Ukraine training Sahel militants to use drones – Russian envoy
RT | November 12, 2026
Ukrainian officers are training armed groups and terrorist organizations in the Sahel to use drones as part of Kiev’s alleged support for militants fighting African governments, Russian Ambassador to Algeria Aleksey Solomatin has said.
The claim adds to repeated accusations by Moscow and several West African governments that Ukraine is supporting militants involved in a jihadist insurgency that has destabilized the region for more than a decade. Speaking to RIA Novosti on Thursday, Solomatin said armed groups operating across the Sahel and Sahara-Sahel region were destabilizing several countries bordering Algeria.
“Ukrainian officers are working in Africa, training [fighters] in the use of drones. They support not states, but armed formations and terrorist groups acting against states and democracy,” he said.
Last week, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service made a similar allegation. Deputy Director Mikhail Maksimovich said Ukrainian military intelligence emissaries were organizing courses in Africa, particularly Mali, to train drone operators, including users of “kamikaze” drones. He also said international terrorist organizations were showing growing interest in obtaining drone technology from Kiev.
Ukraine has faced accusations of backing terrorism in the Sahel since July 2024, when rebels ambushed Malian forces and personnel of Russia’s Wagner private military group near Tinzaouaten in northern Mali. Ukrainian military intelligence spokesman Andrey Yusov later said the rebels had received the “necessary information” that enabled the successful operation.
Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso formally filed a complaint with the UN Security Council, accusing Ukraine of supporting international terrorism in the Sahel. The letter cited Yusov’s remarks and comments by Ukraine’s then-ambassador to Senegal as evidence of what the three governments described as Kiev’s involvement in the deadly Tinzaouaten attack.
Russian officials, including Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, have said Kiev was opening a “second front” in Africa by supporting militants in countries friendly to Moscow.
In September, CNN reported that around 15 Ukrainian specialists were assisting Tuareg rebels in northern Mali with drones, including remotely directing missions. French newspaper Le Monde had earlier reported that cooperation between Ukrainian military intelligence and Malian rebels began in early 2024, including drone training in Ukraine and the Sahel.
Ukraine has repeatedly denied supporting terrorist groups in the Sahel. Last week, its Foreign Ministry said claims by Mali and Niger were unsupported by “credible evidence.” It added that the allegations “coincide with key messages of Russian propaganda” aimed at undermining trust in Kiev and weakening its relations with African partners.
EU trying to boycott ties between Niger and Algeria
By Lucas Leiroz | November 12, 2026
European interventionism in Africa is increasingly being denounced by local authorities. Tired of foreign interference and the complicity of European states with terrorism across the African continent, local states are seeking alternative international partnerships, gradually breaking their ties with Western powers. In response, Europe has become even more aggressive in Africa, fueling coups d’état, the proliferation of terrorism, and civil wars.
One such recent instance of aggressive European interventionism in Africa has taken place in Niger. The country recently faced a serious crisis, in which criminal forces, backed by foreign actors, attempted to overthrow the legitimate government through an armed uprising. The coup attempt was promptly neutralized thanks to the joint efforts of local forces, alongside Algerian and Russian military personnel. Since then, allegations have emerged regarding the potential involvement of European powers in the attempted coup.
Furthermore, the Europeans have begun to interfere in the ties between Niger and Algeria. Currently, Algerian troops are being deployed to Nigerien territory, at the request of the local government, to assist in the country’s domestic stabilization and pacification. To the EU, it appears “dangerous” that two African nations engage in cooperation against crime and terrorism. Brussels has strongly condemned these Nigerien-Algerian ties, repeatedly questioning the local government about the true purpose of such cooperation.
In a recent statement on the matter, officials from Niger’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned the European attempt to interfere in the country’s ties with Algeria. On November 9, EU Chargé d’Affaires Olai Voionmaa attended a meeting with Nigerien Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine after being summoned. During the meeting, government representatives presented the EU official with a statement emphasizing the country’s sovereignty and condemning any foreign attempts to intervene in Niger’s domestic affairs.
“Niger does not receive injunctions from any country or institution (…) [Our country] does not need permission from Brussels” to exercise its sovereignty,” the statement reads.
In fact, Algerian troops arrived in Niger in October. The local government requested this support, fearing that new threats of a coup could emerge. The measure was approved by both Nigerien and Algerian lawmakers, fulfilling all legal requirements for a joint military operation in accordance with the laws of both countries. This marked the first case of Algerian participation in a military operation abroad since the early 1970s. The Algerian government stated that the measure is vital for protecting energy infrastructure and other economic investments on Nigerien soil.
Economic ties between Niger and Algeria have strengthened substantially in recent years. Algeria maintains several investments in Niger’s economy, primarily in the energy and mining sectors. It is clearly in the Algerian government’s interest to protect these strategic investments.
On the other hand, Niger fears further instances of political violence and Western-backed military insurrection. Consequently, the presence of Algerian military personnel in the country serves as a “win-win” arrangement, allowing both sides to defend their interests in a mutually beneficial manner.
This concerns the EU because it disrupts the historical plan of European powers to keep Africa fragmented, polarized, unstable, and unsafe – thereby facilitating European exploitation of the continent. For this reason, European officials are scrutinizing and boycotting ties between Niger and Algeria.
Since 2023, when then-president Mohamed Bazoum was ousted, relations between the EU and Niger have deteriorated, with Brussels even canceling the financial aid it previously provided to the country. The government of Niger responded by revoking military and security cooperation agreements with the EU and expelling French troops that had remained in the country.
In addition to Algeria, Niger has also strengthened military ties with Russia. Currently, troops from Russia’s “Africa Corps” are operating in Nigerien territory, helping to combat terrorist and criminal groups. Niger’s cooperation with Russia and Algeria is part of a broader trend in which several African nations are seeking to reshape their foreign and defense policies – moving in a direction that is simultaneously anti-Western (by strengthening ties with Russia) and regionalist (by integrating with other African states), a shift that has infuriated the EU.
Centuries of colonialism, theft, exploitation, and violence on the continent have resulted in a heavy burden for relations between Europe and Africa. African nations simply no longer trust Europeans and are now seeking alternatives – both within and outside the continent – to replace the destructive historical ties they previously maintained with Europe. Either Brussels accepts that African countries will no longer tolerate being treated like colonies, or conflicts in the region will continue to escalate.
Lucas Leiroz, member of the BRICS Journalists Association, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, military expert.
You can follow Lucas on X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram.
Independence movement declares mobilization against Morocco
RT | November 12, 2026
Western Sahara’s independence movement, the Polisario Front, has declared general mobilization over an alleged Moroccan military buildup, as UN peacekeepers withdraw from the disputed territory after 35 years.
The Algeria-backed movement announced the decision following an emergency meeting chaired by its leader, Brahim Ghali, on Tuesday, according to a statement published by its official news agency, Sahara Press Service. Polisario accused Morocco of deploying troops, weapons, and equipment along the separation wall dividing the territory, and urged Sahrawis to prepare to defend their right to independence.
In a post on its official Facebook page, the movement said the mobilization is intended to “confront the expansionist Moroccan occupier.” Polisario described the deployments as a dangerous escalation and appealed to the UN and African Union to intervene.
Moroccan news outlet Maghreb Times reported on Monday that Moroccan forces have intensified movements of military convoys, equipment, and logistical supplies from the country’s northern regions toward the south.
Morocco controls most of Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony it annexed in 1975. The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established in 1991 to monitor a ceasefire between Morocco and Polisario and organize a referendum on the territory’s future. Disagreements over voter eligibility have prevented the vote.
MINURSO’s mandate expired on October 31 after the UN Security Council failed to agree on its renewal. Russia vetoed a US proposal tying an extension to Morocco’s plan for autonomy under its sovereignty in the sparsely populated territory. Moscow argued that the draft resolution prejudged sovereignty and undermined Sahrawi self-determination. Russia’s alternative proposal to extend the existing mandate also failed to secure the council’s support.
The North African nation reaffirmed its commitment to the ceasefire following a royal meeting last week, saying the pledge would remain unchanged despite the UN mission’s departure.
US President Donald Trump recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the territory in 2020 as part of a deal involving Rabat’s normalization of relations with Israel. In July, Morocco named the 1,055 km Tiznit-Dakhla highway, which extends into Western Sahara, after Trump. The US president welcomed the gesture as a “great honor.”
At Tuesday’s UN General Assembly debate, US Ambassador Mike Waltz defended Washington’s approach, saying “a referendum that can never be held serves no one.” Russia’s Deputy Permanent Representative Anna Evstigneeva countered that Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty “cannot be imposed on the Security Council.”

US arms supplied to Ukraine found in war-torn Sudan – Moscow
RT | October 15, 2026
Weapons supplied to Ukraine from US military stocks have been found in the possession of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a senior Russian diplomat has said, citing markings linking them to deliveries to Kiev.
Yulia Zhdanova, head of Russia’s delegation to the Vienna Negotiations on Military Security and Arms Control, made the statement on Wednesday at a meeting of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Forum for Security Co-operation.
Sudanese troops recovered MK19 automatic grenade launchers, M72 anti-tank weapons, and Swedish-made AT4 launchers during an operation near Bara, she said, according to TASS. “A preliminary examination of the markings revealed that these weapons were donated to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in December 2024 from US military stock,” Zhdanova said.
Sudan’s army and the RSF have been at war since April 2023, forcing millions from their homes and exposing civilians to bombardment, hunger, and widespread abuses. In June last year, Sudanese Foreign Ministry official Muhammad Al-Sirr told RT that Ukraine was supplying drones to the paramilitary forces at very low prices and helping its fighters use the technology to strike Sudanese infrastructure.
Sudan descended into chaos in April 2023 when fighting erupted between the national army, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The conflict followed months of tension between their commanders, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, over a planned transition to civilian rule. What began in the capital, Khartoum, as a power struggle has devastated the country, killing tens of thousands, displacing millions, and pushing parts of Sudan into famine.
Regional and international peace efforts, including African Union mediation and Saudi-US talks in Jeddah, have repeatedly stalled. In September 2025, the Quad group – the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates – proposed a three-month humanitarian truce leading to a permanent ceasefire and a civilian-led political transition. Burhan rejected a subsequent US-led proposal that November, arguing it would dismantle state security institutions while leaving the RSF in place. The paramilitaries said they accepted the truce.
The UAE’s involvement has deepened mistrust of mediation. Sudan’s army-backed government severed diplomatic ties with Abu Dhabi in May 2025, accusing it of supporting the RSF. The UAE denies supplying weapons to the paramilitaries. Relations with Washington deteriorated further in September 2026 after the US questioned both factions’ legitimacy. Sudan rejected the remarks and called for peace efforts free from foreign dictates.
Meanwhile, rival administrations have entrenched Sudan’s divisions. Burhan’s government returned to Khartoum in January 2026 after the army recaptured the capital, having operated from Port Sudan during the fighting. In July 2025, the RSF-aligned TASIS coalition announced a rival government based in Nyala, Darfur, with Dagalo heading its governing council. The UN Security Council and African Union rejected the move.
Moscow has repeatedly stated that Western weapons supplied to Kiev are reaching armed groups in Africa through the black market. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova raised the alarm as early as 2022, warning that Stinger missiles, Javelin anti-tank systems, and grenade launchers could enter illicit trading networks worldwide.
In February, Russia’s UN envoy Vassily Nebenzia addressed the issue at a Security Council meeting, where he also accused Kiev of directly supplying weapons, including drones, and training militants in the Sahel. Zhdanova previously blamed corruption in Ukraine and failures to track Western-supplied military equipment for weapons reaching terrorists and criminal groups in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.
Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso jointly appealed to the UN Security Council in August 2024, accusing Ukraine of supporting international terrorism following a deadly ambush on Malian forces near Tinzaouaten. Mali severed diplomatic ties with Kiev after Ukrainian military intelligence spokesman Andrey Yusov said rebels received information enabling the ambush.
Addressing the UN General Assembly last month, Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop renewed the accusations, saying Ukraine was backing armed groups undermining his country’s territorial integrity. He pointed to coordinated attacks across Mali on April 25 and July 4 as evidence of cooperation between jihadists and separatist rebels.
Last week, AFP reported that sources within the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a Tuareg-led separatist rebel coalition fighting Mali’s government, acknowledged receiving Ukrainian training, including instruction in operating drones.
ICC ignored ‘very well-documented’ NATO crimes – ex-Libyan minister
RT – October 11, 2026
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has ignored allegations of “very well-documented” NATO war crimes brought before it, former Libyan Information Minister Moussa Ibrahim has told RT.
In an interview on Saturday, he argued that the US-led military bloc has never been held accountable for what he described as “very well-documented” crimes committed during military interventions in several countries.
“In Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Libya, we have literally… millions of documents, videos, footage, statements, witnesses who testify to the crimes against humanity committed by NATO collectively and NATO countries individually,” he said.
The former minister said he had personally participated in a 2013 effort to bring allegations of NATO war crimes before the ICC over the bloc’s 2011 intervention in Libya, which left the country devastated and deeply divided.
“We presented a very powerful profile of thousands and thousands of pages. And it was not even allowed to be seen or heard or discussed. It was dismissed right away,” Ibrahim said, adding that prominent European human rights lawyers had been involved in preparing the case.
The failure to pursue such cases demonstrated the “limitation” of the system, he said, urging the East, particularly China and Russia to “rethink the whole equation.”
The ICC needs to be “radically, not superficially” reformed or replaced with a new international judicial institution capable of upholding human rights without Western political interference, he stressed. A handful of powerful Western countries currently exploit the ICC for their own advantage while ensuring “that they are immune against any cases brought forward against them,” he said.
The remarks come just days after Washington imposed sweeping new sanctions on the court after accusing it of overstepping its jurisdiction in pursuing alleged crimes involving American and Israeli nationals. The move followed the ICC’s 2024 issuance of arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.
Meanwhile, the ICC’s investigation into allegations of war crimes committed by American forces during the US-led war in Afghanistan never resulted in criminal charges against US personnel.
Watch the RT segment.
Ukrainian Soldiers, Potential Mercenaries: Have Gun, Will Travel!
By Jeffrey Silverman – New Eastern Outlook – September 26, 2026
Ukraine is already providing an early glimpse of what may become a much larger post-war phenomenon: highly trained combat personnel, particularly special-forces and other specialists, carrying their battlefield skills beyond the borders of the countries, in which they acquired them, with many of them NATO trained.
History offers plenty of warnings. Africa has spent decades wrestling with the problem of demobilized combatants, soldiers and guerrillas, whose military skills suddenly have little obvious place in civilian economies.
South Africa and Georgia both provide instructive case studies. After apartheid, using the South African example, the labor force had to absorb, integrate or demobilize personnel from competing military and paramilitary structures. Thousands of former combatants faced unemployment and uncertain futures, while the new South African National Defence Force itself eventually had to undergo substantial downsizing, and not only among white troops.
So what happens when the largest European land war in generations finally winds down? What will the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian servicemen do when the battlefield no longer needs them, and the economy cannot reintegrate them?
Many will also have significant trauma, both mental and physical, the former being far harder to identify, it is an unfortunate fact that many former combatants will have developed a taste for killing.
And that is where the story becomes considerably more uncomfortable.
In 2024, UNODC and international organized-crime specialists were already examining the possibility that Ukraine’s enormous post-war veteran population could become a source of organized-crime risk—not because veterans were inherently criminal, but because demobilization, weapons proliferation, inadequate reintegration and the availability of trained manpower could create conditions attractive to criminal networks.
Have Gun, Will Travel is an old American expression, but it may acquire a new geopolitical meaning in the aftermath of the Ukraine war. The world already has a market for soldiers, military trainers, private security personnel and combat veterans. Africa, the Middle East and other conflict zones have repeatedly demonstrated the demand for experienced men with battlefield skills.
Will wealthy states, such as the Gulf monarchies, Western governments, private military companies and international security organizations see this enormous reservoir of experience as a manpower pool to be exploited? Almost certainly in fact, it is already happening in Africa, where Ukrainian “specialists” are aiding terrorist groups, particularly in the Sahel, aiming to overthrow governments that have been causing the French problems.
It is doubtful that so many of these veterans be recruited for legitimate security and peacekeeping missions but rather for the less visible wars conducted through proxies, contractors and allied forces as US Flag Draped in Dover Delaware is not politically expedient.
The next major Ukrainian export may not be agricultural products, weapons, or drones. But battlefield tested military experience.
There is a particularly interesting precedent in Africa. War on the Rocks warned several years ago that the eventual end of the Ukraine war could produce an influx of experienced personnel into African conflicts. And we can now see the reverse phenomenon too: Russia has recruited tens of thousands of foreign nationals into its war, including substantial numbers from Africa.
The fact that Ukrainian personnel or Ukrainian-trained capabilities are already appearing in African theaters would suggest that the post-war question isn’t simply what happens to Ukrainian veterans inside Ukraine? It is also who will recruit their expertise internationally?
The broader literature is already warning about exactly this transition: the Global Initiative has specifically examined organized-crime risks surrounding Ukraine’s eventual veteran population.
Demand for armed warm bodies
That does not require those governments to deliberately create a “mercenary army.” Governments already have incentives to use contractors, partner forces, local auxiliaries and allied personnel when they don’t want to commit their own regular forces.
The postwar Ukrainian veteran question is potentially a major international-security story in its own right.
“The postwar disposition of Ukraine’s enormous veteran population could become one of the most important security questions of the post-war period. History shows that when large numbers of highly trained combatants are simultaneously demobilized, economically marginalized and connected to international illicit markets, some will inevitably find employment in private warfare, political militias, transnational security networks and organized crime.”
Africa provides some very strong precedents
This has happened repeatedly in Africa. Research on Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe found that poorly designed demobilization and reintegration programs could themselves create later security problems.
And the phenomenon isn’t limited to Africa. Research on Colombia found that demobilization of armed groups could increase some forms of crime—particularly robbery—where former combatants were not successfully reintegrated.
Ukraine could produce a much larger version of the problem
This is where the argument becomes interesting.
Ukraine is potentially different in scale, technological sophistication and international connectivity. A future Ukrainian demobilization could involve enormous numbers of veterans. One recent analysis by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime estimates that Ukraine could eventually have up to nine million veterans, alongside millions of displaced people and refugees.
Obviously, nine million does not mean nine million armed or unemployed men. Most veterans will simply return to civilian life. But even a tiny percentage becoming involved in illicit activity could constitute a significant population.
The Financial Times reported that Colombian criminals have sought to send people into Ukraine to acquire advanced drone expertise and bring that knowledge back to criminal organizations in Colombia, and it is now becoming apparent the Mexican cartels are following suit.
The post-Soviet precedent is important too
There is another historical analogy that may be even more relevant than Africa: the breakup of the Soviet Union.
When the USSR collapsed, large numbers of trained military personnel suddenly found themselves outside a functioning Soviet military system. Some went into private security and legitimate military contracting; others became involved in mercenary activity. Former Soviet military personnel subsequently appeared in conflicts in Africa and elsewhere.
Ukraine is producing veterans with skills that did not exist at anything like today’s scale in previous wars—particularly FPV/drone warfare, electronic warfare and battlefield intelligence.
But there is another elephant in the room. The combat in Ukraine has been brutal, well beyond anything else seen in recent decades. Combined with the violently racist nationalist indoctrination by the Ukrainian government, this has created a large number of emotionally traumatised young men and women, for whom killing comes natural.
If enough of these individuals are recruited into the worlds conflict zones, either by state actors or the underworld and terrorists, the results will be absolutely horrific in terms of war crimes and brutality, as evidenced by the massacre of civilians during the Ukrainian invasion of Kursk, and now in Africa.
Those hoping to profit from the monster they have created may well find its teeth searching for them.
Jeffrey K. Silverman is a freelance journalist and international development specialist, BSc, MSc, based for 30 years in Georgia and the former Soviet Union
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The Geopolitical Balance in the Red Sea: The UAE Being Displaced by New Players
By Samyar Rostami – New Eastern Outlook – September 26, 2026
The persistence of current geopolitical alignments, the attention of Eastern actors to the region, the strengthening of Sanaa’s position in the Red Sea, and the expansion of regional opposition to the UAE’s role will diminish Abu Dhabi’s role in the region.
For the past ten years, the Southern Red Sea has been a pivotal factor in the UAE’s foreign policy. Over the past decade, the UAE has built a layered maritime, air, and commercial infrastructure network, including military bases, in the Red Sea or near Yemen, Somaliland, Somalia and Sudan, starting from 2015.
According to some estimates, the value of UAE investments along Africa’s coastal regions and the Arabian Peninsula amounts to $60 billion.
In September 2015, the UAE established its first military base in Africa, in Eritrea. These bases possessed strategic advantages: the ‘protection of interests’ and control over the security and economic architecture of international maritime routes.
With the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, cooperation between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi in the Red Sea intensified.
The UAE’s approach—channeled through companies such as DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports—is centered on controlling ports, strategic waterways, military bases, and key trade and energy routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, in coordination with the United States and its allies. Abu Dhabi’s approach also included engagement with non-state armed actors and separatist movements in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia.
Factors Behind the UAE’s Diminishing Role
Over the past decade, the UAE emerged as a party to the conflicts in the southern Red Sea. However, geopolitical developments over the past year signal a gradual decline in the UAE’s role in the southern Red Sea.
Several factors are also significant, stemming from US and Israeli military strikes against Iran, the war between Sanaa and Saudi Arabia, Saudi-Emirati rivalry in the region, and disputes among African states.
Sudan’s value lies in its geopolitics. With 853 kilometres of coastline and several key ports, Sudan constitutes a vital link in the Red Sea.
The Sudan war since April 2023 has created conditions for the expansion of the UAE’s role. The UAE faces accusations of providing training and logistical support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Human rights and political demands against the UAE has increased.
The UAE also maintains bases inside Sudanese territory. However, the ongoing war in Sudan and the support of allies for the Sudanese government have led to increased pressure on the UAE.
Riyadh regards the Red Sea as part of its strategic interests and its exclusive backyard. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh each view the other as a direct threat to their position and interests in parts of the southern Red Sea. Thus, the reduction of the UAE’s footprint in the southern Red Sea constitutes a strategic gain for Riyadh. Riyadh has effectively sought to weaken Abu Dhabi’s role.
In late 2025, Saudi Arabia’s support for Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) resulted in pressure being brought to bear on UAE-backed forces.
In July 2026, Saudi Arabia hosted talks among 14 countries—including Egypt, Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia—which established a multinational maritime defence alliance. The UAE and Ethiopia were excluded from the list.
The formation of a Riyadh-led Red Sea maritime task force—with the participation of Turkey, Egypt, Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea—without coordination with the UAE amounts to a further constriction of the UAE’s role in the region.
Despite ongoing Egyptian–Emirati consultations on guaranteeing maritime navigation security in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, Egypt’s foreign policy is not aligned with the UAE’s interests in Sudan and the Red Sea. Additionally, the alignment and coordination among Israel, India, the UAE, and Ethiopia are not particularly consonant with Egypt’s interests in Ethiopia and the Red Sea.
Until last September, the UAE played a significant role in the southern Yemeni islands of the Red Sea and in southwestern Yemen. However, Sanaa’s advance in the eastern Red Sea—the port of Mokha, Mayun Island, and other archipelagos north of the Bab al-Mandab Strait—in September 2026 inflicted negative and fundamental consequences on the UAE’s regional role.
Sanaa’s advance amounts to the nullification of the presence of Emirati actors in Yemen’s future political sphere. Sanaa is seeking to consolidate itself as a strategic “node” within the Iran-led Axis of Resistance.
Despite Cairo’s opposition to Sanaa’s proposal for maritime navigation coordination in the Red Sea, Sanaa—having secured control over the most important islands and cities overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait on the Yemeni side—is calling for the formulation of new rules to ensure security and navigation in the region. Ansar Allah’s control over Bab al-Mandab could put the UAE under pressure. Any expansion of Sanaa’s role in Sudan could likewise prove detrimental to the UAE.
Amid tensions between the United States and Iran, Abu Dhabi finds itself facing a more constrained strategic space.
The UAE’s alignment with the United States is, in a sense, also an intensification of Abu Dhabi’s tensions with Iran in areas such as the Red Sea. Unlike the UAE, Iran is seeking better relations with the Sudanese government. Many in Iran believe that Israel and the UAE are devising an economic and geopolitical plan to control the vital routes of the Red Sea and Yemen’s ports.
With Israel’s formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, many in the countries of the southern Red Sea have linked it to the UAE.
After years, Eritrea revoked the UAE’s access to its military infrastructure. Eritrean officials have recently made sharp statements about the UAE and Israel—particularly regarding Tel Aviv’s recognition of Somaliland.
Eritrea is providing frontline support to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Any deeper alliance between Eritrea and Sudan, Iran, Russia, China, and Sanaa could diminish the UAE’s regional role in the Red Sea. Additionally, some countries and actors near the Red Sea also hold a negative view of the UAE’s regional role.
The Somali government’s decision in January 2026 to sever relations with the UAE is, in a sense, a counter to the UAE’s role in the Somaliland and Puntland regions. Somalia has revoked all agreements with the UAE, including cooperation as well as security and defence arrangements. This move has negative implications for the UAE’s role in the southern Red Sea.
Moreover, the southern Red Sea plays a pivotal role in the regional strategy of Russia and Beijing. For example, apart from China’s role in Djibouti, Beijing is Eritrea’s principal creditor and has expanded its influence in Sudan.
The developments of the past year have also contributed to a decline in the standing of the UAE’s allies in the region.
Outlook
The US presence in the Red Sea’s African states is rooted in counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations.
The European Union’s presence in the region, via Operation ASPIDES, is limited to commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Despite the UAE’s formal withdrawal from some bases, its economic and security influence, as well as its soft-power instruments, remain strong.
A decrease in UAE military deployments in the region could negatively impact its support for allies in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan.
The UAE continues to have significant economic potential, secure partnerships, and influence in the southern Red Sea. In a way, this is considered a threat and a risk to certain African nations in the Red Sea region.
Certainly, a more extensive Sanaa presence over Bab al-Mandab, strategic coasts, and islands could confront Abu Dhabi’s maneuver and role in the southern Red Sea with a structural challenge.
The UAE’s approach in ports, logistics, energy, and other strategic infrastructure—along with deeper defense and security coordination with the West in the southern Red Sea—is likely to continue. However, the expansion of the UAE’s role also requires an extensive US presence in the Red Sea.
Moreover, the persistence of current geopolitical alignments, the attention of Eastern actors to the region, the strengthening of Sanaa’s position in the Red Sea, and the expansion of regional opposition to the UAE’s role will diminish Abu Dhabi’s role in the region.
Samyar Rostami is а political observer and senior researcher in international relations.
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Why Algeria finally shut the door on the UAE
Abu Dhabi’s alliance with Tel Aviv has pushed its rivalry with Algiers from quiet hostility into open regional confrontation
By Anis Raiss | The Cradle | September 14, 2026
On 10 September 2026, Algeria severed diplomatic relations with the UAE, giving the Emirati ambassador in Algiers 48 hours to leave. From midnight the following day, Algerian airspace was closed to UAE-registered aircraft, although commercial flights to and from Algiers were exempt until the end of the year.
The rupture had been signaled in advance. During a televised interview in July, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune described a Gulf state he declined to name in five words: “Wherever they set foot, blood flows.” He was referring to its role in Libya, Sudan, and Yemen.
Abu Dhabi answered within hours through Anwar Gargash, diplomatic advisor to Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ). Relations between states, he wrote, are managed “through reason, communication and clarity of interests, not through riddles and signals that require decoding.”
One week earlier, a UN fact-finding mission on Sudan had found “reasonable grounds to believe” that external networks, including some operating through the UAE, were supplying the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Darfur with fighters, weapons, and training.
The source of Algiers’s anger was therefore no riddle. Algeria had become the third government in nine months to take direct action against Abu Dhabi’s regional reach.
Abu Dhabi’s nine-month reckoning
The sequence began on 30 December, when a Saudi-led coalition struck weapons and vehicles that had arrived at Yemen’s Mukalla Port aboard two ships from Fujairah. Riyadh called its national security a red line and accused Abu Dhabi of arming Southern Transitional Council (STC) separatists who had swept into Hadhramaut and Al-Mahra.
The UAE denied that the shipment contained weapons but announced the withdrawal of its remaining forces after Yemen’s Saudi-backed presidential council issued a 24-hour ultimatum. A week later, STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi reportedly fled by sea toward Somaliland, then flew through Mogadishu before reaching Abu Dhabi.
Five days after that flight, Somalia’s federal government annulled its agreements with the UAE covering ports, security cooperation, and defense. Mogadishu cited “strong evidence” of actions undermining the country’s sovereignty, national unity, and political independence. The decision included Berbera, Bosaso, and Kismayo, although enforcement in Somaliland and Puntland remained uncertain. Two regional diplomats told Bloomberg that Saudi officials had pressed Mogadishu to act.
The same pattern surfaced in Sudan through an 83-page Human Rights Watch (HRW) report published in May, which found evidence that the Abu Dhabi-based Global Security Services Group appeared to have hired hundreds of Colombian contractors who fought alongside the RSF around El-Fasher.
On 3 September, the UN mission reported that as many as 2,000 former Colombian soldiers may have joined the conflict, some of whom had trained at a military-style facility in Ghayathi in the UAE before operating drones and artillery in Darfur. Abu Dhabi dismissed the findings as a “false media campaign.”
Kabylie enters Israel’s periphery map
Kabylie is the Amazigh mountain region east of Algiers, home to several million people with their own language and a long history of friction with the central state. Its separatist wing, the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylie (MAK), operates from Paris and was designated a terrorist organization by Algiers in 2021.
Algerian state media now alleges that UAE diplomats have been in contact with the movement, although no supporting evidence has been made public. Even a Semafor column written by a former Emirati government official conceded that point. The Kabylie project does, however, have documented patrons elsewhere.
On 14 December 2025, MAK’s government-in-exile proclaimed a “Federal Republic of Kabylie” at a ceremony in Paris. Twelve days later, Israel recognized Somaliland, becoming the first UN member to do so.
On 14 January 2026, Dan Illouz, a Likud member of the Knesset of Moroccan Jewish descent, tabled an urgent motion calling for a study of recognition for Kabylie and described Algeria as part of the “Iranian evil axis.”
The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security had already advocated “principled political support, leading over time to diplomatic recognition.” Ferhat Mehenni, the folk singer who founded MAK and styles himself as its president-in-exile, had addressed Knesset members as early as 2012.
The Somaliland precedent is where Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv converge. The UAE became the first Gulf state to normalize relations with Israel in 2020, while its port operator DP World holds a 30-year concession at Berbera, Somaliland’s main harbor, alongside a longstanding Emirati security presence.
When Arab and Islamic states issued a joint statement condemning Israel’s recognition, the UAE declined to sign. Reports have since pointed to an Emirati role in facilitating the move, leaving the breakaway territory recognized by Tel Aviv anchored to infrastructure controlled from Abu Dhabi.
These moves draw on a doctrine older than the states now applying it. David Ben Gurion’s periphery strategy sought to contain the Arab core through alliances with non-Arab states and minorities on its edges, including Iran under the Shah, Turkiye, Ethiopia, and Kurdish movements. Israel recognized Somaliland in December, and Kabylie reached the Knesset agenda the following month.
Rabat arms the western flank
The corridor linking Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv passes through Rabat, where, in November 2020, two months after the UAE signed the Abraham Accords, Abu Dhabi became the first Arab government to open a consulate in Laayoune, in occupied Western Sahara, whose independence Algeria has supported since 1975. Morocco restored its own relations with the occupation state one month later.
Military procurement soon gave that alignment material form. In early January 2026, the third session of the Morocco–Israel Joint Military Committee met in Tel Aviv to set the year’s work plan, while Israeli officials described Morocco to the Jerusalem Post as Israel’s most important security partner in Africa.
Rabat operates IAI’s Barak MX air defense system, Elbit’s ATMOS howitzers, and Hermes 900 drones. In November 2025, BlueBird Aero Systems, half-owned by IAI, opened a plant in Benslimane, outside Casablanca, to produce SpyX loitering munitions, described as the first facility of its kind in North Africa.
Spanish defense outlet Escudo Digital has also reported that Israeli-built surveillance and strike drones are stationed at Mahbes, a forward airstrip in Western Sahara close to the Algerian border. If accurate, it would place Israeli platforms within reach of Tindouf, where the Sahrawi refugee camps and Polisario leadership are based.
The economic leg of this alignment extends south through Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative, which offers landlocked Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad access to the sea through the $1.6 billion Dakhla Atlantic Port, reported to be 70 percent complete in November 2025.
The port lies in the same occupied territory where the Emirati consulate stands. On 24 July 2026, Bamako reaffirmed its commitment to the corridor, 13 days after restoring diplomatic relations with Algiers. Normalization has thus acquired its own infrastructure, running from the Gulf through the Maghreb and into the Sahel.
Algeria raises the military stakes
Algeria’s answer has centered on air power rather than competing corridors. Footage that surfaced in February 2026 appeared to show an Su-57 over northern Algeria, reinforcing reports that Algiers had become the first foreign operator of Russia’s fifth-generation fighter – a development that would alter the military balance in the Maghreb.
United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) had announced the delivery of two aircraft to an unnamed foreign customer in November 2025. Su-35 deliveries were reported to have begun in January 2025, followed by a fresh batch of Su-34 bombers in June 2026, even as Russia’s own air force continued to absorb wartime losses.
The hardware was accompanied by a senior Russian commander whose presence surfaced on 9 May 2025, when the Russian embassy in Algiers published photographs of a Victory Day wreath-laying led by an unnamed “head of the group of Russian military specialists in Algeria.”
Kommersant identified him as Sergei Surovikin, an assessment later echoed by British military intelligence. Surovikin had directed Russia’s Syrian air campaign, commanded its forces in Ukraine through the Kherson withdrawal, and vanished after the Wagner mutiny of June 2023. Moscow sent one of its most notorious commanders to Algiers without naming him in the caption.
Washington responded on 3 February 2026, when Robert Palladino, head of the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Algeria’s Su-57 purchase was “problematic” and could trigger CAATSA sanctions.
Marco Rubio – who is now the US secretary of state – had demanded sanctions over Algeria’s Russian arms purchases in 2022. Regional alignments do not divide cleanly. Moscow and Abu Dhabi both back Khalifa Haftar in Libya, while Russia’s Africa Corps supports the Malian junta whose drone Algeria shot down in April 2025. Across Western Sahara and the Maghreb, however, the fault lines are more clearly drawn.
The defense of Abu Dhabi
Abu Dhabi’s official response expressed hope that the break would be “temporary.” A fuller defense appeared the next day in Semafor‘s Gulf section, where a column said the government had “run out of enemies to blame for the dismal state of its economy.”
It portrayed Algeria’s decision as a domestic maneuver, arguing that Algiers needed a new adversary after decades of blaming Morocco and had chosen a wealthy, distant state unlikely to retaliate. The Kabylie allegation was treated as a pretext for rallying the street.
Absent from that account were Mukalla, Mogadishu, El-Fasher, and Ghayathi, along with the Saudi strike on an alleged Emirati shipment, Somalia’s annulment of its agreements with Abu Dhabi, and the UN mission’s findings on UAE-linked networks in Darfur eight days before the column appeared. The nine-month record that helps explain Algiers’s actions went unmentioned.
The column’s author, Tareq Alotaiba, is a fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center and a master’s student at Georgetown. According to his biography, he previously spent 12 years working in economic policy, foreign affairs, and national security for the Abu Dhabi and UAE federal governments. Algiers has its own weaknesses, including a parliamentary election turnout of 21.24 percent in July, the lowest recorded since independence. The column did not mention that figure either.
Algeria’s break with Abu Dhabi marks growing resistance to the network of ports, proxies, and separatist movements through which Emirati and Israeli power is projected across the region. Tel Aviv’s periphery doctrine depends on such footholds and on governments prepared to host them. Algiers has closed one more door.
Leaked chemical dossier reveals Israel’s role in Sudan’s civil war: Report
Press TV – September 11, 2026
A dossier of evidence alleging chemical weapons use by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) was compiled by Israeli intelligence and shared with Western media outlets in a coordinated operation to discredit the army and bolster its paramilitary rival, a report says.
The dossier, described by the New York Times and Washington Post over the weekend as “shared by a Middle Eastern intelligence agency,” contained nearly 150 documents, bomb blueprints, images, videos, voice notes and several thousand intercepted text messages allegedly detailing how a secretive SAF unit developed and produced chlorine bombs over six months in 2024.
Multiple Sudanese and US sources told Middle East Eye that the “Middle Eastern intelligence agency” is Israeli, and that the dossier was nearly identical to one Israel handed to the US government before Washington sanctioned Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, leader of the SAF, in January 2025.
A former US official described the interception of vast numbers of messages as “an advertisement for Pegasus,” the spyware developed by Israeli cyber-intelligence firm NSO Group to infiltrate mobile phones.
“The thing that is shocking is how much Mossad has been tracking this,” one Sudanese security analyst, who could not be named, told Middle East Eye.
“I knew Mossad had interests in Sudan… but the level and depth and length of surveillance suggests that Israel is more involved in Sudan than we think.”
The revelations raise serious questions about Israel’s role in Sudan’s civil war and appear to confirm that Israeli intelligence is actively siding with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) — whose main patron is the United Arab Emirates — against the Sudanese army.
On 13 September 2024, the RSF released a statement accusing the army of firing “toxic” missiles on al-Jaili, a crucial oil refinery north of Khartoum controlled at the time by the paramilitary.
There were no confirmed deaths in the attack, and there are no other confirmed occasions in which the SAF used chlorine bombs. The dossier does not contain medical evidence or testimony from any victims.
In a statement shared with Middle East Eye, the Sudanese government clarified that Sudan is a state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and “has remained committed to its provisions and procedures, including the non-production, non-stockpiling and non-use of chemical weapons.”
It said that “all chlorine stocks in the country are designated exclusively for water purification, civilian industrial uses and energy, and it stands ready to demonstrate this before any competent international body.”
Israeli sources involved in the Zionist regime’s decision-making in the Horn of Africa have previously sought to develop and maintain relationships with a variety of different players, rather than backing one side or another.
“The Israeli love story with Hemedti intensified in 2021,” one North African analyst told Middle East Eye, referring to RSF head Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo Musa. The RSF chief was believed at the time and afterwards to have developed ties with Mossad.
In the leadup to Sudan’s war, then-Israeli foreign minister Eli Cohen met Burhan as part of what the Israelis called a “historic diplomatic visit” intended to pave the way for the finalization of a peace agreement. The war scuppered this.
But Hemedti maintained his ties with Israel, whose key ally the UAE continued to support the Sudanese paramilitary — charges Abu Dhabi still denies, despite mounting evidence, including from the United Nations.
“This feels like they are picking sides,” a former US official said of Israel, the dossier and the RSF. “The intelligence they shared with Washington succeeded in getting Burhan and the SAF sanctioned.”
“The Israel-UAE relationship has only grown deeper,” the source said.
Last month, Africa Intelligence reported that two of Hemedti’s brothers, Abdul Rahim and Algoney, had travelled secretly to Tel Aviv in May 2025 and again in February this year to meet with Israeli intelligence and foreign ministry officials.
The dossier’s Israeli origins fit a broader pattern of Israeli intelligence operations aimed at shaping narratives, influencing Western media and undermining governments that refuse to align with its regional agenda.
By feeding selectively leaked and unverified material to American newspapers, Israeli intelligence has succeeded in manufacturing a chemical weapons scandal that has been used to justify sanctions against Sudan’s army leadership while its rival — accused of genocide by the UN — receives continued support from Israel’s Persian Gulf allies.
Algeria cuts ties with UAE over interference, destabilization

The Cradle | September 10, 2026
Algeria announced on 10 September that it will sever its diplomatic relations with the UAE in response to “provocative or hostile actions” and after “exhausting all means to preserve bilateral relations.”
The Algerian Foreign Ministry said in a statement that the government had decided to “sever diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates” after exercising “great restraint and a high sense of responsibility.”
The statement said Algiers had repeatedly warned Abu Dhabi of the “grave consequences” if such actions persisted.
The ministry reported that the UAE ambassador to Algeria was officially informed of the decision and given a 48-hour deadline to comply.
Last year, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune described his country’s relations as warm with all Gulf states except one, in a veiled reference to the UAE.
He described relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar as “fraternal,” while accusing the unnamed country of interfering in Algeria’s internal affairs and seeking to destabilize it.
Tensions escalated in February when Algeria began proceedings to cancel an air services agreement with the UAE signed in Abu Dhabi in May 2013.
The cancellation came amid reports that the UAE was seeking to support the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylie (MAK), a separatist group in northern Algeria, which Algiers considers a terrorist organization.
Relations between the two countries have deteriorated in recent years amid the UAE’s efforts to destabilize states and fuel civil wars across West Asia and North Africa in partnership with Israel.
In April 2024, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune referred to the UAE when he stated that, “Wherever there is conflict, the money of this state [the Emirates] is there – in Mali, Libya, and Sudan.”
The UAE has also strongly backed Morocco in its bid to annex Western Sahara, while Algeria supports the Polisario Front, which fights for self-determination in the territory.
The UAE also supported Morocco’s normalization with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords, which Algeria opposed.
Since gaining independence from France in 1962, Algeria has consistently supported the Palestinian cause, in part due to both countries’ shared history of resisting foreign colonial occupation.
Algiers cut ties with Morocco after Rabat normalized relations with Israel under US auspices in December 2020, viewing the deal as a direct threat to Algeria’s borders and security.
“Morocco’s military exercises with Israel contradict the principles of good neighborliness that we have always tried to uphold,” stated President Tebboune in an interview with French media.
Israel provides covert intelligence, security assistance to Sudan’s RSF militia: Report
The Cradle | August 30, 2026
The leadership of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a militia accused of genocide in Sudan, has maintained secret, high-level security and intelligence contacts with Israel since before the start of the civil war in 2023, Africa Intelligence reported on 28 August.
According to the report, RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, secretly visited Tel Aviv in May 2025 and February 2026 for meetings with the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s Africa Division and Israeli intelligence officers.
Hemedti was joined by his two brothers, Abdul Rahim, the RSF’s second-in-command, and Algoney, on both trips.
Links between the RSF, which is fighting against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and Israel have emerged previously.
In 2022, Israeli newspaper Haaretz and Dutch investigative news outlet Lighthouse reported that a jet linked to former Israeli intelligence officer Tal Dilian delivered sophisticated EU-made phone-surveillance and hacking equipment to the RSF.
Dilian is the founder of the Intellexa network, a private intelligence firm based in Cyprus.
While Israel provides security and intelligence assistance to the RSF, the UAE remains the RSF’s principal backer.
Abu Dhabi provides the Sudanese militia with heavy weapons, drones, armored vehicles, ammunition, logistics, transit routes, and foreign mercenaries, in particular from Colombia.
The US government, UN, and various rights groups have documented that the RSF committed genocide in Sudan.
Last month, a coalition of rights groups led by the Raoul Wallenberg Center for Human Rights petitioned the International Criminal Court (ICC) to open an investigation into senior UAE officials and other regional figures for complicity in the genocide of non-Arab tribes in Sudan.
The submission accused them of enabling genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by supplying the RSF and the SAF with weapons, money, and mercenaries, and knowingly assisting crimes carried out by a group.
Sudanese survivors filed a separate request naming Emirati Vice President Mansour bin Zayed Al-Nahyan over his role in financing and supplying the RSF.
That filing sets out murder, torture, and rape, including fighters driving vehicles over fleeing civilians. It points to the fall of El-Fasher on 26 October 2025, where UN reports record 6,000 people killed in three days.
The UK has also covertly assisted the RSF.
London has licensed around $565 million worth of weapons sales to the UAE across the past three years, including British-manufactured equipment that has repeatedly ended up in the hands of the RSF.
Nathaniel Raymond of Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab told the House of Commons that British officials disregarded two years of real-time intelligence on the coming slaughter, which killed an estimated 60,000 people.
Raymond testified that the UK “prioritized HMG’s economic, security, and diplomatic relationships with the UAE above preventing the intentional starvation, forced displacement, and the genocidal slaughter” of civilians.
