Warmongers in meltdown as Trump heralds Iran deal
In essence, this agreement brings the situation to where it was supposed to be following the announcement of the original ceasefire
By Trita Parsi | May 23, 2026
I wrote yesterday that the United States and Iran were on the verge of an agreement. Trump appeared to confirm as much a few hours ago with an unusually disciplined Truth Social post — grammatically coherent, diplomatically measured, and notably devoid of his customary theatrics or ritual humiliation of the opposing side.
That restraint matters. Unlike his earlier proclamations of imaginary breakthroughs, this statement carried the tone of a serious diplomatic signal rather than political indiscipline. Its timing, moreover, appeared disconnected from market considerations or domestic spectacle. My own sources in Tehran likewise confirm that a major breakthrough has been reached, though it remains contingent on final approval — precisely as Trump indicated.
So what does all of this mean? What do we actually know about the contours of the agreement? How significant was the role played by regional actors in securing the breakthrough, and what explains Europe’s near-total irrelevance in the process? If this arrangement is merely a Memorandum of Understanding, where do the principal vulnerabilities lie as negotiations enter a second phase?
Moreover, can Trump successfully sell the deal at home? What steps can — and likely will — Israel take to sabotage the agreement? And if a final deal is secured, how profound would Israel’s strategic defeat be?
Let me try to address these questions one by one.
First of all, the full details remain unclear. But according to reporting by Amwaj.media —much of which I have independently corroborated — the agreement entails a comprehensive cessation of hostilities, including in Lebanon; the gradual release of Iran’s frozen assets; and an end to America’s “blockade of the blockade” in the Strait of Hormuz.
Maritime traffic through the Strait would resume under joint Iranian and Omani oversight. Once these measures take effect, the parties would have an additional 30 days to negotiate a final agreement. That second-stage accord is expected to address both the nuclear issue and the long-term status of the Strait.
Significant progress, however, already appears to have been made on the nuclear file, and, as I understand it, broad principles for its resolution have largely been agreed upon.
In essence, this agreement restores the situation to where it was always supposed to be following the announcement of the original ceasefire. From the outset, the ceasefire was intended to be regional in scope and to include Lebanon. There was never supposed to be a “blockade of the blockade” — an absurd scheme concocted by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies that only served to undermine America’s strategic position.
Nor was commercial traffic through the Strait meant to remain disrupted. The genuinely new elements are limited sanctions relief for Tehran and a formal commitment to resolve the nuclear issue within the next 30 days.
Yet while reaching this point is undeniably significant, there is still no real deal until a final agreement is secured. And the 30-day window, though short, nevertheless offers ample opportunity for spoilers on all sides to sabotage the process.
The regional buy-in — and the fact that Trump announced the agreement only after speaking with a wide array of key regional leaders, including those of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain, in addition to a separate call with Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu — is highly significant. This regional anchoring affords Trump a degree of political insulation in Washington. Faced with inevitable accusations from hawks that the agreement amounts to defeat or that it betrays Israel, he can point to broad regional support as evidence that America’s principal partners in the Middle East prefer diplomacy to escalation.
Indeed, compared to President Obama’s 2015 nuclear agreement, the regional engagement surrounding Trump’s deal is objectively deeper, broader, and more politically consequential. Obama’s agreement was negotiated despite resistance from Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE; Trump’s appears to be taking shape with active regional backing. Europe’s near-total absence from the process is nevertheless striking — though hardly problematic. By this point, Europe’s diplomatic irrelevance in major Middle Eastern diplomacy has become so normalized that its exclusion barely registers.
Judging by the public panic now emanating from Washington’s war hawks and pro-Israel circles, however, the next 30 days are likely to be politically brutal for Trump. FDD is already openly attacking him. AIPAC is amplifying lawmakers denouncing the agreement. An adviser to the former Crown Prince of Iran has accused Trump of “total surrender.” Many of the same allies who enthusiastically applauded Trump’s decision to initiate the war are now turning on him for choosing diplomacy over permanent escalation.
Senior Israeli politicians, however, may choose a more cautious approach. Rather than confronting Trump directly, they are likely to let their proxies in Washington wage the public battle on their behalf.
Israeli elections are approaching, and Trump remains deeply popular among Israeli voters, while Netanyahu has thus far failed to convert the popularity of the Iran war into a decisive electoral advantage. A direct public clash with Trump over the agreement could therefore prove politically dangerous for Netanyahu. Trump, if provoked, could inflict substantial damage simply by signaling support for one of Netanyahu’s challengers.
Trump may have hinted at this dynamic a few days ago when he — seemingly out of nowhere — told reporters that he enjoys a “99% approval rating” in Israel and could run for prime minister there himself. On the surface, it sounded like another episode of characteristic Trumpian bravado. But in context, it may well have been a pointed warning to Netanyahu and Israel’s political establishment that Trump can damage them far more than they can damage him.
There should be little doubt, however, that if a final agreement is reached — and any lasting agreement will almost certainly require substantial, if not total, sanctions relief for Iran — it would constitute a devastating strategic defeat for Tel Aviv.
Israel’s two wars have, paradoxically, strengthened Iran’s deterrence posture, exposed Israel’s inability to confront Iran without overwhelming American military backing, and inflicted incalculable damage on America’s global standing and aura of military supremacy.
Indeed, the cumulative effect may be so severe that the pursuit of uncontested American global primacy is no longer a realistic option. At the same time, support for Israel within the United States has eroded dramatically across nearly every demographic group except older Republican voters.
Most importantly, sanctions relief would liberate Iran’s economy from decades of constriction and gradually shift the regional balance of power away from Israel and its vision of a “Greater Israel.” For precisely that reason, Israel will almost certainly do everything within its power — behind the scenes — to sabotage the agreement before it becomes irreversible.
But Israel is not the only threat to the deal. Both Washington and Tehran will have to exercise extraordinary discipline to ensure that their competing narratives of victory do not strengthen the hardline opposition camp in the other country. Throughout the negotiations, Trump has shown remarkably little sensitivity to how his inflammatory social media posts complicate Tehran’s ability to compromise. Iran must now avoid making the same mistake. Public triumphalism in Tehran could easily undermine Trump’s political capacity to deliver the agreement domestically.
The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s recent tweet comparing the outcome of Trump’s war to the failed Roman attempts to subjugate the Sassanidian Persian Empire is a case in point. Whatever its domestic appeal in Iran, such rhetoric risks hardening opposition in Washington at precisely the moment when restraint and strategic ambiguity are most needed.
At the end of the day, for the Phase II negotiations to succeed — and for any agreement to prove durable — both sides must be able to claim victory.
Trita Parsi is the co-founder and Executive Vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
Iran to US: Three unresolved issues must be settled before talks begin
Al Mayadeen | May 23, 2026
An informed source close to Iran’s negotiating team has identified three fundamental unresolved issues with the United States, stating that unless these matters are settled, negotiations will not proceed, while also revealing that US officials have privately urged Tehran to disregard Trump’s public statements as domestic posturing.
Speaking to Iran’s Fars news agency, the source said that while American negotiators have effectively retreated from their initial approach based on threats and inducements, having recognised that Iran will not submit to the logic of force, three core disagreements remain. The source noted that Washington has come to understand that Tehran cannot be pressured into submission, yet significant gaps persist.
“If these issues are not resolved, negotiations will not take place,” the source warned.
First sticking point: No nuclear talks until trust measures implemented
The source explained that Iran has declared it will not engage in nuclear discussions during this round of talks. Tehran has made clear that its priority is ending the war, not addressing the nuclear file at this stage.
Only after the other side implements confidence‑building measures will nuclear matters be addressed in a subsequent round. This position reflects Iran’s insistence that Washington must first demonstrate good faith before any discussion of its peaceful nuclear programme.
Second sticking point: Release of frozen funds as precondition
The second fundamental condition for Iran’s entry into negotiations is the transfer and release of Iranian assets frozen abroad. These funds, which have been blocked by US sanctions for years, represent a critical economic issue for Tehran.
“Without this happening, we will not enter negotiations at all,” the source emphasised, indicating that Iran views the release of its assets as a non‑negotiable prerequisite for any diplomatic progress.
Third sticking point: Control over Hormuz shipping traffic
The third disagreement centres on the mechanism for vessel transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Washington insists on a complete return of the strait to its previous status quo, before the US-Israeli war on Iran began.
However, Iran maintains that it will only restore the number of ships to previous levels, but according to its own model. Tehran would determine how many vessels are permitted to pass and grant permission only to those it approves. This means ships must transit under Iranian management and through routes determined by Iran.
The source noted that while the United States has accepted Iran’s positions in many instances, these three major obstacles remain serious.
Iran prepared for all options
The source stressed that Iran has prepared itself for all possible scenarios, indicating that Tehran is not banking solely on a diplomatic breakthrough.
The Iranian armed forces remain on high alert, and military planners continue to update target banks and operational equipment.
This posture reflects Tehran’s understanding that Washington may not be willing to meet its conditions, and that the current ceasefire could collapse at any moment.
US officials: ‘Don’t pay attention to Trump’s tweets’
Fars also reported that certain mediators, along with US officials involved in the indirect negotiations between Iran and the United States, have sent messages to the Iranian side during the text‑exchange process. The message was: “Don’t pay attention to Trump’s tweets.”
According to the sources, these officials emphasized that President Donald Trump’s statements in the media are for “public and domestic consumption,” and that his true position at the negotiating table differs from his public rhetoric. The messages suggest that even Washington’s own negotiators view the president’s social media outbursts as a hindrance to diplomacy.
An informed source also told Fars that Trump’s initial position, known as the “15 points,” represented a high ceiling of American demands that he was unable to achieve, even through the option of war. What is currently on the negotiating table is clearly different from those initial positions. Trump has come to realise that “Iran is not a party that can be subjected to extortion,” the source said.
No current nuclear discussions
Meanwhile, Tasnim news agency quoted an informed source denying reports that Iran had proposed freezing uranium enrichment above 3.6 percent for 10 years. The source confirmed that such reports are “completely baseless.”
The source added that the current focus of messages and conversations is exclusively on ending the war. No details related to the nuclear file are being discussed at this time at all, contradicting Western media reports that have suggested progress on the nuclear front.
Baqaei: US has no role in Strait of Hormuz
Earlier on Saturday, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baqaei reiterated that the United States has no role in the Strait of Hormuz, describing it as a matter between Iran and the coastal states of the Gulf. He also confirmed that negotiations at this stage do not address the nuclear issue or the details of sanctions relief.
Tehran has taken a “responsible and wise” decision to make ending the war on all fronts, including Lebanon, the focus of negotiations, Baqaei said. This approach prioritises stopping the bloodshed and restoring stability to the region before tackling longer‑standing disputes.
Over 50 countries continued to arm Israel during genocide of Palestinians in Gaza: Report
The Cradle | May 23, 2026
An Al-Jazeera investigation published on 23 May revealed that military-grade products from at least 51 countries and self-governing territories kept entering Israel even after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a provisional ruling over the genocide of Palestinians in Gaza.
In January 2024, the UN’s top court ordered Israel to take all measures to prevent genocidal acts in Gaza. By then, Israel’s brutal bombing of Gaza had killed more than 26,000 Palestinians, most of them women and children.
However, countries across the globe continued to provide weapons and military assistance to the Israeli military, the Al-Jazeera report found.
Using Israeli Tax Authority (ITA) import data, customs records, and freedom of information requests, the Al-Jazeera investigation found the military-related goods were shipped to Israel from countries across Europe, Asia, North America, and South America, including from many that have signed the genocide convention.
In some cases, the military supplies originated from countries that had publicly imposed arms embargoes on Israel or had at least partially suspended arms supplies to the country.
According to the ITA data, Israeli arms imports increased after the ICJ ruling, in particular munitions imports.
The five biggest military suppliers to Israel—namely the US, India, Romania, Taiwan, and the Czech Republic—all boosted their shipments of military equipment to Tel Aviv following the ruling.
ITA data showed that 2,603 consignments of military-related goods valued at $885 million were sent to Israel between October 2023 and October 2025. Of those, $805 million worth came after the January 2024 ruling.
The consignments included ammunition, explosive munitions, weapons parts, and armored vehicle components.
According to Stephen Humphreys, professor of international law at the London School of Economics, there was “ample evidence that countries arming Israel may be complicit in international crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
“The most recent ‘ceasefire’ did not change this,” stated Gerhard Kemp, a professor of criminal law at the University of the West of England.
Since the ceasefire reached in October 2025, Israel has continued killing Palestinian civilians in Gaza and creating conditions of life that could destroy the group in whole or in part, Kemp said.
This indicates that states still have an obligation to stop supporting Israel’s war on Palestinians in Gaza, which has now killed at least 72,000 people. Tens of thousands more remain buried under the rubble of buildings Israel has bombed.
“Some states have a very narrow understanding of the duty to prevent genocide and are waiting for a judicial determination that there is a genocide in Gaza,” Kemp said. “But the ICJ will likely take several years to make such a determination. The better view is to look at domestic legal obligations … and international legal obligations and legal tools triggered by available evidence.”
Though the ICJ has not issued its final ruling, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory published a report in September 2025 concluding that Israel “committed a genocide against the Palestinians in Gaza.”
The UN report asserts that “states are obliged to take steps to ensure the prevention of conduct that may amount to an act of genocide … including the transfer of weapons that are used or likely to be used by Israel to commit genocidal acts.”
British bases in Cyprus face renewed scrutiny amid war on Iran
Al Mayadeen | May 23, 2023
The war on Iran has reignited political tensions in Cyprus over the continued presence of British military bases on the island, with critics describing them as a lasting symbol of colonial domination and a direct threat to Cypriot security.
The debate intensified after a drone struck the British Akrotiri base in southern Cyprus in March, causing limited material damage but triggering renewed scrutiny over London’s military role on the strategically located island.
In the days that followed, British and Greek fighter jets intercepted additional projectiles reportedly heading toward Cyprus, while several European states deployed naval assets to the eastern Mediterranean amid fears of regional escalation linked to the US-Israeli aggression on Iran.
According to Cypriot and Lebanese media reports, Cyprus’s intelligence chief, Tasos Tzionis, later allegedly established contacts with the Lebanese Resistance to obtain assurances that no further attacks would target the island, amid concerns that British military activity could drag Cyprus deeper into the regional confrontation.
British military presence described as colonial legacy
Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides has publicly criticized Britain’s handling of the situation, warning that ambiguity surrounding the role of the Akrotiri and Dhekelia bases effectively turned Cyprus into a target during the confrontation.
Speaking in Brussels earlier this year, Christodoulides described the British bases as a “colonial legacy,” stressing the need for a broader discussion with London once regional tensions due to US and Israeli hostilities subside.
The Cypriot government reportedly lacks oversight over many military activities conducted inside the British-controlled zones, including the transfer of military equipment and logistical operations connected to Western regional interventions.
Diplomatic sources cited in the report said London “does whatever it wants” inside the bases, which have long served as key hubs for British and US military operations across West Asia.
Strategic role of Cyprus in Western military operations
Located roughly 150 kilometers from the coasts of Syria and Lebanon and around 350 kilometers from Gaza, Cyprus occupies a central position in the eastern Mediterranean and has increasingly served as a forward operating platform for Western military and intelligence activity.
Akrotiri has reportedly been used in logistical support operations tied to “Israel”, as well as in broader US and British regional military deployments.
The Dhekelia base also hosts extensive surveillance infrastructure, including radar and signal interception systems used in operations stretching from Iraq to Afghanistan.
Researchers and political analysts in Cyprus argue that the continued British presence undermines the island’s sovereignty and complicates efforts to resolve the decades-long division of Cyprus between the Turkish-occupied north and the internationally recognized south.
Calls grow for decolonization and sovereignty
The British-controlled territories are not conventional foreign military bases governed through bilateral agreements. Instead, they remain sovereign British overseas territories retained by London when Cyprus gained independence from British colonial rule in 1960.
Together, Akrotiri and Dhekelia cover roughly 3% of Cyprus’ territory and include civilian communities inhabited by around 11,000 Cypriots.
Critics argue that the arrangement represents an incomplete decolonization process imposed on Cyprus as a condition for independence.
The issue has gained renewed relevance following international legal disputes over Britain’s control of the Chagos Islands, where London agreed to return sovereignty to Mauritius while retaining long-term military access to Diego Garcia, a major Anglo-American military base.
Cypriot officials are now reportedly studying similar legal and diplomatic pathways as pressure grows domestically to challenge Britain’s continued military presence on the island.
Germany’s allegations over attacks on Jewish targets follow ‘worn-out cliches’: Iran embassy
Press TV – May 23, 2026
Iran’s Embassy in Berlin says German prosecutors’ claims about Tehran’s alleged involvement in attacks on Jewish figures are “unfounded” and follow “worn-out clichés.”
In a statement posted on X on Saturday, the Iranian embassy said security is “a necessary and respectable matter” in every country, including both Iran and Germany.
However, it said that such claims against Tehran were made “on orders from Iran’s enemies,” adding that the repetition of “worn-out clichés” merely leads to the discrediting of the legal institutions of the accusing side.
The embassy further stated that if the protection of Jewish institutions and sites linked to Abrahamic religions is considered a universally accepted principle, then “the military attack by the Israeli regime in April 2026 on the Rafi’-Nia Synagogue in Tehran should also be perceived and condemned with the same sensitivity.”
The latest development came after German federal prosecutors announced criminal charges against a Danish national and an Afghan national accused of involvement in an alleged plot targeting prominent Jewish leaders in Germany.
According to prosecutors, the Danish suspect, identified as Ali S. under German privacy laws, is accused of working for the intelligence service of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) and maintaining close ties with the Quds Force.
Prosecutors claimed he was tasked in early 2025 with gathering information on Josef Schuster, president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, and Volker Beck, chairman of the German-Israeli Society, as well as two Jewish grocery stores in Berlin.
German prosecutors alleged that the surveillance activities were intended to facilitate the planning of murder and arson attacks in Germany.
German and Danish authorities had previously announced in July last year that a Danish national was arrested in Denmark on suspicion of spying for Iran by collecting information on Jewish sites and individuals in Berlin.
NATO must ‘show its teeth’ to Russia – Czech president
RT | May 23, 2026
Czech President Petr Pavel has urged NATO to “show its teeth” in response to what he described as Russian “provocations” on the bloc’s eastern flank.
Pavel’s remarks follow a series of Ukrainian drone incursions into NATO airspace in Europe. Since mid-March, long-range UAVs have repeatedly crossed Baltic and Nordic airspace en route to targets in northwestern Russia, particularly oil facilities in Leningrad Region. The incursions prompted fighter jet deployments, and some drones crashed inside NATO states, causing damage.
Moscow has accused European NATO members of quietly allowing Kiev to use their airspace for attacks on Russian territory, but Western officials deny this, instead blaming Russia for the incursions and claiming that Russian electronic warfare systems may have redirected the drones to stray into NATO airspace.
In an interview with The Guardian published Friday, Pavel echoed the accusations, claiming that Russia was intentionally staging “provocations” operating just below the threshold that would trigger NATO’s collective defense clause, Article 5. He also claimed that Russian military officials openly mock the bloc’s indecision during such incidents, and called for “decisive enough, potentially even asymmetric” responses to counter Moscow’s actions.
“Russia, unfortunately, does not understand nice language. They mostly understand the language of power, ideally accompanied with action,” he claimed. “When I asked them why they do these provocative actions in the air… their answer was ‘because we can’. That’s exactly the kind of behavior we allowed.”
Citing earlier Western allegations of Russian “provocations” in the Black and Baltic Seas – such as fighter jet intercepts and purported airspace violations – Pavel suggested that NATO should consider shooting down “either an unmanned or manned” Russian aircraft if spotted near its borders. Moscow has denied the accusations, insisting its patrols occur in international airspace and are a necessary response to Western reconnaissance flights near Russian borders.
Pavel also proposed “potentially asymmetric” measures against Moscow, including disrupting internet access, targeting satellites, or cutting Russian banks off from the global financial system, measures he said “are not killing people, but are sensitive enough to make Russia understand this is not the way they should go.”
Pavel’s position echoes that of several other NATO countries. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said on Thursday that NATO states should actually help Kiev “direct” drone attacks “in the right directions.” Latvian and Estonian officials defended Ukrainian incursions by saying that Kiev “has every right to defend itself.”
Finland, however, rebuked Kiev over the breaches of its airspace, while Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico urged renewed dialogue with Moscow, warning of potential Ukrainian drone provocations involving NATO territory that he said could trigger direct conflict between Russia and the bloc.
Multiple Western officials have claimed that Moscow could test the alliance through provocations and hybrid operations, or eventually attack European states after the Ukraine conflict ends. Citing the purported threat, European NATO members last year pledged to raise military spending to 5% of GDP and launched rearmament initiatives such as ReArm Europe.
Moscow, however, dismissed claims that it poses a threat to Europe as baseless “nonsense” and condemned what it calls reckless EU militarization. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov recently accused European “warmongers” of portraying Russia as a “model external enemy” to distract from domestic problems.

