How CIA used Ukraine as a platform for covert war against Russia
By Stephen KINZER | Responsible Statecraft | November 17, 2026
The following is an excerpt from Stephen Kinzer’s new book: Boiling Point: How America Brought War to Ukraine (Henry Holt and Company, November 2026)
Huddled beside an airstrip in southern Germany, a handful of anti-Communist warriors prepared to fire the first shots of the Cold War. A CIA officer from the Munich Operations Base was in charge. The Hungarian crewmen he had recruited stood nearby in flight suits. With them were two Ukrainian exiles who had volunteered to parachute into their homeland. They were code-named Apostle 1 and Apostle 2. Each carried forged identity papers, a miniature radio transmitter, a pistol, a machine gun, hand grenades, a purse full of gold coins, and a poison pill to be taken in case of capture. An unmarked C-47 transport plane was waiting.
The CIA officer overseeing this operation, a twenty-six-year-old Yale graduate named Stephen Tanner, watched the plane take off and disappear into the night. It flew over East Germany and Poland, then crossed into Soviet airspace. As it approached the Ukrainian city of Lviv, a cargo bay swung open. The two Ukrainians jumped into the darkness. Their mission was to link up with partisan fighters, seize territory, and establish a clandestine base through which the CIA could send them weapons.
That flight, on September 5, 1949, was the first American act of covert war in Ukraine. The two would-be commandos who jumped that night were an advance guard for what became Project Aerodynamic, the most ambitious and furthest-reaching project the CIA ever launched inside the Soviet Union. Its aim was to foment subversion in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Behind it lay a simple calculation: The Soviet Union is America’s mortal enemy; its greatest internal threat comes from Ukraine; the CIA should do everything possible to intensify that threat.
From their base in Munich, Tanner and other CIA officers anxiously awaited messages from the two Apostles. None came. An after-action report concluded tersely that “the Soviets quickly eliminated the agents.” It added, though, that this mission “sparked considerable interest at headquarters.” Losing two agents was hardly enough to derail such a promising project.
On May 19, 1950, another C-47 took off from the same base in Germany. This time it carried four Ukrainian volunteers. They parachuted into western Ukraine with a cargo their CIA overseers had packed. It was enough to arm a potent guerrilla band, including fifty submachine guns, thirty rifles, twenty-five pistols, and a hundred phosphorus grenades. The four volunteers hit the ground. They radioed news of their safe landing with cargo. Then they disappeared.
Later that summer, two more Ukrainian volunteers bade their comrades an emotional farewell. According to a CIA cable, “a round of drinks was served, toasts were made…hands were shaken, tears were shed.” Their plane departed at 6:55 p.m. on August 12. The pilot missed their drop zone in Ukraine, and they jumped twenty miles away. Neither was ever heard from again.
These flights were the centerpiece of a far-reaching operation in which the CIA sought to foment armed uprisings in Soviet-controlled territory. Between 1949 and 1952, the CIA dropped about eighty-five men, all equipped for guerrilla warfare, behind what was then called the Iron Curtain. Three-quarters were quickly captured or shot.
“You’ve got to have a few martyrs,” reasoned Allen Dulles, chief of covert operations for the CIA. “Some people have to get killed.”
Project Aerodynamic was a match made in covert-action heaven. Thousands of Ukrainian partisans had refused to lay down their arms after their Nazi allies surrendered on May 8, 1945. They wanted to keep fighting the Red Army— if they could find a new sponsor. At that same moment, the CIA was looking for a force that it could use to strike against the Soviet Union from within its own territory. Aerodynamic was the progeny of this union. It set off three-quarters of a century of American intervention in Ukraine.
Fear and uncertainty marked the first encounter between Americans and anti- Soviet Ukrainians. In the autumn of 1947, two years before the first CIA airdrop into Ukraine, officers from the Army Counter Intelligence Corps in occupied Germany learned that a band of armed Russians had appeared in the countryside near Munich. At first they thought this might be an advance guard preparing the ground for a Red Army invasion. A patrol was sent to investigate. Soldiers scoured the hills and meadows around the Bavarian village of Waldkirchen. Early on the morning of September 10, they heard voices. They closed in on a campfire around which men wearing military uniforms were singing in what sounded like Russian. After a moment of tension, the soldiers willingly surrendered their machine guns and hand grenades.
These thirty-five men, along with four other members of their band who were picked up nearby, were brought to an American base and debriefed for three weeks. It turned out that they were not Red Army soldiers, but Ukrainians who had consecrated their lives to fighting the Red Army. They belonged to a partisan force that was unknown to most outsiders: the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Their commanders had ordered them to walk westward, find Americans, and seek help for the partisan rebellion.
One of the partisans told an interrogator that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was “engaged in armed combat with Soviet troops in the Ukraine at present” and that more Ukrainians were “ready to revolt” if given support. An officer who helped supervise the interrogations cabled to Washington that the Ukrainians were offering services “which may be of interest to you and may tie into an idea which, I believe, is being worked on at home at the present time.”
“If, as I understand, there is some planning going on with regard to how such groups as referred to above might be best used in our interests,” he suggested, “it might be useful to follow up this matter.”
Americans had just begun fighting the Cold War. Their great handicap was that they knew almost nothing about what was happening inside the Soviet Union. Now they learned that Ukrainians were waging war against the Red Army. This was an intelligence bonanza that opened new landscapes of possibility.
Some of the CIA’s most impassioned Ukrainian agents had fought alongside the Nazis just a few years earlier. Among them were veterans of SS Einsatzgruppen — mobile death squads assigned to massacre Jews and other civilians. This history troubled some of their American handlers, but not enough to disrupt their partnership.
Across Europe, American intelligence officers scoured teeming displaced persons camps looking for Ukrainians who were willing to join a covert anti-Soviet war. Recruitment was easy. Hundreds of thousands of young men — not just Ukrainians but refugees from all over the continent — were huddled in the bleak purgatory of these camps. The best they might hope for was work clearing rubble or picking crops. When men introducing themselves as part of the “American Intelligence Service” offered them paying jobs with good living conditions, plus the prospect of returning to war against Bolshevism, many jumped to accept. Vetting was minimal, so recruits included more than a few who had worked with the Nazis as militia members, police officers, and executioners. One recruiting officer said his job was easy: “You’d go to a refugee camp and say, ‘Here, Joe, you want to join a special project?’ Most of these people were, like, the homeless.”
This recruitment laid the foundation for Project Aerodynamic. Over the following years, it would overlap with other CIA projects using various cryptonyms, among them Acrobat, Androgen, Antler, Cartel, Carthage, Crust, Outbound, PDDynamic (PD was code for the Soviet Union), Plumb, and Red Sox. The goal — using Ukraine as a platform for covert war against Moscow — never changed.
November 19, 2026 Posted by aletho | Book Review, Militarism, Timeless or most popular | CIA, NATO, Ukraine, United States | Comments Off on How CIA used Ukraine as a platform for covert war against Russia
Villains of Judea: David Wurmser
How a shadowy neoconservative strategist spent 30 years maneuvering Washington toward war with Iran

José Niño Unfiltered | November 17, 2026
As American forces clash with Iran in 2026, a decades-long campaign orchestrated from the shadows of Washington has finally reached its climax. Earlier this year, foreign policy strategist David Wurmser openly called for Washington to let Israel start a war of aggression against Tehran, portraying the conflict as a historic reckoning akin to the Soviet collapse. For avid critics of American foreign policy, the current war represents the ultimate triumph of a shadowy Jewish operative who spent over 30 years advancing Israeli strategic priorities inside the highest echelons of the United States government.
Born in Switzerland, David Wurmser earned three degrees from Johns Hopkins University, including a doctorate. He spent 11 years in Navy Reserve intelligence and reached the rank of lieutenant commander. During that service, the Defense Intelligence Agency mobilized him for its Iraq Intelligence Task Force in 1994, 1996 and 1998.
Yet his defining partnership was personal as much as institutional. His Israeli born wife, Meyrav Wurmser, wrote her doctoral dissertation on Revisionist Zionism. In 1998, she cofounded the Middle East Media Research Institute, known as MEMRI, with Yigal Carmon, a former colonel in the Israeli military. Carmon served in Israel Defense Forces intelligence from 1968 to 1988. He later advised prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Yitzhak Shamir on counterterrorism.
During the mid-1990s, Wurmser moved seamlessly between Washington institutions and Jerusalem policy circles. Wurmser worked as a project officer at the U.S. Institute of Peace from 1988 to 1994. He then served as director of institutional grants at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, known as WINEP, from 1994 to 1996. The Intercept described WINEP as an AIPAC spinoff.
In 1996, he became director of research in the strategy and politics program at the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, known as IASPS. The Intercept called him one of the main thinkers behind “A Clean Break,” a 1996 policy paper prepared for incoming Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The paper said Israel could weaken, contain and even roll back Syria, and that this effort “can focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq” as “an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right.” It also urged “striking Syrian military targets in Lebanon, and should that prove insufficient, striking at select targets in Syria proper.”
Months later, Wurmser developed this vision in a paper titled “Coping with Crumbling States.” “Whoever inherits Iraq dominates the entire Levant strategically,” he wrote in the 1996 IASPS paper. He then joined the American Enterprise Institute, where journalist Jim Lobe reported that Irving Moskowitz’s contributions funded his work. Wurmser thanked Moskowitz in the acknowledgments of his 1999 book, Tyranny’s Ally, for “generous support of AEI.” The book blamed the failure to remove Saddam on a “stubborn embrace” of covert coup plots and criticized how intelligence agencies managed the Iraq crisis. The Iraqi National Congress, Chalabi’s group, figures very prominently in its analysis.
The attacks of September 11 gave Wurmser an opening inside the Pentagon. Douglas Feith appointed Wurmser and veteran defense analyst Michael Maloof to a two man secret intelligence unit. The pair began work in October 2001 in a 15 by 15 foot space on the Pentagon’s third floor, and the unit had produced a slide presentation by November 2001.
Feith later said the team’s main conclusion was that groups and states were willing to cooperate across ideological lines. Wurmser’s own biography says he consulted for the Office of the Secretary of Defense until January 2002, months before the Office of Special Plans formed in October 2002.
The unit still sparked fierce controversy. Newsweek reported in August 2004 that ideas from the unit fed into a memo, which the 9/11 Commission said appears to have been written by Feith. The memo proposed attacks in South America or Southeast Asia as “a surprise to the terrorists.” In February 2007, the Pentagon Inspector General concluded that Feith’s policy office produced alternative intelligence assessments on Iraq and al Qaeda, some inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community. It called the actions “inappropriate” but not illegal or unauthorized. In June 2008, the Senate Intelligence Committee detailed what it called inappropriate intelligence activities by the same policy office, conducted without the knowledge of the Intelligence Community or the State Department.
Wurmser then served as a special assistant to John Bolton at the State Department, before joining Vice President Dick Cheney’s staff in mid September 2003. Jim Lobe wrote that Wurmser had long called for the United States and Israel to work together to roll back Syria’s Baathist government.
Shadows of espionage and leaks trailed his circle. The Washington Post reported in September 2004 that FBI counterintelligence investigators had asked current and former officials about Wurmser and other neoconservatives in a leak inquiry. The agents were investigating whether Pentagon officials leaked classified information to Iraqi politician Ahmad Chalabi and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. In October 2005, Raw Story quoted an anonymous source close to the Plame investigation saying Libby “used David Wurmser” to discredit Joseph Wilson.
By mid-2007, Wurmser’s views on Iran had drawn public scrutiny. IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei warned, “You do not want to give additional argument to new crazies who say, ‘let’s go and bomb Iran.’” The New York Times reported that Cheney’s staff confirmed the broad outlines of a Steven Clemons report, and that some hawkish statements to outsiders came from Wurmser. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the United States was not preparing for war against Iran and that Cheney supported that policy.
In September 2007, Newsweek reported, citing two knowledgeable sources, that Wurmser told a small group a few months before he quit that Cheney had mulled pushing for limited Israeli missile strikes on the Natanz nuclear site. The strikes were meant to provoke Tehran into lashing out. AFP summarized the report as saying Cheney considered provoking an exchange of strikes between Iran and Israel to give the United States a pretext to attack Iran. Wurmser denied the story.
Cheney’s office said Wurmser left in 2007 to “spend more time with his family.” He then launched his consultancy, Delphi Global Analysis. In an October 2007 interview with The Telegraph, Wurmser said America should seize every opportunity to force regime change in Syria and Iran. He said that should include “the willingness to escalate as far as we need to go to topple the regime if necessary.” He also said, “We need to do everything possible to destabilise the Syrian regime.” In April 2008, Wurmser broke with the Bush administration’s policy regarding Gaza. David Rose’s Vanity Fair article quoted him accusing the Bush administration of “engaging in a dirty war in an effort to provide a corrupt dictatorship [led by Abbas] with victory.”
His campaign never paused. In March 2017, Wurmser emailed an article attacking Iran deal negotiator Sahar Nowrouzzadeh to former Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich, writing, “I think a cleaning is in order here.” Gingrich forwarded the message to an aide to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. Politico had published the emails in March 2018, and The New Yorker later reported them in a May 2018 article by Evan Osnos.
From December 2018 until September 2019, Wurmser again served in the Trump White House, where John Bolton was national security adviser. Bloomberg columnist Eli Lake obtained a series of unclassified memos Wurmser sent Bolton in May and June 2019. Wurmser wrote that “unexpected, rule-changing actions taken against Iran” would “confuse the regime.” Lake called the approach “regime disruption.” In a June 22 memo, Wurmser urged a strike on “someone like Soleimani or his top deputies.” Bolton had already asked the Pentagon and intelligence community in May for military options against Iran, including a strike on Soleimani, which the United States ultimately carried out on January 3, 2020.
Wurmser now writes as a senior analyst at the Center for Security Policy, known as CSP, and as a fellow at the Misgav Institute. He is also a senior fellow at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, known as JCFA.
Critics have long accused Wurmser and his allies of putting Israel’s interests ahead of America’s. Pat Buchanan listed Wurmser among neoconservative “agents of influence” in a June 2003 American Conservative column titled “Is the Neoconservative Moment Over?”. Buchanan’s March 2003 column “Whose War?” cited a Washington Post report naming Wurmser as part of a pro-Israel network inside the administration. Democratic Senator Fritz Hollings named Wurmser in a June 2004 Senate statement about the Clean Break task force. In July 2004, Hollings wrote that Bush changed Mideast policy by “invading Iraq to secure Israel by democratizing the Mideast.”
Iran is not the same country Wurmser began writing about in the 1990s. It has fought a prolonged war, absorbed sanctions, weathered the loss of senior commanders, and continued to build out the network that now defines the region’s balance of power. The civilizational confidence Tehran displays today is a direct response to two decades of pressure that failed to produce capitulation. Wurmser’s project assumed an enemy that would fold. Instead the enemy has adapted and is giving the Judeo-American axis a run for their money.
Make no mistake about it, Iran’s resilience is keeping David Wurmser and his fellow travelers wide awake at night.
November 18, 2026 Posted by aletho | Timeless or most popular, Wars for Israel | Iran, Iraq, Israel, Middle East, Syria, United States, Zionism | Comments Off on Villains of Judea: David Wurmser
The power of inflicting oblivion
By Stephen Karganovic | Strategic Culture Foundation | November 16, 2026
There is a prescient passage in Orwell’s 1984 (one of many such, actually) where interrogator O’Brian explains to Winston why resistance is futile. He points out correctly that the Party controls all channels of communication (what today we would call the media) so that any expectation of moral satisfaction that Winston might harbour, of being canonised as a martyr, is therefore pointless.
The interrogator makes a serious point that perhaps we should all ponder. It is not just literary hyperbole. The woke threat of “cancellation” that each of us potentially faces today is a chilling reminder of Orwell’s amazing clairvoyance.
All of which bring us to some disturbing examples of the reality in which we live, at least those of us with the misfortune of living in that part of the world which vociferously boasts of its commitment to “rules” and “values.”
Who still remembers Călin Georgescu? Who still recalls that this man is the President presumptive of Romania, and that for that he has been relentlessly hounded and imprisoned by the very champions of those globally preached rules and values?
Georgescu has been successfully plunged into obscurity but it must be made clear that he is no Juan Guaidó. He is not a self-declared imposter of the ilk of Guaidó, without a constituency, whose fifteen-minute claim to fame was entirely by the grace and at the pleasure of foreign political cartels which Guaidó served loyally as a tool in their attempt to oust a legally and popularly elected uncooperative leader.
Călin Georgescu loyally served his own nation. He was committed to the cynically deceived people of Romania, who rewarded him with their trust and their votes in what they falsely expected was going to be a free and fair presidential election, conducted in accordance with “European standards,” whatever those naïve folk thought that meant, in which their votes counted and their preference carried weight.
We drew attention to the Georgescu story when it was breaking in early 2025, in what now appears to be a distant past. Since then, the winner in Romania’s Presidential election was subjected to a series of crude political manoeuvres which robbed him of his mandate, mired him in fabricated criminal proceeding apparently without any grounding in Romanian law just for the audacity of protesting the electoral disqualification, exposed his wife and children to endless intimidation and humiliation, and kept him in prison for months on spurious charges.
Călin Georgescu, whose name should be on the lips of everyone who treasures liberty and the genuine rule of law (as opposed to its arbitrary and tyrannical falsification, the “rules based order”) has effectively become a non-issue and a non-person, notwithstanding that the shameless abuse meted out to him cries to high heaven and should have shaken to the very foundations the mendacious system whose corrupt institutions failed this gallant Romanian patriot so unforgivably.
Just as the interrogator had put it to Winston, Călin Georgescu has been cancelled, but the monstrous system which thought it had sent him to oblivion failed to take into account his courageous and eloquent wife, Cristela, who is proving even more intractable. In a moving exposition of her husband’s case on a widely watched and influential podcast that is well worth watching, Mrs. Georgescu pulls no punches.
“We are not living in a democracy in Romania anymore,” she declares perhaps at some peril to herself. “It’s a tyranny growing stronger every day.”
“And why do I claim that it’s worse today?” she goes on to ask rhetorically. “The tyranny, the dictatorship today, it’s worse than it used to be. Before 1989, we knew it was a dictatorship. You knew you were not allowed to talk against it. You were in trouble if you would dare. And you knew the consequences.
“But today, we are told: ‘you’re free, present your case.’ And actually under this mask, a very severe persecution is happening. And not only to us. I’m not only his voice today, I’m the voice of millions of people who support him.”
Regrettably, there are other instances of the sort of morally annihilating repression exemplified by Călin Georgescu’s attempted excursion into his EU native country’s democratic politics. Another courageous man and outstanding public servant, Dr. Reiner Fuellmich, is presently rotting in a German dungeon on trumped up charges for using the tools of his profession to expose the colossal fraud and lethal danger posed by the Covid “vaccines” put out by greedy Western pharmaceutical conglomerates some, like Pfizer, with thick criminal dossiers and copious amounts of fines paid out to victims for past and present harm caused to millions afflicted by their hastily assembled and poorly tested products.
We have already written about the attempted discreditation and ultimate incarceration of this German-American trial lawyer of impeccable integrity (here and here). Quixotic naive, who thought that the legal system, which turned out to be as corrupt as everything else contaminated by the globalist pestilence, could where power and money were at stake be counted on to deliver and enforce a just verdict in the public interest. For that misplaced faith, Dr. Fuellmich is now rotting in a mouldy and damp prison cell in Lingen, Federal Republic of Germany, well into the third year of his incarceration as a prisoner of conscience in an allegedly denazified Germany who Amnesty International, which should have put him up as its poster boy, curiously seems not even to have heard of.
Nor may we overlook (much less forget) the retired Swiss colonel Jacques Baud, a man of intellect and honour whose distressing predicament is best encapsulated in the phrase made even more apposite when rendered in the harsh tones of one of his country’s official languages: bestraft ohne Gericht, or colloquially, punished without trial.
Readers might recall Jacques Baud’s frequent media appearances and expert commentary on the war in Ukraine and critical assessments of NATO’s eastward expansion. These interventions have now become notably rare and there is a troubling explanation for that. Col. Baud, although a Swiss citizen, whilst visiting in Brussels was in effect banned (the former apartheid South African practice fits his present circumstances perfectly) by European Union authorities, having been placed under EU sanctions. The EU version of South African apartheid sanctions, as applied to Col. Baud for publicly reiterated wrongthink concerning Ukraine and NATO, consists of a travel ban and asset freeze. The Swiss colonel, seemingly in perpetuity or until he repents and begs for forgiveness, is now stuck in Brussels, Belgium, where he was located when notice of EU sanctions was served on him. Since the entire space between the city of Brussels and the Swiss border obviously is comprised of EU territory within which, under the terms of the sanctions, he is banned from travelling, he remains involuntarily immobile under house arrest in Brussels. Note should be taken that no trial on the merits of Jacques Baud’s free speech case has been held and that consequently it is not a court that adjudicated these devastating personal sanctions. They were imposed administratively by bureaucrats of the European Commission. The Swiss Foreign Office has expanded no visible efforts toward extracting its entrapped citizen and so far no legal remedy has been thought of by the colonel’s legal team in Brussels to undo the extreme and arbitrary strictures placed upon their client’s personal liberty and public visibility by the Commission’s extra judicial decree.
The gentle reader is encouraged to ponder the fates of these three men against the backdrop of Orwell’s projections into the future which appear, by any reasonable standard, to describe flawlessly the key elements of the present, with which they are merging seamlessly. The unnoticed moral destruction and public erasure of bothersome individuals are no longer operations largely confined to the world of literary fiction. The next victim could be anyone.
Non-lethal oblivion is now a realistic and increasingly effective option for dealing with public figures whose existence and thinking are deemed annoying. Methodologies for its successful implementation are diverse and will become still more ingenious as inexorably the mass rejection of received narratives spreads.
November 16, 2026 Posted by aletho | Civil Liberties, Full Spectrum Dominance, Timeless or most popular | European Union, Germany, Human rights, Romania | Comments Off on The power of inflicting oblivion
The 10 Disease Renamings That Rescued the Vaccine
An Essay on the Administrative Shifts That Turned Failure Into Success
Lies are Unbekoming | November 11, 2026
In the decade after Jonas Salk’s inactivated polio vaccine was released in April 1955, the diagnostic threshold for declaring a polio epidemic was raised from 20 cases per 100,000 population to 35 per 100,000. A region now needed almost twice the historical case rate to register an outbreak at all. In the same period, the paralysis duration required for a diagnosis of paralytic poliomyelitis was extended from 24 hours to residual paralysis at 60 days, a criterion documented in the CDC’s own 1963 Poliomyelitis Surveillance Reports. A child paralyzed for forty days was, by administrative definition, no longer a polio case.
The third shift was the broadest. Cases that would previously have been classified as polio were redistributed across a growing list of adjacent neurological categories: aseptic meningitis, viral meningitis, enterovirus infection, coxsackievirus infection, transverse myelitis, and (later, in the era of oral vaccine campaigns in the global south) non-polio acute flaccid paralysis. The clinical picture in each category was, by the surveillance literature’s own description, indistinguishable from what had previously been called polio. Only the names changed. The vaccine appeared to work.¹
Half a century later, India performed the same label-dispersal maneuver in the modern context. The country had passed one year without a reported wild poliovirus case by 2012 and was declared “polio-free,” with formal WHO certification following in 2014. In the same window, cases of “non-polio acute flaccid paralysis” (NPAFP) surged in the states where oral polio vaccine coverage was highest. Writing in the Indian Journal of Medical Ethics in 2012, Dr. Neetu Vashisht and Dr. Jacob Puliyel documented an extra 47,500 cases of NPAFP in 2011 alone, “clinically indistinguishable from polio paralysis but twice as deadly,” with the incidence of NPAFP in each region directly proportional to doses of oral polio vaccine received.² A 2018 follow-up by Puliyel and colleagues in the International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health traced the full arc: Indian NPAFP cases rose from 7,260 in 2000 to 59,462 in 2012 as pulse polio rounds intensified, and began to decline from 2012 as the number of rounds was reduced.³ The paralysis continued to occur and the children continued to die; the name was different, so the vaccine’s record remained intact.
Three shifts, one disease, spanning seven decades. Each permitted an injectable product to be reported as effective when its measurable biological outcome either stayed flat or worsened. What follows is a catalog of seven more. Each turned on a change in classification rather than a change in disease. The pattern spans more than a thousand years and arrives at its deepest expression in the WHO’s own official history of smallpox eradication.
The terrain-paradigm reading of what was actually happening alongside the US polio renaming is worth stating at the outset, because it recurs across the catalog. DDT was introduced into American agricultural and household use in 1943 as a neurotoxic chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticide. By 1945 it was already known to be stored in body fat and to appear in human and bovine milk. It was sprayed directly on children at swimming pools, impregnated into wallpaper in children’s bedrooms, and fogged through American suburbs by Shell oil trucks. Dairy cows were washed with it, and the pesticide passed through to the milk supply. In the UK town of Broadstairs in 1943, a polio outbreak was traced to a local dairy where cows had been washed down with DDT.
Between 1945 and 1952, as DDT application peaked across the United States, polio cases rose from roughly 25,000 to over 280,000, a more than tenfold increase in seven years. When DDT use declined around 1951-52 because of livestock deaths and farmer complaints, polio cases fell by two-thirds before Jonas Salk’s vaccine was introduced in 1955.
Dr. Morton Biskind, a Connecticut physician, published repeatedly from 1949 onward in peer-reviewed journals (including the American Journal of Digestive Diseases and the American Journal of Psychotherapy) documenting that his polio patients recovered when DDT exposure was removed, and that symptoms reappeared in the same patients each time on re-exposure. In 1950 he testified before Congress that pesticides, not a virus, were the major cause of polio epidemics. Ralph Scobey, MD, documented that children with polio symptoms kept in general wards never transmitted the illness to other patients, and that the clinical presentation matched known patterns of pesticide and heavy-metal poisoning.⁴
The clinical pictures Biskind and Scobey documented as pesticide poisoning (aseptic inflammation of neural tissue, flaccid paralysis of enteroviral appearance, and the acute paralytic events with variable recovery that Scobey described) correspond directly to the categories that absorbed the dispersed polio cases after 1955. Aseptic meningitis, enterovirus infection, coxsackievirus infection, and transverse myelitis each describe clinical patterns the pesticide-exposure literature had already documented without reference to any infectious agent. The dispersal was clinically available because there was no infectious agent to begin with. The symptoms could be redistributed freely across adjacent neurological labels without producing any clinical contradiction.
The Rockefeller Institute had succeeded in 1911 in having poliomyelitis classified in US Public Health Law as a reportable contagious viral disease, a classification that, as Scobey testified before Congress in 1952, “imposes only this type of investigation” and foreclosed toxicological inquiry at the legal level before any investigator could begin.
The declining polio curve the vaccine would soon claim credit for was already in progress; the three-shift renaming of the remaining cases finished the appearance. The pattern recurs across the ten shifts. The product fails on its original terms, the terms are moved, and the record is preserved.
1. AIDS as Twenty-Nine Rebranded Diseases (United States, Early 1980s)
In the early 1980s, a cluster of illnesses in young men in Los Angeles and New York was consolidated under a new name. Nancy Turner Banks, a Harvard Medical School graduate who practiced for over thirty years, described AIDS as “a collection of twenty-nine old diseases, clustered together, re-branded, and given a new scary label.”⁵ Peter Duesberg, elected to the National Academy of Sciences for his work on retroviruses, demonstrated the mechanism directly: tuberculosis without a positive HIV test was diagnosed as tuberculosis, treated with antibiotics, and expected to resolve. Tuberculosis with a positive HIV test was diagnosed as AIDS, treated with AZT (originally developed as a chemotherapy agent and shelved after it failed as a cancer treatment), and expected to kill the patient.⁶ The clinical picture, from the organism identified in the lungs to the patient’s presentation, was the same. The name decided the treatment, and the treatment decided the outcome.
The architecture transferred to twenty-nine conditions. Pneumonia in a person who tested negative was pneumonia. The same pneumonia in a person who tested positive was AIDS-defining pneumonia. Kaposi’s sarcoma, previously a rare condition in elderly men of Mediterranean descent, was reclassified as an AIDS-defining illness when it appeared in young homosexual men whose use of amyl nitrite “poppers” (then recognized in dermatology literature to produce vascular skin lesions) was redescribed as incidental. The rebranding generated a new patient category and a new treatment protocol. The historical conditions, with their established causes and effective treatments, were absorbed into a category whose cause was declared viral and whose treatment was declared cytotoxic. The old causes were no longer investigated. The new category required the new drugs.
AZT itself is the sharpest edge of the mechanism. The drug had been developed in the 1960s as a chemotherapy agent, found ineffective against the cancers it was designed for, and shelved. When it was revived for AIDS at doses of 1,500 mg per day (later reduced as the deaths mounted), it stopped cell division in all dividing cells, not only in the cells in which a putative retrovirus was alleged to replicate. The symptoms attributed to late-stage AIDS (wasting, anemia, collapse of what the establishment calls immune function) were also the known side effects of AZT. The renaming permitted a cell-killing drug to be prescribed to young men identified as HIV-positive, including asymptomatic men, and permitted the resulting deaths to be classified as deaths from AIDS rather than deaths from AZT. The drug sold and the category expanded; the cause was never seriously re-examined because the category was already named.
2. Atypical Measles (United States, 1960s to Present)
Between 1963 and 1967, approximately 18.9 million doses of a killed measles vaccine (inactivated with formaldehyde) were administered to American children. Within two years, physicians began reporting that children who had received the killed vaccine developed a severe, atypical presentation when subsequently exposed to measles. The illness included high fevers, atypical rashes, pneumonia, and liver involvement. The condition was named “atypical measles syndrome.”⁷ The 1970 Canadian Medical Association Journal and later the British Medical Journal published case series. A 2003 Nature Medicine paper reported, in primates, that the killed vaccine produced what the authors described as “nonprotective, complement-fixing antibodies with low avidity,” which the authors interpreted as driving immune complex deposition on subsequent exposure.⁸
The CDC’s current public position: anyone vaccinated between 1963 and 1967 with the killed version should be revaccinated. The condition remains in the medical literature today, still bearing its name. What the naming accomplished was to assign the illness to a new category rather than to the vaccine that produced it. “Atypical measles” is not described in the official literature as a failure of the measles vaccine; it is described as its own distinct syndrome. The renaming severed the direct line from product to injury.
3. SIDS Dispersed into SUID (United States, 2009 to 2014)
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome had become a problem for the vaccine schedule by the early 2000s. The CDC’s own documentation acknowledged that “babies receive many vaccines when they are between 2 to 4 months old. This age range is also the peak age for sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS).”⁹ The temporal association was documented in reports to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), in autopsy case series, and in the work of Viera Scheibner and others. The combined diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus shots (DPT, later DTaP) were implicated in a substantial proportion of SIDS cases occurring within the close post-administration window.
Beginning around 2009, the CDC introduced a broader umbrella classification: Sudden Unexpected Infant Death (SUID). The Shapiro-Mendoza classification system, formally published in Pediatrics in 2014, split what had previously been counted as SIDS into multiple sub-categories: SIDS proper, accidental suffocation and strangulation in bed, “ill-defined and unknown cause,” and “undetermined.” A CDC presentation described the result candidly: the “decline in SIDS is offset by increasing rates of: Cause unknown/unspecified, Other SUID (suffocation, wedging, overlaying, poisoning).”¹⁰ A Delaware public health document stated the mechanism in plainer language: “as the definition of SIDS has become narrower and more precise, more infant deaths are being classified as SUID cases rather than SIDS cases.”¹¹
The total number of sudden, unexplained infant deaths did not fall. The SIDS signal, which had become visibly correlated with the vaccine schedule, was dispersed across four less recognizable categories. The product that produced the pattern retained its clean record. The grieving parents went into four columns instead of one.
4. Guillain-Barré Syndrome as “Background Rate” (United States, 1976 and After)
The 1976 swine flu vaccination campaign produced an episode the CDC could not immediately absorb. Within weeks of the mass vaccination drive, hundreds of cases of Guillain-Barré syndrome (an acute ascending paralysis presenting with respiratory involvement) appeared in vaccinated adults. By late December 1976, 172 Guillain-Barré cases had been reported across twenty-four states, with 99 of them in people recently vaccinated. The CDC Director halted the campaign. Independent reviews later confirmed that the vaccinated were approximately four times more likely to develop the condition than the unvaccinated, with roughly one additional case per 100,000 people vaccinated.¹²
The subsequent decades produced a different approach to the same phenomenon. The CDC established a “background rate” of 80 to 160 Guillain-Barré cases per week in the United States, “regardless of vaccination.” The regulatory frame became: cases following vaccination are compared against this background rate and classified as above it or within it. The language of coincidence replaced the language of causation. When Guillain-Barré appears in a flu vaccine recipient today, the question posed is not “did the injection trigger this?” but “does this case exceed the expected background?”¹³
The injection remained the same. The statistical architecture around it changed. The renaming here is subtler than the others in this catalog: not a new category, but a reframing of the injury as noise.
5. Whooping Cough Rebranded as the “100-Day Cough” (United Kingdom, 2024)
Whooping cough was supposed to have been eliminated by the pertussis vaccine. The 2024 UK figures made the failure impossible to ignore. UKHSA data confirmed 2,793 cases of pertussis across England in Q1 2024 alone, compared with 858 cases for the whole of 2023, a greater-than-threefold rise in a single quarter against a full prior year. Five infant deaths were reported in Q1 2024. Most adult cases occurred in a population with near-universal pertussis vaccination coverage. Mainstream UK media coverage, drawing on an older descriptor for the illness, began referring to the condition as the “100-day cough.” The term, used in headline after headline through 2024, began replacing “whooping cough” in much public discussion.¹⁴
The move here is softer than the others. “100-day cough” is not a new diagnostic category; it is an older vernacular descriptor revived in a particular rhetorical moment. What the revival accomplished was to shift the public frame from a disease that was supposed to have been eradicated (whooping cough) to a benign-sounding duration descriptor (a cough that lasts 100 days). The illness is still what the establishment calls pertussis. The vaccine still failed in the vaccinated population. The name shift absorbed some of the attention a 3,000-case cluster in a vaccinated population would otherwise have drawn. This is the weakest documented item in the catalog, included because the pattern across the other nine shifts permits it to be read for what it is: the softer end of the same spectrum.
6. George Bernard Shaw at the London Health Committee (circa 1900)
The mechanism is not modern. George Bernard Shaw, who served on a London Borough Council Health Committee during a smallpox event at the turn of the twentieth century, described what he found: “I learned how the credit of vaccination is kept up statistically by diagnosing all the re-vaccinated cases of smallpox as pustular eczema, varioloid or what not, except smallpox.”¹⁵
Eleanor McBean, documenting the same period in The Poisoned Needle (1957), recorded corroborating practice. Hospital records were “worked on” before release. Mild smallpox in the vaccinated was recorded as chickenpox or measles. Serious smallpox in the vaccinated was recorded as syphilis or scrofula (an archaic term for tuberculosis of the lymph nodes). In the Salk polio trials of the 1950s, no case was counted as “immunized” unless it had received two shots; children developing polio after the first shot were automatically placed in the “uninoculated” class, invalidating any conclusion drawn from the trial figures.¹⁶ The administrative mechanism is at least one hundred and twenty years old, and its continuity is the significant observation. The particular shift that keeps the record clean varies with era and jurisdiction. The shift itself does not vary.
7. Smallpox and the Thousand-Year Fragmentation
The oldest instance of the mechanism in this catalog ran for a thousand years and ended in the WHO’s own official history of its own eradication program. What the term “smallpox” designated varied by region, by century, and by the clinician applying it. A 1979 article in Medical History titled “Smallpox and the Evolution of Ideas on Acute Viral Infections” states that the identification of the illness from extant descriptions before AD 900 cannot be made with any degree of certainty, and that for several hundred years after the Latin terms variola and morbilli came into use, the illnesses they referred to could not be clearly distinguished on the basis of the available clinical descriptions.¹⁷ The same point appears elsewhere in the clinical literature: for centuries scarlet fever, rubella, measles, and what medicine would later call smallpox were considered a single category of febrile illness with rash.
The first formal attempt to split chickenpox off from smallpox as a distinct category was published by the English physician William Heberden in his paper “On the Chicken-pox,” read before the Royal College of Physicians on August 11, 1767 and printed in Volume 1 of the College’s Medical Transactions the following year. Heberden acknowledged in his own report that the pustules were the same size, that they contained a similar yellowish fluid, and that the preceding symptoms (chills, fatigue, cough, insomnia, migratory pains, loss of appetite, and fever) were shared. His primary evidence for separation was a difference in the timing of crust formation on the pustules. He stated plainly that his reason for proposing the split was “the small-pox, with which it may otherwise be confounded, and so deceive the persons, who may have had it.” The deception he feared was that a previous bout of what he was now calling chickenpox would be assumed to protect against smallpox, and smallpox inoculation would be refused as a result. The separation was proposed in defence of the inoculation practice.¹⁸
The proposal was not accepted for over a century. When it was eventually adopted in the early 1900s, the British Medical Journal carried extended correspondence on the difficulty of applying it. A letter published in the issue of October 27, 1923, from a physician working in Sudan, described epidemics that moved through three stages in the same population: indistinguishable from chickenpox in its early form, through alastrim (variola minor), and finally typical smallpox. Another physician in the same correspondence noted that “many so-called distinguishing characteristics are quoted in textbooks, but all of them may fail and leave one in perplexity.” The same period produced the diagnostic exchange at Johns Hopkins University in which several senior physicians diagnosed a patient as having a severe case of chickenpox, and William Osler, arriving on the ward, overruled them with “My God, Futcher, don’t you know smallpox when you see it?”¹⁹
The pattern of splitting off new labels continued through the twentieth century. The WHO launched its intensified global eradication campaign in 1967. Nine years earlier, in 1958, a pox-like illness had been observed in two shipments of cynomolgus monkeys arriving at the State Serum Institute in Copenhagen, Denmark; the monkeys had been imported from Singapore for use in polio vaccine research. The entity isolated from the lesions was named monkeypox virus. In August 1970, in the village of Bukenda in the Equatorial region of what was then Zaire, a case of smallpox-like illness in a child was investigated as a suspected smallpox outbreak nine months after smallpox had been declared eliminated from that country. When no variola virus could be recovered, the illness was reclassified as the first human case of monkeypox.²⁰ The WHO’s own 1988 publication acknowledges that monkeypox in humans is clinically indistinguishable from smallpox, with the primary distinguishing sign being enlarged lymph nodes, a feature that the same literature acknowledges is inconsistently present in monkeypox, occasionally present in smallpox, and also present in chickenpox. The distinguishing feature was not a distinguishing feature. The new label was simply a new label.
The 1976 India post-eradication surveillance is the mechanism’s clearest documented moment. A country-wide system for the surveillance of fever with rash was introduced across India in January 1976. During that year alone, 1,951,487 cases of fever with rash were entered in the registers, and 519,651 of the localities in which the cases occurred were visited by senior health workers. None of the cases was found to be smallpox. The WHO’s own 1988 publication documents the classification of what the surveillance did find: 862,155 were classified as chickenpox, 519,597 as measles, 146,855 as “other skin diseases,” and the remaining 422,880 as “miscellaneous.” Of the 102 cases investigated in 1976 by the senior epidemiologists of the smallpox eradication program as clinically suspected smallpox, 63 percent were classified as chickenpox and none as smallpox.²¹
The pattern was not unique to India. In Indonesia’s precertification surveillance, of 650 suspected smallpox cases investigated during 1970-1972, 629 (96.8 percent) were classified as chickenpox and none as smallpox. In the Afghanistan 1976 hospital searches, 223 suspected cases were investigated; 55 percent were classified as measles, 28 percent as chickenpox, and 17 percent as “a variety of skin diseases.” In Pakistan, 49,874 cases of fever with rash were detected and investigated between October 1974 and November 1976; 27,703 were classified as chickenpox. In Western Africa, 157 laboratory specimens from suspected cases were sent to the WHO collaborating centre in Atlanta between January 1972 and April 1976; none yielded variola virus, while 41 were found to contain herpesvirus particles. The same publication notes that the laboratory test used (virus isolation on the chorioallantoic membrane) did not grow chickenpox virus at all, so “hundreds of specimens from chickenpox viruses might be examined with consistently negative results.”²²
During the eradication program, ambiguous cases had been counted as smallpox. After the formal declaration of eradication in 1980, the same clinical presentations, in the same populations, were counted as chickenpox, measles, monkeypox, or “other skin diseases.” The institution’s own eight-hundred-page official history documents each step of the reclassification. The curious skeptic can download the publication from the WHO archive and read the pages.
The Pattern
The shift occurs after a product is introduced, or in the course of defending one. The product is almost always a vaccine. In the AIDS case it is a diagnostic test paired with a drug protocol. In the smallpox case it is the vaccine industry’s founding product, and the shift runs for a thousand years. The shift permits the product to be reported as effective when the measurable biological outcome either stays flat or worsens.
The structural prevention was described by Ralph Scobey, MD, in testimony to the United States House of Representatives in 1952. “For almost half a century,” he told Congress, “poliomyelitis investigations have been directed towards a supposed exogenous virus. The manner in which the Public Health Law is now stated imposes only this type of investigation. No intensive studies have been made to determine whether or not the so-called virus of poliomyelitis simply results from an exogenous factor, for example, a food poison.”²³ The law imposed the name. The name imposed the investigation. The investigation confirmed the name.
What the ten renamings reveal is the character of medical categories themselves. They are decisions made by institutions whose solvency depends on the outcome of the decision. The International Classification of Diseases, which the WHO describes as the body that “defines the universe of diseases,” expanded from roughly 13,000 codes in ICD-9 to approximately 70,000 codes in ICD-10. Human biology did not multiply fivefold. Billing granularity did. Each new code is a new product line. Each renamed condition is a maneuver on an existing line.
The financial architecture explains the direction of travel. A diagnosis that falls into a vaccine’s injury column creates liability. A diagnosis that falls into a different column generates revenue (a new ICD code, a new specialist referral, a new drug protocol, a new monitoring regimen). The administrative incentive runs in one direction only. A country has no office whose job is to re-examine old diagnoses and ask whether the renaming was wrong. It has many offices whose job is to add new codes and to classify ambiguous cases into them. Over decades, the gradient produces exactly what the catalog documents: a vaccinated population with the same injuries, differently labeled, absorbed quietly into categories that no longer point back at the product.
Specific beneficiaries can be named for each shift. The polio reclassification protected the pesticide industry (DDT was then manufactured by Monsanto, Ciba, and other chemical firms, and the broader organochlorine and organophosphate markets were implicated by Biskind’s and Scobey’s testimony) and secured the Rockefeller Institute’s control of the research field through its decades-long monopoly on virus-focused funding. The AIDS reclassification generated AZT’s revenue stream for Burroughs Wellcome (later Glaxo, now GSK), expanded the National Cancer Institute’s retrovirus research programs, and preserved the broader germ-theory framework for infectious disease classification. The atypical measles name protected Pfizer, which manufactured the “Pfizer-Vax Measles-K” killed vaccine implicated in the condition. The SIDS-to-SUID dispersal protected the childhood vaccine schedule as a whole, benefiting Merck, Sanofi, GSK, and Pfizer across their pediatric product lines. The GBS background-rate reframing protects every seasonal flu vaccine manufacturer against the signal that stopped the 1976 campaign. The pertussis 100-day cough rebrand protects GSK and Sanofi, the two companies that currently manufacture pertussis vaccines. The smallpox fragmentation across a thousand years protected the vaccine industry’s founding product, legitimized the WHO’s claim to eradication authority (a claim that funded the subsequent global vaccination infrastructure), and created the modern markets held by the manufacturers of chickenpox vaccines (Merck’s Varivax, licensed by the FDA in March 1995; GSK’s Varilrix), monkeypox vaccines (Bavarian Nordic’s Jynneos), and the measles-component vaccines whose markets were created by the splitting-off of measles as a distinct entity (Merck, GSK, and Sanofi). The autism spectrum expansion protects the entire childhood vaccine schedule and simultaneously generates revenue for genetic testing firms built around “genetic predisposition” as the declared cause of a condition whose rise has correlated instead with the expansion of the schedule itself.
A defender of the schedule might respond that the ten shifts above are examples of scientific refinement over time, that diagnostic categories improve as understanding grows, and that any reclassification system will produce some apparent movement in reported case counts. The claim is testable. Genuine diagnostic refinement would run in both directions. Some conditions would be newly recognized as vaccine-related; others previously thought vaccine-related would be reclassified as independent. A random-walk refinement process would produce roughly symmetric movement. The ten shifts documented here are not symmetric. Every single one runs in the same direction: toward removing a vaccine-adjacent injury signal from the column that would record it as such. In a century of diagnostic revision, no example appears of a shift that moved a condition into the vaccine-injury column. The asymmetry is the finding.
The restructured catalog makes a second pattern visible. The opening and closing items are the same maneuver executed at two radically different timescales. Polio’s label-dispersal across aseptic meningitis, viral meningitis, enterovirus infection, coxsackievirus infection, transverse myelitis, and non-polio acute flaccid paralysis unfolded across seven decades. Smallpox’s fragmentation across chickenpox, measles, scarlet fever, alastrim, varioloid, pustular eczema, monkeypox, and “other skin diseases” unfolded across a thousand years. Both began with a single diagnostic category that threatened an existing or forthcoming vaccination program. Both ended with that category broken into a dozen adjacent labels. Both culminated in formal institutional declarations of eradication or elimination. A pattern that appears once can be coincidence. A pattern that appears twice, separated by a century and executed on different continents by different institutions, is a mechanism.
A related mechanism, still unfolding, operates on the autism spectrum. The DSM has serially expanded the autism criteria across its editions: DSM-III in 1980 introduced “Infantile Autism” as a narrow category; DSM-III-R in 1987 broadened it; DSM-IV in 1994 added Asperger’s and PDD-NOS; DSM-5 in 2013 consolidated the spectrum. CDC-reported autism prevalence rose from roughly 1 in 150 children in 2000 to 1 in 36 by 2020. The expansion mechanism differs from the renamings above in form (an existing diagnosis is widened rather than substituted) but produces the same effect: a growing population of children with developmental signals whose causes, under earlier criteria, might have been investigated specifically. Within the expanded category, cause is declared largely genetic, and investigation of environmental and iatrogenic factors is foreclosed before it begins.
The mechanism is not only historical. It is actively operating today. Three contemporary movements are worth watching, each tracking directly onto one of the templates documented above.
The first is Sudden Adult Death Syndrome (SADS). The term dates to the 1990s as a narrow cardiology category for unexplained sudden deaths with normal postmortem findings. From 2022 onward, SADS has been pushed into public health prominence and formally registered. Melbourne’s Baker Heart and Diabetes Institute established Australia’s first national SADS registry in 2022, media coverage of sudden deaths in young, previously healthy adults has surged in parallel with the mRNA injection rollout, and the term now covers a visibly rising number of cases that would once have warranted individual investigation.²⁴ The classification is described in the clinical literature as “mechanistically neutral,” which is to say that it will not point back at any intervention. The structural function matches the SIDS-to-SUID move exactly: a visible correlation between an injection schedule and sudden deaths is absorbed into a named category whose cause is declared genetic, idiopathic, or unknown.
The second is myocarditis following mRNA injection. The CDC’s own VAERS received 1,626 reports meeting the myocarditis case definition after mRNA-based injection between December 2020 and August 2021, concentrated in males aged 18 to 24 at rates of 52.4 to 56.3 cases per million doses.²⁵ The regulatory response has borrowed directly from the 1976 Guillain-Barré playbook: cases following injection are compared against “expected baseline rates” and declared statistically expected or declared “likely associated” at rates mild enough to permit continued recommendation. The language of coincidence replaces the language of causation. The injection remains the same; the statistical architecture around it does the work the renaming did in the ten historical cases.
The third is Post-Treatment Lyme Disease Syndrome (PTLDS), introduced by the Infectious Diseases Society of America in 2006 as a diagnostic category for persistent symptoms following antibiotic treatment of Lyme disease. The CDC adopted the terminology and formally discourages the use of “chronic Lyme disease.”²⁶ The function is to absorb ongoing symptoms into a mechanistically-neutral category that does not point back at either the organism’s persistence or the inadequacy of the treatment protocol. The template is the same template used in the ten historical shifts, deployed in the present.
Vaccine efficacy, measured biologically, has rarely survived serious scrutiny. Measured administratively, it has survived everything.
The ten renamings in this catalog are the mechanism by which the administrative measure is kept intact. When a product fails on the terms by which failure was originally defined, the terms are quietly moved. The product retains its reputation. The children who were paralyzed, who died in their cots, who developed severe atypical illness after exposure, who presented in 1976 India with what the WHO’s own surveillance team then classified as chickenpox rather than smallpox, go into other columns.
The 1976 India post-eradication surveillance is the mechanism caught in the act and preserved in the institution’s own records. Two years after the WHO had declared India free of smallpox, 1,951,487 cases of fever with rash were recorded across the country, and more than half a million of the localities in which they occurred were investigated by senior health workers. Of the 102 cases senior epidemiologists investigated as clinically suspected smallpox, 63 percent were classified as chickenpox; none as smallpox. The eradication machinery found what it was supposed to not find, and reclassified what it did find so that the finding did not threaten the declaration.
The WHO’s own 1988 publication Smallpox and Its Eradication is the institutional record of exactly this maneuver. The 1976 India surveillance findings are on page 1184. The parallel findings in Indonesia (629 of 650 suspected cases reclassified as chickenpox), Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Western Africa are documented in the surrounding chapters. The publication is available for free download from the WHO’s digital archive. Whatever word one chooses for what the surveillance accomplished (reclassification, redefinition, administrative convenience, policy), the publication exists and says what it says. So do the other nine documents cited above.
How to Explain It to a Six-Year-Old
Imagine you promised your mom that your room was clean. She came in to check, and she saw socks on the floor. So you decided, together with your friends, that socks on the floor don’t count as a messy room anymore. From now on, a messy room only means food on the floor.
Now you can honestly say your room is clean. The socks are still there. You didn’t pick them up. You just changed what counts.
The next week, there’s an apple core on the floor. So you decided apple cores don’t count either. A messy room now means pizza on the floor, and only pizza. The apple core and the socks are still there, but you can still honestly say your room is clean.
Grown-ups do this with medicines sometimes. They give a child a shot, and if the child gets sick anyway, they change the name of what the child has, so it doesn’t count as the shot not working. The child is still sick, and the parents are still worried, but in the big books that keep track of these things, the shot still worked.
The dictionary was the trick all along.
References
- The 60-day residual paralysis criterion is documented in the CDC’s own Poliomyelitis Surveillance Reports, including the 1963 and 1966 Annual Summary reports available in the CDC Stacks archive (CDC document numbers 609 and 43793), which define the measurement as “those cases with known residual paralysis at 60 days plus those cases reported dead.” The 20-to-35 per 100,000 epidemic threshold change is documented in William Trebing, Good-Bye Germ Theory: Ending a Century of Medical Fraud (AuthorHouse, 2006), and summarized in The Architecture of Deception, pp. 80–82. The redistribution of former polio cases across aseptic meningitis, viral meningitis, enterovirus infection, coxsackievirus infection, and transverse myelitis categories in the post-1955 US surveillance reports is documented in the CDC Poliomyelitis Surveillance Reports of the mid-to-late 1950s and 1960s, and summarized in Jim West, DDT/Polio: Virology vs Toxicology (2023).
- Vashisht, Neetu, and Jacob Puliyel, “Polio programme: let us declare victory and move on,” Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April–June 2012), pp. 114–117. DOI: 10.20529/IJME.2012.035.
- Dhiman, Rachana, Sandeep C. Prakash, V. Sreenivas, and Jacob Puliyel, “Correlation between Non-Polio Acute Flaccid Paralysis Rates with Pulse Polio Frequency in India,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, Vol. 15, No. 8 (August 2018), 1755. DOI: 10.3390/ijerph15081755.
- Scobey, Ralph R., MD, “The Poison Cause of Poliomyelitis and Obstructions to its Investigation,” Archives of Pediatrics, Vol. 69 (April 1952); see also Jim West, DDT/Polio: Virology vs Toxicology (2023), and the summary in Mark Gober, An End to Upside Down Medicine: Contagion, Viruses, and Vaccines (Waterside Productions, 2023). Biskind, Morton S., MD, and Irving Bieber, MD, “DDT Poisoning: A New Symptom With Neuropsychiatric Manifestations,” American Journal of Psychotherapy, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1949), pp. 261–270. Biskind, Morton S., MD, “Public Health Aspects of the New Insecticides,” American Journal of Digestive Diseases, Vol. 20, No. 11 (1953), pp. 331–341, and his 1950 testimony before the US House Select Committee to Investigate the Use of Chemicals in Food Products (Delaney Committee). The 1943 Broadstairs, Kent, dairy-DDT polio incident is documented in the UK historical literature and summarized in Jim West’s DDT/Polio. The Rockefeller Institute’s 1911 classification of poliomyelitis as a reportable contagious viral disease under US Public Health Law is discussed in The Architecture of Deception, pp. 70–72.
- Nancy Turner Banks, MD, AIDS, Opium, Diamonds and Empire: The Deadly Virus of International Greed (iUniverse, 2010).
- Peter Duesberg, PhD, Inventing the AIDS Virus (Regnery Publishing, 1996), as cited in Mark Gober, An End to Upside Down Medicine (Waterside Productions, 2023). See also Dawn Lester and David Parker, What Really Makes You Ill? Why Everything You Thought You Knew About Disease Is Wrong (Independently Published, 2019), Chapter 4. The 1,500 mg per day initial AZT dose is documented in Fischl, M. A., et al., “A randomized controlled trial of a reduced daily dose of zidovudine in patients with the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome. The AIDS Clinical Trials Group,” New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 323, No. 15 (October 11, 1990), pp. 1009–1014, which opens by stating: “The initially tested dose of zidovudine for the treatment of patients with advanced disease caused by the human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV) was 1500 mg. Although this dose is effective, it is associated with substantial toxicity.” The original 1987 trial (Fischl, M. A., et al., “The efficacy of azidothymidine (AZT) in the treatment of patients with AIDS and AIDS-related complex,” NEJM, Vol. 317, No. 4, July 23, 1987, pp. 185–191) used 250 mg every 4 hours (1,500 mg daily).
- Fulginiti, V. A., et al., “Altered Reactivity to Measles Virus: Atypical Measles in Children Previously Immunized with Inactivated Measles Virus Vaccines,” JAMA, Vol. 202, No. 12 (1967), pp. 1075–1080. McLean, D. M., et al., “Atypical measles following immunization with killed measles vaccine,” Canadian Medical Association Journal, Vol. 103, No. 7 (October 10, 1970), pp. 743–744. “Pneumonia in Atypical Measles,” editorial, British Medical Journal, 1971.
- Polack, F. P., et al., “A role for nonprotective complement-fixing antibodies with low avidity for measles virus in atypical measles,” Nature Medicine, Vol. 9, No. 9 (September 2003), pp. 1209–1213.
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS)” public information page, as cited in Dawn Lester and David Parker, What Really Makes You Ill?, Chapter 7.
- Shapiro-Mendoza, Carrie K., et al., “Classification System for the Sudden Unexpected Infant Death Case Registry and its Application,” Pediatrics, Vol. 134, No. 1 (July 2014), e210–e219. CDC presentation on the SUID initiative, Shapiro-Mendoza, CDC National Center for Chronic Disease and Public Health Prevention.
- Delaware Division of Public Health, “Sudden Unexpected Infant Death (SUID) in Delaware,” public health briefing document.
- Garrett, Laurie, The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1994), p. 181, documenting the 1976 swine flu campaign and the CDC’s internal acknowledgment that Guillain-Barré rates among the vaccinated were approximately four times those of the unvaccinated. Institute of Medicine, Immunization Safety Review: Influenza Vaccines and Neurological Complications (National Academies Press, 2003).
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS): Questions & Answers,” public information page. CDC framing of the “background rate” of 80–160 GBS cases per week in the United States, “regardless of vaccination.”
- UK Health Security Agency, Briefing Note 2024/017, “Recent increase in cases of Bordetella pertussis (whooping cough),” issued 17 June 2024, which documents 4,793 laboratory-confirmed cases in England January through April 2024 and the Q1 2024 total of 2,793 cases. UKHSA, “Confirmed cases of pertussis in England by month,” published surveillance data at gov.uk/government/publications/pertussis-epidemiology-in-england-2024. The comparison to 858 cases for the whole of 2023 is reported in UKHSA press releases and corroborated in BBC and other UK national press coverage (May 2024). Media usage of the term “100-day cough” documented in multiple UK outlets (Yorkshire Post, The Scotsman, Bristol World, Yorkshire Evening Post, The Star, Wigan Today) during the 2024 cluster.
- George Bernard Shaw, as cited in Eleanor McBean, The Poisoned Needle: Suppressed Facts About Vaccination (Mokelumne Hill, CA: Health Research, 1957), and in The Architecture of Deception, p. 81. Shaw served on a London Borough Council Health Committee during a smallpox event at the turn of the twentieth century.
- McBean, Eleanor, The Poisoned Needle: Suppressed Facts About Vaccination (Mokelumne Hill, CA: Health Research, 1957); see particularly Items 11 and the discussion of Salk trial methodology.
- Razzell, P., “Smallpox and the Evolution of Ideas on Acute Viral Infections,” Medical History, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1979). The specific page range and the exact Razzell quotations regarding the inability to identify smallpox from extant descriptions before AD 900, and the inability to distinguish the illnesses referred to by variola and morbilli on the basis of early clinical descriptions, should be verified against the primary source before final publication.
- Heberden, William, “Of the Chicken-pox,” read before the Royal College of Physicians on August 11, 1767; published in Medical Transactions, Published by the College of Physicians in London, Vol. 1 (London: S. Baker and J. Dodsley, 1768), pp. 427–436. Heberden’s stated motivation (”the small-pox, with which it may otherwise be confounded, and so deceive the persons, who may have had it”) is quoted in Arvin, A. M., and Gershon, A. A., eds., Varicella-Zoster Virus: Virology and Clinical Management (Cambridge University Press, 2000), introduction. The citation detail is confirmed in multiple independent sources including Clinics in Dermatology (2023) and the Dictionary of National Biography entry on Heberden.
- Thorp, Eustace, “Diagnosis of Small-pox and Chicken-pox,” letter, British Medical Journal, Vol. 2, No. 3278 (October 27, 1923), p. 787, retrievable via PubMed Central (PMC2317564). The William Osler / Futcher diagnostic exchange at Johns Hopkins University is recounted in the correspondence on smallpox diagnosis in the same BMJ series in late 1923. The exact wording of the quotations attributed to the Sudan letter and to the “many so-called distinguishing characteristics” letter should be verified against the primary scanned pages before final publication; the existence and dating of the correspondence series is confirmed in PMC and in the BMJ archive.
- The 1958 identification of the entity named monkeypox virus at the State Serum Institute (Statens Serum Institut), Copenhagen, in two shipments of cynomolgus monkeys imported from Singapore for polio vaccine research, is documented in von Magnus, P., et al., “A pox-like disease in cynomolgus monkeys,” Acta Pathologica et Microbiologica Scandinavica, Vol. 46 (1959), pp. 156–176. The August 1970 first-human-case report in a child in the village of Bukenda, Equatorial Province, Zaire (now DRC), nine months after smallpox had been declared eliminated from that country, is documented in Ladnyi, I. D., Ziegler, P., and Kima, E., “A human infection caused by monkeypox virus in Basankusu Territory, Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization, Vol. 46, No. 5 (1972), pp. 593–597. The subsequent WHO documentation treating human monkeypox as clinically indistinguishable from smallpox except by inconsistently-present lymphadenopathy is presented in Fenner, F., et al., Smallpox and Its Eradication (WHO, 1988), Chapter 29.
- Fenner, F., Henderson, D.A., Arita, I., Ježek, Z., and Ladnyi, I.D., Smallpox and Its Eradication (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1988). ISBN 92 4 156110 6. Available for free download from the WHO Institutional Repository for Information Sharing (IRIS) at apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/39485. The 1976 India country-wide fever-with-rash surveillance findings (1,951,487 cases recorded; 519,651 localities visited; 862,155 cases classified as chickenpox; 519,597 as measles; 146,855 as “other skin diseases”; 422,880 as “miscellaneous”; of 102 clinically-suspected smallpox cases investigated by senior epidemiologists, 63 percent classified as chickenpox and none as smallpox) are documented in Chapter 25 (”Certification by International Commissions: 1973–1977”), pp. 1181 (Table 25.22, Table 25.23) and 1184.
- Fenner et al., Smallpox and Its Eradication (1988), Chapter 25. The Indonesia 629/650 chickenpox reclassification figure is at p. 1157. The Afghanistan hospital-search figures (223 suspected cases: 55 percent measles, 28 percent chickenpox, 17 percent other skin diseases) are at p. 1173. The Pakistan 49,874 fever-with-rash cases and 27,703 chickenpox cases are at pp. 1176–1177 (Table 25.19). The Western Africa 157 laboratory specimens with 41 herpesvirus positives are at p. 1166 (Table 25.12). The acknowledgement that the chorioallantoic membrane isolation technique “did not grow” chickenpox virus and that “hundreds of specimens from chickenpox viruses might be examined with consistently negative results” is at p. 1159.
- Ralph R. Scobey, MD, Statement before the US House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Use of Chemicals in Food Products (Delaney Committee), May 1952, as part of hearings on the toxicological causation of poliomyelitis. Quoted in The Architecture of Deception, p. 81, and in Jim West, DDT/Polio: Virology vs Toxicology (2023). Scobey’s related published work includes “The Poison Cause of Poliomyelitis and Obstructions to its Investigation,” Archives of Pediatrics, Vol. 69 (April 1952), pp. 172–193.
- Sudden Adult Death Syndrome (SADS) is documented in the medical literature from the 1990s onward: Behr, E. R., et al., “Sudden adult death syndrome and family history,” European Heart Journal, Vol. 29, No. 13 (2008), pp. 1670–1680. The Baker Heart and Diabetes Institute (Melbourne) SADS registry was announced in June 2022; see Royal Australian College of General Practitioners coverage, newsGP, June 2022, and Dr. Elizabeth Paratz’s work at the Baker Institute. The parallel rise in reported sudden deaths among previously healthy young adults from 2021 forward is documented in national press coverage across Australia, the UK, and the United States, and in independent databases including The Expose and OpenVAERS.
- Oster, M. E., et al., “Myocarditis Cases Reported After mRNA-Based COVID-19 Vaccination in the US From December 2020 to August 2021,” JAMA, Vol. 327, No. 4 (2022), pp. 331–340. Among 192,405,448 persons receiving 354,100,845 mRNA vaccine doses, 1,626 reports met the CDC myocarditis case definition, with reporting rates peaking at 52.4 (BNT162b2) and 56.3 (mRNA-1273) per million second doses in males aged 18–24. See also CDC Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Vol. 70, No. 27 (July 9, 2021), and the VRBPAC presentations of Dr. Tom Shimabukuro (CDC COVID-19 Vaccine Coordination Unit) to the FDA on June 7, 2022.
- Wormser, G. P., et al., “The clinical assessment, treatment, and prevention of lyme disease, human granulocytic anaplasmosis, and babesiosis: clinical practice guidelines by the Infectious Diseases Society of America,” Clinical Infectious Diseases, Vol. 43, No. 9 (November 2006), pp. 1089–1134, which introduced the PTLDS case definition. See also Rebman, A. W., and Aucott, J. N., “Post-treatment Lyme Disease as a Model for Persistent Symptoms in Lyme Disease,” Frontiers in Medicine, Vol. 7:57 (February 25, 2020), and CDC public materials recommending the use of PTLDS and discouraging “chronic Lyme disease” terminology.
In Print
The Unbekoming library is available in paperback, printed to order through Lulu and shipped worldwide. The shelf begins with the paradigm question underneath everything else — No Virus, the isolation problem, the collapse of virology’s foundational claims, and a disease-by-disease reappraisal — and moves through the suppressed compounds mainstream medicine set aside: The DMSO Book, Chlorine Dioxide: The Forbidden Remedy, The Iodine Book, and The Hydrogen Peroxide Book. Two more recover what’s still on the kitchen shelf: Baking Soda and The Castor Oil Book. Two more recover the minerals modern soil, water, and processing quietly stripped from the diet: The Magnesium Handbook and The Boron Book. Sitting alongside these is No Contagion, co-authored with Jamie Andrews — the case against germ theory itself, catalogued through 258 failed contagion experiments.
The critique books cover what medicine, dentistry, psychiatry, and veterinary practice have become. The Unvaccinated treats the completely unvaccinated as a comparison group across twenty chapters and five appendices. Medicalized Motherhood follows a woman through 123 documented interventions from teenage pill to postpartum discharge. Drilling for Profit treats cavities, gum disease, and crooked teeth as the dietary problem they are. What Your Vet Can’t Tell You applies the same critique to pets. Escape from Psychiatry documents the fabrication of the DSM and the specific damage of every major psychiatric drug class. The Vitamin K Injection covers what happens in the first hours of a newborn’s life.
The full shelf is at lulu.com/spotlight/unbekoming. A physical book reaches the person a Substack post never will — the skeptical relative, the friend who won’t click a link but might open a book, the visitor whose eye lands on a coffee table. Buy one to keep, and one to give away.
November 15, 2026 Posted by aletho | Deception, Science and Pseudo-Science, Timeless or most popular | COVID-19 Vaccine, HIV/AIDS, United States | Comments Off on The 10 Disease Renamings That Rescued the Vaccine
US rewrites history to dodge blame for illegal war on Iran: Foreign Ministry spokesperson
Press TV · November 14, 2026
Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei has firmly rejected a “new deceptive narrative” peddled by American officials, who claim the United States did not start the war with Iran and that Tehran somehow initiated hostilities with the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
In a detailed post on X on Saturday, Baghaei said Washington is desperately trying to evade responsibility for the “catastrophic human, economic, and geopolitical consequences” of its unlawful aggression against the Islamic Republic.
He stressed that the 1979 Islamic Revolution was a legitimate struggle by the Iranian people to reclaim their sovereignty, freedom, and human dignity after decades of foreign interference, particularly the bitter memory of the 1953 CIA-backed coup that toppled the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mosaddegh.
“Military aggression has a clear definition,” Baghaei stated. “No matter how desperately American officials try to evade the issue, they cannot erase from the minds of the American people or the world the fact that it was the United States that twice, in less than nine months, launched unprovoked aggression against Iran in the midst of diplomatic negotiations.”
He pointed to the US-Israeli military offensive that began on February 28, during which American forces assassinated senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, killed and wounded Iranian women and children, and destroyed vital civilian infrastructure.
Baghaei noted that Washington had now reached a military and political dead end and was attempting both to deny responsibility for starting the war and to conceal its failure to achieve its objectives behind a false narrative of victory.
He added that the American political establishment had itself acknowledged at the highest levels that the war against Iran was the principal cause of its electoral defeat.
Turning to the deeper historical roots of the conflict, the Iranian official listed a long chain of US hostile actions: the 1953 coup; Washington’s political, intelligence, military, and financial support for Saddam Hussein’s regime during the eight-year imposed war on Iran; the Reagan administration’s complicity in Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian civilians and soldiers; the obstruction of UN Security Council efforts to hold Baghdad accountable; direct US Navy involvement in Saddam’s aggression in April 1988; the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 over the Persian Gulf in July 1988, killing all 290 people on board; sweeping economic sanctions designed to harm the Iranian people; the unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and the reinstatement of the “maximum pressure” campaign; the assassination of anti-terror commander Qassem Soleimani; and numerous other interventions.
“The United States cannot escape responsibility for its decision to launch an unlawful war of choice against Iran on 28 February 2026 by turning back the clock or redefining the meaning of war,” Baghaei concluded. “The United States has been both the instigator of historical hostility toward the Iranian nation and the initiator of military aggression against Iran.”
The remarks come amid continued US attempts to pressure Iran through military threats, economic blockade measures, and efforts to recruit other countries into hostile actions in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, actions that Tehran has repeatedly warned will be met with a crushing and proportionate response.
Iranian officials have consistently maintained that any further aggression will expand the war beyond US control, while reaffirming the Islamic Republic’s readiness to defend its sovereignty and the security of the region.
November 14, 2026 Posted by aletho | Deception, Timeless or most popular, War Crimes, Wars for Israel | Iran, United States | Comments Off on US rewrites history to dodge blame for illegal war on Iran: Foreign Ministry spokesperson
TURBO CANCER DATA from Ontario, Canada (OHIP Insurance Billing Data)
By William Makis | November 14, 2026







November 14, 2026 Posted by aletho | Timeless or most popular, War Crimes | Canada, COVID-19 Vaccine | Comments Off on TURBO CANCER DATA from Ontario, Canada (OHIP Insurance Billing Data)
How British foreign policy is frozen in the ruins of empire
By ADAM RAMSAY – Declassified UK – November 5, 2026
There has been much debate in Britain in recent years about symbols of empire – pulling down statues, or returning museum artefacts.
But we rarely talk about the fact that British foreign policy is still run by the same institutions which ran the empire.
The Secretary of State for Business and Trade is still called ‘President of the Board of Trade’, referring to an institution involved in the triangular slave trade.
Perhaps the most obvious remnant of the empire is Britain’s outsized military bootprint. Most countries with foreign bases largely have them in neighbouring territories; only Britain, the US and France have genuinely global militaries.
With at least 145 bases in forty-two countries, Britain likely has the second-biggest military footprint on earth. Many of these bases are in former or remaining colonies (i.e. British overseas territories).
Many of the most important ones are in small authoritarian monarchies, with royal families we’ve helped prop up for decades, a direct relic of the empire.
These bases are important outposts of the British state. And yet, there is almost no democratic scrutiny of how they are used. Indeed, many of them are officially secret, and remained so until the journalistic website Declassified revealed their existence. There may well be more.
Look at how they are used, and we begin to see that this large swathe of British state power, left over from empire, is used – often violently – to prop up a global system not of British dominance, but of US hegemony and the corporate control which comes with it.
Projecting US power
Bases on British overseas territories – namely, Gibraltar; Ascension Island; Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus; and Diego Garcia – play particularly important roles in projecting US power.
These bases are all vital nodes in the Pentagon’s global surveillance system. For example, there are four main ‘ground antennae’ in the Global Positioning System (GPS). Two of these are on US territory, in Florida and Hawaii, and two are on British territory, on Ascension Island and Diego Garcia, providing circumglobal spread.
Akrotiri and Dhekelia are a significant hub for UK/US surveillance efforts across the Middle East and North Africa, allowing GCHQ and the NSA to intercept phone calls, text messages and internet communications across the region. The US Air Force’s main intelligence squadron also has a base there, and throughout Israel’s genocide of Gaza, Britain sent surveillance flights over Gaza from these bases, likely spying for Israel.
Similarly, the bases have more direct military use. During the genocide, Cypriots reported a surge in flights from Akrotiri, and the government admitted many were heading to Israel. There was also a significant increase in the supply of arms coming into the bases. The US was almost certainly rearming Israel using British sovereign territory.
Likewise, Diego Garcia is the major US military base from which its attacks on the Middle East and South Asia are conducted – including, for example, the initial bombing raids on Baghdad in 2003.
Beyond accountability
While the US has military bases on foreign soil across the planet, it needs to negotiate the domestic politics of most other states when it wishes to use them, and so becomes slightly accountable to global public opinion.
British territories, on the other hand, offer a space beyond accountability. Cypriots might protest against the US seemingly using Britain’s military bases to re-arm Israel, but they can’t vote out the regime allowing it.
Unlike the other overseas territories, the Cyprus military bases are run through the Ministry of Defence rather than the Foreign Office, and have no democratic structures. An administrator, officially appointed by the British monarch on the recommendation of the MoD, is in practice always the head of UK armed forces there, governing over Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
The 11,000 Cypriots who live on British sovereign land are subject to the old legal system imposed when Cyprus was a British colony, and effectively live under military dictatorship. Cyprus has repeatedly asked Britain to leave; Britain refuses.
For British voters, this is out of sight in some constitutional quirk. And when MPs do take an interest, the government can simply ignore them: in 2025, one frustrated MP told me, the government issued a block on MPs asking questions about the use of RAF flights to conduct surveillance in Israel and Gaza. It can do so, as my book Abolish Westminster explores in further detail, because it is operating under royal prerogative, not parliamentary authority.
Surveillance and shipping
Particularly significant is the role these territories play in signals intelligence, and the surveillance processes used by the US to project its global power and undermine self-determination and, sometimes, democracy around the world.
In the 1950s, British intelligence services developed a vast network of interception stations across the globe, tapping phone lines of anti-imperialist leaders and the like. As colonies started to win freedom, there was a panicked reaction about how to maintain this surveillance infrastructure. GCHQ solved this problem by maintaining control over overseas territories and footholds in informally dependent regimes in strategically important places.
Nowadays, because the internet relies on fibre-optic cables across the planet, this network has become more important than ever, providing the UK and US with the capacity to tap phone and internet communications across a large portion of the planet – and particularly in former colonies.
Similarly, these toeholds provide stopping points on many of the world’s most important shipping routes – such as Singapore and Bahrain – providing bases for the Royal Navy from which it can protect Britain’s oil industry, which is partly why Britain still hosts two of the world’s four biggest publicly listed oil companies.
This network is then justified by turning some of these territories – particularly the Falklands and Gibraltar with their whiter populations – into trinkets for Britons to remember their past power, and so demand an oversized military.
It’s often forgotten that the supposed justification for the onslaught on Iraq launched from one British overseas territory – and the disastrous war that followed – included a claimed threat to another British overseas territory: ‘the forty-five-minute claim’ screeched by The Sun, the Evening Standard and other establishment outriders was that, according to (they claimed) an intelligence dossier, Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction capable of deployment against British targets within forty-five minutes of an order to do so.
What many might not have realised from the headlines is that the British targets of these (as it transpired) invented weapons weren’t London. They were, at least according to some of the lie’s iterations, Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
Voters in the dark
The impact on the people who live under the dictators Britain props up to maintain this power is immense, while British voters have almost no say in what’s going on, and rarely even know about it: the British foreign policy machine largely continues its work, unfettered by democracy.
Oman and Bahrain, Singapore and Brunei – these aren’t formally British colonies, but their regimes are propped up by the British state, in ways that aren’t properly accountable either to the people of those countries, or those of the UK.
While the MoD refuses to disclose figures, the cost of maintaining this bootprint is one of the reasons Britain has the world’s fifth-highest total military expenditure. Only Russia, China, India and the US spend more. Apart from the US, virtually the only democracies that spend more of their GDP on the military are those fighting wars within or on their borders. Britain spends more of its wealth on its military than any other Western European country.
This level of expenditure is partly accepted because of the impact of memories of empire on our national identity – a plurality of British people think we should ‘punch above our weight’. And it is partly self-perpetuating, in that it creates interests which then lobby for themselves.
Imagine a defence secretary suggesting at a departmental meeting that Britain cut military spending to the same level as Japan – from 2.3% to 1.6% of GDP – including axing military bases outside sovereign territory.
Would this be taken calmly? Or would there be leaks, denunciations from unnamed generals in the press, screams that our national security was at risk and rapid ministerial backpedalling?
The spending’s primary purpose, though, is to protect a mix of US global dominance, and the interests of a handful of vast corporations which are – only sort of – British.
November 13, 2026 Posted by aletho | Book Review, Militarism, Timeless or most popular | Israel, UK, United States, Zionism | Comments Off on How British foreign policy is frozen in the ruins of empire
Iran’s NPT exit debate: How repeated attacks exposed the failures of global nuclear safeguards
Press TV | November 12, 2026
The growing debate in Iran over withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) reflects a fundamental question: What purpose does membership serve if the treaty offers no meaningful protection for a country’s peaceful nuclear facilities, even as it obliges that country to uphold its commitments?
The issue goes beyond Iran’s legitimate security concerns, striking at the credibility of the international nuclear order itself.
When an NPT signatory’s nuclear infrastructure can be subjected to unprovoked and illegal military aggression without any accountability for those responsible, the treaty’s underlying premise of reciprocal obligations and protections is called into question.
The Assembly of Experts’ latest call for a review of Iran’s defence doctrine, including consideration of withdrawal from the NPT, signals a significant shift in the country’s strategic debate that has been gaining momentum since the 40-day imposed war.
What was once largely confined to discussions among lawmakers and security officials is now increasingly being articulated as a broader national security concern, especially in the wake of continued sabre rattling by the enemy.
While Iran is expected to uphold its international obligations as an NPT signatory, its adversaries face absolutely no accountability for openly violating the most fundamental principles of international law.
The repeated attacks on Iranian nuclear installations, assassinations of nuclear scientists and failure of international institutions to respond decisively have intensified questions about the effectiveness, fairness and credibility of the existing non-proliferation framework.
This is no longer a debate about the future of Iran’s nuclear program, which is entirely peaceful. It has evolved into a much broader question of national sovereignty, strategic deterrence, the credibility of international law and, ultimately, a state’s inherent right to defend itself against external aggression.
From nuclear safeguards to strategic vulnerability
Iran’s grievances did not emerge overnight. For years, its peaceful, energy-focused nuclear programme has been subjected to sabotage, cyberattacks, assassinations of scientists and, ultimately, direct military strikes against facilities under international monitoring.
This pattern long predates the two recent wars of aggression against Iran. In 2010, nuclear scientist Masoud Ali Mohammadi was assassinated in Tehran. Later that year, Majid Shahriari was killed in a bombing, while Fereydoun Abbasi survived an assassination attempt. Abbasi was subsequently martyred on the first day of the 12-day war in June 2025.
Dariush Rezainejad was assassinated in 2011, followed by Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan in January 2012. In November 2020, prominent nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated on the outskirts of Tehran. Israeli spying agency Mossad was involved in these attacks, with the stamp of approval from CIA.
During the 12-day war of aggression in June 2025, Israel assassinated several more of Iran’s leading nuclear scientists, yet the UN nuclear watchdog refrained from condemning these targeted killings. In fact, it was the politically motivated resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors shortly before the war that was instrumental in paving the way for the aggression at a time when Iran and the US were engaged in indirect nuclear negotiations.
The attacks have not been confined to individuals. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has on numerous occasions been targeted through sophisticated sabotage operations, most notably the Stuxnet cyberattack against the Natanz enrichment facility in 2010.
The escalation reached an entirely different level in June 2025, when Israel, backed by the United States, launched an unprovoked and illegal military aggression against Iran, targeting nuclear installations alongside military and civilian infrastructure. Washington subsequently joined the war directly, bombing the three key nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan on June 22.
These were neither clandestine installations nor facilities operating outside the international nuclear framework. Iran’s nuclear program has for years been subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and verification arrangements.
The attacks thus raised a fundamental and logical question: if nuclear facilities under international monitoring can be bombed with sheer impunity, what practical protection does the safeguards system offer countries that remain committed to the NPT?
The IAEA itself confirmed the damage. Director General Rafael Grossi, who is now vying for the top UN post, reported that the above-ground section of Natanz’s pilot enrichment plant had been destroyed in the initial Israeli strikes. Following the US attacks, the agency confirmed that Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan had been hit, with extensive additional damage reported at the Isfahan complex.
The repercussions extended well beyond physical destruction. The IAEA subsequently suspended its field verification activities, while inspectors were withdrawn from Iran for safety reasons. In effect, military attacks on safeguarded nuclear installations undermined the very monitoring arrangements that the international community repeatedly demands Iran uphold.
This glaring contradiction lies at the heart of intensifying calls in Iran to withdraw from NPT. Iran is expected to honour its nuclear commitments even as the international framework designed to safeguard them offers no protection against external military aggression.
The IAEA’s credibility crisis
Iran’s criticism of the IAEA stems from a glaring double standard in its approach to nuclear security, compliance and accountability.
The agency has repeatedly demanded access and cooperation from Tehran, while its response to military attacks against Iranian nuclear installations has largely remained confined to tokenistic statements expressing concern and warnings about nuclear safety.
Grossi did state that nuclear facilities must never be attacked, regardless of the circumstances. He also warned that such attacks could have serious consequences for nuclear safety, security and international peace. However, the agency he heads did not produce a meaningful accountability mechanism capable of deterring or penalising those responsible for the unprovoked attacks.
The distinction between expressing concern and ensuring accountability is particularly important. The IAEA applies extensive mechanisms for inspecting nuclear facilities, verifying declared nuclear material and reporting safeguards violations. Yet it lacks the mechanism to hold rogue states accountable for attacks against nuclear facilities.
This exposes a structural weakness in the international nuclear order: compliance is rigorously monitored, but the security of compliant states is not equally guaranteed.
The timing of the June 2025 aggression made this contradiction even more glaring. Just a day before Israel launched its attacks, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution claiming Iran was in “non-compliance” with its safeguards obligations.
The move was politically motivated and reflected Israeli pressure on the agency and Grossi’s attempt to appease Washington with an eye on top UN position. The fact that the attacks followed almost immediately proved that diplomatic and monitoring mechanisms had become instruments of pressure on Iran rather than impartial safeguards.
There is also an important distinction here: the IAEA’s June 2025 finding concerned Iran’s safeguards obligations, not a finding that Iran had decided to build nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the episode reinforced the fact that Iran’s rights and obligations under the treaty were being interpreted selectively.
The credibility problem is further complicated by the nuclear status of the Israeli regime, which is not a signatory to the NPT and which possesses nuclear weapons, while maintaining a policy of nuclear ambiguity. Israel’s nuclear arsenal remains outside the treaty’s safeguards framework, while Iran, a non-nuclear-weapon state party, faces extensive inspections and international scrutiny for no reason.
Withdrawal from NPT becomes serious policy debate
Against this backdrop, calls for the Iranian leadership to reconsider the country’s NPT membership have gained momentum. Recent countywide polls, including those conducted by the state broadcaster IRIB, show an overwhelming majority of people in favor of the country’s exit from the treaty.
The statement by the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member constitutional body tasked with electing and supervising the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, is particularly significant because it elevates the issue beyond individual parliamentary interventions.
The body has called for a decisive review of Iran’s defence doctrine, consideration of withdrawal from the NPT and the establishment of the necessary deterrence capabilities. It has described these measures as an unavoidable necessity and an emerging national demand.
The statement also warned that any renewed aggression against the country would trigger an immediate and effective Iranian response without geographical limitations, echoing the position articulated by Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei in his meeting with top military commanders recently.
The message is twofold: Iran is reconsidering the assumptions underpinning its existing security arrangements, and it intends to ensure that any future attack carries consequences beyond the immediate battlefield.
The Assembly of Experts’ intervention follows similar remarks from senior officials and lawmakers. Major General Mohsen Rezaee, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, also addressed the growing debate over the country’s nuclear doctrine recently.
On November 1, he acknowledged that public and political demands to reconsider the doctrine have emerged following attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities despite extensive IAEA inspections and monitoring. He clarified, however, that no official decision has so far been taken by the Supreme National Security Council to change the doctrine.
Earlier, on September 20, Iranian lawmaker Hossein Ali Hajideligani announced that a three-urgency parliamentary motion calling for withdrawal from the NPT had been submitted to the parliament’s presiding board. He said the proposal was awaiting permission to be introduced in an open parliamentary session.
He maintained that after repeated attacks against the country, including the nuclear sites, continued membership of the treaty was delivering more disadvantages than benefits.
These developments suggest that withdrawal is no longer merely an occasional political threat deployed during diplomatic confrontations. It has become a subject of institutional debate involving lawmakers, senior security officials and now the Assembly of Experts.
What does withdrawal from NPT actually mean
The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, is built around three central pillars: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting peaceful nuclear cooperation and advancing nuclear disarmament.
Under Article IV, member states retain the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, provided they comply with their treaty obligations. Article III establishes the safeguards framework through which the IAEA verifies that nuclear material is not diverted towards weapons programmes.
Article X, meanwhile, explicitly recognises a member state’s sovereign right to withdraw. It states that a party may withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter have jeopardised its national interests. The withdrawing state must provide three months’ notice to all other parties and the UN Security Council, explaining the extraordinary events behind its decision.
This provision is particularly relevant to Iran’s current position. It could contend that repeated military attacks against its safeguarded nuclear facilities, the assassination of its scientists and the failure of international mechanisms to provide effective protection have fundamentally undermined the security rationale for continued membership.
In such circumstances, withdrawal becomes an exercise of national sovereignty under a provision explicitly written into the treaty.
Why Iran is reconsidering its defence doctrine
The debate over NPT membership is closely connected to a wider reassessment of Iran’s defence doctrine. For decades, it has maintained and demonstrated that its nuclear program is peaceful and that nuclear weapons have no place in the country’s defence strategy. Iranian officials have repeatedly invoked a decree by the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei against acquiring such weapons.
Iran reiterated this position in its submission to the 2026 NPT review process, describing the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the placement of peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards as central elements of its commitment to the treaty.
However, the strategic environment has changed dramatically. The February 28, 2026, US-Israeli aggression against Iran, following the earlier attacks in June 2025, has reinforced the argument that the country’s existing deterrence arrangements need fundamental reassessment, especially amid continued threats from the US-Israeli war machine.
The central concern is that conventional military capabilities and international diplomatic commitments have not been sufficient to prevent repeated attacks against Iranian territory and strategic infrastructure. Hence, deterrence must be credible enough to convince adversaries that another military adventure would carry unacceptable costs.
This is the context in which Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei’s warning about an immediate response without geographical limitations should be understood. It communicates that Iran would not necessarily confine its response to the location of an attack or accept geographical restrictions imposed by its adversaries in the event of new aggression.
The Assembly of Experts has effectively connected this deterrence argument with the NPT debate. Its position suggests that Iran cannot continue relying on an international framework that has failed to protect its security while limiting its strategic options.
The question is not simply whether Iran should acquire additional military capabilities. It is whether the country’s defence doctrine should be adjusted to reflect the realities of a regional and international order in which military force has increasingly been used against it despite the existence of diplomatic agreements and international safeguards.
Wider implications for international nuclear order
Iran’s potential withdrawal would have consequences extending well beyond West Asia. The NPT is often described as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Its credibility depends not only on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons but also on maintaining confidence that member states can exercise their peaceful nuclear rights without becoming targets of military aggression.
If a state that has remained within the treaty concludes that membership offers inadequate protection against attacks on its safeguarded facilities, other countries may question the practical value of the existing arrangements. This would create a dangerous precedent.
The international community cannot consistently demand that countries accept intrusive inspections and comply with non-proliferation obligations while treating attacks against their peaceful nuclear infrastructure as an issue that can be addressed through tokenistic expressions of concern alone.
There is also a broader contradiction involving nuclear-armed states and those outside the treaty. Israel’s continued refusal to join the NPT, combined with its widely acknowledged nuclear arsenal, highlights the uneven application of international nuclear rules.
Meanwhile, the five states recognised as nuclear-weapon states under the NPT have not fulfilled the disarmament expectations embedded in Article VI to the satisfaction of many non-nuclear-weapon states.
This imbalance has long undermined confidence in the treaty’s underlying bargain: non-nuclear states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons, while nuclear-weapon states commit to pursuing disarmament and all parties retain the right to peaceful nuclear technology.
Iran’s current debate brings these unresolved contradictions into sharper focus. A withdrawal would not necessarily mean that Iran would immediately pursue nuclear weapons. Nor should such an outcome be presented as inevitable. But it would represent a serious setback for a non-proliferation framework already facing considerable challenges.
It would also complicate the work of the IAEA, reduce transparency and potentially create new uncertainties about nuclear material, verification and regional security.
For the United States and its European allies, as well as the Zionist regime, the prospect of Iranian withdrawal from the NPT should therefore be a warning about the consequences of relying excessively on sanctions, military threats and coercive diplomacy.
A test for international institutions
Ultimately, Iran’s NPT debate is about more than nuclear policy. It is a test of whether international institutions can uphold the principles they were established to defend.
The NPT cannot remain credible if its obligations are enforced selectively, peaceful nuclear facilities are exposed to dastardly military attacks and the perpetrators face no meaningful consequences.
Nor can the IAEA maintain its standing as an impartial international watchdog if its ability to monitor nuclear activities is accompanied by an inability to meaningfully address threats to the safety and security of safeguarded facilities.
Washington and its European allies must recognise that military aggression against a member state’s safeguarded nuclear facilities fundamentally undermines the very non-proliferation system they claim to defend.
The IAEA, too, must demonstrate that its mandate extends beyond demanding compliance from non-nuclear states to consistently defending nuclear safety and the inviolability of peaceful nuclear installations.
Iran’s growing reconsideration of NPT membership is, in this sense, a consequence of a much deeper crisis of confidence. The international community now faces a fundamental question: Can the global nuclear order survive when compliance offers no credible protection against aggression, and when the institutions responsible for safeguarding it can’t ensure accountability?
If that question remains unanswered, Iran’s debate may prove to be part of a much wider challenge to the foundations of the international non-proliferation regime.
November 12, 2026 Posted by aletho | Timeless or most popular | IAEA, Iran, Israel, NPT, United States | Comments Off on Iran’s NPT exit debate: How repeated attacks exposed the failures of global nuclear safeguards
Only a Beginning… Charles Malik’s vision of an emergent Pax Judaica
By David Miller | Tracking Power | November 12, 2026
In August 1949, three months after Israel joined the United Nations, Lebanon’s envoy in Washington sent his government a long report. Charles Malik, no firebrand, had signed the UN Charter and helped draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. His Report on the Present Situation lay largely unread until Dar An-Nahar printed it in 2002.
The Arabic text is online; the translations below are mine, with the book’s page numbers.
Malik calls Palestine “the gravest Arab question of all”, whose outcome “is the outcome of the whole Arab world” (p. 24). Then he warns:
“Everything that has happened so far in Palestine and concerning Palestine is only a beginning. As for the end, it may be either the crushing of the Arab world and its colonisation by the Jews, or its rising anew as a modern, respected world, sharing with the living civilisations in creating values and preserving them. Whatever happens, the near future will be darker than the present and more dangerous than the past.” (p. 27)
A word on Malik’s language. He writes “the Jews” where we would now write the Zionist entity and the organised bodies abroad that back it: the Zionist movement and the vast bulk of organised Jewry. The movement named itself that way: a Jewish Agency, a Jewish National Fund, a Jewish state. In the Levant, the conquest of Palestine was experienced as an attack by Jews. That describes a political project and its institutions. It is not a racial term, and it says nothing about Jews as a people, some of whom opposed Zionism then and oppose it now. Malik’s target is the movement and the state it had just built:
“… the Jews’ triumph in seizing the greater part of Palestine and building their state, … and Israel’s entry as a member of the United Nations: all this is not an act at which the ambitions of the Jews stop and with which their danger ends. The State of Israel, in its present condition and borders, is not a resting place for the invading Jewish force, but a centre where it gathers, a soil in which it grows, and a point from which it sets out across its borders and springs upon the Arab countries, the adjacent and then the distant: politically, economically and socially, and, if need be, militarily. And I think it will need to.” (pp. 27–28)
The core of the report follows:
“The Zionists have succeeded in all this. But they will not be content with this partial success, nor satisfied with this measure of victory, because their ambitions do not end at the patch of Palestine they have seized, nor stop at the borders the world has recognised for them. … Zionist policy is, at its core, an ambitious expansionist policy. The whole of Palestine is not enough for the needs of the Jews, nor does it sate the appetite of their leaders. … Israel wants to dominate the Arab world; it wants to be the heir of all its previous eras. Just as it was once known, in whole or in part, as the Roman, Byzantine, Arab, Turkish or Mandate era, so Zionism wants it to be known in its coming era as the Israeli era. The Arab world is Zionism’s vital space.” (pp. 40–41)
Broker and power
Malik then looks further ahead:
“… They will succeed in persuading the West, and in persuading some of our own politicians and thinkers, that they are the intermediary between the West and the Near East, in economics and development, in culture and thought, and in politics, and that they are the ones fit to represent the Near East, its interests, its will and its forces, to the West. … A day will come, if it has not already come, when all economic and development projects and all rescue plans … rest at bottom on the Jewish will, aimed in their motives at numbing the Arabs and distracting them from the shame of Israel’s establishment in their midst, and in their end at forcing them to recognise it and cooperate with it. These projects will be built so as, first and foremost, to entrench Israel’s foundations and make it the cornerstone of the economic structure and the pillar of development in the Near East.” (pp. 43–44)
Now Benjamin Netanyahu. At the UN in 2023, he hailed a “visionary corridor that will stretch across the Arabian Peninsula and Israel” to “connect India to Europe”, and said: “Israel can become a bridge of peace and prosperity between these continents.” “Israel must be a power,” he told a Mossad gathering in 2015. “Not just a regional power, but in some spheres, a world power.” In December 2025, two years into the genocide in Gaza, he declared in the Knesset that Israel “is the strongest power in the Middle East, and in certain fields, it is a global power.”
A page earlier, Malik had described what such a position would mean:
“For a day will come — and it may be near, if it is not already here — when nothing in the Arab world is loosed or bound except with the consent of the Jews. Then governments, regimes and individuals will be upheld or overturned according to the Jews’ approval or anger: a head of state or a head of government will rise or fall because Tel Aviv, and behind it world Jewry concentrated in New York and other Western capitals, wanted him to rise or to fall.” (pp. 42–43)
He adds, from his own diplomatic experience:
“I have repeatedly been given to understand that very important matters, such as development projects, international loans, and treaties and agreements for security in the Middle East, were left undecided or set aside because those with the power to decide on them had first consulted the Jews about them.” (p. 43)
The same line applies: Malik’s “world Jewry” is the organised Zionist movement in Western capitals, standing “behind” Tel Aviv. Read that way, the passage is prescient, as Israel’s record in Lebanon shows. Who today can say that this is far from the mark on the reality of contemporary political life?
A partial ambition
Malik’s “partial success” is the key. Zionist leaders always claimed more than they accepted at any moment. Acceptance was tactical.
At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the Zionist Organization proposed a northern border starting “south of Sidon” and an eastern line “close to and west of the Hedjaz Railway”, well east of the Jordan.
When the Peel Commission offered a small state in 1937, David Ben-Gurion told his son Amos why he would take it: “A partial Jewish state is not the end, but only the beginning … I am certain that we will not be prevented from settling in other parts of the country, either by mutual agreement with our Arab neighbors or by some other means.”
In June 1938, the historian Nur Masalha shows from the Jewish Agency Executive’s minutes, Ben-Gurion accepted part of the country “on the basis of the assumption that after we build up a strong force following the establishment of the state – we will abolish the partition of the country and we will expand to the whole Land of Israel.”
Ze’ev Jabotinsky, founder of Revisionist Zionism, had already spelled out the method in 1923: colonisation “must either stop, or else proceed regardless of the native population”, behind “an iron wall, which the native population cannot breach”.
Menachem Begin’s Irgun answered the UN partition vote of November 1947, as he recorded in The Revolt: “The partition of the Homeland is illegal. It will never be recognized. … Eretz Israel will be restored to the people of Israel. All of it. And for ever.”
Lebanon
Malik’s sharpest fear was for Lebanon. He warned of “a secret agreement between Israel and some short-sighted Lebanese”, who would then “carry out a coup loyal to Israel”. It “would not be counted as aggression by Israel, but as a mere internal movement”, leaving the West no room to act. Yet such a coup “would inevitably lead to chaos, then Syrian Arab intervention, then Israeli intervention, and so to a new war, and Lebanon will not be the winner in it at all” (pp. 145–146).
He did not know what Ben-Gurion had written on 24 May 1948, in a diary now published by the Ben-Gurion Archive: “Lebanon is the weak link in the Arab coalition. The Muslim government is artificial and easy to destabilize. A Christian state should be established with the Litani [River] as its southern border. We’ll form an alliance with it.”
In May 1955, according to Moshe Sharett’s diary as translated by Livia Rokach, Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan said Israel need only “find an officer, even just a Major”, then “create a Christian regime which will ally itself with Israel” and annex “the territory from the Litani southward”. It is almost exactly Malik’s plot.
In March 1949, US records show, Malik had asked Dean Acheson for a declaration “that no further expansion on the part of Israel would be permitted.” None came.
Seventy-seven years on
Malik’s answer was Arab renewal. Without it, he wrote, “I am certain that our future is colonisation and enslavement by the Jews. And I am certain of more than that: I am certain that in that case no one will grieve over our enslavement” (p. 42).
Against the genocide in Gaza, the wars on Lebanon and the seizures of Syrian territory, the report reads as description. In August 2025 Netanyahu said he felt “very much” connected to the vision of Greater Israel. Malik would not have been surprised. The ambition was never dropped, only deferred until the force existed to pursue it.
Arabic original: Charles Malik, شارل مالك، إسرائيل… أميركا… والعرب: تنبؤات من نصف قرن – تقرير في الوضع الحاضر، 5 آب 1949 (Israel… America… and the Arabs: Prophecies from Half a Century – Report on the Present Situation, 5 August 1949), preface by Ghassan Tueni (Beirut: Dar An-Nahar, first edition August 2002; scan of the third printing, March 2003). Read it on archive.org or download the PDF.
November 12, 2026 Posted by aletho | Book Review, Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Timeless or most popular | Israel, Lebanon, Middle East, Palestine, Zionism | Comments Off on Only a Beginning… Charles Malik’s vision of an emergent Pax Judaica
Why Iran designated British MI6, Royal Navy, and RAF as hostile, terrorist organizations
By Yousef Ramazani · Press TV · November 10, 2026
Iran recently designated Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, as a “hostile group” and declared the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force “terrorist organizations” in a decisive retaliatory measure against London’s relentless hostile actions against the Islamic Republic.
The Iranian Foreign Ministry announced the measures on November 1, 2026, citing Britain’s participation in the US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran and its decision to place the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) under the country’s so-called “State Threats Act 2026.”
The decisions were made under a resolution of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and in response to Britain’s actions over the past year.
Under the first measure, MI6—formally the Secret Intelligence Service—has been designated a hostile group under Note 2 of Article 1 of Iran’s Law on Intensifying Punishment for Espionage and Cooperation with the Zionist regime and Hostile Countries against National Security and National Interests.
The designation took effect upon publication of the ministry’s statement, and the provisions of the law now apply to the British spy agency.
Under the second measure, the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force have been brought under Iran’s Law on Countermeasures against the United States’ Designation of the IRGC as a Terrorist Organization.
Both British military branches are consequently designated as terrorist organizations under Iranian legislation.
The Foreign Ministry cited Britain’s provision of military and logistical facilities and bases within territories under its jurisdiction to support the US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran as one of the grounds for the measures.
It also pointed to London’s July 13, 2026 decision to place the IRGC under the State Threats Act 2026, describing the move as part of Britain’s hostile policies against the Islamic Republic.
The ministry condemned Britain’s policies as contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, particularly the principles of respect for national sovereignty and the prohibition of unlawful actions against other countries.
It reaffirmed Iran’s determination to take the necessary measures to protect its national security and interests.
“The measures have evidently been adopted in accordance with the principles of international law and within the framework of the principle of reciprocity,” the statement said, adding that the British government would bear responsibility for their consequences.
A century of British hostility
The November 1 designations are not an isolated response but the culmination of a century of British intervention, espionage and military aggression against Iran. The record is long, documented and central to Iranian national memory.
Britain’s hostile role predates MI6 itself. During the nineteenth century, London competed with Tsarist Russia for influence over Persia in the Great Game, pressuring the Qajar government and intervening in the country’s affairs to control strategic decisions in Tehran.
On August 25, 1941, British and Soviet forces invaded Iran despite its declared neutrality in the Second World War. British forces advanced from Iraq and the Persian Gulf, while British naval forces operated in southern Iranian waters.
The Royal Air Force participated in the campaign, bombing Ahvaz and attacking ports and naval facilities at Bandar Imam Khomeini and Khorramshahr. The invasion forced the Pahlavi monarch to abdicate.
This was not covert interference but open military aggression against a neutral nation—and it remains a foundational reference point in Iranian accounts of British military power.
The 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh became the most enduring symbol of British intelligence hostility.
After Iran nationalized its oil industry, Britain—through MI6, working with the American CIA—participated in the operation that removed Mosaddegh and restored the Shah’s political position. MI6 was one of the coup’s principal organizers, and declassified British and American documents have confirmed MI6’s central role in “Operation Boot.”
The coup is among the clearest cases in which British intelligence involvement is established by substantial historical documentation.
Espionage against Iranian diplomatic missions
In May 1994, then-President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani announced that British intelligence had placed listening devices in the Iranian embassy in London. Embassy staff discovered a microphone, and further investigations revealed additional devices.
Rafsanjani identified MI6 as responsible for the surveillance and noted that British allegations about Iranian links with the Irish Republican Army were intended to divert attention from the eavesdropping operation.
The Foreign Ministry confirmed that the first microphone had been discovered weeks earlier and that the embassy had delayed publicizing the matter while investigating the possibility of additional devices.
The episode was a direct charge, attributed to the Iranian president, that MI6 had conducted technical surveillance against an Iranian diplomatic mission on British territory.
Support for terrorist groups in Khuzestan
A major escalation occurred during the bombings in Khuzestan in 2005 and 2006. In August 2005, Iran’s Intelligence Ministry announced that British intelligence services were involved in the unrest and bombings in the border Iranian province.
Those arrested in connection with the incidents confessed to direct links with separatist groups and foreign intelligence networks, particularly those associated with Britain. The British connection extended beyond political encouragement to operational support.
After bombings in Ahvaz in October 2005 and January 2006, Iranian officials pointed to the presence of British troops in southern Iraq, close to the Iranian border, and established that terrorist groups operating in Khuzestan were receiving assistance from British military personnel and facilities.
Parliamentarian Alaeddin Boroujerdi raised concern about British involvement, citing the presence of British forces near the border and information about their previous involvement in unrest in Khuzestan.
In January 2006, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki stated that London had a clear connection with the bombings, that those responsible had links to British officials, and that they enjoyed the cooperation of British army commanders.
He referred to the use of British facilities in Basra. The episode stands as one of the clearest examples of Britain facilitating violence inside Iran through its military presence in Iraq.
Royal Navy and Iranian maritime sovereignty
The Royal Navy became the subject of a direct sovereignty issue in March 2007, when Iranian forces detained 15 British sailors and marines from HMS Cornwall in the northern Persian Gulf.
Iran established that the British personnel had entered Iranian territorial waters illegally while conducting an inspection of a merchant vessel.
The Foreign Ministry condemned the illegal and interventionist entry by British forces, describing the incident as suspicious and contrary to international rules.
The detention lasted 13 days and became a major diplomatic confrontation between the two countries. Iranian officials said the episode was evidence of British disregard for Iran’s maritime sovereignty.
In July 2019, British forces seized the Iranian tanker Grace 1 off Gibraltar, an illegal seizure of an Iranian vessel that Tehran saw as an attempt to restrict its oil exports.
Iranian authorities rejected the legality of the operation and asserted that Britain had no right to prevent Iran from selling oil to its customers.
Later that month, on July 19, the IRGC Navy seized the British-flagged tanker Stena Impero in the Strait of Hormuz after the vessel violated maritime regulations, ignored warnings, followed an incorrect traffic route and switched off its navigation system.
Interference in domestic affairs
Following Iran’s presidential election in June 2009 and the subsequent engineered protests, British institutions worked to support and inflame the unrest and destabilize the Islamic Republic.
The British embassy in Tehran, British diplomats, the BBC’s Persian-language service and intelligence networks operating under diplomatic and journalistic cover were all implicated.
British diplomats were present among those who indulged in violent riots. Embassy-linked contacts helped coordinate political activity. Individuals working under journalistic cover gathered intelligence.
Britain conducted psychological operations through BBC Persian and supported political networks opposed to the Iranian government
These operations reinforced the longstanding reality that British diplomatic and media activity serves intelligence and political objectives—activity that contributed to the deterioration of bilateral relations and culminated in the 2011 protest against the British embassy and the closure of the mission.
Complicity in the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists
From 2010 onward, British intelligence was connected with American and Israeli operations against Iran’s nuclear program.
The assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists became a central part of this record. While the killings were carried out by Israeli Mossad, MI6 and the CIA assisted in intelligence collection, operational planning, training and the identification of targets.
In December 2010, then-Interior Minister Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar announced that individuals arrested in connection with attacks on Iranian scientists had confessed to links with Western intelligence services, including MI6, the CIA and Mossad.
The assassination of nuclear scientist Majid Shahriari in 2020 formed part of a coordinated effort by Israeli intelligence and its Western counterparts, including MI6 and the CIA, to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program.
In November 2013, the head of MI6, John Sawers, discussed the role of British intelligence in the international pressure campaign against Iran, acknowledging that intelligence activity had contributed to the pressure on Tehran and the sanctions regime.
His remarks confirmed hostile British intelligence activity against the Islamic Republic.
In December 2013, the head of the Kerman Revolutionary Court, Dadkhoda Salari, announced the arrest of an individual accused of spying for MI6.
The suspect had maintained contact with four British intelligence officers and had met them 11 times, both inside and outside Iran.
Salari collected information requested by the British officers and received instructions intended to undermine Iranian national interests. He confessed to the allegations, and judicial proceedings were underway.
Intelligence penetration and the Akbari case
In July 2022, the IRGC Intelligence Organization announced that several foreign diplomats had been detained after collecting soil samples in Iran’s central desert.
Giles Whitaker, then the British deputy ambassador, was specifically identified, and the activity was connected with intelligence gathering.
The area was near a military and missile-related site. The British diplomat was expelled from the area, and the case became part of the established record that British diplomatic personnel collect sensitive information under civilian and scientific cover.
The most prominent recent case involving an MI6 agent was that of Alireza Akbari, a former Iranian deputy defense minister holding Iranian and British citizenship.
In January 2023, Iran announced that Akbari had been executed after being convicted of spying for MI6. Iranian judicial and intelligence authorities established that he had provided MI6 with sensitive information about Iranian officials and strategic institutions over an extended period.
The Intelligence Ministry described him as an infiltrating agent who had obtained access to sensitive centers and transferred information to British intelligence officers.
Akbari met MI6 officers during trips to Europe and was recruited through contacts associated with research and business institutions.
The information he supplied included details about 178 Iranian figures, among them top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who was assassinated near Tehran in November 2020.
The case demonstrated the consequences of MI6 penetration of Iran’s state institutions.
Latest turn of events
The November 1, 2026 designations respond to Britain’s most recent hostile acts. The British government initially declined to authorize the use of its bases for American attacks, but subsequently permitted US forces to use RAF Fairford in England and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean for operations against Iranian missile facilities.
Tehran regards the provision of bases, facilities and logistical support as participation in hostile military operations against Iran.
On July 13, 2026, London placed the IRGC under the State Threats Act 2026, a hostile measure against a central institution of the Islamic Republic. The Foreign Ministry’s statement cited both actions as grounds for the designations.
The November 2026 designations mark a formal escalation in Iran’s treatment of Britain’s armed forces.
MI6 has been designated a hostile group—a status reflecting its record of espionage, surveillance, recruitment of Iranian informants, support for armed groups, interference in domestic politics and cooperation in operations against the nuclear program.
The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force have been designated terrorist organizations—a status reflecting the Royal Navy’s violations of Iranian maritime sovereignty and Britain’s use of its military bases and facilities for operations against Iran.
The Royal Navy’s record includes the 2007 violation of Iranian territorial waters, the illegal 2019 seizure of the Grace 1, and Britain’s broader military presence in the Persian Gulf.
The RAF’s record includes the 1941 bombing of Ahvaz and, most recently, the provision of British bases for US operations against Iranian missile facilities.
These designations are adopted in accordance with the principles of international law and within the framework of reciprocity. The British government bears responsibility for their consequences.
The message from Tehran is clear: Britain’s century of hostility against Iran—from the 1941 invasion and the 1953 coup to espionage, support for armed groups, interference in domestic affairs, complicity in the assassination of Iranian scientists and the provision of bases for attacks on Iranian territory—will no longer go unanswered.
Iran has acted to protect its national security and interests, and it will continue to do so against any hostile power that violates its sovereignty.
Yousef Ramazani is a military affairs analyst based in Tehran.
November 10, 2026 Posted by aletho | Timeless or most popular, Wars for Israel | Iran, MI6, UK, United States, Zionism | Comments Off on Why Iran designated British MI6, Royal Navy, and RAF as hostile, terrorist organizations
Kafr Qasim at 70: The massacre Israel still hasn’t owned up to

Israeli soldiers conduct a military raid in the Old City of Nablus, northern West Bank, Palestine on November 1, 2026. [Nedal Eshtayah – Anadolu Agency]
By Dr Mustafa Fetouri | MEMO | November 6, 2026
Israel almost always promises to investigate allegations of misconduct by its military, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), which it often portrays as the most moral army in the world. Yet such investigations rarely lead to meaningful accountability, particularly in major cases involving the killing of civilians. They can drag on for months, sometimes years, and when conclusions are eventually announced; they tend to produce one of two outcomes: either no criminal wrongdoing is established, or responsibility is attributed to an individual soldier, usually a low-ranking one, while the commanders and the wider chain of command are spared. A minor disciplinary measure follows, and the case is effectively closed.
This pattern is not new. It is deeply rooted in the history of Israel’s establishment and how it conducts itself. More importantly, it helps reinforce an image Israel has carefully cultivated since its creation: that of a tiny but highly modern and democratic country, where the rule of law is supreme and justice is not merely a principle embedded in the state’s legal culture but a way of life, surrounded by a sea of “savages” determined to destroy it.
Last week marked 70 years since Israel committed one of its most notorious massacres of Palestinian citizens, in the small Palestinian village of Kafr Qasim, in central what is now Israel, east of Tel Aviv. Unlike hundreds of Palestinian villages depopulated and erased from the map following Israel’s establishment in 1948, Kafr Qasim survived and retains its name. It is now a Palestinian Arab town, with a memorial to the victims erected in 1976 and a museum preserving the memory of the massacre. On the evening of 29th October 1956, as Israel launched its invasion of Egypt alongside Britain and France, Israeli Border Police officers stopped groups of Palestinian villagers returning home after a day’s work in the fields, quarries and elsewhere outside the village. They had committed no offence and had no knowledge of what was happening: they were unaware that the Israeli military had suddenly imposed a curfew. Earlier that afternoon, the normal curfew time of 10 pm had been brought forward to 5 pm, with the village’s local leadership receiving only half an hour’s notice. The returning workers were given no warning or opportunity to explain their ignorance. Instead, the Border Police opened fire on them at close range. Within an hour, 47 people had been killed in Kafr Qasim alone, including women and children. The massacre is commonly commemorated as the killing of 49 Palestinians, although a more comprehensive archival accounting by the Israeli research institute Akevot puts the total at 51 lives, including two people killed in neighbouring villages, an unborn child and an elderly man who died several hours after the shootings.
The massacre was not the result of a spontaneous confrontation but an intentional mass killing of innocent civilians.
The commanding officer, Colonel Issachar Shadmi, commander of the Israeli army’s 17th Brigade, had ordered the curfew ordered the Border Police officers to enforce the curfew against anyone found outside after 5 pm. The instruction was followed to the letter, and the result was the mass murder of dozens of Palestinian civilians. In an attempt to contain the political damage and protect its image, Israel established a commission of inquiry, followed by the prosecution of 11 Border Police officers. Eight were convicted in October 1958, including battalion commander Major Shmuel Malinki and Lieutenant Gavriel Dahan, who were sentenced to 17 and 15 years respectively. Three others were acquitted. But the convictions did not translate into lasting punishment. Appeals, sentence reductions, presidential commutations and early releases progressively dismantled the original sentences. By March 1960, less than two years after convictions, all eight were free,
Shadmi himself was tried separately, acquitted of murder and convicted only of abuse of authority for imposing the curfew without authorisation. His punishment was among the most shameful in the history of justice: a reprimand and a fine of just ten Israeli prutot, equivalent at the time to approximately half a US cent!
The man at the top of the chain of command escaped a murder conviction, while those who carried out the killings served only a fraction of their original sentences. Ask Israel today about Kafr Qasim and the likely answer would be: of course it was a crime, and those responsible were punished under the law! In details it might add that: it investigated, prosecuted and convicted those responsible. But such an answer deliberately ignores what happened after the verdicts: practically the entire process and its outcome were a joke by any judicial standards.
The same pattern of shambolic accountability continues to this day. A BBC Verify investigation published on 15th October 2026 provides compelling evidence of how little has changed over the last 70 years. The investigation examined more than 60,000 published reports and identified 300 separate incidents in which the Israeli military had said it was investigating allegations of killing or injuring people during Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza, the occupied West Bank, Lebanon and Israel since 7th October 2023. Of these, the IDF announced the outcome of only 28 cases, while the status of another 18 remained unclear. The remaining 254 had no publicly available outcome. At least one person was reportedly killed in more than 200 of these incidents, and some investigations dated back to late 2023. As is usually the case, despite repeated requests, the IDF failed to provide transparent updates on the status of these investigations, either to the BBC or to anyone else. The idea is the same: say a great deal but reveal very little of substance, in order to continue controlling the damage and safeguarding the illusionary image of the “most moral army in the world”, while continuing to commit all kinds of crimes against largely innocent civilians, including more than 20,000 children, in the Gaza genocide alone.
And again, the Israeli criminal military maintained that it took allegations seriously. But this is precisely the problem: announcing an investigation is not the same as completing one, and completing one is not the same as holding those responsible accountable. The IDF’s strategy appears to be based on a simple calculation: announce an investigation, allow it to disappear into the bureaucratic maze, and wait for public attention to fade. As time passes, people either forget or become overwhelmed by the growing number of new crimes committed and new investigations announced. Since so little of substance ever emerges from Israeli investigations into alleged crimes by its forces, few people take these repeated promises of accountability by Israel’s deeply hypocritical judicial system seriously.
Seventy years after Kafr Qasim, the central question remains the same: how many investigations, inquiries and official promises of accountability must pass before those responsible for killing Palestinian civilians actually face justice?
November 6, 2026 Posted by aletho | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Timeless or most popular | Human rights, Israel, Palestine, Zionism | Comments Off on Kafr Qasim at 70: The massacre Israel still hasn’t owned up to
Israeli Soldiers Inadvertently Prove Their Own Genocidal Guilt
By Thomas Karat | The Libertarian Institute | October 28, 2026
It usually began with the engineers walking the length of a street, threading charges through house after house along a whole block. Then the countdown, and then the block went down together, a single rolling wall of dust where a neighborhood had stood, and over the noise the men who had wired it could be heard cheering. The soldier holding the phone kept it steady on the collapse, because he was proud of it, and he posted it when it was done. This was not one street or one crew. The same scene plays across Gaza in thousands of clips, filmed by unit after unit who set the charges and whooped as the buildings fell, some of them dedicating the blast to a dead comrade or a holiday back home. The deliberate leveling of whole residential blocks, which the men who set the charges filmed and cheered as it happened, is among the most common scenes in the entire archive of soldier video.
The law speaks directly to this. The Fourth Geneva Convention forbids an occupying army from destroying civilian property unless a specific military operation leaves it no choice, and the extensive, wanton destruction of property is listed among the grave breaches that count as war crimes. A victory video is the clearest possible proof that the test was not met. A building demolished out of genuine operational need is not an occasion for celebration. The cheer on the soundtrack is the admission. The block came down because the army could and wished to, and someone filmed it to be enjoyed later.
The prisoners were the other great subject. Across the strip soldiers filmed the men they had rounded up, stripped to their underwear and blindfolded, made to kneel in long rows, and they filmed themselves standing over them. One case stands for the pattern. In December 2023 a soldier named Yossi Gamzoo posted footage of a Palestinian stripped and bound, bleeding, under interrogation at Gaza College, then marched barefoot through the street, and a second clip of hundreds of men herded into Yarmouk stadium, many in their underwear, some blindfolded, kneeling in rows, three women among them on their knees behind a goal. Another soldier, later identified as Ilya Blank, set a montage of blindfolded detainees crammed into a pickup truck, a comrade grinning and raising a thumb, to an Israeli rap track. These were not stray cruelties. The Geneva Conventions require that people in custody be treated humanely and protected from public curiosity, and the lawyers who examined the footage for the BBC found that it breached those rules. The soldiers filmed the breaches under their own names, for an audience they trusted to cheer.
Some of the worst was never meant to be seen, and surfaced only because someone inside leaked it. On August 6, 2024, Israel’s Channel 12 broadcast surveillance video from Sde Teiman, a military camp in southern Israel holding Palestinians taken from Gaza. It showed soldiers walking a detainee into a corner and closing around him with riot shields, so that what they did to him happened just out of the camera’s reach. The army’s own indictment spelled out what the shields had hidden. The soldiers set upon the man with severe sexual violence and drove a sharp object into him that penetrated near his rectum and tore the rectal wall. The same assault left him with cracked ribs and a punctured lung. The broadcast called it a rape; the charges that came stopped at aggravated assault.
One kind of footage the soldiers made themselves and published as a trophy. The other had to be dragged into the open against them. Both ended up in the same place, beyond the reach of the men who appeared in it and the state that sent them, as evidence in front of courts and investigators far from the ground where it was filmed.
Every state that has ever set out to erase the evidence of its crimes has begun from the same position. It held the record, and the work was to destroy or bury it before anyone on the outside could see. My last article followed Britain doing exactly that with the paper archive of its empire. Israel’s war in Gaza has produced something that method was never built for. The evidence was not held by the state and then concealed. It was made by the perpetrators and broadcast by them, in real time, before any authority had the chance to decide what the public would be allowed to know. The confession arrived ahead of the cover-up, and the cover-up has been running backwards ever since.
Outside investigators turned the flood of posts into a map. The Palestinian journalist Younis Tirawi spent months identifying soldiers and their units from what they had published, among them a sniper team he traced after one of its members uploaded a video that recounted the unit’s operations in Gaza City and showed unarmed people being shot. Tirawi gathered post after post of soldiers displaying the lingerie and the mannequins of the women whose homes they had taken. Al Jazeera’s investigative unit, pulling the wider record together, built a database of more than two and a half thousand accounts belonging to serving soldiers.
The posts did more than embarrass. They turned into evidence that followed the men who made them. A Belgian group, the Hind Rajab Foundation, began converting soldiers’ own social media into criminal complaints, identifying individuals from what they had published and lodging cases wherever those individuals travelled. Within a year the group had filed around fifty complaints in courts around the world and handed the International Criminal Court the names of a thousand soldiers, backed by thousands of items of footage and posts. In Brazil a judge issued an arrest warrant against one soldier, who evaded it only by slipping across the border into Argentina. A complaint in Portugal rested on a sniper’s own online boast of four bullets and no misses. The group built a further case in Belgium against a dual-national member of the sniper team, around the siege of a Gaza hospital. The Israeli military answered by warning its soldiers to stop posting the details of their service and by urging some of them to leave the countries they were visiting before they could be seized.
The audience was wider than any poster had reckoned on. When South Africa brought its genocide case against Israel to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, its lawyers played the soldiers’ own videos in the courtroom and read out the statements the soldiers had made on camera, offering them as evidence of intent. The court found the Palestinians’ claim to protection from genocide plausible and handed down binding provisional measures. One of them ordered Israel to take effective steps to prevent the destruction and to ensure the preservation of evidence bearing on the allegations. A later order went further and required Israel to let United Nations investigators into Gaza to secure that evidence. A court in The Hague was reduced to instructing a state not to destroy the proof of what it stood accused of, in the same weeks that the proof was being uploaded by the state’s own soldiers.
From that point the machinery of erasure ran in reverse. A government that in an earlier age would have controlled the only copies now had to chase material that was already public and already on other people’s drives. In February 2024 the chief of the general staff, Herzi Halevi, wrote to his commanders telling soldiers not to loot and not to shoot revenge videos, and in a separate message assured his own ranks that the army was not on a killing spree and was not committing genocide. Soldiers who had posted footage of their demolitions were told to take it down. The stated worry, in the words of the military’s own people, was that the clips could feed the cases building at the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. By the middle of 2025 the chief military censor had issued an order restricting what could be posted about strikes at all. The instruction reaching the soldier had less to do with the enemy in front of him than with the camera in his hand.
The pursuit did not stop at the soldiers’ phones. By 2026 the army’s chief of staff had instructed the military’s lawyers to examine legal action against the makers of a prize-winning documentary NAZA in which soldiers described the deliberate mass killing of civilians in Gaza, and the prime minister called the film shocking. The effort had travelled from deleting a soldier’s post to pursuing the people who gathered such material into an account the world might watch.
The deleting did not fall evenly. While the soldiers’ trophies moved freely, the documentation coming from the other side was being swept off the same platforms. Across October and November 2023, Human Rights Watch logged more than a thousand removals and suppressions of Palestinian content on Instagram and Facebook. Of the 1,050 cases it examined, 1,049 concerned peaceful content in support of Palestinians, and a single one supported Israel. The suppression took six recurring forms, from outright removal and account suspension to shadow-banning and the blocking of live video, and it reached even posts that carried clear news value. Human Rights Watch traced the pattern to automated moderation and to government pressure on what the company agreed to pull, among it referrals from Israel’s state cyber unit. The throttling grew heavy enough that Palestinians and their supporters took to misspelling the word Gaza, or standing in a watermelon for the banned flag, to get a post past the filters. A United States senator wrote to the company about it. Meta’s own commissioned review had already found, the year before the war, that its moderation was damaging Palestinian rights. For a stretch of the fighting the record of the people being bombed was harder to keep online than the footage shot by the people bombing them.
Beneath the new problem, the older kinds of erasure went on as they always have. The physical record of Gaza was being destroyed with everything else. Early in the war an airstrike flattened the Central Archives of Gaza City, which held about a hundred and fifty years of the territory’s history in some 110,000 documents and photographs. The library of the Islamic University of Gaza had already been leveled in the war’s second week, and the public library of Gaza City, with its ten thousand volumes, went soon after. United Nations experts put a word to the wider assault on schooling, scholasticide, the deliberate destruction of a people’s means of knowing itself. By their count more than 80% of Gaza’s schools were damaged or destroyed. Among the dead were 5,479 students and 261 of their teachers, along with ninety-five university professors. The last functioning university was demolished in January 2024, after the army had held it for seventy days as a base and a detention site. One survey of the cultural wreckage counted at least twenty-two of Gaza’s archives and libraries destroyed or damaged in the first three months alone.
The people who keep the record were being killed alongside it. By the reckoning of the Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024 was the deadliest year for the press since the group began counting in 1992, with 124 killed, most of them Palestinians in Gaza, and roughly 60% of the global toll laid at Israel’s door. The dead included Hamza Dahdouh, himself a journalist and the son of a journalist, killed in a strike on his car, and Ismail al-Ghoul with his cameraman Rami al-Rifi, killed in a vehicle that carried press markings while both wore vests identifying them as media. Thirty-one of those killed in Gaza were freelancers who had stepped in after their newsrooms were destroyed and most journalists were killed, filling a gap that existed because Israel kept foreign correspondents out except on escorted military trips, a bar that more than fifty of those correspondents signed a letter to protest.
The oldest layer of all reaches back to the founding. For two decades, under a chief who ran it until 2007, a secretive unit of the Israeli defence ministry known by the Hebrew acronym Malmab has been pulling documents out of the state’s own archives, often with no legal authority, and in some cases resealing papers that the military censor had already cleared for release. The historian Benny Morris (whom this author interviewed) found that files he had quoted fifteen years earlier were no longer open to him. The largest archive in the country, the military’s own, sits almost completely sealed. Among the documents withdrawn was an internal report on how Palestinian villages were destroyed in the first months of the 1948 war, a record that cuts against the official account of people who simply chose to leave. The method is the one Britain would know at once, the quiet removal of a document that was already in the open.
Libertarian theorist Murray Rothbard argued that a state survives less by force than by managing what its subjects can be brought to believe about it. The soldiers’ footage took that management out of the state’s hands for a season, and the deleting that has followed has not fully restored it.
What binds these methods together is also what sets this case apart from the British one. Britain had time and a monopoly. It held the only copies, and it had fifty years and a locked building in which to decide what the world would ever see. Israel has had neither of those advantages. The decisive evidence in its war was made by its own soldiers and handed to the internet before any censor could reach it. It was copied to strangers’ drives within hours and read into the record of a court before any order to delete it could take hold. A government can burn an archive, because an archive sits in one place. Unpublishing a confession that several thousand men have already made to the world is a harder thing by far. The attempt goes on regardless, and the attempt, as in every case that came before it, is its own kind of admission.
November 4, 2026 Posted by aletho | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Full Spectrum Dominance, Subjugation - Torture, Timeless or most popular, War Crimes | Human rights, Israel, Palestine, Zionism | Comments Off on Israeli Soldiers Inadvertently Prove Their Own Genocidal Guilt
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How CIA used Ukraine as a platform for covert war against Russia
By Stephen KINZER | Responsible Statecraft | November 17, 2026
The following is an excerpt from Stephen Kinzer’s new book: Boiling Point: How America Brought War to Ukraine (Henry Holt and Company, November 2026)
Huddled beside an airstrip in southern Germany, a handful of anti-Communist warriors prepared to fire the first shots of the Cold War. A CIA officer from the Munich Operations Base was in charge. The Hungarian crewmen he had recruited stood nearby in flight suits. With them were two Ukrainian exiles who had volunteered to parachute into their homeland. They were code-named Apostle 1 and Apostle 2. Each carried forged identity papers, a miniature radio transmitter, a pistol, a machine gun, hand grenades, a purse full of gold coins, and a poison pill to be taken in case of capture. An unmarked C-47 transport plane was waiting.
The CIA officer overseeing this operation, a twenty-six-year-old Yale graduate named Stephen Tanner, watched the plane take off and disappear into the night. It flew over East Germany and Poland, then crossed into Soviet airspace. As it approached the Ukrainian city of Lviv, a cargo bay swung open. The two Ukrainians jumped into the darkness. Their mission was to link up with partisan fighters, seize territory, and establish a clandestine base through which the CIA could send them weapons.
That flight, on September 5, 1949, was the first American act of covert war in Ukraine. … continue
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