Chinese jet fuel and the myth of energy independence
Inside China Business | April 8, 2026
Except for in Russia and (ironically) Iran, the war in the Persian Gulf has blown up energy markets everywhere. Worldwide, no country is self-sufficient in all its energy needs, and disruptions in a supply chains anywhere result in major problems everywhere. China is the largest refiner of jet fuel in Asia-Pacific, and has enormous reserves of crude stashed away, which can last months. But immediately after the war on Iran began, China locked down its exports of jet fuel. The effect on prices across Asia was felt immediately, with costs more than doubling in just six weeks. In the United States, fuel prices also soared, and also by over 100%.
Resources and links:
$140, and going higher: That’s the real price of oil, right now. Oil traders will be wiped out.
• $140, and going higher: That’s the real p…
Singapore’s major oil source is blocked and experts warn Australians will pay https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-04-0…
Australia and Japan face jet fuel supply crunch as China cuts exports https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-ec…
Daily Jet Fuel Spot Prices https://www.airlines.org/dataset/argu…
America’s energy independence https://no01.substack.com/p/americas-…
US crude oil exports decreased by 3% in 2025 despite higher production (+3%) https://www.enerdata.net/publications…
Petroleum & Other Liquids, Imports by Country of Origin https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move…
China set to extend fuel export ban with small exemptions, sources say https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pa…
South Korea to enforce 5-day vehicle rotation system as Mideast conflict hits energy supplies https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific…
Nations across Asia strike direct deals with Iran for Hormuz passage
Al Mayadeen | April 7, 2026
As US President Donald Trump threatens to “obliterate” Iran’s energy infrastructure unless it reopens the Strait of Hormuz, a growing number of countries are now negotiating directly with Tehran to secure safe passage for their ships.
Several nations in Asia, arguably the region most affected by the ongoing fuel crisis, have been able to get their vessels through the chokepoint, through which about a fifth of the world’s oil and gas normally transits. Tehran effectively closed the Strait after the country was attacked by the US and “Israel” on February 28.
It is a state of affairs that reflects a new geopolitical reality: access to the world’s most critical energy chokepoint is no longer governed by international maritime law, but by direct diplomacy with Iran.
A ‘de facto toll booth regime’
According to maritime tracking platform Kpler, commodity traffic through the strait fell by 95 percent when the war began. Before the US-Israeli aggression, around 100 ships transited daily. On some days this past week, that number was in the single digits.
But Iran has not closed the Strait entirely. Instead, it has created what maritime intelligence firm Lloyd’s List has described as a “de facto toll booth regime,” a permissions-based system operated by the IRGC, in which vessels from friendly countries are escorted through a narrow northern corridor near Larak Island.
As of this week, a second southern corridor near the Omani coastline has become operational, with Windward Maritime Intelligence tracking 11 transits on Sunday split across the two routes.
Iran names friendly nations
Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has publicly named the countries considered friendly enough for passage: China, Russia, India, Iraq, and Pakistan. Several others have since joined the list.
India was among the first countries to secure safe transit, reportedly without paying any fees. The Iranian embassy in New Delhi posted on social media that “our Indian friends are in safe hands.”
Pakistan was allocated 20 vessel slots by Tehran. “This is a welcome and constructive gesture by Iran,” Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said.
Thailand struck a deal after weeks of disruptions that included a Thai bulk carrier being struck by Iranian projectiles in March, leaving three crew members unaccounted for. A Thai tanker subsequently crossed without paying a fee.
Malaysia secures passage
Malaysia secured assurances of safe passage through what its Transport Minister described as a “good diplomatic relationship with the Iranian government.” The Iranian embassy in Kuala Lumpur said on Monday that the first Malaysian ship had passed through the strait since the war began. “Iran does not forget its friends,” it said.
A Malaysian Foreign Ministry statement confirmed that one of seven Malaysian-owned commercial vessels stranded in the strait has been granted safe passage and is now heading to its destination, following “high-level diplomatic engagements” and “constructive” talks with Iranian officials led by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim.
Other nations join the list
The Philippines, despite its close ties with the US, became the latest Asian country to secure an agreement after what its foreign secretary described as “a very productive phone conversation” with Tehran. Iran assured “safe, unhindered and expeditious passage” for Philippines-flagged ships.
China, Iran’s largest oil buyer, confirmed that some of its ships had sailed through. Windward’s data show Chinese-linked vessels account for around 10 percent of the limited traffic still moving through the strait.
Indonesia secured passage for two of its vessels following diplomatic engagement with Tehran. Iraq has also been granted an exemption, with Windward identifying 21 Iraqi-linked tankers already operating under the arrangement.
Japan joined the list this week after a vessel operated by Mitsui OSK Lines carrying liquefied natural gas passed through the strait.
A system based on political alignment
The system is selectively allocated based on political alignment rather than open maritime norms. Of the roughly 280 global transit requests tracked by one intelligence firm, only 17 were approved. Some 670 commodity vessels were still stranded west of the strait as of last week.
Iran’s parliament is pursuing legislation to formally codify the toll system, likely making permanent a wartime measure and turning one of the world’s most important shipping routes into a fee-paying corridor controlled by its military.
A strategy that works
While Washington threatens military action and demands European naval support, Iran has quietly built a parallel system: nations that engage with Tehran diplomatically get their ships through. Those who follow Washington’s lead find the strait closed.
As the US-Israeli war on Iran enters its sixth week, the message is clear. Iran controls the Strait. Iran decides who passes. And Iran is proving that diplomacy, not threats, is the only path through. The countries that need their ships to move are making their own deals, and they are getting results.
Japan Clings to US Vassalage Despite Energy Crunch Caused By Iran War
Sputnik – 27.03.2026
With 90% of Japan’s oil and 11% of its LNG sourced in the Persian Gulf, effectively closed thanks to the US-Israeli war on Iran, Tokyo has been put in a strategic bind, facing growing pressure both domestically and in ties with neighbors.
Tokyo has contributed 80M barrels of oil to the G7-led 400M barrel phased reserves release, but signaled it will only sell it to domestic refiners, rejecting pleas for help from Vietnam and the Philippines, per Bloomberg.
Domestically, the government has been forced to lift restrictions on coal-fired power plants, introduce subsidies to keep gasoline at ~$4 a gallon, and raise household electricity bills by ~$95 starting in April. Over time, logistical, flights, and everything else linked to hydrocarbon energy will face price hikes.
80M barrels is enough for ~45 days. If Hormuz remains blocked after then, Japan will have only two options, neither of them good:
- engage in a cutthroat energy bid price war, which will raise domestic prices and worsen ties with other energy-dependent neighbors in Asia
- introduce fuel rationing, which could trigger a recession or even a debt crisis (Japan already has a debt-to-GDP ratio of ~240%, the highest among rich nations)
Notwithstanding these pressures, Japan:
- continues to buy US Treasuries ($1.2T and counting)
- lets 50k+ US troops be stationed on its territory, 80 years after the end of WWII, for ‘defense’ (although the Iran war has seen US pulling out assets and repositioning them in Israel)
- keeps sanctions on Iranian oil, one of the only sources of Gulf oil currently making its way past Hormuz
- has pledged $73B to US energy security projects, including small modular reactors and natural gas infrastructure in Tennessee, Alabama, Pennsylvania and Texas
- swallows US tariffs and accepts an export-crushing strong yen policy to satisfy Washington
- sidelines its own foreign policy interests, including ties with powers like China and ASEAN
Role reversal – “divide & conquer” used against the west
Ashes of Pompeii | March 21, 2026
For centuries, the strategy of “divide and conquer” has been a cornerstone of Western geopolitical power. The British Empire mastered the art of ruling vast territories with minimal forces by exploiting internal divisions, setting local leaders against one another, leveraging ethnic tensions, and securing cooperation through selective incentives (aka bribes). The United States later employed similar tactics, from Cold War interventions to coalition-building in Iraq and Southeast Asia. The principle remains consistent: fracture opposition to maintain advantage.
Today, we are witnessing a role reversal in real time. Iran, long subjected to Western pressure and sanctions, is employing a parallel strategy regarding the Strait of Hormuz. Much of the west is not entirely enamoured of Trump’s Iran strategy but is afraid to openly challenge America. The closing of the Strait is economically catastrophic for most US allies and they are caught between a rock and a hard place – a vindictive Trump demanding support to open the Strait, and economic hardship.
In steps Iran with its own “divide and conquer” strategy, now reportedly negotiating with individual Asian and European countries a sort of Hormuz toll to allow tankers from these allied countries to pass through. And of course, they would each be required to not support the the US Navy if it attempts to open Hormuz. These discussions would be regarding tolls, security guarantees, and bilateral arrangements that would circumvent a collective response.
This approach carries significant strategic implications. If key U.S. allies secure individual agreements ensuring their energy shipments, the incentive to support a unified, potentially confrontational effort to keep Hormuz open is dead in the water.. Why risk escalation when a separate deal preserves economic interests? This dynamic could gradually erode the cohesion of Western alliances. Imagine Japan, Korea or Germany putting their national interests ahead of America’s! Unthinkable just a few weeks ago.
Iran’s maneuvering reflects a calculated understanding of coalition politics. By offering tailored terms, Tehran exploits the very real economic dependencies that different nations have on Persian Gulf oil flows. A country like Japan, facing immediate energy shortfalls, may prioritize short-term access over long-term strategic solidarity.
The irony is substantive, not merely rhetorical: a regional power taking advantage of a strategy historically used to extend Western influence, now being adapted to counter that same influence. Traditional western asymmetric power dynamics being used against the west.
If Iran successfully institutionalizes a system of bilateral tolls or passage agreements, it could reshape regional power structures and perhaps challenge the precedent of freedom of navigation under international law. However, this development also exposes the conditional nature of the “rules-based order” itself. When international norms align with western strategic interests, they are vigorously defended; when they become inconvenient, exceptions are quietly made. The interesting aspect here, is that for once, the exception is used against the USA.
In the end, this is power politics, plain and simple. Iran is using the tools available to it, geography, energy dependence, and diplomatic patience, to turn a strategic vulnerability into leverage. The West built much of its influence by splitting opponents; now it faces the same tactic applied in reverse. One would expect that states would always seek national advantage where they find it, but that has often not been the case for “junior” members of the western alliance in the last 30 or 40 years.
This is just another step towards a multipolar world where the west is seeing its own playbook used against it, where alliances and coalitions may be less static, and where national interest may be considered more important than following the diktats of a hegemon or a bloc leader.
Turn around is fair play and America and the west will need to get used to the idea that other countries, here Iran, can both play hardball and use divide and conquer strategies.
I am not sure Donald Trump will quite understand the significance of this moment.
Seven US allies endorse Hormuz ‘coalition,’ offer ‘no commitment’ for military action
The Cradle | March 20, 2026
The UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, and Canada issued a joint statement on 20 March in support of a potential “coalition” to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, while specifying “no commitment” to a concrete military role.
“We express our readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage through the strait,” the close US allies announced.
The joint statement did not, however, touch on any military involvement or the commitment of any forces to the initiative.
One political reporter writing for Axios said the statement was “largely a gesture to placate [US] President [Donald] Trump, who has railed against allies for declining to help secure the strait and warned that a failure to do so could undermine the future of NATO.”
The allies condemned attacks on commercial vessels and energy infrastructure, citing “the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iranian forces,” and called on Tehran to “cease immediately its threats, laying of mines, drone and missile attacks and other attempts to block the strait.”
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said no state is considering “a military mission to forcibly break the Iranian blockade,” adding the EU favors “diplomacy and de-escalation.”
She clarified that any contribution would apply to a “post-conflict phase” and require agreement among all parties.
Other governments echoed this position, with Germany confirming “no military participation,” while France said its deployments remain strictly defensive.
The UK ruled out a NATO mission, focusing instead on negotiations, though it has sent planners to coordinate options.
Despite the political backing and global panic over soaring energy prices , maritime data shows the strait is only partially restricted, as roughly 90 vessels crossed in early March.
Iran has established a controlled “safe” shipping corridor through its territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz, allowing only approved vessels – mainly from countries like India, Pakistan, China, Iraq, and Malaysia – to transit after IRGC vetting, while ships linked to the US or Israel are effectively excluded.
Access is currently negotiated on a case-by-case basis but is moving toward a formal system requiring detailed disclosures of ownership and cargo, often coordinated through intermediaries and, in at least one case, involving a reported $2-million payment.
So far, at least nine vessels have used the route, which passes near Larak Island for inspection, but traffic remains minimal.
The US remains largely the only country carrying out direct military operations, deploying forces and striking Iranian positions along the strait, as well as conducting offensive strikes inside Iran.
Earlier US-led efforts to secure regional shipping routes followed a similar trajectory, with coalitions struggling to gain meaningful participation as several allies refused or limited involvement, leaving only a small number of naval deployments.
Efforts to secure maritime routes during the Israeli genocide on Gaza in 2024 faced the same constraints, as US and EU resources proved insufficient to deter Yemeni strikes across the Red Sea.
Officials had warned that strikes on Yemen were “not contributing to the solution,” while Yemeni attacks on vessels continued, raising pressure on global trade routes.
Yemeni forces maintained their stance as a support front for Gaza, persisting with attacks until Washington ended its campaign under an Omani-brokered truce, with President Trump claiming Yemeni forces “don’t want to fight anymore.”
Even The Neo-Cons Admit The Iran War Is Failing
The Dissident – March 16, 2026
The current U.S./Israeli war on Iran is, in many ways, a product of the policies long advocated by U.S. neoconservatives, most importantly the clean break strategy drafted by the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), which advocated taking out “Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and, finishing off, Iran” on behalf of Israel.
But many of the original Neo-cons who first drafted this plan, including John Bolton and even Robert Kagan and Bill Kristol, the founders of the Project for a New American Century, are now jumping ship and admitting that the U.S./Israeli war on Iran is failing.
In an interview with NPR, longtime Neo-con John Bolton, despite saying he has “been a supporter of efforts at regime change in Iran for a long time” was forced to admit that the regime change plan has failed and that the U.S. underestimated Iran’s response.
Bolton was forced to admit that Trump underestimated Iran’s ability to effectively close the Strait of Hormuz and disrupt oil shipping in response to the U.S/Israeli bombing, saying:
… it was questionable whether he was cooperating effectively with and assisting the opposition inside Iran. That’s what I said, I think, in our last conversation. Since then, I’m very worried that there are now signs that they haven’t thought about a lot of other things. For example, there’s reporting that the White House was surprised at how quickly oil prices went up.
And all I can say to that is I’m surprised that they’re surprised. If they weren’t planning for that both economically, politically and militarily, then that’s a huge hole in the planning. I am worried that they apparently didn’t take as seriously as they should have the potential to mine the Strait of Hormuz. Trump said several days ago that the Iranian navy had been completely destroyed. And despite years of listening to that kind of thing, I should have known better. I actually sort of believed in for a while. But now we learned that it was only yesterday that we got around to destroying 16 mine-laying vessels. Of course, they’ve got the capability to mine via drones going over the strait and dropping mines in it.
Even more shocking than Bolton’s admission was a podcast released by the founders of PNAC, Robert Kagan and Bill Kristol, where they essentially admitted that the U.S. war on Iran was destroying the U.S. empire.
Robert Kagan, in the podcast, admitted that the Iran war was debilitating America’s ability to wage a new Cold War on Russia and China, and isolating the U.S. empire globally.
The “undoubted effect of the Iran war has been to drive a deeper wedge between the United States and pretty much all of its allies or at least all of its traditional allies, both in Europe and in Asia, and I would say potentially even in the Middle East” Kagan Said.
Kagan lamented that the Iran war was crippling the U.S.’s ability to continue the proxy war in Ukraine saying, “the skyrocketing oil prices … are even before Trump took the action of lifting sanctions against Russia was going to increase Russian income” and “American forces are … burning through major stocks of weaponry and particularly Patriot and other forms of interceptors on which Ukraine depends heavily because those are the interceptors that defend their major cities from constant Russian attacks.”
Kagan also lamented that the war was taking away the U.S. empire’s ability to wage a new Cold War on China, saying, “very few countries in the world are more dependent on Middle East oil, including the oil that comes directly through the Strait of Hormuz, than Japan. Japan I think, depends on something like 95% of its oil supplies come from the Middle East and 70% of that runs through the Strait of Hormuz. So once again the Japanese were not consulted”, adding, that the prime minister of Japan is “very upset” and “ talked about how this crisis has severely impacted Japanese interests”.
He also added “the Japanese will notice that the United States has sent significant forces that are dedicated both to the defense of Japan and are sort of critical to any response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Those forces are now being sent or some of them are already there, and some are being sent to the Middle East.”
Kagan also admitted that the war in Iran is isolating the Gulf States from the U.S. and potentially moving them towards China.
He said, “I just wonder whether the Gulf States in particular are wondering whether they’ve joined the right team here because they have, by the way, been very on background, very vocal in saying that they were against the war. … They did not favor it. They thought they had a pretty good deal going with the Iranians, that kind of an agreement that they would get to, they would leave each other alone for the most part,” adding, “it turns out the United States can’t really protect them. I mean they have suffered the worst in some respects because it’s not only that they’ve been targets and that they’re shipping you know they’ve lost money on oil, but you know they with the tremendous cooperation of the Trump and I would say in this case the Trump family and social circle have been very deeply involved in the United States making investments in AI and other things but particularly AI they’re hosting data centers for all kinds of companies and in general, they’ve been trying to make themselves an attractive place for investment and also tourism.”
Citing the example of Dubai, Kagan said, “You watch the UAE is basically arresting people for taking pictures of damage that may have been done by Iranian drone strikes and other things on things in Dubai. For instance, I think they’ve arrested foreigners who took pictures of these things. Why? Because they don’t want people to see that it’s risky to be in Dubai, because then people won’t invest and they won’t come, and so it’s kind of a disaster for them,” adding, “the bottom line for the Gulf States is that the United States undertook this war and then was not able actually to protect them”.
He added, “I don’t think it’s hard to persuade certain Gulf states like the UAE and others that maybe China is also a pretty good partner or at least as much of a reliable partner as the United States has turned out to be.”
In other words, Kagan and his host Bill Kristol are essentially admitting that the Iran war is destroying and isolating U.S. empire and destroying the U.S.’s ability to project power in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East through proxy states.
This is why Kagan- as journalist Max Blumenthal described it – essentially “describes Israel as a strategic liability leading the US into a quagmire” saying, “I find it a little bit it’s kind of a syllogism when people talk about what a great ally Israel is. It it is a great ally in defense of Israel” adding, “at the end of the day, Iran is a much greater threat to Israel than it is to the United States.”
Kagan also admitted that Iran, “were deliberately not closing the straits for all these years precisely because we did not confront them with the prospect of complete annihilation” adding, “it was only when both the Israelis and the United States made it clear that their goal was the annihilation of regime, assassinated the entire leadership with a bombing strike that they then did this. So we are now solving a problem that we clearly provoked.”
Make no mistake about it, John Bolton, Robert Kagan, Bill Kristol, and their fellow Neo-cons set the stage for this war with Iran, but the fact that even they are now jumping ship shows that war is not at all going as planned for the U.S.
‘Not our war’: Trump’s naval coalition to reopen Strait of Hormuz dead in the water
The Cradle | March 16, 2026
Several countries have either rejected or expressed serious concerns about US President Donald Trump’s plan to form a coalition aimed at escorting vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, which Tehran has closed to Washington and its allies in retaliation for the brutal US-Israeli strikes on the Islamic Republic.
Germany’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Johann Wadephul, said on 15 March that he was “skeptical” of Trump’s plan.
“Will we soon be an active part of this conflict? No,” he went on to say.
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said, “What does Trump expect a handful of European frigates to do that the powerful US Navy cannot?” adding, “This is not our war, and we did not start it.”
Meanwhile, France officially rejected the US request to send warships to the Strait of Hormuz.
The French Foreign Ministry rejected reports that it was gearing up to send vessels, saying, “No. The carrier strike group remains in the Eastern Mediterranean. France’s position remains unchanged: defensive and protective.”
Australia has also denied the request, as have Japan, China, Norway, and Spain. The UK and South Korea said they were reviewing options.
The US president had demanded that NATO states join his proposed coalition, threatening that they would face a “very bad future” if they did not.
Trump had also expressed hope that “China, France, Japan, South Korea, the UK, and others, that are affected by this artificial constraint, will send ships to the area so that the Hormuz Strait will no longer be a threat by a nation that has been totally decapitated.”
Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz to Washington and its allies in response to the US-Israeli war against the Islamic Republic. Several vessels trying to cross in violation of Iranian warnings have been targeted.
A number of countries have reached out to Tehran for access to the Strait, through which 20 to 30 percent of the world’s energy passed prior to the war.
India has confirmed that two of its ships passed after talks with Iran. Tehran also allowed a Turkish vessel to pass through the strait.
“The Strait of Hormuz has not been militarily blocked and is merely under control,” said Alireza Tangsiri, naval commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated, “The Strait of Hormuz is open. It is only closed to the tankers and ships belonging to our enemies, to those who are attacking us and their allies. Others are free to pass.”
After Yemen began its pro-Palestine blockade in the Red Sea following the start of the Gaza genocide in 2023, Washington launched a naval operation under the name Prosperity Guardian – aimed at deterring Sanaa’s forces and facilitating the transit of vessels.
The US failed to secure enough partners, and the mission ultimately failed.
The Ansarallah-led Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) has recently vowed that it is ready to intervene alongside Iran’s other allies – meaning the potential closure of another vital energy route, the Bab al-Mandab strait.
Japan to Sign Up For NATO’s Ukraine Arms Pipeline
Sputnik – February 10, 2026
Japan has allegedly pledged significant financial support for Ukraine, and committed to providing specialized equipment, with reports indicating long-term assistance.
Doubling down on its US-pushed militarization drive, Japan is moving closer to NATO by signing on to the alliance’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) program, which facilitates the flow of military equipment to Ukraine, according to NHK.
Sources cited by the outlet claim Japan will soon officially announce its participation in the initiative, announced during the NATO Summit in July 2024 and headquartered in Wiesbaden, Germany.
The equipment that Japan is expected to procure for Ukraine reportedly includes body armor, vehicles, and, potentially, radar systems.
The NSATU mechanism coordinates the donation of military equipment from Allied and partner nations to Ukraine’s armed forces, aligning their capabilities with NATO standards.
Russia has repeatedly argued that Western weapons shipments to Ukraine undermine any prospects for a negotiated settlement and amount to NATO’s direct involvement in the conflict. Russia has also warned that convoys delivering arms to Ukraine would be treated as legitimate military targets.
Pentagon downgrades China threat, shifts focus to homeland, hemisphere
Al Mayadeen | January 24, 2026
The United States Department of War has released its long-delayed 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), signaling a major shift in Washington’s military priorities by no longer treating China as the “primary threat” to US national security.
The document, published late Friday, places the defense of the US homeland and the Western Hemisphere at the center of Pentagon planning, a sharp departure from strategies issued under both former President Joe Biden and President Donald Trump’s first term, which identified China as the foremost strategic challenge.
According to the strategy, past US administrations “ignored American interests,” allowing strategic vulnerabilities to emerge in areas such as the Panama Canal, Greenland, and the broader Western Hemisphere. The document explicitly calls for abandoning what it describes as “grandiose strategies” in favor of policies rooted in the “practical interests” of the US public.
Reduced emphasis on China, conciliatory tone in the Pacific
While China remains a key concern, the 2026 NDS no longer characterizes Beijing as an “acute” or “existential” threat. Instead, it refers to China as a “settled force” in the Indo-Pacific that must be deterred from dominating the US or its allies.
The document adopts a notably conciliatory tone, stressing that Washington does not seek to “strangle or humiliate” China. It argues that a “decent peace” is achievable under terms favorable to the US and acceptable to Beijing, emphasizing diplomacy, stable relations, and expanded military-to-military communication channels to avoid escalation.
Although the Pentagon continues to advocate a “strong denial defense” in the Pacific, the strategy does not specify what military assets will be deployed. Notably, Taiwan is not mentioned by name, marking a significant shift from the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which explicitly framed Taiwan as a central security concern.
Europe’s declining importance, new DPRK strategy
In contrast to the National Security Strategy released last month, the defense document avoids describing Europe as being in “civilizational decline”, but it nonetheless downplays the continent’s strategic importance.
“Although Europe remains important, it has a smaller and decreasing share of global economic power,” the strategy states, adding that while US engagement will continue, Washington will prioritize defending the homeland and its immediate sphere of influence.
The strategy also outlines a reduced US military role in deterring the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, shifting primary responsibility to South Korea, which currently hosts around 28,500 US troops.
“South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited US support,” the document states.
The strategy notably omits any reference to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, reinforcing speculation that Washington is moving toward managing the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities rather than seeking their elimination.
“This shift in the balance of responsibility is consistent with America’s interest in updating US force posture on the Korean Peninsula,” the strategy explains, noting that Washington seeks to make its forces more flexible and better positioned to respond to a wider range of contingencies across the region.
Burden-sharing and regional rebalancing in the Pacific
Across the broader Pacific region, the Pentagon is urging allies to assume greater responsibility for their own defense, linking continued US cooperation to increased military spending by allies, with benchmarks as high as 5% of GDP. The strategy emphasizes economic and maritime security over regime-change policies, describing the Indo-Pacific as the world’s most dynamic economic region and underscoring the need to protect trade routes and strategic access points.
Japan and South Korea are identified as central to this regional balancing approach, with the US seeking to “incentivize and enable” allies to play a more assertive role in collective defense.
Meanwhile, South Korea has raised its defense spending to 7.5% of GDP and continues to field upwards of 500,000 regular troops with approximately 3.1 million reservists. On its part, Japan is moving to decisively break with decades of post-war pacifism, accelerating a historic military buildup and adopting a more assertive security posture.
Tokyo is on track to reach defense spending equivalent to 2% of GDP by March 2026, abandoning the long-standing 1% cap, as part of a five-year rearmament plan totaling 43 trillion yen. The shift is accompanied by the development of “counterstrike” capabilities, marking a transition from an exclusively defense-oriented doctrine toward deterrence by punishment and the fielding of overtly offensive weapons. While Japanese officials frame the change as strategic maturity and greater alliance responsibility, critics have denounced it as a revival of Japanese militarism.
The release of the 2026 NDS comes after months of internal delays. US media reported that a draft reached War Secretary Pete Hegseth as early as September, but disagreements within the administration over how to characterize China’s threat, particularly amid ongoing trade negotiations, stalled its publication.
Despite references to Russia, Iran, and DPRK as sources of risk, the strategy treats these threats as secondary, reinforcing the Pentagon’s pivot toward homeland defense and regional retrenchment rather than expansive global confrontation.
What’s on Trump’s mind as US adjusts to multipolarity
By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | December 12, 2025
The world order’s transformation to multipolarity is a work in progress with the variables at work, but its outcome will be largely determined by the alignment of the three big powers — the United States, Russia and China. Historically, the ‘triangle’ appeared as the lid came off the Sino-Soviet schism in the 1960s and a ferocious public acrimony erupted between Moscow and Beijing, which prompted the Nixon administration to moot Henry Kissinger’s secret mission to Beijing to meet up face to face with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou En-lai and, hopefully, work out a modus vivendii to jointly counter Russia.
Revisiting the Sino-Soviet schism, it is well understood by now that the US-Soviet – China triangle never really ran the course that Kissinger had envisaged. Kissinger’s failure to consolidate the opening of relations with China was partly due to his loss of power by January 1977 and, in a systemic sense, inevitably so, given the complexity of the boiling cauldron of Sino-Soviet schism where ideology mixed with politics and geopolitics — and realpolitik.
While the western mythology was that the US built up the foundations of China’s rise, historiography points in another direction, namely, that Beijing always had in mind the dialectics at work and even as a degree of compatibility of Chinese and American interests in checking the expansion of Soviet power existed, Beijing was determined to avoid military conflict with the Soviet Union and concentrated its attention on improving its tactical position within the US-Chinese-Soviet triangle.
On its part, the Soviet Union also consistently promoted increased exchanges with China despite the bitter acrimony and even military clashes with a view to undercut perceived advantages the US derived from the Sino-Soviet split — and even sought to persuade China to accept the military and territorial status quo in Asia.
In fact, to retard Sino-US cooperation against them in the early 1970s, the Soviets offered at one point to modify their territorial claims along their border, to sign non-aggression pacts and / or agreements prohibiting the use of force, to base Sino-Soviet relationship on the five principles of peaceful co-existence, and to restore high-level contacts, including party ties, in the interests of their common opposition to the US.
If China largely ignored these overtures, it was almost entirely due to the great turbulence in its internal politics. Suffice to say, no sooner than Mao, the Soviet Union’s nemesis, died in September 1976 (and the curtain descended on the Cultural Revolution), Moscow followed up quickly with several gestures, including Brezhnev sending a message of condolence (the first CPSU message to China in a decade), followed by another Party message in October congratulating the newly-elected CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng, and shortly thereafter in November sending their chief negotiator for border talks Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev back to China in an attempt to resume the border talks. But, again, if nothing came of it, that was because of China’s invasion of Vietnam and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan soon thereafter in 1980.
Indeed, looking back, the main legacy of the 1970s viewed through the prism of the US-China-Russia ‘triangle’ was the reorientation of China’s defence policy and its geopolitical realignment with the West. China made no contribution significantly to weaken the Soviet Union or to aggravate the stagnation and brewing crisis in the Soviet political economy.
Meanwhile, the Sino-US differences over Taiwan and other issues had reemerged by 1980-1982, compelling China to reassess its foreign policy strategy, which manifested in Beijing’s announcement in 1982 of its “independent” foreign policy — plainly put, an attempt to rely less explicitly on the US as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union — and the move to open “consultative talks” with Moscow, and a growing receptiveness towards the numerous pending Soviet overtures for bilateral exchanges (in sports, cultural and economic areas, etc), the overall direction being to reduce tensions with the Soviets and increase the room for manoeuvre for Beijing within the China-US-Soviet triangle.
Indeed, a broader detente between China and the Soviet Union had to wait till the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan following the Geneva Accords signed in April 1988. Nonetheless, a basic change in the Sino-Soviet relations through the 1980s appeared, which included regular scheduled summit meetings; resumption of cooperative ties between the CCP and the CPSU; Beijing’s acceptance of the pending Soviet proposals for non-aggression / non-use of force; and resumption of Sino-Soviet border questions at vice-foreign minister level.
Washington could sense the shift in Chinese policy directions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Notably, reviewing the marked shift in the Chinese strategy, a CIA assessment noted:
“More recently, Moscow followed Brezhnev’s call in 1982 for improved relations with China with a halt in most authoritative Soviet statements critical of China. When Sino-Soviet discussions resumed in October 1982, Soviet media cut back sharply on criticism of China. And they have remained restrained on this subject, although occasional polemic exchanges marked Sino-Soviet coverage at the time of Premier Zhao Ziyang’s visit to the United States in January 1984. Moscow has continued to be critical of China through the Soviet-based clandestine radio Ba Yi… China for its part has continued criticism of Soviet foreign policy, although past attention to Soviet “revisionist” internal policies has all but disappeared since China’s own economic policies have been significantly changed after Mao’s death.”
Succinctly put, with CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev consolidating power circa late 1988 by his election to the chairmanship of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet and on a parallel track, Deng had outmaneuvered political rivals and become China’s paramount leader by 1978 — and had launched the Boluan Fanzheng program to restore political stability, rehabilitate those persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, and reduce ideological extremism — the door had opened for the two erstwhile adversaries to enter the rose garden of reconciliation.
Significantly, the timing of Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing to meet up with Deng in 1989 was far from ideal by virtue of the Tiannenmen Square incidents, but neither side proposed to postpone or reschedule the meeting. Such was the intensity of their mutual desire for reconciliation.
Today, the above résumé has become necessary when we assess the future directions of the Trump administration’s China policies. The common perception is that Trump is attempting to create a wedge between Putin’s Russia and Xi Jinping’s China with a view to isolate the latter and thwart it from surpassing the US. But there is no shred of evidence available hinting at the potential for decoupling Russia from China.
All the signs are to the contrary in the direction of the steady integration of the two countries. Last week, the Kremlin announced a visa-free regime for Chinese citizens to visit Russia. Interestingly, this was a reciprocal move. FT reported recently that a Chinese businessman has been given equity in Russia’s biggest manufacturer of drones which supplies the military — in the first known collaboration in the area of defence industry.
With the Power of Siberia 2 on the anvil, China’s dependence on Russia for its energy security will increase further. Russia’s foreign trade is undergoing a profound shift, with China replacing the EU as Russia’s main trading partner. Overall, Sino-Russian relations are closer today than they have been in decades.
On the other hand, there is no credible suggestion that the Trump administration is preparing for a war with China. Japan under its new leadership is whistling in the dark.
So, what is on Trump’s mind? In his revolutionary agenda for the remaking of the new world order, Trump aims at a strategic concord between the US on one side and Russia and China on the other. The recent US National Security Strategy strongly points in that direction, too. The implications of this revolutionary thinking for multipolarity are going to be profound — for partners such as India or allies like Japan or Germany alike.
A “ripple-on” effect following Sanae Takaichi’s remark
By Vladimir Terehov – New Eastern Outlook – December 7, 2025
The scandal triggered by a comment made by Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on November 7, 2025 about the Taiwan issue is still reverberating and shows no sign of dying down.
The “ripples on the water” provoked by her remark on the global political arena not only refuse to fade, they keep reaching new actors.
Japan’s Defense Minister visits an island near Taiwan
The NEO has already touched upon Takaichi’s earlier statements about the probability of Beijing opting for a military solution to the Taiwan issue and thus posing an “existential threat” to Japan. Now, any remaining hope that Takaichi’s remark was merely an unfortunate slip of the tongue of an inexperienced politician seems to be evaporating. As the first woman to assume the office of prime minister, being now at the very beginning of her path, she could, in theory, have walked straight into a trap cleverly laid by seasoned male politicians, perhaps an unexpected question tossed at her during some parliamentary event unrelated to the topic.
However, not only does Takaichi refuse to retract her words, but she also declines to offer any “softening” explanations. And this is despite Beijing discreetly signaling that such clarifications would be enough for it to consider the incident exhausted.
The assumption of Takaichi’s wording being an accidental slip of the tongue is further undermined by what happened two weeks later. Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi appeared on the small island of Yonaguni—Japan’s westernmost inhabited island, home to 1,500 people, lying closest to Taiwan’s eastern coast. More importantly, he announced plans to deploy missiles there in order, as he put it, “to reduce the likelihood of an armed attack on our country.”
He did not specify what kind of missiles he was taking about. Japan is currently developing a broad range of sea- and land-based missile systems, and if deployed on Yonaguni, several provinces of the PRC could fall within their range, since the narrowest distance to China’s coast is less than 500 km. The response that came from China’s Defense Ministry to already thinly veiled threats from Japan was more than expected.
It’s worth noting that another stage in the deterioration of bilateral relations was preceded by an attempt to rectify the situation in the realms of an emergency trip to Beijing by a Plenipotentiary of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, which, nevertheless, was to no avail. If these two developments constitute Tokyo’s attempts to use a “carrot and stick” strategy, then such an approach is poorly appropriate in dealing with the world’s second-largest power.
Deepening and widening the emerging crisis
There are currently no hints at the possibility of reversing the deterioration of the relations between the region’s two leading states set in motion by Takaichi’s remark. Her previously arranged meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in South Africa never took place. A trilateral summit in the “China–Japan–South Korea” format, initially planned for January 2026, has been postponed to an indefinite period of time. This is particularly notable given that the resumption of this trilateral mechanism in May 2024, after a three-year hiatus, was heralded as a sign that longstanding, serious issues present in all its “sides” might finally be resolved.
Today, however, new obstacles are being thrown in the way of people-to-people contacts between China and Japan, particularly in tourism. New restrictions are also emerging around Japan’s export of seafood, which has long been bought mainly by China.
Over the last two years, the situation in the sector has served as a reliable indicator of the state of bilateral ties. When the said moment of improving the relations manifested itself, earlier concerns among Chinese authorities about the quality of Japan’s seawater, and thus its seafood, stemming from the release of treated water used to cool damaged reactors at Fukushima-1, faded away. Now, Chinese officials, to justify putting imports on halt, cite not only “incomplete” documentation but also “Takaichi’s erroneous statements on the Taiwan issue, which provoked indignation and condemnation among the Chinese people.”
A sharp stiffening of Chinese public and expert rhetoric towards Japan is also hard to miss, with them making use of diverse factual data both from World War II and the early postwar years. Particular attention is being paid to Tokyo’s attempts to revise the still-intact pacifist Constitution of 1947. Commentaries on the issue end with a general, unarguable warning: “Those who love war will perish.” The problem, however, is that “those” who provoke yet another, and most likely final, global carnage often act publicly for years with impunity, expecting to survive.
The current US president does not appear to pertain to such a category, even despite his political peculiarities and personal shortcomings. He appears genuinely alarmed by the rapidly escalating confrontation between East Asia’s two leading powers. Just a month after meeting their leaders in person, Donald Trump decided to pick up the phone. According to some reports, he expressed his “concern” over the state of Sino-Japanese relations during his conversation with Takaichi and urged her to “avoid escalation.” Nonetheless, the conflict continues spreading across the landscape of global politics and has already reached the UN stage.
The issue surfaced in late November during a phone call between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Emmanuel Bonne, diplomatic adviser to the French president, as well as during Wang Yi’s meeting with UK National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell that came to China on a visit. Notably, Bonne himself had visited China only a month earlier.
Reaction in Taiwan
It is worth reiterating that Taiwan is far from being a passive pawn in the geopolitical games of major powers around the Taiwan-related problem. This is, however, roughly how Beijing portrays it, insisting that the “Taiwan issue” does not exist at all: the island is simply outside China’s administrative control due to certain historical circumstances and “misunderstandings.”
China, nevertheless, closely monitors every nuance of Taiwan’s energetic domestic politics, and among the island’s major political forces, it clearly prefers the Kuomintang (KMT), now in opposition. Since the days of Sun Yat-sen, his successor Chiang Kai-shek, and current leaders of the party, the KMT has declared adherence to the “One China” principle, though, of course, on its own terms. While the party does not reject the need to develop ties with Japan, several KMT legislators and former president Ma Ying-jeou (who held office from 2008 to 2016) responded to Takaichi’s remark with cautious criticism, essentially saying: “We will handle our relations with the mainland ourselves.”
By contrast, the representatives of Taiwan’s current administration, starting with President Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party, have expressed full understanding of both Takaichi’s comments and Japan’s defense plans mentioned above. Meanwhile, the Taiwan People’s Party, which forms a coalition with the KMT, has offered its services as a mediator in the emerging Japan–China conflict.
Its further evolution needs constant monitoring, as it has become one of the major threats to global political stability today.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia-Pacific affairs
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