Israel Is Arming ISIS Linked Gangs With Military Drones To Help Carry Out Further Ethnic Cleansing In Gaza
The Dissident | May 28, 2026
Israel is going forward with its plan to force Gaza’s Palestinian population to flee to make way for Israeli annexation.
Israel Katz, Israel’s defence minister, said last week, “the voluntary emigration plan from Gaza will be implemented” , “everything at the right timing and in the right manner”, “voluntary emigration” being a euphemism for the complete ethnic cleansing of Gaza.
Benjamin Netanyahu has since stated that he ordered IDF militants to occupy 70 percent of the Gaza Strip, in violation of the so-called “ceasefire”.
Benjamin Netanyahu said , “At this point, we are fully in control of 60% of the territory of the Gaza Strip… and my directive is to get to… 70%”.
Netanyahu implied the end Israeli goal is to occupy all of Gaza, saying, “First 70%. We’ll start with that” in response to calls from audience members to occupy “100 percent”.
To aid in this genocidal campaign of ethnic cleansing and annexation, Israel has again tasked its criminal proxies in Gaza.
The Times of Israel reported that:
In the remainder, some armed groups backed by Israel continue to challenge Hamas’s dominance as the territory’s governing power.
A militia led by Ashraf al-Mansi, which works against Hamas in northern Gaza with Israeli backing, published footage on Thursday showing one of its members operating a heavy military drone.
The footage appeared to be the first of its kind released by an anti-Hamas militia, which until now have primarily been seen using light weapons.
It added:
A statement published on al-Mansi’s Facebook page said that “the People’s Army led by Ashraf al-Mansi in northern Gaza announces the successful introduction of advanced drones into operational use.”
Brig. Gen. Ghassan Dehini, who is considered the commander of various militias in Gaza, announced that “several successful operations” had been carried out using the new drones.
Referring to the drones, the Times of Israel noted “given Israel’s military and logistical support for the militias, it is likely they were transferred from Israel”.
For context, the so-called “popular forces”, currently led by Ghassan Dehini and which Ashraf al-Mansi is a part of, is a group of ISIS-linked criminals who became Israeli proxies after the start of the Gaza genocide.
These criminal gangs during the Genocide in Gaza, looted humanitarian aid in Gaza with support from Israel.
This was carried out both to continue the genocidal blockade on Gaza, and as a false flag to falsely blame Hamas.
By tasking its proxy gangs to carry out false flag aid lootings, Israel falsely accused Hamas of being behind the aid lootings, in order to justify the “Gaza Humanitarian Foundation” sites, the U.S./Israeli backed fake aid sites used to lure and massacre starving Palestinians.
The former Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman revealed in early 2025 that “Israel is providing weapons to a Jihadist group in the Gaza Strip affiliated with ISIS,” referring to the Israeli-backed criminal gangs behind the false flag aid lootings led by Yasser Abu Shabab, who the Financial Times described as “Gaza’s most notorious gangster”.
Soon after, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that “The IDF and Shin Bet security service are using Gaza-based militias to carry out military operations in exchange for pay and control over territory in the enclave,” adding, “Each militia consists of dozens of armed men, most from prominent Gaza clans, including the Abu Shabab family.”
One IDF official told the paper, “They’re given more missions in densely populated zones. It’s no longer just the menial work we gave them in the beginning. Now they’re conducting major operations,” and another said, “They train for missions right in front of us, We’ve seen them in groups of five to ten armed men. Sometimes it even alarms our forces because no one bothers to update us.”
The so-called “popular forces” last year faced an internal coup, with militant members killing Yasser Abu Shabab and replacing him with Ghassan al-Duhaini, who similarly previously joined the Army of Islam, or Jaysh al-Islam, “a Gaza-based Salafi jihadist group with a similar ideology to al-Qaeda that declared its allegiance to ISIS in 2015”.
The Jerusalem Post noted that Ghassan al-Duhaini “was a commander in a terrorist group in Gaza that was associated with al-Qaeda”.
In an interview with the Middle East Forum, Ghassan al-Duhaini said he “adopted Salafi jihadism” and “affiliated with a faction that was close to Jabhat al-Nusra (the Syrian Al Qaeda branch) during the war in Syria” .
Now, Israel is yet again backing this ISIS-linked criminal network, even arming it with military drones to help carry out the “final solution”to the Gaza genocide.
How Western Intelligence Agencies Built the Global Jihadist Network
By José Niño | The Libertarian Institute | May 26, 2026
Americans have been fed a comforting fairy tale about Islamic terrorism. Radical jihadists attack the West simply because they despise freedom, democracy, and the American way of life. This narrative flatters domestic audiences while conveniently obscuring a far more troubling reality. For decades, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel have armed, financed, tolerated, and tapped into Sunni Islamist extremists as geopolitical tools to destabilize rivals. The evidence spans multiple theaters and rests on declassified documents, congressional investigations, and credible investigative journalism.
The most thoroughly documented case is Operation Cyclone, the CIA program to arm and finance the Afghan mujahideen from 1979 to 1992. In a 1998 interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski confirmed that the CIA began aiding mujahideen opponents of the pro-Soviet Kabul government six months before the Soviet invasion—a calculated provocation intended to draw Moscow into an unwinnable war. When asked if he regretted supporting Islamic fundamentalism that gave “arms and advice to future terrorists,” Brzezinski replied:
“What is more important in world history? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some agitated Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?”
Multiple intelligence agencies participated in this operation. MI6 ran covert operations supporting hardline commanders. Pakistan’s ISI served as the critical financial and logistical conduit—operating under the direction of Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq, who controlled ISI policy throughout the war. Saudi Arabia agreed to match CIA contributions dollar for dollar, a commitment secured when Brzezinski visited Riyadh in February 1980 and one that CIA officer Gust Avrakotos and congressman Charlie Wilson (D-TX) would fly to Riyadh to enforce whenever Saudi payments fell behind. Historian Steve Coll documented in Ghost Wars that Osama bin Laden informally cooperated with ISI-run guerrilla training camps on behalf of newly arrived Arab jihadists, with intimate connections to CIA-backed commander Jalaluddin Haqqani. The global jihadist network that became al-Qaeda grew directly from this infrastructure.
The Afghan theater was not an isolated experiment but the opening chapter of a longer story. The same networks it created spread rapidly to the next front. The Chechen insurgency of the 1990s was joined by Arab and Central Asian jihadists who had cut their teeth in Afghanistan. The most prominent was Ibn Khattab, a Saudi-born mujahideen veteran born in 1969 inʿAr’ar, Saudi Arabia, who left for the Afghan jihad at age 18 before entering Chechnya in 1995. Saudi-backed organizations funneled funds, and Gulf state charities developed during the Afghan jihad maintained, in some cases wittingly and in others not, support for al-Qaeda-affiliated groups throughout the decade. Several of the future 9/11 conspirators—including Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh—originally sought to travel to Chechnya in 1999 before being redirected to al-Qaeda’s Afghan camps, per the 9/11 Commission.
While the Chechen theater illustrated how Western-cultivated networks could spiral beyond control, Washington was already running new variations of the same playbook elsewhere. Veteran investigative journalist Seymour Hersh’s 2007 New Yorker article “The Redirection” documented that the W. Bush administration, in cooperation with Saudi Arabia, launched covert operations to weaken Hezbollah and Iran by bolstering Sunni factions. According to Hersh’s intelligence sources, “a by-product of these activities has been the bolstering of Sunni extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile to America and sympathetic to Al Qaeda.”
Israel was running its own parallel operations against Iran during the same period. Foreign Policy magazine published a 2012 report by journalist Mark Perry drawn from CIA memoranda, describing how Israeli Mossad officers posed as CIA agents to recruit members of Jundallah, a Pakistan-based Sunni Salafi organization responsible for numerous bombings inside Iran. As one intelligence official told Perry:
“It’s amazing what the Israelis thought they could get away with. Their recruitment activities were nearly in the open.”
The same structural logic that shaped Afghanistan, Chechnya, and the Middle East has also played out in Central Asia. The Chinese government has accused the United States of using Uyghur Islamist networks to destabilize Xinjiang, with Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian repeatedly alleging American support for Uyghur militant organizations during 2020 and 2021. The U.S.-funded National Endowment for Democracy has provided grants to Uyghur exile organizations. NED co-founder Allen Weinstein acknowledged in a 1991 Washington Post column by David Ignatius that “a lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.” In October 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo formally revoked the designation of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a terrorist organization—a move Beijing characterized as evidence of Western support for Uyghur militancy.
Across Afghanistan, Chechnya, the Middle East, and Xinjiang, the same structural features recur. Western strategic interests converge with the short-term utility of Sunni Islamist networks. Operations route through intermediaries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s ISI, or Gulf states, allowing Washington to maintain official distance. Blowback eventually arrives years later, paid in American blood.
The naive story about terrorists hating freedom serves domestic propaganda purposes while obscuring a far darker truth: Western intelligence agencies have functioned as architects of mayhem, generating instability abroad in pursuit of American primacy. If the world wants genuine stability, it must first acknowledge this pattern and demand that these agencies be held accountable for the chaos they have unleashed across multiple decades.
France’s Shadow War in Mali
By Freddie Ponton | 21st Century Wire | May 11, 2026
France did not really leave Mali. It changed tactics and found new hands to carry the gun. After being pushed out by a military government that turned toward Russia, China, and the wider Global South, Paris appears to have re-entered the war through Ukrainian military intelligence channels, long-standing Tuareg networks, and a battlefield configuration in which separatist rebels and Al-Qaedaʼs Sahel branch were hitting the same state enemy at the same time.
The late-April attacks in Mali said something larger about the Sahel. A former colonial power that had been shown the door was suddenly back in the frame, leaning on intermediaries and the momentum of jihadist advances to weaken a government that had chosen Russian support, Chinese weapons, and the language of anti-colonial independence over its old dependence on Paris.
Paris returns through the back door
The sequence is clear. On 25 April, coordinated attacks struck Kati, Gao, Kidal, Sévaré and other strategic points in Mali. Defense Minister Sadio Camara, one of the central figures in Bamako’s post-French realignment and often described as Moscow’s man in the junta, was killed in an attack on his residence. The capital was shaken, roads toward Bamako came under pressure, and in the north, the insurgents advanced as Russian fighters and Malian forces lost ground. Four days later, while the government was still counting its dead, Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, spokesman for the Azawad Liberation Front, or FLA, surfaced in Paris and met French security and defence representatives while demanding that Russian forces leave Mali. That alone should have set off alarms from Bamako to Brussels.
French media then supplied the missing bridge. Radio Télévision Luxembourg, RTL, reported that France was relying on French-speaking Ukrainian soldiers, including former Foreign Legion personnel, to provide operational support on the ground in Mali in coordination with Tuareg rebels. The report was explicit enough to describe a French effort to avoid direct cooperation with jihadists linked to Al-Qaeda by using Ukrainian relays instead. The same investigation recalled that at the beginning of 2025, Ukrainian military intelligence had presented a detailed plan to French authorities to help dislodge the juntas in the Sahel region and roll back Russian influence. Paris supposedly hesitated at first on security grounds. From where things stand now, the April operation feels less like an improvised response than the delayed execution of that proposal.
For readers unfamiliar with Mali, one fact matters more than any other. This is a large Sahel state that was once a core part of France’s post-colonial sphere of influence. After coups in 2020 and 2021, the new authorities pushed out French troops, challenged the old Françafrique order, and brought in Russian security support while deepening ties with non-Western partners. That made Mali a test case in Africa’s attempt to break with inherited dependency. Seen from that angle, the April offensive was more than just local tensions between armed factions. In fact, it was part of a wider struggle over who gets to decide the political future of the Sahel.
The offensive that exposed the convergence
The April 25 offensive laid bare the forces converging against Bamako. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), better known as JNIM, claimed major attacks around the south and center. The FLA and allied Tuareg formations pushed in the north. Together they created the sense of a government under siege, with one arm of the offensive squeezing the capital and another unravelling the junta’s hold on strategic northern towns. JNIM is not a vague insurgent label. It is Al-Qaeda’s official branch in the Sahel, born from a 2017 merger that brought together Ansar Dine, AQIMʼs Sahara branch, al-Murabitoon and the Macina Liberation Front under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghali, a veteran Tuareg commander now wanted by the International Criminal Court.
That reality becomes significant, especially when the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) is so often presented in softer terms, as if it were merely a separatist front pursuing legitimate local grievances. The FLA, founded in late 2024 in Tinzaouaten from a reorganization of Azawad movements, draws on a long history of Tuareg rebellions in northern Mali. Its public face is political and diplomatic, and its battlefield behaviour tells a much sharper story. In the April assault, it moved in the same strategic rhythm as JNIM, benefiting from the firepower, shock value, and confusion generated by Al-Qaeda’s Sahel network.
The north was especially revealing. Kidal, the symbolic heart of Tuareg politics and rebellion, fell back under FLA control after Russian Africa Corps contractors and Malian forces withdrew. Accounts describe negotiated departures, seized matériel, and a humiliating loss for Bamako and its Russian backers. Africa Corps units left behind vehicles and equipment while seeking safe passage out of a town they had retaken from Tuareg groups only a few years earlier. In Bamako’s orbit, meanwhile, JNIM tightened pressure with threats to block access roads and attacks designed to create the perception of a capital edging toward siege. To supporters of the insurgency, the junta looked fragile, but to anyone watching external interference, the alignment of interests was impossible to ignore.
Much of Western coverage flattened this into a familiar story about state weakness and local instability. That framing leaves out the politically explosive part. These attacks came after two years of mounting accusations from Mali and its Sahel allies that Ukraine was aiding anti-state armed factions and that France had never fully abandoned its northern networks. Put next to Ramadane’s Paris visit and RTL’s reporting on French support through Ukrainian channels, the April offensive starts to read less like a sudden collapse than the military expression of a proxy design that had been taking shape for some time.
Ukraine’s war spills into the desert
Ukraine’s place in this story is not incidental. It is one of the clearest windows into how the war with Russia has spilled into Africa. In 2024, reporting from Le Monde described Ukrainian links with northern Malian rebels and said Ukrainian operatives had trained Tuareg fighters to use drones. That reporting was reinforced by statements from Tuareg figures themselves, who acknowledged contacts with Ukrainians, and by later accounts of drone know-how and explosive FPV tactics moving into the Sahel theatre. Mali cut diplomatic ties with Ukraine in August 2024 after comments from a Ukrainian intelligence spokesman were interpreted in Bamako as an admission of involvement in the Tinzaouaten ambush that killed large numbers of Wagner and Malian personnel.
In that July 2024 ambush near Tinzaouaten, Tuareg separatists claimed to have killed 84 Wagner operatives and 47 Malian soldiers. Ukraine’s own military intelligence spokesman then boasted that its services had supplied the “essential intelligence, and not just intelligence” that made the operation possible.
Tinzaouaten already carried the shape of what came later, and showed that Russian assets in Mali could be hit through a combination of local insurgents, drone warfare, and outside intelligence support, leaving Moscow’s contractors exposed far from their main war. By 2026, those methods had grown more polished. Reports on rebels’ use of FPV systems, including fibre-optic drones that resisted jamming and adapted commercial platforms, pointed to a battlefield increasingly shaped by techniques honed over eastern Ukraine. Russian and Malian convoys were taking fire from above in areas where state air superiority had once seemed secure.
Regional coverage and Sahel sources have since pointed to Algeria as the state that might have helped make that Ukrainian support physically possible long before the April offensive. Niger had already moved into Russia’s security orbit by then, which suggests Algerian territory and networks as the only realistic corridor for covert assistance to reach Tuareg fighters in northern Mali. The same Algeria that has spent years mediating Tuareg affairs, hosting peace talks and cultivating influence over Iyad Ag Ghali’s environment, seems to be quietly repairing relations with both Paris and Washington.
For Kyiv, the logic is straightforward. Russia’s Africa Corps is both a military instrument and a geopolitical symbol, securing mining sites and political partnerships across a belt of African states. Hitting it in Mali weakens Moscow’s position abroad while demonstrating that Ukraine can impose costs on Russia beyond Europe. For France, Ukrainian projection in the Sahel has a different value; primarily because it opens a way to hurt Russia’s African network and destabilize the junta without visibly redeploying French troops or sitting down with jihadist commanders.
RTL’s report on French-speaking Ukrainian ex-Legionnaires operating as intermediaries is powerful precisely because it solves a practical problem. Paris can guide and assist operations that serve its interests while insisting that no French soldier is on the ground. The Ukrainians provide deniability, military expertise, and a shared anti-Russian mission. The Tuareg rebellion provides local cover and established terrain knowledge, while JNIM provides the battlefield weight that neither France nor Ukraine could openly supply themselves. Taken together, the result is a war in which Malian sovereignty and Russian presence are being tested by actors who will never stand behind the same podium but who are clearly useful to one another on the ground.
France’s long shadow and the new division of labour
The events of this year did not emerge in a vacuum. Across Mali and the wider Sahel, accusations that France manipulates armed Islamist-adjacent networks have circulated for years. Some claims are stronger than others, while some remain allegations. However, put together, they form a political memory that explains why Bamako and its allies quickly read the April offensive as more than a domestic insurgent wave.
French president Emmanuel Macron visits the troops of France’s Barkhane counter-terrorism operation in Africa’s Sahel region in Gao, northern Mali, 19 May 2017
One of the hardest facts in that longer history is the ransom trail. A decade ago, a major New York Times investigation found that European governments had pumped large sums into Al-Qaeda-linked groups through ransom arrangements and that France was among the major payers. French and other European hostages taken in the Sahara and Sahel were released after opaque deals in which governments denied paying, but local intermediaries and US officials said otherwise. Reporting from the same period described France as one of the champions of ransom payments to Al-Qaeda affiliates in North and West Africa. The practical outcome pointed towards networks that abducted Western nationals gained money, leverage, and survivability from transactions tied directly or indirectly to French state interests.
In Bamako, those revelations sit on top of a thicker layer of suspicion. The Malian outlet L’Aube accused Paris of effectively financing JNIM through ransom payments, alleging that France paid between 12 and 13 million euros for the release of Olivier Dubois and Jeffrey Woodke and that the money was used by the group to buy arms and ammunition. Niger‘s authorities later levelled similar charges, with General Abdourahamane Tchiani accusing France of pouring several billion CFA francs into armed groups across the Sahel and using Nigerian intelligence channels for training, equipment and financing linked to terrorism. Against that backdrop, RTL’s talk of a new hierarchy of enemies in Mali lands with much greater force. France avoids direct contact with Al-Qaeda’s men by working through Ukrainian and Tuareg intermediaries, yet accepts a configuration that strengthens the jihadists on the ground.
Then came the accusations from Mali itself. In 2021, Prime Minister Choguel Maïga told Russian media that France had created an enclave in Kidal, barred the Malian army from entering, and taken deputies of Ansar Dine’s leader to form a new armed group trained by French officers. Although those claims were denied and never fully proven in public, they reflected a widespread belief in Mali that France’s northern policy was always selective, that some armed actors were enemies only until they became useful, and that counterterrorism language had long concealed a hierarchy of interests. When RTL later explained that France now limits its operational support to Ukrainian relays to avoid direct contact with jihadists linked to Al-Qaeda, it gave that older suspicion a fresh and chilling plausibility.
A new division of labour is also coming into view across the Sahel battlefield. JNIM supplies most of the foot soldiers and carries out the suicide car bombings and complex ground assaults that the Tuareg front alone could not manage. The FLA offers a separatist banner, a political vocabulary tied to Azawad and Tuareg grievances, and a face that Western actors can present as more acceptable than open jihadism. Ukrainian intelligence, drawing on ex-Foreign Legionnaires and years of experience under fire, interfaces directly with Tuareg commanders and delivers modern drone and ambush tactics. France coordinates with the Ukrainians and leans on its long history of intelligence work with Tuareg elites, but keeps just far enough away from open jihadist contact to preserve a legal and political alibi. Algeria appears to be sitting in the background as facilitator and fixer, a state that has repeatedly handled Tuareg files, mediated peace accords, and is now edging back toward closer ties with Paris and Washington. Above all of this sits the United States, rolling out a new counterterrorism strategy that asks European allies to take more responsibility for African theatres and to shoulder more of the burden of rolling back Russian influence worldwide.
Furthermore, it is acceptable to draw parallels with Syria, which offers the clearest precedent for what is emerging in Mali, where Western powers are claiming a war on terror while tolerating or working around Al‑Qaeda‑linked formations when they serve a shared objective on the battlefield. In Syria, Western powers tolerated, rebranded or worked around Al-Qaeda-linked formations when those forces were useful against the Syrian state. Mali is not a carbon copy, but the political reflex is familiar. France appears to have accepted a battlefield reality in which its preferred anti-junta channel moved alongside, and benefited from, Al-Qaeda’s own assault on the Malian state. That is enough to strip away the moral language of the so-called war on terror and expose a pattern that keeps resurfacing whenever Western influence is under threat.
Africa pushes back against the old pattern
Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have spent the last few years trying to build a different political vocabulary for the region. Their Alliance of Sahel States, or AES, is not simply a club of juntas, and should be seen also as a rebellion against the old script in which Paris decided security priorities, Western diplomats managed legitimacy, and African governments were expected to accept permanent tutelage in exchange for nominal stability. That rebellion is messy, militarized, and far from pure, which explains why Bamako’s turn toward Russia, China, and Turkey carries such symbolic weight across the Global South.
The response to the April offensive grew from that new landscape. AES partners launched joint military actions, including airstrikes in Malian territory, after the attacks on Gao, Ménaka and Kidal. Moscow has made clear that it does not intend to abandon Bamako. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said after the April attacks that Russian forces would stay in Mali at the request of the current government and continue helping it fight extremism, terrorism and other harmful phenomena. Russian military statements added that Africa Corps units had helped prevent a change of power and inflicted irreparable losses on the attackers.
This is not a symbolic presence. Reporting has described a Russian deployment of roughly 2,000 to 2,500 Africa Corps personnel in Mali, supported by repeated shipments of armoured vehicles, artillery and electronic warfare equipment. China had already been supplying new defence systems, including short-range air defences designed to help deal with the very drones that had become a weapon of choice for jihadist and Tuareg militias. Turkey emerged as another important arms partner through the supply of combat drones to the Malian state. Each of those relationships tells the same story. Mali is trying to diversify away from Paris and anchor its survival in a more multipolar world.
Pressure is building from the other side of the chessboard. Nigeria has warned that the rebel and jihadist advance in Mali threatens the wider region and hinted that it could intervene again, echoing its role in supporting the last French military operation there more than a decade ago. Almost at the same time, Washington published a new counterterrorism strategy urging Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security, explicitly including counterterror operations in Africa. Together, those signals sketch the outline of a tomorrow in which the same states accused of secretly feeding the fire in Mali can present themselves once more as firefighters.
That is the wider fight behind the headlines. If France can return through covert channels, Ukrainian intermediaries, and a tolerated overlap with jihadist momentum, then the message to the rest of Africa is brutally simple. Expelling the old colonial power does not free a country from its reach. It only drives its methods deeper into the shadows.
The anger in Bamako, Niamey and Ouagadougou did not come from nowhere. It was built over years of lectures about democracy from governments that armed the neighbourhood, years of foreign troops sold as protection while insecurity spread, years of counterterrorism campaigns that left ordinary people poorer, less mobile, and less safe. That memory sits behind every cheer for sovereignty in the Sahel. The old order still has embassies, media networks, military bases, and intelligence contacts. What it no longer has is the automatic right to be believed.
France once marched into Mali under the guise of rescue. Now it seems to be edging back in through a side door, behind Ukrainian handlers, Tuareg envoys, and Al-Qaeda gunmen who happen to be shooting at the same enemy. If JNIM ever reaches the gates of Bamako, nobody should call it a mystery born from the desert. The road to that disaster is already being paved through a proxy system that weakens Mali in the name of saving it and then prepares to market the resulting collapse as the reason for another intervention.
What advances on Bamako today is more than JNIM and a Tuareg front. It is a proxy machinery in which Western states and their partners are willing to ride jihadist momentum, break a government they cannot control, and then market the ruins as proof that Africa still needs their protection.
‘Little Sparta’: Why The UAE Attacked Iran for Israel’s Sake
By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle | May 9, 2026
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been accused of launching direct strikes targeting Iranian civilian infrastructure, while escalating its anti-Tehran rhetoric and having lobbied the US to return to all-out regional war. Although on the surface of things, it would appear nonsensical for such a small and fragile country to commit itself to reckless actions of these kinds, the UAE is no ordinary Gulf State.
While presenting itself as an innovative nation, one that is dissimilar to its neighbors in that its focus is the creation of wealth, “unity” and “peace”, the UAE fosters an image of a wise and inviting leadership that caters to outsiders. Utilizing their immense oil wealth, Abu Dhabi’s rulers have managed to construct an image of themselves that is almost as artificial as Dubai’s Skyline.
Behind the “tallest building” and “deepest pool” in the world are not talented Emirati architects, hard labor, and meticulous planners; instead, there are foreign experts and modern-day slaves. Although the Emirati rulers may be the ones who own everything and their people the ones who reap the benefits, even their prized oil industry would be nothing without all the foreigners who did everything for them.
Interestingly, both their foreign intelligence operations and oil industry have been heavily influenced by Palestinians, specifically from the Gaza Strip, and other non-Emirati Arabs, who helped make their nation run. Many of their police patrol officers are not their own nationals either, while 80% of their armed forces are foreigners.
The “peace” and “unity” that they promote are simply a Zionist project to attack the resistance to Israel’s expansionist endeavors. Not only were the ‘Abraham Accords’ lobbied for by the UAE, with it using its influence in Sudan and Morocco to bring even more States on board, but their entire national project has also been centered around assassinating pan-Arab and pan-Islamic unity.
Not only does the UAE use “inter-faith” projects to normalize Zionism and Zionists amongst Muslims, it actively controls a host of Islamic influencers, sheiks, Quran reciters, and scholars, whose role is to target impressionable Muslims. These individuals are used to push sectarianism, especially against Twelver Shias, but even against fellow Sunni Muslims who refuse to comply with their views.
Across the region, the UAE, known amongst its war hawk allies as ‘Little Sparta’, pursues a bloodthirsty approach, especially across the Horn of Africa. In Sudan, it is the primary backer of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of warlord Muhammad Dagalo (Hemedti), a militant group accused of committing genocide. In Gaza, they are also accused of backing the Israeli-controlled ISIS-linked death squads, used to fight against the Palestinian resistance.
In Libya, they provided support to warlord Khalifa Haftar’s men, while propping up the Southern Transitional Council (STC) separatists in Yemen. They claim to oppose “Islamists” and “Islamic extremism”, while they actively promote Wahhabi Islam, with the political goal of encouraging the most malignant forms of sectarianism. Their only true opposition to ‘Islamists’ is a stance against the Muslim Brotherhood and all groups who dare to challenge Israel, and/or the United States in any way.
To demonstrate the depths of their hypocrisy, consider that the toughest fighters belonging to their STC proxy forces in Yemen were former Al-Qaeda and ISIS militants. In the name of combating the so-called “Islamist threat” of the Ansarallah government in Sana’a, the UAE decided to throw its weight behind hardline Salafist militants.
When it comes to the Iran conflict, the UAE optical illusion is also in effect. It played victim, feigned neutrality, while simultaneously pushing claims that it managed to intercept more Iranian missiles and drones than the Israelis did. In this way, it becomes both the hero and victim, but in an even less believable way than the Zionists, who clearly have more believable propaganda.
In reality, the UAE not only provided a launching pad for the illegal US-Israeli attack on Iran, but had even fully integrated its air defense systems with Israel following their normalisation agreement. They were providing the Israelis with information used to help them combat Iranian retaliatory strikes on their territory, while the Emirati-owned Wing Loong II UAVs were used to monitor Iranian airspace in support of the US-Israeli aggression.
While the US certainly used other Persian Gulf Arab States to attack the Islamic Republic, none were so enthusiastic as Abu Dhabi’s leadership. Oman is the only country in the region that did not allow for its territory to be used for offensive action against Iran, while Qatar began developing a more neutral tone, especially as the war progressed, the UAE went the opposite direction. Eventually, the Emirati anti-Iran rhetoric escalated to the degree that the Emirati rulers began labeling Tehran as terrorists.
Understanding why is crucial to comprehending the nature of the UAE as an entity in the Persian Gulf. Contrary to its propaganda, Abu Dhabi is the means through which Israeli and Western imperial power is harnessed.
The British, who helped form the “Trucial States” that would later band together under the leadership of Abu Dhabi and become the United Arab Emirates in 1971, referred to them as “pirates”. This legacy of being a disrespected puppet of the empire is something that holds true until this day, where the ultra-rich Emirati leadership enthusiastically does the bidding of their superiors.
In only 54 years, the regime along the Persian Gulf has managed to present to the world a model of what unfettered materialism leads to. A regime that operates off of oil money, which wouldn’t exist without foreign know-how and intelligence. It looks down on other Arabs, despite it needing them to function or to have become what it is.
It claims to represent a moderate and peaceful version of Islam, promoting Madkhali Wahhabi voices who promote it as a model of socially conservative religion and claim it represents a leadership that follows the virtues of Tawheed (monotheism) above all others. Simultaneously, Dubai is a representation of everything that Islam opposes socially, while the same pro-UAE preachers who want to excommunicate ordinary Muslims from their religion over the slightest disagreements will sit back as Hindu Temples are openly constructed.
It has been involved in aiding two genocides, perhaps a third if you consider the 400,000 deaths in Yemen to constitute a genocide also. Even today in Somalia, only it and Israel recognize and back the Somaliland separatist movement, which could contribute to major future bloodshed.
All of this is relevant to keep in mind as the UAE is as artificial and malignant to the region as the Israelis are. Both have utter contempt for the people surrounding them, refuse to acknowledge the limits of their power, and have major narcissism complexes. In the UAE, they have to monitor every square inch of their territory, censor everyone’s thoughts, killing, deporting or imprisoning anyone who refuses to go along with stroking their fragile egos.
Ultimately, the UAE is just as complicit in regional atrocities as are the Israelis, which is why it is no surprise that they decided to directly join the illegal US-Israeli war on Iran. Their mission is to conquer, dominate and destroy the surrounding region, in order to come out on top, working hand in hand with the Zionists to do so. Now that their tourism industry has been devastated and they have taken significant blows, that only reinforces the idea of aiding the Israelis in pursuing their expansionist endeavors.
Recent history alone has demonstrated that the UAE is willing to clash with neighboring Saudi Arabia, however irrational that idea may have been, and how quickly Riyadh managed to quash their separatist proxy project in Yemen. They also demonstrated in 2017 that they were willing to push Qatar to the breaking point, in order to demand on Israel’s behalf that they stop providing financial support to Hamas, as well as using Al-Jazeera to air coverage favorable of Palestinians.
The UAE is not a normal country; it doesn’t have thousands of years of history like neighboring Oman, it is an aggressive asset that cares only for expanding the power of its monarchy. Therefore, it is to be assumed that it will participate in continued attacks on its neighbors, while wearing the cloak of plausible deniability.
However, the Emiratis are likely to find out against Iran, what they quickly learned when they recently clashed with Saudi Arabia, they are not Israel and can’t behave as such without consequences.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.
Mali: a new front in the Western war on multipolarism
Strategic Culture Foundation | May 1, 2026
An audacious coup attempt against the government in the West African state of Mali appears to have been thwarted by the Malian Armed Forces, supported by their Russian allies.
The surprise coup was launched last weekend when an estimated 12,000 fighters attacked at least five cities, including the capital, Bamako. Fighting continued during the past week, with most of the casualties – over 1,000 dead – suffered by the insurgents who came under heavy ground and air fire from state forces backed by Russian auxiliaries belonging to the Africa Corps.
Mali’s leader, Assimi Goïta, made a nationwide televised address appealing for calm and stating that the country’s security situation had been brought under control. He paid tribute to his defense minister, General Sadio Camara, who was killed in action on the first day of the coup attempt on April 25. The leader also acknowledged the actions of his country’s strategic partner, the Russian Federation, for helping to defeat the coup, which he condemned as “foreign-sponsored”.
For its part, the Kremlin said it would continue supporting the Malian government to restore stability and security to the country.
Both the Malian authorities and Moscow have accused Western sponsors of involvement in the insurgency. Russia’s foreign ministry claimed that Western military instructors had helped coordinate the wide-ranging attacks. There were reports of militants armed with French Mistral anti-aircraft missiles and U.S.-made Stinger Manpads. There are also unverified reports of mercenaries from Ukraine and NATO states fighting on the ground.
This is not the first time that NATO and Ukraine have been linked to destabilizing the national security of Mali. Two years ago, Mali cut diplomatic links with Kiev after a Ukrainian military intelligence official claimed that Ukrainian forces had been supplying insurgents.
In the latest uprising, the Western news media have been quick to highlight supposed military gains made by the rebels. The Western coverage has sought to portray the violence as a spontaneous challenge to the government in Bamako, which the Western media disparages as a “military junta”. The same media have also claimed that the unrest is a blow to Russia’s strategic interests in Africa. In particular, it is claimed that Moscow’s security partnership with Mali and other African states is being exposed as ineffective and weak.
Two militant groups were involved in the coup attempt this week. The Tuareg ethnic people’s liberation movement, known as the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), and an Al-Qaeda-linked jihadist group known as Jammat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Both entities had been fighting each other until recently, but now seem to have allied. Who brokered that expedient alliance?
The widespread insurgent attacks mounted against five cities covering a distance of some 2,000 kilometers also suggest that the fighters were provided with considerable intelligence and logistical support. Mali is a huge country, the sixth largest in Africa, with a land area twice that of France or Texas. Previous attacks were mainly confined to the remote northern half of the country, which is typically a desert landscape. To launch an assault on the capital in the south is a significant development. The devastating bomb attack on the defense minister’s residential compound near Bamako also suggests that there was foreign assistance.
The geopolitical background is highly significant. Mali formed an Alliance of Sahel States (AES in French) in September 2023 along with Niger and Burkina Faso. The three former French colonies ordered the withdrawal of French military forces and asserted a newfound political independence. They accused France of playing a double game by secretly supporting separatists and Islamist groups to give a pretext for French military involvement in their countries. In a further affront to French arrogance, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso pointedly turned to Russia for security assistance and, in return, have offered Russia access to key natural resources in a mutual partnership.
For centuries, France and other Western states have plundered Africa without giving anything back to the continent except new forms of economic slavery and exploitation.
Meanwhile, Russia and China have gained renewed partnerships with many African nations. A history of colonial depredation hampers neither Russia nor China. Indeed, the Soviet Union has a largely honorable legacy of supporting African independence, which many Africans acknowledge. In the contemporary context, Moscow and Beijing’s espousal of a multipolar world and cooperative development has resonated strongly with African countries.
When Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso kicked out the French neocolonial trappings three years ago, there was palpable scorn in Paris, particularly from French President Emmanuel Macron. If the Sahel alliance succeeded with Russian help, that would be a major blow to France’s national esteem and the anti-Russian propaganda narrative of the NATO bloc.
The attempted coup in Mali should be viewed in this light. It is much bigger than Mali’s internal tensions and divisions. What’s at stake is maintaining the right of political independence and sovereignty in African nations to choose their own political and developmental path. In a word: self-determination. Old colonial powers like France and other NATO members would like to turn the clock back to the former times of hegemonic control.
As many informed analysts have noted, the current conflicts in Ukraine and other places, such as Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, Latin America, Asia-Pacific, the Arctic, and so on, are not isolated aberrations. They are all part of a “new great game” for Western powers to reassert global dominance.
The Western ruling elites want to, indeed need to, confront the rising multipolar world that challenges their hierarchy of privileges and profits. Russia and China are the main targets for the Western powers to win their strategic war. The proxy war in Ukraine is part of that. So too is Washington’s aggression against Iran to cut off energy supplies to China and Asia.
The coup attempt in Mali is another site of struggle that appears to be instigated by NATO powers in their proxy war against Russia and the historic vision for a multipolar world.
There is an ominous echo of the Syria scenario, where Western powers finally overthrew a Russian ally at the end of 2024, to be replaced by jihadists whom the West backed covertly for years before that.
Given the strategic importance, Russia and China must not let this happen in Africa. The firm defense of Mali this week by the country’s leadership and armed forces, acting with the support of Russia and the mass of Malian people, indicates that Western intrigue will fail.
Why the CIA conspiracy to invade Iran with Kurdish militias failed
By Robert Inlakesh | Al Mayadeen | April 5, 2026
At the beginning of the US-Israeli War on Iran, stories were circulated about the United States attempting to use Kurdish militia groups in order to wage a ground offensive against Iran. Yet the strategy never ended up getting off the ground. Understanding the context helps explain what happened
On February 22, just prior to the joint US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran, five Kurdish-Iranian militant factions held a conference declaring a historic unity agreement had been reached. As a result the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan, and a branch of the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan came together. They declared themselves the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK), explicitly to fight against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
For long, Tehran had argued that these groups were being backed by the Western and Israeli intelligence agencies. However, journalists also adopting this analysis were often framed as being conspiracy theorists. That was, of course, until a few days into the US-Israeli war on Iran, when it emerged that the Trump administration was openly in talks with them, encouraging an invasion of Iran’s Western borders.
Then came the bombshell report from CNN, whose sources alleged that the CIA had been covertly working to arm these Kurdish-Iranian groups based in Iraq. So, at this stage, and shockingly so, there is no conspiracy to unravel as it has already been exposed.
What would such an invasion look like?
As has become evident, regime change in Iran is not going to be possible through a campaign from the air alone; the natural next step to achieving this was always going to be creating an insurgency inside the country, whilst invading from without also. In the US’s alleged strategic thinking, a Kurdish invasion would ideally work to foster a wider uprising inside the country, thus creating a general environment of chaos and division.
However, bringing about such a predicament was not going to come easy. In January, the Israeli Mossad attempted to foster an armed uprising that would trigger a civil war. Iran managed to put this bloody assault down with overwhelming force in just two or three days, a conflict which cost the lives of 3,117 people, including hundreds of policemen and security force members.
Initially, this uprising sought to use paid agents from criminal groups in the West of Iran and there was some evidence that Kurdish militia groups were used to clash with the Iranian security forces, but this was quickly quelled. In fact, in 2022, when the death of Mahsa Amini triggered nationwide protests, Western intelligence agencies jumped on the opportunity to use Kurdish separatist groups, but failed to achieve their desired objectives.
In Iraq, the US, and later the Israelis, also worked alongside Kurdish forces in order to secure the control of oil resources and successfully created the semi-autonomous Iraqi-Kurdistan region, complete with its own Kurdish government. The same came in north-eastern Syria, where the US helped set up what was known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), using them to fight back ISIS and claim control of not only Syria’s oil fields but the most fertile agricultural land in the country.
Unfortunately, Kurdish nationalism has always been promoted by the United States, and before it the British, dating back to the 1920’s, in a way that enables them to use the Kurdish minority populations of the region to do their bidding. Although these Kurdish nationalist groups, who seek to build separatist regions in Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkiye, proudly believe that their groups are fighting for a noble cause, they almost always end up causing more harm to the Kurdish populations and those around them.
This is not to comment on the historical or moral validity of Kurdish nationalism and their struggle for statehood, instead it is a factual assessment. Take for instance the recently dissolved Kurdish autonomous region project in north eastern Syria, what the US-backed SDF called Rojava. In 2015, the United States armed and funded them to fight against ISIS, promising them a bright future in return for their sacrifices on the battlefield.
Eventually, the Kurdish-led SDF, which ruled over a majority Arab territory, managed to seize the area of Afrin, towards the north-west of Syria. Turkiye, which views almost every Kurdish group as a terrorist organisation and/or threat, decided in 2018 to launch “Operation Olive Branch”, crushing the SDF and seizing that territory for themselves, handing it over to their own proxy forces. What did the US military do to help them? You guessed it, they ran away and deserted their Kurdish allies.
In 2019, Turkiye then launched “Operation Peace Spring”, seizing a strip of north-eastern Syria from the SDF and using their Al-Qaeda linked proxy forces called the “Syrian National Army” (SNA) to hold on to that land. Again, the US deserted their Kurdish allies. Despite this, the SDF crawled right back to their US backers and refused to reach an agreement with the then government of Bashar al-Assad.
When Assad was overthrown in December of 2024, there came a significant threat to many Kurdish-Syrians and more specifically the longevity of the SDF’s rule in north-eastern Syria. Syria’s new ruler, Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani while he led Al-Qaeda in Syria), decided to lead an offensive against the SDF to recapture the north-eastern portion of the country and place it under Damascus’s rule.
In January of 2026, after the US again deserted the Kurdish movement at the moment of truth, the SDF’s rule fell, and al-Sharaa took over north-eastern Syria. Why? Well, it’s very obvious: the US had only been using the Kurdish group as a proxy to withhold Syria’s oil and agricultural resources from it, until the government of Bashar al-Assad was toppled. Once regime change was accomplished, al-Sharaa was invited to the White House, and his Al-Qaeda and ISIS history was ignored.
See, the US never cared about the Kurds, nor did the Israelis, because both had covertly, and in some cases overtly, supported al-Qaeda linked groups in Syria also- playing both sides.
Although tragic, history shows us that it is very likely that Kurdish militant groups are used to do the West’s bidding, with promises of securing their own interests that never materialise. Therefore, it was always safe to assume that this would be attempted again. This time, however, the chance they had was extremely slim, and the consequences of such action even threatened the collapse of the Iraqi-Kurdistan project altogether.
The Kurdish groups in Iran cannot likely inspire a general uprising inside the country, this is for a number of reasons. The Kurdish population is considerable, numbering around 10 million of Iran’s 92 million strong population, yet they are not all hellbent on destroying the government, this is simply propaganda, most are normal people living their lives. These hostile Kurdish groups are based primarily in Iraq, in terms of their militant numbers, meaning that their forces inside Iran would have been overwhelmed from the jump.
Then there was the issue of the Iraq-Iran border, which had already been fortified and is where the Iranian military has deployed assets and soldiers to guard against an anticipated assault. But before they even reach the Iranian side, where they would have been greatly outnumbered, they would have to face off against Iraqi groups that are aligned with Iran. In total, these Iraqi groups – under the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU) – constitute a force of around 250,000 fighters if fully mobilised.
In order for such an assault to succeed in creating an uprising in Iran, or inspire other armed factions from other minority groups in the country – like the Lors, Arabs or others – to begin taking action, they would need to at least see results.
Even if the Kurdish factions were to hypothetically seize some territory, Iran is such a massive country that the temporary loss of towns and villages wouldn’t be such an issue. That’s the best case scenario for these groups, assuming they get past the Iraqis – in addition to the Iranian Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC)’s drones and missiles – first. If anything, such an offensive would have been destined to trigger an enormous backlash against the Kurdish regional project, rather than do it any good.
As for the idea of this leading to Balkanisation, it is not something that appears to be possible in the foreseeable future. This is not to say that Tel Aviv and Washington won’t try. Yet, the Iranian opposition is so incredibly divided – territorially and ideologically – that the ability for groups to work together is also scarce.
Take for example the Iranians who support Israeli puppet Reza Pahlavi. These are hardline Persian Nationalists who believe that they are a superior ethnicity to Kurdish people, Afghans, Arabs and so on. Under the rule of the deposed Shah of Iran, whose son is now worshipped in a cult-like fashion by a small but vocal minority of Iranians [especially in the diaspora], the non-Persian groups inside the country were enormously undermined and discriminated against.
In fact, under the Islamic Republic, the minorities fare much better than they have under the Pahlavi monarchs and those Shahs that came before them. Their conditions are by no means perfect, and there are often complaints that the centre of Iran is prioritised by the government, which is where the majority of ethnic Persians are situated, yet there is simply no comparison between the way they are treated under the current Islamic rule and that of the previous leaderships.
In conclusion, the options for creating a Syria-style civil war in Iran were always much lower than was being claimed by some commentators, or had been presented by pro-war think tanks in Washington. As Iran is under attack, and atrocities are being carried out against civilians on a daily basis, this has worked to make the nation’s people rally behind the flag, rather than embark upon bloody sectarian revolts.
Another key factor to understand here is that the Islamic Republic is clearly holding its own against the world’s top military superpower and the region’s most advanced military. This in itself makes small militant groups more hesitant to take action. Having said this, the US and Israelis appear to be willing to sacrifice all their proxies in a bid to achieve regime change, or at least inflict a significant blow, this time around, so it is never an impossibility that some desperate action may still be ordered at some stage.
His Majesty’s head-chopper: Syria’s MI6-backed president bows to King Charles

By Kit Klarenberg | The Grayzone | April 3, 2026
When Syria’s “interim” leader Ahmed al-Sharaa touched down in London on March 31, he was given a much warmer welcome than many once thought possible. As the longtime leader of Syria’s Al-Qaeda branch, the US had been offering a $10 million bounty for information on his location just 15 months prior. Yet here was Al-Sharaa, proudly posing for photo ops with King Charles and Prime Minister Keir Starmer.
British intelligence had been working towards this day for almost two decades. The path for al-Sharaa’s rule was cleared by MI6 after years of mentoring under Jonathan Powell, who now serves as National Security Advisor to Starmer. The time had come for Britain to formally anoint its Syrian puppet.
The ongoing US-Israeli war on Iran, and the Strait of Hormuz’s closure, were reportedly at the top of Starmer and al-Sharaa’s agenda. The British premier praised his counterpart’s supposed success in battling ISIS, while al-Sharaa thanked London for its assistance in pushing for sanctions on Syria’s ruined economy to be lifted. The pair have enjoyed warm relations since al-Sharaa’s seizure of power in December 2024, which Starmer publicly celebrated as a golden opportunity for London to “play a more present and consistent role throughout the region.”
Ever since, the British have systematically steered Damascus’ self-appointed government towards recognition and welcome by Western states. In May 2025, as al-Sharaa’s death squads massacred Alawites and other ethnic and religious minorities, US President Donald Trump received his Syrian counterpart in the oval office, where he gifted him a bottle of Trump-branded cologne. The BBC acknowledged this development would have been “unthinkable just months ago.”
Al-Sharaa took the next steps in January 2026, when he signed an unpopular US-brokered accord with Israel, which former Syrian President Bashar Assad had steadfastly refused to endorse for decades.
The impacts of the deal were immediately visible. As Al-Sharaa’s forces swept through Kurdish territory in north east Syria, the Kurds’ erstwhile Israeli backers refused to intervene, and US envoy Tom Barrack publicly declared that the American partnership with the Kurds had “expired.”
Within weeks, al-Sharaa’s forces wrested control of the country’s wheat and oil-producing areas, which had been under US-led occupation for years. Though Syria and Israel have yet to formally normalize relations, al-Sharaa describes relations between the countries as “good.” Today, Syria’s airspace and ground territory is routinely used by Israel and its Western sponsors to wage war on Iran.
Though the rapid transition took many by surprise, the campaign to re-establish Western control over Syria was actually set in motion years ago.
Starmer’s top advisor also groomed al-Sharaa for power
Among the most important vehicles for grooming the former Syrian Al Qaeda warlord known as Mohammed Jolani into the politician, Ahmad Al-Sharaa, was a supposed conflict resolution NGO known as Inter-Mediate. Founded by Jonathan Powell, a former advisor to PM Tony Blair who helped negotiate the Good Friday accords in Northern Ireland, works closely with the British Foreign Office and MI6.
Powell’s Inter Mediate cultivated al-Sharaa’s militant Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) faction for power for years before the December 2025 palace coup, and now boasts a dedicated office within the presidential palace in Damascus.
Coincidentally, Powell took up the post as Starmer’s advisor mere days before HTS declared themselves Syria’s government. As a confidant of Tony Blair, Powell was a key figure in the push for the criminal 2003 Anglo-American Iraq invasion, helping shape bogus intelligence claiming that Baghdad posed a biological and chemical weapons threat to justify the illegal intervention.
Despite his role in the destruction of Iraq, British media has reported that Powell “may have more influence over foreign policy than anyone in government after the Prime Minister himself.” Today, Powell is charged with “coordinating all UK foreign policy, security, defence, Europe, and international economic issues.”

Al-Sharaa was also personally welcomed by Hamish Falconer, an intelligence-aligned Member of Parliament who spent years collaborating with MI6 as the British foreign office’s Terrorism Response Team leader and once served as a hostage negotiator in talks with the Taliban.
Falconer is a close associate of Amil Khan, a British intelligence contractor who worked obsessively to generate sympathetic coverage of HTS while plotting to undermine this outlet due to our critical reporting on Syrian jihadists and their friends in the British government.
Hamish’s father, Charlie Falconer, was a longtime friend and former roommate of former Tony Blair. Following Blair’s May 1997 election victory, Falconer senior was elevated to the unelected House of Lords, then served in a series of high-ranking government posts throughout his pal’s tenure, often coordinating with Jonathan Powell.
While there, the elder Falconer applied “huge pressure” to Attorney General Lord Goldsmith to change his conclusion that invading Iraq was completely illegal. This intervention may have played a decisive role in enabling the illegal war of aggression. Today, it’s been reported that many on Downing Street are “growing increasingly wary about the influence of… smooth Blairites.”
According to one British outlet, top officials in London are purportedly asking, “at what point… does ‘experience’ and ‘guidance’ become ‘control’?” The same question must be asked of MI6’s longstanding links to al-Sharaa.
British intel set up al-Sharaa’s civil apparatus
It is uncertain when British contact with HTS began. But Robert Ford, who served as the US ambassador to Syria from 2011 to 2014, disclosed that in 2023 Inter-Mediate sought his personal assistance in rebranding HTS from “terrorists” into politicians. Ford met repeatedly with al-Sharaa, who reportedly expressed no remorse about the massacres and atrocities he perpetrated in Iraq. Al-Sharaa had served five years in the US military’s notorious Camp Bucca jail for his involvement with Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. He was released in 2011 – just in time for the Syrian dirty war.
In September 2025, former-MI6 chief Richard Moore admitted Britain’s foreign spying agency had been courting HTS long before its seizure of Damascus. “Having forged a relationship with HTS a year or two before they toppled Bashar, we forged a path for the UK Government to return to the country within weeks” of the fall of Assad, Moore boasted.
British psychological warfare operations and ‘aid’ efforts greatly assisted HTS’ consolidation of power in areas of Syria it occupied. As The Grayzone revealed in the immediate aftermath of Assad’s fall, leaked documents show MI6 was well-aware that reports of the group’s split from Al Qaeda were a fantasy.
Nevertheless, British propaganda efforts portrayed dangerous, chaotic HTS-occupied territory as a “moderate” success story, in order to demonstrate “a credible alternative to the [Assad] regime,” per the leaks. Central to these psy-ops were British-created assets including the Free Syrian Police (FSP) and White Helmets.
Framed by Western media as providing vital humanitarian services to local populations, these ostensibly independent agencies enjoyed fawning coverage in mainstream media. In reality, the pair collaborated closely with extremist groups, including HTS, and were complicit in hideous atrocities.
Whether intentional or not, HTS was “significantly less likely to attack opposition entities… receiving support” from the British government, a UK intelligence contractor stated. The work of the White Helmets and FSP greatly enhanced the terrorist group’s credibility as a governance actor and service provider among Syrians. When HTS took power outright in northwest Syria, the FSP became the territory’s formal police force. Since Assad’s ouster, the White Helmets have been tapped by British intelligence assets to run the country’s emergency services.
Despite al-Sharaa’s refusal to repudiate his extremist past, British diplomats initiated a series of meeting with him and other HTS warlords from December 2024 onwards. The public encounters continued even as legacy media outlets acknowledged these summits were completely illegal, as HTS was a proscribed terror group under British law. Starmer did not formally lift this designation initially, but nonetheless led calls for the removal of sanctions on Syria by all Western countries.
In March 2025, the UK terminated the majority of its Syria sanctions, and the rest of the EU followed shortly. With the revocation of US sanctions in July, Syria had effectively been welcomed back into the fold of the so-called international community.
While London’s man in Damascus appears eager to please Starmer and his counterparts in Western capitals, his sectarian politics remain a source of domestic credibility. In January, al-Sharaa’s forces overran northeastern Syria, and freed many ISIS fighters from Kurdish-run prisons, where MI6 had long-managed covert propaganda operations to influence inhabitants. Many freed ISIS brides reportedly refused repatriation to their home countries, “because their husbands are with” al-Sharaa.
The Rebirth of ISIS, Israel and the Continuation of Syria’s Civil War
By Robert Inlakesh | Palestine Chronicle | December 25, 2025
The chaotic predicament in which Syria now finds itself was, in many ways, predictable, yet this makes it nonetheless tragic. Despite the recent removal of the US’s crushing Caesar Act sanctions, the challenges ahead are so numerous as to render this a minor victory for the country.
In order to begin to understand what is happening inside Syria, we first have to begin to comprehend what happened following the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Although the moment that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) entered Damascus, and Ahmed al-Shara’a declared himself leader, was dubbed a liberation of the country, thus interpreted as the end to the nation’s civil war, what had really happened was the birth of a new chapter in the Syrian war.
On December 8, 2024, the Israeli air force saw its opportunity and hatched a long-planned strategy to destroy Syria’s strategic arsenal and occupy key portions of territory in the south of the nation. That day, however, much of the Arabic language world’s media completely ignored the historic event and refused to cover its ramifications.
Another key point was that, beyond Israel’s land grab, the country’s territory still remained divided, as the US-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) maintained its control over the northeast of the country. This movement believes that the territory it controls, with Washington’s backing, is called Rojava and is part of the land of Kurdistan.
Türkiye, to the north, views the Kurdish movement as a strategic threat and treats the SDF as an extension of other Kurdish organizations it deems terrorist groups. The majority of the people living inside SDF-controlled territory are Arabs, an issue that can also not be overlooked.
HTS Ascendant and the Collapse of the State
Then we have the HTS government that took over Damascus, which originally pledged to rule for all Syrians and not just the Sunni majority. However, HTS is a rebranding of Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot. Understanding this fact is key, because HTS was the de facto government in the territory called Idlib, in northwestern Syria; although a secular leadership was on paper, supposed to be the ruling authority.
In 2018, when Bashar al-Assad’s forces halted their offensive and sent all the armed groups opposing them on “Green Buses” to the Idlib enclave, Ahmed al-Shara’a, who called himself Abu Mohammed al-Jolani at the time, had started to consolidate power. This led to HTS establishing its own prisons and undergoing a process whereby it managed to control various al-Qaeda-affiliated Salafist armed groups inside the territory.
When HTS took Damascus, it did so with a ragtag army composed of militants from dozens of armed groups from inside Idlib, including many former ISIS fighters and others from different groups that were given the options to join forces with HTS, lay down their weapons, or face fierce crackdowns.
The way these crackdowns on dissidents were carried out, along with corruption in the governance of Idlib, even led to protests inside the province against HTS. Many hardline militants had also accused al-Shara’a of providing the US with details on the whereabouts of former ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Keep in mind now that when HTS took over Damascus, they did so without a fight and the former regime simply collapsed in on itself. So here was HTS, now tasked with managing the majority of Syria and had to do so without any army, because the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) had been disbanded.
Many elements of the former government, intelligence, and military under Bashar al-Assad were told they had been granted amnesty, yet forces aligned with HTS, and in some cases those within it, decided to take the law into their own hands through brutal field executions.
This eventually led to a group of former SAA fighters in the coastal region taking up arms against the new HTS security forces, triggering a response from a broad range of sectarian groups and others who were seeking “revenge” in blood feuds. The result was the mass murder of Alawite civilians across the coast.
Israel, the Druze File, and Syria’s External Fronts
Earlier this year, Israel also took advantage of tensions between Syria’s Druze community and sectarian militants aligned with Damascus, backing Druze separatist militias. This had been a strategy that Tel Aviv attempted to implement all the way back in 2013, when Israel began backing some dozen opposition groups, including al-Qaeda- and ISIS-linked militants that were committing massacres against the Druze.
The Syrian Druze population is primarily situated in the Sweida province in southern Syria. Israel long sought to create a Druze rump state there, which would serve as a land bridge to the Euphrates and allow for the total Israeli domination of the south. The Israelis are also allied with the SDF, although not as overtly as the Americans are, meaning that if their strategy works, then they have secured their domination all the way through to the Iraqi border.
This Monday, tensions again flared up between the Syrian forces aligned with Damascus and HTS in eastern Aleppo, with both sides blaming each other for the violence. Periodically, tensions continue to escalate in Sweida, yet come short of the large-scale sectarian battles we saw earlier this year.
Meanwhile, US forces have now expanded their footprint throughout Syria and have taken over more military air bases, even working alongside Damascus as a partner in the “fight against ISIS,” or “Operation Inherent Resolve.”
On December 13, an attack that killed three US servicemembers was blamed on a lone-wolf ISIS fighter. In response, the US then declared it was launching a retaliatory bombing campaign across the country.
The narratives of both Washington and Damascus make little sense, regarding this being a lone-wolf ISIS attack. Instead, the evidence suggests that the attack was carried out by a member of the HTS security forces, but this is perhaps a story for another day.
Now we hear report after report about the rise of ISIS. And while it is certainly true that ISIS is on its way back, even if in a weaker state, the context is never mentioned.
Internal Fractures, ISIS, and an Unstable Future
Not only has the current Syrian administration managed to play right into Israel’s hands with the management of the situation in Sweida, set up a shadow governance model that is even more corrupt than the previous regime, while isolating all of Syria’s minority communities in one way or another, but it has also effectively turned many of its own allies against it.
There is no actual “Syrian Army” to be spoken of right now, at least there isn’t one that is professionally trained or big enough to handle any major war. Instead, the Syrian state will rely on its allies, like major tribes and a range of militant groups. However, as time goes on, more and more of HTS’s allies and even many who now fill the ranks of its own security forces are growing tired of the government’s antics.
A large component of their anger comes from issues concerning tight Syrian relations with the US, leading to the hunting down of Sunni militants across the country, but particularly in and around Idlib. As mentioned above, HTS had integrated many ISIS fighters and those belonging to other hardline Salafist Takfiri fighting groups, but many of these militants have never been willing to sacrifice their core beliefs for a secular state.
For years, the man they knew as Jolani had preached against the United States and Israel, yet, after taking power, he began cozying up with them and targeting Sunni militants alongside the US military. In addition to this, the large number of foreign fighters inside the country have not been granted citizenship and feel as if their futures are threatened.
In other words, the conditions are ripe for some kind of revolt, and Ahmed al-Shara’a is surrounded by countless threats. If ISIS were to begin gaining traction, there is a good chance many of these fighters, currently allying themselves with the Damascus government, will switch sides. In fact, this is something that has already been happening, although in small numbers and isolated cases.
What we see is a recipe for disaster, one which could explode in any direction, triggering a much larger chain of events in its wake. So far, it appears as if there are four primary threats to the stability of the HTS government. These are the Sweida front, the Israel front, the SDF front, and the potential for an internal insurgency.
Mike Huckabee, the US ambassador to Israel, recently gave an interview during which he commented that Ahmed al-Shara’a “does know that any pathway for stability in Syria, his pathway for survival, is that he has to be able to have peace with Israel.”
It is important to understand that the two most powerful influences on Damascus are Washington and Ankara, yet it is clear that the US has the edge and could quickly overthrow the HTS regime at any time of its choosing.
Türkiye now has enormous influence inside Syria, where it is competing with the Israelis and attempting to set red lines, yet has failed to impose any equations as of yet. Perhaps the only way that the Turkish state could deter the Israelis is through backing a resistance front in the south of the country, yet it is clear that the US will not allow such a scenario to develop.
Even if a rather weak resistance group, or collection of groups, were to be formed and pose little strategic threat to Israel, this could also end up presenting a challenge to the rule of HTS in the long run. This is because such a resistance organization would enjoy enormous popular support and likely encourage other armed actors inside the country to join forces, creating a Lebanon-style system, whereby the forces of the state are incapable of confronting the occupier, and instead a resistance group would handle security.
The United States and Israel would never permit something like this to evolve, likely moving to commit regime change before such a plot is even conceived.
This leaves Ahmed al-Shara’a in an impossible position. He has no confidence in him as a ruler from the country’s minorities, growing anguish amongst the majority Sunni population, and no real army to be spoken of. Instead of resisting the Israelis, as his men and population at large seek, he sends his officials to sit around the table with them, while Syria’s official social media pages publish images of Syria without including the occupied Golan Heights.
Since 1967, most of the Syrian Druze living in the occupied Golan Heights had refused to take Israeli citizenship. After the sectarian bloodshed that occurred earlier this year, these Syrian Druze began applying for Israeli citizenship en masse. This is the impact that the rulers in Damascus have had on their own people; they have pushed Syrians who resisted Israeli citizenship for decades to switch sides, playing right into Tel Aviv’s hands.
Meanwhile, little is being done to reassure the disillusioned militants who had fought alongside HTS and believed they were fighting for a liberation cause and/or Islamic Caliphate, only to realize that they fought for a regime that negotiates with Israel and bows to the White House. Therefore, it is no wonder that when a group like ISIS appeals to them through its propaganda, it manages to convince them to join the organization’s fight.
What’s more is that this outcome was barely difficult to predict; only days after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, militants from Idlib were posting photos on Facebook of themselves holding up pictures of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in the Umayyad Mosque, the most important mosque to Sunni Muslims in Syria.
Not only this, while ISIS networks on social media were, in the past, blocked almost instantly, they began popping up in the open on places like Facebook again. This begs the question as to why such obvious ISIS glorification and supporters were permitted to begin operating so openly online during this period.
When it comes to Takfiri Salafist doctrine, whether someone is affiliated with ISIS or al-Qaeda offshoots, they do not simply abandon this ideology overnight because of changing political circumstances.
Now, Takfiri militants idolize a man named Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, which is why these Salafi groups are often referred to as Wahhabis. Historically speaking, this ideology was the bedrock on which the Saudi family launched their offensives to conquer Arabia, declaring the Ottomans kafir (disbelievers) and justifying their alliance with Britain, against other Muslims, on this basis. Therefore, some may justify the actions of al-Shara’a on the basis of their doctrine, but only to a certain extent.
When HTS began killing fellow Sunni Muslims, alongside the United States and cozying up to individuals responsible for the mass murder of their co-religionists, this started to become a major problem. It could no longer be branded an “alliance with the people of the book,” especially when fellow Salafists were kidnapped and killed by HTS government forces.
Some attention has recently been placed on the comments of the US envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack, who remarked that Syria should not be a democracy and instead a monarchy, even explicitly stating that this plan could include merging Syria with Lebanon. Such a system would certainly please many allies of al-Shara’a, and comments like these could be made in the interest of restoring faith in the leader.
Nonetheless, the current system is still operating on a knife-edge and is far from achieving a monarchy that rules the northern Sham region. In the distance, the Israelis are watching on and simply waiting for the next opportunity to achieve even more of their goals.
This is all because the war in Syria never truly ended; the only thing that changed is that Bashar al-Assad’s government fell, and perhaps if that had occurred during the first years of the war, there wouldn’t have been so many issues.
As is normally the case with human psychology, we seek to frame things in a favorable way to our worldview, meaning that we simply ignore evidence to the contrary. Yet, the case of Syria is really not all that dissimilar from the post-US-backed regime change realities currently existing in Libya, although there are key differences, of course.
So long as Syria remains without an effective resistance front against the Israelis, it will never recover and remain trapped. In Lebanon, it took years before such a resistance force truly took off in the south, and even then, it took decades to expel and then deter the Israelis. Syria is a much more complex picture, which makes predicting outcomes even more difficult.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.
Mali holds firm: West eyes new front to sabotage Sahel independence
By Aidan J. Simardone | The Cradle | November 19, 2025
If you are to believe western media, Mali is days away from falling to Al-Qaeda. Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), a branch of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, is blockading fuel to the capital, Bamako. It is only a matter of time before growing frustration turns Malians against their “illegitimate” government. Or so the story goes.
The reality tells a different tale. The situation is serious, not only for Mali but also for the broader Alliance of Sahel States, which includes Burkina Faso and Niger. And yet, Mali is recovering. Russia has stepped in, delivering vital fuel shipments. Schools are reopening. Vehicles are back on the road. Towns previously captured by JNIM are being reclaimed.
It is a huge gamble for Russia. But should it succeed, Moscow will have secured a key ally and gained the favor of anti-imperialist countries in Africa. The risk, however, might not come from JNIM. Instead, it could come from a western-supported intervention that seeks not to stop Al-Qaeda, but to destroy the Alliance of Sahel States.
From French client to anti-colonial spearhead
After it gained independence, Mali continued to rely on France. Even its currency, the CFA franc, is pegged to the euro. In school, children were taught French history and learned to speak French. Until recently, France had 2,400 troops stationed as part of its “counterterrorism” operations.
Despite these apparent efforts, groups like JNIM, the Islamic State in the Sahel, and Azawad separatist militias grew. Meanwhile, western corporations profited as Mali became the fourth-largest producer of gold. With this wealth extracted, Mali remained one of the poorest countries in the world.
Bamako’s cooperation with the west did not always curry favor. Its alleged failure to follow the 2015 Algiers Accords with Azawad separatists resulted in the UN Security Council (UNSC) imposing sanctions in 2017. This made little impact, with Mali’s economy continuing to grow.
Yet most Malians were still in poverty, and the security situation worsened. Frustrated, a coup was launched in 2020. But when protests erupted, another coup followed in 2021, led by Assimi Goita, Mali’s current president. Western institutions portrayed it as democratic backsliding, with a military unjustly taking over the country. But the coup was highly popular, with people celebrating. According to a 2024 poll, nine out of 10 people thought the country was moving in the right direction.
President Goita was a radical, anti-colonial, pan-Africanist. In 2022, he kicked French troops out, instead seeking help from Russia. In 2025, Mali withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), accusing it of working with western powers. Goita nationalized the gold mines, removed French as Mali’s official language, and replaced school curricula about French history with Bamako’s own rich history.
Western-aligned institutions retaliated with sanctions. ECOWAS, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), and the EU imposed economic penalties. Cut off from financial institutions, Mali defaulted on its debt. But the impact was partly muted.
A few months after sanctions were imposed, the court of the WAEMU ordered that sanctions had to be lifted. Gold mining, which contributes to 10 percent of the economy, saw no impact. Mali shifted its trade to non-ECOWAS countries, and the economy continued to grow.
The West African country redirected trade outside the ECOWAS bloc and resolved its debt in 2024. Far from isolating the country, sanctions strengthened internal solidarity.
Even when ECOWAS lifted sanctions in July 2022 – citing a transition plan to civilian rule – no action was taken when the deadline passed. The reason? The sanctions had backfired, exposing ECOWAS as a western instrument and bolstering support for the Goita government.

Map of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Sanctions failed, so proxy war begins
JNIM continues to receive financing from Persian Gulf patrons and income from ransoms and extortion. While it has a strong rural presence, it controls no major cities. Azawad separatists and ISIS fighters are similarly confined to Mali’s remote north.
A different strategy was needed. In recent weeks, JNIM has attacked fuel trucks, depriving Bamako of oil. Cars were unable to fill up, and schools closed. According to western media, JNIM wants to strangle the capital to promote unrest. Mali has had five coups since independence, three of which have occurred since 2012. News reports suggest that given this history, JNIM can ultimately topple the Malian government.
Reports of an “immediate collapse” are nearly a month old. What Western media fails to understand is that, unlike previous governments in Mali, the current one is highly popular. Truckers are willing to risk their lives to bring fuel to the capital. “If we die, it’s for a good cause,” one trucker said. Even if the blockade were to stop all fuel, Malian’s resilience and support for Goita would only increase.
Thankfully for Bamako, JNIM is facing setbacks. Russia, which provides support from the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) and, in 2023, vetoed the UNSC’s sanctions, sent 160,000 and 200,000 metric tons of petroleum and agricultural products. This has provided some relief, with fuel lines shortening and schools reopening.
On 15 November, Mali and the African Corps seized the Intahaka mine. The next day, the town of Loulouni was also recaptured. That same day, the blockade south of Bamako was weakened, allowing convoys of fuel trucks to reach the city.
Manufacturing consent for intervention
So why does the western media continue insisting that Mali is collapsing? Simple: to justify military intervention.
One of the biggest propagandists has been France. In a post on X from the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Paris blamed Russia for abandoning Mali, despite being one of the only nations supporting it during this crisis. French news channels LCI and TF1 ran stories such as “Mali, the Jihadists at the gates of Bamako” and “Mali, the new stronghold of Al-Qaeda.”
In response, Bamako banned them from the country. Niger has also accused Benin of being a base of operations for France. French state media, France 24, did not deny the claim, only disputing that the number of soldiers was far less than Niger claimed.
France stands to regain a significant geopolitical advantage from regime change in Mali. The country borders seven former French colonies. A return would reassert French regional influence and weaken the anti-imperialist Alliance of Sahel States. Niger remains crucial to France’s uranium supply, which is necessary for 70 percent of the country’s energy. Bamako is also quickly becoming a major exporter of lithium – essential for electronics and electric cars – with the recent opening of its second mine.
Other western countries have also lost out under Goita’s rule. Canadian company Barrick Mining lost $1 billion when Mali nationalized the mining industry. Last month, other western firms, such as Harmony Gold, IAMGOLD, Cora Gold, and Resolute Mining, had their mining exploration licenses revoked.
The growing Russia–Mali partnership resembles Moscow’s 2015 intervention in Syria. Just as Russia propped up Damascus for as long as it could from a US-led proxy war, it now shores up Bamako. The payoff could be similarly strategic: diplomatic support, military basing rights, and influence in an emerging multipolar Africa.
Unlike past interventions cloaked as counterterrorism, the west now appears reluctant. Washington and its allies, usually quick to bomb under any pretext, have done nothing to aid Bamako. This silence suggests either tacit support for JNIM or confidence that Mali will implode without direct action.
Outsourcing war
As a member of the Alliance of Sahel States, the west fears that Mali’s resilience will be an inspiration to others to join the anti-imperialist struggle. The 2021 coup emerged as a result of inequality and insecurity. These factors can be found in many other West African countries such as Benin, the Ivory Coast, and Togo.
Some observers theorize that Africa’s most populous country, Nigeria, could soon have a revolution, amid high inequality and insecurity from Boko Haram. Nigeria’s growing ties with Mali are a serious threat to the west.
With sanctions failing to bring Mali to its knees, the only solution for the west is military intervention. This might be direct, as seen with Niger, where French troops are stationed in bordering Benin. But more likely, western countries will outsource their intervention to African states. This has occurred in Somalia, where the US has Kenya and Uganda do its dirty work in return for aid. The same could occur with Mali.
The most likely actors to play this role are ECOWAS and the African Union. ECOWAS receives military training from the US, and many of its leaders are closely tied to Washington. It also receives extensive financing from the EU, most recently receiving €110 million ($119 million) to support “peace, trade, and governance.” Far from neutral, it has become an enforcement arm for western interests. The bloc has previously sanctioned Mali and, in 2023, threatened to invade Niger.
The African Union has also served the interests of the west, such as the African Union Mission to Somalia, which is supported and financed by Washington and Brussels. The African Union Constitutive Act prohibits military intervention in any member state, with the exception of war crimes or at the request of the state.
Mali, however, was suspended from the African Union in 2021, making intervention fully legal under the Act. Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, recently called for “urgent international Action as crisis escalates in Mali.”
Bamako versus the empire
Mali faces a two-pronged assault: economic strangulation and the threat of foreign-backed military intervention.
Though JNIM remains a nuisance, it has failed to topple the government. The bigger threat comes from western capitals and their African proxies. Russia remains one of Mali’s few reliable allies. If successful, Moscow’s support will elevate its standing across the continent.
More importantly, Mali’s endurance will inspire other African states to challenge western domination and reclaim sovereignty.
Syria pledges to hand over hundreds of Uyghur militants to China: Report
The Cradle | November 17, 2025
The Syrian government plans to hand over Uyghur foreign fighters within its security forces to China, AFP reported on 17 November, ahead of Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani’s first visit to Beijing.
The issue of the extremist foreign fighters from China’s majority Muslim Xinjiang province was expected to be on the agenda for Shaibani’s meeting with Chinese officials, a Syrian government source told AFP on condition of anonymity.
“Based on China’s request, Damascus intends to hand over the fighters in batches,” the source stated.
A Syrian diplomatic source elaborated further, telling AFP that “Syria intends to hand over 400 Uyghur fighters to China in the coming period.”
Shaibani became foreign minister after the group he helped found, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), took power in Damascus in December of last year with help from the Turkiye, Israel, and the US.
Large numbers of extremist Muslim fighters traveled from Europe, Arab countries, Turkiye, and China to assist HTS, the former Al-Qaeda affiliate, to topple the government of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.
The CIA-led operation to topple Assad, known as Timber Sycamore, began in 2011. The effort involved sparking anti-government protests and flooding Syria with heavily armed and well-funded militants from Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).
Fighters from the Uyghur religious minority belong to the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a group that aims to establish an Islamic state spanning Xinjiang and other parts of Central Asia.
After coming to Syria with the help of Turkish intelligence, the group helped HTS (formerly the Nusra Front) conquer Idlib governorate in northwest Syria in 2015.
In 2017, Syria’s ambassador to China said that between 4,000 and 5,000 Uyghurs were fighting in the country.
Uyghur fighters often took over homes of Christians and Druze, who were ethnically cleansed from Idlib, which became the base from which HTS launched its campaign to topple Assad last year.
The new Syrian army gave a prominent Uyghur militant from TIP a high-ranking position as brigadier general, while also integrating thousands of the group’s fighters.
The Chinese government has for years expressed concern about the TIP’s presence in Syria. On 31 December, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson called on all countries to “recognize the violent nature” of the TIP and “crack down on it.”
Western governments and rights groups claim that the Chinese government is repressing the Uyghur Muslims in China, including imprisoning large numbers in internment camps and prisons.
Syria’s HTS deploys foreign fighters to Lebanon border: Report
Press TV – November 13, 2025
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has reportedly deployed foreign Takfiri fighters from northern Syria to the border with Lebanon, sparking renewed concern over the group’s destabilizing activities and growing presence in the region.
According to sources cited by The Cradle, foreign militants affiliated with HTS were transferred in recent days from the Harem area in Idlib province to the city of al-Qusayr, near the Syrian–Lebanese border.
The movement reportedly coincided with the transfer of heavy military equipment, including armored vehicles and other hardware.
“At the same time, forces affiliated with the Ministry of Defense of the ‘Syrian Transitional Government’ attempted to advance and take positions inside Lebanese territory, specifically in the Wadi al-Thalajat area of Ras al-Maara, along the Syrian–Lebanese border in the Damascus countryside,” the sources said, referring to barren areas where the Lebanese army is not present.
These reports emerge shortly after Washington announced Syria’s participation in the US occupying coalition in the Arab country, as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani — once affiliated with al-Qaeda and Daesh — arrived in Washington on Sunday.
The HTS military remains deeply infiltrated by extremist elements. Many of its current commanders and officers are known former members of al-Qaeda and Daesh factions.
The reported buildup of HTS-linked forces near Lebanon coincides with renewed US threats that such militias could be deployed against Hezbollah.
On Friday, US envoy Tom Barrack said that “Damascus will now actively assist us in confronting and dismantling the remnants of ISIS, the IRGC (Islamic Revolution Guards Corps), Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist networks, and will stand as a committed partner in the global effort to secure peace.”
Analysts warn that the alignment of US policy with extremist-leaning Syrian factions such as HTS risks reigniting cross-border violence and undermining the security achieved by Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces after expelling Daesh and al-Qaeda elements from Lebanon’s eastern border in 2017.
Jolani told the Washington Post in an interview that “good” progress has been made in direct talks to reach an agreement with Israel, while boasting about weakening the Axis of Resistance on behalf of Tel Aviv.
“Israel has always claimed that it has concerns about Syria because it is afraid of the threats that the Iranian militias and Hezbollah represent. We are the ones who expelled those forces out of Syria,” he said.
“The US is with us in these negotiations, and so many international parties support our perspective in this regard. Today, we found that Mr. Trump supports our perspective as well, and he will push as quickly as possible in order to reach a solution for this,” he added.
Jolani also met with US-based Syrian rabbi Yosef Hamra.
Hebrew reports have revealed that a main part of the agreement will likely involve HTS–Israeli intelligence sharing and cooperation against the Axis of Resistance, specifically Iran and Hezbollah – which helped the former government recapture large swathes of Syria from al-Qaeda and Deash.
Israel carried out heavy strikes in Damascus and elsewhere in southern Syria earlier this year, under the pretext of protecting the Druze minority from Jolani’s extremist forces.
Now, it continues to carry out incursions, seize territory, and expand the occupation it established after the fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s government last year.
Yet Jolani and other HTS officials have repeatedly signaled that they pose no threat to Tel Aviv.
The deployment of Takfiri fighters along the Lebanese border serves as a pretext for confronting resistance groups and advancing Israeli interests, coming as Israel continues its repeated acts of aggression across Syrian territory following the collapse of former President Bashar al-Assad’s government late last year.
Analysts are asking why al-Jolani does not deploy any forces against Israel, which continues to attack and occupy parts of Syria almost daily.
The HTS-led regime will reportedly hand over the occupied Golan Heights to Israel as part of a looming normalization deal with the illegal entity.
Since taking power, HTS has committed widespread war crimes and brutal repression, particularly against minority communities such as the Alawites, who have faced targeted violence, as Syria has experienced waves of sectarian and regional unrest under the group’s control.

