Putin calls for data on Romania drone incident to be shared
RT | May 29, 2026
Russian President Vladimir Putin has called for an “objective investigation” into a drone incident in Romania in which two people were injured. Moscow is ready to share its assessment if it is provided with either the debris of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or the data about it, he told journalists on Friday.
A drone crashed into an apartment block in the eastern Romanian city of Galati near the Ukrainian border early on Friday. The Romanian Defense Ministry claimed the UAV had originated from Russia.
Putin noted that drones have previously crashed in various EU nations, including Finland, Poland, and the Baltic States.
“A short time later, it would emerge that these incidents had nothing to do with Russian aircraft at all. Rather, they involved drones of Ukrainian origin that had gone off course due to electronic warfare… or technical shortcomings,” the president said during his visit to Kazakhstan.
Putin called on the Romanian authorities to share “objective evidence” with Russia, adding that Moscow did the same when the Ukrainian military targeted a Russian presidential residence in a drone strike. “Let them [Romanians] do the same and provide the evidence to us,” he added.
Romanian President Nicusor Dan, who visited the drone crash site on Friday, told journalists that the incident could have been caused by Ukrainian air defenses. According to him, the drone was a part of a group of Russian UAVs deployed against targets in Ukraine.
“Some of them were shot down over Ukrainian territory, and one of them was probably hit above the city of Reni. Its trajectory changed and it came toward Galati,” he said, adding that the Romanian authorities have data on the drone’s movement. According to Dan, the incident was not considered a deliberate attack by Russia but rather the consequence of military operations not far from the Romanian border.
Russia has previously been blamed for drone and missile incidents in EU nations. One of the most high-profile incidents involved an S-300 air defense missile killing two people in Poland not far from the Ukrainian border in 2022.
Kiev was quick to frame the incident as a Russian attack “on the collective security” of NATO while Warsaw eventually determined that the projectile had been fired by Ukraine in a bid to repel a Russian strike on targets inside Ukraine.
Over 50 countries continued to arm Israel during genocide of Palestinians in Gaza: Report
The Cradle | May 23, 2026
An Al-Jazeera investigation published on 23 May revealed that military-grade products from at least 51 countries and self-governing territories kept entering Israel even after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a provisional ruling over the genocide of Palestinians in Gaza.
In January 2024, the UN’s top court ordered Israel to take all measures to prevent genocidal acts in Gaza. By then, Israel’s brutal bombing of Gaza had killed more than 26,000 Palestinians, most of them women and children.
However, countries across the globe continued to provide weapons and military assistance to the Israeli military, the Al-Jazeera report found.
Using Israeli Tax Authority (ITA) import data, customs records, and freedom of information requests, the Al-Jazeera investigation found the military-related goods were shipped to Israel from countries across Europe, Asia, North America, and South America, including from many that have signed the genocide convention.
In some cases, the military supplies originated from countries that had publicly imposed arms embargoes on Israel or had at least partially suspended arms supplies to the country.
According to the ITA data, Israeli arms imports increased after the ICJ ruling, in particular munitions imports.
The five biggest military suppliers to Israel—namely the US, India, Romania, Taiwan, and the Czech Republic—all boosted their shipments of military equipment to Tel Aviv following the ruling.
ITA data showed that 2,603 consignments of military-related goods valued at $885 million were sent to Israel between October 2023 and October 2025. Of those, $805 million worth came after the January 2024 ruling.
The consignments included ammunition, explosive munitions, weapons parts, and armored vehicle components.
According to Stephen Humphreys, professor of international law at the London School of Economics, there was “ample evidence that countries arming Israel may be complicit in international crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
“The most recent ‘ceasefire’ did not change this,” stated Gerhard Kemp, a professor of criminal law at the University of the West of England.
Since the ceasefire reached in October 2025, Israel has continued killing Palestinian civilians in Gaza and creating conditions of life that could destroy the group in whole or in part, Kemp said.
This indicates that states still have an obligation to stop supporting Israel’s war on Palestinians in Gaza, which has now killed at least 72,000 people. Tens of thousands more remain buried under the rubble of buildings Israel has bombed.
“Some states have a very narrow understanding of the duty to prevent genocide and are waiting for a judicial determination that there is a genocide in Gaza,” Kemp said. “But the ICJ will likely take several years to make such a determination. The better view is to look at domestic legal obligations … and international legal obligations and legal tools triggered by available evidence.”
Though the ICJ has not issued its final ruling, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory published a report in September 2025 concluding that Israel “committed a genocide against the Palestinians in Gaza.”
The UN report asserts that “states are obliged to take steps to ensure the prevention of conduct that may amount to an act of genocide … including the transfer of weapons that are used or likely to be used by Israel to commit genocidal acts.”
Europe’s Drone Pipeline to Ukraine Could Soon be in Russia’s Crosshairs – Analyst
Sputnik – 16.04.2026
The Russian Defense Ministry’s statement on Europe’s plan to scale up drone production for Ukraine contained an explicit warning, says military analyst Ivan Konovalov speaking to Sputnik : Europe is turning into a “strategic rear base.”
The term applies to infrastructure that, while located outside the battlefield, directly sustains combat operations.
Under this logic, European hubs supplying Ukraine with drone components, data systems, FPV drones and heavy fixed-wing UAVs are no longer a “civilian facility in a peaceful country.”
“Once the production cycle on their territory is integrated into Ukraine’s strike capabilities against Russia, the line is crossed – they become a target deep within the enemy’s operational structure,” remarks the analyst.
After Russia’s strikes dismantled Ukraine’s centralized drone production, a workaround emerged: assembly lines were set up in Bavaria and the UK, using foreign-made components, while the finished systems were marketed as “Ukrainian.”
However, European production creates a long, predictable supply chain via Poland or Romania, exposed to disruption, insurance risks, and logistical bottlenecks, says the pundit.
Large shipments are visible to reconnaissance and potentially easier to disrupt at critical junctions, he argues.
For the European economy, it will entail growing risks for cargo insurance, airspace restrictions in border regions, and potentially forced relocation of production into underground or highly dispersed facilities.
“All this is fraught with massive non-productive costs for EU taxpayers, while Russia has long adapted to counter such challenges.”
Ukraine Targets Russian Merchant Fleet With NATO Intel Support – Presidential Aide
Sputnik – 13.04.2026
MOSCOW – The Ukrainian special services are targeting the Russian merchant fleet with coordination and intelligence support of NATO, Russian presidential aide and chairman of the Russian Marine Board Nikolai Patrushev said on Monday.
“The risks of illegal actions and terrorist attacks against ships sailing from or towards Russian ports are increasing. The Ukrainian special services, with the coordination and intelligence support of NATO countries, are targeting the non-military maritime infrastructure and the merchant fleet of our country,” Patrushev told Russian media.
The Baltic states and Finland’s provision of airspace for attack drones means that NATO members directly participate in the attacks on Russia, the official said, adding that neighboring countries are complicit in Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian ports in the Baltic.
“Kiev cynically regards the death of three crew members, which was a tragedy for their relatives, friends, and all normal people, as its victory. At the same time, we record the hypocritical policies of a number of states and international organizations that refrain from assessing attacks on Russian ships,” the Russian presidential aide said.
Kiev, which has flooded the Black Sea with mines and unmanned boats, remains the main source of terrorist and military danger, Nikolai Patrushev said.
“NATO countries continue to play out exercise scenarios to neutralize non-existent security threats from Russia, even though they themselves face real threats in the Black Sea. The Kiev regime, which has flooded the Black Sea with mines and unmanned boats, remains the key source of terrorist and military threats in the region,” Patrushev said.
Drifting Ukrainian mines are increasingly being discovered in close proximity to the coasts of Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, Patrushev added.
The route of the Ukrainian UAVs through the Baltic States required a careful study and at least the consent of the leadership of those states over which it passed, Patrushev said.
“I believe that neighboring countries are also complicit in these crimes, even if Ukrainian drones are launched from the decks of ships in the Baltic Sea… The distance from the northern borders of Ukraine to the Leningrad Region is more than 1,400 kilometers [870 miles]. Such a route requires careful study and at least the consent of the leadership of the countries over which it passes,” Patrushev said.
A frigate of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet escorted tankers with Russian oil through the English Channel last week, Patrushev said.
Last month, the UK government announced that UK military personnel will be able to board vessels subject to UK sanctions and transiting through UK territorial waters. London will also impose even greater restrictions by blocking British waters, including the English Channel, for sanctioned vessels. The measure affects the so-called “shadow fleet,” allegedly engaged in the transportation of Russian energy resources.
“Given that London prefers to interpret international law in its favor, last week a frigate of the Black Sea Fleet escorted tankers with Russian oil across the English Channel,” Patrushev said.
If necessary, other measures will be taken to ensure the safety of navigation and protect national interests in international waters, the official added.
“It seems that the British are haunted by the evil fame of their ancestors, who made profit in a piratical manner on the transport passing along their shores,” Patrushev said.
NATO continues to build anti-Russian infrastructure in the Black Sea region under the guise of the recent Sea Shield 2026 exercises, Nikolai Patrushev said.
“The North Atlantic Alliance, under the guise of the Sea Shield – 2026 exercises held in early April, continues to form an anti-Russian infrastructure in the Black Sea area. Romania was chosen as the main territory of the maneuvers as a Black Sea springboard to confront Russia,” Patrushev said.
Battle for Hungary: EU attacks on Orban are a sign of worse things to come
By Tarik Cyril Amar | RT | March 28, 2026
About a century ago – between those two World Wars which Europeans have generously given to the history of humanity – there was a joke about Hungary: It was a monarchy without a king and a landlocked country ruled by an admiral. It was funny because it was true.
Nowadays, though, we have proudly advanced. Now, we have a whole European Union, with 27 member states and 450 million people, run by an unelected German who really serves the US and has, a bit like Siegfried or Brunhilde, a special “shield” (about which more below) to protect a “democracy” administered and defined by an non-transparent, privileged, and aloof nomenklatura of equally unelected bureaucrats.
Contemporary Hungary, meanwhile, is, by the sober standards of reality, by no means a perfect but a perfectly normal country, that is, neither better nor worse than most of the rest. No longer a weird monarchy with a gaping hole at the top but a run-of-the-mill Western-style capitalist democracy, it has a feisty prime minister for a leader instead of an admiral without a coast. That prime minister, Viktor Orban, is a typical if especially canny and successful professional politician, who combines a knack for crowd appeal, demagoguery included, with deft political power plays.
It is true, if electoral districts need re-designing in Hungary, the party in power is likely to favor its own chances, just like they do in the EU’s big “daddy” the US, for instance. Likewise, if you are doing business in Hungary, being close to the party – or parties –in power tends to be better for your company. But that’s no different in, again, the US (with the caveat that there the current president and his extensive clan are now taking an extra large cut for themselves). Or, indeed, in Germany and France. The latter, as it happens, has just reached a new low in Transparency International’s annual corruption index.
Hungary may not have unbiased mass media, as its critics indignantly charge. But then, who does? Certainly not Germany, Britain, France, or, for that matter, the US. As a matter of fact, it is the EU and the German authorities which are currently obstinately misusing a sanctions regime designed for foreign policy purposes – and not working, but that’s another matter – to circumvent ordinary legal procedures, trample on civil and human rights, and punitively destroy the existence of individual dissidents and critical journalist.
Hungary’s elections may suffer from that media slant and some sharp administrative practice, too. But that again, is at least equally true of all major states in Europe and of the US as well. Indeed, say what you will about voting under real-existing Orbanism, it has not featured the brutal, EU-driven manipulation we have recently seen in Romania and Moldova.
And there is also nothing comparable in Orban’s Hungary to the extremely suspicious (to say the least) manner in which the last German elections featured a statistically bizarre accumulation of “mistakes” that eliminated the New-Left BSW from parliament.
Since it seems likely that a correct – or clean – result would make Germany’s current ruling coalition impossible, the implications of this case of deeply flawed elections at the very center of the EU are most disturbing: at this point, Germany may have an electorally baseless government, the German parliament’s refusal to permit a clearly necessary recount is either more foul play or indistinguishable from it, and Berlin’s political course – domestically and abroad – would be principally different under a government that would have to rely on the correct election results.
And let’s not even mention minor details, such as that Hungary’s mixed election system (combining first-past-the-post districts and national party lists) is far more representative than that of that “cradle of parliamentary democracy” and police-state-for-Zionism Great Britain.
In view of the above, you would expect, if anything, Budapest going after Brussels as well as some other individual EU member states to demand better democratic behavior. But this is the alternative-reality world of the EU’s sectarian “elite,” where genocidal Israel is only defending itself, “Europe is the values of the Talmud” (perish the thought its history may have a little more to do with first Christian and then Enlightenment ideas), the US is a good and reliable ally, and four white, blonde women serving the same radical Centrism proudly constitute “diversity.”
Hence, in topsy-turvy land, it is, obviously, once again the EU that is charging Hungary with flunking the test of “democracy.” That, in and of itself, might not be important: words are cheap. The problem is that, as before in Romania and even Moldova – not even a member state – the EU Commission has long passed from mere talk, at which it excels, to mean action, which makes everything only worse. Indeed, the EU’s meddling in Hungary has recently escalated.
The catalyst for this escalation is the upcoming Hungarian election. To be held on April 12, domestically, back in Hungary, the outcome will merely decide if Orban can stay in power – which he has been without interruption since 2010 – or will be replaced by the opposition’s new hope, Peter Magyar, a former Orbanist himself. Yet there are good reasons Politico has called these “the EU’s most important elections” this year despite the fact that Hungary is a small country of less than 10 million citizens.
For one thing, Orban is the primus inter pares of a group of very inconvenient sovereigntist rebels inside the EU, which also includes Slovakia’s leader Robert Fico, the Czech Republic’s Andrej Babis and, occasionally but with special weight, Bart de Wever from Belgium, which is an EU founding member. Orban’s toppling would not only weaken this loose group of leaders that still remember that they are supposed to serve their countries first but also make for a chilling object lesson in what happens to those frustrating Brussels too much.
Especially, if they resist the Commission party line on three topics: the relationship with Russia, the Western – now entirely EU-financed – proxy war waged against Moscow by means of Ukraine, and, last but not least, money, in particular money to be wasted – or not – on Kiev’s Zelensky regime. In all three areas, Orban has been Brussel’s main irritant, consistently arguing for normalization with Russia through diplomacy, a quick negotiated end to the proxy war, and an end also to the pathological inter-dependence with Zelensky’s ultra-corrupt and extremely dangerous regime.
Recently, this Hungarian resistance has led to repeated clashes with both the EU establishment and Kiev. Zelensky has publicly threatened Orban with violence in the worst Mafia style; Budapest has taken action against extremely suspicious transports of tens of millions of euro and dollars as well as bullion to Kiev; Hungary and Ukraine have been sparring over Kiev’s attempts to block the Druzhba pipeline; Budapest has been blocking yet another massive “loan” (never to be paid back) for Zelensky and his crew, and, most recently, Orban has called on Kiev to immediately withdraw its agents and operatives from Hungary.
And, by the way, you may suspect Orban of seeking an electoral boost. But even if that is the case, it makes no difference to the fact that aggressive subversion is exactly what the Zelensky regime does. Ask the Germans how things with their pipelines went. The braver ones might dare answer.
As we live in modern, online times, the shape much of the escalating EU meddling on the side of Orban’s opponents in Budapest and Kiev has taken is a nasty combination of social media manipulation at scale, illicit surveillance and spying, and the targeted dissemination of what is meant to be compromising information.
A smelly affair features a Hungarian journalist who has produced a source-free report alleging massive Russian interference in the elections, while spending his free time facilitating an EU country’s intelligence service eavesdropping on Hungary’s foreign minister. Some interference indeed. The hypocrisy would be funny if it weren’t so sad.
In Brussels, meanwhile, under the overall umbrella of the “European Democracy Shield” (EDS) initiative and the Digital Services Act (DSA), a so-called Rapid Response mechanism has been activated to – so the official brief tells us – combat disinformation and foreign influence. Yet, in reality, this is a set of compulsory measures that permit the Commission’s dependent auxiliaries to police social media platforms, suppress content in favor of Orban and, thus, promote his rivals.
What makes all of this particularly dreadful is not simply that it is so almost comically Orwellian: The “European Democracy Shield” is really a shield to protect the EU’s unelected bureaucrat rulers and their ideologized technocrats from democracy as a recent report has correctly argued. Its tools, from so-called “fact-checking” to systematic denunciation by “trusted flaggers” to “prebunking” – that is AI-based preventative propaganda campaigns – amount to a box of horrors.
Yet what is even worse is that all of this is only a small part of a much larger and long-term strategy that has been gathering steam for a decade already. The “European Democracy Shield” and the DSA exist in a large, constantly pullulating eco-system of narrative control that also includes, for instance, a “Defense of Democracy Package,” a “European Democracy Action Plan,” and a Digital Markets Act. Attached to this weaponized spearhead for manufacturing Brussels consent is an extensive – and very expensive – train of so-called civil-society organizations and NGOs that provide both censorship assistance and indoctrination.
Hungary, put simply, is a harbinger of more and even worse to come, of what Brussels wants for our future. The EU ‘elites’ are displaying an unbroken will to power over what we are allowed to think, say, and vote for. That is why – whether you like or dislike Viktor Orban – and I heartily dislike him because of his outrageous siding with genocidal Israel – you should certainly greatly dislike and resist the methods that the EU is fielding to stop him. Because they are coming for all of us.
Tarik Cyril Amar is a historian from Germany working at Koç University, Istanbul, on Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, the history of World War II, the cultural Cold War, and the politics of memory.
Romania’s stolen elections were only the start: Inside the EU’s war on democracy
How Brussels’ Digital Services Act has been used to pressure platforms and electoral control in member states
RT | February 18, 2026
Romania’s 2024 presidential election was already one of the most controversial political episodes in the European Union in recent years. A candidate who won the first round was prevented from contesting the second. The vote was annulled. Claims of Russian interference were advanced without public evidence.
At the time, the affair raised urgent questions about democratic standards inside the EU. Newly disclosed documents reviewed by RT Investigations go further. They indicate that the annulment of the Romanian election was accompanied by sustained efforts to pressure social media platforms into suppressing political speech – efforts coordinated through mechanisms established under the EU’s Digital Services Act.
What appeared to be a national political crisis now looks increasingly like a test case for how far EU institutions are willing to go in intervening in the political processes of member states.
The Russian narrative. Again.
On February 3, the US House Judiciary Committee published a 160-page investigation into how the EU systematically pressures social media companies to alter internal guidelines and suppress content. It found Brussels orchestrated a “decade-long campaign” to censor political speech across the bloc. In many cases, this amounted to direct meddling in political processes and elections of members, often using EU-endorsed civil society organizations. The report features several case studies of this “campaign” in action in EU member states, the gravest example being Romania.
It was around the November 2024 Romanian presidential election, the committee found, that the European Commission“took its most aggressive censorship steps.” In the first round, anti-establishment outsider Calin Georgescu comfortably prevailed, and polls indicated he was en route to win the second by landslide. However, on December 6, Bucharest’s constitutional court overturned the results. While a court-ordered recount found no irregularities in the process, a new election was called, in which Georgescu was banned from running.
By contrast, Romania’s security service alleged Georgescu’s victory was attributable to a Russian-orchestrated TikTok campaign. The allegation was unsupported by any evidence whatsoever. Romanian President Klaus Iohannis went to the extent of claiming this deficit was inversely proof of Moscow’s culpability, as the Russians supposedly “hide perfectly in cyber space.” Despite the BBC reporting that even Romanians “who feared a president Georgescu” worried about the precedent set for their democracy by the move, that narrative has been endlessly reiterated ever since.
The US House Judiciary Committee report comprehensively disproves the charge of Russian meddling in the Romanian election. Documents and emails provided by TikTok expose how the platform not only consistently assessed Moscow “did not conduct a coordinated influence operation to boost Georgescu’s campaign,” but repeatedly shared these findings with the European Commission and Romanian authorities. This information was never shared by either party. But the contempt of Brussels and Bucharest for democracy and free speech went much further.
Digital Services Act in action
The committee found Romanian officials egregiously abused the EU’s controversial Digital Services Act before the 2024 election “to silence content supporting populist and nationalist candidates.” Bucharest also repeatedly lodged content takedown requests outside of the formal DSA process, using what committee investigators call “expansive interpretations of their own power to mandate removals of political content.” This amounted to a “global takedown order,” with authorities perversely arguing court demands to block certain content for local audiences were “mandatory not only in Romania.”
This was no doubt a ploy to prevent outsiders, in particular the country’s sizable diaspora, from accessing content featuring Georgescu. His “Romania First” agenda proved quite popular with emigres, numbering many millions due to mass depopulation since 1989. Perhaps not coincidentally, his diaspora supporters have been widely maligned by Western media as fascist enablers. Still, even critical mainstream reports admit they and the domestic population have legitimate grievances, due to Romania’s crushing economic decline in the same period.
Bucharest would clearly stop at nothing to ensure the ‘correct’ candidate prevailed in the first round. Removal demands were plentiful, and on the rare occasions that legal justification was provided, it was based on a “very broad interpretation” of the election authority’s power. For example, TikTok was ordered to remove content that was “‘disrespectful and insults the PSD party’” – a left-wing political faction that was part of the country’s ruling coalition at the time. TikTok twice sought further details of the grounds for this request, but none was forthcoming.
Once Georgescu prevailed, and before the election was annulled, Romanian orders became even more aggressive. Regulators told TikTok that “all materials containing Calin Georgescu images must be removed,” again without any legal basis whatsoever. This proved a step too far for the platform, which refused to remove the posts. It wasn’t just naked political pressure to which TikTok refused to bend. Brussels and Bucharest were assisted first in electoral fraud, then autocratic annulment of the vote’s legitimate result, by local EU-sponsored NGOs.
These were organizations “empowered by the European Commission to make priority censorship requests – either as [EU Digital Service Act] Trusted Flaggers or through the Commission’s Rapid Response System.” Despite their supposed neutrality, the NGOs “made politically biased content removal demands.” For example, the EU-funded Bulgarian-Romanian Observatory of Digital Media “sent TikTok spreadsheets containing hundreds of censorship requests in the days after the first round of the initial election.” The committee characterized much of the flagged content as “pro-Georgescu and anti-progressive political speech.”
This included posts related to “Georgescu’s positions on environmental issues and Romania’s membership in the Schengen Area, and the EU’s system of open borders.” In other words, this was content espousing standard, popular conservative viewpoints, which are absolute anathema to Brussels and Bucharest’s pro-EU elite. Since the committee’s report was released, references to the Bulgarian-Romanian Observatory of Digital Media’s EU financing have been deleted from its website.
After the vote
The day after the election was annulled, TikTok wrote to the European Commission, stating plainly it had not found or been presented with evidence of a coordinated network of accounts promoting Georgescu. Undeterred by TikTok’s denials and scarcely bothered by the lack of material evidence, the European Commission pressed forward and demanded information about TikTok’s political content moderation practices and enquired about “changes” to its “processes, controls, and systems for the monitoring and detection of any systemic risks.”
The European Commission also used the “still-unproven narrative” of Russian meddling “to pressure TikTok to engage in more aggressive political censorship.” In response, the platform informed the commission that it would censor content featuring the terms “coup” and “war” – clear references to the perception that democratic processes had been undermined in Romania – “for the next 60 days to mitigate the risk of harmful narratives.” But this was still insufficient for the censorship-crazed commission.
On December 17, 2004, the European Commission opened a formal investigation into TikTok over a “a suspected breach of the DSA” – in other words, failing to sufficiently censor content before and after the first round of Romania’s presidential election. The platform was accused of failing to uphold its “obligation to properly assess and mitigate systemic risks linked to election integrity” locally. EU efforts to bring the platform to heel didn’t end there, either.
In February 2025, TikTok’s product team was summoned for a meeting with the EU’s Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology. There, they were lectured over the platform’s supposedly “deceptive behavior policies and enforcement” and “potential[ly] ineffective” DSA “mitigation” measures. The US House Judiciary Committee found that the European Commission’s decision to meet TikTok’s product team, “rather than the government affairs and compliance staff whose job it was to manage TikTok’s relationship with the Commission, indicates the European Commission sought deeper influence over the platform’s internal moderation processes.”
Georgescu and the many Romanians who wished to elect him president were punished even more severely. Two weeks after TikTok was threatened by the European Commission, the upstart hopeful was arrested in Bucharest en route to registering to run in the new election that May. Georgescu was charged with “incitement to actions against the constitutional order.” Since then, he has been accused by authorities of plotting a coup and involvement in a million-euro fraud.
When Georgescu’s case finally reached trial this February, these accusations were dropped. He is instead charged with peddling “far-right propaganda.” A report on his prosecution from English-language news website Romania Insider repeated the fiction he owed his first-round victory to a “targeted social media campaign,” managed by “entities linked to Russia.” In the meantime, establishment-preferred candidate Nicusor Dan won the presidency. No doubt satisfied with the integrity of the democratic process given Georgescu was barred from participating, Romania’s Constitutional Court quickly validated the result.
Beyond Romania
Per the US House Judiciary Committee, Romania’s stolen 2024 presidential election is the most extreme example of the EU and member state authorities conspiring to subvert democracy and trample on popular will. But it is just one of many. Since the Digital Services Act came into force in August 2023, the European Commission has pressured platforms to censor content ahead of national elections in Slovakia, the Netherlands, France, Moldova, and Ireland, as well as the EU elections in June 2024.
“In all of these cases… documents demonstrate a clear bias toward censoring conservative and populist parties,” the committee concluded. Ahead of the EU elections, TikTok was pressured into censoring over 45,000 pieces of purported “misinformation.” This included what the report deemed “clear political speech” on topics such as migration, climate change, security and defense, and LGBTQ rights. There is no indication Brussels has been deterred from its quest to prevent the ‘wrong’ candidates being elected to office in member states, or citizens expressing dissenting opinions.
In fact, we can expect these efforts to ramp up significantly. For one, the US committee’s bombshell report generated almost no mainstream interest, indicating Brussels can and will get away with it again. Even more urgently, in April, Hungary goes to the polls. Already, the narrative that ruling conservative Viktor Orban intends to rig the vote to secure victory is being widely perpetuated. And the EU’s censorship apparatus stands ready to validate that narrative, regardless of truth, and popular will.
EU targets platforms that refuse to censor free speech – Telegram founder
RT | December 6, 2025
The EU is unfairly targeting social media platforms that allow dissenting or critical speech, Telegram founder Pavel Durov has said.
He was responding to a 2024 post by Elon Musk, the owner of X, who claimed that the European Commission had offered the platform a secret deal to avoid fines in return for censoring certain statements. The EU fined X €120 million ($140 million) the day before.
According to Durov, the EU imposes strict and unrealistic rules on tech companies as a way to punish those that do not comply with quiet censorship demands.
“The EU imposes impossible rules so it can punish tech firms that refuse to silently censor free speech,” Durov wrote on X on Saturday.
He also referred to his detention in France last year, which he called politically motivated. He claimed that during that time, the head of France’s DGSE asked him to “ban conservative voices in Romania” ahead of an election, an allegation French officials denied. He also said intelligence agents offered help with his case if Telegram quietly removed channels tied to Moldova’s election.
Durov repeated both claims in his recent post, describing the case as “a baseless criminal investigation” followed by pressure to censor speech in Romania and Moldova.
Later on Saturday, Durov wrote: “The EU exclusively targets platforms that host inconvenient or dissenting speech (Telegram, X, TikTok…). Platforms that algorithmically silence people are left largely untouched, despite far more serious illegal content issues.”
Last year Elon Musk said the European Commission offered X “an illegal secret deal” to quietly censor content. “If we quietly censored speech without telling anyone, they would not fine us. The other platforms accepted that deal. X did not,” he wrote.
On Friday, European Commission spokesperson Tom Rainier said the EU fined X €120 million for violating the Digital Services Act. He claimed the fine was unrelated to censorship and was the first enforcement under the law. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio criticized the move on X, calling it “an attack on all American tech platforms and the American people by foreign governments.”
Durov and Musk have both faced pressure from EU regulators under the Digital Services Act (DSA), which came into force in 2023. The law requires platforms to remove illegal content quickly, though critics say it can be used to suppress lawful expression.
‘External attack’ could explain blast at Hungarian refinery using Russian crude – Orban
RT | October 30, 2025
An “external attack” may have been the cause of an explosion at Hungary’s largest oil refinery last week, Prime Minister Viktor Orban said on Thursday.
Writing on Facebook, Orban cited a report he received from investigators on the explosion and fire at the facility located in Szazhalombatta, saying the probe was still underway.
”We do not yet know whether it was an accident, malfunction or external attack,” Orban said, noting that “the Sazhalombatta refinery is one of the five most important strategic industrial plants in Hungary.”
“The Polish foreign minister advised Ukrainians to blow up the Druzhba oil pipeline. Let’s hope this isn’t the case,” he added.
The Szazhalombatta facility, also known as the Danube refinery, was built to process crude received via the Druzhba pipeline from Russia. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski expressed hope that the link would be destroyed in an online spat last week with his Hungarian counterpart, Peter Szijjarto.
Orban said in his update that his government is negotiating with the refinery’s owner, MOL Group, to reign in rising petrol prices, which jumped following the incident.
The Hungarian leader is a longtime critic of the European Union’s response to the Ukraine conflict, particularly sanctions on Russia that he argues have caused significant damage to members of the bloc. Budapest insists that Russian energy is crucial for Hungary’s economic wellbeing and has accused Brussels of ignoring its concerns, including about Kiev’s attacks on the Druzhba pipeline.
The Sazhalombatta blast coincided with a similar incident at a Druzhba-connected oil facility in Ploiesti in southern Romania.
Refinery Fires Help EU Topple Pro-Peace Governments to Wage War on Russia
Sputnik – 23.10.2025
While it is too early to tell who exactly is responsible for the recent fires at the refineries in Hungary and Romania as investigations are still ongoing, figuring out who benefits from them is easier, Endre Simó, the president of the Hungarian Community for Peace, tells Sputnik.
According to Simo, it is “those who want to gain a market with their own products by displacing cheaper Russian products.”
“Given the history, namely the explosion of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and the series of Ukrainian attacks against the Druzhba oil pipeline, intentionality cannot be ruled out either in Hungary or Romania,” he points out.
He further notes that the main victim of these incidents is Serbia which, due to its only significant refinery being targeted by US sanctions, is forced to rely heavily on the now-damaged MOL’s refinery in Százhalombatta.
Thus, the refinery fires are also a boon to those seeking to overthrow the pro-peace government of Viktor Orban in Hungary and Alexandar Vucic in Serbia, and using “impermissible means” to meddle in Hungary and Serbia’s internal affairs “in order to bring opposition forces that serve the Brussels policy to power.”
Refinery Fires in Europe Are Part of EU Crusade Against Russian Oil and Gas
Sputnik – 23.10.2025
The timing of the recent incidents at the oil refineries in Hungary and Romania is very suspicious in light of the threats from Poland, Dr. George Szamuely, senior research fellow at The Global Policy Institute, tells Sputnik.
When Polish Foreign Minister Sikorsky openly justifies the Nord Stream bombing and then tries intimidating Hungary into giving up Russian oil, and then suddenly the refineries are ablaze – that’s one hell of a coincidence.
The refinery fires were definitely a part of a broader campaign to cut off the flow of Russian energy to Europe, Szamulely notes – a campaign that ends up hurting the EU members but fails to affect Russia.
“These measures that the EU is adopting are measures directed towards hurting EU member states, forcing them into line,” he explains.
Only the Russophobic EU bureaucrats like Ursula von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas benefit from this disruption of energy supply chains, and they are eager to “punish anybody at all who is not on board with their program.”
The incidents in Hungary and Romania convey a simple message: “if you are going to keep importing your fossil fuels from Russia, look at the sort of things that can happen, all sorts of explosions, fires, sabotage.”
As elections approach in Moldova: What do the allegations of an attack on Transnistria mean?
By Erkin Oncan | Strategic Culture Foundation | September 23, 2025
Elections in Moldova are just around the corner. Scheduled for September 28, 2025, they are set to become a stage for a serious “political showdown” among the country’s leading political forces.
The results will be determined by the fierce competition between pro-Western actors advocating for Moldova’s “integration with Europe” and forces leaning toward Russia. The outcome will affect not only Chişinău’s domestic politics but also the regional balance of security.
Moldovan politics is sharply divided. On one side stands President Maia Sandu’s pro-Western Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). On the other are two major pro-Russian alliances: the Victory Bloc, composed of right-wing/nationalist forces, and the Moldova For Alliance, representing leftist/socialist currents rooted in the country’s socialist past.
Of these two, the Victory Bloc, led by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, accused of corruption, was barred from running in the elections. This has considerably strengthened the hand of the pro-Russian leftist alliance. While Sandu’s defeat is within the realm of possibility, pro-Russian factions believe she will once again resort to various irregularities and abuses, “just as in previous elections.”
Moldova’s political divide also mirrors its geographic and social makeup. While there are significant pro-Russian constituencies even in the west of the country, the division becomes sharper toward the east, closer to Russia.
The Gagauzia Autonomous Region and the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, with its alleged socialist-style administration, are widely considered “pro-Russian regions” of the country.
The Chişinău government jailed Gagauzia leader and Victory Bloc member Evghenia Guţul on charges of so-called corruption and unexplained financial resources. In recent weeks, however, the region most highlighted in accusations of “abuses and violations” under Sandu’s administration has been Transnistria.
Located along Moldova’s eastern border, squeezed between the pro-Western Moldovan government and Ukraine, Transnistria has a history closely resembling that of Ukraine’s Donbas region.
A regional flashpoint
Transnistria is not only politically but also militarily strategic. Russian military personnel are stationed in the region, and the Soviet-era ammunition depots at Kolbasna elevate its importance far beyond Moldova’s usual political disputes.
According to pro-Russian politicians in Moldova, the Central Election Commission continues to discriminate against voters from Transnistria. The first controversy erupted over the ballot papers.
Official data shows that of the 2.772 million ballot papers printed for the upcoming elections, only 23,500 were allocated to Moldovan citizens residing in Transnistria. This means the vast majority of them will not be able to vote.
Additionally, “repair works” announced by the Chişinău government just before the elections are being interpreted as attempts at electoral interference. PAS representatives told the Joint Control Commission (JCC) that seven bridges would be under repair simultaneously in September and October. Crucially, these bridges connect Transnistria with the rest of Moldova, and six of them are located in the “Security Zone.”
Why are the bridges important?
The “security zone” in Transnistria was established under the Yeltsin–Snegur Ceasefire Agreement of July 21, 1992, following the Transnistria War.
Stretching 225 kilometers along the de facto border between Moldova and Transnistria, it serves as a buffer zone monitored by the JCC, headquartered in Bender.
Deployed there are about 400 Russian soldiers, nearly 500 Transnistrian troops, and over 350 Moldovan soldiers. Observers from Ukraine and the OSCE also take part in the monitoring.
Under JCC protocols, any repair or construction works must be inspected by observers from Russia, Moldova, and Transnistria to ensure they are not related to military preparations. Yet, a few days ago, sudden inspections were launched without allowing any JCC members entry.
These “repairs” could effectively lock down the elections. With the bridges closed and only 12 polling stations in the region, out of 300,000 Moldovan citizens in Transnistria, only around 50,000 will be able to cast a ballot.
Under normal conditions, at least part of the remaining 250,000 could still participate. But the closures will make it impossible, leading many Transnistrians to see the works as a deliberate effort to suppress their vote.
A similar situation occurred in the last presidential elections, when police under Sandu’s orders shut down two major bridges and even stopped or turned back voters crossing from Transnistria.
Adding to the tensions, two polling stations were “suddenly” declared “mined.”
All of this is viewed as part of Sandu’s broader effort to block pro-Russian political forces. Considering that Moldovan citizens in Russia (about 500,000 people) will also be unable to vote, the tally suggests around 750,000 pro-Russian voters may be disenfranchised.
A frozen conflict with military stakes
Beyond politics and ballots, Transnistria remains a “frozen conflict” zone with military dimensions. The area is strategically critical for both Russia and NATO.
For Russia, if its “Black Sea closure” strategy in Ukraine were ever completed, connecting with Transnistria—home to Russian passport holders and massive Soviet weapons stockpiles—would be a key step.
For NATO, Transnistria is equally vital: situated on Ukraine’s border and near the Black Sea, it represents both an obstacle and an opportunity for the alliance’s eastern expansion.
In this climate, reports of growing numbers of foreign military experts in Moldova, cited by both Russian and Ukrainian sources, merit close attention. Military insiders also allege that intense, closed-door talks are underway between Kiev and Chişinău, and that Sandu’s visit to the UK may have included discussions on Transnistria.
According to a report by Ukrayinski Novini, British officials welcomed Moldova’s decision to provide logistics infrastructure for an international peacekeeping mission that could later be deployed to Ukraine. Moldova also pledged to serve as a “regional hub” for Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction.
“Ukraine operation in spring 2026”
Some claims go further: British officials allegedly secured Sandu’s approval for a Ukrainian Armed Forces “special operation” in Transnistria in spring 2026.
British military experts are said to be preparing certain Ukrainian units for such an assault after Moldova’s parliamentary elections.
While these remain unconfirmed, the very idea underscores Transnistria’s potential to disrupt NATO’s eastward strategy.
Although Odessa has long been seen as a Russian target, the reality suggests a different scenario: if Western forces settle in Odessa, Transnistria will inevitably come into the spotlight.
In light of these geopolitical calculations, Sandu’s possible re-election is expected to mark the beginning of an effort to dismantle the administrations in both Gagauzia and Transnistria. Pro-Russian politicians insist that Sandu’s domestic maneuvers must be understood in this geostrategic context.
The logic behind Transnistrian plans also recalls the Odessa Summit of June 11, 2025, when Romanian President Nikuşor Dan, Maia Sandu, and Volodymyr Zelensky held a special meeting said to focus on Black Sea strategies.
Since Sandu’s rise to power, Moldova has signed bilateral agreements with several NATO members, including France, the UK, Romania, and Poland. Moreover, Moldova has participated in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program since 1994 and regularly joins alliance exercises.
How was Transnistria formed?
After the collapse of the USSR, the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic declared independence from Moldova following the 1992 war. Situated between Moldova and Ukraine, it remains internationally unrecognized except by a few breakaway states such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the now-defunct Nagorno-Karabakh.
Its crisis roots stretch back to the 1917 Russian Revolution. While Moldova eventually became part of Romania, Transnistria remained within Soviet territory. After World War II, Moldova was re-incorporated into the USSR, and Transnistria became an autonomous region within the Moldavian SSR.
In the late Soviet period, Transnistria’s industrial strength—providing 40% of the republic’s GDP and 90% of its electricity—set it apart from agrarian Moldova. Its population was also distinct: predominantly Russian and Ukrainian, rather than Romanian-speaking Moldovans.
When Moldova declared independence in 1990 and pushed nationalist measures such as making Moldovan the sole state language and adopting the Latin alphabet, Transnistria’s people felt threatened. They organized under the United Council of Work Collectives (UCLC), eventually proclaiming independence on September 2, 1990, under Igor Smirnov.
The Moldovan government saw this as a rebellion, and clashes escalated into war. Both sides raided Soviet arms depots, and the conflict culminated in the Battle of Bender in 1992, leaving about 1,000 dead, including 400 civilians. The July 21, 1992 ceasefire froze the conflict and created the current “security zone.”
Unlike Donbas, however, Transnistria has managed to maintain its autonomy while preserving ties with Moldova, thanks in part to the decline of nationalism and the resurgence of leftist politics in the wider country.
Is Transnistria socialist?
Although Soviet symbols and flags remain in use, the region cannot be described as truly socialist. It is heavily reliant on Russia both militarily and economically. Its governance style blends Russian backing with Soviet nostalgia.
Meanwhile, Chişinău receives active support from NATO-member Romania, which holds influence in Moldova’s political and judicial institutions and harbors ambitions of eventual unification.
In short, Transnistria is bound to feature ever more prominently in Moldova’s multi-layered politics. Once seen by European tourists as little more than a “Soviet nostalgia stop,” it now represents a geopolitical hotspot where frozen conflicts threaten to thaw under mounting political and military pressures.
Ex-Romanian presidential candidate accused of coup attempt
RT | September 18, 2025
Prosecutors in Romania are taking former presidential candidate Calin Georgescu to court. He is accused of plotting a coup after his first-round election victory was annulled last year.
Georgescu, a former UN official, came out on top in the first round of the presidential vote in November 2024, after campaigning on national sovereignty, criticism of involvement in NATO and the EU and opposition to continued military aid for Ukraine.
However, his victory was canceled by the country’s Constitutional Court, citing “irregularities” in his campaign and alleged Russian interference – a claim Moscow has denied. Georgescu was banned from the race altogether, with the re-run of the election in May being won by pro-EU candidate, Nicusor Dan.
Romanian General Prosecutor Alex Florenta said on Tuesday that Georgescu and 21 other people had been indicted for attempting to instigate violence after the cancellation of the election results in December.
The evidence collected during the investigation suggested that Georgescu held a secret meeting with Horatiu Potra, a military contractor who previously operated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and discussed a plan to spark unrest in Bucharest, the prosecutor claimed.
Shortly afterward, Potra was detained by traffic police en route to the capital with “a paramilitary group” of 20 people armed with weapons and explosives, he added.
Georgescu, who quit politics several months ago, has denied any wrongdoing. The date for the trial has not been set yet.
Florenta also claimed that the probe revealed a pattern of hybrid attacks against Romania by Russia over the past year, including cyberattacks, public events, and online disinformation.
Asked to comment on the accusations by journalists on Tuesday, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov reiterated that they were groundless.
“Let’s recall how Washington accused Russia of meddling in the election, attempting destabilization, and so on. Later, they themselves admitted that all this was not true. It is the same with Romania,” Peskov stressed.
