Israel, had been making gains up to February 2026. It has murdered hundreds of thousands of people in Sudan. Rapes, sexual torture and executions have been common and almost 400,000 people are in starvation.
However, Sudanese government forces have achieved a string of military victories that appear to be turning into a rout.
With UAE shipments rerouted from the Hormuz Straight and the UAE to Saudi Arabia due to Iran’s counterattacks of shipping, the UAE economy, and it’s global financiers, have been dealt a major blow.
Meanwhile, Sudanese forces are targeting RSF arms and supply depots, crippling front-line RSF troops by cutting off ammunition, fuel, and essentials.
Sorry, The New Republic, Climate Change Isn’t Causing Somali Migration. Blame Civil Strife and Poverty.
By Linnea Lueken | Climate Realism | March 10, 2026
The New Republic (TNR) posted an article titled “Somali Immigrants Fled Climate Change. Now They’re Facing ICE,” claiming that Somali migrants in the United States have been driven out of their country by climate-change caused drought. This is false, or at least incomplete. Drought is a natural part of the region, even multi-year drought, and the present one is no different than the region has experienced with some regularity historically. It is civil strife and government corruption, resulting in continued poverty, that is leading Somalis to flee their homeland. With present governing institutions and security, they have been unable to improve water handling practices. Climate change has nothing to do with Somali emigration elsewhere in the region or to the United States, as even those interviewed for the article acknowledge.
TNR undermines its titular claim that unprecedented man-made climate change has forced Somalians to migrate by admitting that Somalian culture has “deep-rooted traditions of movement and migration.” TNR goes on to say that “Somalis have been caught in civil war and unrest for decades, and many have migrated to Kenya, Ethiopia, Europe, and the United States.”
Somehow not noticing the actual central point of that statement, that Somalians often move and that political strife has kept them destabilized, TNR says that climate change plays a “pervasive role” in the migration.
TNR claims that a multi-year drought “made a hundred times more likely due to warming caused by fossil fuel emissions—is affecting Somali people’s decisions to either relocate internally or migrate across international borders.”
Incredibly, later in the article, TNR refutes its own suggestion that this drought is worse, and pushing unprecedented migration, by explaining that this is how farmers have long dealt with drought in Somalia:
Traditionally, Somali pastoralists had resilient ways to deal with changes in rainfall and drought patterns, where families migrated and moved on a regular basis, even crossing borders in the process. But the nature of climatic changes—and conflict—overwhelmed their traditional capacities, leading to more rural-urban migration within the country and in East Africa.
That’s right, severe drought is something Somalians have dealt with for ages, long enough to have known traditions regarding adaptation to the dry periods.
There is no evidence that this drought is worse than those that drove historic migration.
The cited claim that recent drought in Somalia was made “a hundred times more likely” by climate change is not based on sound science. It comes from an attribution study from World Weather Attribution that specifically seeks to tie various weather conditions to human-caused climate change, they do not come to any other conclusions. Climate Realism has gone into the specifics of how unscientific World Weather Attribution studies are here, here, and here.
The TNR piece says that “[f]rom 2020 to 2023, the East Africa region had five failed rainy seasons, an unprecedented drought and climatic episode not seen in 40 years, which led to 70 percent crop loss, three million livestock deaths, and the displacement of about 2.9 million people in Somalia, according to some estimates.”
Admitting that a weather event also happened 40 years ago should tell a writer that their argument about something being “unprecedented” – meaning, without precedent, or never happened before—is faulty.
In fact, studies and data show a long history of swings between severe drought and monsoon floods in the region, and they show that nothing about modern drought is unprecedented. Paleo studies, including one published in Science, show that “intervals of severe drought lasting for periods ranging from decades to centuries are characteristic of the monsoon and are linked to natural variations in Atlantic temperatures.”
Climate Realism has covered this very claim before: In Anthony Watts’ “No, CBS News, Drought in Somalia is Not Being Driven by Climate Change,” he compared natural weather-driving patterns like the Atlantic Meridional Oscillation (AMO) and recent drought in Somalia and found repeated patterns of drought that were similarly severe.
Somalia is part of the Sahel region, and Watts shared this graphic of the region’s rainfall index since 1900, which shows that the rainfall in the Sahel varies widely over time:
Figure 1: More than a century of rainfall data in the Sahel show an unusually wet period from 1950 until 1970 (positive index values), followed by extremely dry years from 1970 to 1991. (negative index values). From 1990 until present rainfall returned to levels slightly below the 1898–1993 average, but year-to-year variability was high. Source: Benedikt Seidl – based on JISAO data
Additionally, comparing crop production data between Somalia and neighboring countries like Ethiopia and Kenya reveals that even when drought impacts East Africa, Somalia is uniquely incapable of maintaining agricultural production. During the same period in which Ethiopia and Kenya saw increasing production in vital cereal crops, UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) data show Somalia declining. (See figure below)
Is climate change not hitting Kenya and Ethiopia? What is the difference?
While Somalia has a long history of severe, recurring droughts, the worst drought in the past 50 years was the “Long-tailed Drought” from 1973 to 1975. That drought, and a subsequent similarly deadly drought in the early 1980s, occurred when the Earth was in a cooling spell and atmospheric carbon dioxide was much lower than today.
Somalia’s civil war and resulting destruction and corruption is the prime force behind Somalia’s emigration. Ironically, one of the interviewees in the TNR piece says as much:
Drought does not necessarily lead to famine and does not always lead to migration,” said Abdi Samatar, a Somali scholar and geographer at the University of Minnesota […] Somalis were unable to “put Humpty Dumpty back together in their country,” and in the absence of government support, “people have to do what they can for themselves,” Samatar added.
We at Climate Realism could not have said it better ourselves, though we have explained as much in past articles where mainstream outlets tried to link climate change and Somalia’s migration issue.
The New Republic’s effort to tie Somalians fleeing their country for the United States to climate change was a flawed, agenda-driven effort from the start. Even when those interviewed by TNR link the mass exodus of residents from Somali to other factors, TNR persists in pushing the narrative that climate change is playing a “pervasive role.”
It is true that Somalia is suffering through a severe, life threatening drought. It is also true that such droughts are not unprecedented but have been common throughout the region’s history. The nation’s unstable government and the ongoing, long-standing, civil war bear far more of the blame than climate change, especially since there is little or no evidence that Somalia’s climate has changed much over the past century.
The current drought is hitting Somalia’s populace worse than those of nearby countries in the region because of the political instability there. The New Republic was told this by the experts they interviewed but chose to ignore it to advance a climate scare story. Evidently, it’s too much to hope for honest journalism at The New Republic.
Linnea Lueken is a Research Fellow with the Arthur B. Robinson Center on Climate and Environmental Policy.
Buck Dancing for Zion: Kenya’s and Nigeria’s Growing Love Affair With Israel
Israel has found new golems to exploit on the Dark Continent
José Niño Unfiltered | February 18, 2026
In October 2025, hundreds of Kenyans marched through Nairobi’s Central Business District carrying banners reading “Israel Belongs to God”. Bishop Paul Karanja declared to the crowd, “We are here to declare that Israel is not alone. We will continue to stand with them.” The demonstration commemorated the second anniversary of the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks, but it represented something far more significant than a single day of solidarity. It revealed a geopolitical quirk that has left analysts scrambling for explanations.
According to a June 2025 Pew Research Center survey covering 24 countries, Kenya showed 50% favorable views toward Israel with 42% unfavorable. Nigeria registered 59% favorable and 32% unfavorable. These were the only two nations with majority positive sentiment toward Israel. In 20 of the 24 countries surveyed, majorities held negative views. Kenya and Nigeria, in addition to India, stand virtually alone in their enthusiasm for the Jewish state at precisely the moment when global opinion has turned sharply against it.
This pro-Israel shift among the populations in Kenya and Nigeria is not a sudden development born from the Gaza war. It represents years of cultivation, theological indoctrination, security partnerships, and strategic maneuvering that transformed two African nations into some of Israel’s most promising partners in the post-October 7 age.
The most fundamental explanation behind this rise in pro-Zionist sentiment lies in the explosive growth of evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity across both countries.
Nigeria houses one of the world’s largest evangelical populations, with Operation World estimating the country ranks either third or fourth globally in total evangelical numbers, trailing only the United States and potentially Brazil or China depending on methodology. Pew Research Center puts Nigeria’s total Christian population at 93 million as of 2020, a 25% increase from 2010, making it the sixth-largest Christian nation in the world and the largest on the African continent.
Pentecostalism has become deeply embedded in Nigerian Christianity, though its precise share remains debated. The U.S. State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report, citing the Christian Association of Nigeria, places Pentecostals at approximately 30% of the Christian population, with an additional 10% identifying as evangelical Christians in non-Pentecostal traditions and African-instituted charismatic churches accounting for another 5 to 10%. When Pentecostal and charismatic Christians across all denominations are counted together, researchers at the Center for the Study of Global Christianity at Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary place the combined Pentecostal and charismatic share of Nigerian Christianity significantly higher, reflecting the deep penetration of charismatic practice even within mainline churches. That figure has exploded in recent decades, driven by aggressive evangelization, media expansion and the global reach of Nigerian-founded movements like the Redeemed Christian Church of God and Deeper Life Bible Church.
Kenya presents a different evangelical landscape but one equally conducive to pro-Israel theology. According to the 2019 national census, evangelicals comprise 20.4% of Kenya’s total population out of 47.6 million residents — roughly 9.6 million by the census’s strict denominational count. Broader estimates that apply a wider evangelical definition, including researcher Sebastian Fath’s figures cited by Lifeway Research, place Kenya’s evangelical population closer to 20 million. An estimated 30 to 35% of Kenya’s population identifies as Pentecostal, indicating significant overlap between evangelical and Pentecostal identities.
Together, Nigeria and Kenya account for approximately 78 million evangelicals under the broader definitional framework, representing over 42% of Africa’s estimated 185 million evangelical population. This concentration reflects broader patterns of African Christianity’s expansion and the global southward shift of Christian demographics.
The theological framework binding these believers to Israel rests on Christian Zionism, a dispensationalist interpretation that views the modern state of Israel as fulfillment of biblical prophecy. Genesis 12:3 serves as the foundational text. “I will bless those who bless you, and whoever curses you I will curse.”
The International Christian Embassy Jerusalem, a global evangelical organization, has actively cultivated ties with Nigerian churches, organizing pilgrimages and promoting pro-Israel narratives. Pastor Rex Ajenifuja of I Stand With Israel has mobilized grassroots campaigns emphasizing that “Nigeria loves Israel” and framing solidarity as a spiritual obligation. Prominent Nigerian pastors have explicitly connected pro-Israel theology to national prosperity. During visits to Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Adeboye explained, “The problems that we are seeing between the Jews and the rest of the world, is because they are the favorites of God. When you are special to God, then automatically the devil wouldn’t like you either.”
In Kenya, the theological stance intersects directly with political power. Current President William Ruto’s administration has deepened ties with evangelical leaders who have publicly endorsed Israel as part of their eschatological worldview. During prayer services, Ruto and First Lady Rachel Ruto — a devout evangelical known for her faith diplomacy program that enlists clergy in matters of state — have woven Israel into Kenya’s spiritual identity. Ruto himself prayed at Jerusalem’s Western Wall during a 2023 state visit, with the site’s rabbi noting it was the longest prayer by any world leader he had witnessed there. At a faith rally convened by Rachel Ruto, crowds waved Kenyan and Israeli flags together while praying for both nations. Influential evangelical figures have openly equated support for Israel with national blessing.
Bishop Dennis Nthumbi, Africa Director of the Israel Allies Foundation, has described Kenya’s bond with Israel as a “covenantal, long-standing relationship” that no politician can sever. Bishop Mark Kariuki, the presiding bishop of Deliverance Church Kenya and former chairman of the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya, has aligned himself with the broader conservative evangelical political theology that underpins pro-Israel sentiment across the continent. The Kenyan government provided active support for the October 2025 pro-Israel march. Speaking in a televised interview on Kenya’s Elevate TV ahead of the march, Africa-Israel Initiative president Bishop Joshua Mulinge confirmed that the government had granted permits and provided police escorts throughout the route. “The Kenyan government has been very supportive,” he said. “We thank God for our head of state and for the entire government.”
The Times of Israel reported that the October 2025 march aimed to call Kenyan Christians “out of the prayer closet and into the streets” to publicly express solidarity with Israel beyond private prayer. Speakers emphasized that “Christianity originated in Jerusalem and that the Church remains spiritually rooted in Israel.” A Norwegian representative of the Africa Israel Initiative stated, “I believe that anybody who blesses Israel, as the Bible says, is blessed. I think it should be in every Christian’s heart to support Israel.”
The political dimensions of evangelicalism in both countries reveal important patterns of religious influence on governance. In Nigeria, evangelical and Pentecostal movements have shaped political discourse around moral conservatism, prosperity theology, and spiritual warfare against corruption, even as the country’s Christian-Muslim demographic balance remains contested. Pew Research places Muslims at 56.1% and Christians at 43.4% as of 2020, though Afrobarometer surveys of adults have found Christians in the majority. Kenya’s evangelical community has achieved more direct political influence, particularly through President Ruto’s administration, which explicitly appeals to evangelical constituencies and employs religious rhetoric in governance.
A 2024 study by the French Institute for Research in Africa described Ruto as the first born-again president in what it called “the making of a born-again republic,” documenting how key evangelical leaders including Bishop Mark Kariuki of Deliverance Church Kenya, Bishop David Oginde of CITAM, and evangelist Teresia Wairimu of Faith Evangelism Ministries described Ruto as God’s appointed ruler during his 2022 campaign. This theological stance embraced by Ruto has been used to justify the suppression of pro-Palestinian activism, as evidenced by Kenyan police’s arrest of Kenyans displaying Palestinian flags in 2023.
Theology alone does not explain the depth of Kenya and Nigeria’s alignment with Israel. Strategic security cooperation provides pragmatic reinforcement for religious sentiment.
Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram and Kenya’s struggles with al-Shabaab have led to intelligence sharing agreements and military training programs facilitated by Israel. These partnerships, while pragmatic, are often justified through evangelical rhetoric that conflates Islamist extremism with broader anti-Israel sentiment. Nigerian evangelicals have long portrayed Boko Haram’s insurgency as evidence of jihadist violence targeting Christians, reinforcing theological solidarity with Israel as a fellow victim of Islamist terrorism. That narrative, however, is contested by researchers including Brookings and conflict-monitoring group ACLED, which has found that the majority of Boko Haram’s victims have been Muslim, with religion-targeted attacks against Christians accounting for only 5% of civilian-targeting events recorded in its data.
In November 2011, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga in Jerusalem and declared that “Kenya’s enemies are Israel’s enemies so we should be able to help,” pledging to build a coalition against fundamentalism that would bring together Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Tanzania. The meeting produced a memorandum of understanding on homeland security cooperation, with both Netanyahu and Israeli President Shimon Peres committing to help Kenya secure its borders against militant threats.
Similarly, Israeli ambassador Gil Haskel stated, “Israel is willing to send consultants to Kenya to help Kenya secure its cities from terrorist threats and share experience with Kenya because the operation in Somalia is very similar to Israel’s operations in the past, first in Lebanon and then in Gaza Strip.”
In February 2016, President Uhuru Kenyatta traveled to Jerusalem to strengthen counterterrorism cooperation, with discussions focused on combating al-Shabaab following the 2013 Westgate Mall attack and the 2015 Garissa University massacre. Nadav Peldman, Israeli deputy ambassador to Kenya, stated that Israel was “ready and willing to assist Kenya” in fighting terrorism, calling it “a heinous crime that should be confronted with the same force it projects.”
That defense relationship has since deepened under President William Ruto, who negotiated a $26 million Israeli government-backed loan in July 2025 to acquire the SPYDER surface-to-air missile system manufactured by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. The system, delivered in December 2025, accounted for roughly 70% of Kenya’s Ministry of Defence development budget for FY2025/26. The partnership spans counterterrorism operations, cybersecurity infrastructure, intelligence sharing, and joint military training.
Israeli-Kenyan relations have an economic dimension to them as well. In Kenya, Israeli drip irrigation technology — including low-pressure systems distributed through MASHAV — has been deployed to boost food security, alongside a 2016 Jerusalem Declaration in which Kenya and Israel committed to a 10-point water and irrigation cooperation framework. On the digital side, Kenya and Israel launched the Cyber-Dome Initiative between Israel’s National Cyber Directorate and Kenya’s Communications Authority, and have held Cyberweek Africa in Nairobi annually since 2023 to expand cybersecurity capacity-building across the continent.
The Israel-Nigeria partnership followed a parallel trajectory, with Nigeria’s Ministry of Defence reaffirming in April 2025 its commitment to “enhancing military cooperation with the State of Israel” following a meeting between Permanent Secretary Ambassador Gabriel Aduda and Israeli Ambassador Michael Freeman. The two sides discussed joint operations, knowledge exchange, defense industry development, and plans to finalize a new bilateral defence agreement, with Aduda pledging that Nigeria would “engage in strategic initiatives to replicate successful Israeli military cooperation frameworks.”
Nigeria, meanwhile, hosts over 50 Israeli companies operating across construction, infrastructure, hi-tech, communications and IT, and agriculture and water management. Cultural ties have also deepened: in 2021 the Israeli ambassador to Nigeria and the country’s vice president initiated a collaborative film co-production between Israeli and Nollywood filmmakers to mark 60 years of diplomatic relations. Israel’s MASHAV agency, established in 1958, provides agricultural training, water management, and health programs across East Africa, with Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, and Seychelles identified as its primary African partners for capacity-building.
None of the growing pro-Zionist sentiment in Kenya and Nigeria is a coincidence. Well-funded pro-Israel organizations have systematically cultivated African Christian support through parliamentary lobbying, church mobilization, and faith-based diplomacy.
The Washington, D.C.-based Israel Allies Foundation maintains a global parliamentary network of more than 1,500 pro-Israel lawmakers, coordinating faith-based caucuses in Kenya, Nigeria, and across Africa. Bishop Scott Mwanza of Zambia served as the foundation’s inaugural Africa Director, coordinating existing caucuses across the continent. He was succeeded by Rev. Dennis Nthumbi, who currently oversees 16 Israel Allies Caucuses as Africa Director and has been a leading voice in mobilizing Christian parliamentary support for Israel across the region.
In September 2024, 25 African lawmakers from 19 countries gathered in Addis Ababa for the first Pan-Africa Israel Parliamentary Summit, where they signed the “Addis Ababa Declaration of Africa-Israel Cooperation and Partnership.” The declaration, which included lawmakers from Kenya and Nigeria among others, affirmed Jerusalem as “the legitimate, undivided, and eternal capital of the Jewish State of Israel,” condemned anti-Zionism as antisemitism, and called for strengthening bilateral ties and supporting Israel’s observer status at the African Union.
Key Kenyan organizations include the Africa-Israel Initiative, launched in Zambia in April 2012 by a coalition of African church leaders including Bishop Joshua Mulinge of Kenya, who now serves as its president and leads the movement across more than 20 African nations. The Israel Allies Foundation Africa Division is led by Rev. Dennis Nthumbi. King Jesus Celebration Church Worldwide, chaired by Bishop Paul Karanja, co-convened the 2025 “March for Israel” through Nairobi’s Central Business District alongside the Africa-Israel Initiative and the Israel Allies Foundation. The Evangelical Alliance of Kenya serves as the national umbrella body for evangelical churches.
Nigerian organizations include the Lagos-based I Stand with Israel International Friendship Organization, led by Pastor Rex Ajenifuja; Christians United for Israel Nigeria Chapter, part of the global CUFI network founded by American pastor John Hagee; and the Africa for Israel Christian Coalition, founded by South African Israel lobbyist Luba Mayekiso, whose Nigerian affiliates have mobilized over 3,000 pastors across 22 states.
Prominent Nigerian evangelical leaders include Pastor Chris Oyakhilome, founder of Christ Embassy; Pastor Enoch Adeboye, General Overseer of the Redeemed Christian Church of God, who has visited Israel multiple times and donated two ambulances to Magen David Adom, Israel’s emergency blood services organization; and the late Prophet TB Joshua, founder of Synagogue Church of All Nations, who was named “Tourism Goodwill Ambassador for Israel” by Minister of Tourism Yariv Levin following a 2019 evangelical crusade in Nazareth.
Nigerian Christian pilgrimages to Israel have become a significant phenomenon. According to the Nigerian Christian Pilgrim Commission, approximately 18,000 Christian pilgrims from Nigeria travel to holy sites in Israel and Jordan each year on average, with the NCPC targeting around 10,000 pilgrims annually for its organized exercises. The NCPC organizes multiple pilgrimage cycles throughout the year — including Easter, Women’s, Youth, and General pilgrimages — with participants praying for Nigeria’s leaders and offering intercessory prayers at holy sites. The 84,000 figure in the original text is not supported by Israeli tourism data; Israel Central Bureau of Statistics figures show Nigerian tourist arrivals peaked at 12,700 in 2019, while a 2025 analysis of the decade from 2015 to 2025 estimated over 80,000 total Nigerian Christian pilgrimages over that entire ten-year span.
Former President Goodluck Jonathan — a practicing Pentecostal Christian who, as sociologist Ebenezer Obadare documented in Pentecostal Republic, cultivated strong ties with Nigeria’s Pentecostal constituency — played a pivotal role in what might be called “pilgrimage diplomacy.” In October 2013, he became the first sitting Nigerian president to undertake a pilgrimage to Israel, leading a delegation that included six state governors — including Governors Elechi of Ebonyi, Obi of Anambra, Akpabio of Akwa Ibom, Suswam of Benue, Jang of Plateau, and Orji of Abia — along with ministers and church leaders including CAN President Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor.
Initial pre-trip reports of 19 governors and 30,000 pilgrims proved to be overblown. Jonathan visited holy sites, met with President Shimon Peres and Defense Minister Bogi Ya’alon, and signed bilateral agreements on aviation. He made a second private pilgrimage in 2014, meeting Prime Minister Netanyahu with an entourage of about 20 political and religious leaders.
Jonathan expressed security solidarity when he wrote to Prime Minister Netanyahu during the search for three Israeli teens abducted by Hamas in 2014, stating, “I assure you that we are in solidarity with you, as we believe that any act of terrorism against any nation or group is an act against our common humanity.”
These visits had diplomatic consequences. In December 2014, when the UN Security Council voted on a Jordanian-tabled resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and Palestinian statehood within three years, Nigeria abstained — a last-minute reversal that left the resolution one vote short of the nine needed to pass. The Guardian reported that both Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had phoned President Jonathan to ask him not to support the resolution. Nigeria’s abstention, alongside those of the UK, Lithuania, South Korea, and Rwanda, meant the US and Australia’s opposing votes were sufficient to defeat the measure without Washington needing to invoke its veto — a significant diplomatic victory for Israel given Nigeria’s historical support for the Palestinian cause.
Kenyatta played a particularly instrumental role in the diplomatic warming between Kenya and Israel. In February 2016, he visited Jerusalem for counterterrorism talks with Netanyahu. Netanyahu then reciprocated with a historic visit to Kenya in July 2016 — the first visit by an Israeli prime minister to sub-Saharan Africa in nearly 30 years. It was during that Nairobi press conference, not during Kenyatta’s Jerusalem visit, that Netanyahu declared: “Israel is coming back to Africa, and Africa is coming back to Israel.” Kenyatta in turn pledged to help Israel regain observer status at the African Union.
Following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks, President William Ruto posted on X that “Kenya joins the rest of the world in solidarity with the State of Israel and unequivocally condemns terrorism and attacks on innocent civilians in the country. The people of Kenya and their government hereby express their deepest sympathy and send condolences to the families of all victims… Kenya strongly maintains that there exists no justification whatsoever for terrorism, which constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security. All acts of terrorism and violent extremism are abhorrent, criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of the perpetrator, or their motivations.”
The statement also called for de-escalation and a ceasefire — context omitted from early reporting — and drew sharp criticism from Kenya’s Muslim leaders and some opposition figures. Ruto subsequently softened his position at a November 2023 Arab-African summit in Riyadh, where he stated that “terrorism cannot be an answer to any conflict; neither is occupation” and reaffirmed Kenya’s support for a two-state solution.
Based on post-October 7 trends, the trajectory of support for Israel augurs a distinctly melanin-enhanced future, as centuries-old European animus toward organized Jewry—now reactivated by the industrial-scale genocide in Gaza—diminishes traditional alliances on the Old Continent. Under these circumstances, Israel must pivot toward emergent partners in the Global South, where nations like Kenya and Nigeria, buoyed by decades-long philosemitic trends, can provide millions of new golems for world Jewry to tap into.
Concomitant with Israel’s burgeoning alliance with India—itself a bastion of Hindu nationalist affinity for the Jewish state—this reconfiguration signals that pro-Zionism will inexorably become brown-coded within mere decades, as the Global South’s burgeoning populations eclipse fading Euro-American sympathies.
No, Al-Jazeera, Climate Change Hasn’t Altered African Flood and Drought Patterns
By Anthony Watts | Climate Realism | February 3, 2026
Al Jazeera (AJ) recently published an article titled “Drought in the east, floods in the south: Africa battered by climate change” by Haru Mutasa, in which the reporter details recent experiences of drought in East Africa and flooding in southern Africa, asserting that those weather events are proof that climate change is battering the continent. This is false. The article relies on flimsy content such as personal observation, interviews, and evocative imagery to imply causation, ignoring data and trends that show no appreciable changes in flood or drought patterns over time.
Mutasa asserts that “rising seas and intensifying storms” and shifting rainfall patterns are already devastating livelihoods, citing the author’s personal field observations as evidence of a broader climate crisis. Readers are shown photos of dry riverbeds, dead livestock, submerged neighborhoods, and distressed residents, then invited to connect these scenes directly to global warming. The emotional impact is real, but emotion is not evidence.
Let us start with AJ’s most basic error: weather is not climate. Climate is defined by long-term patterns measured over decades, typically 30 years or more. A drought in one region followed by floods in another over a few weeks or months says nothing about a durable climate trend. Africa’s climate has always been highly variable, with sharp swings driven by ocean–atmosphere cycles such as the El Niño–Southern Oscillation and the Indian Ocean Dipole. Short-term extremes—sometimes back-to-back—are a known feature of the region, not a recently discovered diagnostical proof of climate change.
The historical record bears this out. Southern and eastern Africa experienced severe droughts and catastrophic floods long before modern greenhouse gas emissions rose. Mozambique’s Limpopo River basin, featured prominently in the article’s flood imagery. The area has a long history of major inundations, including the devastating 2000 Mozambique floods, which displaced hundreds of thousands and occurred during a strong El Niño year. East Africa’s Horn has likewise seen repeated, multi-year droughts throughout the twentieth century, interspersed with episodes of extreme rainfall. These precedents matter because they show that today’s events are consistent with a long pattern of variability rather than proving a novel climate regime.
In fact, science has shown a 50-year seasonal variability across centuries in East African droughts and floods recorded in lake sediments.
When measured data are consulted instead of anecdotes, the alarm bells fade. Climate at a Glance summarizes the global evidence in “Floods” and “Drought,” explaining that there is low confidence in any increasing trend of global flood frequency or magnitude and that drought trends are regionally mixed, not universally worsening. These conclusions align with the cautious language used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), which emphasizes uncertainty and regional variability rather than blanket claims of intensification.
The AJ article substitutes interviews for analysis. Quoting local residents and aid workers about hardship may document suffering, but it does not diagnose cause. Infrastructure deficits, land-use changes, deforestation, river management, dam releases upstream, population growth in floodplains, and limited early-warning systems all play decisive roles in disaster outcomes across Africa. Climate Realism has repeatedly shown how media coverage overlooks these factors while attributing complex events to climate change by default, as catalogued in its Africa-related reporting and extreme-weather analyses accessible via Climate Realism’s search on floods and droughts and Climate Realism’s coverage of drought claims.
Even within the article’s narrative, local management issues loom large. Mutasa notes dam releases in South Africa’s Mpumalanga province sent additional water downstream into Mozambique—an operational decision with immediate hydrological consequences that has nothing to do with global temperature or climate change. Treating such factors as footnotes while elevating climate change as the primary driver of flooding misinforms readers about where real risk reduction lies.
Serious climate reporting distinguishes between events and trends, and between personal experiences and measured evidence.
By presenting interviews and moment-in-time scenes as confirmation of a continent-wide climate verdict, Al Jazeera is misleading its audience by making a causal connection where data show none. Africa’s vulnerability to climate and weather extremes is real, but the causes are multifaceted and long-standing. Ignoring historical precedents and measured trends in favor of an alarming narrative certainty does not inform the public; it misleads it with false headlines.
Collapsing Empire: US Bows To African Revolutionaries
By Kit Klarenberg | Al Mayadeen | February 6, 2026
On February 2nd, the BBC published an extraordinary report on how the Trump administration “has declared a stark policy shift” towards Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, the governments of which have sought to eradicate all ties to Western imperial powers, and forged the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). The independent bloc is a revolutionary enterprise, with the prospect that further countries will follow its members’ lead. And Washington is under no illusions about the new geopolitical realities unfolding in Africa.
The British state broadcaster records how Nick Checker, State Department African Affairs chief, is due to visit Mali to convey US “respect” for the country’s “sovereignty”, and chart a “new course” in relations, moving “past policy missteps.” Checker will also express optimism about future cooperation with AES “on shared security and economic interests.” This is an absolutely unprecedented development. After military coups deposed the elected presidents of all three countries 2020 – 2023, the trio became Western pariahs.
France and the US sought to isolate and undermine the military governments, halting “cooperation” projects in numerous fields. Meanwhile, the Economic Community of West African States, a neocolonial union of which all three were members, first imposed severe sanctions on Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, before its combined armed forces prepared to outright invade the latter in summer 2023. The three countries didn’t budge, and in fact welcomed Western isolation, forging new international partnerships and strengthening their ties. ECOWAS military action never came to pass.
In January 2025, the trio seceded from the union and created AES. Western-funded, London-based Amani Africa branded the move “the most significant crisis in West Africa’s regional integration since the founding of ECOWAS in 1975,” claiming it dealt “a significant blow to African… cooperation architecture.” Meanwhile, Burkina Faso’s leader Capt Ibrahim Traoré has become a media hate figure. A disparaging May 2025 Financial Times profile slammed him as a cynical opportunist leading a “Russia-backed junta”, and his supporters a “cult”.
As the BBC unwittingly explains, such antipathy towards Traoré stems from establishing himself “as a standard-bearer in resisting ‘imperialism’ and ‘neocolonialism’.” Via “vigorous social media promotion, he has gained huge support for this stance and personal popularity among young people across the continent and beyond,” ever since seizing power in September 2022. Far from just talk, Traoré and his fellow AES “junta” leaders have systematically sought to neutralise malign Western influence locally, while pursuing left-wing economic policies for the good of their populations.
France and the US have proven markedly powerless to hamper, let alone reverse, this seismic progress. While officials in Paris and Washington hitherto relentlessly hammered AES’ members over “democracy and human rights” concerns, the BBC reports such considerations will be wholly “absent from the agenda” when State Department officials now visit Mali. In other words, the Empire recognises it no longer has the ability to dictate the composition or policies of regional governments and must engage administrations on their own terms.
‘Despotic Governments’
While generating only occasional mainstream interest, the push by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to rid themselves of Western imperialism has been remarkable in its scope and efficacy. French and US media programmes and channels have been blocked throughout AES. In August 2022, Paris’ forces were sent packing from Mali after a nine-year-long occupation. Two years later, Russian soldiers took over an airbase in Niger housing American forces at the government’s invitation, after authorities demanded Washington withdraw from the country.
These purges have had a knock-on effect in the wider region. For example, in November 2024, Chad abruptly terminated a military agreement, ending France’s long-running occupation of the country. Around the same time, Senegal demanded that the French close their military base in Dakar. The last troops departed in July 2025, leaving Paris with no permanent installations in Central or West Africa. Meanwhile, efforts by AES members to drive Britain, France, and the US out of every major sector of their economies are ongoing.
Right when Chad and Senegal were bidding bon voyage to French forces, Niger seized control of local mining firm Somaïr, a component of state-owned French nuclear company Orano. Somaïr provided a quarter of the uranium supply to European nuclear power plants. Resultantly, EU imports of uranium from Russia rose by over 70%, despite the supposedly crippling sanctions imposed over the Ukraine proxy war. In another bitter irony, Moscow has concurrently cemented itself as a close partner of AES member states in economic and military fields.
This burgeoning relationship has triggered a predictable chorus of condemnation and fearmongering from Western journalists, politicians, and pundits. Yet, a March 2024 poll published by the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation found 98% of Malians approve of their country’s bond with Russia, with 83% being “very satisfied” and 15% “rather satisfied”. More generally, the same survey highlighted how Mali’s “junta” enjoys overwhelming public support, about which Western governments can only fantasise.
In all, 81% of respondents believed life in Mali had improved since the military administration took power. A staggering 99% expressed satisfaction with the work of security forces, 95% were optimistic about the country’s future prospects, and 87% rejected calls for an election. Similar results were found in a poll of Burkina Faso’s population in August. A stunning 66% of citizens said it was legitimate for the military to seize power, if “elected leaders abuse their power for their own interests.”
As a fascinating paper by Senegalese academic Ndongo Samba Sylla forensically details, ever since supposed independence was granted to Africa in the 1960s, France and other imperial powers have worked concertedly to ensure its constituent countries are ruled by pliant puppets. Along the way, the West has “shown no scruples in backing odious civilian or military regimes” favourable to their interests. This produces “choiceless democracies” across Africa, with “despotic governments” that come to power “through fraudulent elections and… do not create any welfare for their people.”
‘Lasting Solutions’
Sylla cites the example of Chad, where France sustained a corrupt, brutal dictator, Idriss Deby Itno, in office 1990 – 2021. Following his death, Emmanuel Macron diplomatically backed his son’s “unconstitutional succession”. The French President’s unabashed advocacy for an illiberal, nepotistic power grab is to be contrasted with Macron’s furious censure of the military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, demands they hold elections, and calls for “financial sanctions from African countries, the West and its financial institutions.”
France could impose sanctions directly on the trio due to Paris’ control of the Central Bank of West African States, the financial arm of ECOWAS. Membership ties states to the CFA Franc, a currency created after World War II that allowed Paris to maintain grossly iniquitous trading relationships with its African colonies, when its economy was ravaged and its overseas empire rapidly unravelling. The CFA Franc makes it cheap for members to import from France and vice versa, but prohibitively expensive for them to export elsewhere.
Such forced dependency creates a captive market for the French, and by extension, Europe, decisively blunting local development. Member states are impotent to enact meaningful policy changes, as they lack control over their own economies, forced to take orders from the IMF, World Bank, and Western investors. As Sylla remarks: “No matter who you elect, they will have to stick with the basic economic policy blueprint.” Creating a replacement currency is AES’ next major challenge – although its members have already started constructing a central bank.
AES’ continued existence and successes are anathema to Paris. Since “decolonisation” in Africa in the early 1960s, the French have launched 50 overt interventions in Africa, which doesn’t account for assassinations of anti-imperialist leaders, palace coups, rigged elections, and other skullduggery employed to maintain France’s mephitic, exploitative grip over its former holdings. Delusions of keeping the continent wedged under their heels have not faded, despite the dramatic collapse of French power locally. In April 2024, General Francois Lecointre, former French Army Chief of Staff, declared:
“What we Europeans have in common is the Mediterranean and Africa, where our destiny is at stake… Europe will have an obligation to return to Africa to help restore the state and bring back administration and development. It’s not China, Russia, or Wagner [Group] who are going to provide lasting solutions to the very great difficulties facing these African countries and their people.”
Residents of AES evidently beg to differ, and stand ready to defend their leaders from foreign destabilisation. US officials aren’t unwise to the region’s new power dynamic. In an October 2025 interview with Le Monde, Trump confidante and State Department senior advisor for Africa, Massad Boulos, rejected any suggestion Washington would criticise the Sahel’s military governments, as while “democracy is always appreciated… people are free to choose whatever system is appropriate for them.” The anti-imperialist struggle continues apace in Africa – and for now, revolutionaries are winning.
Featured Video
Prof John Mearsheimer TRUMP WILL BE FORCED TO CUT A DEAL w/IRAN
or go to
Aletho News Archives – Video-Images
From the Archives
Not Hamas-Israeli conflict: The Palestinian cause belongs to the world
By Ramzy Baroud | MEMO | October 15, 2023
This, in his thinking, could only mean one thing: “Never before has Israel stood more honored and revered by the nations of the world.”
Blog Roll
Aletho News- Prof John Mearsheimer TRUMP WILL BE FORCED TO CUT A DEAL w/IRAN
- Hantavirus, the WHO, and the Conflicts in Weighing Mortality
- Russia says disputes over Iran, Greenland and Canada distract from Palestine
- Russia Not Ruling Out West’s Preparing Another ‘Bloody Hoax’ in Ukraine – Diplomat
- Iraq, Pakistan ink Hormuz safe passage deals with Iran: Report
- CIA Waging Covert War Against Drug Cartels in Mexico – Reports
- ‘Utterly baseless’: Iran rejects Kuwait’s claim of hostile plot on its island
- Hidden deep in an NPR story about a man who threatened to kill Jews at Cornell… He admits he did it to benefit Israel
- Col Douglas Macgregor: If We Go Back To BOMBING IRAN
- Trump admits US sent weapons to fuel riots, terrorism inside Iran
- If Americans Knew
- Nakba Day is almost here, but every day is also Nakba Day – Daily Update
- Gaza: ‘Doctors Under Attack’ Wins Top Award After Being Shelved by the BBC
- The Nakba at 78: A statistical snapshot of Palestine
- Israel Expels Father Louis Salman from Palestine
- How Israel Turned Eurovision’s Stage Into a Soft Power Tool
- Palestinians in Jerusalem receive only 7% of housing units
- If not stopped, Israel will wipe out Christians from Palestine by 2050: Bethlehem pastor
- Hidden Deep in an NPR Story About a Man Who Threatened to Kill Jews at Cornell… He Admits He Did It to Make People Love Israel
- Peter Mandelson: the untold Israel connection
- Epstein Advised U.S. Treasury on Crypto During Obama’s Iran Sanctions Push
- No Tricks Zone
- German Expert: “No Climate Crisis” …”Warming Generally Better For Humanity”
- New Paleo Research: Modern ‘Climate Change’ Has Had No Apparent Impact On Precipitation Patterns
- 90% Subsidized… Bielefeld Germany’s €7 Million Hydrogen Garbage Truck Fleet Sits Idle
- New Study: Declining Trends In 1980-2023 Tropical Cyclone Frequency, Accumulated Energy
- 46 IPCC Scientists Break Rank, Publicly Challenge Long-Standing Dogmatic Climate Claims
- Another Study Links Warming To Cloud Forcing, Shortwave Radiation, Natural Atmospheric Circulation
- Wind Energy Is Toxic, Hazardous To Human Health, Scientific Review Shows
- Oversupply Of Volatile Solar Energy Leads To Record NEGATIVE Prices!
- New Study: Extreme Heat Records, Heatwaves, Extreme Cold Records Declining Across US Since 1899
- It’s The Cold, Stupid! Cold 20 Times More Lethal Than Heat, Multiple Studies Show
Aletho News 