Invoking 9/11 to justify war against Iran is ‘utterly absurd’: Tehran
Press TV – September 12, 2026
Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman has rejected US attempts to invoke the anniversary of the September 11 attacks to justify a “reckless and unlawful war” against Iran, saying Washington’s narrative on terrorism is riddled with fundamental contradictions.
In a post on X early Saturday, marking the anniversary of the September 11 attacks, Esmaeil Baghaei criticized remarks by the US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth on terrorism and Iran.
“The narrative advanced by the US Secretary of War on the anniversary of 9/11 is riddled with fundamental contradictions,” he said.
Baghaei said the US could not simultaneously wage aggression, carry out assassinations, and cause civilian casualties while claiming exclusive authority to define terrorism and determine whose violence was legitimate.
“The perpetrators of 9/11 were not Iranians; they were the very same people whom the US itself had armed, organized, or otherwise cultivated in the preceding decades,” he said.
He also criticized the US-led “war on terror,” saying the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had brought years of war, occupation, civilian deaths, and widespread devastation.
“Against this backdrop, invoking the anniversary of 9/11 to justify a reckless and unlawful war against Iran is utterly absurd,” Baghaei said.
He further rejected attempts to justify the US war against Iran through counterterrorism rhetoric, stressing that the war involved the assassination of officials of a sovereign state and attacks on civilians, including women and children.
“A criminal war that has involved the assassination of officials of a sovereign state and the targeting of civilians, including women and children, cannot be made morally coherent simply by wrapping it in the language of counterterrorism,” he said.
The American invasion of Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001, less than a month after the September 11 attacks killed 2,977 people in the United States. Washington presented the foolhardy military adventure as the opening battle in a so-called “war on terror.”
Yet after 20 years of brutal military occupation, trillions of dollars spent, and enormous human suffering resulting from the US-led coalition’s horrendous war crimes, the occupiers have not achieved a political settlement or eliminated the forces they had vowed to defeat.
Nearly half of US citizens say Washington’s post-9/11 wars ‘worth the cost’
The Cradle | September 3, 2026
Nearly half of US citizens believe the wars waged by Washington in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond after the 11 September 2001 attacks have been “worth it,” a YouGov poll published on 2 August shows.
The poll was commissioned ahead of the 25th anniversary of the attacks, which the US government used as a pretext to launch the so-called “War on Terror” that led to the deaths of nearly 5 million people.
Respondents were asked if fighting “against the threat of terrorism through military operations abroad” and introducing “increased security and surveillance inside of the United States … have been worth the cost.”
Forty-eight percent responded yes, while another 27 percent said they weren’t sure. The remaining 25 percent said no.
Support for this view was strongest among Republicans, with 71 percent responding yes.
When asked whether some people in the US government knew about the 11 September attacks beforehand but let the attacks happen anyway, 39 percent of respondents agreed, and the same number disagreed.
Immediately after the attacks, US officials blamed Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.
Al-Qaeda was founded in the 1980s in Afghanistan. At the time, the CIA was arming and funding Islamic extremists known as “mujahideen” to fight the occupying Soviet Army.
The CIA later supported Al-Qaeda militants fighting in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Iraq, and Syria, while claiming to be opposed to the group.
In 2024, the US helped install former Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Ahmad al-Sharaa as president of Syria following the CIA’s 14-year covert war to topple the government of Bashar al-Assad.
When YouGov asked if Iraqi president Saddam Hussein was involved in the 11 September attacks, 38 percent agreed, while 34 percent disagreed.
Pro-Israel officials in the administration of former US president George W. Bush began pushing for an invasion of Iraq immediately after the attacks on the World Trade Center buildings in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC.
The US government and media launched a massive propaganda campaign to wrongly convince US citizens that former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein had collaborated with Al-Qaeda to carry out the attacks and that the Iraqi government possessed weapons of mass destruction that could threaten the US homeland.
Sixty-seven percent of respondents to the poll said that the amount of surveillance by the US government had been affected “a lot” by the 9/11 attacks.
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Bush signed the Patriot Act, which gave the US government sweeping powers to surveil US citizens, allowing the National Security Agency (NSA) to track their phone calls and movements.
When YouGov asked if “Muslims in the United States have been treated better, about the same, or worse than people of other religions,” 52 percent of respondents said Muslims have been treated worse.
Among Democrats, 71 percent agreed with the statement, while 28 percent of Republicans agreed.
After 9/11, many US citizens became hostile to Muslims, viewing them as “terrorists.”
A 2023 report from the Costs of War Project at Brown University estimated that 4.5 million people have died as a consequence of the US wars since the 9/11 attacks.
The US military carried out attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen.
Of the 4.5 million deaths, roughly 900,000 were killed by direct violence. Roughly 3.6 million resulted from “indirect” deaths caused by the aftereffects of the wars.
Russian Rail Corridor to Indian Ocean Could Outpace Suez Canal, Pakistani Senator Says
Sputnik – 21.08.2026
Russia–Central Asia–Indian Ocean rail corridor through Afghanistan and Pakistan could slash delivery times from 35 days to just five.
A proposed railway network linking Russia with Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan could unlock trade potential exceeding that of the Suez Canal, according to Pakistani Senator Mushahid Hussain.
Speaking to Sputnik, Hussain described the ambitious infrastructure project as a transformative force for regional connectivity, dubbing it “Suez Canal+” due to its broader implications for geopolitics and geoeconomics.
The remarks follow an announcement by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin, who confirmed that Russia, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are exploring the extension of railways through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean. “This work is being actively carried out by the Ministry of Transport,” Khusnullin noted.
A Revolutionary Shift in Regional Connectivity
Hussain emphasized that the project would provide Central Asian countries and Afghanistan with direct access through Pakistan to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, potentially uniting the region in unprecedented ways.
“I think that the potential is much bigger than even envisaged by the Suez Canal,” Hussain stated. “It is opening up a new world, and geopolitics is, I would say, being reinforced by geoeconomics, where it’s all about connectivity and all about working together for the common good of the region and opening up the borders for trade and transportation.”
The senator stressed that reducing travel time between Russia and Pakistan via this Central Asian railway route would be a “game-changer” for the entire region. Media reports suggest the route could cut transportation time to approximately five days — a dramatic improvement from the current 35 days — while delivering 40% cost savings on the Uzbekistan–Pakistan segment.
“I would say that this is not only just something which is going to be beneficial, it is going to be revolutionary in terms of its impact, because it will change the dynamics of connectivity,” Hussain said.
Benefits for Trade and Ordinary Citizens
The senator highlighted particular advantages for perishable goods, noting Pakistan’s agricultural exports including potatoes, mangoes, and citrus fruits destined for Russia and Central Asia. “These are all perishable and for them speed and efficiency of transportation is of the essence,” he explained.
Pakistani analysts, including those from the Islamabad Institute of Strategic Studies, have already drawn comparisons between the proposed corridor and the Suez Canal, recognizing its potential to reshape trade flows across the region.
Ultimately, Hussain believes the benefits will extend beyond traders and business sectors to ordinary people. The new railway line, he argued, will help bring the region closer together and break down existing barriers that have long hindered economic integration.
“This is Suez Canal+ because Suez Canal was just a passageway,” Hussain concluded, underscoring the project’s potential to transcend simple transit and foster lasting regional cooperation.
India’s reluctance to confront US over Chabahar attacks exposes contradictions in its Iran policy: Journalist
Press TV – July 26, 2026
India’s continued reluctance to openly challenge Washington despite the recent US attacks on Iran, including the strategic coastal city of Chabahar, has exposed the contradictions at the heart of New Delhi’s foreign policy, says an Indian journalist and foreign policy analyst.
Speaking to the Press TV website, Sanjay Kapoor, founder and editor of Hardnews magazine and president of the Editors Guild of India, said India’s approach towards Chabahar has never been independent of US policy on Iran, noting that New Delhi has consistently calibrated its engagement with the strategic Iranian port around Washington’s broader regional strategy.
“India decided to take up the Chabahar project only after then US President Barack Obama had signed the JCPOA and there was a global attempt to normalise ties with Iran,” Kapoor said.
He noted that India, like many other countries, had also severed its energy relationship with Iran after Washington instructed New Delhi to stop purchasing Iranian oil, underscoring India’s willingness to accommodate American concerns over the Islamic Republic.
“India also cut energy ties with Iran after the US told New Delhi to stop buying Persian oil. In other words, India has been mindful of US concerns on Iran,” he stated.
Kapoor said the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government in New Delhi has simultaneously cultivated close strategic relations with Israel, a policy that has further aligned India’s foreign policy with that of Washington.
“Besides, this BJP government has been close to Israel also, which ensures that New Delhi stays close to the US and its foreign policy,” he told the Press TV website.
His remarks follow the recent US aggression against southern Iran, during which the port city of Chabahar was also targeted, raising questions over the future of India’s flagship connectivity project in the region and whether New Delhi can continue portraying the port as a strategic priority while avoiding direct criticism of US attacks on Iranian territory.
Located on Iran’s southeastern coast, Chabahar has long been regarded as India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, allowing it to bypass Pakistan while providing Tehran with an important regional trade hub.
India has invested in developing the Shahid Beheshti terminal of the port, viewing Chabahar as a counterweight to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Deep historical ties have not translated into strategic consistency
Despite India’s cautious approach in recent years, Kapoor told the Press TV website that relations between Iran and India rest on centuries of historical, cultural and religious interaction.
He pointed out that India is home to the world’s second-largest Shia population after Iran, adding that religious links between the two countries continue to shape people-to-people relations.
He also referred to Imam Khomeini’s old ties with his hometown, Lucknow, the capital of northern India’s biggest state, Uttar Pradesh.
“There is continuous interaction between the Shia clergy in India with their counterparts in Iran and Iraq,” he noted, adding that Iran has traditionally viewed India differently from many other countries, pointing to the longstanding cultural affinity between the two civilizations.
“Iran also never saw India as a foreign country. They also perceive Kashmir in India as Iran-e-Sagheer (little Iran),” he said, referring to the Muslim-majority Himalayan region of Kashmir in northern India.
Kapoor argued that successive governments in New Delhi believed these deep-rooted ties would allow India to preserve its relationship with Tehran even while strengthening strategic cooperation with Washington.
“The Indian government under the BJP always believed that they will manage substantial ties with Iran like they managed the Chabahar Port,” he stated.
However, he maintained that New Delhi ultimately regarded alignment with the United States as the more pressing strategic priority.
“For whatever reason, they thought they had more compelling reason to align themselves with the US. They believed that Iran could wait,” Kapoor remarked.
According to the veteran journalist, India’s reluctance to publicly support Iran stems less from hostility towards Tehran than from its determination to remain aligned with Washington’s geopolitical ambitions.
“Their reluctance to support Iran openly is due to their desperation to be on the right side of the US,” he stressed.
He believes Indian policymakers expect the current regional situation to evolve and remain confident that New Delhi’s long-standing doctrine of strategic autonomy will eventually enable it to restore any damage to bilateral relations.
“They believe that what’s happening is transitory and the final outcome will look different from now. Their resort to strategic autonomy in their foreign policy will give them a chance to make up with the Iranian government,” Kapoor said.
US attacks have exposed the fragility of India’s Chabahar strategy
Kapoor said Chabahar was originally conceived as a stable alternative to Iran’s other major ports, making it particularly attractive to India when Tehran offered New Delhi the opportunity to develop the Shahid Beheshti terminal.
“Chabahar was meant to be away from the ferment that used to be in Bandar Abbas. It was expected to be stable and peaceful. That was the unique selling point of Chabahar when its terminal, Shahid Beheshti, was offered to India by the government of Iran,” he said.
However, he said the recent US attacks around the port have fundamentally altered those assumptions.
“For some strange reason, Chabahar is facing the ire of US attacks. They have misiled and bombed the port.”
Kapoor questioned New Delhi’s claim that Indian infrastructure at the port escaped damage during the attacks.
“The Indian government says Indian infrastructure has not been lost due to the attack. That’s saying a bit much,” he added.
The senior Indian journalist noted that New Delhi invested approximately $120 million in the Shahid Beheshti terminal but deliberately limited further investment because US sanctions made financing increasingly difficult.
According to Kapoor, Russian government sources have previously indicated that Moscow helped India overcome funding shortages for the project on several occasions.
Despite maintaining its presence at Chabahar for years, Kapoor argued that New Delhi never fully embraced the project.
“Despite soldiering on for many years, India always remained a reluctant partner,” he said.
Kapoor said many Iranian experts have long argued that Tehran deliberately preserved Chabahar as an opportunity for India despite having other potential partners.
“As many Iranian experts told me, Tehran had kept Chabahar for India,” he told the Press TV website. “They argue that if they had wanted, they could have given the port to Pakistan, China or even Russia.”
He said India’s strategic calculations changed significantly after the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, removing one of the principal reasons behind New Delhi’s investment in the Iranian port.
“India thought Chabahar had become untenable after the US left Afghanistan,” he said.
Rather than engaging with Afghanistan’s new Taliban-led government, Kapoor said India shifted its focus to alternative connectivity initiatives backed by Washington and several of its regional partners.
The journalist believes India’s regional priorities have increasingly shifted away from Chabahar towards the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a US-backed connectivity initiative linking India with Europe through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israeli-occupied territories and Mediterranean countries such as Greece and Italy.
“India did not want to negotiate with the Taliban and happily became part of IMEC, which promised a lot, including a seat on the G7 high table,” he stated.
Kapoor recalled that speculation briefly emerged in Indian media about reviving New Delhi’s engagement with Chabahar following the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Tehran and Washington. However, he said those expectations quickly faded once the ceasefire broke down and US attacks on Iran resumed.
India depends on Afghanistan and Washington’s calculations
Asked whether the long-term success of Chabahar ultimately depends on Iran’s stability and sovereignty, Kapoor said New Delhi’s strategic calculations extend beyond developments inside Iran.
“Chabahar’s stability depends, in India’s estimation, on who controls Afghanistan and on how the US perceives the port,” he noted.
He explained that India’s primary motivation for investing in Chabahar was never limited to commercial interests alone but centred on gaining direct access to Afghanistan while bypassing Pakistan.
According to Kapoor, changes in the regional geopolitical landscape have complicated those calculations.
“My contention may not square with the views of others, but India would only make a pitch for Chabahar if it doesn’t elicit a hostile response from its (Persian) Gulf partners and that’s only possible if Washington is backing India to help Afghanistan as well as support against Pakistan,” he said.
He argued that Pakistan remains a central factor in India’s strategic thinking, noting that the evolving military balance in South Asia following the recent war against Iran has further complicated New Delhi’s decision-making.
“After the recent war in West Asia, there has been a shift and Pakistan is better off militarily. What happens next will impact India’s policy towards Chabahar,” he remarked.
To Kapoor, India’s future investment in the port will depend primarily on the trajectory of Iran-US relations and Pakistan’s regional position.
“To sum up, India will invest in Chabahar if the US builds working relations with Iran and Pakistan is on the defensive due to this.”
Relations with Israel carry long-term risks
Kapoor said India’s growing partnership with Israel inevitably raises questions in Iran about the future direction of bilateral relations.
“Ordinarily, the trust that India and Iran enjoy should get eroded after PM Modi was in Tel Aviv just days before the war broke out,” the Indian journalist stated.
“The moot question that Iran should ask itself is whether India is a friend or a foe,” he added, pointing to the numerous interactions between Indian and Israeli leaders in recent years.
He added that despite increasing strategic cooperation with Israel and close ties with Washington, India has so far managed to preserve working relations with Iran.
According to Kapoor, New Delhi appears confident that it can maintain relations with “both sides” without suffering major diplomatic consequences.
Sitting ducks: Why the US security umbrella no longer protects the Gulf?

By Dr Mustafa Fetouri| MEMO | July 16, 2026
In Kuwait alone—less than 150 kilometres across the Gulf from Iran—the United States maintains a major military hub of approximately 13,500 personnel spread across installations such as Camp Arifjan and Ali Al Salem Air Base. To its south, Saudi Arabia hosts roughly 2,700 U.S. troops, centered at Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj. Elsewhere in the Gulf, every state hosts either a US military presence or provides access and defence cooperation under bilateral agreements: Qatar houses more than 10,000 personnel at CENTCOM’s sprawling forward headquarters at Al Udeid; Bahrain hosts around 9,000 personnel at the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet; the UAE accommodates approximately 3,500 personnel at Al Dhafra while providing deep-water naval access at Jebel Ali; and Oman offers strategic port and airfield access under bilateral agreements, despite having no large permanent US troop presence.
Beyond the Gulf monarchies, Washington maintains approximately 2,500 troops in Iraq and around 900 in northeastern Syria under Operation Inherent Resolve. To Iran’s northwest, the US operates from Incirlik Air Base in Türkiye— a NATO logistics and intelligence hub too. Until its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, American forces also maintained a major military presence along Iran’s eastern frontier, supported for two decades by extensive supply routes and intelligence cooperation through Pakistan. Although the US lies nearly 10,000 kilometres from Iran, it has constructed an unparalleled regional military architecture of permanent bases, rotational deployments, naval facilities, pre-positioned equipment, access agreements, and security partnerships that stretches from the Eastern Mediterranean across the Gulf to the western Indian Ocean. Combined with the military capabilities of close allies—including Britain, France, and Türkiye—this network almost literally surrounding Iran from all sides. The common thread underpinning this posture has long been the protection of regional partners, the safeguarding of global energy routes, and the defence of US strategic interests.
Yet, this foundational premise has collapsed under the weight of the US-Israeli war on Iran, which has fundamentally transformed the entire regional security landscape. This “war of choice” has exposed how a security arrangement once marketed as an ironclad insurance policy has devolved into a primary strategic liability.
Rather than serving as an effective deterrent, large and static American military installations now act as strategic liability—drawing Iranian retaliatory strikes while denying host states true autonomy or the promised protective shield.
The Gulf states have discovered, at a heavy price, that they are trapped in an impossible paradox: their sovereign territory serves as a staging ground for military operations they were never consulted about—at least that is what they say publically –instantly transforming their critical infrastructure, oil facilities, and urban centers into high-priority targets. Compounding this vulnerability is the stark geopolitical reality that while Washington may eventually pivot away or withdraw—much as it did from Afghanistan—Iran is a permanent neighbour that is going nowhere.
Beyond the immediate threat of missile strikes, the presence of these US installations directly undermines the core national strategies of the Gulf monarchies. Mega-development projects and economic diversification plans—from Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 to Dubai’s global trade hubs—rely entirely on an image of absolute regional stability, investor confidence, and open maritime transit. By hosting forward US bases, host nations inadvertently tie their economic futures to Washington’s military posture, creating an environment of perpetual crisis. Furthermore, defending these expansive American footprints forces host militaries to consume their own finite air-defense interceptors and defense budgets to guard US assets rather than securing their own national borders.
At the same time, while almost all Gulf States have, at least publicly, refrained from taking direct offensive action against Iran to avoid total escalation, they recognise that they are already viewed as passive participants in the wider conflict.
Maintaining this precarious balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult against rising domestic anti-war sentiment, as public anger over regional devastation steadily erodes the host governments’ domestic credibility.
For Washington, this massive network of forward-deployed bases has produced a profound strategic paradox. What was designed to project uninhibited American power now ties US freedom of action to the political consent of cautious host nations. When host governments impose strict sovereignty restrictions—refusing permission for US forces to launch offensive sorties or intelligence missions against regional adversaries from their soil—the Pentagon finds its multi-billion-dollar installations functionally sidelined during critical military surges. Instead of providing seamless operational flexibility, these fixed, highly vulnerable outposts transform into costly “imperial entrapment” liabilities: requiring thousands of US troops, high-end missile defense batteries, and constant naval escort deployments simply to protect the bases themselves, rather than executing broader strategic objectives or enabling Washington’s long-sought pivot to the Indo-Pacific. With the conflict between the US and Iran reigniting, Trump is demanding that the Gulf states pay once again to protect the Strait of Hormuz—a vital transit route that never closed until the war was started by Trump, not Iran.
This strategic calculus becomes infinitely more complex when factoring in Israel’s role in the regional security outlook. In recent years, certain Gulf states—most notably the UAE—operated under the premise that normalization and closer security alignment with Israel via the Abraham Accords would yield a net security dividend. Yet, this belief was never shared across the Gulf; nations like Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia maintained a far more cautious, sceptical stance toward Tel Aviv. The outbreak of the US-Israeli war on Tehran on February 28 utterly shattered any illusion that an Israeli-linked security architecture could bring regional stability. Instead, it exposed deep internal fault lines among the entire region. Reaching a collective, long-term security understanding with Iran was already a formidable challenge; doing so now, in the wake of a devastating conflict that forced Gulf States into the crossfire, is immensely more complicated. Moving forward, no regional framework can hold if it relies on a anti-Tehran pact anchored in Washington and Tel Aviv while ignoring the permanent reality of Iranian geographic power.
Ultimately, the fallout from the US-Israeli war on Iran exposes a fundamental reality that Washington and its regional allies can no longer ignore: the entire Middle Eastern security architecture must be fundamentally re-evaluated.
The core dilemma facing the region is that no collective security arrangement can ever be viable or effective if it seeks to exclude Iran—an indispensable, geographically permanent power armed with increasingly sophisticated offensive, defensive, and asymmetric capabilities.
Moving forward, any stable regional order must not only account for Tehran’s military leverage, but also accommodate its non-negotiable strategic demands. This includes addressing governance and transit rights over the vital Strait of Hormuz—through which one-fifth of global oil flows—and reaching a durable, pragmatic framework on its nuclear program. Regardless of the final outcome of ongoing US-Iran negotiations, the lesson for the Gulf is clear: true security cannot be built on an external garrison model that marginalizes the region’s principal indigenous power.
Explainer: Which foreign delegations attended the funeral of martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution?
Press TV – July 4, 2026
The funeral ceremony for the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, brought together one of the largest gatherings of foreign dignitaries in Iran in recent decades, with representatives from across Asia, Africa, Europe, the Americas, and major international organizations attending the event in Tehran.
The delegations included presidents, prime ministers, parliamentary speakers, foreign ministers, senior government officials, political leaders, and representatives of religious organizations and resistance movements, underscoring the broad international participation in the ceremony.
Asia
Asia accounted for the largest share of official delegations.
From West Asia, Iraq sent one of the largest delegations, including Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, senior officials, and representatives of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
Saudi Arabia was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Waleed Al-Khuraiji, while Oman sent the chairman of its State Council and Qatar was represented by Parliament Speaker Hassan bin Abdullah Al Ghanim.
Shia community representatives also attended from Bahrain and several other Persian Gulf countries.
Lebanon dispatched Defense Minister Michel Menassa alongside senior delegations from Hezbollah and the Amal Movement.
Yemen was represented by Vice President Mahmoud al-Junaid and an Ansarullah delegation.
Palestinian groups also attended, including senior Hamas leaders and Islamic Jihad Secretary-General Ziyad al-Nakhalah.
From the wider Asian region, Pakistan sent one of the highest-level foreign delegations, headed by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir. The delegation also included the Senate speaker, senior government officials, and religious leaders.
Afghanistan was represented by delegations from the Taliban administration and the Afghan resistance.
India sent a special government envoy at the deputy foreign minister level.
China was represented by He Wei, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.
Tajik President Emomali Rahmon attended the ceremony in person, while Armenia was represented by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Georgia sent President Mikheil Kavelashvili along with a Muslim delegation.
Türkiye dispatched Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz, together with political and party representatives.
Turkmenistan was represented by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, Chairman of the People’s Council and National Leader.
Among other participants were Azerbaijan’s parliament speaker, Kazakhstan’s foreign minister; the parliamentary speakers of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka; Thailand’s deputy prime minister; Malaysia’s agriculture minister; Myanmar’s special envoy; and official delegations from South Korea and North Korea.
Africa
Several African governments were represented by ministerial- or cabinet-level delegations.
Egypt sent its Senate speaker.
South Africa, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia, Tanzania, and Tunisia all sent official representatives.
Nigeria and Senegal also dispatched delegations to participate in the funeral ceremonies.
Europe and the Americas
Russia sent Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, as President Vladimir Putin’s special representative.
Belarus was represented by its parliament speaker, while Serbia sent its communications minister. Bulgaria also dispatched parliamentary and political representatives.
Germany was represented by members of the country’s Shia community.
From Latin America, Cuba sent its higher education minister as a special representative, while Nicaragua was represented by Foreign Minister Valdrack Jaentschke.
International organizations
The ceremony also drew senior representatives of several international organizations.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was represented by Secretary-General Nurlan Yermekbayev, while the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) sent Deputy Secretary-General Tariq Ali Bakheet.
The D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) were represented by their respective secretaries-general.
US Threatens ICC With Sanctions Over Future Investigations – Report
Sputnik – 10.12.2025
The Trump administration has threatened the International Criminal Court (ICC) with potential sanctions if it does not amend its founding documents to exclude President Donald Trump and his top officials from future investigations, Reuters reported on Wednesday, citing an administration official.
In addition to its pledge not to target the US, the Trump administration also demands that the ICC halt existing investigations into Israel and American military actions in Afghanistan, the report said.
In return for these concessions, the Trump administration is prepared to forgo additional sanctions on court officials and refrain from sanctioning the court itself, according to the report.
Washington has conveyed its demands to ICC members and directly to the court, which has 125 members, the report added.
The United States is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC in 2002 with powers to prosecute heads of state.
In recent years, the ICC has issued arrest warrants for several world leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. These decisions have been criticized. Some states, such as Hungary, decided to withdraw from the ICC.
On February 6, Trump signed the executive order on sanctions against the ICC for its actions against Washington and its allies, including Israel. The order states that the US will take significant measures against those “responsible for the ICC’s transgressions.” Some of the measures include the blocking of property and assets, as well as the suspension of entry into the US for ICC staff and their family members.
Final SIGAR report finds decades of US corruption, waste in Afghanistan
Press TV – December 5, 2025
The final audit from Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) paints a stark portrait of how tens of billions of dollars ostensibly earmarked for nation‑building were diverted, misused or wasted.
According to SIGAR’s report, from 2002 to 2021 the United States appropriated about $148.21 billion purportedly for Afghan reconstruction. Of that sum, roughly $88.8 billion went to security‑sector projects, while other enterprises disguised as development, humanitarian assistance, governance and institution‑building consumed the rest.
But the watchdog estimates that between $26 billion and $29.2 billion of those funds were lost to waste, fraud and abuse—red flags that preceded the Afghan government’s collapse and the rapid Taliban takeover in 2021.
The report logged 1,327 separate cases of misuse, mismanagement, or corruption tied directly to US‑funded programs.
Among the failures major investments in the Afghan security forces were undermined by inflated troop rolls, ghost‑salary schemes, and an inability to maintain complex gear.
As SIGAR’s acting inspector general put it, “the government we helped build… was essentially a white collar criminal enterprise.”
SIGAR’s acting inspector general, Gene Aloise, told reporters that the project was undermined by “early and ongoing US decisions to ally with corrupt, human-rights-abusing power brokers.”
This strategy, he continued, strengthened insurgent networks and eroded hopes for stable governance in Afghanistan.
Large‑scale hardware and infrastructure also went to waste. The United States funded planes, bases, and military assets, many never used or deteriorating rapidly post‑contract.
One instance involved transport aircraft bought for tens or hundreds of millions of dollars that were later scrapped or abandoned when maintenance systems collapsed.
Despite almost $90 billion spent on training and equipping army and police forces, Afghan troops disintegrated quickly when US support ended, added the report.
Moreover, even broader cost estimates for the war paint an even more sobering picture.
Estimates put the total US cost — including military operations, veteran care, interest on borrowed funds and other long-term liabilities — at more than $2.3 trillion over the two decades, according to the Costs of War project at Brown University.
Based on the SIGAR’s final judgement, the much-hyped mission to purportedly build a stable, democratic Afghanistan delivered neither stability nor democracy.
In September, President Donald Trump sparked a fresh geopolitical firestorm with his calls to reclaim Afghanistan’s Bagram Air Base, signaling a willingness to re-establish a US military presence in a country that has warned against any return of foreign troops.
Trump said the United States was “trying to get [Bagram] back” and described it as “one of the biggest air bases in the world,” highlighting its strategic runway and location to contain China.
Two days later, he posted on social media that if Afghanistan does not return the base, “BAD THINGS ARE GOING TO HAPPEN.”
US military officials warn that retaking Bagram would require “tens of thousands” of troops along with massive logistical and air-defense support to hold the facility, a scenario that could mirror the pitfalls of the long Afghan war.
The United States had invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 in response to the September 11 attacks, even though not a single Afghan national was among the hijackers.
Over the course of the 20-year US occupation of the Asian nation, hundreds of thousands of Afghans lost their lives.
When Washington and its allies deployed troops in 2001, they claimed their mission was to dismantle al-Qaeda under what became known as the US “war on terror.” Yet two decades later, in August 2021, the Taliban quickly retook multiple provincial capitals and then entered Kabul with virtually no resistance.
The rapid collapse of the US-backed government forced Washington into a rushed and chaotic evacuation of diplomats, citizens, and Afghan partners — a scene that drew intense criticism for the US government’s mismanagement of its own exit.
Trump’s ‘drug boat’ attacks mirror controversial Obama-era tactic – NYT
RT | November 28, 2025
US airstrikes on suspected drug smugglers in the Caribbean ordered by President Donald Trump bear similarities to the controversial ‘signature strikes’ on purported terrorists under former President Barack Obama, the New York Times has argued.
The Obama-era operations conducted primarily in Pakistan and Yemen relied on detecting patterns of behavior that US intelligence agencies claimed indicated terrorist activity, rather than identifying wrongdoing by specific individuals. Critics condemned the approach for its vague criteria – sometimes as broad as ‘military-age male’ in an area prone to militancy – and for resulting in civilian casualties.
Pentagon officials have acknowledged in closed-door briefings that they often do not know the identities of the people killed in what the White House calls a campaign against “narcoterrorism” in the Caribbean, the NYT reported on Thursday. Despite this, US officials insist that the comparison does not apply, arguing that the strikes are aimed at narcotics rather than individuals.
“They told us it is not a signature strike, because it’s not just about pattern of life, but it’s also not like they know every individual person on the boats,” Representative Sara Jacobs, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, told the outlet.
The Obama administration’s killings of low-level militants and people merely assumed to be militants was criticized as counterproductive and fueling further radicalization. Trump officials reportedly argued that attacking boats at sea reduces the risk of collateral damage.
Some US allies, including the UK, have reportedly declined to assist with the ‘drug boat’ strikes, warning that they could violate international law. The campaign has already resulted in more than 80 deaths.
Analysts increasingly suspect that the operations could be laying the groundwork for a regime-change effort in Venezuela, whose president, Nicolas Maduro, the US accuses of leading a criminal cartel.
