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Russia Wants to End Ukraine Conflict – Lavrov

Sputnik – 15.09.2026

MOSCOW – Russia wants to end the Ukrainian conflict, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on Tuesday.

On Ukraine

“We want to resolve this conflict and appreciate our friends’ willingness to help in this effort,” Lavrov said at the embassy roundtable on the situation around Ukraine, adding that if the US had not abandoned the Anchorage agreements, we would have been living in peace already for one year.

Russia is always ready for negotiations on Ukraine and has never delayed them or tried to complicate them, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, commenting on the prospects for the imminent convening of a new round of negotiations.

“We are always ready for negotiations. We have never delayed these negotiations or tried to complicate them,” Lavrov said.

If Ukraine is ready to resume negotiations, Russia agrees to them and has something to say, the minister said, adding that Russia has never changed its position on talks on Ukraine.

“We are ready to seek reasonable compromises within the framework of this position, but fundamentally, we have not changed our goal: to ensure our security, to prevent NATO from appearing on our borders, and to safeguard the legitimate rights of Russians and Russian‑speaking people who have lived on these lands for centuries,” Lavov added.

On Russia-US Relations

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that he plans to meet with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York.

“I have a meeting with secretary Rubio scheduled in New York on the sidelines of the General Assembly,” Lavrov said.

September 15, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , | Comments Off on Russia Wants to End Ukraine Conflict – Lavrov

Is the Noose Tightening on Iran?

By Bryan Anthony Reo – New Eastern Outlook – September 11, 2026

The Western takeover of Syria, the weakening of Hezbollah, and now the capitulation of Hamas signal that Western/American/Israeli penetration of Iranian outer defenses is essentially complete. The only remaining coherent and unassailed bastion outside of Iran is found among the Houthi. There remains Iran itself, which has weathered six months of American and Israeli aggression.

Western Encroachment on Russia from the South and West

Over the last fifteen or sixteen years, I have followed and analyzed certain developments across the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Central Asia, and I have noticed a pattern, a theme, a trend — that trend being the dismantling of certain sovereign states aligned with Russia and Iran, or at least committed to their own sovereignty in resistance (or perhaps rather, ‘defiance’ is a better term) to the attempts at policy imposition by Western nations (usually the USA, sometimes France or the UK or Israel).
Iraq went down in 2003.

Then in the recent modern era, Libya was one of the first to be dismantled with the toppling and murdering of Colonel Gaddafi in 2011.

Syria followed in 2024, but fortunately Assad and his family were able to leave safely.

Lebanon was fractured and crippled decades ago and limps along on life support, with only Hezbollah holding the line to protect Lebanese national sovereignty.

Jordan was bought off and is a pathetic satellite of the USA, as is Egypt, with both of those nations having puppet governments that have betrayed their people and their regional partners for American dollars and Western approval.

It is now increasingly obvious and apparent that the Arab Spring was nothing more than a color revolution aimed at the Arab world, the way color revolutions occurred in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, and were attempted elsewhere (i.e., Belarus). The Arab Spring was intended to plunge the Arab/Islamic world into chaos and allow the replacement of the post-Cold War era Arab nationalist strongmen with weak, fractured coalition parliaments and fractured states or simply outright chaos (Libya) or Israeli/American puppet regimes.

In some sense, it would be reasonable to label the American advance across the Arab world, from North Africa to the Middle East, as long-term strategic “shaping operations” to remove genuinely sovereign and pro-Moscow governments from the board, so that American and Israeli positions throughout the region become almost unassailable and Russia is denied easy access to the Mediterranean and Iran is denied outer defensive bastions. This advance has been so blatant it is almost impossible not to notice, and attention must be called to it.

Iran Alone Defies America in Central Asia/Middle East

Iran and a few partners (Hezbollah, Houthi, etc.) throughout the region are all that remain in defiance of the Israelis and their American muscle/enforcers.

Syria has become a puppet satellite of the USA/Israel and has effectively ceded a large portion of southwestern Syria to the Israeli “security zone” that has resulted from Israel’s advance from the Golan Heights.

It should be increasingly obvious that Israel will never leave the territory it has occupied in Syria; it will move soldiers in, construct more permanent outposts, and then move settlers in.

Meanwhile, the Damascus branch of Al Qaeda, installed by the CIA and Mossad, is more concerned with trying to provide a legal basis by which they can murder former Syrian President Assad than with maintaining the territorial integrity of Syria against Israeli expansionism.

Across the border in Lebanon, Israel and the USA are working hard to plunge Lebanon into a renewed civil war, as that is the most probable outcome from the policy being foisted on Beirut, specifically the “disarm Hezbollah at all costs” policy. Any significant armed attempt by the anemic, corrupt, Western-aligned government in Beirut to disarm Hezbollah will likely result in a civil war.

While this is happening in the near periphery of Israel, closer to home, in Gaza, it appears that Hamas has capitulated, or at least their senior leaders are prepared to cut and run and toss their fighters under the bus so long as they have personal security guarantees and are able to depart Gaza with their families and wealth.

The disarmament of Hamas will begin the final chapter in the story of the Palestinian people, and this chapter will end with their permanent mass expulsion from the remnants of the Palestinian territories and the formal annexation of those territories into the state of Israel and their population by Zionist settlers.

It will also mean that in regard to the regional chessboard, the only pieces remaining on the board in opposition to Israel and America are essentially Hezbollah, the Houthi, and Iran itself.

Westerners, especially Atlanticists, are great at advocating for the setting of wildfires, and for starting those wildfires, but they seldom give much thought to what happens once they set a conflagration in motion

Despite American Propaganda, Iran is Actually Winning

CNN claims “80% of all traffic transiting Hormuz is going through the American route,” which, on its face, is plausible and is likely the case.

However, the CNN article does not tell the actual story: that traffic transiting Hormuz is down at least 90-95%.

Thus the notion that “80% of all traffic transiting Hormuz uses the American route via Oman” becomes far less impressive when one analyzes it through the lens of the traffic being 95% reduced from where it had been before the war.

I once had a potential client ask me to take a loser of a case on contingency; he even said, “You can have 100% of the money,” after which I told a colleague, “One hundred percent of zero is still zero.”

80% of 5% is a minuscule 4%, which means 4% of the pre-war traffic is using the American route via Oman. This is hardly something to brag about and it is not evidence that Iran is days from collapse or that the USA has won or is in the process of winning.

By the very nature of the situation, Iran wins by default if the US fails to maintain Hormuz open and freely available for maritime commerce. If the USA is unable to subdue Iran, then Iran prevails. All Iran has to do is avoid losing. It is similar to how in a lawsuit the plaintiff has the burden to prosecute a claim against the defendant in order to succeed and prevail; if the defendant simply avoids losing, then the defendant wins. If Iran is able to avoid botching the defense of their country and come through the war with their regime intact and while maintaining control over the Strait, or at least effectively maintaining area denial of the Strait, then Iran wins.

The Americans can sink some Iranian ships and try a repeat of Operation Praying Mantis, but this isn’t the 1980s, and Iran is a much harder target.

The US can likely even manage commando raids and strikes on Kharg Island, but it won’t be able to take and hold the island. Likewise, the USA is not capable of taking and*holding Qeshm Island (something likely necessary to exercise any significant long-term control over the Strait of Hormuz). An American operation to seize Qeshm Island, unless it has a plan for how to resupply the occupying forces with food and water in the face of drone and missile attacks interdicting the supply craft, is essentially an operation in “how long can these men hold out until they have to surrender to Iran due to hunger and thirst.” In short, an American invasion and occupation of Qeshm Island would be extremely ill-advised, unless President Trump has some secret logistical weapon, or a “trump card” that the American public is simply not aware of.

Negotiations with Iran are the Only Way Forward (But Iran Has NO Reason to Trust Americans Now)

It is painfully obvious that the only way forward for the United States in regard to Iran is to enter into negotiations, negotiations that would have to be fair, reasonable, sincere, and honest. However, given the American tendency to engage in direct strikes and targeted killings (assassinations) of the people they are negotiating with, it is doubtful if the Iranians are going to believe anything the Americans have to say at this stage.

Negotiations with Iran would also require (at least implicitly) the recognition of Iran as having legitimate national and regional interests if not indeed being an actual regional power in Central Asia and the Middle East, something the United States appears unwilling to do, largely because of Israeli/Zionist influence being exerted on American policy.

How can any sincere American diplomat go to Iran and ask, in good faith, that they trust him? How can he suggest, in good faith, that they work with American envoys? We have an established record of murdering diplomats during breaks in diplomatic sessions. How does any nation recover and come back from this reputation?

Neo-Con Provocations and Delusions Hinder Negotiations

At the present time it seems the United States is living in a fantasy land where it can endlessly sustain and support Ukraine in its war against the Russian people in Donbas and Crimea (using Ukraine as a NATO puppet to advance NATO/American interests in Eastern Europe), escalate on the Korean Peninsula against North Korea; continue to aggress against Iran in the Persian Gulf and wider region; support Israel against Hamas and Hezbollah; support the Saudis against the Houthi; and pivot forces from Europe to the Pacific and East Asia as part of a long-term program to contain and curtail China as a prelude to attempting to dominate China.

It is a very ambitious American grand strategy, and while lacking the resources to be successfully pursued, it also lacks any coherent overarching worldview that would string it all together and explain the motive, reasoning, or the telos. At present, it seems America is a mediocre chess-player simply moving pieces back and forth across the board, without any rhyme or reason, although that is the conclusion one reaches at a casual glance. A more thorough analysis would reveal that America’s policy in regard to Iran is primarily aimed at fulfilling long-term Zionist ambitions in the region and providing a puppet government in Tehran amenable to the stationing of American military assets (including nuclear weapons) that would be used to coerce and threaten Russia for the purpose of pursuing the long-term American neo-con goal of causing the collapse of the Russian Federation as a coherent, centralized polity.

America is presently trying to escalate with Iran and Russia, and is always eager and willing to unnecessarily confront, provoke, or escalate with the DPRK and China as well.

What is the American End Goal? Short-Sighted Regime Change?

Let us suppose that American/Zionist goals are accomplished in Iran, and Iran collapses; at that point the USA will have opened a southern front against Russia, with the ability to threaten Russia by projecting power across the Caspian and by escalating provocations throughout the Caucasus region as a way to distract, divide, weaken, and strain Russian resources.

But to what end? For what purpose? Why? While attending recent seminars at the University of Oxford in Aristotle’s Politics and Nuclear/Particle Physics, I had the opportunity to discuss ongoing geopolitical matters with a variety of European classmates. The vast majority (80%) had the standard mainstream EU/UK/Atlanticist line, and some were militantly anti-Russian. One (a man born in the Latvian SSR in 1986) openly said he wanted to see “democracy” rise up in Iran, topple the Islamic Republic, and to see “Putin toppled” in Moscow, and Western liberal democracy take over Russia.

My challenge to all of that was multi-faceted, but one aspect I consistently hammered home was “Why? What comes next? The US has a very bad track record of collapsing regimes and dealing with the aftermath… Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria… Why would we want to collapse stable states such as Iran and Russia? Even if we could, why would we want to collapse those states? What about the aftermath? What about thinking five years or ten years down the road instead of just thinking about the next six months or twelve months? The leaders in Iran and Russia are reasonable and rational, and those powers being intact and stable are crucial to regional stability; why remove them and have them replaced with, well, who really knows, some unknown quantity that might be a lunatic or a zealot or something unreasonable.”

I have very little appetite, and no sympathy, for the view that the USA should lead the way in toppling all non-Western governments so they can be replaced by what would presumably be Western-aligned parliamentarian democracies of the plutocratic variety. Westerners, especially Atlanticists, are great at advocating for the setting of wildfires, and for starting those wildfires, but they seldom give much thought to what happens once they set a conflagration in motion.

Many of the Russophobes cannot see past their own hatred of Russia and of President Putin, and they cannot wrap their minds around the simple truth that the West is fortunate to be able to deal with and interact with a Russia that has historically strong and visionary leadership in the form of true statesmen such as Putin and Lavrov, who are well-educated, experienced, and have coherent and sensible worldviews shaped by a proper and true classical education, whereas most Western leaders are fungible, interchangeable bureaucrats educated in technocratic parliamentary procedure and institutional rules.

Much like we are with Iran, we in the West are squandering golden opportunities for historic cooperation and mutual benefit with Iran and Russia because we are pursuing absurd policies based on, well, frankly, crap beliefs, garbage intelligence, and an incoherent worldview formed in the crumbling and decaying ruins of post-modernity.

Whether or not the US is actually succeeding in tightening a noose against Iran, it is certainly expending significant resources in an effort to do so, although it presently seems to have very little to show for all the effort.

Bryan Anthony Reo is a licensed attorney based in Ohio and an analyst of military history, geopolitics, and international relations

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September 11, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Is the Noose Tightening on Iran?

Russia, China clash with West at UNSC over legality of Iran ‘snapback’ sanctions

Press TV – September 10, 2026

Russia and China have opposed the activation of the so-called snapback mechanism against Iran at a UN Security Council meeting, warning that Western attempts to reactivate the relevant UN sanctions regime would only further heighten divisions and undermine multilateral diplomacy.

The five permanent members of the Security Council engaged in a fierce procedural battle on Thursday over the legal validity of international sanctions against Tehran.

At the heart of the dispute is the “snapback” provision embedded in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was originally designed to automatically restore UN Chapter VII sanctions in the event of significant Iranian non-compliance, deliberately bypassing the veto power of permanent council members.

Despite fierce objections from Moscow and Beijing, the council voted 11-2 in favor of adopting the provisional agenda, with two abstentions.

Under UN rules, procedural votes require a minimum of nine affirmative votes and cannot be blocked by a permanent member’s veto.

‘Legal mandate expired’

Both Russia and China stressed that the legal framework for the snapback mechanism no longer exists.

They emphasized that UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA, officially expired on October 18, 2025.

Consequently, the nonproliferation agenda item regarding Iran was struck from the council’s list of active issues on that same day.

The Russian representative stated that because the resolution has expired, there are no legal or procedural grounds to reactivate the 1737 sanctions committee, which ceased to exist in 2015.

Moscow dismissed Western claims and UN Secretariat conclusions supporting the snapback as “biased and erroneous.”

China echoed the sentiments, expressing “grave concern” and “strong opposition” to the West’s maneuvers.

Beijing warned that forcing the reimposition of sanctions and convening meetings under a defunct agenda item would seriously impede any chances of a political settlement to the Iranian nuclear issue.

China called on all council members to respect the termination date outlined in Resolution 2231 to preserve the authority of the Security Council and the credibility of multilateral diplomacy.

Western powers defend sanctions regime

Western delegations, however, firmly rejected the Russian and Chinese legal challenges, insisting that the sanctions have been legitimately revived following Iran’s alleged breaches of the nuclear deal.

“The United Kingdom, with France and Germany, initiated the snapback mechanism in full accordance with Security Council Resolution 2231,” the British representative stated, arguing that the European troika (E3) acted in response to Iran’s “significant non-performance” under the 2015 pact.

London maintained that the snapback process officially concluded on September 28, 2025, keeping six Chapter VII resolutions in effect.

The US representative took a harder line, accusing Moscow and Beijing of attempting to undermine council decisions merely to shield Tehran.

“Regardless of such politically driven matters, the facts are the facts. The 1737 Committee exists,” the American diplomat asserted, pointing to recent IAEA reports claiming Iran remains non-compliant with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

Tehran has consistently condemned the European troika’s actions, viewing the snapback maneuver as a politically motivated stunt orchestrated by Washington rather than a legitimate diplomatic tool.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei previously lashed out at the E3, describing their move as an act of “stubbornness” carried out to fulfill US orders without rational calculation.

He said that Britain, France, and Germany damaged their own credibility as parties to the JCPOA by misusing the snapback mechanism.

Baghaei emphasized that the E3’s illegal maneuver caused confusion within the UN system and creates no legal obligations for member states.

“In line with the preservation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, we expect countries to refrain from complying with the three European countries’ move, which is considered a form of imposition on the structure of the Security Council,” he said.

September 10, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Russia, China clash with West at UNSC over legality of Iran ‘snapback’ sanctions

Kiev plotted terror attack on UK ambassador in Moscow – FSB

RT | September 10, 2026

Russian security operatives have foiled a Ukrainian plot to carry out a false-flag attack on the British ambassador and other diplomats in Moscow, which was intended to draw the UK into a direct conflict with Russia, the Federal Security Service (FSB) has said.

In a statement on Thursday, the agency said it had detained a Russian national who worked for an organization contracted to protect the British Embassy in Moscow. The man collected sensitive information about embassy security on instructions from a Ukrainian contact, as well as personal data on diplomatic personnel, including photographs, home addresses, details of vehicles, and itineraries, the FSB said.

“The Kiev regime planned to carry out sabotage and terrorist attacks against British diplomatic representatives in Moscow to subsequently blame Russia for them in order to draw the United Kingdom into direct armed conflict with the country, secure additional weapons deliveries [to Kiev], and ramp up sanctions on Russia,” the agency said.

Neither the UK Embassy in Moscow nor British Ambassador Nigel Casey has commented on the statement.

The FSB said the suspect had been recruited by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and acted on instructions of Ukrainian blogger Dmitry Karpenko, also known as “Apostle Dmitry.”

Karpenko, 44, became known for recording interviews with Russian prisoners of war and covering POW swaps between Moscow and Kiev, as well as for propagating videos featuring Russian nationals collaborating with the Ukrainian military.

Karpenko was also criticized by Ukraine’s Commission on Journalistic Ethics, which said his videos exposed prisoners’ identities and at times resembled interrogations. The blogger also faced accusations of Islamophobia after an interview with a captured Russian serviceman from Chechnya, during which he made remarks widely seen as offensive to Muslims.

Britain has been one of Ukraine’s biggest backers since the escalation of the conflict in 2022, providing billions of pounds in military and financial assistance to Kiev. London has also refrained from condemning Kiev over a string of assassinations and bombings targeting Russian military officials and public figures inside Russia.

After Ukraine claimed responsibility for the 2024 killing of Russian General Igor Kirillov, commander of the Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Protection Forces, Downing Street said Britain would “not mourn” his death.

September 10, 2026 Posted by | False Flag Terrorism | , | Comments Off on Kiev plotted terror attack on UK ambassador in Moscow – FSB

Iran, Russia, China Demand Guarantees Against Further Attacks on Iranian Nuclear Sites

Sputnik – 09.09.2026

MOSCOW – Iran, Russia and China have demanded guarantees against further attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran’s mission in Vienna said on Wednesday.

“China, Iran, and Russia, in a joint statement to the [IAEA] BoG [Board of Governors] today, condemned repeated attacks against Iran’s nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, together with continuing threats of further aggression. In this regard, effective assurances, in particular guarantees of the non-recurrence of such actions, are indispensable for further development of Iran’s cooperation with the Agency,” the mission wrote on X.

The prevailing security conditions have effectively made the normal implementation of IAEA safeguards in Iran impossible, the mission added.

The US and Israel struck a number of Iranian nuclear facilities during the conflict of June 2025. Iranian nuclear sites were also hit during the latest escalation that began in late February 2026. Tehran blamed the US for the strikes.

The IAEA Board of Governors began its regular session on Monday in Vienna. The session, which runs until September 11, will address issues related to the implementation of safeguards in Iran and developments surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.

September 9, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Comments Off on Iran, Russia, China Demand Guarantees Against Further Attacks on Iranian Nuclear Sites

How the Latest Iran Sanctions Could Impact Central Asia

The US Iran strategy is working against its Central Asia strategy; Secondary sanctions may push the region closer to China and Russia.

By James D. Durso | The National Interest | September 8, 2026

On August 19, US President Donald Trump announced an “ECONOMIC D-DAY” against the Islamic Republic of Iran, warning of “tremendous economic consequences” for any country allowing its financial institutions, businesses, airports, or government entities to provide Iran a “lifeline.” On August 24, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced “Operation Economic Outcast,” which sanctions Iran and its facilitators in third countries (but no major Chinese banks), and declared, “you are either with us or against us.”

Potential secondary sanctions threaten Central Asia’s developing trade, energy, and transport links with Iran, raising costs, disruption risks, and pressure to diversify routes. The Central Asian republics are not major supporters of Iran, but Iran is becoming an increasingly important southern outlet for their trade and connectivity. The biggest risk is therefore collateral damage to legitimate commerce and transportation, rather than a confrontation over Iran policy.

The Effect of Secondary Sanctions on Central Asia’s Economy

Banking and financial services could become the most immediate problem. Central Asian banks and companies may decide that even legitimate transactions involving Iran are not worth the compliance risk. If a Kazakh or Uzbek bank processes an Iranian payment and Washington later determines the transaction constitutes a prohibited “lifeline,” the bank could lose access to the US financial system.

That creates a powerful chilling effect: the US threatens sanctions, banks become risk-averse, Iranian transactions become difficult, and Central Asia-Iran trade declines as the republics lose access to a market of over 90 million people.

Washington is already targeting Iranian shadow-banking networks and foreign facilitators for enabling Iran’s rahbar banking system. The Treasury Department said its August 7 action involved networks spanning several countries and hundreds of millions of dollars in Iranian transactions.

The result could be over-compliance: Central Asian banks might stop handling perfectly legal Iran-related transactions simply because determining what Washington will regard as a “lifeline” is too difficult. Secondary sanctions can dampen commerce even without formal designations, as private actors withdraw to avoid US financial-system exclusion or penalties.

Transportation and logistics corridors could become economically unattractive, potentially with greater strategic consequences than the direct loss of trade. A container originating in Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan and traveling through Iran to a Persian Gulf port might have nothing to do with Iran politically. Still, it could require an Iranian trucking company, an Iranian railway, an Iranian port, Iranian customs services, Iranian insurance, an Iranian bank, and fuel purchased in Iran. As the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a major player in Iran’s economy, it will be tough not to deal with an IRGC-affiliated business.

If Washington interprets normal business activity as supporting the Iranian government, the entire corridor could become commercially radioactive. Iran offers a continuous land route southward and onward to the Persian Gulf petrostates, South Asia, East Asia, and East Africa.

The Central Asian republics are landlocked and have pursued pragmatic economic ties with Iran primarily for southern access to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean via ports such as Bandar Abbas and Chabahar. These routes form part of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and related rail and road networks, offering alternatives or complements to routes that transit Russia, China, or Afghanistan.

Energy relationships are another vulnerability, particularly for Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Energy swaps, fuel purchases, and other transactions involving Iranian counterparties could become more expensive or difficult if banks, insurers, shippers, or trading companies conclude that they face sanctions exposure.

A prior Turkmen gas-swap arrangement involving Iran was disrupted by US sanctions, illustrating how sanctions can affect nonmilitary transactions. Tajikistan has also sought large preferential fuel supplies from Iran amid unreliable Russian supplies.

Central Asian governments may therefore face higher freight and insurance rates, longer transit times, additional compliance costs, and pressure to use alternative corridors. They may also see greater use of barter or non-US Dollar settlement mechanisms where feasible.

Trade and regional connectivity. The economic effect is likely to be less a complete collapse of trade than higher prices and greater complexity of using Iran. The region may accelerate diversification toward the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (the “Middle Corridor”), Pakistani ports, or Chinese routes, although each has capacity, cost, or security limitations.

Kazakhstan is probably the most exposed, given its long-term connectivity strategy and interest in an outlet to the Persian Gulf. It has been developing multiple routes to diversify its export geography, including the Middle Corridor through the Caspian and South Caucasus, as well as routes through Iran. Its development of port infrastructure in Iran illustrates that Astana sees Iranian territory as part of its long-term connectivity portfolio.

Bilateral trade rose 26.4 percent in 2025 to about $430 million, with ambitions to reach $3 billion, supported by the Eurasian Economic Union-Iran free trade agreement. Rail freight with Iran increased 69 percent, while INSTC freight overall grew 12 percent to 3.5 million tons. In June 2026, Kazakhstan signed a 27-year Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) deal for its own logistics terminal at Bandar Abbas, aimed at Persian Gulf, South Asian, Southeast Asian, and East African markets. Secondary sanctions could delay or derail the terminal project and raise logistics costs; banks and carriers could also self-sanction and chill transactions even without formal government action.

Washington now faces a dilemma: the more aggressively it sanctions Iranian transit infrastructure, the harder it becomes for Central Asian states to build the independent trade routes Washington claims it wants them to develop.

Uzbekistan has an especially strong reason to maintain multiple southern options. Tashkent has pursued routes through Turkmenistan and Iran toward the Persian Gulf while also developing routes westward via the Middle Corridor and eastward (the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway).

Roughly 9 percent of imports and 10 percent of non-gold exports transited Iran in 2025. Officials have estimated potential losses from Middle East logistics disruptions at $1–$1.5 billion (0.7–1 percent of GDP). Sanctions pressure could force costly rerouting toward the Middle Corridor or other paths, raise freight rates, and reduce competitiveness.

In June, Tashkent concluded a successful investment forum that saw interest from 193 American companies and investors, and where Washington and Tashkent launched a joint investment platform to “identify strategic investments in Uzbekistan for the US and US allies in key sectors.” In February 2026, the United States and Uzbekistan established a critical-minerals partnership, including a framework for up to $400 million in investment in the two countries.

Uzbekistan’s president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, visited the White House in February 2026, and the leaders concluded agreements in critical minerals, energy and petrochemicals, agriculture and poultry, and irrigation and water-saving technology, the latter a critical issue in the water-stressed country. They also announced a three-year, $35 billion Economic Cooperation Program. Uzbekistan’s World Trade Organization accession got a boost, and the Board of Peace gave Uzbekistan a role in Trump’s Middle East initiative.

The Uzbek leader has made a substantial personal investment in the relationship with the United States, and Uzbekistan has an incentive to comply with US sanctions on prohibited Iranian entities while preserving legitimate transit and commercial relationships wherever possible. That said, Trump must ensure his attack on Iran’s economy doesn’t damage the economies of countries that want a serious relationship with America, as future leaders will not again expose themselves politically if the Americans are careless.

Turkmenistan could face a somewhat different problem. It has extensive energy and transportation ties with Iran and depends on its neighbors for alternative routes. At the same time, Ashgabat traditionally values neutrality (and it is official state policy) and is unlikely to want to become involved in a US-Iran confrontation.

Turkmenistan is expanding cooperation with Iran in transport, energy, communications, and construction. US sanctions disrupted a prior gas-swap arrangement, so secondary measures could freeze or raise the cost of energy swaps and transit.

If Washington begins sanctioning Iranian transportation or energy counterparties broadly, Turkmenistan could be forced to choose between maintaining economically useful relationships with Iran and avoiding exposure to the US financial system, an uncomfortable choice for a country that works not to take sides.

Tajikistan’s direct trade with Iran is smaller, but its exposure is growing. Freight with Iran rose 17.5 percent in the first half of 2026 to 433,000 tons, mostly by rail. Tajikistan has sought large preferential fuel supplies from Iran—2.55 million tons of crude and products, including 2 million tons of crude plus diesel, gasoline, and aviation fuel—amid unreliable Russian supplies. It has also discussed joint road corridors with Iran and Afghanistan, potentially extendable regionally and toward China.

Disruptions could therefore hit fuel access, raise costs, and complicate logistics. Tajikistan may seek alternative suppliers and routes, but those alternatives could be more expensive or less reliable.

Kyrgyzstan is less directly tied to Iran than the other republics, so immediate sanctions exposure should be lower. Nevertheless, it could feel the effects indirectly through higher regional freight costs, fuel prices, insurance costs, banking restrictions, and shared corridor dependencies.

The Strategic Consequences of US Secondary Sanctions in Central Asia

The Central Asian governments pursue multi-vector policies and generally avoid open confrontation with Washington. They are unlikely to disregard US pressure or politically champion Iran, but will manage exposure carefully, possibly scaling back high-visibility projects while seeking workarounds.

Their most likely strategy is: comply with US sanctions on prohibited Iranian entities while preserving legitimate transit and commercial relationships wherever possible. They may also seek explicit US assurances or exemptions for infrastructure projects, but that may dissuade US investors if multiple approvals are needed over a project’s lifetime. And US policy can change overnight.

Washington says it wants Central Asia to become less dependent on Russia and China, and Central Asian governments want that too; one way to do it is by developing connectivity through Iran.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan joined Trump’s Board of Peace, but that may not protect them if Trump decides “all hands” must support America’s crusade against Iran. The point of maximum danger for the two republics may come if Trump can’t force China to isolate Iran and tries to punish Beijing by punishing Astana and Tashkent for trans-shipping Chinese goods while allegedly concealing their true origin to take advantage of lower tariffs. There is always the chance a Trump-affiliated investor may ask the White House to attack Tashkent’s trade with Iran, $578 million in 2025, if it doesn’t like Tashkent’s terms and conditions for a deal.

Consequently, an overly broad sanctions campaign could produce greater dependence on China and Russia, the opposite of the strategic objective Washington often advocates for Central Asia, consequences that probably weren’t considered before Trump and Bessent took to social media. Russian State Railways is sanctioned by the United States and the European Union, so Central Asian businesses may be stuck between two transport options, both sanctioned by the West.

The consequences will depend on how Washington defines a “lifeline.” If “lifeline” means financing Iran’s military or IRGC, oil exports, weapons procurement, or sanctions-evasion networks, the Central Asian impact could be manageable. If it means ordinary transportation, banking, aviation, port services, and non-military government-to-government commerce involving Iran, the consequences could be much larger.

The American administration has already demonstrated that it is willing to sanction foreign transport and financial networks supporting Iran’s military and procurement activities. That distinction is central to the policy question. If Washington wants Central Asia to have “connectivity without dependence,” it may need to distinguish carefully between Iranian military lifelines and Iranian transportation infrastructure that Central Asian states use simply to reach global markets.

Central Asia probably will not be the principal target of the new sanctions, but it could be the sanctions’ most significant collateral damage. The danger is not that the republics will support Iran, but that Washington could make legitimate Iranian transit so financially risky and demand that Iran’s neighbors help quarantine the Islamic Republic, undermining Central Asia’s effort to develop alternative routes to the world to the benefit of China and Russia.

James Durso is a regular commentator on foreign policy and national security matters. Mr. Durso served in the US Navy for 20 years and has worked in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. His writing has appeared in The Hill, The National Interest, Defense News, and Responsible Statecraft. Follow him on X: @james_durso

September 9, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , | Comments Off on How the Latest Iran Sanctions Could Impact Central Asia

Lavrov: Russia, China keep no technological secrets from each other

Al Mayadeen | September 8, 2026

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Russia and China have built an equal, strategic partnership in which neither side withholds technology from the other, in remarks published Tuesday.

Speaking to the online project Sama Menshova, Lavrov said the absence of technological secrecy between the two countries reflects the balanced and mutually beneficial character of their comprehensive strategic partnership, pointing to joint agreements as evidence.

Asked whether Russia risks slipping into the role of China’s “junior partner,” Lavrov rejected the framing outright, saying Moscow and Beijing have never approached the relationship in those terms.

The foreign minister praised China’s standing as a leading technological power across both applied and theoretical science, citing its output of high-tech goods, robotics and reusable spacecraft.

He said Russia’s own scientific tradition is equally strong, and that the two countries’ strengths complement one another, pointing to joint work underway in space exploration, advanced technology and artificial intelligence.

Maritime trade between the two countries climbs

Separately, Russia’s Transport Ministry said Tuesday that maritime cargo traffic between Russian and Chinese ports rose 19.2 percent year-on-year in the first half of 2026, reaching 109.5 million tonnes.

The ministry released the figures during the 30th plenary session of the Russian-Chinese Subcommission on Transport Cooperation, held as part of the Second Russian-Chinese Forum in Khabarovsk.

Officials noted that sea cargo volumes between the two countries had already grown 4.3 percent across all of 2025, reaching 196.75 million tonnes, before accelerating further in the opening months of this year.

Broader trade ties continue to expand

This technological and maritime cooperation comes against a backdrop of fast-growing overall trade between the two countries.

According to China’s General Administration of Customs, trade between Russia and China rose 28.4 percent in the first eight months of 2026 compared with the same period last year, reaching $185 billion.

Chinese exports to Russia totaled $84.675 billion between January and August, up 30.7 percent year-on-year, while Russian exports to China climbed 26.5 percent to $100.37 billion over the same period, customs data released Tuesday showed.

The figures leave Russia with a trade surplus of more than $15.6 billion over the eight-month period.

September 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , | Comments Off on Lavrov: Russia, China keep no technological secrets from each other

US Placing Missiles in Europe to Cancel Strategic Stability Talks Prerequisites – Russian MFA

Sputnik – 07.09.2026

MOSCOW – The deployment of US ground‑based US intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems in Europe, in particular in Norway, will nullify the prerequisites for a constructive dialogue with the United States on strategic stability, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on Monday.

“Steps such as the deployment of US ground‑based US intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems in Europe, which threaten Russia, will, to put it mildly, nullify the prerequisites for a constructive conversation with the United States on strategic issues,” Zakharova said in a statement.

Russia views the deployment of systems in Norway capable of launching medium- and short-range missiles as yet another step in a series of highly destabilizing actions by NATO, the statement read.

“As part of Russia’s response measures, the locations where US systems are deployed and controlled, as well as the infrastructure supporting them, are becoming the focus of special attention from Russia’s strategic deterrence forces, which includes planning the combat use of the relevant strike assets in the event of an armed conflict,” Zakharova said.

The ministry added that favorable conditions for a substantive and productive dialogue with the United States on strategic stability had not been established now.

September 7, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , | Comments Off on US Placing Missiles in Europe to Cancel Strategic Stability Talks Prerequisites – Russian MFA

How Britain built a war network around Russia

The UK is spinning a web of influence designed to survive any Ukraine peace deal

By Oleg Yanovsky | RT | September 5, 2026

Last week, UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham announced in Kiev that defense manufacturer MBDA had been authorized to disclose information concerning the British components of the SCALP missile, the French version of the long-range Storm Shadow, to Ukraine.

Officially, the decision concerns documentation required to organize local assembly, but in practice, it could facilitate the transfer of blueprints, components, assembly kits or finished missiles.

Moscow regards this technology transfer as the UK crossing a red line, as London hasn’t even attempted to shift responsibility onto intermediaries and the decision was publicly authorized by the prime minister. Britain has therefore assumed direct responsibility for the resulting escalation and deepened its involvement in military operations against Russia.

SCALP was developed through a joint British-French program and its assembly requires classified information about British components and French sub-assemblies, as well as access to a secure facility. Ukraine doesn’t possess a complete production cycle, but even a partial transfer of classified data would integrate Ukrainian assembly into the British-French manufacturing chain and bind all three parties together for years.

Before this decision, Britain had been far more careful about covering its tracks. For example, the Flamingo missile, marketed as a product of the Ukrainian company Fire Point, is identical to a design unveiled in 2025 by the British-Emirati Milanion Group. That arrangement allowed London to keep its distance, with formal responsibility for the missile’s development and deployment resting with Kiev.

Britain is also attempting to free future missile projects from the American vetting process, so under Project Brakestop, the Ministry of Defense has commissioned MBDA UK, MGI Engineering and Rotron Aerospace to produce three prototypes of long-range missiles for Ukraine. The purpose is to reduce dependence on US authorization and, consequently, on the position of the administration in Washington. London wants to determine for itself when and under what conditions such weapons are transferred.

British drones are already being used by Ukraine to strike targets deep inside Russia. They include the Nyan jet-powered drone, manufactured by Callen-Lenz, a subsidiary of BAE Systems. For its developers, the battlefield offers something particularly valuable: operational data with which to refine the weapon.

Russia has also repeatedly pointed to the direct involvement of British specialists in the deployment of Storm Shadow missiles.

On the same day as the SCALP announcement, London secured access to Avengers AI Labs, an extensive body of data gathered by Ukrainian frontline sensors, so now British companies will be able to use this information to train target-recognition and autonomous-control systems, greatly shortening the journey from development to battlefield deployment.

Five British governments have come and gone during the active phase of the Ukraine conflict, but the country’s anti-Russian course has remained remarkably consistent.

Boris Johnson began a program to develop the Ukrainian navy, Rishi Sunak signed a ten-year security agreement, Keir Starmer followed with the Centenary Partnership Agreement and Burnham has now authorized access to classified missile technology. Each government has built upon the commitments made by its predecessor.

The same continuity is visible in Britain’s strategic doctrine, where Sunak’s Conservative government described Russia in its 2023 Integrated Review Refresh as the “most acute threat” to British security and Starmer’s Labour government retained that position. The 2025 National Security Strategy called Russia “the most obvious and pressing example” of confrontation, while the Strategic Defence Review described it as an “immediate and pressing threat.”

That review established the principle of “NATO first, but not only NATO” and committed Britain to preparing for war.

These doctrines are supported by long-term financial obligations, given London has promised Ukraine £3 billion, approximately $4 billion, annually until at least the 2030-31 financial year. The century-long partnership agreement provides for joint production, technology transfers and cooperation in the Baltic, Black and Azov seas where Britain’s presence is intended to endure for decades, regardless of when the current military campaign ends.

The declaration signed by Britain, France and Ukraine on January 6, 2026, already outlines arrangements for the postwar period. These include multinational forces, military logistics hubs, secure facilities and a special legal regime for foreign personnel. In London’s calculations, a ceasefire wouldn’t end its involvement, but it would consolidate a new phase of Britain’s military and industrial presence.

To coordinate these efforts, Britain is assembling several overlapping structures, such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, the Maritime Coalition, the “coalition of the willing,” the International Fund for Ukraine and Lancaster House 2.0. Meanwhile, a classified British-German program known as Deep Precision Strike also envisages developing weapons with a range exceeding 2,000 km during the 2030s.

The International Fund for Ukraine is financed by Britain and 15 other countries, while the British Ministry of Defense administers procurement. Participating states receive technology, contracts, guarantees and a place at the planning table while London turns the resources of its partners into instruments of British influence.

Ukraine is not the only front in this strategy, and across northern and eastern Europe, Britain’s coalition network already rests upon established military infrastructure.

The Joint Expeditionary Force coordinates national and NATO operations during the transition from crisis to conflict, at the same time Britain is doubling its contingent in Norway, expanding its presence in Estonia and deploying equipment stocks, command systems and targeting capabilities. A network of supply, communications and fire-control facilities is being constructed close to Russia’s borders to enable rapid combat deployment.

Britain also seeks a leading role in coordinating NATO defense initiatives. This allows London to shape allied plans, establish standards and monitor their implementation, while also influencing how other countries build their armed forces and prepare for a possible war against a specifically identified opponent. Yes, Russia, of course.

Britain’s elected governments merely provide public legitimacy for this strategic course, as beyond the electoral cycle, the same network of intelligence agencies, professional bureaucrats, City financial interests, defense corporations, foundations and think tanks continues to operate.

This network establishes the institutional framework, distributes contracts, attracts investment and moves personnel between government departments and corporate boards. Ukraine has become one of its principal hubs, bringing together British standards, European manufacturing, Western capital, defense conglomerates and Silicon Valley start-ups.

This is the essence of the British approach, where London compensates for its shortage of resources by coordinating the capabilities of others and turning that coordination into political power.

The British establishment understands two arguments, a threat to its status and the prospect of unacceptable costs, and this status gives the UK the ability to form coalitions, exclude opponents and write the rules, and fear arises only when the consequences of escalation reach Britain itself.

London will therefore support only a settlement that preserves its military and institutional position in Ukraine and it won’t accept any peace agreement that restricts British influence over the postwar order.

Russian attacks on port and logistics infrastructure in Yuzhny and Izmail affect more than supplies to the Ukrainian armed forces. For Britain, which leads the Maritime Coalition and has extended its century-long partnership to the Black and Azov seas, these ports possess particular strategic value, given that military logistics, export routes, insurance markets and future maritime programs all converge there.

Russian policy must recognize the networked character of Britain’s strategy and focus upon the coordination centers through which London harnesses foreign resources while diluting its own accountability. So long as Britain can raise the stakes while transferring the costs to its partners, its policy will not change.

Deterrence begins when the cost of a strategy is borne not only by those who execute it, but also by those who organize it.

This article was first published by Kommersant and was translated and edited by the RT team.

September 5, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , | Comments Off on How Britain built a war network around Russia

The dangerous European illusion about a war with Russia

By Lucas Leiroz | Strategic Culture Foundation | September 4, 2026

The Leipzig incident exposed something more troubling than the incident itself: the confidence with which German and European authorities seem to approach the possibility of a direct confrontation with Russia.

While German and European authorities go public, in what looks like a ridiculously rehearsed performance, accusing Russia of “hybrid attacks,” it seems clear to any attentive observer that Europeans are completely disconnected from reality.

The central question lies elsewhere: what would happen if Russia actually decided to attack Germany?

The answer would probably be very different from what Europeans seem to imagine.

First of all, the obvious needs to be repeated: Europe is not Ukraine.

The Special Military Operation in Ukraine is taking place in a specific territory, with its own military dynamics and within certain strategic limits. From the earliest stages of the conflict, Moscow established a clear list of strategic objectives to be achieved through conventional means of warfare, while respecting the civilian population and avoiding unnecessary escalation.

There are clear reasons for this approach in Ukraine. Despite the delusional Banderist attempts to rewrite history, the truth is that Russians and Ukrainians have always been one people, sharing common ethnic, cultural, and religious roots. Millions of Russians have Ukrainian relatives and vice versa. An unrestricted war against Ukraine would consequently affect millions of Russians. Therefore, there is nothing surprising about Russia’s strategy of military restraint.

None of this would happen in Europe.

A direct confrontation between Russia and a NATO member would produce completely different calculations. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and other European countries would not be regarded as fraternal nations occupied by coup juntas. On the contrary, they would be regarded as total enemies, against whom the use of force would face far fewer constraints, if any.

The idea that a potential Russian offensive against Europe would simply consist of more drones, sabotage, and limited attacks against infrastructure seems extremely comforting. And precisely for that reason, it is dangerous. Europeans are provoking Russia while taking the experience of Ukraine as an example of what could happen to them in a potential direct war.

But this calculation is wrong. Russian actions against Europe would be completely different. In Ukraine, Russia’s foremost concern is to spare civilians. Attacks against infrastructure are avoided, offensives are restrained, and even retaliation for Ukrainian provocations on Russian territory is often ignored simply because Russia does not want the violence of a potential escalation to result in the deaths of more Ukrainian civilians.

In Europe, the immediate and total destruction of every enemy target would be the highest priority, regardless of the humanitarian costs. Europeans are not Ukrainians, and the ties between Russia and Western Europe are not the same as the ties Russia has with Ukraine. There would be no comparable pressure within Russian public opinion for restraint in the use of force.

Furthermore, it must be remembered that restraint in the use of force in a war with Europe could actually be dangerous for Russia, since it would be dealing with countries belonging to a collective-defense bloc with nuclear capabilities. Russia would therefore be forced to launch attacks powerful enough to dismantle the offensive capabilities of its adversaries, regardless of the costs. It would be a matter of security.

This does not mean that Russia wants to start a war against Germany. Nor does it mean that every incident on German territory is automatically part of a Russian military campaign. It means that European governments should take much more seriously the consequences of turning every incident on European territory into another step toward escalation. And, of course, it means that Russia has nothing to do with the recent suspicious incidents in Europe – which could be either sabotage carried out by local militants or carefully prepared false-flag operations.

Berlin has already announced diplomatic measures against Moscow, including the closure of the Russian consulate in Bonn and measures against Russian institutions on German territory. The European Union is discussing new sanctions. The more Europe turns incidents of this kind into direct political confrontation, the greater the need to understand where the limits of escalation lie. Russia certainly does not care about diplomatic actions, but Moscow is definitely growing tired of Europe’s participation in Ukrainian terrorism.

Europeans should ask themselves whether they are really prepared to discover, through their own experience, what the Russian response would be in the event of an open war.

They definitely should not try to see these consequences.

September 5, 2026 Posted by | False Flag Terrorism, Militarism | , , , , | Comments Off on The dangerous European illusion about a war with Russia

Norway seizes Russian Arctic science vessel at Kiev’s request

RT | September 3, 2026

Norwegian authorities have seized a Russian research vessel in Svalbard at the request of Ukraine’s state-owned energy company Naftogaz, amid growing tensions between Moscow and NATO states over access to and control of the Arctic.

The Professor Molchanov was detained on Wednesday while docked in Barentsburg, a Russian settlement on the Norwegian-administered archipelago. The Governor of Svalbard said the move followed an August 31 order by the Nord-Troms and Senja District Court granting Naftogaz the right to seize the ship. The vessel has been barred from leaving Barentsburg until further notice.

The crew and passengers aboard the vessel learned about the seizure from media reports, a TASS correspondent traveling with the expedition said. Russian Far East and Arctic Development Minister Aleksey Chekunkov said on Thursday that “the crew is safe,” adding that lawyers for the Arktikugol trust would soon issue a legal response and intended to challenge the seizure order.

The Professor Molchanov is a Russian state-owned research vessel operated by the country’s hydrometeorological service, Roshydromet. Alongside scientific expeditions, it has served since last year as a regular passenger and cargo link between Murmansk and Barentsburg, transporting scientists, employees of the state-owned Arktikugol, contractors, their families and supplies to the Russian settlements on Svalbard.

Direct air links between Russia and Svalbard ceased in 2020, while direct maritime passenger service was restored in 2025. The Professor Molchanov is currently the only vessel operating the route, with ten round trips between Murmansk and Barentsburg planned for 2026.

Under the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, Norway exercises sovereignty over the archipelago, while signatory nations are granted equal rights to engage in commercial and scientific activities there. Russia has maintained a presence on Svalbard for decades, with Arktikugol serving as its principal economic operator on the islands.

Naftogaz said it sought the seizure as part of an international effort to enforce a Hague arbitration award over assets it lost in Crimea following the peninsula’s reunification with Russia in 2014.

Russia has rejected the arbitration tribunal’s jurisdiction over the dispute, arguing that the Crimean assets in question could not qualify as Ukrainian investments made on Russian territory under the relevant bilateral investment treaty.

Acting Naftogaz chief Sergey Fedorenko praised the move as “another important step toward restoring justice,” pledging to continue the hunt for Russian assets worldwide.

Naftogaz, which claims Moscow currently owes it approximately $4.22 billion, plus interest and legal costs, has previously pursued Russian state property elsewhere in Europe. Finnish authorities froze a number of Russian-owned properties in 2024 at the company’s request. The Kremlin vowed to challenge the measures, while the Russian Foreign Ministry denounced them as illegitimate and warned of possible retaliatory steps.

The latest seizure comes just weeks after Moscow issued unusually explicit warnings against Western attempts to detain Russian vessels.

President Vladimir Putin described plans to seize Russian ships and sell their property as “piracy and robbery,” warning that Moscow would respond in kind and could do so in whatever part of the world it considered appropriate. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov subsequently said Russia would choose its own targets, including vessels operating in the interests of countries that had made such seizures their policy.

Tensions have also been mounting in the Arctic itself. In an article published earlier this week, Lavrov accused NATO states of seeking to turn the region into a “new front” against Russia and its partners. He pointed to large-scale Western military exercises and expanding command infrastructure near Russia’s northern borders, warning that the buildup increased the risk of an armed confrontation with potentially disastrous consequences.

Lavrov maintained that Moscow wants the Arctic to remain an area of peace and cooperation, but warned that Russia would defend its interests “by all available means” if confronted with hostile actions.

September 3, 2026 Posted by | Aletho News | , , | Comments Off on Norway seizes Russian Arctic science vessel at Kiev’s request

The Bishkek Declaration: What the SCO Signed, and Why India’s Name on It Matters

By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | September 2, 2026 

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation closed its 26th heads-of-state summit in Bishkek on September 1 with a joint statement — the Bishkek Declaration — timed to the bloc’s 25th anniversary and signed by the leaders of all ten member states: Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and the host, Kyrgyzstan. It is a long anniversary text, adopted alongside some 28 other outcome documents and amendments to the SCO Charter, and its language on the war in Iran is unambiguous. But the single most consequential fact about the declaration is not what it says. It is whose signature sits on it. Narendra Modi’s India — a Quad member, a US strategic partner, and a country the same declaration implicitly defends against Washington’s tariffs — put its name to a text condemning American and Israeli military action, mourning a dead Iranian supreme leader, and rejecting the sanctions architecture the United States has built. That signature is the story.

What the declaration says

On the war, the SCO condemned the military strikes on Iranian territory that it said caused numerous civilian casualties and significant damage to Iran’s economy, characterizing those strikes as violations of international law and the UN Charter that created serious risks to international peace and security. It expressed condolences on the death of Supreme Leader Seyyed Ali Khamenei — killed earlier in the war — reaffirmed support for Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for the conflict to be resolved solely through political and diplomatic means. It extended the point to Gaza, calling a comprehensive and just settlement of the Palestinian question the only path to stability in the region.

On sanctions, without naming the United States, the members opposed “unilateral coercive measures” inconsistent with UN and WTO rules and damaging to the global economy — language that simultaneously covers US sanctions on Iran, Western sanctions on Russia, and the tariff pressure on India. On the nuclear question, they upheld Iran’s position directly, affirming every member’s “inalienable right” to peaceful nuclear energy and declaring that measures restricting that right are contrary to international law.

The rest is familiar SCO scaffolding, weightier for the anniversary: an open, non-discriminatory multilateral trading system; implementation of the SCO economic and energy cooperation strategies to 2030; a push to reform global governance toward a multipolar order that “excludes bloc-based and confrontational” methods; responsible use of artificial intelligence; and the ritual condemnation of the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, with a pointed line that “double standards” in counterterrorism are unacceptable. Pakistan takes the rotating chairmanship for 2026–27 and will host the 2027 summit in Islamabad.

From the Knesset to Bishkek: the anatomy of a reversal

To read India’s signature as simple hedging understates it. Six months earlier, Modi had planted India firmly in the opposite camp — and the Bishkek text reverses, almost line for line, the position he took in February.

On February 25–26, 2026, Modi made a state visit to Israel: the first Indian prime minister to address the Knesset, honored with the Speaker’s Medal as the first foreign leader to receive it, presiding over the elevation of the India–Israel relationship to a “special strategic partnership” with 27 bilateral outcomes and a defense co-production track. Two days after he left, on February 28, the US and Israel opened their war on Iran. India’s response was conspicuous silence: it did not condemn the strikes on Iranian sovereignty, and it did not condole the killing of Iran’s supreme leader. New Delhi zeroed out its Chabahar port funding in the 2026–27 budget under US pressure, let bilateral trade with Iran collapse, and offered only a muted, “humanitarian” reaction when an Iranian frigate returning from joint exercises with India was sunk near Sri Lanka. Commentators summarized the moment cleanly — Modi had put India firmly in the Israel–US camp — while critics at home called it a strategic surrender. Among India’s BRICS and SCO partners, Russia, China, and Iran above all, the tilt bred real distrust.

What turned India back was oil. India imports roughly 85 percent of its fuel and draws a large share of its crude and LNG through the Strait of Hormuz. Under the 50 percent US tariff wall — half of it levied explicitly to punish Russian-crude purchases — New Delhi had spent early 2026 trimming Russian imports and leaning on Gulf suppliers, a quiet alignment with Washington. The Iran war detonated that arrangement: Hormuz disruption tightened supply, prices surged, the rupee came under pressure, and Modi was reduced to urging citizens to conserve fuel. With Gulf barrels suddenly unreliable and Washington’s tariffs making the alignment costly anyway, India turned back to discounted Russian crude out of straightforward energy necessity. As one analysis put it, the energy shock reordered India’s alignments — the tilt toward Washington of a few weeks earlier giving way to a familiar, interest-driven return to Moscow.

Modi was working two constituencies at once, and they pulled opposite ways. The influential Indian-American diaspora he has assiduously courted aligns comfortably with a pro-US, pro-Israel posture; against it stood the roughly ten million Indians in the Gulf and a domestic opinion for whom the image of India embracing Israel mid-war became a live political liability the opposition worked hard. Energy security and the Gulf-and-domestic pull won.

Seen against that arc, the Bishkek signature is the visible completion of a U-turn. The declaration made India condemn the strikes it had refused to condemn in February and mourn the supreme leader it had refused to mourn. The signature therefore reads less as conversion than as correction — an interest-driven snap back to the multi-aligned center after a six-month experiment in the Israel–US camp proved too expensive.

This is where strategic autonomy, not alignment, becomes the only coherent description, and the distinction matters for anyone tempted to call the SCO a consolidated anti-US front. India will lean toward Washington and Jerusalem when the terms are right and swing back toward Moscow and the Global South when its energy and standing require it, bending each forum to its own positions rather than adopting anyone’s line. Modi spent the Bishkek summit proving the point even as he signed the consensus: he demanded an end to “double standards” on terrorism in language every observer read as aimed at Pakistan, then sitting at the same table and about to take the SCO chair; he insisted connectivity projects respect sovereignty and territorial integrity, India’s standing refusal to bless China’s Belt and Road and the corridor it runs through territory India claims; and he pressed Putin directly to move from endless war toward a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine rather than echo Moscow.

And the timing is not incidental. India hosts the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi on September 12–13 — ten days after Bishkek — as BRICS chair for 2026, with Putin confirmed and Xi and Pezeshkian expected. A chair cannot antagonize the leaders it is about to receive, so part of the Bishkek signature is simply the housekeeping of a host keeping its room intact before its own showcase. Yet India deliberately themed its BRICS presidency around resilience and cooperation — a framing chosen to keep the focus on delivery rather than confrontation. The tell is in the gap: India signed a confrontational SCO text while steering its own BRICS summit deliberately away from confrontation. The New Delhi declaration on September 13 will be the better test of where India actually stands, and whether the correction that began at Bishkek holds.

The energy weight behind the declaration

A bloc’s communiqué is worth as much as the material power behind it, and on oil the SCO’s ten members carry more weight than the “regional talking shop” framing suggests. Taken together, and using the most recent 2026 figures, the member states produce on the order of 21 to 23 million barrels per day of crude and condensate — roughly a fifth of world output. Set against OPEC’s crude production of about 27 to 28 million barrels per day, the SCO membership produces somewhere near 80 percent of what the entire OPEC cartel pumps.

SCO member Crude + condensate (approx., 2026)
Russia ~10.9 million bbl/d
China ~4.3–5.0 million bbl/d
Iran ~3.3 million bbl/d (war-depressed)
Kazakhstan ~1.8 million bbl/d
India ~0.7 million bbl/d
Others (Uzbekistan, etc.) ~0.2 million bbl/d
SCO total ~21–23 million bbl/d

Four caveats sharpen rather than soften the picture. First, Iran sits in both camps — it is the only country that is both an SCO member and an OPEC member — so the two blocs are not cleanly separable; strip Iran out to avoid double-counting and the SCO membership still produces roughly two-thirds of OPEC’s volume. Second, Russia alone, at nearly 11 million barrels per day, produces about 40 percent as much as all of OPEC combined and is the gravitational center of the SCO’s energy weight. Third, the figures are unusually soft this year because the war has curtailed Iranian output and repeatedly throttled Gulf flows through Hormuz — crude and liquids transiting the strait fell from about 21.6 million barrels per day before the conflict to under 5 million in the second quarter of 2026 — so actual regional production has swung well below capacity. Fourth, and most telling, several of OPEC’s Gulf heavyweights — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait — are not SCO members but SCO dialogue partners, drawn into the organization’s orbit since 2023. The bloc that just defended Iran and condemned the US-Iran war is steadily accreting the very Gulf producers on whom OPEC depends.

The deeper asymmetry is that OPEC is a supply cartel, while the SCO spans both ends of the oil market. Its members include not only Russia, Iran, and Kazakhstan on the production side but China and India — the world’s largest and third-largest crude importers — on the demand side. No other grouping contains both the sellers and the biggest buyers of oil under one roof, and the declaration’s commitments to an SCO energy cooperation strategy to 2030, a proposed SCO Energy Consortium, and expanded settlement in national currencies are early scaffolding for exactly that: a producer-consumer bloc that could, over time, price and clear a meaningful share of Eurasian energy trade outside the dollar and outside OPEC’s writ. That ambition is nowhere near realized. But it is the material fact that gives an anniversary communiqué more heft than its boilerplate would suggest.

The Bishkek Declaration is, on its face, a predictable statement of Eurasian grievance: condemn the strikes on Iran, defend Iran’s nuclear rights, reject Western sanctions, call for a multipolar order. What lifts it above boilerplate is the combination of the signatory and the substance behind it. India signed a text that condemns the very strikes on Iran it pointedly declined to condemn in February, when Modi was in the Knesset — not because it has changed sides, but because a six-month tilt toward Israel and Washington collided with an energy shock and a tariff wall, and snapping back to the multi-aligned center became the rational course. The anti-coercion language now shields India too, and a BRICS summit India must host in ten days makes keeping the room intact its own necessity. And the bloc doing the signing controls something close to four-fifths of OPEC’s oil output, both of Asia’s giant import markets, and a growing roster of Gulf dialogue partners. The declaration’s rhetoric is cheap. The energy and demographic weight standing behind it is not.

September 3, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , | Comments Off on The Bishkek Declaration: What the SCO Signed, and Why India’s Name on It Matters

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