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India’s reluctance to confront US over Chabahar attacks exposes contradictions in its Iran policy: Journalist

Press TV – July 26, 2026

India’s continued reluctance to openly challenge Washington despite the recent US attacks on Iran, including the strategic coastal city of Chabahar, has exposed the contradictions at the heart of New Delhi’s foreign policy, says an Indian journalist and foreign policy analyst.

Speaking to the Press TV website, Sanjay Kapoor, founder and editor of Hardnews magazine and president of the Editors Guild of India, said India’s approach towards Chabahar has never been independent of US policy on Iran, noting that New Delhi has consistently calibrated its engagement with the strategic Iranian port around Washington’s broader regional strategy.

“India decided to take up the Chabahar project only after then US President Barack Obama had signed the JCPOA and there was a global attempt to normalise ties with Iran,” Kapoor said.

He noted that India, like many other countries, had also severed its energy relationship with Iran after Washington instructed New Delhi to stop purchasing Iranian oil, underscoring India’s willingness to accommodate American concerns over the Islamic Republic.

“India also cut energy ties with Iran after the US told New Delhi to stop buying Persian oil. In other words, India has been mindful of US concerns on Iran,” he stated.

Kapoor said the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government in New Delhi has simultaneously cultivated close strategic relations with Israel, a policy that has further aligned India’s foreign policy with that of Washington.

“Besides, this BJP government has been close to Israel also, which ensures that New Delhi stays close to the US and its foreign policy,” he told the Press TV website.

His remarks follow the recent US aggression against southern Iran, during which the port city of Chabahar was also targeted, raising questions over the future of India’s flagship connectivity project in the region and whether New Delhi can continue portraying the port as a strategic priority while avoiding direct criticism of US attacks on Iranian territory.

Located on Iran’s southeastern coast, Chabahar has long been regarded as India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, allowing it to bypass Pakistan while providing Tehran with an important regional trade hub.

India has invested in developing the Shahid Beheshti terminal of the port, viewing Chabahar as a counterweight to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Deep historical ties have not translated into strategic consistency

Despite India’s cautious approach in recent years, Kapoor told the Press TV website that relations between Iran and India rest on centuries of historical, cultural and religious interaction.

He pointed out that India is home to the world’s second-largest Shia population after Iran, adding that religious links between the two countries continue to shape people-to-people relations.

He also referred to Imam Khomeini’s old ties with his hometown, Lucknow, the capital of northern India’s biggest state, Uttar Pradesh.

“There is continuous interaction between the Shia clergy in India with their counterparts in Iran and Iraq,” he noted, adding that Iran has traditionally viewed India differently from many other countries, pointing to the longstanding cultural affinity between the two civilizations.

“Iran also never saw India as a foreign country. They also perceive Kashmir in India as Iran-e-Sagheer (little Iran),” he said, referring to the Muslim-majority Himalayan region of Kashmir in northern India.

Kapoor argued that successive governments in New Delhi believed these deep-rooted ties would allow India to preserve its relationship with Tehran even while strengthening strategic cooperation with Washington.

“The Indian government under the BJP always believed that they will manage substantial ties with Iran like they managed the Chabahar Port,” he stated.

However, he maintained that New Delhi ultimately regarded alignment with the United States as the more pressing strategic priority.

“For whatever reason, they thought they had more compelling reason to align themselves with the US. They believed that Iran could wait,” Kapoor remarked.

According to the veteran journalist, India’s reluctance to publicly support Iran stems less from hostility towards Tehran than from its determination to remain aligned with Washington’s geopolitical ambitions.

“Their reluctance to support Iran openly is due to their desperation to be on the right side of the US,” he stressed.

He believes Indian policymakers expect the current regional situation to evolve and remain confident that New Delhi’s long-standing doctrine of strategic autonomy will eventually enable it to restore any damage to bilateral relations.

“They believe that what’s happening is transitory and the final outcome will look different from now. Their resort to strategic autonomy in their foreign policy will give them a chance to make up with the Iranian government,” Kapoor said.

US attacks have exposed the fragility of India’s Chabahar strategy

Kapoor said Chabahar was originally conceived as a stable alternative to Iran’s other major ports, making it particularly attractive to India when Tehran offered New Delhi the opportunity to develop the Shahid Beheshti terminal.

“Chabahar was meant to be away from the ferment that used to be in Bandar Abbas. It was expected to be stable and peaceful. That was the unique selling point of Chabahar when its terminal, Shahid Beheshti, was offered to India by the government of Iran,” he said.

However, he said the recent US attacks around the port have fundamentally altered those assumptions.

“For some strange reason, Chabahar is facing the ire of US attacks. They have misiled and bombed the port.”

Kapoor questioned New Delhi’s claim that Indian infrastructure at the port escaped damage during the attacks.

“The Indian government says Indian infrastructure has not been lost due to the attack. That’s saying a bit much,” he added.

The senior Indian journalist noted that New Delhi invested approximately $120 million in the Shahid Beheshti terminal but deliberately limited further investment because US sanctions made financing increasingly difficult.

According to Kapoor, Russian government sources have previously indicated that Moscow helped India overcome funding shortages for the project on several occasions.

Despite maintaining its presence at Chabahar for years, Kapoor argued that New Delhi never fully embraced the project.

“Despite soldiering on for many years, India always remained a reluctant partner,” he said.

Kapoor said many Iranian experts have long argued that Tehran deliberately preserved Chabahar as an opportunity for India despite having other potential partners.

“As many Iranian experts told me, Tehran had kept Chabahar for India,” he told the Press TV website. “They argue that if they had wanted, they could have given the port to Pakistan, China or even Russia.”

He said India’s strategic calculations changed significantly after the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, removing one of the principal reasons behind New Delhi’s investment in the Iranian port.

“India thought Chabahar had become untenable after the US left Afghanistan,” he said.

Rather than engaging with Afghanistan’s new Taliban-led government, Kapoor said India shifted its focus to alternative connectivity initiatives backed by Washington and several of its regional partners.

The journalist believes India’s regional priorities have increasingly shifted away from Chabahar towards the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a US-backed connectivity initiative linking India with Europe through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israeli-occupied territories and Mediterranean countries such as Greece and Italy.

“India did not want to negotiate with the Taliban and happily became part of IMEC, which promised a lot, including a seat on the G7 high table,” he stated.

Kapoor recalled that speculation briefly emerged in Indian media about reviving New Delhi’s engagement with Chabahar following the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Tehran and Washington. However, he said those expectations quickly faded once the ceasefire broke down and US attacks on Iran resumed.

India depends on Afghanistan and Washington’s calculations

Asked whether the long-term success of Chabahar ultimately depends on Iran’s stability and sovereignty, Kapoor said New Delhi’s strategic calculations extend beyond developments inside Iran.

“Chabahar’s stability depends, in India’s estimation, on who controls Afghanistan and on how the US perceives the port,” he noted.

He explained that India’s primary motivation for investing in Chabahar was never limited to commercial interests alone but centred on gaining direct access to Afghanistan while bypassing Pakistan.

According to Kapoor, changes in the regional geopolitical landscape have complicated those calculations.

“My contention may not square with the views of others, but India would only make a pitch for Chabahar if it doesn’t elicit a hostile response from its (Persian) Gulf partners and that’s only possible if Washington is backing India to help Afghanistan as well as support against Pakistan,” he said.

He argued that Pakistan remains a central factor in India’s strategic thinking, noting that the evolving military balance in South Asia following the recent war against Iran has further complicated New Delhi’s decision-making.

“After the recent war in West Asia, there has been a shift and Pakistan is better off militarily. What happens next will impact India’s policy towards Chabahar,” he remarked.

To Kapoor, India’s future investment in the port will depend primarily on the trajectory of Iran-US relations and Pakistan’s regional position.

“To sum up, India will invest in Chabahar if the US builds working relations with Iran and Pakistan is on the defensive due to this.”

Relations with Israel carry long-term risks

Kapoor said India’s growing partnership with Israel inevitably raises questions in Iran about the future direction of bilateral relations.

“Ordinarily, the trust that India and Iran enjoy should get eroded after PM Modi was in Tel Aviv just days before the war broke out,” the Indian journalist stated.

“The moot question that Iran should ask itself is whether India is a friend or a foe,” he added, pointing to the numerous interactions between Indian and Israeli leaders in recent years.

He added that despite increasing strategic cooperation with Israel and close ties with Washington, India has so far managed to preserve working relations with Iran.

According to Kapoor, New Delhi appears confident that it can maintain relations with “both sides” without suffering major diplomatic consequences.

July 26, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Comments Off on India’s reluctance to confront US over Chabahar attacks exposes contradictions in its Iran policy: Journalist

Sitting ducks: Why the US security umbrella no longer protects the Gulf?

By Dr Mustafa Fetouri| MEMO | July 16, 2026

In Kuwait alone—less than 150 kilometres across the Gulf from Iran—the United States maintains a major military hub of approximately 13,500 personnel spread across installations such as Camp Arifjan and Ali Al Salem Air Base. To its south, Saudi Arabia hosts roughly 2,700 U.S. troops, centered at Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj. Elsewhere in the Gulf, every state hosts either a US military presence or provides access and defence cooperation under bilateral agreements: Qatar houses more than 10,000 personnel at CENTCOM’s sprawling forward headquarters at Al Udeid; Bahrain hosts around 9,000 personnel at the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet; the UAE accommodates approximately 3,500 personnel at Al Dhafra while providing deep-water naval access at Jebel Ali; and Oman offers strategic port and airfield access under bilateral agreements, despite having no large permanent US troop presence.

Beyond the Gulf monarchies, Washington maintains approximately 2,500 troops in Iraq and around 900 in northeastern Syria under Operation Inherent Resolve. To Iran’s northwest, the US operates from Incirlik Air Base in Türkiye— a NATO logistics and intelligence hub too. Until its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, American forces also maintained a major military presence along Iran’s eastern frontier, supported for two decades by extensive supply routes and intelligence cooperation through Pakistan. Although the US lies nearly 10,000 kilometres from Iran, it has constructed an unparalleled regional military architecture of permanent bases, rotational deployments, naval facilities, pre-positioned equipment, access agreements, and security partnerships that stretches from the Eastern Mediterranean across the Gulf to the western Indian Ocean. Combined with the military capabilities of close allies—including Britain, France, and Türkiye—this network almost literally surrounding Iran from all sides. The common thread underpinning this posture has long been the protection of regional partners, the safeguarding of global energy routes, and the defence of US strategic interests.

Yet, this foundational premise has collapsed under the weight of the US-Israeli war on Iran, which has fundamentally transformed the entire regional security landscape. This “war of choice” has exposed how a security arrangement once marketed as an ironclad insurance policy has devolved into a primary strategic liability.

Rather than serving as an effective deterrent, large and static American military installations now act as strategic liability—drawing Iranian retaliatory strikes while denying host states true autonomy or the promised protective shield.

The Gulf states have discovered, at a heavy price, that they are trapped in an impossible paradox: their sovereign territory serves as a staging ground for military operations they were never consulted about—at least that is what they say publically –instantly transforming their critical infrastructure, oil facilities, and urban centers into high-priority targets. Compounding this vulnerability is the stark geopolitical reality that while Washington may eventually pivot away or withdraw—much as it did from Afghanistan—Iran is a permanent neighbour that is going nowhere.

Beyond the immediate threat of missile strikes, the presence of these US installations directly undermines the core national strategies of the Gulf monarchies. Mega-development projects and economic diversification plans—from Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 to Dubai’s global trade hubs—rely entirely on an image of absolute regional stability, investor confidence, and open maritime transit. By hosting forward US bases, host nations inadvertently tie their economic futures to Washington’s military posture, creating an environment of perpetual crisis. Furthermore, defending these expansive American footprints forces host militaries to consume their own finite air-defense interceptors and defense budgets to guard US assets rather than securing their own national borders.

At the same time, while almost all Gulf States have, at least publicly, refrained from taking direct offensive action against Iran to avoid total escalation, they recognise that they are already viewed as passive participants in the wider conflict.

Maintaining this precarious balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult against rising domestic anti-war sentiment, as public anger over regional devastation steadily erodes the host governments’ domestic credibility.

For Washington, this massive network of forward-deployed bases has produced a profound strategic paradox. What was designed to project uninhibited American power now ties US freedom of action to the political consent of cautious host nations. When host governments impose strict sovereignty restrictions—refusing permission for US forces to launch offensive sorties or intelligence missions against regional adversaries from their soil—the Pentagon finds its multi-billion-dollar installations functionally sidelined during critical military surges. Instead of providing seamless operational flexibility, these fixed, highly vulnerable outposts transform into costly “imperial entrapment” liabilities: requiring thousands of US troops, high-end missile defense batteries, and constant naval escort deployments simply to protect the bases themselves, rather than executing broader strategic objectives or enabling Washington’s long-sought pivot to the Indo-Pacific. With the conflict between the US and Iran reigniting, Trump is demanding that the Gulf states pay once again to protect the Strait of Hormuz—a vital transit route that never closed until the war was started by Trump, not Iran.

This strategic calculus becomes infinitely more complex when factoring in Israel’s role in the regional security outlook. In recent years, certain Gulf states—most notably the UAE—operated under the premise that normalization and closer security alignment with Israel via the Abraham Accords would yield a net security dividend. Yet, this belief was never shared across the Gulf; nations like Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia maintained a far more cautious, sceptical stance toward Tel Aviv. The outbreak of the US-Israeli war on Tehran on February 28 utterly shattered any illusion that an Israeli-linked security architecture could bring regional stability. Instead, it exposed deep internal fault lines among the entire region. Reaching a collective, long-term security understanding with Iran was already a formidable challenge; doing so now, in the wake of a devastating conflict that forced Gulf States into the crossfire, is immensely more complicated. Moving forward, no regional framework can hold if it relies on a anti-Tehran pact anchored in Washington and Tel Aviv while ignoring the permanent reality of Iranian geographic power.

Ultimately, the fallout from the US-Israeli war on Iran exposes a fundamental reality that Washington and its regional allies can no longer ignore: the entire Middle Eastern security architecture must be fundamentally re-evaluated.

The core dilemma facing the region is that no collective security arrangement can ever be viable or effective if it seeks to exclude Iran—an indispensable, geographically permanent power armed with increasingly sophisticated offensive, defensive, and asymmetric capabilities.

Moving forward, any stable regional order must not only account for Tehran’s military leverage, but also accommodate its non-negotiable strategic demands. This includes addressing governance and transit rights over the vital Strait of Hormuz—through which one-fifth of global oil flows—and reaching a durable, pragmatic framework on its nuclear program. Regardless of the final outcome of ongoing US-Iran negotiations, the lesson for the Gulf is clear: true security cannot be built on an external garrison model that marginalizes the region’s principal indigenous power.

July 16, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Sitting ducks: Why the US security umbrella no longer protects the Gulf?

Explainer: Which foreign delegations attended the funeral of martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution?

Press TV – July 4, 2026

The funeral ceremony for the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, brought together one of the largest gatherings of foreign dignitaries in Iran in recent decades, with representatives from across Asia, Africa, Europe, the Americas, and major international organizations attending the event in Tehran.

The delegations included presidents, prime ministers, parliamentary speakers, foreign ministers, senior government officials, political leaders, and representatives of religious organizations and resistance movements, underscoring the broad international participation in the ceremony.

Asia

Asia accounted for the largest share of official delegations.

From West Asia, Iraq sent one of the largest delegations, including Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, senior officials, and representatives of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).

Saudi Arabia was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Waleed Al-Khuraiji, while Oman sent the chairman of its State Council and Qatar was represented by Parliament Speaker Hassan bin Abdullah Al Ghanim.

Shia community representatives also attended from Bahrain and several other Persian Gulf countries.

Lebanon dispatched Defense Minister Michel Menassa alongside senior delegations from Hezbollah and the Amal Movement.

Yemen was represented by Vice President Mahmoud al-Junaid and an Ansarullah delegation.

Palestinian groups also attended, including senior Hamas leaders and Islamic Jihad Secretary-General Ziyad al-Nakhalah.

From the wider Asian region, Pakistan sent one of the highest-level foreign delegations, headed by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir. The delegation also included the Senate speaker, senior government officials, and religious leaders.

Afghanistan was represented by delegations from the Taliban administration and the Afghan resistance.

India sent a special government envoy at the deputy foreign minister level.

China was represented by He Wei, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon attended the ceremony in person, while Armenia was represented by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Georgia sent President Mikheil Kavelashvili along with a Muslim delegation.

Türkiye dispatched Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz, together with political and party representatives.

Turkmenistan was represented by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, Chairman of the People’s Council and National Leader.

Among other participants were Azerbaijan’s parliament speaker, Kazakhstan’s foreign minister; the parliamentary speakers of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka; Thailand’s deputy prime minister; Malaysia’s agriculture minister; Myanmar’s special envoy; and official delegations from South Korea and North Korea.

Africa

Several African governments were represented by ministerial- or cabinet-level delegations.

Egypt sent its Senate speaker.

South Africa, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia, Tanzania, and Tunisia all sent official representatives.

Nigeria and Senegal also dispatched delegations to participate in the funeral ceremonies.

Europe and the Americas

Russia sent Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, as President Vladimir Putin’s special representative.

Belarus was represented by its parliament speaker, while Serbia sent its communications minister. Bulgaria also dispatched parliamentary and political representatives.

Germany was represented by members of the country’s Shia community.

From Latin America, Cuba sent its higher education minister as a special representative, while Nicaragua was represented by Foreign Minister Valdrack Jaentschke.

International organizations

The ceremony also drew senior representatives of several international organizations.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was represented by Secretary-General Nurlan Yermekbayev, while the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) sent Deputy Secretary-General Tariq Ali Bakheet.

The D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) were represented by their respective secretaries-general.

July 4, 2026 Posted by | Solidarity and Activism | , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Explainer: Which foreign delegations attended the funeral of martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution?

American Military Failure in Afghanistan

Tales of the American Empire | March 12, 2026

As American military forces arrived in Afghanistan, they began building a network of bases to rule the entire nation. This repeated the mistakes of the Vietnam war. Each base required clean water, electricity, security, and frequent resupply, which required guarding bridges, road mine clearing, weekly supply convoys, and helicopter runs. This was expensive, required much manpower, left forces dispersed, provided ample targets for the enemy, and alienated the population with frequent “search and destroy” patrols that caused much death and destruction. Employing this failed strategy in Afghanistan was more difficult as the rugged terrain limited airpower while numerous caves provided the enemy with great hiding locations. In some areas, it was not practical to establish military outposts on good defensive terrain since mountaintops lacked road access and a local water supply. Nevertheless, American Generals insisted on military outposts everywhere, no matter the vulnerability of the base.

American combat forces should have remained mostly out of sight as a reserve force to protect large cities and dispatch units to rural areas only when a large enemy force converged to attack local forces. American aid should have focused on improving the economic infrastructure and local militia forces in a long-term, passive effort that would minimize manpower requirements, causalities, and costs.

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Related Tale; “Osama Bin Laden WAS NOT Responsible for 9/11”;    • Osama Bin Laden WAS NOT Responsible for 9/11  

Related Tale; “American Bases Overrun in Vietnam”;    • American Bases Overrun in Vietnam  

“The Battle of COP Keating TRADOC G2 OE Enterprise G&V”; August 10, 2012;    • The Battle of COP Keating – October 3rd, 2009  

“Battle of Wanat Video Recreation; TRADOC G2 OE Enterprise G&V”; July 14, 2014;    • Battle of Wanat Video Recreation  

“11 Days and a Wake up; Battle of Wanat”, Afghanistan War Documentary; June 2, 2019;    • 11 days and a Wake Up  

“Afghan War Diary 2004-2010”; Wikileaks; July 25, 2010; https://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/Afghan…

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“US Watchdog Rips Failed Nation-Building Effort in Afghanistan in Its Final Report”; December 2005; https://news.antiwar.com/2025/12/04/u…

March 14, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Timeless or most popular, Video | , | Comments Off on American Military Failure in Afghanistan

US Threatens ICC With Sanctions Over Future Investigations – Report

Sputnik – 10.12.2025

The Trump administration has threatened the International Criminal Court (ICC) with potential sanctions if it does not amend its founding documents to exclude President Donald Trump and his top officials from future investigations, Reuters reported on Wednesday, citing an administration official.

In addition to its pledge not to target the US, the Trump administration also demands that the ICC halt existing investigations into Israel and American military actions in Afghanistan, the report said.

In return for these concessions, the Trump administration is prepared to forgo additional sanctions on court officials and refrain from sanctioning the court itself, according to the report.

Washington has conveyed its demands to ICC members and directly to the court, which has 125 members, the report added.

The United States is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC in 2002 with powers to prosecute heads of state.

In recent years, the ICC has issued arrest warrants for several world leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. These decisions have been criticized. Some states, such as Hungary, decided to withdraw from the ICC.

On February 6, Trump signed the executive order on sanctions against the ICC for its actions against Washington and its allies, including Israel. The order states that the US will take significant measures against those “responsible for the ICC’s transgressions.” Some of the measures include the blocking of property and assets, as well as the suspension of entry into the US for ICC staff and their family members.

December 10, 2025 Posted by | War Crimes | , , , , | Leave a comment

Final SIGAR report finds decades of US corruption, waste in Afghanistan

Press TV – December 5, 2025

The final audit from Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) paints a stark portrait of how tens of billions of dollars ostensibly earmarked for nation‑building were diverted, misused or wasted.

According to SIGAR’s report, from 2002 to 2021 the United States appropriated about $148.21 billion purportedly for Afghan reconstruction. Of that sum, roughly $88.8 billion went to security‑sector projects, while other enterprises disguised as development, humanitarian assistance, governance and institution‑building consumed the rest.

But the watchdog estimates that between $26 billion and $29.2 billion of those funds were lost to waste, fraud and abuse—red flags that preceded the Afghan government’s collapse and the rapid Taliban takeover in 2021.

The report logged 1,327 separate cases of misuse, mismanagement, or corruption tied directly to US‑funded programs.

Among the failures major investments in the Afghan security forces were undermined by inflated troop rolls, ghost‑salary schemes, and an inability to maintain complex gear.

As SIGAR’s acting inspector general put it, “the government we helped build… was essentially a white collar criminal enterprise.”

SIGAR’s acting inspector general, Gene Aloise, told reporters that the project was undermined by “early and ongoing US decisions to ally with corrupt, human-rights-abusing power brokers.”

This strategy, he continued, strengthened insurgent networks and eroded hopes for stable governance in Afghanistan.

Large‑scale hardware and infrastructure also went to waste. The United States funded planes, bases, and military assets, many never used or deteriorating rapidly post‑contract.

One instance involved transport aircraft bought for tens or hundreds of millions of dollars that were later scrapped or abandoned when maintenance systems collapsed.

Despite almost $90 billion spent on training and equipping army and police forces, Afghan troops disintegrated quickly when US support ended, added the report.

Moreover, even broader cost estimates for the war paint an even more sobering picture.

Estimates put the total US cost — including military operations, veteran care, interest on borrowed funds and other long-term liabilities — at more than $2.3 trillion over the two decades, according to the Costs of War project at Brown University.

Based on the SIGAR’s final judgement, the much-hyped mission to purportedly build a stable, democratic Afghanistan delivered neither stability nor democracy.

In September, President Donald Trump sparked a fresh geopolitical firestorm with his calls to reclaim Afghanistan’s Bagram Air Base, signaling a willingness to re-establish a US military presence in a country that has warned against any return of foreign troops.

Trump said the United States was “trying to get [Bagram] back” and described it as “one of the biggest air bases in the world,” highlighting its strategic runway and location to contain China.

Two days later, he posted on social media that if Afghanistan does not return the base, “BAD THINGS ARE GOING TO HAPPEN.”

US military officials warn that retaking Bagram would require “tens of thousands” of troops along with massive logistical and air-defense support to hold the facility, a scenario that could mirror the pitfalls of the long Afghan war.

The United States had invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 in response to the September 11 attacks, even though not a single Afghan national was among the hijackers.

Over the course of the 20-year US occupation of the Asian nation, hundreds of thousands of Afghans lost their lives.

When Washington and its allies deployed troops in 2001, they claimed their mission was to dismantle al-Qaeda under what became known as the US “war on terror.” Yet two decades later, in August 2021, the Taliban quickly retook multiple provincial capitals and then entered Kabul with virtually no resistance.

The rapid collapse of the US-backed government forced Washington into a rushed and chaotic evacuation of diplomats, citizens, and Afghan partners — a scene that drew intense criticism for the US government’s mismanagement of its own exit.

December 5, 2025 Posted by | Corruption, False Flag Terrorism, Militarism | , | Leave a comment

National Guard shooter a former CIA asset: why Rahmanullah Lakanwal case is typical

Trump points finger to Biden, but the deeper scandal is about America’s “terror fabric”

By Uriel Araujo | December 3, 2025

Last week, Afghan national Rahmanullah Lakanwal allegedly shot two National Guard officers near the White House, killing one and injuring the other. Authorities swiftly detained him, treating it as an isolated security breach, but the incident predictably fueled national debates on immigration and Islamic extremism.

President Donald Trump and CIA Director John Ratcliffe have pointed fingers at former President Joe Biden, claiming his policies enabled the attack. Interestingly, Ratcliffe himself acknowledged that Lakanwal was resettled in the US due to his prior collaboration with the CIA as part of a partner force in Kandahar, which ended amid the chaotic 2021 evacuation.

That detail alone — linking a suspect in an attack near the nation’s capital to its own intelligence apparatus — barely registered in the news cycle. In most countries, it would spark parliamentary inquiries, mass resignations, and nonstop media scrutiny, especially given the fact that clandestine operations and political assassinations are some of the CIA specialties.

The shooting itself followed a now-familiar script: a sudden act of violence, an almost immediate tightening of security, and official assurances that there was “no broader threat” or plot. Yet the most significant fact remains unexplored. Who exactly is this shooter? Under what circumstances did he work with US intelligence? When did he cease to do so? And more importantly, how does an American intelligence asset end up opening fire in the heart of the capital? Not to mention (in the context of Trump’s new War on Drugs): is this intelligence asset connected to the Afghan dope trade?

In any case, we are not looking at an isolated anomaly. Each time a political assassination attempt, mass shooting, or terrorist threat incident captures national attention in the US, investigators often concede that the suspect had some form of prior contact or connection with federal agencies. Sometimes it is the CIA. At other times the FBI. Thus far, the pattern has been acknowledged only in fragments, but rarely examined as a systemic problem, conspiracy theories aside.

American intelligence agencies (like those of other countries) do not recruit from convents. They often operate in war zones, criminal markets, and militant networks. The question is: are American agencies simply gathering intelligence, or are they also shaping (to some degree) the very threats they claim to prevent?

Back in 2021, I wrote that any  American withdrawal from Afghanistan was likely to stay incomplete, with special forces and covert presence expected to remain, partly due to Afghanistan’s strategic importance and the resurgence of massive opium/heroin production under the US-backed government after 2001.

One may recall that Afghanistan has been a hub for CIA activity for over 40 years, and, as I recently noted, warlords, traffickers, militias, and fixers there were not accidental byproducts of intervention but often operational tools. With American “withdrawal”, these networks did not vanish, but rather scattered. This troubling legacy remains underreported, especially its most profitable pillar: narcotics.

Washington did not just fail to stop the Afghan drug trade. It is fair to say it maintained it. Opium financing sustained armed groups, secured loyalty, and lubricated covert operations long after public rhetoric focused on reconstruction. US intelligence has become structurally entangled with drug revenues during the occupation and the very collapse of this system triggered economic and security chaos inside Afghanistan itself. Considering all of this, I’ve recently written that the Taliban’s sudden shutdown of most the world’s largest illicit heroin supply this year was likely to provoke serious blowback

Thus, when Afghan-linked personnel surface in a national security scandal, American indignation is conveniently selective.

The same logic applies domestically. The FBI has an extensive record of infiltrating extremist groups on US soil, and, in multiple documented cases, actively encouraging or facilitating crimes that otherwise might never have occurred. FBI agents and informants have funded operations, provided materials, and pushed vulnerable individuals toward violence just in time for dramatic arrests (and sometimes not in time for that). Evidence can be thin enough in any single case, but overwhelming in accumulation.

The 2009 Newburgh case is emblematic, when a paid FBI informant induced impoverished Black Muslims from New York to plot a terrorist plan, even providing them cash, and orchestrating the entire plot to bomb Bronx synagogues.

The same can be said of the Fort Dix Five (2007) episode; of the Liberty City Seven case (2006); of the Rezwan Ferdaus affair (2011); of the Cleveland Bridge Plot (2012), and many others, with a clear pattern emerging: studies (like those of award-winning journalist Trevor Aaronson) even estimate federal informants drove nearly half of post 911 terror convictions, in what has been described as a “terror fabric”. This means domestic terrorism in America is largely a product of its own security apparatus.

No wonder public confidence in federal institutions has collapsed. Americans are asked to accept an absurd contradiction: that the intelligence community can monitor global communications in real time but cannot detect local radicals already on its payroll.

Thus, the fact that the Utah Valley University (where the Charlie Kirk assassination took place) is a key intelligence hub triggered a lot of conspiratory speculation. One may also recall, in the context of Trump’s so-called war against the “deep state”, that there were links between federal agencies and two Trump assassination attempt suspects (Thomas Crook and Ryan Routh).

So much for the notion that political violence in America is always the work of random loner shooters. Of course sociological, cultural and psychological factors play a role and much has been written from that angle. But sometimes “deep state” intrigues are also a factor that should not be overlooked.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

December 3, 2025 Posted by | Deception, False Flag Terrorism, Timeless or most popular | , , | Leave a comment

Obama Paved the Way for Trump’s Venezuelan Killings

By Jim Bovard | The Libertarian Institute | December 3, 2025

The Trump administration’s killings of scores of Venezuelans are justifiably provoking outrage. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently proclaimed, “We have only just begun to kill narco-terrorists.” Donald Trump and Hegseth are cashing a blank check for carnage that was written years earlier by President Barack Obama.

In his 2017 farewell address, Obama boasted, “We have taken out tens of thousands of terrorists.” Drone strikes increased tenfold under Obama, helping fuel anti–U.S. backlashes in several nations.

As he campaigned for the presidency in 2007, then-Senator Barack Obama declared, “We will again set an example for the world that the law is not subject to the whims of stubborn rulers.” Many Americans who voted for Obama in 2008 expected a seachange in Washington. However, from his first weeks in office, Obama authorized widespread secret attacks against foreign suspects, some of which spurred headlines when drones slaughtered wedding parties or other innocents.

On February 3, 2010, Obama’s Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair stunned Washington by announcing that the administration was also targeting Americans for killing. Blair revealed to a congressional committee the new standard for extrajudicial killings:

“Whether that American is involved in a group that is trying to attack us, whether that American has—is a threat to other Americans. We don’t target people for free speech. We target them for taking action that threatens Americans.”

But “involved” is a vague standard—as is “action that threatens Americans.” Blair stated that “if we think that direct action will involve killing an American, we get specific permission to do that.” Permission from who?

Obama’s first high-profile American target was Anwar Awlaki, a cleric born in New Mexico. After the 9/11 attacks, Awlaki was showcased as a model moderate Muslim. The New York Times noted that Awlaki “gave interviews to the national news media, preached at the Capitol in Washington and attended a breakfast with Pentagon officials.” He became more radical after he concluded that the Geoge W. Bush administration’s Global War on Terror was actually a war on Islam. After the FBI sought to squeeze him into becoming an informant against other Muslims, Awlaki fled the country. He arrived in Yemen and was arrested and reportedly tortured at the behest of the U.S. government. After he was released from prison eighteen months later, his attitude had worsened and his sermons became more bloodthirsty.

After the Obama administration announced plans to kill Awlaki, his father hired a lawyer to file a challenge in federal court. The ACLU joined the lawsuit, seeking to compel the government “to disclose the legal standard it uses to place U.S. citizens on government kill lists.” The Obama administration labeled the entire case a “State Secret.” This meant that the administration did not even have to explain why federal law no longer constrained its killings. The administration could have indicted Awlaki on numerous charges but it did not want to provide him any traction in federal court.

In September 2010, The New York Times reported that “there is widespread agreement among the administration’s legal team that it is lawful for President Obama to authorize the killing of someone like Mr. Awlaki.” It was comforting to know that top political appointees concurred that Obama could justifiably kill Americans. But that was the same “legal standard” the Bush team used to justify torture.   

The Obama administration asserted a right to kill U.S. citizens without trial, without notice, and without any chance for the marked men to legally object. In November 2010, Justice Department attorney Douglas Letter announced in federal court that no judge had legal authority to be “looking over the shoulder” of Obama’s targeted killing. The letter declared that the program involves “the very core powers of the president as commander in chief.”

The following month, federal judge John Bates dismissed the ACLU’s lawsuit because “there are circumstances in which the Executive’s unilateral decision to kill a U.S. citizen overseas” is “judicially unreviewable.” Bates declared that targeted killing was a “political question” outside the court’s jurisdiction. His deference was stunning: no judge had ever presumed that killing Americans was simply another “political question.” The Obama administration’s position “would allow the executive unreviewable authority to target and kill any U.S. citizen it deems a suspect of terrorism anywhere,” according to Center for Constitutional Rights attorney Pardiss Kebriae.

On September 30, 2011, a U.S. drone attack killed Awlaki along with another American citizen, Samir Khan, who was editing an online Al Qaeda magazine. Obama bragged about the lethal operation at a military base later that day. A few days later, administration officials gave a New York Times reporter extracts, a peek at the fifty-page secret Justice Department memo. The Times noted, “The secret document provided the justification for [killing Awlaki] despite an executive order banning assassinations, a federal law against murder, protections in the Bill of Rights and various strictures of the international laws of war, according to people familiar with the analysis.” The legal case for killing Awlaki was so airtight that it did not even need to be disclosed to the American public.

Two weeks after killing Awlaki, Obama authorized a drone attack that killed his son and six other people as they sat at an outdoor café in Yemen. Anonymous administration officials quickly assured the media that Abdulrahman Awlaki was a 21-year-old Al Qaeda fighter and thus fair game. Four days later, The Washington Post published a birth certificate proving that Awlaki’s son was only 16-years old and had been born in Denver. Nor did the boy have any connection with Al Qaeda or any other terrorist group. Robert Gibbs, Obama’s former White House press secretary and a top advisor for Obama’s reelection campaign, later shrugged that the 16-year-old should have had “a far more responsible father.”

Regardless of that boy’s killing, the media often portrayed Obama and his drones as infallible. A Washington Post poll a few months later revealed that 83% of Americans approved of Obama’s drone killing policy. It made almost no difference whether the suspected terrorists were American citizens; 79% of respondents approved of preemptively killing their fellow countrymen, no judicial niceties required. The Post noted that “77 percent of liberal Democrats endorse the use of drones, meaning that Obama is unlikely to suffer any political consequences as a result of his policy in this election year.” The poll results were largely an echo of official propaganda. Most folks “knew” only what the government wanted them to hear regarding drones. Thanks to pervasive secrecy, top government officials could kill who they chose and say what they pleased. The fact that the federal government had failed to substantiate more than 90% of its terrorist accusations since 9/11 was irrelevant since the president was omniscient.

On March 6, 2012, Attorney General Eric Holder, in a speech on targeted killings to a college audience, declared, “Due process and judicial process are not one and the same, particularly when it comes to national security. The Constitution guarantees due process, it does not guarantee judicial process.” TV comedian Stephen Colbert mocked Holder, quipping “Trial by jury, trial by fire, rock, paper scissors, who cares? Due process just means that there is a process that you do.” One purpose of due process is to allow evidence to be critically examined. But there was no opportunity to debunk statements from anonymous White House officials. For the Obama administration, “due process” meant little more than reciting certain phrases in secret memos prior to executions.

Holder declared that the drone attacks “are not [assassinations], and the use of that loaded term is misplaced; assassinations are unlawful killings. Here, for the reasons I have given, the U.S. government’s use of lethal force in self-defense.” Any termination secretly approved by the president or his top advisers was automatically a “lawful killing.” Holder reassured Americans that Congress was overseeing the targeted killing program. But no one on Capitol Hill demanded a hearing or investigation after U.S. drones killed American citizens in Yemen. The prevailing attitude was exemplified by House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Peter King (R-NY): 

“Drones aren’t evil, people are evil. We are a force of good and we are using those drones to carry out the policy of righteousness and goodness.”

Obama told White House aides that it “turns out I’m really good at killing people. Didn’t know that was gonna be a strong suit of mine.” In April 2012, The New York Times was granted access for a laudatory inside look at “Terror Tuesday” meetings in the White House:

“Every week or so, more than 100 members of the government’s sprawling national security apparatus gather, by secure video teleconference, to pore over terrorist suspects’ biographies and recommend to the president who should be the next to die.”

It was a PowerPoint death parade. The Times stressed that Obama personally selected who to kill next:

“The control he exercises also appears to reflect Mr. Obama’s striking self-confidence: he believes, according to several people who have worked closely with him, that his own judgment should be brought to bear on strikes.”

Commenting on the Times’ revelations, author Tom Engelhardt observed, “We are surely at a new stage in the history of the imperial presidency when a president (or his election team) assembles his aides, advisors and associates to foster a story that’s meant to broadcast the group’s collective pride in the new position of assassin-in-chief.”

On May 23, 2013, Obama, in a speech on his targeted killing program at the National Defense University in Washington, told his fellow Americans that “we know a price must be paid for freedom”—such as permitting the president untrammeled authority to kill threats to freedom. The president declared that “before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured—the highest standard we can set.”

Since almost all the data on victims was confidential, it was tricky to prove otherwise. But NBC News acquired classified documents revealing that the CIA was often clueless about who it was killing. NBC noted, “Even while admitting that the identities of many killed by drones were not known, the CIA documents asserted that all those dead were enemy combatants. The logic is twisted: If we kill you, then you were an enemy combatant.” Killings are also exonerated by counting “all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants… unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent.” And U.S. bureaucrats have no incentive to track down evidence exposing their fatal errors. The New York Times revealed that U.S. “counterterrorism officials insist… people in an area of known terrorist activity… are probably up to no good.” The “probably up to no good” standard absolved almost any drone killing within thousands of square miles in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Daniel Hale, a former Air Force intelligence analyst, leaked information revealing that nearly 90% of people who were killed in drone strikes were not the intended targets. Joe Biden’s Justice Department responded by coercing Hale into pleading guilty to “retention and transmission of national security information,” and he was sent to prison in 2021.

Sovereign immunity entitles presidents to kill with impunity. Or at least that is what presidents have presumed for most of the past century. If the Trump administration can establish a prerogative to preemptively kill anyone suspected of transporting illicit narcotics, millions of Americans could be in the federal cross-hairs. But the Trump administration is already having trouble preserving total secrecy thanks to controversies over who ordered alleged war crimes. Will Trump’s anti-drug carnage end up torpedoing his beloved Secretary of War Hegseth and his own credibility with Congress, the judiciary, and hundreds of millions of Americans who do not view White House statements as divine revelations handed down from Mt. Sinai?

December 3, 2025 Posted by | Civil Liberties, Full Spectrum Dominance, Timeless or most popular | , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Trump’s ‘drug boat’ attacks mirror controversial Obama-era tactic – NYT

RT | November 28, 2025

US airstrikes on suspected drug smugglers in the Caribbean ordered by President Donald Trump bear similarities to the controversial ‘signature strikes’ on purported terrorists under former President Barack Obama, the New York Times has argued.

The Obama-era operations conducted primarily in Pakistan and Yemen relied on detecting patterns of behavior that US intelligence agencies claimed indicated terrorist activity, rather than identifying wrongdoing by specific individuals. Critics condemned the approach for its vague criteria – sometimes as broad as ‘military-age male’ in an area prone to militancy – and for resulting in civilian casualties.

Pentagon officials have acknowledged in closed-door briefings that they often do not know the identities of the people killed in what the White House calls a campaign against “narcoterrorism” in the Caribbean, the NYT reported on Thursday. Despite this, US officials insist that the comparison does not apply, arguing that the strikes are aimed at narcotics rather than individuals.

“They told us it is not a signature strike, because it’s not just about pattern of life, but it’s also not like they know every individual person on the boats,” Representative Sara Jacobs, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, told the outlet.

The Obama administration’s killings of low-level militants and people merely assumed to be militants was criticized as counterproductive and fueling further radicalization. Trump officials reportedly argued that attacking boats at sea reduces the risk of collateral damage.

Some US allies, including the UK, have reportedly declined to assist with the ‘drug boat’ strikes, warning that they could violate international law. The campaign has already resulted in more than 80 deaths.

Analysts increasingly suspect that the operations could be laying the groundwork for a regime-change effort in Venezuela, whose president, Nicolas Maduro, the US accuses of leading a criminal cartel.

November 28, 2025 Posted by | War Crimes | , , , | Leave a comment

Taliban unveil five-year plan to help Afghan farmers replace poppy crops

The Cradle | November 3, 2025

The Ministry of Agriculture of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan announced on 3 November the approval of a five-year plan to provide alternatives to growing poppies for the country’s farmers.

Afghanistan has traditionally been a hub for growing poppies, which are used to produce heroin, a highly addictive and deadly drug, for consumption in Europe and elsewhere.

After taking power in 2021 following a chaotic US military withdrawal, the Taliban banned the cultivation of the plant.

Poppy cultivation flourished during the 20-year US occupation of the country, with many drug lords connected to the CIA receiving top positions in the Afghan government in Kabul.

According to the Agriculture Ministry, the five-year program will benefit some 149,900 farmers and involve $71 million in funding.

“This plan is designed to provide legal and sustainable economic opportunities for farmers in the sectors of agriculture, livestock, natural resources, and irrigation,” stated Sher Mohammad Hatami, spokesperson for the ministry.

The plan includes projects focused on orchard development, grain production, livestock growth, irrigation system improvements, the establishment of greenhouses, and training centers for farmers.

The ministry stated that other crops, including saffron, asafoetida (hing), cotton, and wheat, will be promoted as alternatives for farmers.

Meanwhile, several farmers told Tolo News that the ban on poppy cultivation had created serious economic challenges for them and called on Afghan authorities to provide help in transitioning to an alternative.

“We were forced to grow this crop, and now the government doesn’t help us even once a year,” said Barat, a farmer from Badakhshan.

Azim, another farmer from Badakhshan, said, “We want support in finding alternatives to drug cultivation, because farmers in this province are in need.”

A June 2023 report published by Alcis, a British-based geographic information services firm, revealed that the Taliban government had largely eliminated opium cultivation in the country, wiping out the base ingredient needed to produce heroin.

This outcome mirrored a similar move by the Taliban in 2000 when they were in power the first time.

Under the guise of the “War on Terror,” the 2001 US and UK invasion of the country was driven in part by the desire to restore the heroin trade, which the Taliban had abruptly terminated after taking power for the first time in 1996.

The western powers sought to re-establish the lucrative flow of billions of dollars that the heroin trade provided to their financial systems.

November 3, 2025 Posted by | Economics | , | Leave a comment

Imran Khan wasn’t overthrown — Pakistan was

Former Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan [ARIF ALI/AFP via Getty Images]
By Junaid S. Ahmad | MEMO | October 30, 2025

From the barracks of Rawalpindi to the halls of Washington, a sordid alliance stalks the republic of Pakistan: a military caste addicted to power, a civilian class cowed into servitude, and a foreign patron ever ready to pull the leash. What unfolds is less a grand strategy than a tragicomedy: generals trading sovereignty for sinecures, soldiers harbouring contempt for their officers, and a once-promising democratic movement crushed under the twin weights of imperial ambition and martial tutelage.

At the summit of Pakistan’s national hierarchy sits the uniformed elite—high-command officers whose benefit resides not in defending the people, but in ensuring their own station remains unchallenged. The vast majority of junior officers and ordinary soldiers know the drill: they march at a command, live off state hand-outs, yet watch in silence as their rulers gamble everything in Islamabad’s corridors of power. Beneath their boots pulses a latent contempt: not for the institution of soldiering, but for the generals who confuse war-games with governance, who mistake subservience for sovereignty. They know the charade: a military that catalogues enemies abroad yet fails its citizens at home; a top brass more at ease with arms deals and alliances than with schools or clinics.

Meanwhile, in Washington and its allied capitals, they observe the last great outsourcing of empire. The US sees Pakistan not as an independent partner, but as a subcontractor—an air-strip here, a drone base there, a pliant nuclear state with acceptable risks. When Imran Khan—in office—moved, albeit imperfectly, toward a new Pakistan: one marked by social justice, independent foreign policy, and friendship with all nations, he ran head-first into this alliance. He derailed the pat-scripts: refused US basing rights, challenged embassy diktats, and dared to recast Kashmir and Palestine not as trophies of patronage but as tests of principle. His mistake was not corruption—it was defiance. And the consequence was swift: a regime-change operation dressed in parliamentary garb, a military and intelligence complex that salivated at the smell of capitulation, and a Washington that nodded, funded and quietly applauded.

From here the narrative spirals into farce. Pakistan’s flag-waving elite collect defence pacts as one might souvenirs—each a badge of fidelity to the imperial order, each certifying that the country’s violent and unjust alignments will continue unimpeded. The generals embrace those pacts not because they secure Pakistan—they don’t—but because they secure the elite’s privilege: a share of the deals, a veneer of patriotism, a shield against accountability. And while their generals trade in hardware and geopolitics, the cries of the oppressed vanish into night: Pashtun civilians bombed under the guise of “counter-terror,” Afghan refugees reviled as villains by a state that once nurtured their tormentors.

Yes, nuclear-armed Pakistan could not muster a single bullet for Gaza. It did not send a protection force. It does not lobby the United Nations for justice, despite the occasional meaningless rhetoric. Instead, it signs on to the next big defence contract, brushes its hands of the Palestinian plight, and turns its back on the ideal of Muslim solidarity. What kind of state is this that boasts nuclear weapons yet lacks the moral will to send aid—or more than a token gesture—to fellow victims of aggression? A state that lectures others on terrorism while shelling its own Pashtun tribes. A state so short on legitimacy it must invoke the bogeyman of the Afghan refugee, call entire populations “terrorists,” then crush any dissent with tanks and tear-gas.

Speaking of dissent—when Imran Khan’s movement rose, the state responded with idylls of terror. Cadres of young activists, women, students, social justice advocates—whether Karachi or Khyber—found themselves in dungeons sanctioned by a military-political complex. The hearings were stacked, the charges manufactured, the message simple: move for justice and you move into our sights. The generals clapped their hands, Washington twisted the strings, and the civilian face of Pakistan trembled. The officer class may nominally obey the high command—but in quiet mess halls and among soldiers’ wives the whispers of outrage gather: “Why are we policing our own people? Why is Urdu-speaking Karachi the victim of our operations? Why do we trespass into forests and valleys and call them terror zones?”

In the borderlands the farce becomes terrifyingly concrete. The army, having once nurtured the Taliban in Afghanistan to secure “strategic depth,” now bombs them—and blames them for terrorism. In this brain-twist of national strategy, the creator is recast as the adversary, the patron transformed into the provoked. The Pashtun civilian watches as homes are razed near the Durand Line, as refugees arrive on Pakistani soil bearing the costs of wars Pakistan helped manufacture, and as the generals portray them as fifth-column terrorists. The irony would be comical were it not so brutal.

And what of Kashmir? In the so-called “free” Azad Kashmir of Pakistan, huge anti-government demonstrations rage. A region whose inhabitants yearn for dignity, not just slogans. Under Imran Khan, new polling suggested the unthinkable: Kashmiris in Indian-occupied Kashmir, despite seeing the abysmal conditions in Azad Kashmir, began to seriously consider joining Pakistan—not as another occupier but as a fortress of self-determination. The generals would rather you not notice that: they prefer the pre-scripted dispute, the perpetual conflict, the tortured rhetoric of “we stand with Kashmir” while the state stands with its own survival. The polls are telling: if Pakistan’s Kashmir policy is failing, the state itself is structurally unhealthy.

To be sure, the Pakistan military remains an institution of extraordinary capability. But capability is not legitimacy; nor is turf-control a foundation for national purpose. The generals continue to conflate war-power with nation-power, forgetting that true power is fostered by schools, by hospitals, by trust in institutions—and by consent, not coercion. And when a regime trades in foreign patronage—be it Washington’s dollars or Beijing’s infrastructure—but cannot deliver justice or dignity at home, the bargain has already been lost.

As the Iranian–Israeli conflict rages, as Gaza bleeds, and as the great-game intensifies in South Asia, Pakistan stands at a crossroads: obey its patrons, shrink its sovereignty, and reclaim the empire-client script—or reject the military’s primacy, embrace true independence, and build a republic that answers not to external powers but to its people. The generals will tell you that the choice is security; the civilians will whisper it is dignity.

Here is the truth the generals, the politicians, and the strategists don’t want you to admit: you cannot rule a nation by telling its people to be silent while you thunder abroad. You cannot build strategic depth on the graves of your own citizens. You cannot pretend to champion Palestine while allying with its oppressors. You cannot call yourself a sovereign state when your alliances define you more than your aspirations.

Pakistan’s military may still march on; its generals may still wield the levers of power; Washington may still fax orders and funnel funds. But the people—they are waking up. And once the echo of Imran Khan’s voice becomes a roar, no amount of bayonets, no arsenal of deals, no drums of war will silence it. The generals may hold the fortress of Rawalpindi, but they cannot hold the conscience of a nation. The struggle for that is already well underway—and the verdict will not wait.

October 30, 2025 Posted by | Civil Liberties, Corruption, Militarism | , , | Leave a comment

Kabul hails regional powers’ rejection of foreign military bases in Afghanistan

MEMO | September 28, 2025

Afghanistan on Saturday welcomed a joint stance by China, Russia, Iran and Pakistan opposing any reestablishment of foreign military bases in the country, the Taliban administration said, Anadolu reports.

Hamdullah Fitrat, deputy spokesman of the interim government, issued the statement after foreign ministers of the four nations met on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly in New York.

The four countries form a quadrilateral consultation mechanism created in 2017 to promote regional stability and coordinate efforts to counter terrorism, narcotics and extremism emanating from Afghan territory.

In a joint communique, they voiced support for Afghanistan’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and said they “firmly” oppose any move by outside powers to set up military bases in Afghanistan or the wider region.

Fitrat said that Afghanistan’s territory would not be allowed to be used against any country and that no armed groups are permitted to operate inside the country.

“Afghanistan is taking serious steps against corruption, drugs and all kinds of undesirable issues and considers this process its responsibility,” he said, adding that Kabul seeks positive relations with all countries based on “mutual respect.”

It comes days after US President Donald Trump warned “bad things” would happen if the interim Taliban administration did not cede control of Bagram Air Base to the Pentagon.

The Taliban returned to power in August 2021 after the withdrawal of US-led forces ended a two-decade war.

Kabul has said it would not negotiate its territorial integrity and urged Trump to honor the 2020 Doha agreement.

September 28, 2025 Posted by | Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Leave a comment

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