Israel strikes Syria as Turkish FM visits Damascus, exposing rivalry for control
Press TV – August 7, 2026
Israeli forces have launched an artillery attack on Syria’s Quneitra Province while Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was visiting the Arab country.
The attack, reported by Syria’s state news agency SANA, targeted agricultural land surrounding the village of al-Samadaniyah al-Gharbiyah.
Israeli military incursions and aggressions in southern Syria, along with harassment of local citizens, have become recurrent amid inaction from Syria’s Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) regime led by former Daesh and al-Qaeda deputy Abu Muhammad al-Jolani.
No injuries were reported on Thursday, but the timing was no coincidence. Israel appeared to be sending a clear message that while Turkey’s proxy regime sits in the capital, Israel’s military boots are on the ground, and its artillery is within range.
In his remarks in Damascus on Thursday, Foreign Minister Fidan warned that Israeli attacks on Syria are among the greatest threats to the country’s stability.
“Israel’s attacks targeting Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are among the greatest threats to the country’s stability,” he said.
Fidan urged the international community to respond more strongly to Israel’s occupation policy and press the regime to ensure compliance with the 1974 Disengagement Agreement and respect for Syria’s sovereignty.
The agreement’s Demilitarized Buffer Zone—a UN-monitored strip of land separating Israeli and Syrian forces—was unilaterally renounced by Israel following the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024.
Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared the agreement “collapsed” and ordered his military to invade and occupy the buffer zone, along with additional Syrian territory beyond it.
Since the Turkish-backed coup that installed Jolani’s al-Qaeda-affiliated militants in Damascus, Israeli occupation forces have waged a systematic campaign of agricultural terror across southern Syria—poisoning croplands with chemical sprays deployed from aircraft, bulldozing orchards and olive groves, and abducting local farmers.
In a deliberate strategy of ecocide and economic strangulation, Israeli troops have sealed off entire communities from their ancestral lands, blocking hundreds of families from accessing their fields and grazing grounds while destroying agricultural infrastructure that once sustained the region’s rural population.
“Around 100 families are completely barred from accessing their land. Most of the agricultural roads have been destroyed by Israeli tanks. Furthermore, the occupation forces have take control of large areas of grazing land,” Hassan al-Din Ahmed, a farmer, told Al Jazeera.
Ahmed, whose son was kidnapped by Israeli forces, stressed that “farmlands aren’t the only things Israelis have taken.”
He was grazing cattle when “occupation forces came and arrested my child Saddam from the land”, he told the broadcaster.
“It has been two years, four months without any charge being brought against him,” the farmer added.
According to director of agriculture in Quneitra Mohammad Rahal, Israeli occupation forces used glider aircraft to spray herbicides on agricultural land in the area, causing very significant damage.
The Israeli violations have affected the entire Arab country and triggered a hunger crisis there.
In May, the World Food Programme halved emergency assistance from 1.3 million people to just 650,000, amid critical funding shortfall.
It also halted a nationwide bread subsidy that helped about four million Syrians afford bread every day.
Thursday’s shelling was just the latest chapter in Israel’s systematic dismantling of Syria.
Since Assad’s fall, the Zionist regime has conducted hundreds of airstrikes against military installations, arsenals, and civilian infrastructure—reducing Syria’s defenses to rubble while its military advances beyond the occupied Golan Heights, seized since 1967.
Netanyahu has instructed his military to advance further into Syrian territory, surpassing the Golan Heights occupied since 1967, and to capture multiple strategic sites.
Despite the HTS’s commitments to collaborate with Tel Aviv, Israel has shown no inclination to retreat from Syria.
The two parties have engaged in intermittent discussions aimed at reaching a “security agreement”, but no agreement or significant progress has been reported.
Tel Aviv’s real grievance lies not with Jolani’s al-Qaeda pedigree, which Israel has historically tolerated or even exploited, but with his absolute dependence on Turkey—a patron that armed his militants, bankrolled his coup, and now dictates the political direction of Damascus.
Fidan’s visit laid bare the cynical rivalry between two occupying powers. Israel views Turkey’s growing influence in Damascus with deep suspicion—fearing that Ankara’s ambitions may eventually challenge Zionist expansionist plans.
Turkey, meanwhile, is consolidating its grip on Jolani’s regime, signing military cooperation agreements and training Syrian security forces to ensure Damascus remains a compliant satellite.
American journalist reveals role of Jolani regime’s Washington envoy in her 2016 kidnapping
Press TV – July 29, 2026
American journalist Lindsey Snell says the chargé d’affaires of Syria’s ruling Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham-led (HTS) administration in Washington participated in her abduction by the al-Nusra Front militants in northern Syria in 2016, claims that have drawn renewed attention to the background of officials serving in Syria’s diplomatic service.
Snell made the claim on Wednesday after posting archival footage on her X account of an interview she conducted with Mohamed Qanatari shortly before she was kidnapped in Syria in 2016.
According to Snell, Qantari was a member of the al-Nusra Front at the time and took part in her kidnapping before later serving in the foreign ministry of the HTS regime.
In the video posted on X, Qanatari appears wearing a face covering in front of an al-Nusra Front flag while discussing the group’s objectives. Snell said that although he insisted on concealing his identity during the interview, she later identified him by his voice, eyes and manner of speech.
Snell, an American freelance journalist, was kidnapped in Syria in 2016 while reporting on the conflict. Snell escaped from the militant group’s grip after more than 2 weeks in captivity. She has maintained that Qanatri was directly involved in her detention by the armed group, which at the time operated as al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria.
In July 2016, the Nusra Front renamed itself to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham.
Syrian authorities have not publicly responded to Snell’s claims.
The controversy comes as Syria has sought to expand diplomatic engagement with the United States following political changes in Damascus. Qanatri currently serves as chargé d’affaires at Syria’s embassy in Washington, representing the country’s interests in the absence of a formally accredited ambassador.
The allegations have also renewed debate over the vetting of officials appointed to diplomatic positions following the political transition in Syria, with critics questioning whether individuals linked to armed factions should be allowed to represent the country abroad.
Snell’s claims have resurfaced nearly a decade after her abduction, drawing renewed attention amid broader discussions over accountability for abuses committed during Syria’s prolonged conflict.
The American journalist said she plans to release a second installment of the video containing additional footage from her 2016 interview.
Netanyahu will reject US demands for withdrawal from Lebanon, Gaza, Syria if asked: Report
The Cradle | July 28, 2026
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has told cabinet ministers that Washington wants Israeli soldiers to pull back from positions in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza, and that he does not intend to comply with US demands, Channel 13 reported on 27 July.
The report, which cites unnamed security sources familiar with the matter, states that US officials want the Israeli army to carry out a “series of withdrawals” across the three fronts.
Channel 13 does not state whether Washington is seeking full or partial pullbacks; however, Netanyahu told the ministers that he “intends to stand on my own two feet and resist.”
“I will strongly oppose this and tell them no,” he reportedly said.
The comments come as Netanyahu has set off for Washington for a meeting set for Tuesday with US President Donald Trump, after which he is scheduled to attend the funeral services for Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, one of Washington’s most persistent warmongers and an unwavering backer of Israel, who died on 11 July.
Israeli forces are currently occupying major stretches of land in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza.
Israel maintains positions in border and hilltop areas in southern Syria, especially near the Golan frontier, where the military has established footholds inside Syrian territory, and regularly conducts raids against locals.
What began as a pretext to aid Druze communities battling Damascus’s extremist troops and Syrian government-backed Bedouin tribes after the ousting of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad has become a so-called “buffer zone.” Israel has since used it to launch incursions into Lebanon.
In Lebanon, Israel maintains its so-called “Yellow Line” in the south that runs from the Mediterranean coast in the west to the Mount Hermon area in the east, extending around 10 kilometers inland and, in some parts, passing the Litani River.
Israel’s occupation of Lebanon has been marked by repeated ceasefire violations, including near-daily strikes, demolitions, and incursions. Beirut cited more than 2,000 violations in late 2025 alone, while hundreds of thousands of Lebanese remain displaced.
Many dozens of Lebanese villages within the Yellow Line have been completely demolished, with the intent of ethnically cleansing the area and creating a dead zone to which residents cannot return.
According to comments from February by Israeli Minister of War Israel Katz, Israeli troops will be staying in Lebanon and Syria “indefinitely.”
In Gaza, following almost three years of genocide and near-daily ceasefire violations since last October, Israel continued to slowly edge its Yellow Line in the strip further under the cover of night.
The most recent reporting says the controlled area has expanded to about 65 percent of Gaza and that the line has been shifted westward in places by hundreds of meters and, in some areas, by more than a kilometer.
Netanyahu has publicly said he wants to expand Israeli control over the strip further up to 70 percent.
Satellite imagery released on 21 July and reviewed by AP and Haaretz shows that the Israeli military has dug a 23-kilometer earthen trench along its new positions, cutting the devastated enclave in two.
In one stretch of southern Gaza, the trench sits more than a kilometer past the Yellow Line.
Preparing for Regional Escalation: Iran Appears to Be Pre-Empting the US’ Attack Strategy
By Robert Inlakesh | Palestine Chronicle | July 15, 2026
The US Trump administration sought to weaponize diplomacy once again against the Islamic Republic of Iran and implement a surprise attack strategy – this time, Tehran appears to have preempted the American-Israeli plot.
The Iran-US Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) officially died this week, but in reality it was terminated on June 26 with the Lebanon-Israel deal that Washington brokered. The reason why was simple: the United States decided to print on paper a new deal that violated the former by granting Israel de facto permission to maintain a belligerent occupation of southern Lebanese lands.
Throughout the month that the MoU technically held, the US committed various violations of a number of clauses of the agreement, including by direct threats from Donald Trump himself to assassinate the entire Iranian negotiating team. But the Lebanon issue was far more indicative of where things were heading than the limited skirmishes in the Persian Gulf and threats to commit war crimes.
Clause 1 of the MoU concerned the ensuring of the war’s termination on all fronts, with Lebanon being explicitly mentioned. Tehran made it clear that this meant a full withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from southern Lebanon and the protection of Lebanese sovereignty.
Instead of implementing the clause, Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu coordinated a careful approach to the Lebanon war, one that would not result in a withdrawal or end to the war, while simultaneously being careful not to provoke any Iranian retaliatory strikes. Therefore, the US worked with Israel to develop a new conspiracy. This involved the use of the US-proxy regime in Beirut to stir division within Lebanon, an attempt to force the Lebanese army to clash with Hezbollah, combined with an initiative to pressure neighboring Syria to invade the Bekaa Valley region in order to take on Hezbollah.
Meanwhile, as this plot was developing, the Israelis returned to the pre-March 2 status quo more or less in Lebanon – Hezbollah froze its retaliatory operations, while Israel continued to blow up civilian homes, bomb on a lower scale, while maintaining its presence inside south Lebanon.
A US military advisory force is being deployed to Beirut in order to guide the Lebanese army on its newly agreed-upon mission to clash with Hezbollah, the stated goal of which is to disarm the movement. Speculation also has it that the US may even be considering deploying thousands of combat troops into Lebanon in order to help prop up the regime in Beirut if the situation goes sideways, although this assertion is yet to be fully substantiated.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) has been documenting the ongoing mobilization and military buildup along the Lebanese-Syria border, as Trump himself has repeatedly stated in public that he seeks to use Syria’s forces to invade Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s sudden silence and lack of operations indicate that it has been taking these threats very seriously. Fighting Israel alone has been a battle that it has proven capable of managing, but preparations to fight US-proxies inside Lebanon, the possible collapse of the Lebanese Army into warring factions, and combating a Syrian invasion all demand new defensive and even perhaps offensive preparations.
Iran, for its part, was clearly also coordinated more heavily with Yemen’s Ansarallah leadership. The Yemen front never fully opened during the war earlier this year. Tehran openly challenged Saudi Arabia’s blockade on Yemen, while Ansarallah was mobilizing its forces and declared that it would fight to break the blockade. When Riyadh took the decision to strike Sana’a International Airport, this reopened the Yemen-Saudi War for the first time since early 2022, collapsing the UN-brokered ceasefire.
Yemen’s role in the renewal of the regional war will add major pressure, especially as it holds the card to shut down the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, imposing a blockade in the Red Sea that will choke the global economy further than it has been under the pressure of the Strait of Hormuz blockade. Ansarallah’s capabilities have also significantly developed since 2022, meaning that they will be able to aid Iran in their war efforts against targets in the Arabian Peninsula.
If the US succeeds in pressuring Damascus to launch an assault on Lebanon, then Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) have already threatened to enter the fight on the ground. The PMU would likely seek to seize areas in eastern Syria, like Deir Ezzor, which would open up new supply lines inside Syrian territory and put enormous pressure on its forces.
A US-Israeli plot to collapse the Lebanese State in order to weaken Hezbollah is a major gamble to say the least, one which will inevitably lead to a rise in regional sectarianism. It is also very likely that Arab Gulf media will also act to portray the conflict as a new Sunni-Shia war, as they begin to take more active roles in support of the US-Israeli war effort.
Ultimately, it appears as if the Iranians are not taking any chances and are being proactive, which has been reflected in the scale of their strikes on US assets in the region, including a surprise attack that took out US ATACMS missiles in Kuwait earlier this week.
A return to full-scale war this time around could trigger a series of conflicts that will spiral out of control and thus make any easy off-ramp impossible. The Global economic repercussions will be horrendous, as the only end to the war is total victory or total defeat. The US will be put in a position where it will be forced to withdraw from the region, while Israel is betting on the idea of Iran being significantly weakened as a result of the conflict’s continuation.
No side appears to be backing down, so unless the US suddenly decides to perform a 180-degree pivot in its approach, West Asia is about to erupt into total chaos.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine. He contributed this article to The Palestine Chronicle.
The monopoly of arms: Why the doctrine is enforced only where resistance exists
By Sondoss Al Asaad | Al Mayadeen | July 15, 2026
For decades, the slogan of “restricting arms to the state” has been presented as a universal principle of sovereignty and state-building. Yet a closer geopolitical examination reveals a striking inconsistency: the doctrine is aggressively promoted in countries like Lebanon and Iraq, while it is largely absent from discussions in surrounding countries such as Syria, Libya, or other fragmented states where multiple armed actors continue to exist.
This selective application raises an uncomfortable question: Is the objective truly the consolidation of state authority, or is the slogan primarily employed where armed movements challenge Israeli military superiority and American hegemony?
Political philosopher Carl Schmitt argues that sovereignty ultimately belongs to whoever decides the exception.
Modern geopolitical practice appears to confirm his observation. The international order invokes legal principles selectively, depending on whether they reinforce or undermine prevailing strategic interests. The debate over arms, therefore, is not merely legal; it is profoundly political.
The Lebanese case illustrates this contradiction with exceptional clarity.
Following the November 2024 ceasefire, “Hezbollah withdrew from the north of the Litani River and ‘accepted’ that decisions regarding war and peace would rest exclusively with the Lebanese state and its armed forces”. The expectation promoted by Western capitals was that this would allegedly strengthen Lebanese sovereignty and reduce tensions.
The reality unfolded differently; the Israeli enemy, unable to establish a lasting foothold inside southern Lebanese villages during sixty-six days of warfare, achieved after the ceasefire what military operations had failed to accomplish. It maintained positions inside Lebanese territory, continued near-daily airstrikes across Lebanon, and expanded targeted assassinations while facing little meaningful deterrence.
The sequence of events inevitably fuelled a renewed domestic debate. If sovereignty means that only the state possesses weapons, what happens when the state itself lacks the capacity to prevent violations of its own borders?
This dilemma reflects what Thomas Hobbes identified centuries ago as the fundamental purpose of political authority: providing security.
The legitimacy of the state rests not merely on possessing legal authority but on its ability to protect those living under its jurisdiction. When that capacity weakens, alternative security arrangements inevitably emerge.
The issue extends beyond Lebanon; In Iraq, international pressure consistently emphasizes integrating or dismantling armed resistance groups under the banner of state monopoly over force. Yet comparable urgency is rarely directed toward states where numerous militias continue to operate without challenging Israeli strategic dominance.
Syria offers another revealing comparison. Multiple foreign militaries, including American, Turkish, and Israeli forces, remain active on Syrian territory alongside various local armed factions.
Libya remains fragmented among competing military authorities and militias. Yet the international discourse seldom revolves around an immediate imperative to monopolize arms before broader political settlements are achieved.
Such inconsistencies have led many observers to conclude that the slogan itself is not universally applied but strategically deployed.
French philosopher Michel Foucault argued that power operates through discourse by defining what becomes accepted as common sense.
The phrase “arms outside the state” has increasingly become one such discourse. It transforms a complex security equation into a simplified legal formula while avoiding a more difficult question: Can sovereignty exist when a state cannot defend its territory?
Israeli forces open fire on civilians in southern Syrian village
Israeli military camp with armored vehicles along strategic road connecting the villages of Jamla and Saysoun in Daraa Governorate, Syria on June 28, 2026. [Enver Asfur – Anadolu Agency]
MEMO | June 29, 2026
Israeli forces opened fire on Syrian civilians on Sunday evening as they began withdrawing from the village of Abidin in Daraa province, southern Syria.
The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported that “Israeli occupation forces opened fire towards residents while withdrawing from the village of Abidin in the western Daraa countryside.”
There were no immediate reports of injuries, and the Syrian authorities have not commented on the incident.
Earlier on Sunday, the Israeli army set up tents on Tal al-Maghar, west of Abidin village, and in the Yarmouk Basin area in the Daraa countryside.
Syrian media reported that Israeli forces fired live ammunition and illumination flares, targeting farmers near El-Tallah after a force of four armoured personnel carriers moved from al-Jazira barracks towards the area.
Israeli military activity in Syria has escalated in recent months, including raids on civilian homes, searches, the establishment of checkpoints, and the detention of civilians, including shepherds and children.
After the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime on 8 December 2024, Israel declared the 1974 Disengagement Agreement had collapsed and took control of the UN-monitored buffer zone.
The Middle East, Hormuz and the New Mercantilism
By Craig Murray | June 29, 2026
The provisional surrender document signed by Donald Trump appeared to represent a triumph for Iran and indeed for the world; but neither the USA nor Israel has the slightest sense of honour and they cannot be trusted to negotiate in good faith.
Iran knows this – after all, the USA twice attacked Iran actually during peace negotiations, on each occasion killing key Iranian negotiators.
To understand the American position, it is important to realise two key points:
- Greater Israel is an absolute priority
- Opening the Strait of Hormuz is not a US priority
While the US/Israeli alliance were defeated in their attempt to impose regime change on Iran, and indeed have consolidated the popular support of the Iranian government, they have succeeded in expanding Greater Israel. Israel has ethnically cleared and devastated a vast swathe of Southern Lebanon, expanding its military footprint, and notably attempting to repeat its ploy from November 2024 of pushing forward its armour under cover of ceasefire.
Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon has been a major negotiating point for the Iranian government and is a key – indeed the very first – point of the Iran/USA MOU. But in an extraordinary coup aimed at negating that deal, the USA has signed a deal with Israel and its puppet Aoun regime in Lebanon which seeks to legitimise Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon through the agreement of the “Lebanese government”.
This is an astonishing development. I did not think I could have a lower opinion of the appalling bloated traitor “General” “President” Aoun but not even I – nor I think any commentator – believed he would make such a deal with Israel. The plan is that the Americans, Israelis and Lebanese Army will act together to forcibly eliminate Hezbollah, and only after that is certified – by the Israelis – will the Israelis withdraw from Southern Lebanon.
Here are the operative paragraphs. Note that they carefully do not say in terms that Israel will actually leave Lebanon.
“3. …The Government of Israel and the Government of Lebanon commit to a reciprocal, sequenced process, with clear conditions, whereby the LAF will restore effective sovereign authority over all Lebanese territory, pending the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups and dismantlement of associated infrastructure, enabling the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to progressively redeploy out of the Lebanese territory.”
“5 . …The Government of Israel underscores that the termination of this threat, through the disarmament and dismantlement of such groups in all of Lebanon and additional security arrangements to be agreed upon between the two countries, will eliminate any future need for IDF military action or presence in Lebanon.”
This is plainly completely incompatible with the USA/Iran MOU, which states as Point 1:
“The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran and their allies in the current war are signing this MOU to declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and undertake from now on not to initiate any war or any military operation against each other, and to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other, and ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. The final deal will confirm the permanent termination of the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon and other provisions of this paragraph.”
Of course, everybody knows that Israel will never withdraw voluntarily, any more than they withdrew from the Golan Heights. Annexation is plainly the goal and expansion of Greater Israel at least to the Litani River and probably further.
It is important to realise that this is not only Aoun seeking the annihilation of the Shia population of Southern Lebanon; he is also betraying his own community. Aoun is himself a Southern Lebanese Christian, and Israel has been destroying the homes, churches, hospitals and families of Southern Lebanese Christians with as much glee as they attack Muslims.
The agreement names two “pilot zones” where the combined Israeli and Lebanese Army forces will eliminate Hezbollah, followed by Israeli withdrawal from those zones. But these are zones which Israel is not currently occupying – they are areas where Israel was defeated in fighting by Hezbollah and which have been since subject to relentless Israeli bombardment.
So Aoun has agreed to support militarily an IDF advance further into Lebanon, against an agreement that Israel will be able to withdraw once these key Hezbollah redoubts have been destroyed. Even if Aoun were stupid enough to believe the Israelis will withdraw after the operation, this is a level of treachery it is difficult to comprehend.
Greater Israel is not a concept. It is a reality being created before our very eyes.
Israel now occupies 70% of Gaza and plainly the entire “Board of Peace” mechanism is nothing but smoke and mirrors, pure fraud. It has zero effect on the continued tightening of the Gaza concentration camp into an ever-shrinking area. Israeli settlements in the West Bank expand daily and every night the skies are red with Palestinian homes and crops burning. In East Jerusalem Palestinians are continually evicted and replaced by fresh European or American arrivals. In Syria, Israel is building permanent fortifications and its armour creeps forward field by field, with the full cooperation of “President” al-Jolani.
Iran was able to resist the combined military might of the USA and Israel. That is cause for celebration. But do not allow it to blind your eyes to the continued hard reality of the expansion of Greater Israel.
There is no gain for the US in the US/Iran Memorandum of Understanding which the US did not already possess before starting the war. It is therefore very possible, and in many senses valid, to read it as the formalisation of US defeat: a surrender document. Which is why you should be sceptical about US commitment to the terms.
The Strait of Hormuz was fully open before the US started the war. Allowing the flow of oil to resume has become a short-term US priority due to high domestic retail prices and pending elections, but the MOU envisages more Iranian control – and potentially fees – in the Strait than existed before the war.
There is no indication of restrictions on the Iranian nuclear programme that were not already available in the peaceful negotiations. Crucially there are no limitations on Iran’s vital ballistic missile production. The proposed relaxation of sanctions and release of frozen assets is a triumph for Iran and long overdue, and the $300 billion in dollars in reparations, from unspecified sources, is stunning.
So stunning of course that anyone with their head screwed on will realise there is no long term American intention to keep faith with the deal.
Trump is not stupid. There are many ways of characterising his kind of cunning, but it is not stupidity. He was not, as the prevailing narrative seeks to state, the only person in the World who did not realise the Strait of Hormuz would be closed by the war. The USA is quite happy to see the Strait of Hormuz closed, or permanently made more difficult and expensive to transit.
The key to understanding Trump’s position is his famous love of tariffs. Trump is a mercantilist. For many years the world worked on the general basis of accepting the economics of Adam Smith – that freedom of trade promoted universal, reciprocal wealth creation. That was the founding basis of the World Trade organisation, and is the internal philosophy of big trading blocs like the EU.
Trump rejects this and returns to the philosophy that other nations are all competitors, not potential partners, and that success lies not only in increasing your own production, but in damaging your rivals’ production – which ultimately will increase domestic production further. Trump rejects the basic premise of free trade.
The long prevailing belief in the beneficial effects of free trade historically was, as logic demands, accompanied by the demand for freedom of navigation.
Sweeping away tariffs goes hand in hand with sweeping away the controls on shipping which carry the goods. Before the rise of liberal economics, almost all states had practised mercantilism, with controls on shipping being a major source of state revenue. The magnificence of Kronborg Castle in Helsingør, in which Hamlet is set, was constructed entirely from revenues from tolls on ships exiting the Baltic by passing the strait it overlooks, for example.
Freedom of navigation was initially enforced ultimately by the British, and later the American, Navy. States attempting to enforce customary passage fees, for example in the Malaccan Strait, were classified as “pirates” and freedom of navigation became a routine justification for imperialist aggression and/or colonial occupation. Freedom of navigation eventually became customary international law, ultimately codified in the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.
The simple truth is this: in openly abandoning the principle of free trade, the Trump regime has also abandoned the logically linked principle of freedom of navigation. This is evident not just in their indifference to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. It is evident in the naval blockades of Cuba and Venezuela and above all in the worldwide blockade of Russian hydrocarbon deliveries, including the effective end of free passage through the Strait of Dover, and a de facto naval blockade of the Arctic passages.
Following the shale boom, the United States is a net hydrocarbon exporter. The USA balance of trade benefits from high hydrocarbon prices. Trump is doing everything he can to increase US hydrocarbon production by slashing environmental and other controls. This is a core Trump policy.
The USA does not import hydrocarbons through the Strait of Hormuz. That fact is key to Trump’s thinking.
In this mercantilist view, closure of the Strait has two benefits for the USA.
- It disadvantages rival hydrocarbon suppliers
- It disadvantages rival industrial competitors in Europe and Asia who do get hydrocarbons through Hormuz.
This is exactly the same logic behind the destruction of Nord Stream 2. The same mercantilist system also explains the effective seizure through naval blockade and control of Venezuela’s oil production, and the blockade of Russian hydrocarbons through sanctions and the “shadow fleet” propaganda disguising another naval blockade.
The UK’s recent actions in the Dover strait indicate that the West, not just the United States has surrendered the principle of freedom of navigation in straits.
Trump believes, as he has repeatedly stated in public, that domestic fuel prices in the USA are a blip and will equalise as the USA increases its domestic fuel production and Venezuelan fuel production. However this was not happening in time for the mid-term elections which is why reopening the Strait of Hormuz became a temporary priority that occasioned the ceasefire and MOU with Iran.
None of this implies good faith negotiation or a real prospect for a lasting peace.
Israel Brings The War Rhetoric Towards Türkiye
After Being Defeated In Iran, Israel Targets Türkiye.
By Justin K.P. – The Dissident – June 22, 2026
The idea of Israel going to war with Türkiye- a NATO member- potentially triggering World War III seems insane.
And yet Israel is using their war rhetoric towards Türkiye.
The Israeli Foreign Ministry put out a post seemingly laying the groundwork for an Israeli war, claiming that “Hamas terrorists based in Turkey are directing attacks against Israelis, funding terrorism, and recruiting operatives. The network is exposed. The facts are clear.”
This is far from the first time Israel has used war rhetoric towards Türkiye.
Israel’s Minister of Diaspora Affairs Amichai Chikli recently said that Israel “will be at war with Syria sooner or later” in part because he called Syria “a Turkish protectorate”.
He also fabricated a new “radical Sunni axis of evil” which supposedly includes Pakistan, Turkey and Qatar.
Middle East Eye reported:
“What we are witnessing before our eyes is the rise of a new axis,” Chikli told 103FM radio on Wednesday, referring to Turkey, Qatar and Pakistan. He described this so-called alliance as “a radical Sunni axis of evil, more dangerous than anything we have seen before”.
While Chikli mentioned both Qatar and Pakistan in his interviews, he mainly focused on Turkey, branding Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s vision “an extremely dangerous combination for us”.
Other members of the ruling Israeli Likud party have similarly been declaring Türkiye “an enemy state”.
Middle East Eye noted, “Last week, Israeli lawmaker Ariel Kellner, also of Likud, called Turkey an ‘enemy state’, while Culture and Sports Minister Miki Zohar said last month that Israel’“must begin to treat Turkey as an enemy state,’ suggesting that Turkey would suffer heavy blows in a possible conflict with Israel.”
It added that “In February, former prime minister Naftali Bennett indicated that he sees Turkey as an enemy, with the opposition figure stating: ‘Turkey is the new Iran.’”
Perhaps the most concerning development is the fact that the Foundation for The Defence of Democracies (FDD), an Israeli lobby cutout that played a large role in the U.S. war on Iran, has begun publishing articles using similar rhetoric towards Türkiye.
FDD put out an article titled , “Turkey the new Iran? Ankara’s growing challenge to Western interests”.
The article attempted to label Türkiye as the “new Iran”, writing:
As Iran and its proxies take a beating from American and Israeli forces, observers are questioning whether Turkey is waiting in the wings to emerge as the region’s next “bogeyman.” The answer is likely yes, albeit in its own form.
Turkey is not Iran, but depicting Turkey as a nuisance or simply “complicated” only emboldens a maturing adversarial regime with an established track record of undermining its Western allies.
The article attempted to ratchet up hostilities between Türkiye and the United States, writing, “The real question is whether Turkey is actively undermining US, NATO, and regional security interests. There is little doubt that Ankara is doing just that, and doing so more brazenly with the passage of time.”
It also lamented that Türkiye is too supportive of the Palestinian resistance, writing “Hamas, as an Iranian proxy, has served Ankara’s interests in undermining Israel’s security interests, something which Turkey would like to see intact after the end of the current war.”
FDD has similarly put out articles pushing for the U.S. to put sanctions on Türkiye, saying that “Washington should pursue Global Magnitsky sanctions against targets in Turkey” and that “the United States should utilize Global Magnitsky authorities to target Turkish individuals responsible for human rights violations”.
It also called for the U.S. to designate “government officials” in Türkiye as “terrorist organizations” and wrote that “The United States should protect the international financial sector by recommending added scrutiny and screening to transactions involving Turkish financial institutions” and that “Washington should coordinate with the G7 to return Turkey to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) ‘grey list’ until further improvements are seen in combating terrorism financing.”
The Carnegie Endowment for Peace documented that “FDD was the brainchild of a New York Times journalist-turned-Republican operative, Clifford May,” adding that “it arose out of an organization committed to burnishing Israel’s reputation in the United States. On April 24, 2001, three major pro-Israel donors incorporated an organization called EMET (Hebrew for ‘truth’). In an application to the Internal Revenue Service for tax-exempt status, May explained that the group ‘was to provide education to enhance Israel’s image in North America and the public’s understanding of issues affecting Israeli-Arab relations.’ But in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, May broadened the group’s mission and changed its name to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. As he explained in a supplement to the IRS, the group’s board of directors decided to focus on ‘develop[ing] educational materials on the eradication of terrorism everywhere in the world.’”
It added that, “FDD’s chief funders have been drawn almost entirely from American Jews who have a long history of funding pro-Israel organizations. They include Bernard Marcus, the co-founder of Home Depot, whiskey heirs Samuel and Edgar Bronfman, gambling mogul Sheldon Adelson, heiress Lynn Schusterman, Wall Street speculators Michael Steinhardt and Paul Singer, and Leonard Abramson, founder of U.S. Healthcare.”
Sima Vaknin-Gil, a former Israeli military intelligence officer, in the Al Jazeera documentary The Lobby, admitted that “We have FDD” and that “the foundation is ‘working on’ projects for Israel, including ‘data gathering, information analysis, working on activist organizations, money trail. This is something that only a country, with its resources, can do the best”.
FDD played a huge role in shaping American policy towards Iran at the behest of Israel.
Now, as Israel calls Türkiye an “enemy state”- the FDD has begun pushing Washington to place sanctions on the country and designate government officials as terrorists, laying the groundwork for a new Israeli war.
Syria, Lebanon, and the limits of power
By Bassam Abu Abdallah | The Cradle | June 19, 2026
Remarks by US President Donald Trump in an interview with NBC News earlier this month, in which he said he would like to see “a more precise surgical attack on Hezbollah” and suggested that Syria’s Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani) could play a role in reaching an agreement over the conflict in Lebanon, have revived a familiar question across the region.
Trump later escalated his rhetoric, saying that if Israel “can’t do the job without killing everyone else, Syria should do the job.” Describing the war on Lebanon as a secondary front, he suggested that Syria, in coordination with the US, could take on Hezbollah if Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not be reined in.
Whenever the region enters a period of major change, the same issue resurfaces. Can Syria once again play a direct security or military role in Lebanon, as it did in 1976?
The comparison is tempting on the surface. It invites parallels between the current leadership in Damascus and the late president Hafez al-Assad, who sent Syrian forces into Lebanon during the civil war. Yet even a brief look at the surrounding conditions suggests that the resemblance is largely superficial.
Trump himself did not clarify what form of assistance he had in mind. The possibilities range from border control and curbing smuggling routes to a broader attempt to pressure Hezbollah.
An old question returns
Similar ideas have surfaced before. In a July 2025 interview with The National, US envoy Tom Barrack warned that Lebanon faced an “existential threat” if it failed to address Hezbollah’s weapons, adding that “if Lebanon doesn’t move, it’s going to be Bilad Al Sham [Greater Syria] again.”
In March, Reuters reported that Washington had encouraged Syria to consider sending forces into eastern Lebanon to help disarm Hezbollah, a claim later denied by Barrack. The episode nevertheless fueled speculation about a possible Syrian role in Lebanon.
The responses from Sharaa’s government, however, have remained cautious and indirect. Sharaa has expressed support for Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s efforts to consolidate arms under state authority, while recent exchanges with Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have emphasized coordination between military and security institutions in both countries.
Syria’s self-appointed president and former Al-Qaeda chief Ahmad al-Sharaa dismissed reports that Syrian forces could enter Lebanon as “rumors.”
At the same time, periodic announcements from Syrian authorities about dismantling alleged Hezbollah-linked cells have been interpreted by some observers as signals aimed at Washington, suggesting readiness to engage if political backing is secured. Whether this reflects a concrete agreement or simply an attempt to keep options open remains unclear.
What is clear is that the renewed discussion comes at a moment when broader regional balances are in flux, particularly after the collapse of the previous Syrian order. The question is not whether Syria once intervened in Lebanon, but whether the conditions that made that intervention possible still exist.
1976 and the architecture of intervention
By the time Syrian forces entered Lebanon in 1976, the civil war had pushed the state to the brink. Importantly, the intervention took shape within a web of regional bargains and international understandings, rather than a unilateral move by Damascus.
The move was carried out at the request of the Lebanese president at the time, Suleiman Frangieh, and was supported by influential Lebanese actors who feared a decisive shift in the internal balance of power. It also aligned with broader concerns shared by regional and international players who were wary of Lebanon descending into total disorder.
Accounts in both western and Arab sources point to quiet understandings between the US, Saudi Arabia, and France that gave Syria space to act as a stabilizing force. The objective was about containing a crisis that risked spilling beyond Lebanon and unsettling the wider region.
The intervention was later formalized through the Arab Deterrent Forces (ADF), which provided a measure of regional legitimacy under the umbrella of the Arab League. This layer of political cover mattered as much as the military dimension.
Equally important was the nature of the Syrian state itself at the time. Syria in 1976 was a cohesive political entity with functioning institutions and a professional army that ranked among the largest in the region. Assad’s leadership carried both domestic and international recognition, reinforced by the aftermath of the 1973 war.
From Assad’s perspective, Lebanon was not a distant arena but an extension of its own security environment. The prospect of a hostile force dominating Lebanon was treated as a direct threat to Syrian national security.
Even so, the intervention was not without tension. The Soviet Union, Syria’s principal ally, expressed reservations, reflecting its own alignment with other forces inside Lebanon. Assad nevertheless proceeded, guided by his assessment of Syria’s strategic interests.
The ability to make such a decision rested on a combination of factors: a stable state, a centralized leadership, a disciplined army, regional acceptance, and working relationships with key Arab actors. Together, these elements created a framework that made intervention both possible and, for a time, sustainable.
A different Syria
None of these conditions applies in the same way today. The current leadership in Damascus operates from a transitional position, still seeking to consolidate authority within a country deeply affected by years of conflict.
There is no broad national consensus over the future political order, and the institutional framework remains incomplete. Legislative bodies and representative structures that might anchor political legitimacy are either absent or still in formation. External backing, whether from the US, Turkiye, Qatar, or others, does not substitute for internal acceptance.
Experience suggests that states cannot rely on external recognition alone to secure stability. Durable governance depends on a social contract that reflects a degree of consensus among citizens. In Syria’s case, that process is ongoing and far from settled.
The challenges facing the current authority are primarily internal. Rebuilding state institutions, addressing economic collapse, and managing the social consequences of prolonged conflict all demand sustained attention. Large segments of the population continue to face economic hardship, while public services and infrastructure remain under strain.
The divisions forged during the war have not receded. Political, social, and sectarian fault lines still cut across the country. In this context, the priority remains consolidation at home, not projection abroad.
A leadership still working to establish its authority is unlikely to commit to a regional role that would require resources, cohesion, and legitimacy it has yet to secure.
The question of the military
The structure and character of the military institution further complicate the picture. The Syrian army that entered Lebanon in 1976 was a regular force with a defined command structure and a coherent doctrine.
Today’s military formations are the product of a long, fragmented war. At their core are factions that once operated as distinct armed groups – among them elements that emerged from or overlapped with networks such as the Nusra Front and other Salafi extremist currents, alongside local militias and foreign fighters folded in over time. Efforts to weld these strands into a single national army remain partial and uneven.
Questions also persist regarding leadership structures, external affiliations, and the presence of foreign fighters within certain units. These factors have drawn scrutiny from international actors and have been reflected in sanctions targeting individuals linked to these formations.
Reports of violations during operations along Syria’s coast and in Suwayda have kept questions of accountability and discipline alive. That record complicates attempts to present these formations as a cohesive national army capable of assuming a wider regional role.
Without a unified command structure and broad public confidence, the military lacks the foundation required for sustained operations beyond Syria’s borders.
Lebanon without an invitation
The Lebanese context has also changed in fundamental ways. In 1976, Syria’s intervention was facilitated by internal Lebanese dynamics, including a formal request from the presidency and support from key political forces.
Today, there is no comparable call for Syrian involvement. Across the political spectrum, Lebanese actors tend to view the period of Syrian tutelage as a chapter they do not wish to revisit, regardless of their differing positions on Hezbollah or regional alignments.
The absence of a domestic Lebanese consensus is matched by a lack of regional endorsement. No major Arab state is advocating for a renewed Syrian military role in Lebanon, and the political environment offers little space for such a move.
Regional risks and the Turkish factor
Another variable that did not exist in 1976 is the extent of Turkish involvement in Syria. Ankara’s presence adds a layer of complexity to any potential Syrian move beyond its borders.
Any Syrian move into Lebanon would run straight into Turkish red lines, Iranian interests, and Hezbollah’s own calculations. What begins as a limited step risks quickly widening, pulling in actors who are already embedded across the same theater.
The prospect of Syrian forces entering Lebanon could also deepen sectarian tensions, extending beyond Lebanon into Syria and Iraq. In an already volatile environment, such a development would be difficult to contain.
If the equation shifts
The equation has already begun to shift. Washington and Tehran have signed an interim memorandum that freezes the conflict and opens the door to wider negotiations. Whether that process produces a lasting settlement or merely a temporary pause remains unclear, but the assumptions that governed the region before the agreement are already being tested.
Such a shift would likely alter priorities across multiple arenas, including Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. The emphasis could move from confrontation to managing balances of influence, reducing the relevance of some of the initiatives that emerged during periods of heightened tension.
In that context, the role of actors such as Hezbollah would be recalibrated within a different strategic environment, one where stability takes precedence over escalation.
Limits of power
Comparisons between 1976 and the present miss how far the ground has shifted. That intervention rested on a particular convergence of internal strength, regional acceptance, and international cover.
Syria today sits in a different position. Questions of legitimacy, institutional reconstruction, economic recovery, and social cohesion remain unresolved. The regional environment has also changed, with little appetite for a renewed Syrian role in Lebanon.
The question of intervention is not about intent alone. It turns on power, resources, and the condition of the state itself.
From that perspective, the more pressing question is not whether Damascus can re-enter Lebanon, but whether it has fully reconstituted itself at home.
As the familiar political saying goes, those who have yet to put their own house in order are unlikely to reorganize the neighborhood around them.
The debate, in the end, returns to a simple constraint: power is bounded by geography.
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Book Review
What Is Peanut Allergy?
An Essay on the Injection That Created the Epidemic
Lies are Unbekoming | August 8, 2026
… In 1988, Japanese pediatricians began seeing something new. Children who had received the recently reformulated DTaP vaccine at three months of age were arriving at emergency rooms with anaphylaxis after eating yogurt or Jell-O. Others were reacting at their MMR shot months later. The reactions had not existed at that scale before. The pediatricians investigated. They identified the cause.
The aluminum adjuvant in the new acellular DTaP had sensitized the children to the trace gelatin proteins in the vaccine. Weeks or months later, the MMR (which also contained gelatin) delivered the second dose. The second injection provoked anaphylaxis in a subset of children. Some then reacted to gelatin in food.
The Japanese doctors wrote it down. They published. They removed gelatin from DTaP. New cases of gelatin allergy in Japanese children dropped.
The paper is on file. The cause is named. The solution worked. No Western regulator has applied the same investigation to peanut allergy, though peanut anaphylaxis emerged in Western children during the same window, at the same ages, following the same category of injection schedule change.
The Mayo Clinic’s public description of peanut allergy states that it occurs when the immune system “mistakenly identifies peanut proteins as something harmful.” FARE, the establishment’s own advocacy organization, documents that peanut allergy in US children more than tripled between 1997 and 2008. Neither statement explains why the mistake began, at scale, in a specific decade, in a specific set of countries.
The mistake framing is the tell. A mechanism that “mistakes” a food protein for a threat cannot explain why the mistake was rare in 1980 and epidemic by 1995. The body’s design did not change in fifteen years. What changed was what was injected into infants: what compounds, at what ages, in what combinations.
The Japanese case is the counterfactual. The cause was found and the epidemic was ended. What separates the Japanese gelatin admission from the Western peanut silence is not the science. The science has been in the record since 1913. What separates them is the willingness to name what was done. … Read full essay
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