The Colombian factor in South America
The Latin American left has spent the last few years investing in an image of Colombia that does not correspond to the country’s historical reality
By Lucas Leiroz | Strategic Culture Foundation | August 16, 2026
In Colombia, the newly elected president, Abelardo de la Espriella, has initiated a strong rapprochement with the State of Israel. Relations that had been strained during the government of Gustavo Petro have not only been fully restored but have also deepened substantially – with the new Colombian government even recognizing Israeli “sovereignty” over the Golan Heights, a Syrian region illegally occupied by the Zionists.
The move was met with shock among South American left-wing circles, particularly in Brazil, where Colombia’s historical image as Washington’s main regional asset in South America appears to have been completely “whitewashed” by the years of Petro’s government. It is curious to see how short collective memory is in Ibero-America and how political debate in general is shaped by the emotions of momentary agendas – and how this childish mentality has repercussions even at the highest institutional levels.
Although Espriella’s measures shocked Petro’s supporters across the continent, there is really nothing surprising about what happened – except for the infamous detail that the decision to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights came amid the emergency caused by a devastating earthquake. Colombia has always been the gateway for U.S. imperialism into South America.
Since the days of the Korean War – in which Colombia participated by sending a large contingent of troops – Bogotá has served as the United States’ offensive outpost in the region. Colombia is home not only to U.S. military bases, but also to biolaboratories, intelligence centers, narco-trafficking militias, and private military companies (PMCs) armed by the United States.
Most of the U.S. offensive infrastructure in South America is concentrated in Colombia. It was from Colombian territory that U.S.-armed mercenaries invaded Venezuela in 2020 during the failed “Operation Gideon,” whose objective was to overthrow then-President Nicolás Maduro through an asymmetric warfare campaign.
Going further back historically, between the late 1990s and early 2000s, the United States and Colombia consolidated total security and defense integration through the so-called “Plan Colombia” – the U.S. policy of sending security personnel to the South American country supposedly to “combat drug trafficking” and illegal guerrilla groups. Colombia subsequently internalized the entire U.S. security apparatus, from the CIA to the armed forces and PMCs.
If there is one country in South America capable of functioning as a military pivot for U.S. interests in the region, that country has always been Colombia. This has always been clear to any political analyst – or simply to any serious observer. Apart from Brazil itself – which has historically functioned as a “watchdog” for Washington while retaining a certain degree of autonomy – Colombia is the only country in South America truly capable of carrying out any U.S. military plan.
However, acting in an emotional manner, the left across the continent simply forgot all of this. Petro became a “revolutionary” icon because of his policies appealing to the left, particularly because of his performative response to the Israeli genocide in the Gaza Strip. Petro severed diplomatic relations between Colombia and Israel and strongly condemned the actions of the Zionist state in international forums. But that was where it ended. Petro did nothing beyond diplomatic theater, nothing to structurally alter Colombia’s historical ties with the United States.
Not only that, Petro himself had previously maintained – during the presidential campaign that brought him to power – strongly pro-Western rhetoric, even going so far as to advocate NATO participation in the creation of an “environmentalist” military force to protect the Amazon from problems such as wildfires and deforestation. Petro, like the continent’s entire liberal left, was completely aligned with the agendas of the Democrats and the European Union, with disagreements emerging only in relation to Donald Trump and the State of Israel.
Unfortunately, much of the left-wing political establishment across the Americas seems to act solely on the basis of fleeting political trends and emotions, without paying attention to the deeper historical and geographical context. In recent times, there has been an information-terror campaign about a supposed “danger” to the region posed by Argentina (an economically fragmented country) and Paraguay (a tiny country with no significant military relevance), simply because the current governments of these countries have adopted a more explicitly pro-U.S. and pro-Israel stance. Meanwhile, Colombia was ignored because it was regarded as an “ally” on account of Petro.
Now Petro is out of the picture. And Colombia is returning to what it has always been: the U.S. offensive base in South America. Reality is returning with full force, to the despair of activists who childishly insist on believing in the liberal democratic game.
Why does Turkey transfer ATACMS and will this save Neo-Nazi junta?
By Drago Bosnic | August 12, 2026
NATO member Turkey plans to transfer a massive arsenal of US-made long-range strike systems and artillery munitions to the Neo-Nazi junta forces. This includes at least 70 M39 ATACMS TBMs (tactical ballistic missiles), 12 M270 MLRSs (multiple launch rocket systems), 2,524 M26 227 mm rockets (compatible with both the M270 MLRS and the M142 HIMARS) and 47,000 M509A1 203 mm cluster-munition artillery rounds.
This will be by far the largest single transfer of NATO-sourced weapons and munitions to the Kiev regime outside the United States. It comes at a critical moment for the political West, as the Neo-Nazi junta’s ATACMS stockpiles are virtually gone after years of failures against the Russian military, both in terms of losses caused by Moscow’s world-class long-range precision strike capabilities and its no less stellar SAM/ABM (surface-to-air missile/anti-ballistic missile) systems.
With the US embroiled in its disastrous aggression against Iran, the Pentagon is unable to restock its own arsenal, let alone spare some of its missiles for the Kiev regime. Turkey’s decision to deliver these weapons and munitions comes at a critical moment for the political West, demonstrating its loyalty to NATO and its aggression against the world. Namely, arming the Neo-Nazi junta with so many weapons is a clear message to both Russia and Iran, particularly now that the latter has also been targeted by NATO’s favorite puppet regime. As previously mentioned, it also comes amid US aggression against Iran, demonstrating strategic coordination between Ankara and Washington DC. Turkish motives are certainly multifaceted. Apart from showing loyalty, it’s also gaining massive profits from (re)selling its old stockpile of US-made weapons and earning “points” for a potential return to the troubled F-35 program.
The latter is essentially an economic and financial boost to the troubled Turkish economy, which has suffered due to years of Western pressure and low-level sanctions in the decade since the failed NATO coup against Erdogan. Despite all this and Moscow’s critical role in thwarting the plot, Ankara seems to be distancing itself from the multipolar world and seeking deeper (re)integration into NATO. And while it doesn’t support the political West’s economic siege of Russia, primarily because of its own business interests, Turkey has once again emerged as one of the leading Russian adversaries within NATO, particularly in terms of weapons and munitions transfers. Not to mention its role in supporting all sorts of Islamic radicals and terrorists all across the Middle East, Central Asia and Southeastern Europe, including those who overthrew the last legitimate Syrian government.
Obviously, this was done in coordination with the political West and certain Persian Gulf monarchies, all of which were after President Bashar al-Assad for decades. Turkey’s role in destabilizing the South Caucasus and Central Asia should also be noted, particularly as it directly undermines Russian, Iranian and Chinese national security interests. This is a major challenge for the multipolar world, as it undermines stability in regions critical to BRICS and SCO. It leaves no other logical conclusion except that Turkey is deliberately coordinating its extremely aggressive foreign policy with that of the US and EU/NATO. This includes the involvement of Turkish intelligence in various insurgencies and coup attempts in Central Asia, most notably the failed color revolution attempt in Kazakhstan in early January 2022, which was prevented by joint Russian and Kazakh forces.
Ankara has also been one of the Neo-Nazi junta’s leading arms suppliers and has also played a major role in tricking Russia into fake diplomacy, such as the false promise it wouldn’t release members of the openly Nazi “Azov” battalion. All this was designed as a ruse to buy time for the political West and its favorite puppet regime. As for the latest weapons deal, perhaps the most dangerous aspect is the transfer of cluster munitions, which remain a major hazard for civilians long after fighting has ended. With the American arsenal depleted, Turkey remains one of the few major suppliers of these munitions. Unfortunately, its concern for civilian deaths is virtually non-existent, as it has a long history of using highly controversial weapons that are particularly dangerous for civilians, including white phosphorus that was regularly used by NATO-backed terrorists in Syria.
However, apart from NATO’s terrorist tendencies (hardly surprising considering its origins), can Turkish weapons, particularly the ATACMS, really change anything on the battlefield? While 70 missiles are certainly nothing to be ignored, it should be noted this is only a fraction of what the US already delivered to the Neo-Nazi junta. Namely, it supplied the HIMARS with thousands of M30/M31 GPS-guided rockets (approximately 70 km range) and at least 500 MGM-140 ATACMS ballistic missiles (range 165-300 km, depending on the variant). The Russian military’s unrivaled electronic warfare (EW) and SAM/ABM systems were instrumental in countering these weapons. Of the 500 missiles sent, at least 450 ATACMS are “missing”, which is around 25% of the entire US military’s stockpile. So far, there have been around 20 (if not even fewer) confirmed ATACMS hits on Russian positions.
If 450 were delivered to the Kiev regime and are now “unaccounted for”, is it really that difficult to calculate their actual battlefield effectiveness against the Russian military? As previously mentioned, the Neo-Nazi junta got at least 500 ATACMS, which is approximately 25% of the US Army stocks and 15% of the entire production run since 1991.
Of these, only 50 remained in the Kiev regime’s service by late 2024, meaning that the vast majority got shot down or destroyed while in storage. Even if we go out on a limb and say there have been 20 successful strikes on Russian positions, this would mean that the actual combat effectiveness of the ATACMS is 4.44%, although military reports suggest it’s even lower. In other words, these arms transfers only serve to prolong the fighting and can in no way offer any real battlefield advantages to the Neo-Nazi junta.
Drago Bosnic is an independent geopolitical and military analyst.
Moscow mocks Romanian ‘evidence’ linking downed drones to Russia
RT | August 12, 2026
Romanian officials have presented pieces of foam plastic as supposed evidence that drones recently shot down over the country were Russian, Moscow’s embassy in Bucharest has said.
Speaking to the Izvestia newspaper on Wednesday, the mission responded to Romania’s accusations that Russian UAVs have on numerous occasions strayed onto its territory during attacks on Ukrainian military-related sites.
During a meeting at Romania’s Foreign Ministry on the matter, Russian diplomats were shown “pieces of foam plastic” and were asked to regard them as evidence of the drones’ supposed Russian origin. “Naturally, we were provided with no facts linking these drones to our country,” the embassy said.
The mission suggested that the incidents amounted to a “prearranged performance” involving shooting at training targets, intended to justify Romania’s military buildup and higher defense spending. “The local political establishment has long pursued this goal and is actively implementing it in practice,” the embassy said, adding that Bucharest is purchasing expensive Western-made weapons with taxpayers’ money, justifying it by the alleged “threat from the East.”
Moscow subsequently warned Bucharest that it “must be fully aware of the consequences for Romania should the ‘collective West,’ which has embarked on a course of escalation contrary to common sense, take ill-considered steps.”
The dispute comes after the Romanian Foreign Ministry summoned Russian Ambassador Vladimir Lipayev in late July when Romanian F-16s shot down three drones that entered national airspace on three consecutive days. Officials in Bucharest blamed Russia, while Moscow said no evidence or technical flight data was provided to prove its involvement.
Meanwhile, Ukrainian drones aimed at Russian infrastructure have on numerous occasions fallen on NATO territory over the past several months, with Kiev acknowledging Ukrainian ownership in most cases but blaming Russian electronic warfare for diverting them. NATO nations have mostly refrained from criticizing Kiev.
In most cases, Romania continued to attribute its own incidents to Russia, including in May when a drone hit an apartment building in Galati, injuring two people. Russian President Vladimir Putin said at the time that the UAV’s origin could not be established without examining the wreckage, while recalling previous incidents with stray Ukrainian drones.
Pointing to earlier incidents in the Baltics, Putin noted that “the initial reaction was exactly the same as it is now in Romania: ‘Alarm! The Russians are coming!.. Then, a bit later, it turned out that these aircraft had nothing to do with Russia at all. They were Ukrainian drones that had gone off course.”
Israel is going all out to stop Turkey from getting F-35s
Despite the pressure, President Trump seems to be moving closer to approving Ankara’s reentry into the fighter jet program
By Fatih Kocaibiş | Responsible Statecraft | August 10, 2026
For the first time in years, Washington is discussing Turkey’s return to the F-35 program as a serious possibility.
At the NATO summit in Ankara last month, President Donald Trump said he would lift the CAATSA sanctions that the U.S. imposed on Turkey after Ankara purchased Russian S-400 missile defense systems in 2019. Trump added that he was “certainly” considering restoring Turkey’s access to the F-35 program, which was also suspended at the time..
Notably, a separate sale of American engines for Turkey’s domestic KAAN fighter jet has advanced through congressional review. Ankara is also reportedly exploring the transfer of its S-400 batteries to a Gulf state, a step Washington has demanded for years.
But the Russian system is no longer the only source of resistance. Israel argues that Turkish F-35s would, in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s words, “destroy the power balance” in the region. The phrase invokes Israel’s “qualitative military edge,” a provision in U.S. law according to which Washington cannot sell weapons to Middle Eastern states if those arms would give them capabilities on par with Israel’s own weaponry.
Yet these rules have never been formally applied to Turkey, which is, after all, a U.S. treaty ally. What is being tested is thus not only an arms sale, but whether Israel’s claim to regional primacy can restrict American policy toward a NATO ally.
How Turkey was pushed out
Turkey’s search for a long-range air defence system predates the crisis by a decade. In 2009, the Obama administration approved a sale of Patriot missile defense munitions to Turkey, but the deal broke down over questions of price, technology transfer and local production. Ankara turned to a Chinese system in 2013, cancelled it in 2015, and signed with Moscow in 2017. A late American offer in 2018 came too late to reverse the Russian deal, and the first S-400 components arrived in July 2019.
But the S-400 decision was never simply the product of a failed arms negotiation. When Turkey downed a Russian jet in November 2015, it became the first NATO member to do so since the 1950s. As pressure from Moscow mounted, Ankara had to face it largely alone. The withdrawal of American and German Patriot batteries that same winter, even though armed groups in Syria still posed a threat, hardened Turkey’s sense of exposure.
The July 2016 coup attempt turned mistrust into a political rupture, particularly given that Fethullah Gülen, who Turkish authorities accused of orchestrating the coup, was living in the United States at the time.
Russia exploited the opening, filling Turkey’s defense gap while widening the rift with its NATO allies. Turkish officials justified the purchase as an urgent requirement.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gave it a second meaning. The real issue, he said, was not to the S-400 but to Turkey acting on its own will. Elsewhere he refused to retreat, saying Turkey was “not a slave.” Repeated at rallies, Erdogan’s rallying cry about the missile defense system turned it into an emblem of strategic autonomy, making the purchase as hard to reverse politically as militarily.
This has now become a political liability for Erdogan. In Turkey today, commentators and the main opposition describe the purchase as an act of stubbornness — one that left the S-400 rusting in a hangar and wasted the $1.5 billion Turkey had already paid for the F-35 program.
Turkey remains the only participant expelled after paying in, and the six aircraft it financed were never delivered. Its air force depends on an aging F-16 fleet, with Eurofighter Typhoons serving as a stopgap. The domestic KAAN fighter is the long-term answer, but its first batch is set to fly using American F110 engines under a $700 million sale that drew organized opposition in Congress before clearing review in July.
How Israel built a case against Turkey’s return
Within 72 hours of the Ankara summit, Netanyahu took his objections to three American networks, arguing that Erdoğan was “not a friend” and could not be trusted.
The centerpiece of Israel’s case against Turkey was a remark by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Asked on CNN Türk whether Turkey was among Israel’s targets, the foreign minister said Israel had become a problem for the world and that, with these policies and this mindset, “these men have become a burden that humanity can no longer bear.” The reference to “these policies” and “this mindset” pointed to the Netanyahu government, and the same judgment about Israel’s isolation has surfaced in European capitals and at senior levels of the U.S. administration, from Trump to Vice President JD Vance.
But Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar recast the remark as dehumanizing Jews and calling for Israel’s erasure, and this framing became the dominant account in Israeli commentary. Netanyahu carried it further on Fox, telling American viewers that Fidan had said the Jewish state must basically be wiped out.
The framing slotted Turkey into an existing category, the state that denies Israel’s right to exist. But that is the language of Iranian state rhetoric, repeated by senior officials and inscribed on missiles. Turkey has never pursued such a policy; in fact, it supports a two-state solution and has recognized Israel diplomatically since 1949. Yet Israeli leaders, eager to drive a wedge into Ankara’s relationship with Washington, appear determined to cast Turkey as the next Iran.
Balance for whom?
The most revealing element of Netanyahu’s argument was his definition of the regional balance. By telling Washington that Turkish F-35s would “destroy the power balance,” he equated regional stability with continued Israeli superiority. Israel operates 48 F-35s and is contracted for 100, while Ankara’s immediate effort centers on the six aircraft it already paid for. Turkey’s return to the program would not erase Israel’s advantage; rather, it would modestly narrow an asymmetric order built around Israeli air power and freedom of action.
Israel’s concerns about Turkey are difficult to reconcile with Tel Aviv’s own increasingly preventive and attack-oriented doctrine. While Israeli officials like Netanyahu frame Turkish F-35s as evidence of “aggressive aspirations,” Israeli aircraft have struck targets in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iran, Qatar, and Gaza. In Ankara, this is seen as hypocrisy; Netanyahu’s “balance” is, in this reading, less about mutual restraint and more about preserving Israel’s air superiority and freedom to strike.
Nor are the objections unique to Turkey. Since 2008, American law has required arms sales to Middle Eastern states be certified as preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge, a standard Israel has invoked against countries including Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Nor is this only the position of Netanyahu. Naftali Bennett, his top rival in the coming election, told CNN that Israel cannot allow its Turkish “enemies” such advanced weaponry.
But applying the qualitative military edge doctrine to Turkey does not make sense for U.S. interests. Ankara is not a Middle Eastern buyer seeking parity with Israel but a NATO member whose air force anchors the alliance’s southeastern defense, and its deterrent capacity is a European security question as much as a Middle Eastern one. Extending an Israeli veto over what Washington sells its own allies would put that doctrine in direct tension with NATO’s requirements.
Israel’s concern extends beyond the military effect of a stronger Turkish air force. Despite his best efforts, Netanyahu is unlikely to easily reverse Trump’s broader opening to Ankara. By appointing his longtime associate Tom Barrack as ambassador there, Trump opened a new phase in Turkish-American relations. As Trump said when asked about Netanyahu’s opposition to giving F-35s to Turkey, “nobody tells me what we should be selling or not.”
Unless Ankara takes a step that directly threatens Israel’s security — an unlikely scenario — Trump has little incentive to abandon a relationship he finds useful. That relationship, more than the aircraft, is what Israel is working to prevent.
Fatih Kocaibis is a Turkey-based journalist and political analyst covering U.S. foreign policy, transatlantic relations, and European security, and their implications for Turkish foreign policy.
NATO to soon double US nuclear sharing warheads, deploy them in Finland, Poland and Lithuania
By Drago Bosnic | August 4, 2026
NATO is no longer even bothering to hide that it wants to expand its nuclear footprint on the “old continent”. Namely, the most aggressive racketeering cartel in recorded history is sliding into an increasingly dangerous nuclear posture, with the shift being sold as “routine deterrence”. In reality, the change is a deliberate widening of escalation options aimed at upending Russia. Combined with France’s preparation of a base for nuclear-capable “Rafale” fighter jets, this process is effectively a (geo)political and military masterclass in “normalizing” a confrontation that could bring about thermonuclear annihilation of humanity. With the new “Eastern Front” closer to a hair-trigger condition than ever before, this sort of escalation is virtually guaranteed to deliver what Western warmongering oligarchies have wanted for centuries – an all-out war with Russia.
Firstly, it should be understood that even from a theoretical point of view, this is not static deterrence, but an active preparation for offensive nuclear warfare. New infrastructure, upgraded airbases, greater readiness for nuclear-capable assets, massive expansion of delivery options and systems, etc., none of which are “administrative measures” or “seamless red tape”. This changes the strategic equation by making it easier to initiate nuclear escalation at shorter notice, giving Russia little to no time to evaluate response options and forcing it to rely on absolute use of its devastating firepower. In simpler terms, the Kremlin is left with no choice but to launch its entire strategic arsenal, by far the largest and most powerful in the world, if any incoming missile from NATO-occupied Europe is detected.
The general public, largely oblivious to the current nuclear posture developments, is actively being lied to that these steps are “defensive”, because Moscow is “aggressive”. However, the practical reasoning is to deepen the permanence of nuclear tensions in Europe. The role of Paris is especially telling, as it exposes the contradictions at the heart of the EU’s nuclear posture. Namely, France likes to frame its strategic arsenal as an “instrument of sovereignty” that’s supposedly separate from NATO’s wider nuclear posture. And yet, the timing of preparing airbases for nuclear strikes involving its “Rafale” fighter jets tells a very different story. What conclusion is Russia supposed to make given that the processes are concurrent? Would anyone with an ounce of “grey matter” view it as “purely coincidental”?
Thus, it can only be expected that Moscow will not view any of this as a series of isolated incidents. In the current geopolitical climate, this is clearly part of NATO’s wider doctrinal shift aimed at projecting strategic pressure, complicating Russian deterrence planning and tightening the nuclear dimension of European security. The nuclear integration of the US, EU and NATO is where the danger multiplies and grows exponentially. When nuclear-capable jets, forward operating bases and broader coordination are normalized at once, the line between deterrence and provocation effectively vanishes. In which twisted universe can doubling (if not tripling) the number of deployed nuclear warheads be seen as defensive? And to say nothing of the fact that they’re going to be placed in Finland, Poland and Lithuania.
Namely, all three countries border Russia. In practice, this means there would be a “nuclear wall” stretching from the Arctic all the way to the heart of Central Europe. That’s around 3,800 km of frontline that could explode into a thermonuclear annihilation at virtually any moment. Any move presented as “deterrence” could lead to cataclysmic consequences, meaning there’s zero room for error. And yet, NATO’s constant belligerence has reduced diplomatic contacts with Moscow to exchanging protest notes. The more the “old continent” is wired for nuclear war, the less response time leaders on both sides have in an escalating crisis. This dramatically increases the chance that what could be a temporary geopolitical flare-up becomes a military emergency before anyone can stop it or at least slow it down.
In addition, NATO’s wider nuclear build-up perfectly fits the Pentagon’s “geopolitics of controlled chaos”. In practice, that translates into a NATO-occupied Europe that’s mainly useful as a springboard for strategic pressure against the Kremlin. The overall nuclear posture keeps moving closer to the point where peace is maintained only by the threat of immediate catastrophe. This sort of “logic” is precisely what drove the world to the edge of the abyss during the (First) Cold War. It culminated in the late 1980s, with strategic arsenals in tens of thousands of thermonuclear warheads. NATO’s aggressive posture and forward deployment of offensive weapons forced the Soviet Union to build nearly 50,000 thermonuclear warheads, the largest and most destructive strategic arsenal in human history.
Hopeful that long-term peace with the political West was possible, Russia reduced this massive strategic asset to just about 12% of what it was at the time. What did it get instead? Only more belligerence and truly unprovoked aggression, while being presented as a “threat”. Not to mention the total disregard for its most basic national security interests, including NATO-backed terrorist attacks on Russian civilians and energy infrastructure.
Faced with such odds, Moscow had no choice but to dramatically increase the effectiveness of its thermonuclear arsenal. Namely, while the Soviet arsenal had around 60% of missiles with MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) warheads, modern Russia has upward of 90% of MIRV-ed missiles, demonstrating how NATO aggression keeps making the world less safe.
The EU Has No Plan If Peace Breaks Out in Ukraine
By Glenn Diesen | August 4, 2026
Over the past years, NATO has held “peace summits” to which Russia was not even invited, where European leaders such as President Duda spoke about peace in terms of breaking up Russia into smaller states. Now that NATO is clearly losing its proxy war, the EU demands an “unconditional ceasefire”. This is not a peace proposal but an effort to further extend the war. An “unconditional ceasefire” is a conditionality for starting negotiations, which is intended to freeze a conflict that NATO is losing, giving it time to rearm, regroup, and even send in NATO troops as “peacekeepers”.
Why has the EU boycotted diplomacy for 4.5 years and continues to do so? And why will NATO not even take NATO expansion off the table in return for a ceasefire? Would it not be wise to discuss with the other side how we failed to establish a mutually acceptable pan-European security architecture after the Cold War, which has led us into this horrific war? The EU uses smears and censorship to prevent its own public from even discussing this matter, and it will certainly not be discussed with Russia.
The EU cannot allow this war to end, as there is no plan for peace. Fighting with Ukrainians keeps the U.S. in Europe, temporarily preserves European unity, protects an unpopular political elite from the rising opposition that seeks course correction, offers military Keynesianism as an economic model for a de-industrialising Europe, weakens Russia as a strategic rival, and buys the European leaders time to prepare for a direct war with Russia. A peace agreement would require European leaders to repay the funds they have seized and partly stolen from Russia, which they also used as collateral for loans to Ukraine. Victory would give the Europeans a strong U.S. behind them and a battle-hardened Ukraine in front of them, while defeat would leave Europe without a clear role or relevance in a multipolar world. There is no plan for what to do when peace breaks out.
When the Trump administration broke with the NATO consensus of boycotting diplomacy to negotiate an end to the Ukraine War, the main objective of the European leaders was to shut down the talks. The European leaders rushed to Washington to insist that peace entails an “unconditional ceasefire” without even discussing a political settlement, and intensified deep strikes into Russia to sell the idea that Russia can be defeated. The European leaders were successful as the Trump administration began adopting the false narrative that Ukraine had “turned the tide”. While the Trump administration had initially aimed to either end the Ukraine War or outsource it to the Europeans, the proxy war in Ukraine is now Trump’s war.
If the goal was to “help Ukraine”, then NATO would not have toppled the Ukrainian government in 2014 in the effort to pull Ukraine into the NATO orbit that only a small minority of Ukrainians wanted; NATO would not have sabotaged the Minsk Agreement between 2015 and 2022; NATO would not have pressured Zelensky to reverse his peace platform that won him the election in 2019; NATO would not have torpedoed the Istanbul agreement in 2022; or at least NATO would have ended the war in November of 2022 on the recommendation of General Mark Milley when Ukraine was at its strongest. Instead, “standing with Ukraine” now entails deporting Ukrainian refugees and financing military recruiters to hunt Ukrainian men on the streets to send them to die in a war that Ukraine cannot possibly win. Proxy wars are ruthless as they use the proxy as cannon fodder, yet proxy wars are always sold to the public as being motivated by empathy and support for the proxy that is unnecessarily sacrificed.
Bulgaria’s Bezmer Base and the Logic of American Power Projection
By Adrian Korczyński – New Eastern Outlook – August 3, 2026
On July 22, 2026, the Bulgarian parliament voted to authorize the deployment of up to eight U.S. Air Force KC-135 tanker aircraft and 250 U.S. military personnel at Bezmer Air Base.
The vote was 136 in favor, 13 against, with two abstentions. The deployment is scheduled from July 24 to October 1, 2026. On paper, the government insists this is merely “logistical support.”
A Diplomatic Warning from Tehran
Before the vote, Iran’s Foreign Ministry warned that allowing the deployment would make Bulgaria “an accomplice of aggressors.” Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei explicitly stated that any action facilitating U.S. military operations against Iran would make Sofia complicit in “aggression and war crimes.”
The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry responded that it was not “undertaking any hostile actions against Iran” and that “it is out of the question for any military operations in the Middle East to be conducted from Bulgarian territory.” The contrast between the official explanation and the operational role of the deployment is difficult to ignore.
Bezmer in the US Logistics Network
Bezmer Air Base, located in southeastern Bulgaria near the town of Yambol, is one of several joint-use facilities established under the 2006 U.S.-Bulgaria Defense Cooperation Agreement. The agreement allows U.S. forces to use three Bulgarian bases — Bezmer, Graf Ignatievo, and Novo Selo — for training and logistical purposes. Bezmer’s appeal is straightforward: it is close to the Black Sea, has a runway capable of handling large aircraft, and is situated in a country that is a full NATO member.
What makes Bezmer particularly useful is its position within the broader American logistics network. U.S. tanker aircraft operating from Bezmer can refuel fighter jets and bombers over the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Red Sea without returning to bases in Germany, Italy, or Greece. This reduces transit time and allows for sustained operations over a longer period. Bezmer functions as a forward refueling node in a system that stretches from Ramstein in Germany to Souda Bay in Crete to Kogălniceanu in Romania.
The base is not being used for combat operations, but it is enabling them. There is a difference between pulling the trigger and supplying the fuel, but that difference matters less to the pilots being refueled—or to the Iranians being targeted. The Bulgarian government argues that it is merely fulfilling its treaty obligations to its ally. Prime Minister Rumen Radev, often described as more skeptical of Western military adventurism, insisted the tankers would be used “exclusively for logistical and in-flight refuelling missions outside Bulgarian airspace.” The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry echoed this position, stating that no military operations would be conducted from Bulgarian territory.
Spain vs. Bulgaria
The contrast with Spain is instructive. In March 2026, Spain explicitly refused to allow its bases to be used for the U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran. Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares stated that Spanish bases would not be used for operations “inconsistent with the United Nations Charter.” The Spanish government argued that using its territory for offensive operations against Iran would violate its constitutional obligations and its own foreign policy principles. Madrid made a sovereign choice to refuse Washington’s request.
Unlike Spain, Bulgaria ultimately chose to facilitate the deployment, reflecting its broader security dependence on NATO structures. It did not publicly question the legality of the operation, nor did it challenge the broader strategic rationale behind the request. The Bulgarian authorities chose to accommodate the request rather than contest it.
Several factors may explain this difference. Spain has traditionally pursued a more cautious approach towards military involvement in the Middle East, while Bulgaria places greater emphasis on demonstrating reliability within NATO. Different strategic cultures and security priorities appear to have shaped their respective decisions. Bulgaria, by contrast, is a smaller country more dependent on NATO guarantees for its security. It is also a country that has long sought to demonstrate its value as an ally, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine. For Bulgaria, saying no to Washington is not a luxury it believes it can afford.
There is also a domestic political dimension. The decision was approved by a parliament where the government holds a comfortable majority. Local opposition was minimal. Some Bulgarian officials have argued that refusing the request would have damaged Bulgaria’s standing in NATO. A Bulgarian official’s comment encapsulates the logic of alliance dependency: “We cannot want to be in NATO and then refuse to give anything in return.”
Local Concerns
The decision was not universally welcomed. Burnt-out trees from a fire at the Bulgarian military training ground in Koren were still smouldering during the parliamentary debate. Bezmer’s mayor voiced concerns about the region becoming a potential target. Local communities near Bezmer are not convinced by the official narrative.
The concerns are not entirely theoretical. Iran has already shown its willingness to retaliate against countries it perceives as hostile. In the past, Iranian-backed groups have targeted American bases in Iraq and Syria, and Iranian cyber operations have hit European infrastructure. Bulgarians living near Bezmer now have reason to wonder whether their town might become a target in a future escalation.
Alliance Politics in Practice
The Bulgarian parliament’s decision illustrates a broader reality of the transatlantic relationship. European countries are not always eager participants, but they are deeply integrated into the logistics of U.S. military power. These are not signs of European unity—they are signs of fragmentation within a structure that still depends on the United States for security.
The deeper question is whether this arrangement is sustainable. Bulgaria has made a strategic choice to deepen its military integration with the United States. That choice has immediate operational consequences—a tanker base that enables strikes on Iran—and long-term implications for Bulgarian sovereignty. It may also have security consequences if Iran chooses to respond. The Bulgarian parliament’s decision follows a pattern: Europe increasingly functions as a platform for U.S. power projection.
The deployment at Bezmer therefore reflects a broader reality of contemporary alliance politics: even when European governments avoid direct participation in military operations, they increasingly provide the logistical infrastructure that makes those operations possible. As military logistics become increasingly central to modern warfare, the distinction between participation and support may prove more political than operational.
Adrian Korczyński, Independent Analyst & Observer on Central Europe and global policy research
Brazil approaches NATO and Israel to modernize its armed forces
By Raphael Machado | Strategic Culture Foundation | August 2, 2026
In an unusual statement given the turbulent relations of recent years, Brazilian President Lula defended the rearmament and modernization of Brazil’s Armed Forces. According to him, Brazil must have strong armed forces, even if it does not intend to use them, but as deterrent forces to prevent direct interference from foreign powers in the country.
The statement took place at an event organized under the auspices of Avibras Aeroco, an important strategic company in the Brazilian defense sector. Avibras is best known for producing the Astros anti-aircraft systems, which are operated by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, Bahrain, Angola, Indonesia, Malaysia and, naturally, Brazil itself. In addition to the Astros, Avibras also produces various types of armored personnel carriers and some other anti-aircraft equipment such as the SKYFIRE and the EDT-FILA. The company is also developing an anti-ship missile, a laser-guided missile, a fiber-optic guided missile, an air-to-air missile and an upgrade to the Astros.
Such a high level of activity on Avibras’s part is notable because the company only resumed its operations in May-June 2026, after more than 4 years of total operational standstill. Avibras’s problems began during the pandemic era (which leads us to reflect once again on the role of health crisis management in the deindustrialization of numerous countries and the destruction of their middle classes). While most relevant defense industry companies worldwide are subsidized or receive some type of government support, Brazil had been treating its companies in this sector as private enterprises like any other for decades. Thus, with reduced orders and the impossibility of travel, Avibras gradually became unable to pay its debts, salaries and cover its operational costs. In 2022, all activities are halted and a strike begins over more than 1 year of overdue wages.
Meanwhile, foreign companies (especially from Australia, Saudi Arabia and China) showed interest in acquiring Avibras, which could result in an uncomfortable and uninteresting situation, especially if Avibras were acquired by Australia.
A mobilization of patriotic sectors of Brazilian society, however, throughout this entire period, managed to exert enough pressure on the government to convince it of Avibras’s importance, leading to new contracts with the Armed Forces, a bankruptcy protection agreement and the end of the workers’ strike.
The Avibras case – which points to a renewal of interest in military affairs on the part of the Brazilian State – is not isolated, however.
Brazil’s military spending rose about 13% in 2025, but the country remained in 21st place globally – a ridiculous level given the country’s size and its international leadership aspirations. For 2026, a 6% increase was forecast, and at the end of 2025, approximately 6 billion extra dollars were also approved, due to budgetary limits for specific modernization projects.
The modernization projects in question fall within the logic of the Transformation Policy, a document built from observation of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine and recent conflicts in the Middle East. Based on this document, Brazil’s Armed Forces defined as part of their objectives the expansion of military drone use, the development of anti-drone systems, the national-level integration of sensor and radar systems and the expansion of cyber warfare capabilities.
Specifically, the project aimed at integrating and connecting military sensors, radars, satellites, aircraft and electronic systems is SISFRON (Integrated Border Monitoring System), which is set to receive approximately 600 million dollars. The drones used in this system will be from Israel’s Elbit.
Another program receiving historic attention from Brazil is Prosub, aimed at developing conventional submarines and nuclear-powered submarines, the result of a partnership with France dating back to 2008. Needless to say, for 14 years of cooperation this Brazil-France partnership has little to show so far, but there are promises that this year and next summer will see the delivery and launching of submarines.
The Brazilian Navy also expanded its fleet through the incorporation of a new frigate – to NATO standards – developed jointly by Brazil’s Embraer and Germany’s ThyssenKrupp.
The Air Force’s focus, in turn, is the Gripen Program, the result of a long-standing cooperation between Brazil and Sweden, which is only now yielding results. The Gripen fighters are assembled in Brazilian factories, and Brazil recently set aside a budget of approximately 400 million dollars for this program, which eventually envisions a fleet of 56 modern fighters.
There is also the recent formalization of a contract with the Italian CIO consortium for the acquisition of Centauro II armored vehicles, for use on Brazil’s borders, with a budget of approximately 1 billion dollars to acquire approximately 100 combat vehicles.
It is important to note that the fact that Brazil has understood the need to improve its Armed Forces is reassuring, and we imagine that the U.S. attack on Venezuela was one of the elements that reinforced this conviction and facilitated the acceleration of plans and the expansion of budgets.
It is also noteworthy that few of the projects and plans under development involve the U.S., which is peculiar considering the umbilical ties that exist between the U.S. Armed Forces and Brazil’s Armed Forces since World War II. Recently, the Commander of the Brazilian Navy, Marcos Olsen, reaffirmed the commitment to a doctrinal alignment of Brazil’s Armed Forces with the U.S. in an interview with CNN. But now, Brazil is preferring not to acquire its equipment or develop joint projects with the U.S., with the exception of the recent plan to acquire outdated (and used) Black Hawk helicopters.
It should also be noted that most of these partnerships developed by Brazil involve technology transfer, which is always of interest to Brazil and has guided Brasília’s international cooperation decisions. Agreements with the U.S. rarely involve technology transfer.
At the same time, however, it is striking that all the projects involve cooperation with NATO countries or their close allies, such as the State of Israel. Even with technology transfer, cooperation with countries like France and Israel raises concerns.
France is a country already notorious for handing over Argentine military secrets to its British allies during the Falklands War. Meanwhile, Israel has a history of placing backdoors in all electronic systems sold to foreign countries since the PROMIS case of the 1980s.
This is, then, clearly a crossroads situation in which the Brazilian government’s stance of not taking a geopolitical position and maintaining a certain “neutrality” facilitates the strengthening of ties with countries that are very clearly involved in international conflicts on the globalist and Atlanticist side of the equation.
Russian Strike on US Drone Factory in Kiev Makes Clear – NATO’s Overseas MIC Footprint Is Fair Game
Sputnik – 31.07.2026
A July 24 Russian attack on the Ukrainian capital hit a drone factory belonging to Terminal Autonomy – a Delaware-HQ’ed maker of low-cost UAV and AI navigation systems.
The attack deprived Ukraine’s military of a key long-range strike drone capability in the form of AQ-400 Scythe (32kg payload, 750km range) and AQ-100 Bayonet (4kg, 60km) drones.
More importantly, it sent Zelensky’s NATO “partners” an unmistakable message: if they set up shop in Ukraine, their manufacturing facilities will be targeted.
“I do expect that the strikes on Western facilities as and when they are identified will continue and probably intensify,” veteran French geopolitical analyst Come Carpentier de Gourdon told Sputnik, adding that he expects “growing dissention and disagreement” within NATO on how to react.
“So far the EU and its allies, particularly the US, have hidden as far as they could any losses and even denied that their facilities or personnel were attacked and hit. That policy will probably continue for as long as possible, but the resolve will also probably be very weakened eventually,” given the difficulty of “selling” it to these countries’ respective populations.
As for immediate consequences, they may include:
- the “postponement” of new NATO weapons manufacturing contracts in Ukraine
- more production in neighboring countries
- most importantly, a blow to Ukraine’s attempt to sell itself as a nascent global manufacturer of drone hardware, including for the conflicts in the Middle East.
Merz readies secret plan to move German troops to Russian border – media
RT | July 31, 2026
The German government is developing a “secret plan” to prevent regional authorities from potentially obstructing the deployment of NATO troops to the Russian border, according to a joint investigation by The Telegraph and Die Welt.
The “contingency” measures are reportedly driven by fears that the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party could secure enough support in upcoming regional elections in two eastern states to form local governments.
Known for criticizing Berlin’s anti-Russia policies as harmful to Germany’s national interests, the right-wing party has grown to become the country’s most popular political force after once again being excluded from last year’s federal coalition talks.
In the state of Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD currently enjoys the support of 41% of voters, a recent survey suggested, compared with only 24% for Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In the northeastern state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the AfD is polling at 36%, seven points ahead of its closest competitors, the Social Democratic Party.
Berlin has long accused the AfD of extremism, while Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has claimed that the party has “undeniable” ties to Russia and must be deprived of access to classified information if it comes to power.
The federal government is now seeking a way to rein in what The Telegraph bluntly described as “pro-Kremlin traitor states” in the event that NATO decides it is time to go to war with Moscow.
NATO roundabout
The scenario centers on NATO’s Reinforcement and Sustainment Network, which involves moving large troop contingents, heavy equipment, and logistical supplies to bloc members in Eastern Europe and the Baltic. Germany is set to play the role of what The Telegraph and Die Welt described as NATO’s “roundabout,” with its geographical location making it a central logistics hub.
The head of Germany’s Joint Operations Command, Lieutenant General Alexander Sollfrank, stated last year that Berlin is prepared for a war with Moscow and stands ready to facilitate the deployment of 800,000 NATO troops toward the Russian border in less than six months.
Moscow has repeatedly stated that it has no intention of attacking NATO unless attacked first and has dismissed such allegations as “nonsense” designed to justify Russophobic hysteria and rampant militarization.
Nevertheless, the NATO mechanism could be triggered without any hostile move by Russia, “at the first sign” reported by a Western intelligence service that Moscow was preparing an attack, according to The Telegraph.
Protests and obstructionism
The issue poses significant challenges for Berlin because such a deployment would technically take place before any conflict with Russia had actually broken out, while regional authorities enjoy broad powers over activities on their territory during peacetime.
An uncooperative regional government could potentially delay troop movements through “bureaucratic obstructionism” by withholding the necessary permits or refusing to provide NATO troops with police escorts and priority access to local roads.
Merz’s government also reportedly expects the deployment to trigger protests among local residents and debates within regional authorities about the extent to which they want to become involved in a process that could “expose them as part of NATO’s logistical hub.”
Bending the rules
Under German law, the federal government has very few ways to limit states’ independence short of declaring a state of emergency or imposing martial law. “The key question is how to circumvent a state not adhering to the federal idea without violating the constitution,” Roderich Kiesewetter, an MP from Merz’s CDU, told The Telegraph and Die Welt, adding that the Interior Ministry is drawing up relevant plans.
Berlin has already set the secret plan in motion to “create mechanisms that would make it possible to overrule individual states or to take the necessary measures,” added Tobias Krull, deputy chairman of the Saxony-Anhalt parliament’s Interior Committee.
Few details have emerged about what such plans could entail, but nationwide emergency regulations are reportedly being revised as part of the scheme. “Federal law takes precedence over state law – it’s as simple as that,” an unnamed lawmaker told the outlets.
Germany’s Basic Law allows for so-called “federal enforcement” if a regional government violates an obligation under federal law, but the clause has never been invoked.
During a state of emergency or under martial law, the federal parliament could also activate certain provisions allowing the government to intervene in state affairs and simplify military logistics. This would still require a two-thirds majority – something Merz’s government would be unlikely to secure, given that the AfD controls more than 23% of the seats in the Bundestag, while another 10% are held by the Left – another party the chancellor has ruled out cooperating with.
NATO deploys Italian, Spanish, Turkish jets to eastern flank
Al Mayadeen | July 30, 2026
NATO announced Thursday that the air forces of Italy, Spain, and Turkey will deploy fighter jets to the alliance’s eastern flank as part of efforts to reinforce air patrols and strengthen NATO air defense operations.
“The Italian Air Force, Spanish Air and Space Force and Turkish Air Force will deploy their fighter jets to contribute to the security of NATO airspace along the Eastern Flank, as part of the NATO Air Defence mission,” the alliance said in a statement.
NATO said the deployments are intended to support allied deterrence, protect its airspace, and reinforce military readiness along the eastern flank.
Turkey sends F-16 fighters to Estonia
NATO said Turkey will deploy five F-16 fighter aircraft and around 80 personnel to Estonia’s Amari Air Base for the first time.
The Turkish deployment will contribute to NATO’s air policing mission as the alliance continues rotating forces across its eastern members.
Italy will also send four Typhoon fighter jets and more than 100 personnel to Lithuania’s Siauliai Air Base.
Italy and Spain reinforce NATO air patrols
Spain will deploy seven F-18 fighter jets and around 200 personnel to Romania’s Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, according to NATO.
The Spanish deployment will also include an A400M aircraft for aerial refueling and three NH-90 helicopters assigned to counter-drone operations.
NATO said the new units will replace Portuguese, Romanian, and French forces currently involved in the alliance’s eastern flank air defense mission.
The deployments come as NATO continues strengthening its military presence along its eastern borders amid heightened tensions in Europe.
Russia warns of escalating NATO activity in Baltic
Russia accused NATO earlier this year of significantly expanding its military operations in the Baltic Sea, particularly near the Kaliningrad region, warning that the alliance’s growing presence poses risks to regional stability and international navigation.
Artem Bulatov, special envoy at the Russian Foreign Ministry, stated that NATO is intensifying efforts to enhance its combat capabilities and infrastructure in areas adjacent to Kaliningrad, pointing to a sustained military buildup under various operational frameworks.
According to Bulatov, NATO launched its Baltic Sentry mission in January 2025 under the stated aim of protecting critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, while continuing extensive air patrols and expanding the scope of its exercises.
Member states engaging in ‘provocative’ actions
He added that the scale and frequency of NATO drills have increased, alongside provocative actions by member states targeting vessels involved in transporting goods to and from Russia.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko warned that these activities are creating “serious threats” to international shipping routes and economic operations in the region, suggesting that NATO’s mission is effectively aimed at controlling key logistical corridors.
Grushko further argued that the alliance’s operations are designed to restrict the movement of goods linked to Russia, raising concerns in Moscow over the militarization of maritime routes in the Baltic.

