Iran halts talks with US – media
RT | June 1, 2026
Iran has halted negotiations with the US over the ongoing Israeli offensive in Lebanon, moving to block maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, Tasnim news agency has reported, citing sources.
Israel has intensified its bombing campaign in Lebanon in recent days, against what it describes as sites used by the Hezbollah militant group. The Israeli military has pushed deeper into the country’s south, seizing Beaufort Castle, a 900-year-old Crusader fortress and a key vantage point in the region.
While Iran made an end to the war in Lebanon a condition for its Pakistani-mediated negotiations with the US, the hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah have continued despite a supposed ceasefire announced in mid-April.
In response to the escalation in Lebanon, Tehran is stopping the “negotiations and exchange of messages through a mediator,” according to Tasnim.
Iran has reportedly demanded an “immediate cessation of hostilities” in the country, as well as in the Palestinian enclave of Gaza, making it a condition for continuing the contacts with the US.
Tehran and its regional allied groups have also expressed readiness to seal off the Strait of Hormuz, as well as to “activate other fronts,” including disrupting maritime traffic in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, according to the agency.
Beyond Gaza: The expanding geography of displacement
By Dr Oroub El-Abed | MEMO | May 29, 2026
The War on Gaza continues and has not stopped. It is even expanding to wider geography of displacement and has been unfolding across the Eastern Mediterranean. The Zionists are empowered to widen their gradual restructuring of the land: depopulating borderlands, fragmenting societies, erasing cultural landscapes, and normalising permanent instability across the whole of Palestine, southern Lebanon, and southern Syria.
This week, the Israeli military ordered the immediate evacuation of the ancient Lebanese city of Tyre. Tyre A city that carries thousands of years of Mediterranean history, Phoenician heritage, trade, memory, and civilization was suddenly reduced to a military target. Residents were ordered to move north of the Zahrani River as Israeli bombardment intensified across southern Lebanon despite the language of a “ceasefire.” Entire communities were once again placed on the road during Eid, carrying children, blankets, medicine, and fragments of home while others elsewhere exchanged sweets and celebratory visits.
The symbolism of Tyre matters. Cities like Tyre are archives of human civilization. Their ports, neighbourhoods, cemeteries, mosques, churches, markets, and coastal life embody centuries of coexistence and cultural production. When such places are emptied, bombed, or transformed into militarized zones, the damage extends beyond physical destruction. A civilization itself becomes vulnerable to erasure.
The same logic that devastated Gaza is now visibly extending outward. In Gaza, entire archaeological sites were destroyed. Urban landscapes have been flattened under the justification of war. Universities, hospitals, archives, schools, libraries, bakeries, agricultural lands, and refugee camps have been systematically destroyed. The assault has targeted the infrastructure of Palestinian life itself, it has dismantled the social, cultural, and demographic foundations necessary for collective survival.
In the occupied West Bank, Palestinians continue to face settler violence, military raids, land confiscation, and forced displacement. Villages are emptied through intimidation, checkpoints fragment movement, and economic suffocation deepens dependency and precarity. Yet the expansionist vision articulated through biblical and historical claims is now stretching beyond Palestine.
Now southern Lebanon and southern Syria are being pulled into the same spatial planning.
Reports and online campaigns promoting land acquisition in areas near Daraa and southern Syria reveal a deeply alarming trend: the normalization of territorial expansion beyond internationally recognized borders. References to ancient “Davidic routes” or biblical entitlement are increasingly integrated into public discourse, settlement imaginaries, and strategic military narratives. The danger lies in transforming expansion into something culturally acceptable and politically negotiable.
This is occurring at the very moment Syrian refugees are being pressured to return “home” after years of displacement with many Global North countries issuing deportation regulation letters against them. Governments and international actors increasingly speak of refugee return as though Syria has become stable enough for repatriation. But what does “return” mean if homes are destroyed, lands fragmented, economies collapsed, and territories themselves vulnerable to new forms of Zionist militarization and external control? Refugees are told to go back while the geography they once belonged to is simultaneously being reconfigured.
The contradiction
The publicised initiatives presented under the language of “peace” and “reconstruction” now stand exposed as hollow political theater. Donor fatigue deepens. Funding commitments evaporate. Humanitarian systems are collapsing under both political paralysis, Israeli persist with insolence to continue the attacks against Palestinians and deliberate underfunding. Gaza’s Peace Board, created by Trump remains largely unfunded while displacement spreads regionally. The promise of rebuilding has become another mechanism for managing headlines with peace illusions rather than protecting people.
Meanwhile, millions remain displaced across the region. In Lebanon alone, over a million people have reportedly fled their homes since the escalation intensified. Entire southern communities now live between temporary shelters, schools, relatives’ apartments, or overcrowded Beirut neighbourhoods.
Families displaced during Eid navigate trauma while attempting to preserve dignity amid uncertainty. The contrast is painful: festive tables offering ka’ek and chocolate exist alongside families searching for mattresses, medication, and safety.
This widening geography of displacement reveals a deeper transformation underway in the Middle East. Forced migration is becoming a governing logic of regional order. Populations are uprooted, contained, redistributed, or rendered permanently precarious while territorial realities are reshaped through military violence and demographic engineering.
Tyre should alarm the world not only because people were forced to flee, but because an ancient city carrying human civilization is being drawn into a broader architecture of destruction. Southern Syria should alarm the world not only because of geopolitical tensions, but because territorial expansion is increasingly discussed openly while refugees themselves remain disposable. Gaza should alarm the world not only because of death tolls, but because the destruction of an entire society is unfolding in front of global institutions that are unable or unwilling to stop it.
What is happening today exceeds the boundaries of a single conflict. It is the expansion of a political project that treats land as empty once people are displaced from it, culture as expendable, and civilian existence as negotiable. The fear is that this geography of displacement may continue and widen far beyond Gaza, unless confronted with nationalist power and regional unity.
Fars sources dispute Trump claims on proposed Iran agreement
Al Mayadeen | May 29, 2026
Fars News Agency cited informed sources rejecting recent claims by US President Donald Trump regarding a potential agreement with Iran, saying his remarks are “a mixture of truths and lies” aimed at portraying a “fabricated victory.”
According to the report, the proposed agreement, drafted under the framework of “commitment in exchange for commitment,” is currently in the final stages of approval in Iran, though no final decision has yet been made.
The sources said Trump, whom they said is unable to withdraw from the agreement process, made statements that contradict the actual provisions of the text while simultaneously claiming that the US would immediately end the blockade against Iran.
Distortions in Trump’s remarks
The report said Trump falsely claimed that Iran would be required to open the Strait of Hormuz without imposing transit fees. According to the sources, no such clause exists in the agreement.
Iran, they said, has stressed that once the blockade is lifted, the strait would reopen according to arrangements determined by Tehran, including possible ship monitoring, inspections, maritime services, and security measures. The report added that Iran is currently preparing the infrastructure for implementing those procedures.
Fars also dismissed Trump’s claim that Iran would dismantle or destroy its nuclear materials, saying informed sources confirmed that the memorandum of understanding contains no such provision and that the allegation is “entirely baseless.”
Key provisions omitted
According to the report, one of the most important terms ignored in Trump’s statements is the immediate payment of $12 billion from frozen Iranian assets.
The sources said the agreement requires the payment to be carried out immediately and stipulates that Iran will not proceed to further stages of negotiations until the transfer is completed. Failure to fulfill this obligation would constitute a violation of US commitments under the deal, the report added.
The report also stated that another key component of the proposed agreement involves establishing a full ceasefire in Lebanon in line with Hezbollah’s position.
According to the sources, only after these issues are resolved would Iran move to the next phase of talks concerning the lifting of all sanctions and the nuclear issue, in accordance with Tehran’s “red lines.”
Iranian officials also stressed that any final agreement would be based on the principles and red lines of the Islamic Republic and formulated with “complete distrust” toward the US, ensuring that any breach of commitments would trigger an immediate reciprocal response.
Al Jazeera Claims The US-Iran Deal is Done… Not So Fast
By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | May 27, 2026
Notwithstanding the Al Jazeera report, there are still significant areas of disagreement that make a deal between Iran and the US unlikely. The Pakistan-Qatar mediation channel toward a possible memorandum of understanding remains active. But “active” does not mean “settled.” The unresolved center of gravity remains sequencing. The following is based on information I received from a knowledgeable source with access to the negotiations. It mirrors my analysis.
Washington and Israel want Iranian concessions first, while Tehran wants tangible, front-loaded economic and security relief before it gives ground on anything that matters. That is the heart of the present deadlock.
Iran’s position is not theatrical. It is rooted in a clear strategic doctrine: after decades of sanctions, pressure, assassinations, sabotage, and military threats, Tehran will not trade hard leverage for verbal assurances or a memorandum of understanding.
Promises are not enough. Mechanisms matter. Sequencing matters. Asset movement matters. Enforcement matters. The central judgment is this: Iran is not blinking.
Tehran is not operating from weakness, confusion, or desperation. It is executing a highly disciplined strategic posture: firmness on the fundamentals, flexibility on the margins, and careful use of its available leverage across the nuclear file, the Strait of Hormuz, regional alliances, frozen assets, and the Pakistan-Qatar mediation channel.
This is not the behavior of a state preparing for unconditional surrender. Nor is it the behavior of a state recklessly lurching toward total war. It is the behavior of a state converting pressure into leverage — and leverage into economic and security guarantees.
The Nuclear File: Sovereignty Is the Red Line
According to a knowledgeable source, enrichment is not a negotiable bargaining chip. Tehran views enrichment as three things simultaneously:
- A sovereign right;
- A deterrence instrument;
- A domestic legitimacy anchor.
No meaningful quantity of enriched uranium will leave Iranian territory under the present framework. That line is firm.
On weaponization, the assessment is more nuanced. Iran is not presently building a bomb. But it is deliberately preserving the capability to move toward one if it concludes that its survival is at stake.
The phrase “all bets are off” should not be read as an announcement of imminent weaponization. It should be read as doctrine: if Iran faces an existential assault, it will not leave any strategic option permanently closed. That is virtual deterrence — and, at least for now, it is working.
Strait of Hormuz: Tehran’s Non-Nuclear Strategic Lever
The Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s most powerful non-nuclear instrument. The logic from Tehran is blunt: the United States cannot freeze Iranian assets, sanction Iranian exports, suffocate Iranian banking channels, and then expect unconditional maritime passage as though nothing has happened.
Iran’s emerging posture appears tiered and deliberate. Friendly states receive passage. Neutral states are handled selectively. Hostile or adversary-linked shipping will face interdiction, delay, or denial. This is not simply military posturing. Tehran is attempting to convert maritime geography into a regional security architecture based on reciprocity: if Iran’s economy is strangled, the economic arteries of others will not remain entirely immune.
The reported MOU framework involving the Strait appears real: Iranian de-escalation in exchange for sanctions relief, asset movement, and restoration of commercial access. But the sequencing dispute remains unresolved. Iran wants assets released before surrendering maritime leverage. Washington wants compliance in the Strait before releasing assets. As I write this (Tuesday evening eastern time) this issues remains unresolved.
The Drone and Air-Defense War: Contested Skies, Real Costs
The airspace over Iran, the Persian Gulf, and adjacent maritime corridors has become a live drone and air-defense battlespace. Iran’s message is clear: it may not dominate the air domain, but it can make aerial operations expensive, politically visible, and operationally imperfect. Every drone interdicted, every platform forced down, every failed or disrupted operation adds friction. That friction shapes how Washington and Tel Aviv assess the real cost of escalation.
This is deterrence by attrition. Not absolute deterrence. Not total denial. But enough to complicate operational planning and raise the political price of continued pressure.
Frozen Assets: The Economic Core of the Negotiation
The frozen-assets file is not peripheral. It is central. According to a knowledgeable source with access, Iran is demanding immediate movement on approximately $12 billion held through Qatar-linked channels, within a much larger claim that Tehran places at more than $100 billion in frozen overseas assets.
This is the economic heart of the negotiation. Tehran wants asset release as a precondition for meaningful concessions. Washington wants asset relief conditioned on Iranian performance first. Until this is resolved in a concrete, enforceable way — not with vague language or aspirational language — no MOU is likely to hold. Iran is leery of any verbal assurances from the West and does not trust a MOU having been burned previously on this issue after signing the JCPOA.
For Tehran, this is not merely about money. It is about proof of seriousness. If Washington cannot or will not move assets, Tehran will conclude that the negotiation is designed to extract concessions without delivering relief.
Lebanon and Hezbollah: The Detonator Built Into the System
Lebanon remains the most dangerous variable in the entire equation. The diplomatic architecture now being constructed contains a structural flaw, and that flaw runs directly through Beirut. Lebanon is not a side theater. It is the tripwire.
Israel wants continued freedom of operation in southern Lebanon. Iran views Hezbollah as a central pillar of its regional deterrence architecture. From Tehran’s perspective, Hezbollah is not a disposable card. It is non-negotiable. Hezbollah has not agreed to disarm. Israel has not abandoned its operational doctrine. Iran has not agreed to separate the Lebanese file from its broader regional deterrence posture.
The American formula — that if Hezbollah behaves, Israel will behave — is not a guarantee. It is an aspiration dressed up as a diplomatic condition. This means that even a signed MOU between Washington and Tehran could be blown apart by one Israeli operation in Lebanon, or one Hezbollah response, that crosses a threshold neither side can fully control. In fact, Israel has renewed its offensive in Lebanon on Tuesday, but apparently acceded to Donald Trump’s demand to halt bombings of Beirut.
The ground war in southern Lebanon, however, is back on in its full fury, with Israel trying to push beyond the Yellow Line while Hezbollah is scoring major hits on Israeli forces, tanks and vehicles. Netanyahu is facing major pressure from Ben Gvir and Smotrich to expand military operations
Abraham Accords and the Pakistan Variable
Iran’s rejection of the Abraham Accords is categorical. Tehran views the Accords as a U.S.-backed normalization architecture designed to entrench Israeli regional legitimacy while hollowing out the Palestinian cause. Any attempt to fold that architecture into an Iran settlement cuts directly against Tehran’s strategic and ideological position.
The Pakistan dimension is especially sensitive. Islamabad is functioning as a key mediation channel between Washington and Tehran. But pressuring Pakistan to join or support the Abraham Accords while simultaneously relying on Pakistan to carry messages to Tehran creates a structural contradiction. Pakistan understands this. Its public rejection of forced linkage is not diplomatic boilerplate. It is the condition under which Islamabad preserves credibility with Tehran and keeps the mediation channel alive.
Saudi Arabia remains in its established position: no normalization without a credible path to Palestinian statehood. In the current environment, that condition cannot be met.
Three Triggers That Could Blow This Up
The negotiations remain alive because both sides understand the danger of uncontrolled escalation. But there is no strategic trust. The situation remains combustible and highly sequenced. One operational incident could change the trajectory very quickly.
The three most dangerous triggers are:
1. Failure of the frozen-asset transfer mechanism
If Tehran concludes that Washington is blocking relief while extracting concessions, the entire diplomatic framework could collapse.
2. An Israeli operation in Lebanon that crosses Iran’s response threshold
This could force Hezbollah into a major confrontation and pull Iran back into a harder regional posture.
3. Renewed US strikes during the ceasefire or negotiation window
If Iran reads such strikes as negotiation under fire, it is likely to conclude that diplomacy is merely cover for coercion.
A new regional logic? If Israel strikes Lebanon, Iran strikes back at the UAE
By Trita Parsi | May 25, 2026
Despite the ceasefire and tentative progress toward a memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran, the Persian Gulf has remained perilously volatile. In the past 24 hours alone, several rounds of fire have been exchanged between US and Iranian forces in the region. Though both sides appear to view the incidents — which may have killed as many as four IRGC naval personnel — as falling below the threshold that would shatter the ceasefire altogether, the clashes underscore the fragility of the current arrangement and the ever-present danger of renewed escalation.
Yet in recent days, it was not the Persian Gulf that emerged as the greatest threat to the agreement. It was Israel’s potential refusal to fully adhere to the regional ceasefire and halt its bombardment of Lebanon. That danger remains acute.
Iran has three principal reasons for insisting that any ceasefire be genuinely regional in scope — one that includes not only the United States and Iran, but also Israel and Lebanon.
First, solidarity with the peoples of Gaza and Lebanon is not merely rhetorical theater for Tehran; it lies at the heart of the Islamic Republic’s regional identity and strategic posture. Having already been perceived by some in the Arab world as abandoning these constituencies in 2024, Iran can scarcely afford another rupture that would further erode its credibility within the so-called “axis of resistance.”
Second, continued Israeli attacks risk reigniting direct confrontation between Israel and Iran — a dangerous cycle that has already erupted twice since October 7, 2023. The linkage between these theaters is neither imagined nor incidental. It is openly acknowledged in Western discourse, which routinely portrays Iran as the central node of resistance to Israeli and American policies, operating through allied groups in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Yemen. From Tehran’s vantage point, a durable cessation of hostilities with Israel cannot be disentangled from ending Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon. For Iran, this is not an aspirational addendum to diplomacy; it is a foundational condition.
But perhaps the most consequential issue is what Lebanon reveals about Washington itself. For Tehran, tying Israel to the ceasefire is ultimately a test of America’s willingness — and ability — to restrain its closest regional ally. If Trump either cannot or will not do so, then the value of any agreement with Washington comes sharply into question. A ceasefire that leaves Israel free to reignite hostilities at will — while the United States remains unable to prevent itself from being dragged back into conflict — offers little assurance of stability. Under such circumstances, the utility of a deal with Washington diminishes dramatically.
Trump could still choose to put American interests first and compel Israel to comply, much as Ronald Reagan did in 1982 when he pressured Prime Minister Menachem Begin to halt Israel’s devastating assault on Lebanon. Reagan reportedly expressed outrage at the bombardment of Beirut, warning Begin that America’s support could not be taken for granted. Within hours, the bombing stopped. Trump, by contrast, has thus far shown little ability to ensure sustained Israeli compliance with his demands.
A more plausible scenario may be a murkier and more dangerous one: Washington and Tehran reach an agreement, Israel initially abides by it, but over time gradually extricates itself from the arrangement and resumes strikes on Lebanon under the familiar banner of “self-defense.”
At that point, Iran would face a painful dilemma. Tehran would almost certainly pressure Trump to intervene and might even threaten to abandon the agreement altogether. But if Washington failed to act, would Iran truly sacrifice sanctions relief, economic recovery, and an end to open warfare merely to register its objections? Moreover, walking away from the deal might not compel Trump to restrain Israel. Iran could end up with neither an agreement nor a ceasefire in Lebanon. In fact, it would be an outcome Israel would welcome.
One option increasingly discussed within segments of Iran’s security establishment is more ominous still: remaining within the agreement while imposing costs elsewhere — namely on the United Arab Emirates, one of Israel’s closest regional partners. This argument has circulated quietly within segments of Iran’s security establishment, though the extent of its support remains unclear. Yet given the growing sentiment among Iranian decision-makers that Tehran showed excessive restraint toward the UAE during the war, the notion of a “UAE for Lebanon” strategy no longer appears far-fetched.
The logic is brutally simple. If the broader US-Iran arrangement tolerates Israel attacking an Iranian ally in Lebanon, then Tehran may conclude that the same arrangement can tolerate Iran targeting an Israeli ally in the Persian Gulf. Under such a scenario, Iran could retaliate against Emirati territory or Israeli operatives based there for every Israeli strike conducted in Lebanon. Rather than collapsing the agreement outright, Tehran would seek to exact a calibrated price for Israeli noncompliance.
Such a strategy would carry grave risks. Emirati retaliation could follow, potentially igniting a wider regional confrontation. Yet it remains unclear whether Washington would rush to the UAE’s defense if doing so meant destroying the very agreement it had negotiated with Tehran. In that sense, the strategy would place the burden back on the United States: either restrain Israel or watch the conflict metastasize across the Persian Gulf.
The implications for the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council would be profound. Few Gulf states harbor deep affection for the UAE’s increasingly muscular regional posture, but even fewer desire another destabilizing regional war. Moreover, forcefully condemning Iranian retaliation against the Emirates would only throw into sharper relief the broader Arab silence surrounding Israel’s ethnic cleansing in southern Lebanon.
Hopefully, none of this comes to pass. A durable agreement between Washington and Tehran — backed by the overwhelming majority of regional states — remains possible. And Trump could yet decide that preserving regional stability requires compelling Israel to respect the terms of a broader ceasefire.
But the very fact that Tehran is contemplating escalation against the UAE if Israel escalates in Lebanon illustrates the degree to which the Emirates have made themselves needless targets in the larger Israeli-Iranian rivalry by signing the Abraham Accords.
The journey to the second liberation of South Lebanon
The spider’s web theory lives on
By Robert Inlakesh | Al Mayadeen | May 25, 2026
Twenty-six years on from the liberation of South Lebanon, the message has become clear: as long as the Israeli regime remains, peace will never be possible. This year’s Liberation Day anniversary will be observed by a population that is now fighting another struggle against occupation, one that will have implications beyond the freeing of Lebanese lands alone.
On May 25, 2000, the Israeli occupation forces withdrew from most of the Lebanese lands they had occupied illegally in 1982; a move that came following nearly two decades of brutal oppression and was triggered as a result of the fierce resistance waged by the local population. For the Arab World, and specifically for the Palestinian cause for national liberation, that day became a signal that resistance does work.
A day later, former Hezbollah Secretary General, martyr Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, delivered his famous ‘Spider’s Web’ speech from a small football stadium in Bint Jbeil, arguing that the Lebanese model of armed resistance is a blueprint for the Palestinian people. This address has haunted the Israeli senior leadership ever since.
What Sayyed Nasrallah laid out was the theory that the Zionist regime was frailer than a spider’s web, meaning that despite its exterior, internally it was weak and could easily be cut down. He paid particular attention, when stating this metaphor, to ensuring the public knew precisely what he meant, which was that the Israeli society was incapable of enduring the repercussions of the regime’s policies. Today, this speech could not be more relevant.
The Israeli military doctrine, since the entity’s founding, has been based on the concept of always fighting short wars and avoiding wars of attrition. David Ben-Gurion, the first Israeli Prime Minister, was the first to ensure that his settler project implemented this doctrine, arguing that because his military was more advanced, they could manage to inflict defeats on the enemies, but that the wars it fought had to be limited due to the overwhelming numerical advantages on the Arab side.
If you look back through Israeli military history, you will also notice a pattern of short wars, especially those in which the Zionist entity achieved significant gains. Their most successful war was the “6-Day War” for example. Even last year, their attack on Iran became the “12-Day War”.
The Israelis withdrew from South Lebanon because they understood that the fight they were facing was going to bog them down and drain them, especially as the Lebanese Resistance was gradually growing in strength. In the Gaza Strip, the same concept applied in 2005. They ran cost-benefit analyses and decided it was best to leave.
Over the years, having only fought short wars against militarily inferior opponents, the Israeli society was able to live in its own bubble world. The consequences of their actions were a small price to pay, especially if these consequences were only felt during shorter periods of time. Other than this, they maintained belligerent occupations, meaning that their army was transformed into more of a riot police force than a proper standing army.
During the Second Intifada, which began in 2000, only months after the liberation of South Lebanon, the Israelis then transitioned into a method of warfare that depended more heavily on “targeted assassinations” and special forces raids. They implemented this strategy, alongside their counterinsurgency approach to warfare, and specialized in occupying civilian populations.
In 2006, they encountered a new obstacle, sustained rocket fire on their settlements, managing to blast as deep into occupied Palestine as Haifa. Later on, the Palestinian Resistance would develop its own rockets and eventually reach Tel Aviv and beyond. However, due to Gaza’s resistance being significantly weaker than Hezbollah, they settled for limited wars of aggression where they would implement the infamous “Dahieh Doctrine” – targeting the civilian population as a means of achieving future “deterrence”.
Lebanese Hezbollah managed to deter the Israelis for 17 years, even managing to force the Zionists to accept an agreement demarcating Lebanese maritime borders. However, the October 7 Al-Aqsa Flood operation jolted the Israelis into a reactionary and accelerationist mindset; they were no longer willing to slowly achieve their goals; instead, they had to do things at a pace in their minds.
But they fell into a trap; they were dragged into a war of attrition. In Gaza, this was something they could survive because the rocket fire gradually dwindled, and their soldiers refused to actually fight the Palestinian Resistance head-on. Instead, they carried out a genocide from a distance, mainly, with their main goal being to destroy buildings.
Which brings us back to South Lebanon. As you read this, the second guerrilla war of liberation is being waged, aiming at achieving an even bigger goal than was achieved in 2000. Hezbollah is now facing a similar predicament to what occurred in 1982 when the Israelis declared a “security zone” in southern Lebanon, which they maintained until the formal occupation was declared in 1985.
The major difference is that the Lebanese Resistance was still in its infancy in the 1980s, and the Palestinian Resistance had left in 1982. This time, the Israelis have been drawn into a trap, one that they cannot easily get out of. It is the beginning of the spider’s web theory proving itself in real time.
Although the war is being fought at a somewhat lower intensity since the announcement of a temporary ceasefire, the invading Zionist militants are being dealt blows on an hourly basis in the south and northern occupied Palestine. You need only look at their media to realize that Israeli society is under pressure in the north already, and the war of attrition has just begun.
The people of Lebanon and Palestine, who form the backbone of their national liberation movements, have proven themselves hardy and capable of enduring the hardships of war, while standing behind their Resistance fighters who come from amongst them. In the case of the Zionists, their army is formed of their public, who are conscripted into it, meaning it is a settlers’ armed forces, but they are a fundamentally weak society.
For the Israelis, they are more interested in living a Western European style of life and aren’t willing to make the necessary sacrifices to win wars of attrition, despite the superiority of their military equipment and intelligence services. A few occasional rockets are enough for tens of thousands to flee their homes, while a Lebanese farmer will remain in his fields as the bombs drop on his village. Right after the so-called ceasefire of November 2024, the people of the South immediately returned home; the settlers did not.
The Israeli army is also suffering a manpower shortage, has drawn back its presence in South Lebanon already due to the FPV drone threat, and has to score fake symbolic victories, such as planting flags in Bint Jbeil, while failing to properly maintain control of the area where Hezbollah fighters continue to watch and target them.
While the initial period between 1982 and 1985 was simple for the Israelis in the way of securing their occupation of the South, this time they are already being battered and have not achieved one goal yet. Desperately, they cling to their targeted assassinations, believing this will transform the battlefield. Another mistake born out of arrogance.
South Lebanon’s liberation in May 2000 birthed the Spider’s Web Theory of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. In May 2026, that theory is being put to the test. So far, we see that the fighters on the ground are proving Sayyed Nasrallah correct.
Iran lawmaker outlines five conditions for any understanding with US
Al Mayadeen | May 26, 2026
The head of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, Ebrahim Azizi, said there is “no meaning” to any understanding or negotiations with the United States unless Washington takes five concrete confidence-building measures.
Speaking to Iranian state television, Azizi said the measures include ending the war on all fronts, particularly in Lebanon, lifting the maritime blockade, guaranteeing the passage of non-military vessels through the Strait of Hormuz under Iranian supervision, suspending oil sanctions for 30 to 60 days, and releasing frozen Iranian assets.
Azizi stressed that even if an agreement is reached, it would not signify the end of confrontation with the United States, adding that “Iran after the war is completely different from Iran before the war.”
His remarks come amid growing anticipation over indirect US-Iran contacts being conducted through regional mediators, including Pakistan and Qatar. In this context, Iranian Parliament Speaker and head of the negotiating delegation Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf visited the Qatari capital, Doha, on Monday.
For his part, US President Donald Trump said negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran were “going well,” describing the process as one that could either lead to “a great deal for everybody” or “no deal at all.” Trump also linked any potential agreement to the need for Arab and Islamic states backing the talks to sign normalization agreements.
On the Lebanese front, which Iran insists must be included in any prospective agreement aimed at halting the war, the Israeli occupation continues its large-scale attacks on towns in southern Lebanon and the western Bekaa.
Israeli media also reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the occupation’s security minister approved plans to expand the war and target civilian buildings in the Lebanese capital, Beirut, after drone operations carried out by the Islamic Resistance that have inflicted losses on occupation forces.
Fars debunks NYT claims ‘Israel’ was exempted from US-Iran agreement
Al Mayadeen | May 24, 2026
Claims that President Donald Trump exempted “Israel” from commitments under a potential agreement with Iran appear to be baseless, Fars News Agency revealed, based on a review of the final draft text.
Fars reported that The New York Times had alleged “Israel” was granted an exemption from the obligations outlined in the emerging draft MoU with Tehran.
However, an examination of the explicit wording of the prospective agreement shows the opposite. According to the draft text, should the agreement be finalized, the United States and its allies would be bound not to launch any form of aggression against Iran or its allies.
In return, Iran has committed that neither it nor its allies would carry out preemptive military strikes against the United States and its allies.
Consequently, the media outlet’s claim that “Israel’s” regime is exempt from any commitments toward Iran directly contradicts the explicit provisions of the final agreement, rendering the assertion false and unfounded.
US and Iran reportedly near agreement
This closely follows a report by Axios citing a US official familiar with the talks, stating that the United States and Iran are nearing a draft agreement that would reopen the Strait of Hormuz, ease pressure on global oil markets, and launch a new round of talks over Tehran’s nuclear program.
The proposed deal, which mediators and President Donald Trump have suggested could be announced as early as Sunday, would establish a 60-day ceasefire framework that could later be extended by mutual consent. However, officials cautioned that talks remain ongoing and the agreement could still collapse before being finalized.
According to the US official, both sides would sign a memorandum of understanding under which Iran would reopen the Strait of Hormuz, remove naval mines deployed in the waterway, and allow unrestricted maritime traffic to resume. In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports and issue sanctions waivers enabling Tehran to freely export oil.
The official acknowledged that the arrangement would provide a major boost to Iran’s economy, but argued that it would also stabilize global energy markets by restoring oil flows through one of the world’s most strategically important shipping lanes.
Boxed into a Corner: Iran Has Outsmarted Trump Every Step of The Way
By Robert Inlakesh | Palestine Chronicle | May 21, 2026
US President Donald Trump has boxed himself into a corner that his ego will not allow him to get out of. Instead of Tehran surrendering, it is Washington that has to accept defeat, or risk dragging this regional conflict into a much wider and bloody war. The bottom line– Iran is better at wars of attrition.
From the first moments of the US-Israeli attack in February 2024, up until the temporary cessation of hostilities came into effect, the Iranians were in the driver’s seat. Iran’s former leader, Seyyed Ali Khamenei, had remained in his publicly known office and was killed almost immediately, almost too easily, it should be noted.
Unlike at the beginning of the 12-Day War, last June, the Iranians didn’t take 15 hours to respond to the aggression against them. Instead, it took only a few hours until missiles were raining down across the Persian Gulf and on Israeli targets.
The message that has been sent to both the Israelis and the US appears to be one that they are incapable of comprehending: assassinations don’t win wars against the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance. Despite its overwhelming technical and military advantages, the US-Israeli alliance watched on as the Iranians absorbed hit after hit, maintaining the capability to continue firing every single day and inflicting significant retaliatory blows.
Around 16 US bases and hundreds of American military assets were crushed, while the military casualties numbered at least into the hundreds; that we know about. Iran, however, flipped the tables completely and decided to make what could be construed as a territorial gain– they now control the Strait of Hormuz.
The only answers the Trump administration has been able to come up with, in response to the Strait of Hormuz closure and Iran’s proven ability to continue fighting, are that he directs enormous strikes on civilian infrastructure or puts boots on the ground. Both these options will result in severe consequences, regionally and domestically, for the United States.
All of this could be solved if the US government were capable of making its own decisions, independent of Israel. However, we live in the real world, where President Trump openly says he isn’t thinking of his own citizens’ financial position, but instead about what Israel cares about (“Iran can’t have nuclear weapons”).
It is also apparent that Trump doesn’t actually care about Iran potentially building nuclear weapons, because if he did, the path to preventing this outcome is a deal that replicates the 2015 Nuclear Deal. The US’s problems with Iran have never been about nuclear weapons; they seek regime change in Tehran for two reasons: Iran is an independent nation, and Israel wants to see it fall.
Evidently, the Trump administration is in the back pocket of the US-based Israel Lobby and is incapable of saying no, which has gotten them into this current mess. A leader like Trump, whose shallow ego makes him incapable of admitting defeat, has been led into a disaster that he can’t get out of.
Instead of weakening the Islamic Republic, if the war were to end on the simple terms that Iran has set out – namely, a ceasefire on all fronts, a new system governing the Strait of Hormuz, and the lifting of sanctions, in addition to handing over frozen assets and compensation – then Tehran will be transformed into a major regional power. If it were militarily battered and had no leadership, as President Trump consistently claims, this would not even be on the table.
The Trump administration fell for the bait of attacking Iran and launching a decapitation strike; now it is being made to pay a price. The Iranians are not about to throw away their leverage for nothing; they want to use this opportunity to free their nation economically and to achieve victory across the region.
Then came the “Uno reverse card” strategy, Washington imposing a blockade on top of Iran’s blockade. If you were to believe the White House, the Iranians are already begging on their knees due to this strategy. If you instead trust your own perceptions, then the reality couldn’t be further from this fictional and egotistical depiction.
Iran can easily outlast its opponents when it comes to surviving an economic war, because it has suffered through this for 47 years. Which means that Trump is running out of time.
On the Lebanon front, Hezbollah is grinding down the Israeli ground forces who are currently attempting to impose an occupation in the south of the country. Washington’s solution has been to try to use the deeply unpopular Lebanese government in an attempt to stir civil unrest inside Lebanon, but also to drag it into a normalization agreement with Tel Aviv, one that will present the Israelis with a propaganda victory.
Hezbollah, both Washington and Tel Aviv told the world, was supposed to have been defeated in 2024. Instead, it is now using asymmetric warfare to batter the Israelis and impose a new equation that will eventually force a retreat that will represent an even more consequential retreat than occurred as a result of the 2000 liberation of South Lebanon.
So the Trump administration is running out of time, the economic pressure on his Persian Gulf Arab allies is immense and the Israelis are feeling the heat of Hezbollah’s blows. There are two ways forward: to escalate again militarily or to bow to Iranian demands. The military option is a non-option, because there is simply nothing more that can be achieved without enormous consequences. Yet, Donald J Trump, the weakest President in American history, appears incapable of saying no to Israel.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.
