Qatar Warns of ‘Industrial Catastrophe’ If Strait of Hormuz Remains Closed
By Kyle Anzalone | The Libertarian Institute | September 8, 2026
Qatar is warning that there will be significant global consequences if the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened soon. Iran closed the Strait in response to the war started by the US and Israel. President Donald Trump also imposed a blockade of Iranian ports.
On Monday, Qatar’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Mohammed Al-Ansari, said reopening the Strait of Hormuz remains a priority, warning that the prolonged disruption could lead to an “industrial catastrophe.”
The Strait of Hormuz has become a major issue for Trump. Before the war, the Strait was treated as an international waterway. However, after the US and Israel attacked Iran, Tehran seized control of the Strait.
Since then, Tehran has limited traffic to nations that are not participating in the war against Iran. Additionally, Iran is requiring vessels to use preapproved shipping lanes and pay a “service fee.”
Tehran says any agreement to end the conflict must recognize Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait. Iran is in negotiations with Oman to establish new protocols for ships transiting the waterway. Washington is demanding that Tehran return the Strait to its pre-war status.
The US has attempted to force open the Strait of Hormuz. The US is currently escorting tankers through the waterway in hopes of defending the vessels from Iranian missiles and drones. Over the past week, US warships and tankers were targeted by Iranian missiles and drones.
While US officials have claimed that the amount of oil exiting the Strait is close to prewar levels, monitoring agencies say only a small fraction is getting out of the Persian Gulf.
Trump has attempted to pressure US allies into joining a coalition to reopen the Strait without success. The President has recently turned his focus toward South Korea. He recently scaled back war games with Seoul, in part, because South Korea refused to aid the war against Iran.
On Tuesday, Seoul said it still had not determined if it would provide assistance to the war. “We are closely consulting with the international community, including the US, on ways to make a substantive contribution toward the swift restoration of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and peace and stability in the Middle East,” Defense Ministry spokesperson Chung Bin-na said. “No specific measures have been decided at this point.”
Iran warned South Korea that any involvement in the US war would have “consequences.”
US, South Korea and Japan Begin Joint War Games
By Kyle Anzalone | The Libertarian Institute | September 7, 2026
The US, South Korea, and Japan kicked off five-day Freedom Edge war games in and around the Korean Peninsula.
“The exercise will also incorporate multi-national maritime and aviation capabilities, and introduce enhanced air defense scenarios, medical evacuation training, and maritime interdiction operations,” a statement from Pacific Command (PACCOM) said. “Building on the foundation of Freedom Edge 25, as well as regular trilateral ballistic missile defense and defensive counter-air exercises throughout the year, Freedom Edge 26 stands as our most advanced trilateral cooperation to date.”
The US, South Korea and Japan began holding Freedom Edge in 2024. For the second year in a row, the drills will occur without an American aircraft carrier. The US carrier fleet has been strained by the wars in the Middle East, and the Japan-based USS George Washington was recently deployed to the region.
The military drill often provokes a hostile response from North Korea. During last year’s iteration of Freedom Edge, Pak Jong Chon, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, said the drills “pose a grave challenge to the security interests of our state and a major danger of undermining regional stability and escalating military tension.”
On Monday, North Korean Minister Kim Song-gi said Freedom Edge was pushing the situation to the brink. “US-led military demonstrations are being held one after another, without any break in time or space, as military cooperation between the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea evolves into a dangerous offensive alliance with nuclear elements.” He continued, “This reality poses a serious security threat, pushing instability on the Korean Peninsula and beyond to the brink.”
Last month, President Donald Trump said that the US and South Korean bilateral Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) war games were unnecessarily hostile toward North Korea. “These exercises are not only costly, with much of these costs paid for by the United States of America (as usual!), but send a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile, to a Country that, as long as Donald J. Trump has been President, has been unthreatening and respectful,” he posted on Truth Social.
While Trump cut the UFS drills in half, the Freedom Edge war games have gone forward as planned. South Korean Rear Adm. Kim Ji-hoon called the Freedom Edge drills the “most effective” exercises. “The trilateral Freedom Edge exercise is being executed to counter North Korean nuclear and missile threats and that’s the main purpose of the exercise,” he added.
Trump’s decision to scale back the UFS drills appeared to be part of a push to secure a meeting with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un. Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, rebuked the overture, saying that merely scaling back the war games did not change the hostile US policy towards North Korea.
Supreme Leader Kim said Pyongyang remains focused on establishing a nuclear deterrent to prevent Washington and South Korea from starting a war. On Monday, North Korea put its second 5,000 ton destroyer into service.
“The enemies’ concerns will surely be deepened,” Kim said at the commissioning ceremony. “We must establish more clearly a powerful and reliable nuclear war deterrent, to put into practice the diverse and effective operation of our nuclear combat systems and further strengthen our military activities for maritime defense and war deterrence.”
South Korean Leader Pledges to Replace Unstable Armistice With North Korea With Peace
Sputnik – 15.08.2026
SEOUL – South Korean President Lee Jae-myung on Saturday said the country aims to end the war on the Korean Peninsula and replace the current unstable armistice regime with a peace regime.
“We will begin the path to ending the war and transforming the unstable armistice regime on the Korean Peninsula into a peace regime,” Lee said in a speech marking the 81st anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule.
The president called on both sides to abandon mutual threats and begin inter-Korean talks to end the decades-long “state of war.”
“Let us abandon the intention of threatening each other and begin inter-Korean talks to end this extremely protracted war. Within this process, effective ways to stop the North’s nuclear build-up can also be discussed,” Lee added.
Peace on the Korean Peninsula would contribute to stability and cooperation in Northeast Asia and serve as a milestone toward a “nuclear-free” peace, he said.
Lee also added that South Korea intends to turn the energy of hostility and confrontation into a driving force for peaceful coexistence and shared prosperity, and to fulfill its role as a direct party to the peace process on the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea has repeatedly stated it has no intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons. In September 2025, leader Kim Jong Un declared the denuclearization issue “closed,” adding that Pyongyang would never give up its nuclear arsenal. In March 2026, he said that North Korea would strengthen its nuclear state status as “absolutely irreversible.” The country’s nuclear status has also been enshrined in law.
In September 2023, North Korea added a provision on the accelerated development of nuclear forces to its constitution, following a September 2022 law on nuclear policy.
Historic blow to South Korea’s military intelligence agency
“Military Intervention in Politics Will No Longer Be Possible”
By Erkin Oncan | Strategic Culture Foundation | June 15, 2026
The aftermath of the December 2024 coup attempt in South Korea, led by former President Yoon Suk-yeol, continues to reverberate.
It was revealed that Yoon had ordered drone deployments to North Korea in an effort to escalate tensions and create conditions conducive to a coup. The ongoing trials related to these events have now concluded with prison sentences handed down to Yoon and other senior officials of the era.
The Seoul Central District Court found Yoon guilty of “acts benefiting the enemy” and sentenced him to 30 years in prison. Among those convicted was then–Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun, who also received a 30-year sentence.
Yeo In-hyung, head of the Armed Forces Counterintelligence Command – one of the most powerful units within the South Korean military – was sentenced to 15 years in prison.
The lightest sentence was given to Kim Yong-dae, then commander of Drone Operations, who was closest to the “obedience within the chain of command” principle. He received a three-year prison sentence, suspended for five years.
These prison sentences represent far more than the punishment of a criminal act. Since the suppression of the coup attempt, Seoul has been undergoing a profound transformation in both military and civilian bureaucracy.
One of the most significant steps in this transformation was taken two days ago.
The South Korean government announced the dissolution of a military intelligence unit under the Ministry of National Defense.
The disbanded institution was the Defense Counterintelligence Command, known by the abbreviation DCC.
The primary justification for the decision was the command’s “role during the martial law process.” However, details of the restructuring also provide important clues about the broader transformation underway within the military.
What was the DCC?
The DCC has a history spanning more than 70 years. Since its establishment in 1950, it has also been known as the “Special Service Unit,” “Security Command,” and “Military Security Command.”
It acquired its current structure in October 1977, when the Army Security Command, Naval Security Unit, and Air Force Special Investigation Office were merged.
Not only the DCC but all of Korea’s intelligence services have played central roles in nearly every dark chapter of the country’s modern history.
One of the most notable examples is the assassination of former President Park Chung-hee in 1979, known as the “October 26 Incident.”
Park, one of Korea’s longest-ruling dictators, was assassinated by Kim Jae-gyu, the then-head of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).
This assassination – rooted largely in inter-agency rivalry – demonstrates how state institutions, particularly intelligence bodies, have historically been capable of reshaping political power dynamics in pursuit of institutional dominance.
At the time, the DCC (then known as the Military Security Command) was a powerful centralized military intelligence organization.
The figure who significantly strengthened the DCC and made it capable of intervening in politics was Chun Doo-hwan, who was appointed head of the organization six months before the assassination.
Chun used investigations under his control to purge rivals and seized power through a military coup in 1979. The subsequent wave of martial law culminated in the bloody suppression of the Gwangju Uprising in 1980.
The Gwangju uprising
The Gwangju Uprising (May 18–20, 1980) began with student protests and rapidly expanded into a broader civilian resistance against military dictatorship.
It was brutally suppressed by military forces, resulting in the deaths of thousands of civilians at the hands of their own army.
Today, it is commemorated every May 18 as one of the most tragic events in Korean history.
During this period, the DCC played a central, if not decisive, role. It is known that its members infiltrated civilian crowds in plain clothes, spread misinformation and rumors, and engaged in various provocations to escalate violence.
Scandals and reorganizations
By the 1990s, the DCC once again came under scrutiny, this time due to illegal surveillance scandals.
Investigations revealed that the organization had built a nationwide illegal monitoring network targeting civilians and politicians alike. These revelations led to another name change in 1991.
In more recent history, the agency was implicated in political interference in 2018. According to reports by Yonhap News Agency at the time, the DCC played a role in disseminating online content supporting the ruling party and targeting opposition figures.
During the latest coup attempt, it was also revealed that the DCC had planned operations to surround key institutions such as parliament, formed arrest teams targeting political opponents, and prepared detention lists.
In short, for a significant portion of the public in South Korea, this quasi–counterintelligence structure – often described as a politicized “dirty security apparatus” – had long been seen as an institution that should have been dismantled years ago.
The dissolution process
This historic development in South Korean politics was announced by Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back during a press briefing at the ministry.
According to the minister, the new restructuring ensures that “military intervention in politics will no longer be possible.”
Emphasizing that the decision is “not merely an administrative reorganization,” he stated:
“This step is a fundamental restructuring of the structure and mission of military intelligence agencies to ensure they can never again interfere in politics. It marks a historic turning point toward building a military that belongs to the people.”
What is changing?
Under the new arrangement, the DCC will be dismantled and divided.
Its functions – including counterintelligence, defense industry intelligence, security investigations, and security inspections – will be transferred to different institutions.
A newly established Defense Counterintelligence Center will take over counterintelligence operations, defense industry intelligence, defense industrial security, and cybersecurity.
Authorities related to security investigations and joint investigations conducted during martial law periods will be transferred to the Ministry of National Defense’s existing Investigation Headquarters.
Security inspections at corps-level and above units, along with investigations into security violations, will be assigned to a newly created Defense Security Support Group.
At the same time, several key powers that previously enabled the command’s influence within the military are being completely abolished.
From now on, South Korea’s military intelligence agency will no longer be able to monitor military personnel’s activities, collect intelligence on service members, prepare reputation assessments of officers and soldiers, or gather information on corruption and other misconduct outside the scope of counterintelligence.
Strengthening civilian oversight
As the DCC is dismantled, civilian oversight over the newly established Counterintelligence Center is being guaranteed.
The inspector general of the new structure will be a senior civilian auditor. A newly created intelligence and counterintelligence oversight committee within the Ministry of National Defense will operate directly under the defense minister and be composed entirely of civilians.
The government is also working on new legislation that clearly defines the operational limits of military counterintelligence personnel and establishes penalties for illegal activities.
A turning point
The dissolution of the DCC represents more than a simple institutional reorganization. It can also be interpreted as South Korea’s long-delayed confrontation with its history of military coups and military political influence.
Ultimately, however, the extent to which these plans and decisions are successfully implemented will depend once again on the balance of power within both the military and the political establishment.
Ex-South Korean President sentenced for trying to provoke conflict with Pyongyang
RT | June 12, 2026
A South Korean court has sentenced former President Yoon Suk Yeol to 30 years in prison, Yonhap news agency has reported. Judges reportedly found that he ordered drones to be sent into North Korea in order to inflame tensions and create a pretext for his declaration of martial law.
Yoon declared martial law in December of 2024, citing legislative gridlock and what he described as a plot by pro-Pyongyang forces within the South Korean political establishment. The nation’s parliament formally overturned the decree within hours despite attempts by police and soldiers to stop lawmakers from accessing the National Assembly building.
Yoon was impeached just over a week later, suspended from office, and formally removed from power by the Constitutional Court months later.
On Friday, a Seoul court ruled that Yoon had abused his power and “benefited the enemy” with his drone plot, among other charges, and sentenced him to 30 years in prison. According to the Associated Press, the court also accused him of harming South Korea’s military interests by exposing its capabilities and prompting Pyongyang to take a stronger defensive posture.
Yoon’s former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun was also sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role in the plot, while former Defense Counterintelligence Command chief Yeo In-hyung received a 15-year sentence.
Friday’s sentence adds to Yoon’s growing list of convictions.
In February, he was sentenced to life after being convicted of attempting to orchestrate an insurrection and seize power. In April, an appeals court increased his sentence for abuse of authority and obstruction of duty.
Yoon’s downfall follows a long pattern of legal persecution of former South Korean leaders.
Four of his predecessors had received prison sentences after leaving office. Among them were Chun Doo-hwan, Roh Tae-woo, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, although several were later pardoned.
Role reversal – “divide & conquer” used against the west
Ashes of Pompeii | March 21, 2026
For centuries, the strategy of “divide and conquer” has been a cornerstone of Western geopolitical power. The British Empire mastered the art of ruling vast territories with minimal forces by exploiting internal divisions, setting local leaders against one another, leveraging ethnic tensions, and securing cooperation through selective incentives (aka bribes). The United States later employed similar tactics, from Cold War interventions to coalition-building in Iraq and Southeast Asia. The principle remains consistent: fracture opposition to maintain advantage.
Today, we are witnessing a role reversal in real time. Iran, long subjected to Western pressure and sanctions, is employing a parallel strategy regarding the Strait of Hormuz. Much of the west is not entirely enamoured of Trump’s Iran strategy but is afraid to openly challenge America. The closing of the Strait is economically catastrophic for most US allies and they are caught between a rock and a hard place – a vindictive Trump demanding support to open the Strait, and economic hardship.
In steps Iran with its own “divide and conquer” strategy, now reportedly negotiating with individual Asian and European countries a sort of Hormuz toll to allow tankers from these allied countries to pass through. And of course, they would each be required to not support the the US Navy if it attempts to open Hormuz. These discussions would be regarding tolls, security guarantees, and bilateral arrangements that would circumvent a collective response.
This approach carries significant strategic implications. If key U.S. allies secure individual agreements ensuring their energy shipments, the incentive to support a unified, potentially confrontational effort to keep Hormuz open is dead in the water.. Why risk escalation when a separate deal preserves economic interests? This dynamic could gradually erode the cohesion of Western alliances. Imagine Japan, Korea or Germany putting their national interests ahead of America’s! Unthinkable just a few weeks ago.
Iran’s maneuvering reflects a calculated understanding of coalition politics. By offering tailored terms, Tehran exploits the very real economic dependencies that different nations have on Persian Gulf oil flows. A country like Japan, facing immediate energy shortfalls, may prioritize short-term access over long-term strategic solidarity.
The irony is substantive, not merely rhetorical: a regional power taking advantage of a strategy historically used to extend Western influence, now being adapted to counter that same influence. Traditional western asymmetric power dynamics being used against the west.
If Iran successfully institutionalizes a system of bilateral tolls or passage agreements, it could reshape regional power structures and perhaps challenge the precedent of freedom of navigation under international law. However, this development also exposes the conditional nature of the “rules-based order” itself. When international norms align with western strategic interests, they are vigorously defended; when they become inconvenient, exceptions are quietly made. The interesting aspect here, is that for once, the exception is used against the USA.
In the end, this is power politics, plain and simple. Iran is using the tools available to it, geography, energy dependence, and diplomatic patience, to turn a strategic vulnerability into leverage. The West built much of its influence by splitting opponents; now it faces the same tactic applied in reverse. One would expect that states would always seek national advantage where they find it, but that has often not been the case for “junior” members of the western alliance in the last 30 or 40 years.
This is just another step towards a multipolar world where the west is seeing its own playbook used against it, where alliances and coalitions may be less static, and where national interest may be considered more important than following the diktats of a hegemon or a bloc leader.
Turn around is fair play and America and the west will need to get used to the idea that other countries, here Iran, can both play hardball and use divide and conquer strategies.
I am not sure Donald Trump will quite understand the significance of this moment.
US failures in Iran reveal Russia is key to South Korea’s strategic security
By Drago Bosnic | March 11, 2026
You’re probably wondering what Russia, South Korea, Iran and the United States could possibly have in common. Moscow has very close ties with Pyongyang, not Seoul, while Tehran is simply too far to be of any consequence to South Korean strategic security. Or is it? The failures of American ABM (anti-ballistic missile) systems in the Middle East demonstrate that the US is simply unable to wage simultaneous wars against remotely capable opponents. Namely, the Pentagon is frantically trying to replenish its stockpile of ABM munitions after billions of dollars’ worth of interceptors were wasted trying to shoot down Iranian ballistic missiles, most of which are still 60-year-old Soviet-era technology.
However, the US needs to at least try to protect whatever’s left of its military infrastructure in the Middle East. The only way to achieve this is to transfer critically important ABM systems from other hotspots and redeploy them to the Persian Gulf region. This has already sounded the alarm in Kiev, where the Neo-Nazi junta is whining that they’re being left out. However, South Korea is also raising similar concerns after Washington DC decided to transfer “Patriot” ABM/SAM (surface-to-air missile) systems from the divided peninsula to the Middle East. On March 10, President Lee Jae Myung openly criticized this plan, but admitted it would be unrealistic to expect the US to take Seoul’s concerns seriously.
“The USFK [United States Forces Korea] may dispatch some air defense systems abroad in accordance with its own military needs. While we have expressed opposition, the reality is that we cannot fully push through our position,” he stated.
Local sources report that several “Patriot” batteries have already been withdrawn from Osan Air Base, located in the city of Pyeongtaek, approximately 65 km south of Seoul (although homonymous with the city of Osan City, the airbase is actually about 7-8 km further south). There are reports that the SAM/ABM systems are heading to American bases in Saudi Arabia and/or the UAE. Although we’re yet to see an official confirmation from South Korea, President Lee’s vocal objections serve as de facto evidence to that effect. Many (if not most) local media outlets are far less ambivalent and see the US as the main culprit, blaming its abortive aggression on Iran for the current situation.
Faced with chronic shortages of its grossly overhyped and exorbitantly overpriced air and missile defense systems (and munitions), Washington DC is now forced to redirect them from other hotspots, including NATO-occupied Ukraine, where the Kiev regime is desperately trying to boost the “PR victories” of Western weapon systems. However, while the Neo-Nazi junta is worrying only about the “Patriot”, the Pentagon actually uses more advanced systems, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), which is deployed in both Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. Still, currently deployed THAAD systems are nowhere near enough to cover the critical areas where US occupation forces are stationed.
On March 9, citing two US War Department officials, The Washington Post reported that the Pentagon used around $5.6 billion worth of munitions in just two days of America’s aggression on Iran. With various types of advanced weapon systems and stockpiles depleted, Washington DC was forced to redeploy numerous assets from elsewhere to continue the war. Interestingly, the US still insists that it has “enough munitions” and that the transfer is “only a precaution” and a series of “preventive steps in anticipation of the Iran crisis potentially prolonging”. This is yet another confirmation that things aren’t exactly going as planned by the unadulterated warmongers and war criminals at the Pentagon.
However, various other sources confirm that this is also done to replace assets destroyed during Iran’s retaliation. Namely, according toForeign Policy, it will take 5-8 years to rebuild the radar systems used by the “Patriot” and THAAD in Qatar, while another one destroyed in Bahrain will take up to 2 years to be replaced. The mainstream propaganda machine regularly resorts to damage control in order to hide American losses in manpower and military infrastructure, but the actual figures now hover at around $5-6 billion in destroyed equipment (although it could easily be far worse) and potentially hundreds of KIA/WIA (killed/wounded in action). However, once again, how does this relate to Russia and South Korea?
Well, Seoul foolishly sided with Washington DC, cutting its relatively cordial ties with Moscow. Worse yet, a massive stockpile of South Korean weapons was indirectly supplied to the Kiev regime through the US, helping prolong the NATO-orchestrated Ukrainian conflict. Thus, Russia and North Korea ended their efforts to stabilize the situation on the peninsula through close contacts with South Korea and concluded their own military pact that includes a mutual defense clause. Thus, by being a good vassal to Washington DC, Seoul gained nothing, but lost a unique opportunity to reconcile with Pyongyang through Moscow’s mediation. This has effectively closed the Kremlin’s door to South Korea for years (if not decades) to come.
However, it didn’t have to be like this. Until just 10-15 years ago, their relations were far better, including close defense ties. Namely, Seoul was always dissatisfied with the grossly overhyped and exorbitantly overpriced US-made “Patriot” system, so it looked for alternatives. Back in the early 2000s, it turned to Russia for technology transfers in advanced air defenses. South Korea invited Russian defense industry enterprises, specifically Almaz-Antey and Fakel, to directly participate in the development of a new indigenous air defense system that would replace the troubled “Patriot”. Moscow used its extensive experience in advanced SAM systems to not only speed up R&D, but also deliver a far superior product.
Russian companies combined the components of the export versions of the S-350 “Vityaz” and the S-400 “Triumf”, specifically the 9M96 missile and the 92N6E multipurpose radar, greatly augmenting and vastly enhancing the original South Korean design. This includes a vertical, cold-launch system, far superior to the “Patriot’s” angled approach, in which the missile ignites while in the canister. The Russian method provides 360° coverage, while the “Patriot” is limited to 120° sectors, requiring multiple launch platforms to cover the same area. Thus, thanks to the Kremlin, the (K)M-SAM was born, offering far superior performance for a fraction of the cost, while also being much better optimized and automated.
For instance, the system’s 9M96-derived interceptor costs $1.1 million, nearly seven times less than the “Patriot’s” XM400 (better known as the PAC-3 MSE). Thus, the only air and missile defense systems that South Korea can now rely on are those developed by Russia, because the (neo)colonial master in Washington DC has other priorities. Worse yet, back in late 2024, with the tacit backing of the US, the now-disgraced South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and his Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun nearly caused a war with nuclear-armed North Korea by launching attack drones on Pyongyang. In other words, if Seoul wants to ensure its strategic security, it urgently needs to restart dialogue with Russia and North Korea instead of remaining a US vassal.
Drago Bosnic is an independent geopolitical and military analyst.
North Korea Open to Rapprochement If US Respects Its Nuclear Status – Kim Jong-un
Sputnik – 26.02.2026
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said that Pyongyang has no reason not to pursue rapprochement with the United States if Washington abandons hostility and respects North Korea’s nuclear status.
“If the US respects the present position of our [nuclear] state specified in the Constitution of the DPRK and withdraws its hostile policy toward the DPRK, there is no reason why we cannot get on well with the US,” Kim was quoted by KCNA as saying at a military parade commemorating the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK).
He added that over the past five years, the WPK has permanently enshrined the country’s status as a nuclear state, signaling to adversaries that until the world completely changes, Pyongyang will under no circumstances abandon nuclear weapons.
Kim said that further expanding and strengthening the state’s nuclear armed forces, the core of the armed forces in implementing war deterrence and war-fighting strategy, and consistently exercising the right of a nuclear state, represents the party’s unwavering will.
“We have a long-term plan to strengthen the national nuclear force on an annual basis in the future and will concentrate on increasing the number of nuclear weapons and expanding the means and space for nuclear operation,” the leader said.
Kim added that Pyongyang intends to modernize strike capabilities and nuclear weapons control systems, enhance nuclear force combat readiness through exercises, and improve nuclear crisis response systems. He also prioritized equipping the country’s naval forces with nuclear weapons as part of efforts to strengthen the military.
“The DPRK’s position as the nuclear weapons state plays an important role in deterring the potential threat of its enemies and maintaining regional stability, and the state nuclear force is a basic guarantee and powerful security device reliably ensuring the country’s security, interests and rights to development,” the leader said.
Kim added that the expansion and strengthening of aggressive US-led blocs in the Asia-Pacific region and their military actions, which exceed limits, are creating an unusual situation that seriously threatens security on the Korean Peninsula and in the region.
Trump’s war posturing against Iran traces back to Bush’s infamous 2002 ‘axis of evil’ speech
By Ivan Kesic | Press TV | January 31, 2026
On January 29, 2002, US President George W. Bush’s State of the Union Address infamously branded Iran as part of an “axis of evil,” marking a rhetorical escalation that hardened a decades-long policy of confrontation and laid the groundwork for the persistent crises that continue to threaten regional stability today.
The twenty-fourth anniversary of Bush’s “axis of evil” speech came this week amid a starkly familiar backdrop: US naval “armada” massing in the Persian Gulf and renewed threats of military action from Bush’s successor, Donald Trump.
This moment is not an aberration but the continuation of a sustained, multi-decade strategy aimed at isolating and pressuring the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The policy did not originate with Bush but in the sanctions regimes of the 1990s, significantly shaped by pro-Israeli lobbying efforts within the United States.
It hardened with the rise of neoconservative thinkers who favored regime change over containment – a doctrine vividly applied to Iraq.
Throughout a campaign of disinformation and propaganda regarding weapons of mass destruction, the leveraging of exiled terrorist groups, and a consistent narrative of Iranian threat have been employed to maintain the so-called “maximum pressure.”
As history echoes in January 2026, with a Republican administration again aligning with an Israeli Likud regime to confront Iran, the patterns of the past illuminate the perilous present.
Defining Speech: January 29, 2002
Bush’s State of the Union address fundamentally reshaped the US posture toward Iran in ways that his predecessors had deliberately avoided.
In that speech, Iran was labeled a nation that “aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom.”
By grouping Iran with Iraq and North Korea as part of an “axis of evil,” the infamous and widely condemned declaration decisively rejected any tentative diplomatic outreach that had briefly flickered after the September 11 attacks.
During that period, symbolic gestures, such as candlelight vigils in Tehran, and behind-the-scenes communication channels suggested Iran’s conditional cooperation in Afghanistan.
However, the “axis of evil” label extinguished these nascent contacts. It signaled that the hostile administration in Washington would view Iran not as a potential partner, even tactically, but as a permanent adversary and a primary target in the global “war on terror.”
Crafted within a circle of advisors known for their overt pro-Israeli leanings, the phrase was immediately and enthusiastically embraced by the Israeli regime, which saw it as a long-sought alignment of US rhetoric with its own strategic goals.
The speech institutionalized a framework of hostility that would dictate policy for years, replacing the previous administration’s fluctuating approach with one of unambiguous confrontation.
Dual containment and the sanctions regime
Long before the “axis of evil” rhetoric, the framework for isolating Iran was carefully constructed during the Bill Clinton administration under the policy of “dual containment,” which targeted both Iran and Iraq.
From its inception, this policy was heavily influenced by pro-Israeli lobby groups in Washington. Even as Clinton’s foreign policy team was forming, concerns arose about appointees from the Carter administration who were deemed insufficiently sympathetic to these interests.
Warren Christopher, who was appointed Secretary of State, was initially viewed with caution but ultimately became a key architect of a hardened stance toward Iran.
Christopher, who had served as chief negotiator of the Algiers Accords and was criticized by some Iranian officials, developed a personal animosity toward Iran.
He publicly labeled Iran an “outlaw nation,” a “dangerous country,” and one of the “principal sources of support for terrorist groups worldwide.”
This rhetoric provided a public rationale for an escalating series of economic sanctions designed, in his words, to “squeeze Iran’s economy.”
A powerful proponent of this policy was Martin Indyk, former research director at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)-affiliated Washington Institute for Near East Policy, who served on the National Security Council and later as Ambassador to Israel.
Under his guidance, the threefold accusations of sponsoring terrorism, opposing regional peace efforts, and pursuing weapons of mass destruction became the unwavering justification for punitive measures against the Islamic Republic.
A fierce competition emerged in Congress to demonstrate increasing hostility toward Iran, with figures like Senator Alfonse D’Amato pushing for ever-tighter sanctions – often propelled by direct lobbying from AIPAC, which acted as the “locomotive” behind the legislation.
This culminated in the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996, which aimed to penalize foreign companies investing in Iran’s energy sector. Later reports revealed that the explicit goal of the act was regime change in Iran.
Neoconservatives and the preference for military solutions
The arrival of the Bush administration marked a significant shift in the philosophy underlying US foreign policy – though not in its ultimate objective.
By the late 1990s, while the corporate world and some pragmatic diplomats began questioning the efficacy of unilateral sanctions, a new faction with immense influence pushed for a more radical and hard-nosed approach.
This neoconservative wing, closely aligned with Likudist ideology in the occupied Palestinian territories, viewed sanctions and containment as too slow and unreliable.
They regarded military force as a faster, more effective means of dealing with hostile states.
Key figures such as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and Douglas Feith – all with longstanding ties to pro-Israeli think tanks and advocacy groups – assumed senior roles within the Pentagon and advisory boards.
Their worldview was crystallized in the 1996 policy paper A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm, prepared for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which advocated attacking Iraq to reshape the regional landscape.
For these strategists, patient pressure through sanctions was secondary to the transformative potential of direct military action and regime rollback.
While initially focused on Iraq, Iran remained a firm subsequent target.
They argued that only the forceful removal of threatening regimes could guarantee American and Israeli security, a belief that came to define the administration’s response after the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Iraqi precedent: Destruction as a model
The neoconservative doctrine found its first full-scale application in Iraq. The 2003 invasion, premised on bogus claims of weapons of mass destruction that were later proven false, fulfilled a long-held goal to eliminate the Saddam Hussein-led Ba’athist regime.
The architects of the invasion were not satisfied with only regime change but aimed for the comprehensive degradation of Iraqi power.
After two major wars and over a decade of crippling sanctions, Iraq’s state apparatus and military-industrial base were utterly destroyed.
Some proponents openly described the objective as returning Iraq “to the pre-industrial era,” a stark admission that the goal extended beyond disarmament to eliminating Iraq’s capacity to function as a modern, sovereign regional counterweight.
The devastating consequences – civil strife, the rise of takfirism, and immense human suffering – were regarded as collateral damage within a broader strategic vision.
For those advocating confrontation with Iran, the Iraqi campaign served as both a template and a warning. It demonstrated the overwhelming military power the US could deploy to dismantle a state, while also exposing the catastrophic instability that could follow.
Nevertheless, the ability to reduce a perceived enemy to a state of permanent weakness was noted, informing the maximalist pressure later applied to Tehran.
Propaganda arsenal: Lies and manipulations
Building and sustaining public and international support for relentless pressure on Iran required a sustained campaign of allegations and propaganda.
The core accusations remained consistent: pursuit of nuclear weapons, support for terrorism, and an implacable hostility to peace in the region.
These charges were amplified through a symbiotic network of government officials, pro-Israeli lobbying organizations, sympathetic media outlets, and designated “experts.”
Sensational – and fabricated – stories were regularly fed to the press. In the early 1990s, reports frequently citing unnamed intelligence sources or anti-Iran groups aboad claimed that Iran had purchased nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan or was on the verge of developing a bomb, claims repeatedly debunked by international inspectors and the countries involved.
Media outlets with particular editorial stances published alarming estimates, suggesting Iran was only years or even months away from nuclear capability – deadlines that continually receded as each passed without incident.
The language used was deliberately inflammatory, with senior officials referring to Iran’s “evil hand” in the region and describing it as a “rogue state.”
This ecosystem ensured that any Iranian attempt at diplomatic outreach or confidence-building was overwhelmed by a pre-existing narrative of deceit and malign intent, making substantive dialogue politically untenable in Washington.
Useful tool: MKO role in anti-Iranian propaganda
A particularly revealing aspect of the propaganda and pressure campaign has been the relationship with the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), a terror cult with offices scattered across Europe and the US.
Designated by the US State Department as a terrorist organization due to its history of violent attacks, including against Americans in the 1970s, Iranian officials and civilians in the 1980s, and its alliance with Saddam Hussein during the Imposed War, the terror group nonetheless found influential supporters and was eventually de-listed by Hillary Clinton.
Despite its cult-like structure and lack of popular support inside Iran, the MKO managed to gain an active lobbying and public relations operation in the United States and Europe.
Senior members of the US Congress, especially those with strong pro-Israeli records, championed the group, inviting its representatives to testify and attending its rallies, arguing it represented a “democratic alternative” to the Islamic Republic.
The MKO’s utility was cynically acknowledged; one Congressman stated, “I don’t give a s*** if they are undemocratic… They are fighting Iran, which is… a terrorist state. I say let’s help them fight each other.”
This usefulness peaked in August 2002, when an MKO front held a press conference in Washington to “reveal” the existence of two secret nuclear facilities in Iran at Natanz and Arak.
While these facilities were not in violation of Iran’s safeguards agreement at the time, the revelation – intelligence reports suggest originating with Israeli intelligence and channeled through the exiles – provided the perfect pretext to demand intrusive new inspections and escalate international pressure.
Thus, the MKO served as a deniable cut-out for disinformation and a persistent amplifier of the baseless and sham accusations against the Iranian government.
Unbroken chain: Policy sustained to the present day
The strategic imperative to confront Iran has proven remarkably durable, transcending individual US administrations and enduring significant geopolitical shifts.
This hostile and bellicose policy remains intact today. In January 2026, the situation closely mirrors earlier cycles of tension between Tehran and Washington, dating back to decades of US hostility and a failed “regime change” project.
US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, leading a Likud-dominated coalition, are once again employing military threats against Iran after failing miserably in June last year to dismantle the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The US military has reportedly amassed naval and air forces around Iran’s perimeter, announced by Trump himself, a show of force reminiscent of previous escalations.
This military posture is accompanied by an intensification of a long-standing economic stranglehold, as the Trump administration enforces so-called “ultimate pressure” sanctions with renewed vigor, targeting critical sectors and aiming to sever Iran’s access to the global financial system entirely.
The foundational grievances remain unchanged: allegations of building a “nuclear weapon,” despite Iran’s continued adherence to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) framework after its earlier collapse, and support for regional allies.
Last month, Trump and Netanyahu backed deadly riots and terrorism in Iran, and then threatened to attack Iran if “lethal force” was used against the rioters, arsonists and terrorists. After the riots ended, the focus shifted back to the non-existent “nuclear weapon.”
The tools have expanded beyond diplomatic isolation and covert pressure. Recent reports from within Iran detail how externally backed groups, employing tactics and rhetoric similar to the MKO terrorist cult, sought to exploit domestic unrest by spreading incendiary propaganda and inciting violence, apparently aiming to destabilize the country.
The alignment between the Trump administration and the Likud regime in Tel Aviv remains as close as ever, with both viewing the other as a vital partner in a long-term struggle.
Just as in 2002, diplomatic overtures from Tehran aimed at easing tensions are dismissed or met with increased demands.
The legacy of the “axis of evil” speech has created a foreign policy paradigm that has locked the US and Iran into a perpetual cycle of confrontation, where the mechanisms of pressure – economic warfare, military threat, and the use of terrorist groups – have proven easier to sustain than to dismantle, continually pushing the region toward the brink of war.
What Trump is doing today is simply a continuation of Bush’s policy, which was also carried forward by Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden. The policy remains unchanged.
How South Korea’s gas ambitions sustain the occupation of Gaza
By Hwanbin Jeong | MEMO | January 27, 2026
“Eni participated in a legally announced international tender for offshore exploration licences in waters located within Israel’s Exclusive Economic Zone bordering Egypt … Eni does not foresee being involved in activities in the area in the future.”
This is how Eni, a major Italian energy company, responded to a question from Italy’s national public broadcaster Radiotelevisione italiana (RAI) regarding its alleged involvement in “disputed waters off the coast of Gaza.”
In December 2022, Israel launched its fourth offshore gas exploration licencing round. The Israeli Ministry of Energy described the tender areas as “part of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the State of Israel”, while also acknowledging them as “not yet fully delimited”; some portions overlap with Gaza’s maritime boundaries.
ENI participated in the tender as the operator of a consortium, which won the bid for Zone G on 29 October, 2023. According to Adalah, an Israeli legal centre for Arab minority rights, 62.2 per cent of Zone G lies within maritime areas claimed by Palestine as part of its Exclusive Economic Zone, covering 1,063.3 square kilometres.
Since then, civil society groups have mounted sustained pressure on ENI to withdraw from cooperation with an illegal occupation. After more than two years of campaigning, ENI informed RAI on 2 December, 2025 that it would disengage from the area. Yet the struggle did not end there. The consortium includes two other companies: Israel’s Ratio Petroleum and Dana Petroleum, which was acquired through a hostile takeover in 2010 by the Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC), a South Korean state-owned enterprise.
Recently, South Korean civil society groups have pressed KNOC to clarify its position and withdraw from the project. On 18 December, 2025, KNOC replied that, “after the end of the Israel–Palestine war, and following monitoring of the international situation, the company will review whether to proceed with exploration together with consortium partners such as ENI.” This reveals an intention to carry the project forward once international scrutiny fades, thereby reducing legal and political risk.
How pillage sustains occupation
Pillaging natural resources is a common problem many Global South states still struggle with, but Palestine’s case is uniquely profound for its political consequences. When RAI presented the issue alongside ENI’s position on 14 December, it highlighted Italy’s refusal to recognise Palestinian statehood and underscored a structural reality: “management of these resources risks consolidating the occupation rather than bringing it to an end.”
KNOC’s involvement raises a qualitatively different level of concern. KNOC’s role as a state-owned public enterprise places the issue squarely within the realm of state responsibility under international law. Thus, South Korea has a much stronger incentive to favour the continued occupation of Gaza.
South Korea presents its position on Israel–Palestine as politically neutral. In practice, however, it refers to Palestine only as “self-government”, while pursuing close cooperation with Israel in economic and defence sectors, including arms sales; it became the first Asian country to conclude a bilateral free trade agreement with Israel in 2022. South Korea has also refrained from criticising Israel’s violations of international law. In fact, it has been more muted than many Western countries and even Japan.
Consider what South Korea’s position could mean at this critical juncture in Gaza. The two years of Israeli genocide and devastating destruction have utterly deprived Gazans of any political capability. On 14 January, the USA announced moving to phase two of the Gaza ceasefire, under which Palestinian self-determination is practically nullified, with no defined timeline. Only technocratic participation is allowed, subject to the supervision of an international administering body referred to as a “Board of Peace”, chaired by US President Donald Trump.
Under this arrangement, the Board would make decisions over Gaza’s offshore gas resources, rather than the Palestinian government in the West Bank. South Korea would support this marginalisation of Palestinian self-determination for the sake of safer gas exploitation.
Decolonisation as leverage
The urgency of preventing South Korea from participating in the pillaging of Palestinian resources is clear. The problem is how. Advocacy for Palestinians within South Korea remains weak in both numbers and political influence. Public sympathy is also limited. According to a survey conducted by Korea Research in September 2025, only 39 per cent of respondents reported feeling a great deal of pity for Palestinians, compared with 19 per cent for Israelis. A plurality of respondents (41 per cent) held both sides equally responsible for the war.
It is therefore significant that the United Nations General Assembly has recently revitalised and institutionalised the concept of “colonialism in all its forms and manifestations”. This expanded framework aims to address various aspects of oppression including the illicit appropriation of natural resources. On 14 December, 2025, the UN marked the first International Day against Colonialism in All Its Forms and Manifestations. Four days later, at a high-level plenary meeting commemorating the occasion, UN Secretary-General António Guterres declared:
“Eighty years ago, the United Nations was created to save succeeding generations from war, to uphold human rights and to advance progress in larger freedom. Today, on this first International Day against Colonialism, let us renew that promise – not only by ending colonialism in its traditional forms, but by dismantling its remnants wherever they endure.”
This new phase of decolonisation did not become relevant to Palestine by coincidence. In 2024, Palestine was among the sponsoring states of General Assembly resolution A/RES/79/115, which introduced “the eradication of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations” as a formal agenda item for the 80th session of the General Assembly. Building on this, in 2025, resolution A/RES/80/106 designated 14 December as the International Day against Colonialism and placed the eradication of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations on the General Assembly’s agenda on an annual basis. With 116 votes in favour, the resolution marked the institutionalisation of an expanded decolonisation framework.
Palestine’s engagement with this framework is not primarily driven by the protection of gas resources. At stake is whether its supposedly temporary condition of occupation is recognised as a matter of decolonisation. This position has found broad resonance across the Global South. At the 18 December plenary meeting, 12 of the 33 states that took the floor explicitly referenced Palestine while advocating an expanded understanding of decolonisation. A further 10 states endorsed such positions through statements delivered by their group representatives—Venezuela for the Group of Friends in Defence of the Charter of the United Nations and Uganda for the Non-Aligned Movement. Palestine, in other words, lay at the centre of the debate.
Nearly five months have passed since the opening of the General Assembly’s 80th session with its new agenda item on the eradication of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. Aside from resolution A/RES/80/106, however, no substantive resolutions have yet been adopted or debated under this item. Palestine is unlikely to advance the issue of gas exploitation on its own, given the risk of jeopardising relations with the South Korean government. Any meaningful challenge will therefore require a broader coalition of states with similar interests. The question is who has the courage to initiate it.
South Korea’s Prime Minister Proposes US Send Special Envoy to North Korea — Report
Sputnik – 24.01.2026
South Korean Prime Minister Kim Min-seok has proposed the idea of Washington sending a special envoy to North Korea, the South Korean Yonhap news agency reported.
Kim Min-seok held a meeting with US Vice President JD Vance at the White House.
During his talks with Vance, the South Korean prime minister proposed the idea of the United States sending a special envoy to North Korea as a way to improve relations between Washington and Pyongyang, Yonhap said.
“First, (I told Vance) that in reality, only [US President Donald] Trump has the will and capability to improve relations (with North Korea),” Kim Min-seok said, as quoted by Yonhap, adding that he also said “that sending a special envoy to North Korea, whoever that may be, can be an approach to express an intent to enhance relations (with the North).”
Yonhap said that Vance had allegedly requested Kim Min-seok’s advice on diplomacy with Pyongyang, amid speculation that Trump could seek a meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un when the US president visits China in April.
On Friday, Yonhap reported, citing sources, that US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby was going to visit South Korea and Japan next week to meet with key officials from their foreign affairs and defense ministries.
Colby’s visit to South Korea is expected to take place from January 25-27, after which he will proceed to Japan. The upcoming trip follows a visit to South Korea by US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in November.
Pentagon downgrades China threat, shifts focus to homeland, hemisphere
Al Mayadeen | January 24, 2026
The United States Department of War has released its long-delayed 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), signaling a major shift in Washington’s military priorities by no longer treating China as the “primary threat” to US national security.
The document, published late Friday, places the defense of the US homeland and the Western Hemisphere at the center of Pentagon planning, a sharp departure from strategies issued under both former President Joe Biden and President Donald Trump’s first term, which identified China as the foremost strategic challenge.
According to the strategy, past US administrations “ignored American interests,” allowing strategic vulnerabilities to emerge in areas such as the Panama Canal, Greenland, and the broader Western Hemisphere. The document explicitly calls for abandoning what it describes as “grandiose strategies” in favor of policies rooted in the “practical interests” of the US public.
Reduced emphasis on China, conciliatory tone in the Pacific
While China remains a key concern, the 2026 NDS no longer characterizes Beijing as an “acute” or “existential” threat. Instead, it refers to China as a “settled force” in the Indo-Pacific that must be deterred from dominating the US or its allies.
The document adopts a notably conciliatory tone, stressing that Washington does not seek to “strangle or humiliate” China. It argues that a “decent peace” is achievable under terms favorable to the US and acceptable to Beijing, emphasizing diplomacy, stable relations, and expanded military-to-military communication channels to avoid escalation.
Although the Pentagon continues to advocate a “strong denial defense” in the Pacific, the strategy does not specify what military assets will be deployed. Notably, Taiwan is not mentioned by name, marking a significant shift from the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which explicitly framed Taiwan as a central security concern.
Europe’s declining importance, new DPRK strategy
In contrast to the National Security Strategy released last month, the defense document avoids describing Europe as being in “civilizational decline”, but it nonetheless downplays the continent’s strategic importance.
“Although Europe remains important, it has a smaller and decreasing share of global economic power,” the strategy states, adding that while US engagement will continue, Washington will prioritize defending the homeland and its immediate sphere of influence.
The strategy also outlines a reduced US military role in deterring the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, shifting primary responsibility to South Korea, which currently hosts around 28,500 US troops.
“South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited US support,” the document states.
The strategy notably omits any reference to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, reinforcing speculation that Washington is moving toward managing the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities rather than seeking their elimination.
“This shift in the balance of responsibility is consistent with America’s interest in updating US force posture on the Korean Peninsula,” the strategy explains, noting that Washington seeks to make its forces more flexible and better positioned to respond to a wider range of contingencies across the region.
Burden-sharing and regional rebalancing in the Pacific
Across the broader Pacific region, the Pentagon is urging allies to assume greater responsibility for their own defense, linking continued US cooperation to increased military spending by allies, with benchmarks as high as 5% of GDP. The strategy emphasizes economic and maritime security over regime-change policies, describing the Indo-Pacific as the world’s most dynamic economic region and underscoring the need to protect trade routes and strategic access points.
Japan and South Korea are identified as central to this regional balancing approach, with the US seeking to “incentivize and enable” allies to play a more assertive role in collective defense.
Meanwhile, South Korea has raised its defense spending to 7.5% of GDP and continues to field upwards of 500,000 regular troops with approximately 3.1 million reservists. On its part, Japan is moving to decisively break with decades of post-war pacifism, accelerating a historic military buildup and adopting a more assertive security posture.
Tokyo is on track to reach defense spending equivalent to 2% of GDP by March 2026, abandoning the long-standing 1% cap, as part of a five-year rearmament plan totaling 43 trillion yen. The shift is accompanied by the development of “counterstrike” capabilities, marking a transition from an exclusively defense-oriented doctrine toward deterrence by punishment and the fielding of overtly offensive weapons. While Japanese officials frame the change as strategic maturity and greater alliance responsibility, critics have denounced it as a revival of Japanese militarism.
The release of the 2026 NDS comes after months of internal delays. US media reported that a draft reached War Secretary Pete Hegseth as early as September, but disagreements within the administration over how to characterize China’s threat, particularly amid ongoing trade negotiations, stalled its publication.
Despite references to Russia, Iran, and DPRK as sources of risk, the strategy treats these threats as secondary, reinforcing the Pentagon’s pivot toward homeland defense and regional retrenchment rather than expansive global confrontation.
