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BRICS+ Series: Why the Egypt-UAE Energy Partnership Signals a New Phase for the Global South

By Chloe Maluleke and Dr Iqbal Survé | IOL | July 3, 2026

The latest discussions between Egypt and the United Arab Emirates on expanding natural gas production in the Nile Delta represent more than another investment agreement in the energy sector. They illustrate a broader transformation underway across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where energy security, technological capability and regional capital are increasingly being mobilised from within the Global South rather than relying exclusively on Western financing and expertise.

For decades, energy partnerships in the MENA region largely followed a familiar pattern. Resource-rich states exported hydrocarbons while multinational energy companies from Europe and North America supplied technology, finance and operational expertise. That model is gradually evolving. Today’s agreements increasingly reflect cooperation between emerging economies that possess complementary strengths and shared strategic interests.

Egypt occupies a unique position in this transition. It is simultaneously an African, Arab and Mediterranean nation, giving it significant geopolitical value. While its domestic gas production has fluctuated in recent years because of declining output from mature fields and rising domestic consumption, Cairo remains determined to restore its status as a regional energy hub. The country’s existing liquefied natural gas (LNG) export infrastructure, strategic location along the Suez Canal and established pipeline connections position it as a gateway linking African producers with European and Asian markets.

The UAE, meanwhile, has become one of the Global South’s most influential sources of investment capital. Emirati sovereign wealth funds and state-backed energy companies are increasingly deploying finance across Africa and the wider Middle East, extending beyond traditional oil investments into renewable energy, logistics, ports and advanced extraction technologies. This reflects Abu Dhabi’s long-term strategy of securing energy assets while diversifying its international investment portfolio.

The proposed expansion of geological exploration in Egypt’s Nile Delta therefore serves multiple strategic purposes. It seeks to increase Egypt’s domestic gas output, reduce reliance on costly imports and strengthen export capacity. Equally important, it demonstrates how regional investors are assuming greater responsibility for financing critical energy infrastructure within their own neighbourhood.

For the MENA region, such cooperation strengthens economic resilience during a period of heightened geopolitical uncertainty. Conflicts across the Middle East, disruptions to shipping routes and volatile commodity prices have reinforced the importance of reliable regional supply chains. Expanding domestic production reduces vulnerability to external shocks while allowing countries greater flexibility in balancing domestic demand with export commitments.

The initiative also reflects the growing importance of technological modernisation in hydrocarbon production. Advanced drilling techniques, digital reservoir management and improved recovery methods are enabling countries to maximise output from existing fields without relying solely on new discoveries. Technology transfer has become as strategically valuable as financial investment, particularly for countries seeking to optimise mature energy assets.

The implications extend well beyond North Africa. Across the Global South, governments are increasingly pursuing development strategies centred on South-South cooperation. Rather than depending exclusively on traditional development partners, countries are building networks of investment, expertise and infrastructure with fellow emerging economies. This approach aligns with a broader effort to reshape international economic governance around more diversified partnerships.

For BRICS, the Egypt-UAE partnership reinforces several long-standing objectives. Egypt’s accession to BRICS expanded the grouping’s presence in Africa and the Arab world, strengthening its representation across key energy-producing regions. Although the UAE is not geographically located within North Africa, its growing investment footprint across the continent complements BRICS’ broader emphasis on infrastructure financing, industrial development and economic integration among developing economies.

The partnership also supports BRICS’ vision of enhancing energy security through diversified production and investment channels. As global energy markets become increasingly fragmented by geopolitical tensions, emerging economies are seeking to reduce exposure to concentrated supply chains and external political risks. Regional cooperation between BRICS members and partner economies helps create a more distributed and resilient energy architecture.

However, challenges remain. Expanding natural gas production requires sustained investment, regulatory certainty and environmental stewardship. Natural gas is frequently presented as a transition fuel capable of supporting economic development while renewable energy capacity expands, yet long-term climate commitments will continue to shape investment decisions. Egypt and the UAE will therefore need to balance immediate energy security objectives with growing international pressure to accelerate decarbonisation. [emphasis added]

Ultimately, the significance of the Egypt-UAE energy discussions lies not simply in additional gas wells or increased reserves. They reflect a deeper shift in how emerging economies are organising capital, technology and political partnerships. As the Global South assumes a more active role in financing its own development, regional cooperation is becoming an increasingly important pillar of economic resilience. In that sense, the Nile Delta may represent not only a source of natural gas, but also a symbol of a changing global economic order in which the future of energy is being shaped as much by cooperation within the Global South as by traditional centres of power.

Dr Iqbal Survé is a past chairman of the BRICS Business Council and co-chairman of the BRICS Media Forum and the BRNN.

Chloe Maluleke is an Associate at BRICS+ Consulting Group, Russia & Middle East Specialist.

July 31, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , | Comments Off on BRICS+ Series: Why the Egypt-UAE Energy Partnership Signals a New Phase for the Global South

From Tehran to Riyadh: How Israel Draws the Red Lines America Can’t Cross

By Jamal Kanj | MEMO | July 30, 2026

Israel dragged America into another war, then sat back on the spectator bench and watched U.S. taxpayers foot the bill. Borrowed money burned into bombs. Billions more bled out at gas stations and in inflation, all to reopen a strait that was open before Donald was duped into fighting Benjamin’s war. Now Benjamin Netanyahu watches from a safe distance, gloating as missiles fly between the U.S. forces and Iran in a war he spent years pushing Washington to fight.

At home, flag-draped caskets of American soldiers arriving home from a war Israel instigated and American soldiers carried out. In Congress, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth stood before the Senate requesting more money to keep the war running.

Lawmakers asked to sign the check for a war they never voted to authorize, fought for aims Washington did not set, with no accounting of when — or how— it ends.

In occupied Palestine, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich tells a settler conference that “Israel has no interest in joining the campaign . . .  a confined campaign between Iran and the United States, is the correct [situation] and best for us [Israel].” In layman language, let’s sit and watch Americans die and pay for our war.

Exhibit A: the U.S. military is depleting its own missile-defense stockpiles defending its bases across the region, while Israel hoards its interceptors in reserve. Israel isn’t spending down its stockpile. It’s waiting for the moment American stocks run dry and the Gulf states are left exposed. When that moment comes, Israeli interceptors will become prized leverage, offered to the UAE and the rest of the Gulf at a price.

Last Sunday on Fox News, Netanyahu outlined to America his goals for the war against Iran. A foreign prime minister, on American airwaves, essentially setting the terms and the finish line for an American war, fought by American pilots, funded by American taxpayers, and now apparently concluded at Israel’s discretion. Whatever Trump negotiates, whatever Washington decides, Netanyahu has already told America it doesn’t matter. He isn’t waiting to end the war on Israel’s terms. He’s informing it.

But it is not only America’s war policy that runs through Tel Aviv. It is diplomacy and commerce too. When Washington signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, and the deal was announced, ink dry, both governments on record. Within a day, President Trump reversed course, declaring the agreement was contingent on Saudi normalization with Israel.

Israeli officials do not even try to be diplomatic on how they run Washington policy. Before Trump added the new condition, Israel’s Culture and Sports Minister, Miki Zohar, told Army Radio that “Israel has been clear with the United States about its red lines.” Those are the words of a government that understands it holds a veto pen, set red lines, and where America listens.

Think about it, an Israeli minister speaks openly of red lines over an American commercial and strategic agreement with one of the world’s largest oil exporters, a country central to Gulf security architecture Washington has spent decades building. It did not matter that the Saudi deal serves American energy and strategic interests. It mattered only that Tel Aviv had not yet signed off.

The issue isn’t whether Israel tries to shape American war strategy, or whether its leaders draw red lines Washington isn’t allowed to cross. The real question is why American leaders, across the political spectrum, permit a strategically insignificant country to wield such extraordinary influence over the foreign policy of the world’s only superpower.

Israeli red lines prompted America’s Israel-first loyalists to abruptly discover the agreement was a nuclear proliferation threat. For decades, they have defended, excused, or ignored Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal. Yet the prospect of a Saudi civilian nuclear program suddenly provokes moral outrage. The issue was never stopping nuclear proliferation. It was about sequencing. They would be willing to kosher a Saudi civilian nuclear program the day after, not before, it recognizes Israel.

If Arab capitals want an American relationship that serves their own security and economic interests, they need to stop mistaking proximity for leverage. For years the strategy has been to buy access, funneling billions to powerful intermediaries like Jared Kushner, treating him as the private door into the Oval Office.

But Kushner is no neutral broker. He is an Israel-first advocate who built his post-White House fortune partly on Arab capital while shaping Middle East policy on Israel’s behalf and now uses his wealth to finance Jewish-only colonies built on stolen Palestinian land.

The United Arab Emirates lived this irony in hard numbers. Kushner sold Abu Dhabi on the Abraham Accords with a promise attached: normalize with Israel, and the most advanced American fighter jet in the world would follow, a $23 billion sale of fifty F-35s. The UAE delivered its half instantly, recognition, embassies, open skies. Washington delivered Israel every benefit of that deal. The jets never came. Years of “technical requirements,” stalled reviews, and quiet reversals later.

Trump wants to sell Saudi Arabia the promise of a commercial agreement, but deliver Israel an immediate recognition. The Arab cow gets milked for capital, investment, and diplomatic goodwill, and when the moment comes to deliver, the payoff is led instead to the Israeli altar. Every dollar spent courting Kushner, every concession made in good faith, has purchased not access but the illusion of it, never enough to collect on.

Arab regimes must understand that neither buying access to the president through Israel-first loyalists like Kushner, nor hosting the American bases that fight wars designed in and for Tel Aviv, will change U.S. policy — not while Israel holds the lobby power to dictate red lines American leaders dare not cross.

July 30, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Comments Off on From Tehran to Riyadh: How Israel Draws the Red Lines America Can’t Cross

Fars: US evacuates bases in Qatar and UAE, satellite images show

Al Mayadeen | July 25, 2026

Iranian news agency Fars reported, citing satellite imagery, that the United States has evacuated two military bases in the UAE and Qatar.

According to the agency, US forces evacuated Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE and Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

Fars said satellite images from Sentinel-2, dated July 24, 2026, showed the evacuation of the US military base in the UAE. The agency said five US military aircraft had been stationed at Al Dhafra three days earlier, while the satellite images showed that they had since been evacuated.

US reportedly evacuates Al Dhafra Air Base

Al Dhafra Air Base is located south of Abu Dhabi and hosts the US Air Force’s 380th Air Expeditionary Wing. It is considered a key strategic hub for reconnaissance, aerial refueling, and air defense operations, as well as a major center supporting military operations in the region and providing intelligence coverage across West Asia.

Fars also reported that satellite images showed Washington had fully evacuated Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

Al Udeid Air Base is located west of Doha and is considered the largest US military base in West Asia. It hosts the forward headquarters of US Central Command (CENTCOM) and the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing.

The two bases played a key role in US military operations during the latest US aggression against Iran, which began on February 28 and resumed more than three weeks ago.

Destruction of fighter jets at Azraq base and acknowledgment of casualties

The developments coincided with the release earlier on Sunday of additional satellite images documenting the destruction of a military aircraft hangar inside Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, also known as Azraq Air Base, in Jordan, which hosts US forces.

Earlier today, the IRGC conducted a simultaneous missile and drone strike against the US base in Azraq, Jordan, targeting fighter shelters and a large parking ramp, according to the IRGC’s Public Relations Office.

In a statement, the IRGC reported that the operation was carried out in the early morning hours as part of the 20th wave of Operation Nasr 2. The strike was launched in response to the US aggression the previous night, the statement said.

“With a crushing and simultaneous missile and drone attack on the fighter shelters and a large parking ramp at the American base in Azraq, Jordan,” the IRGC said, “at least two American fighter jets and three American aircraft were completely destroyed while inflicting major damage on a number of others.”

The strikes came shortly after a series of successive attacks launched by Iranian armed forces against US bases in the region, including Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, where the US side acknowledged the deaths of two American soldiers and the loss of another.

Earlier, US network Fox News reported that at least 13 American soldiers had been injured as a result of recent Iranian attacks targeting US bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan.

Damage in Erbil and fires at a Kuwaiti power station

As part of the simultaneous Iranian attacks, footage circulated showing a fire breaking out at a Kuwaiti power station following an Iranian strike.

Additional footage and satellite images also showed the extent of damage inflicted on the US military base in the city of Erbil, the capital of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, after it was targeted by Iranian missile strikes.

In this context, media outlets reported that US officials acknowledged that Iran’s missile capabilities had undergone significant qualitative development, enabling them to effectively bypass US interception and defense systems deployed across the region.

The officials explained that Tehran now possesses advanced missiles capable of traveling at extremely high speeds and maneuvering during the final phase of their trajectory before striking their designated targets.

It is worth noting that Tehran maintains that it harbors no hostility toward the peoples of the region, stressing that its strikes are aimed at US bases in response to repeated US aggression on Iranian territory that has killed and wounded civilians, including women and children.

July 25, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Fars: US evacuates bases in Qatar and UAE, satellite images show

No route around Hormuz: Why West Asia’s pipeline alternatives fall short

The rush to bypass Hormuz leads back to the same problem: Every alternative route remains hostage to war, rival chokepoints, or political disputes.

By Hussein Askary | The Cradle | July 23, 2026

“The only alternative to the Strait of Hormuz is the Strait of Hormuz.”

This blunt assessment, offered by an Iraqi expert in a recent interview, captures the central weakness in the rush to revive old pipeline schemes and promote new ones across West Asia. Since Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz after Israel and the US launched their second war against it in February 2026, the region has been flooded with proposals for alternative oil-export routes.

Washington has encouraged these plans, while several governments have presented dormant or unfinished pipelines as strategic solutions. Yet the closer one looks at geography, markets, costs, capacity, and security, the clearer it becomes that most of these projects cannot substitute for Hormuz.

Even if oil bypasses the strait, it still faces the rival chokepoint of Bab al-Mandab, where the Ansarallah-aligned armed forces have declared a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia and attacked Saudi tankers.

These expensive detours will remain exposed unless security in the Persian Gulf itself improves. Until the war on Iran ends and an inclusive regional security architecture is established, Iranian and Yemeni missiles and drones can reach the pipelines and loading terminals built to evade them.

Asia still runs through Hormuz

The first reason is straightforward. The Strait of Hormuz is the natural outlet of the Gulf energy system. In 2024, oil flows through the strait averaged about 20 million barrels per day (bpd), roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. The International Energy Agency (IEA) describes it as one of the world’s most important oil transit chokepoints.

Most of this oil is not heading west. About 80 percent of the oil moving through Hormuz is destined for Asia, with China, India, Japan, South Korea, and other Asian economies as the principal buyers. The pattern is even clearer for liquefied natural gas (LNG).

The US Energy Information Administration estimated that 83 percent of LNG moving through Hormuz in 2024 went from Persian Gulf exporters to Asian markets, especially China, India, and South Korea.

This market reality matters because many proposed alternatives send oil away from its main customers. Pipelines to the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, or the Levant may appear useful on a map, but they often move Gulf crude farther from Asia rather than closer to it.

Commercially, building multibillion-dollar infrastructure to move oil westward, only to redirect it by sea toward Asian markets, is inefficient. If Hormuz is open, the direct route remains cheaper and faster. If it is closed by war, the underlying problem is not a lack of pipelines but the collapse of regional security.

Old routes, unresolved disputes

The older pipeline options illustrate the point. The Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline once carried Iraqi oil across Syria to the Mediterranean. Built in the early 1950s, it had genuine strategic value in its time but has been largely inactive since it was damaged during the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Washington is now backing efforts to revive the route, with US companies expected to play a role. Yet the project still requires extensive reconstruction and years of work before it can provide meaningful export capacity.

Estimates for a full restoration and expansion to around 700,000 bpd run as high as $8 billion. It cannot answer an immediate crisis in Hormuz, and if regional peace is restored before completion, the commercial case for reviving it weakens sharply.

The Iraq–Turkiye pipeline faces a different but equally serious problem: politics. The route through the Kurdistan region to Turkiye’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan was repeatedly interrupted by disputes among Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Ankara, and international oil companies.

A 2023 arbitration ruling against Turkiye over unauthorized Kurdish exports led to a two-and-a-half-year shutdown. Flows resumed in September 2025, and exports have continued, but the route still depends on fragile agreements over contracts, payments, federal authority, and revenue sharing.

Its limited throughput and political vulnerability prevent it from becoming a structural replacement for a maritime passage that normally carries a vast share of the world’s seaborne oil.

The Iraqi pipeline in Saudi Arabia, known as IPSA, is another example of strategic nostalgia. Built in the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq war, it was designed to move Iraqi crude from the Basra region to the Red Sea.

It stopped operating after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia expropriated it in 2001. Reopening the line would therefore require a Saudi–Iraqi political settlement over ownership and control, as well as a major technical assessment after decades of disuse. In other words, IPSA is not an available alternative; it is a diplomatic and engineering problem dressed up as a solution.

The proposed Basra–Aqaba pipeline is even more controversial. Its advertised purpose is to move Iraqi oil from southern Iraq to Jordan’s Red Sea port of Aqaba, bypassing Hormuz. Yet it has faced intense objections inside Iraq because of its projected cost, uncertain financing, and questionable strategic value.

Since much of Iraq’s crude is sold to Asian customers, sending it westward to Aqaba would add distance and complexity rather than solve the basic market problem. The pipeline would also move Iraqi exports closer to another zone of instability, including the Israeli military sphere and the wider Red Sea security environment.

A bypass route that merely exchanges one security risk for another is no solution. Iraq’s severe fiscal pressures also leave Baghdad poorly placed to finance such an expensive project, while international investors are unlikely to embrace it without strong political and security guarantees.

Bypasses within missile range

The existing Saudi and Emirati bypasses are more credible but still limited. Saudi Arabia’s East–West Pipeline, or Petroline, moves crude from the eastern oil region to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline carries oil from Habshan to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman.

These systems reduce exposure to Hormuz for Saudi Arabia and the UAE and have become important national energy-security assets. But they cannot replace the strait for the region as a whole. They offer little to Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Iran, or most Iraqi exports, and they do not solve the LNG problem, especially Qatar’s dependence on Hormuz.

The IEA estimates that only 3.5 to 5.5 million bpd of spare pipeline capacity is available to bypass the strait. Neither Yanbu nor Fujairah are immune from attack; regional conflict has already shown the vulnerability of ports, tankers, and energy infrastructure.

The crisis pipelines cannot solve

This is why the alternative pipeline debate is misleading. It treats the closure of Hormuz as a logistical puzzle when it is primarily a political and security crisis. If the Persian Gulf remains militarized and unstable, no pipeline network can fully protect exports.

Pipelines cross vulnerable territory, depend on political agreements, and terminate at ports that can also be threatened. If Gulf security improves, however, Hormuz will almost certainly reopen because this serves the interests of producers and Asian consumers alike.

Once that happens, the commercial rationale for many alternative pipelines will fade. Why spend tens of billions of dollars duplicating a natural route with unmatched capacity and direct access to the main buyers?

The more honest conclusion is that alternative pipelines may offer limited resilience for individual states, but they are no strategic replacement for Hormuz. They are costly, slow, politically fragile, geographically inefficient, and in some cases obsolete before construction begins.

The answer to the crisis is a security arrangement that keeps the Persian Gulf open, prevents attacks on shipping, and restores normal trade through the strait.

Under such an arrangement, oil and LNG would continue to flow mainly to Asia by the most direct and economical route. Hormuz will remain indispensable, while the grand pipeline alternatives amount to expensive insurance policies against a crisis that only diplomacy and regional peace can resolve.

July 24, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , , , | Comments Off on No route around Hormuz: Why West Asia’s pipeline alternatives fall short

Pakistan thought it won the peace. Now, it could be dragged into war.

By Elfadil Ibrahim | Responsible Statecraft | July 22, 2026

Four weeks ago, Pakistan looked like one of the biggest winners of the U.S.-Iran war.

Its army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, shuttled between Washington, Tehran and Gulf capitals for months. As part of his efforts, Pakistan hosted the first face-to-face U.S.-Iran talks in years and helped broker the Islamabad memorandum of understanding that Vice President JD Vance signed in June, thanking Munir and calling him one of the “very, very important people” in his life.

Islamabad hired a Washington lobbying firm to convert that goodwill into defense cooperation and minerals investment, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif spoke of a “sun of progress and prosperity” for Pakistan’s chronically stressed economy after the MoU between the U.S.and Iran brought an end to major military operations.

Pakistan’s fortunes have since reversed. Fighting between Washington and Tehran has resumed, and Islamabad’s dual goals of being Iran’s trusted interlocutor and the Arab Gulf states’ security guarantor are once again at odds.

President Donald Trump declared the deal was “over” in early July, after which the U.S. struck civilian and military targets in Iran. Iran, for its part, declared on July 18 through its deputy foreign minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, that it was “suspending all obligations” under the framework. The war has since widened into exactly the kind of multi-front regional conflict Pakistan spent the spring trying to prevent.

The clearest new exposure for Pakistan is in Saudi Arabia, where Iran struck Prince Sultan Air Base at al-Kharj — its first direct hit on Saudi territory since March — just days after the Houthis, Iran’s Yemeni ally, fired missiles on the kingdom, hitting Abha airport in the country’s south. That escalation occurred after Saudi-allied forces hit Sanaa airport in Yemen to prevent the landing of an Iranian airliner; the U.S. Treasury alleged without providing evidence that the plane is linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp. The strikes effectively enforced Riyadh’s airspace veto over the Houthi-controlled capital.

Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact with Riyadh last year. It deployed fighter jets and thousands of troops to the kingdom after earlier Iranian strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure. More recently, Islamabad has reportedly communicated to Tehran directly that attacks on Saudi Arabia will be treated as attacks on Pakistan itself. Sharif’s own statement in the aftermath called the Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia a violation of the kingdom’s sovereignty that Pakistan “strongly condemns,” pledging “unwavering support” for Riyadh’s security.

The tone is notable given that Pakistan’s parliament explicitly refused to get entangled in Yemen over a decade ago. In April 2015, faced with a nearly identical Saudi request to join the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis, Pakistan’s National Assembly voted unanimously to “maintain neutrality.” Islamabad’s calculus has not changed. If anything, recent events have sharpened Pakistan’s desire to broker a lasting peace.

Pakistan is home to the world’s second-largest Shia population after Iran, and the killing of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, in February set off deadly unrest in Karachi and Islamabad; Munir himself had to intervene to calm a wave of processions and pledges of allegiance to the new supreme leader across Shia neighborhoods.

Significantly, Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif attended Khamenei’s funeral in July, and Sharif posted after that “the late Supreme Leader’s wisdom, leadership and profound influence on Iran and the wider region will be remembered for generations” — a demonstration of the fine line Pakistan’s leadership has to walk, one no doubt delivered with a domestic audience in mind as much as an Iranian one.

That fine line becomes impossible to walk when a defense pact, triggered by Saudi-Houthi fighting or by further Iranian strikes on Saudi Arabia, would ask Pakistan to do the exact thing its parliament explicitly refused a decade ago: take a military side against a Houthi-Iran axis, and do so at a moment when its domestic Shia politics is highly combustible

Kuwait is now reportedly asking for the same kind of commitment that Saudi Arabia already has. Reuters reported last week that Islamabad is in early-stage talks with Kuwait — which has absorbed repeated Iranian strikes on its infrastructure in recent days — over an expanded defense agreement that would include “thousands of Pakistani troops on the ground, fighter jets, drones, an air defence system, and other defence-related facilities,” according to an anonymous Pakistani government official cited in the report.

Another anonymous Pakistani security official said the country “cannot consider a deployment of combat troops at this stage.” That hesitation suggests that stacking multiple defense commitments across Gulf states in Iran’s crosshairs makes Islamabad’s balancing act much harder to sustain. Each new pact narrows the room to claim neutrality the next time Tehran calls.

During this war, Pakistan discovered what happens when Gulf partners doubt its ability to balance between Tehran and the Arab Gulf states. The United Arab Emirates recalled a $3.5 billion loan in April and quietly began deporting Pakistani Shia workers by the thousands. The move was widely read as retaliation for Islamabad’s perceived tilt toward Tehran during the mediation. Saudi Arabia stepped in with $3 billion to cover the gap, but the lesson was clear: Pakistan’s neutrality satisfies no one fully, and the cost of disappointing any single Gulf patron is measured in the billions of dollars.

Economic self-preservation has been Pakistan’s primary motive for steering mediation and ending a war that has hobbled the economies of its creditors and choked the trade routes that power its own electric grid. Pakistan is on its 25th International Monetary Fund program; more than half of its tax revenue is put towards servicing its debts. It had barely stabilized its inflation before the Strait of Hormuz’s closure sent rates back into double digits.

In March, as the war’s first phase disrupted energy flows out of Hormuz, Islamabad ordered a two-week school closure and imposed a four-day work week to conserve fuel — measures the government has now indicated it may need to revive.

A parallel disruption to the Red Sea, like the blockade of Saudi Arabia declared by the Houthis Monday, would be highly disruptive to Pakistan’s energy security, and by extension, its economy. While Pakistan imports the overwhelming majority of its fuel from the Gulf, the closing of another critical chokepoint would simultaneously tighten global tanker capacity and insurance costs everywhere, pushing the same spot-market prices Pakistan is already struggling to afford even higher.

It would also add further pressure on Pakistan’s defense commitments to Saudi Arabia, given that Riyadh will not tolerate such a closure. In a recent statement, Riyadh pledged to deal with “Houthi threats against transiting vessels… firmly and swiftly.” The stakes for Saudi Arabia are high: Since the Strait of Hormuz was blocked, Saudi Arabia has relied on its East-West pipeline to divert roughly 5 million barrels per day of crude to the Red Sea Port of Yanbu — its only viable export outlet while Hormuz is all but closed.

None of this means Pakistan’s mediation was a mistake, or that its diplomatic capital has evaporated. Kuwait’s foreign minister still thanked Pakistan last week for its “constructive and mediatory role,” and Islamabad remains one of the few channels through which Washington and Tehran would resume talks, when the time comes. But the specific bet Pakistan made — that ending the war would allow it to bank the goodwill through commerce and financial aid — has not yet paid off.

Instead, the restart of the war has brought Saudi Arabia back into Iran’s crosshairs. At the same time, the Saudi-Houthi front has reopened, the Strait of Hormuz has been closed again, and a blockade of Saudi-linked ships on the Red Sea has been formally declared.

Each of these factors adds immense pressure on Pakistan, which now has every reason to double down on diplomacy, lest it be drawn in as a combatant.

Elfadil Ibrahim is a writer and analyst covering the politics of the Middle East and Africa, with a special focus on Sudan. His work has been featured in The Guardian, Al Jazeera, The New Arab, Open Democracy and other outlets.

July 22, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , , | Comments Off on Pakistan thought it won the peace. Now, it could be dragged into war.

Sitting ducks: Why the US security umbrella no longer protects the Gulf?

By Dr Mustafa Fetouri| MEMO | July 16, 2026

In Kuwait alone—less than 150 kilometres across the Gulf from Iran—the United States maintains a major military hub of approximately 13,500 personnel spread across installations such as Camp Arifjan and Ali Al Salem Air Base. To its south, Saudi Arabia hosts roughly 2,700 U.S. troops, centered at Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj. Elsewhere in the Gulf, every state hosts either a US military presence or provides access and defence cooperation under bilateral agreements: Qatar houses more than 10,000 personnel at CENTCOM’s sprawling forward headquarters at Al Udeid; Bahrain hosts around 9,000 personnel at the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet; the UAE accommodates approximately 3,500 personnel at Al Dhafra while providing deep-water naval access at Jebel Ali; and Oman offers strategic port and airfield access under bilateral agreements, despite having no large permanent US troop presence.

Beyond the Gulf monarchies, Washington maintains approximately 2,500 troops in Iraq and around 900 in northeastern Syria under Operation Inherent Resolve. To Iran’s northwest, the US operates from Incirlik Air Base in Türkiye— a NATO logistics and intelligence hub too. Until its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, American forces also maintained a major military presence along Iran’s eastern frontier, supported for two decades by extensive supply routes and intelligence cooperation through Pakistan. Although the US lies nearly 10,000 kilometres from Iran, it has constructed an unparalleled regional military architecture of permanent bases, rotational deployments, naval facilities, pre-positioned equipment, access agreements, and security partnerships that stretches from the Eastern Mediterranean across the Gulf to the western Indian Ocean. Combined with the military capabilities of close allies—including Britain, France, and Türkiye—this network almost literally surrounding Iran from all sides. The common thread underpinning this posture has long been the protection of regional partners, the safeguarding of global energy routes, and the defence of US strategic interests.

Yet, this foundational premise has collapsed under the weight of the US-Israeli war on Iran, which has fundamentally transformed the entire regional security landscape. This “war of choice” has exposed how a security arrangement once marketed as an ironclad insurance policy has devolved into a primary strategic liability.

Rather than serving as an effective deterrent, large and static American military installations now act as strategic liability—drawing Iranian retaliatory strikes while denying host states true autonomy or the promised protective shield.

The Gulf states have discovered, at a heavy price, that they are trapped in an impossible paradox: their sovereign territory serves as a staging ground for military operations they were never consulted about—at least that is what they say publically –instantly transforming their critical infrastructure, oil facilities, and urban centers into high-priority targets. Compounding this vulnerability is the stark geopolitical reality that while Washington may eventually pivot away or withdraw—much as it did from Afghanistan—Iran is a permanent neighbour that is going nowhere.

Beyond the immediate threat of missile strikes, the presence of these US installations directly undermines the core national strategies of the Gulf monarchies. Mega-development projects and economic diversification plans—from Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 to Dubai’s global trade hubs—rely entirely on an image of absolute regional stability, investor confidence, and open maritime transit. By hosting forward US bases, host nations inadvertently tie their economic futures to Washington’s military posture, creating an environment of perpetual crisis. Furthermore, defending these expansive American footprints forces host militaries to consume their own finite air-defense interceptors and defense budgets to guard US assets rather than securing their own national borders.

At the same time, while almost all Gulf States have, at least publicly, refrained from taking direct offensive action against Iran to avoid total escalation, they recognise that they are already viewed as passive participants in the wider conflict.

Maintaining this precarious balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult against rising domestic anti-war sentiment, as public anger over regional devastation steadily erodes the host governments’ domestic credibility.

For Washington, this massive network of forward-deployed bases has produced a profound strategic paradox. What was designed to project uninhibited American power now ties US freedom of action to the political consent of cautious host nations. When host governments impose strict sovereignty restrictions—refusing permission for US forces to launch offensive sorties or intelligence missions against regional adversaries from their soil—the Pentagon finds its multi-billion-dollar installations functionally sidelined during critical military surges. Instead of providing seamless operational flexibility, these fixed, highly vulnerable outposts transform into costly “imperial entrapment” liabilities: requiring thousands of US troops, high-end missile defense batteries, and constant naval escort deployments simply to protect the bases themselves, rather than executing broader strategic objectives or enabling Washington’s long-sought pivot to the Indo-Pacific. With the conflict between the US and Iran reigniting, Trump is demanding that the Gulf states pay once again to protect the Strait of Hormuz—a vital transit route that never closed until the war was started by Trump, not Iran.

This strategic calculus becomes infinitely more complex when factoring in Israel’s role in the regional security outlook. In recent years, certain Gulf states—most notably the UAE—operated under the premise that normalization and closer security alignment with Israel via the Abraham Accords would yield a net security dividend. Yet, this belief was never shared across the Gulf; nations like Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia maintained a far more cautious, sceptical stance toward Tel Aviv. The outbreak of the US-Israeli war on Tehran on February 28 utterly shattered any illusion that an Israeli-linked security architecture could bring regional stability. Instead, it exposed deep internal fault lines among the entire region. Reaching a collective, long-term security understanding with Iran was already a formidable challenge; doing so now, in the wake of a devastating conflict that forced Gulf States into the crossfire, is immensely more complicated. Moving forward, no regional framework can hold if it relies on a anti-Tehran pact anchored in Washington and Tel Aviv while ignoring the permanent reality of Iranian geographic power.

Ultimately, the fallout from the US-Israeli war on Iran exposes a fundamental reality that Washington and its regional allies can no longer ignore: the entire Middle Eastern security architecture must be fundamentally re-evaluated.

The core dilemma facing the region is that no collective security arrangement can ever be viable or effective if it seeks to exclude Iran—an indispensable, geographically permanent power armed with increasingly sophisticated offensive, defensive, and asymmetric capabilities.

Moving forward, any stable regional order must not only account for Tehran’s military leverage, but also accommodate its non-negotiable strategic demands. This includes addressing governance and transit rights over the vital Strait of Hormuz—through which one-fifth of global oil flows—and reaching a durable, pragmatic framework on its nuclear program. Regardless of the final outcome of ongoing US-Iran negotiations, the lesson for the Gulf is clear: true security cannot be built on an external garrison model that marginalizes the region’s principal indigenous power.

July 16, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Sitting ducks: Why the US security umbrella no longer protects the Gulf?

Türkiye sells S-400 systems to undisclosed Gulf state

Al Mayadeen | July 10, 2026

Türkiye has sold its S-400 air defense systems to an unnamed Gulf country, with the announcement expected to be made on Friday.

Turkish newspaper, Hürriyet journalist Abdulkadir Selvi reported that an informed source told him Ankara finalized the sale of its S-400 systems after a deal was approved overnight on Friday.

He added that the speculated buyers are either the UAE or Qatar, noting that the information will remain unknown until an official statement is made.

Selvi noted that the US assets in the UAE being targeted by retaliatory Iranian strikes during the war on Iran were a cause for wanting an increased air defense presence. He added that the attacks “crippled the UAE’s tourism-based system,” adding that it “has been trying to acquire alternative defense systems” after the Iranian retaliation.

He also brought up the Israeli attack on Qatar last year as a significant reason why Doha may want new air defense systems, as Qatar’s Patriot missile system did not activate during the attack on the Hamas officials in the capital city due to “Israel” being coded as a friendly country.

“Qatar learned from this shock attack that it was unprotected against Israel,” Selvi said.

The Hürriyet journalist reported that regardless of which Gulf state the S-400 goes to, Türkiye seeks to gain freedom from US sanctions from the sale.

Ankara is currently a target of the American sanctions package, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which mandates penalties for entities that participate in “significant transactions” with the Russian defense or intelligence sectors.

The sale of the Russian-made S-400 systems could give Türkiye the break it needs to relieve itself of these sanctions that have barred it from the F-35 fighter jet program.

It is worth noting that US President Donald Trump signaled at returning Türkiye to the F-35 fighter jet program after a years-long ban, which caused tears in the relationship between Ankara and Washington.

July 10, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , | Comments Off on Türkiye sells S-400 systems to undisclosed Gulf state

Red Sea tensions rise as French report claims military base is being built in Somaliland

MEMO | July 7, 2026

A report published by the French newspaper Le Monde says satellite image analysis indicates the gradual construction of a military base in the city of Berbera in the self-declared region of Somaliland.

According to the report, the project is being supported by the United Arab Emirates and is intended to serve the interests of the United States and Israel.

Le Monde said satellite images reviewed by the newspaper showed continued expansion of Berbera Airport since October 2025, including infrastructure development. The newspaper said the work suggests a new military facility is being built at a strategically important location near the southern entrance to the Red Sea.

The report said Berbera has attracted growing interest from regional and international powers because of its location on the Gulf of Aden, close to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most important maritime routes.

It linked the reported developments to increasing competition for influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, amid regional security tensions and efforts to protect international shipping lanes.

According to the newspaper, the report included no official comment from the UAE, the United States or Israel. There has also been no official response from the authorities in Somaliland or the Somali federal government to the claims.

Berbera occupies a strategic position on the Gulf of Aden near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which a significant share of global trade and energy supplies passes between Asia and Europe. Its location has made the area a focus of military and economic competition among regional and international powers.

The UAE has invested in Berbera Port for several years through DP World, which is responsible for developing and operating the port. The UAE previously used facilities in Berbera for logistical and military purposes during its operations in Yemen before announcing a reduction in its military presence there.

July 7, 2026 Posted by | Illegal Occupation, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Red Sea tensions rise as French report claims military base is being built in Somaliland

‘Unprecedented corruption,’ crypto ventures help Trump net $2.2bn in profits since return to office

The Cradle | July 3, 2026

US President Donald Trump’s income last year soared to more than $2.2 billion, largely due to cryptocurrency holdings and related ventures he himself was able to regulate, according to financial disclosure forms released on 3 July.

In contrast, during his first term in office, the president’s income was primarily derived from his real estate businesses, including hotels, golf courses, and other properties, such as Mar-a-Lago. In 2024, before returning to the White House, he reported making over $600 million.

Last week, Trump claimed his skyrocketing wealth was due to the stock market’s rise. “You know why I’m profiting, because the stock market’s going up,” he told reporters last week.

However, the president’s financial disclosures indicate most of his new wealth has resulted from cryptocurrency and related ventures, which he has helped enable by relaxing rules on crypto markets.

In 2024, Trump launched crypto company World Liberty Financial. A UAE state-linked firm acquired a 49 percent stake in the company for $500 million, shortly before his inauguration as president.

The acquisition provided a substantial early windfall for the Trump family, allowing hundreds of millions of dollars to flow into Trump-controlled entities. Just months later, the US president approved the export of tightly guarded AI chips to the UAE, suggesting a connection between the two deals and a conflict of interest.

Meanwhile, the cryptocurrency coin issued by World Liberty Financial and promoted by Trump to his supporters has crashed in value by around 85 percent since its launch.

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Trump made $1 billion on various crypto deals while his supporters lost vast amounts.

Days before returning to the White House, he launched his memecoin, $TRUMP, which reached a market value of nearly $15 billion before plunging 97 percent to about $400 million.

Roughly two-thirds of investors in the president’s memecoin have lost money, WSJ added.

“Since he retook office, he’s making over a billion dollars a year off of crypto, while at the same time his administration is writing the rules of the road for how crypto will be regulated,” Lee Reiners, a Duke University lecturer, told the Washington Post.

“Not only is this an unprecedented level of self-dealing and self-enrichment, the scale is really hard to wrap your head around.”

“It’s corruption on a scale that, to be honest, has few rivals in world history,” said Norm Eisen, who served as ethics advisor to former US president Barack Obama. “That’s because you never had the combination of a president willing to fully monetize the Oval Office combined with a world full of countries and other special interests who are willing to fork over vast sums.”

Trump or people close to him have also reportedly profited from massive, highly suspicious trading spikes in oil futures and stock indexes that occurred just minutes before the president issued major, market-moving announcements on social media regarding the US war on Iran.

Economists, lawmakers, and market analysts have raised concerns about potential insider trading, data leaks, and market manipulation coming from the White House.

July 3, 2026 Posted by | Corruption, Deception | , | Comments Off on ‘Unprecedented corruption,’ crypto ventures help Trump net $2.2bn in profits since return to office

Iran, Saudi FMs hold phone talks as Persian Gulf states rethink US ties

Press TV – June 24, 2026

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Saudi counterpart Prince Faisal bin Farhan have held a phone call to discuss regional developments, as Persian Gulf Arab states recalibrate their approach toward Tehran in the wake of the US-Israeli war that exposed the limits of American power.

Araghchi on Wednesday briefed the Saudi minister on the latest progress in implementing bilateral agreements and the ongoing negotiations following the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed on June 18.

The two top diplomats underscored the importance of maintaining diplomatic channels, strengthening joint cooperation to support regional stability, and achieving positive and sustainable outcomes.

The call came as French news agency AFP said Saudi Arabia is expected to host talks aimed at repairing relations between Iran and Persian Gulf countries following the US-Israeli war on Iran.

It cited a diplomat familiar with the arrangements as saying Wednesday that a regional summit was being planned in Riyadh and could also include other neighboring countries, but no date had yet been set.

The meetings would be separate from the ongoing negotiations between Iran and the United States, the diplomat added.

CNN, citing a senior Persian Gulf diplomat, reported that leaders are increasingly contemplating a future in which the US plays a much smaller role in the regional security architecture, with a possible framework involving a regional non-aggression pact with Iran.

According to Hasan Alhasan, senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “From the Arab states’ perspective, the Iran war is a disastrous turning point for the regional security order.”

The war, which began on February 28, exposed vulnerabilities in the Persian Gulf states’ security model, which is heavily dependent on the nearly 40,000 US troops stationed in the region and American-made air defense systems.

“The US security guarantee is no longer reliable in the way they thought it was,” one analyst at Chatham House told The New York Times.

Washington’s approach is increasingly perceived as selective and heavily centered on Israel’s security interest.

A classified CIA analysis found that US allies in the Persian Gulf are divided over their approach to Iran. According to the assessment, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain prefer continued pressure on Tehran, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait now support negotiations.

Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, noted that the UAE and Bahrain “made themselves frontline states against Iran” through the Abraham Accords and “now they’re in too deep and cannot extract themselves out of it”.

The Saudis, Parsi added, “were at the highest levels pushing for this war. They have come to regret it”.

Adding another layer of complexity is a widening gap between Arab governments and Arab public opinion over Iran.

According to a report by The Economist cited by DID Press, growing anger toward Israel and dissatisfaction with US policies have fueled increasing sympathy for Tehran across parts of the Arab world.

Despite sustained efforts by several Arab governments to reinforce anti-Iran narratives, recent developments have altered perceptions among sections of Arab society.

The report identifies two major drivers behind this shift: anger toward Israel, as many Arabs increasingly view Iranian actions against Israel as a legitimate response to regional military operations, and religious and cultural ties, particularly among Shia communities across the Persian Gulf.

The report concludes that sectarian narratives no longer resonate as strongly as in previous years, and that many Arabs increasingly view Iran as more assertive and resilient than several Arab governments.

Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani traveled to Muscat on Wednesday to initiate talks between Iran, Persian Gulf states, and Iraq on the future operation of the Strait of Hormuz.

The discussions aim to implement a provision of the MoU requiring Iran and Oman to hold talks with other Persian Gulf states on the future management of navigation and maritime services.

Earlier on Wednesday, Oman announced two temporary routes north and south of the existing shipping lane to facilitate safe passage of vessels departing the region, in coordination with the International Maritime Organization.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of global oil and liquefied natural gas normally transits, was heavily disrupted after the United States and Israel launched their war on Iran on February 28.

June 24, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Iran, Saudi FMs hold phone talks as Persian Gulf states rethink US ties

UK suppressed intel on Sudan genocide to protect UAE ties: Report

Press TV – June 24, 2026

UK authorities have suppressed key intelligence and failed to act on warnings about atrocities in Sudan to preserve diplomatic and economic ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), according to testimony presented to lawmakers.

During a hearing of the UK Parliament’s International Development Committee on Tuesday, Nathaniel Raymond, director of Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab, said the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) ignored repeated warnings before the so-called Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured El-Fasher in October 2025.

Raymond told lawmakers that the assault was followed by a massacre that claimed at least 60,000 civilian lives.

He said British policymakers placed strategic ties with the UAE above efforts to prevent starvation, displacement, and mass killings in Sudan.

Evidence presented during the hearing included mobile phone tracking data linking Addis Ababa, Abu Dhabi, and RSF-controlled territory.

According to Raymond, the information pointed to a covert weapons supply network supporting the militant group.

While the UAE and Ethiopia have denied supporting the RSF, Raymond said pressure from Abu Dhabi influenced the UK’s response.

He also stated that UK officials asked his research team in May 2024 to release sensitive tracking data publicly because the government was unwilling to challenge the UAE directly.

Raymond described a missed opportunity after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2736, when RSF operations reportedly paused while international reactions were assessed.

“Once the UAE assessed there would be no consequences, the attack resumed,” Raymond told the committee.

Decisions made by successive British governments, including those led by former Prime Ministers Rishi Sunak and Keir Starmer, contributed to a failure to prevent further bloodshed, he said.

A BBC report published in April linked the UAE to a network of Colombian mercenaries known as the “Desert Wolves,” who provided drone and artillery support to the RSF during the battle for El-Fasher.

Conflict Insights Group director Justin Lynch said, “The scale of atrocities and siege in El-Fasher would not have happened without the drone operations the mercenaries provided.”

Satellite imagery analyzed by Yale researchers after the city’s fall showed evidence consistent with mass casualties, while the United Nations later said the violence bore “hallmarks of genocide.”

June 24, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, War Crimes | , | Comments Off on UK suppressed intel on Sudan genocide to protect UAE ties: Report

Which Country Is the Big Loser from the Ramadan War?

By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | June 23, 2026

While the US certainly suffered some reputational damage and significant economic costs from its unprovoked attack on Iran, the United Arab Emirates may really be the big loser. Let’s focus on Dubai.

Think of Dubai as the World’s most expensive adult theme park that has no emergency exit. For decades, Dubai sold itself to the world as what would happen if Las Vegas and Disney World had a child together, raised it on sovereign wealth, and sent it to finishing school in Monaco. The result was a city of genuinely staggering audacity — an indoor ski slope in the desert, a hotel shaped like a sail that awards itself seven stars because five simply wasn’t enough, palm-shaped islands visible from space that are slowly sinking back into the sea from which they were so expensively extracted. It was, by any measure, the greatest theme park ever built for people who found actual theme parks insufficiently gilded and too puritanical.

The supposed genius of the Dubai proposition was always its geographical logic: i.e., it sits at the crossroads of global trade, pumps enough oil to build the infrastructure, and then gradually replace the oil revenue with everything else — tourism, finance, real estate, the inscrutable business of being a place where very wealthy people park very large amounts of money while asking no inconvenient questions. Oh, did I mention money laundering and hookers?

The Burj Khalifa, the world’s tallest building, named after the ruler of Abu Dhabi because Dubai ran out of money halfway through construction and needed a bailout, stands as perhaps the most honest monument in human history: a gleaming advertisement for ambition funded by someone else. The formula worked brilliantly as long as one variable held constant: the Strait of Hormuz remained open. The US and Israeli attack on Iran turned this assumption inside out.

Disney World works because it controls its environment entirely. Inside the berm, reality is suspended. Outside the berm, Florida continues to be Florida, which, as I can testify, is its own form of unreality but in a less curated direction. Dubai’s version of the berm was always the strait — twenty-one miles of water that kept the global economy flowing through the neighborhood and made Dubai’s position as the region’s entrepôt, logistics hub, financial center, and luxury destination not merely plausible but geometrically inevitable.

When Iran mined the strait in March 2026, Dubai discovered that its berm had a gap in it roughly twenty-one miles wide.

The cruise ships left first — or rather, they tried to. Six of them were trapped inside the Gulf like very large, very expensive rubber ducks in a bathtub whose drain had been plugged by a theocracy. Fifteen thousand passengers discovered that the all-inclusive package they had purchased did not, in the fine print, include Iranian mine-clearance operations as an amenity. The ships eventually got out during a brief window in April when Iran and the US simultaneously claimed the strait was open, which gave the ships a brief opening to make a run to safety. The passengers disembarked elsewhere and appear to have decided that the Arabian Gulf cruise experience had delivered sufficient excitement for one lifetime.

Las Vegas, Dubai’s other spiritual progenitor, is built on the foundational promise that geography is irrelevant — that a city in the middle of a desert can become the center of the world through sheer force of neon and human appetite. Dubai took this lesson and applied it at sovereign scale. If Las Vegas could conjure a city from nothing in Nevada, Dubai could conjure a global financial center from nothing in a desert on the edge of a historically significant but economically peripheral body of water.

The difference is that Las Vegas sits in the middle of a continent. Its supply chains are inconvenienced by traffic on I-15, not Iranian frigates. When something goes wrong in Nevada, the problem is human-scale. When something goes wrong in the Strait of Hormuz, the problem is civilizational-scale, which is a somewhat different category of operational risk.

Dubai’s ports — Jebel Ali, the largest in the Middle East — discovered that being the region’s premier logistics hub is an extraordinary competitive advantage right up until the moment the region becomes inaccessible. The container ships stopped coming. The tankers that hadn’t already been stranded inside the Gulf diverted around Africa, adding two weeks to their journeys and entirely bypassing the hub that had been so carefully constructed to serve them. The cargo kept moving; it simply moved around Dubai rather than through it, in the manner of a river that encounters a spectacular dam and quietly reroutes rather than admiring the engineering.

What Dubai is experiencing is the particular agony of a city built for maximum throughput discovering that throughput has somewhere else to be. The restaurants remain excellent. The hotel pools remain temperature-controlled to a degree that can only be described as a philosophical statement about the relationship between mankind and climate. The brunches — Dubai’s most characteristically Dubai institution, a Friday afternoon event that begins at noon, ends somewhere around consciousness, and costs roughly what a semester of community college costs in Ohio — continue to be held, though with fewer attendees from the European finance sector, which is dealing with its own energy crisis and has temporarily reduced its appetite for unlimited wagyu and proximity to other people’s wealth.

The real estate market, which has spent twenty years as a reliable indicator of how much money the world needs to quietly relocate, is experiencing what agents describe as a period of recalibration and what everyone else describes as a crash. Property values in Dubai are denominated in confidence as much as dirhams, and confidence requires that the fundamental premise of Dubai — the crossroads theory, the inevitability of the location — remains legible. A crossroads from which one of the roads has been temporarily mined is a different proposition.

But the Hormuz crisis has stripped away, at least temporarily, the comfortable fiction that Dubai’s position was natural rather than constructed, inevitable rather than contingent. Las Vegas exists because Americans wanted somewhere to gamble without legal consequence. Disney World exists because Walt Disney wanted to control the parking. Dubai exists because the global economy needed a node at a specific geographic location, and someone had the audacity and the capital to build one there.

All three are, at their core, exercises in the proposition that if you build it extravagantly enough, they will come. Two of them don’t have to worry about what happens if someone mines the entrance.

But there also is a dark side to the UAE in general and Dubai in particular — it is a center for money laundering and foreign intelligence activities. A friend, who is a business/energy consultant in the Persian Gulf summarizes the situation as follows:

The UAE now operates as a Zionist/Israeli-linked Gulf security platform with annex-like and fledgling-colony characteristics. Zionist/Israeli and Israel-linked security, cyber, surveillance, defense, and intelligence-adjacent systems have permeated core state capability to the point of effective strategic control over key security and technology layers.

That penetration creates strategic exposure across the UAE military establishment, internal-security architecture, technology stack, logistics system, financial channels, and monetary confidence base.

The money-flow thesis has also changed. Dubai and the broader UAE have long served as high-liquidity routing environments for offshore capital, sanctions-sensitive money, criminal syndicate proceeds, and illicit flows connected to Africa, gold, real estate, trade, luxury assets, and corporate structuring. The war-risk and security-integration shock has damaged that flow. Capital that depends on opacity, stability, and uninterrupted confidence becomes unstable when the host jurisdiction is visibly embedded in a conflict architecture.

The state is assessed as structurally aligned with the US-Israel security architecture and operationally dependent on Israel-linked security and technology capabilities. The exposure is not merely diplomatic. The UAE security apparatus, technology apparatus, military establishment, cyber-defense layer, and monetary confidence system are assessed as deeply permeated by Zionist/Israeli and Israel-linked systems, vendors, intelligence-adjacent relationships, and defense cooperation. Money flows that used the UAE for opacity, liquidity, asset conversion, gold, corporate layering, luxury consumption, trade routing, and real-estate placement are now exposed to war-risk repricing, sanctions scrutiny, intelligence attention, and capital-flight pressure.

So guess whose uncle is a weekly visitor to the UAE carrying bags of cash? If you guessed Volodimir Zelensky you are correct. Zelensky’s uncle, according to my source, deposits the money in local banks. The money is then used to purchase property that it then subsequently sold. The proceeds from that sale are then sent to banks in Israel… All cleaned up. From there, some of the money makes its way back to members of the US Congress as a way of thanking them for their support of Ukraine.

Will the UAE return to its previous garish glory? Perhaps. One immediate consequence of the US/Israeli attack on Iran is that much of the big money stored in the UAE banks decided that Singapore was more secure, which produced a significant capital flight from Dubai. The de facto expulsion of the US from the Persian Gulf, coupled with Chinese and Russian initiatives to create a new security architecture in the Gulf, is causing the Emiratis to reassess their past relationships. It is not clear what path they will choose to follow going forward, but the UAE emirs did send a delegation to Tehran on June 9. Is Dubai considering a future without wealthy foreigners with an appetite for alcohol and prostitutes? Maybe.

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June 23, 2026 Posted by | Corruption | , | Comments Off on Which Country Is the Big Loser from the Ramadan War?

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