There are No Ceasefires with Israel, Only Opportunities for Later Attacks
By Robert Inlakesh | Palestine Chronicle | April 12, 2026
“The war is not over,” stated Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, less than twenty-four hours after a two-week cessation of hostilities with Iran was declared by the US. A clear sign of what is to come, from an emboldened Israeli leadership that has failed to achieve their goals of “total victory” in a “seven-front war” that has been ongoing since October of 2023.
With all the talk about ceasefire agreements to end regional hostilities in the Arab and English media, the Israeli Hebrew media is looking at things quite differently. Instead of an end to a war that the majority of the international community has worked to close, Tel Aviv eyes the next escalation.
In Lebanon, if a ceasefire is reached, the Israeli government will seek to do so in a way that inflicts a major political blow against Hezbollah, after having failed to achieve actual military accomplishments. Almost immediately following US President Donald Trump’s Truth Social post declaring a two-week ceasefire, Israel jumped to use the opportunity it had gained through the ceasefire in order to focus all of its airpower on Lebanon.
The results were truly devastating; around 300 Lebanese civilians were murdered in a series of strikes that lasted only ten minutes, which followed mass strikes across the country, including the targeting of an ambulance. After this, a series of other attacks took place, including a targeted strike which killed 19 Lebanese in Nabatieh, including at least 12 Security Force members.
Meanwhile, the US picked Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun, who have publicly begged their way to direct negotiations with Israel, while their civilians suffer through successive massacres. The way this is all being orchestrated was laid out well by a presenter on Israel’s Channel 13 News, who openly said that the Israelis are trying to orchestrate civil war inside Lebanon, using the government to order a crackdown on Hezbollah that will trigger it.
There are also Lebanese Forces militiamen who are suspected of helping drag the nation into such a bloody conflict.
Just as on November 27, 2024, when the Lebanon ceasefire was declared, the Israelis don’t see it as an agreement designed to stop aggression mutually. Over the course of 15 months, the Israelis committed 15,400 violations of the Lebanon ceasefire, setting a world record for the most violated ceasefire in recorded human history. While the US-backed Lebanese government pretended as if a new war had started in March, the Israelis had been waging war on the Lebanese south for 15 months.
In the Gaza Strip, the so-called ceasefire was also an opportunity for the Israelis; they got a break from the fighting while continuing to arm and build up their ISIS-linked militia allies. They violated the ceasefire around 3,000 times, killing over 700 Palestinians, all as a Civi-Military Coordination Center (CMCC), composed of over 20 countries, watched on in silence.
All the way back to 1948, the Israelis used ceasefires and temporary truces in the same exact way. For example, they launched ‘Operation Danny’, in July of 1948, during a temporary pause to secure territory in Lydd and Ramla; then ‘Operation Yoav’ in October 1948, breaking the second truce to launch an attack in the Naqab region; followed by ‘Operation Hiram’, also in October 1948 that was initiated shortly after the second truce ended, flooding their forces into the Galilee.
All of the Gaza ceasefire agreements were violated continuously by the Israelis, each used to Tel Aviv’s advantage. More recently, we can turn to Syria, where the Israelis tore up the 1974 disengagement agreement, using the fall of Bashar al-Assad to occupy even more southern Syrian territory, including seven key water assets. They had a well-oiled plan prepared, sitting there waiting for the day that regime change occurred in Damascus.
There is only one example of where the Israelis were forced to abide by a ceasefire, but were still violating Lebanese sovereignty thousands upon thousands of times throughout, and that was following the 2006 Lebanon war, when a costly equation was imposed by force. Yet, the post-October 7 predicament has destroyed all previous understandings and ushered in an expansionist era for the Israeli government. Both Benjamin Netanyahu and opposition leader Yair Lapid have both publicly stated their interest in expanding Israel’s undeclared borders and achieving the “Greater Israel Project”.
Tel Aviv’s defence minister, Israel Katz, has made it clear Israel’s intention to expand its borders up to the Litani River in Lebanon, while Finance Minister Smotrich has openly asserted that the objective of settling the area is a goal.
Israel is currently fighting what it sees as an existential battle to achieve the rebirth of “Eretz Israel”, a regional war that will not end until the project is secured. This means that even if a ceasefire is reached with Iran and Lebanon, it is not actually a ceasefire; it is simply another opportunity to implement new schemes and head back to the drawing board, only to escalate once again in the future.
Both history and the statements coming from the Israeli leadership clearly demonstrate that there is no such thing as a sustainable ceasefire with Israel.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.
Laith Marouf: Hezbollah’s position on US-Iran ceasefire: What you’re not being told
Dialogue Works | April 8, 2026
Why the CIA conspiracy to invade Iran with Kurdish militias failed
By Robert Inlakesh | Al Mayadeen | April 5, 2026
At the beginning of the US-Israeli War on Iran, stories were circulated about the United States attempting to use Kurdish militia groups in order to wage a ground offensive against Iran. Yet the strategy never ended up getting off the ground. Understanding the context helps explain what happened
On February 22, just prior to the joint US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran, five Kurdish-Iranian militant factions held a conference declaring a historic unity agreement had been reached. As a result the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan, and a branch of the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan came together. They declared themselves the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK), explicitly to fight against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
For long, Tehran had argued that these groups were being backed by the Western and Israeli intelligence agencies. However, journalists also adopting this analysis were often framed as being conspiracy theorists. That was, of course, until a few days into the US-Israeli war on Iran, when it emerged that the Trump administration was openly in talks with them, encouraging an invasion of Iran’s Western borders.
Then came the bombshell report from CNN, whose sources alleged that the CIA had been covertly working to arm these Kurdish-Iranian groups based in Iraq. So, at this stage, and shockingly so, there is no conspiracy to unravel as it has already been exposed.
What would such an invasion look like?
As has become evident, regime change in Iran is not going to be possible through a campaign from the air alone; the natural next step to achieving this was always going to be creating an insurgency inside the country, whilst invading from without also. In the US’s alleged strategic thinking, a Kurdish invasion would ideally work to foster a wider uprising inside the country, thus creating a general environment of chaos and division.
However, bringing about such a predicament was not going to come easy. In January, the Israeli Mossad attempted to foster an armed uprising that would trigger a civil war. Iran managed to put this bloody assault down with overwhelming force in just two or three days, a conflict which cost the lives of 3,117 people, including hundreds of policemen and security force members.
Initially, this uprising sought to use paid agents from criminal groups in the West of Iran and there was some evidence that Kurdish militia groups were used to clash with the Iranian security forces, but this was quickly quelled. In fact, in 2022, when the death of Mahsa Amini triggered nationwide protests, Western intelligence agencies jumped on the opportunity to use Kurdish separatist groups, but failed to achieve their desired objectives.
In Iraq, the US, and later the Israelis, also worked alongside Kurdish forces in order to secure the control of oil resources and successfully created the semi-autonomous Iraqi-Kurdistan region, complete with its own Kurdish government. The same came in north-eastern Syria, where the US helped set up what was known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), using them to fight back ISIS and claim control of not only Syria’s oil fields but the most fertile agricultural land in the country.
Unfortunately, Kurdish nationalism has always been promoted by the United States, and before it the British, dating back to the 1920’s, in a way that enables them to use the Kurdish minority populations of the region to do their bidding. Although these Kurdish nationalist groups, who seek to build separatist regions in Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkiye, proudly believe that their groups are fighting for a noble cause, they almost always end up causing more harm to the Kurdish populations and those around them.
This is not to comment on the historical or moral validity of Kurdish nationalism and their struggle for statehood, instead it is a factual assessment. Take for instance the recently dissolved Kurdish autonomous region project in north eastern Syria, what the US-backed SDF called Rojava. In 2015, the United States armed and funded them to fight against ISIS, promising them a bright future in return for their sacrifices on the battlefield.
Eventually, the Kurdish-led SDF, which ruled over a majority Arab territory, managed to seize the area of Afrin, towards the north-west of Syria. Turkiye, which views almost every Kurdish group as a terrorist organisation and/or threat, decided in 2018 to launch “Operation Olive Branch”, crushing the SDF and seizing that territory for themselves, handing it over to their own proxy forces. What did the US military do to help them? You guessed it, they ran away and deserted their Kurdish allies.
In 2019, Turkiye then launched “Operation Peace Spring”, seizing a strip of north-eastern Syria from the SDF and using their Al-Qaeda linked proxy forces called the “Syrian National Army” (SNA) to hold on to that land. Again, the US deserted their Kurdish allies. Despite this, the SDF crawled right back to their US backers and refused to reach an agreement with the then government of Bashar al-Assad.
When Assad was overthrown in December of 2024, there came a significant threat to many Kurdish-Syrians and more specifically the longevity of the SDF’s rule in north-eastern Syria. Syria’s new ruler, Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani while he led Al-Qaeda in Syria), decided to lead an offensive against the SDF to recapture the north-eastern portion of the country and place it under Damascus’s rule.
In January of 2026, after the US again deserted the Kurdish movement at the moment of truth, the SDF’s rule fell, and al-Sharaa took over north-eastern Syria. Why? Well, it’s very obvious: the US had only been using the Kurdish group as a proxy to withhold Syria’s oil and agricultural resources from it, until the government of Bashar al-Assad was toppled. Once regime change was accomplished, al-Sharaa was invited to the White House, and his Al-Qaeda and ISIS history was ignored.
See, the US never cared about the Kurds, nor did the Israelis, because both had covertly, and in some cases overtly, supported al-Qaeda linked groups in Syria also- playing both sides.
Although tragic, history shows us that it is very likely that Kurdish militant groups are used to do the West’s bidding, with promises of securing their own interests that never materialise. Therefore, it was always safe to assume that this would be attempted again. This time, however, the chance they had was extremely slim, and the consequences of such action even threatened the collapse of the Iraqi-Kurdistan project altogether.
The Kurdish groups in Iran cannot likely inspire a general uprising inside the country, this is for a number of reasons. The Kurdish population is considerable, numbering around 10 million of Iran’s 92 million strong population, yet they are not all hellbent on destroying the government, this is simply propaganda, most are normal people living their lives. These hostile Kurdish groups are based primarily in Iraq, in terms of their militant numbers, meaning that their forces inside Iran would have been overwhelmed from the jump.
Then there was the issue of the Iraq-Iran border, which had already been fortified and is where the Iranian military has deployed assets and soldiers to guard against an anticipated assault. But before they even reach the Iranian side, where they would have been greatly outnumbered, they would have to face off against Iraqi groups that are aligned with Iran. In total, these Iraqi groups – under the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU) – constitute a force of around 250,000 fighters if fully mobilised.
In order for such an assault to succeed in creating an uprising in Iran, or inspire other armed factions from other minority groups in the country – like the Lors, Arabs or others – to begin taking action, they would need to at least see results.
Even if the Kurdish factions were to hypothetically seize some territory, Iran is such a massive country that the temporary loss of towns and villages wouldn’t be such an issue. That’s the best case scenario for these groups, assuming they get past the Iraqis – in addition to the Iranian Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC)’s drones and missiles – first. If anything, such an offensive would have been destined to trigger an enormous backlash against the Kurdish regional project, rather than do it any good.
As for the idea of this leading to Balkanisation, it is not something that appears to be possible in the foreseeable future. This is not to say that Tel Aviv and Washington won’t try. Yet, the Iranian opposition is so incredibly divided – territorially and ideologically – that the ability for groups to work together is also scarce.
Take for example the Iranians who support Israeli puppet Reza Pahlavi. These are hardline Persian Nationalists who believe that they are a superior ethnicity to Kurdish people, Afghans, Arabs and so on. Under the rule of the deposed Shah of Iran, whose son is now worshipped in a cult-like fashion by a small but vocal minority of Iranians [especially in the diaspora], the non-Persian groups inside the country were enormously undermined and discriminated against.
In fact, under the Islamic Republic, the minorities fare much better than they have under the Pahlavi monarchs and those Shahs that came before them. Their conditions are by no means perfect, and there are often complaints that the centre of Iran is prioritised by the government, which is where the majority of ethnic Persians are situated, yet there is simply no comparison between the way they are treated under the current Islamic rule and that of the previous leaderships.
In conclusion, the options for creating a Syria-style civil war in Iran were always much lower than was being claimed by some commentators, or had been presented by pro-war think tanks in Washington. As Iran is under attack, and atrocities are being carried out against civilians on a daily basis, this has worked to make the nation’s people rally behind the flag, rather than embark upon bloody sectarian revolts.
Another key factor to understand here is that the Islamic Republic is clearly holding its own against the world’s top military superpower and the region’s most advanced military. This in itself makes small militant groups more hesitant to take action. Having said this, the US and Israelis appear to be willing to sacrifice all their proxies in a bid to achieve regime change, or at least inflict a significant blow, this time around, so it is never an impossibility that some desperate action may still be ordered at some stage.
His Majesty’s head-chopper: Syria’s MI6-backed president bows to King Charles

By Kit Klarenberg | The Grayzone | April 3, 2026
When Syria’s “interim” leader Ahmed al-Sharaa touched down in London on March 31, he was given a much warmer welcome than many once thought possible. As the longtime leader of Syria’s Al-Qaeda branch, the US had been offering a $10 million bounty for information on his location just 15 months prior. Yet here was Al-Sharaa, proudly posing for photo ops with King Charles and Prime Minister Keir Starmer.
British intelligence had been working towards this day for almost two decades. The path for al-Sharaa’s rule was cleared by MI6 after years of mentoring under Jonathan Powell, who now serves as National Security Advisor to Starmer. The time had come for Britain to formally anoint its Syrian puppet.
The ongoing US-Israeli war on Iran, and the Strait of Hormuz’s closure, were reportedly at the top of Starmer and al-Sharaa’s agenda. The British premier praised his counterpart’s supposed success in battling ISIS, while al-Sharaa thanked London for its assistance in pushing for sanctions on Syria’s ruined economy to be lifted. The pair have enjoyed warm relations since al-Sharaa’s seizure of power in December 2024, which Starmer publicly celebrated as a golden opportunity for London to “play a more present and consistent role throughout the region.”
Ever since, the British have systematically steered Damascus’ self-appointed government towards recognition and welcome by Western states. In May 2025, as al-Sharaa’s death squads massacred Alawites and other ethnic and religious minorities, US President Donald Trump received his Syrian counterpart in the oval office, where he gifted him a bottle of Trump-branded cologne. The BBC acknowledged this development would have been “unthinkable just months ago.”
Al-Sharaa took the next steps in January 2026, when he signed an unpopular US-brokered accord with Israel, which former Syrian President Bashar Assad had steadfastly refused to endorse for decades.
The impacts of the deal were immediately visible. As Al-Sharaa’s forces swept through Kurdish territory in north east Syria, the Kurds’ erstwhile Israeli backers refused to intervene, and US envoy Tom Barrack publicly declared that the American partnership with the Kurds had “expired.”
Within weeks, al-Sharaa’s forces wrested control of the country’s wheat and oil-producing areas, which had been under US-led occupation for years. Though Syria and Israel have yet to formally normalize relations, al-Sharaa describes relations between the countries as “good.” Today, Syria’s airspace and ground territory is routinely used by Israel and its Western sponsors to wage war on Iran.
Though the rapid transition took many by surprise, the campaign to re-establish Western control over Syria was actually set in motion years ago.
Starmer’s top advisor also groomed al-Sharaa for power
Among the most important vehicles for grooming the former Syrian Al Qaeda warlord known as Mohammed Jolani into the politician, Ahmad Al-Sharaa, was a supposed conflict resolution NGO known as Inter-Mediate. Founded by Jonathan Powell, a former advisor to PM Tony Blair who helped negotiate the Good Friday accords in Northern Ireland, works closely with the British Foreign Office and MI6.
Powell’s Inter Mediate cultivated al-Sharaa’s militant Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) faction for power for years before the December 2025 palace coup, and now boasts a dedicated office within the presidential palace in Damascus.
Coincidentally, Powell took up the post as Starmer’s advisor mere days before HTS declared themselves Syria’s government. As a confidant of Tony Blair, Powell was a key figure in the push for the criminal 2003 Anglo-American Iraq invasion, helping shape bogus intelligence claiming that Baghdad posed a biological and chemical weapons threat to justify the illegal intervention.
Despite his role in the destruction of Iraq, British media has reported that Powell “may have more influence over foreign policy than anyone in government after the Prime Minister himself.” Today, Powell is charged with “coordinating all UK foreign policy, security, defence, Europe, and international economic issues.”

Al-Sharaa was also personally welcomed by Hamish Falconer, an intelligence-aligned Member of Parliament who spent years collaborating with MI6 as the British foreign office’s Terrorism Response Team leader and once served as a hostage negotiator in talks with the Taliban.
Falconer is a close associate of Amil Khan, a British intelligence contractor who worked obsessively to generate sympathetic coverage of HTS while plotting to undermine this outlet due to our critical reporting on Syrian jihadists and their friends in the British government.
Hamish’s father, Charlie Falconer, was a longtime friend and former roommate of former Tony Blair. Following Blair’s May 1997 election victory, Falconer senior was elevated to the unelected House of Lords, then served in a series of high-ranking government posts throughout his pal’s tenure, often coordinating with Jonathan Powell.
While there, the elder Falconer applied “huge pressure” to Attorney General Lord Goldsmith to change his conclusion that invading Iraq was completely illegal. This intervention may have played a decisive role in enabling the illegal war of aggression. Today, it’s been reported that many on Downing Street are “growing increasingly wary about the influence of… smooth Blairites.”
According to one British outlet, top officials in London are purportedly asking, “at what point… does ‘experience’ and ‘guidance’ become ‘control’?” The same question must be asked of MI6’s longstanding links to al-Sharaa.
British intel set up al-Sharaa’s civil apparatus
It is uncertain when British contact with HTS began. But Robert Ford, who served as the US ambassador to Syria from 2011 to 2014, disclosed that in 2023 Inter-Mediate sought his personal assistance in rebranding HTS from “terrorists” into politicians. Ford met repeatedly with al-Sharaa, who reportedly expressed no remorse about the massacres and atrocities he perpetrated in Iraq. Al-Sharaa had served five years in the US military’s notorious Camp Bucca jail for his involvement with Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. He was released in 2011 – just in time for the Syrian dirty war.
In September 2025, former-MI6 chief Richard Moore admitted Britain’s foreign spying agency had been courting HTS long before its seizure of Damascus. “Having forged a relationship with HTS a year or two before they toppled Bashar, we forged a path for the UK Government to return to the country within weeks” of the fall of Assad, Moore boasted.
British psychological warfare operations and ‘aid’ efforts greatly assisted HTS’ consolidation of power in areas of Syria it occupied. As The Grayzone revealed in the immediate aftermath of Assad’s fall, leaked documents show MI6 was well-aware that reports of the group’s split from Al Qaeda were a fantasy.
Nevertheless, British propaganda efforts portrayed dangerous, chaotic HTS-occupied territory as a “moderate” success story, in order to demonstrate “a credible alternative to the [Assad] regime,” per the leaks. Central to these psy-ops were British-created assets including the Free Syrian Police (FSP) and White Helmets.
Framed by Western media as providing vital humanitarian services to local populations, these ostensibly independent agencies enjoyed fawning coverage in mainstream media. In reality, the pair collaborated closely with extremist groups, including HTS, and were complicit in hideous atrocities.
Whether intentional or not, HTS was “significantly less likely to attack opposition entities… receiving support” from the British government, a UK intelligence contractor stated. The work of the White Helmets and FSP greatly enhanced the terrorist group’s credibility as a governance actor and service provider among Syrians. When HTS took power outright in northwest Syria, the FSP became the territory’s formal police force. Since Assad’s ouster, the White Helmets have been tapped by British intelligence assets to run the country’s emergency services.
Despite al-Sharaa’s refusal to repudiate his extremist past, British diplomats initiated a series of meeting with him and other HTS warlords from December 2024 onwards. The public encounters continued even as legacy media outlets acknowledged these summits were completely illegal, as HTS was a proscribed terror group under British law. Starmer did not formally lift this designation initially, but nonetheless led calls for the removal of sanctions on Syria by all Western countries.
In March 2025, the UK terminated the majority of its Syria sanctions, and the rest of the EU followed shortly. With the revocation of US sanctions in July, Syria had effectively been welcomed back into the fold of the so-called international community.
While London’s man in Damascus appears eager to please Starmer and his counterparts in Western capitals, his sectarian politics remain a source of domestic credibility. In January, al-Sharaa’s forces overran northeastern Syria, and freed many ISIS fighters from Kurdish-run prisons, where MI6 had long-managed covert propaganda operations to influence inhabitants. Many freed ISIS brides reportedly refused repatriation to their home countries, “because their husbands are with” al-Sharaa.
A New Resistance Front: How Does Syria Factor into the Regional War?
By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle | April 2, 2026
A new Syrian resistance group has emerged and is the only organization in the country currently carrying out offensive actions against both Israeli and US targets. This development comes as Israel uses the newly occupied territories in its ground assault on Lebanon, a move that could easily rope Tel Aviv into a new quagmire.
While a US allied leader now technically controls Damascus, the reality on the ground in Syria is that there is no functional State. This being the case, the outbreak of chaos is simply one miscalculation away.
In stark contrast to the regimented and tightly controlled Syria that existed under the rule of Bashar Al-Assad and his father Hafez al-Assad, the country today is divided between countless powers throughout the country, with the President functioning as less of a strongman and more of a symbolic figure that covers the explosive charges ready to detonate. Nowhere was this on clearer display than in the July 2025 clashes in southern Syria’s Sweida Province.
President Ahmed al-Shara’a, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, has allied himself with his Western backers and even gone as far as signing onto a normalization mechanism with Israel. Short of full normalization of ties with Tel Aviv, the “joint fusion mechanism” that was agreed upon by Syrian and Israeli officials seeks to “facilitate immediate and ongoing coordination on their intelligence sharing, military de-escalation, diplomatic engagement, and commercial opportunities under the supervision of the United States.”
Knowing this, it would therefore appear strange that the Israelis still persist with not only bombing Syrian civilian infrastructure across the country, but also Syria’s new military forces. Understanding why will help in unlocking what appears on the surface to be a difficult puzzle to solve.
The Syrian leadership is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), infamous for being a rebrand of al-Nusra Front (Al-Qaeda in Syria). Although it is presented as if it were a real government, the group never had any experience in governance. Instead, they knew only how to rule over smaller militia factions and worked as the de facto leadership in Idlib, despite there having been a “Syrian Salvation Government” (SSG) who were technically in control of the territory.
Prior to the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s leadership in December of 2024, HTS had consented to the SSG’s existence in order to give the veneer of a professionally organized opposition. In reality, HTS held all the power cards, even running its own secret prisons, while leaving the administrative details to be hashed out by the professionals.
All of this is of great importance because Bashar al-Assad’s entire system was not overthrown in some kind of war of liberation; instead, it collapsed without any real fight. Therefore, when Ahmed al-Shara’a entered Damascus and declared himself leader, he was in a very difficult position.
Under the supervision of his foreign backers, chiefly the United States, the new Syrian leadership focused on symbolism rather than fundamentally changing the way the country functioned. Therefore, Damascus opened itself up to Washington and became a playground for Western and Israeli intelligence agents, as the new President attempted to impress Washington.
Meanwhile, many of the most corrupt elements belonging to the former regime, were permitted to continue on as if it was business as usual, all as the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and former intelligence and police services were disbanded. What replaced the former security apparatus were simply militants belonging to the alphabet soup of Al-Qaeda affiliates that had been operating previously out of Idlib.
This being the case, the words of Ahmed al-Shara’a often have little to no bearing on what actually transpires on the ground. Meaning that corruption is rampant, every corner of the nation is filled with different armed forces who have their own territory when push comes to shove. In essence, all of Syria became a big Idlib.
Syria is no longer subjected to sanctions, has gained access to its most fertile agricultural lands, is no longer internationally isolated, while ruling over its own oil and gas fields. Despite all of this, the country’s economy is still in the toilet, and the long-promised prosperity has been reduced to vague future visions. This isn’t to say it’s impossible for things to change, but as it stands, this is Syria today.
Because of the state of Syria’s affairs, cross-border smuggling has exploded and this has evidently benefited Lebanese Hezbollah next door. Two sources familiar with the matter informed Palestine Chronicle that the quantity of weapons flowing through the Syrian-Lebanese border had even increased since the fall of Bashar al-Assad.
According to reports, the US has been applying pressure on Damascus to attack Lebanon in order to help Israel weaken Hezbollah in the Bekaa Valley region. In response, President al-Shara’a broke his silence this Tuesday and declared that Syria will not attack Lebanon, an announcement that came following a threat earlier that day from an Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) spokesperson, threatening to attack if Damascus orders such a move.
This affirmed previous suspicions that such an equation could arise, whereby a Syrian invasion of Lebanon would trigger an Iraqi invasion. The PMU, when fully mobilized, can muster a force of around 250,000 fighters, a much more formidable force than what currently constitutes the Syrian Army.
Another possible equation that could be set is a Syria-Israel clash. Not only could armed resistance groups, aligned with the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance, end up creating such a reality, but others could also be roped in.
Israel’s recent bombing of Syrian military positions, coupled with Israeli Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir’s calls to assassinate the Syrian President, both occurred following an alleged military buildup near the Sweida Province.
It is likely that Damascus was eyeing the opportunity presenting itself to finally deal with the Druze Separatist movement in the southern province. Led by one of the Druze minority group’s spiritual leaders, Hikmat al-Hijri, a unified command calling itself the “National Guard” formed in order to operate a semi-autonomous zone in Sweida.
The National Guard began receiving direct military, financial and logistical support from Israel, who have long sought to establish a Druze rump State in southern Syria, a goal that enables an even greater land grab, as well as opening up “David’s Corridor” [shown in blue below] spanning over to the Iraqi-Syrian border.

In the eyes of Syria’s leadership, the Druze issue is of great importance to solve for a range of reasons. One of which is that there is an enormous amount of sectarian tension, which various groups who form the new Syrian security apparatus, along with the Bedouin tribal forces, seek to punish following the bloodshed that began last July. It will also mean that technically, Syria will be one step closer to having one central government rule the entire country, which is a symbolic victory for Ahmed al-Shara’a.
However, the Israelis appear to have pre-empted such an offensive and committed a number of airstrikes as a warning to the Syrian leadership. There is clear anxiety over such a battle unfolding, because if it occurs, the Israeli military will be forced to intervene in order to save its Druze separatist allies.
As mentioned above, if things spiral out of control, the President himself cannot necessarily do much about it. That means that Syrian forces will likely begin to directly come into contact with the Israelis on the ground, something that could easily spiral.
Most of the fighters who have, for now, aligned themselves with the Syrian government are no fans of Israel, to say the least. This was on full display last December during the military parades conducted by Syria’s new armed forces, who openly chanted for Gaza, threatened Tel Aviv, and some even burned Israeli flags.
The alternative scenario for the Israelis in Syria may end up being worse, meaning that if they were to assassinate al-Shara’a, a power struggle would likely end up playing out on the streets of the Capital and throughout the country. So many different actors will seek to claim power.
Syria’s predicament has turned out to be less favourable to Tel Aviv, not because it poses an immediate strategic threat, but because almost anything is possible there. During the regional war between the Israeli-US alliance and the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance, one wrong misstep could prove fatal and open up yet another front, which will not only drain their resources but also weaken their ability to fight Hezbollah.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.
Israel’s Iran Strategy Uses US Military & Gulf States as Its Pawns
By Robert Inlakesh | Palestine Chronicle | March 29, 2026
While most honest analysts will conclude that the decision made by the White House came as a result of pressure from the Israelis or that this is a war that is being fought for Tel Aviv’s interests, many fail to see any clear strategy at play.
In order to understand the strategy behind the US-Israeli assault on the Islamic Republic, you must first remove the notion that the United States is in the driving seat to any significant extent.
Almost immediately after the 12-Day War in June of 2025, the Israeli leadership was already preparing for the next round. On July 7, Axios News even reported that officials in Tel Aviv believed that US President Trump would give them another green light to attack.
Meanwhile, the most influential Zionist think tanks in Washington DC, the likes of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), were openly discussing the necessity of a new round of confrontations.
These think tanks facilitated discussions and published pieces in which they made it clear that while the next round was inevitable, it had to be the last round, and that the US’s involvement would be important in deciding outcomes.
Understanding the Israeli Strategy
It is no coincidence that senior Israeli officials, all the way from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to opposition leader Yair Lapid, have all recently publicly endorsed the “Greater Israel Project”.
This is not simply posturing, this is their goal. But how does this fit into the Iran war? Well, it will begin to make sense when the context is all provided.
Firstly, the Greater Israel Project’s strategy is grounded in an academic article published by a former Israeli intelligence officer and journalist, Oded Yinon. The plan did not advocate for the physical expansion of the Israeli State’s borders over every nation between the Euphrates River and the River Nile, but instead opted for an approach that would transform Israel into a regional empire.
In order to achieve this goal of a “Greater Israel”, it would first necessitate the collapse of all the region’s sovereign States, which would instead be broken up into warring sectarian and ethno-regimes.
The purpose of achieving the disintegration of the surrounding nations is a simple concept to understand. If they are all divided, economically weak, and lack the military capabilities to stand up to Israel, it makes it easy for the Israelis to control them.
Take, for example, the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq, or the semi-autonomous zone in southern Syria’s Sweida Province, now carved out by Israeli-backed separatists.
Syria and Iraq are perfect examples of what happens when a nation is torn apart and sectarianism, or ethno-supremacist ideologies, are spread through deliberate propaganda campaigns.
Although Secular Arab Nationalism failed in the region, the chief proponent of it, former Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, was indeed correct in his analysis as to why it was a net positive for the region.
A united Arab World would undoubtedly be far stronger than the simple modern nation-states of the region, whose borders were drawn up by European colonial powers.
For the Israelis, they had always sought to impose this long-term solution upon West Asia, of a “Greater Israel”, but were previously seeking to do it in a slow and methodical way, opposed to a ruthlessly violent one.
Part of this way of thinking was centered around the idea that Israel maintained a “deterrence capacity”, meaning that their military power was capable of deterring any significant strategic threat from rising against it.
On October 7, 2023, the Qassam Brigades of Hamas crippled this strategy and debunked the notion of their “deterrence capacity”. A few thousand Palestinian fighters managed to overcome the most militarily advanced army in the region, bursting through the gates of their concentration camp, despite the world’s most advanced surveillance systems being present in the area.
The Palestinian groups themselves appear to have been genuinely surprised by how easily they were capable of achieving their goals. Not only did they inflict a blow on the Israeli military and seize captives, but they also managed to collapse the entire Israeli southern command, all with light weapons.
To Israel, the message was clear: The Arab populations of Jordan and Egypt had taken to the streets, some even pouring across the Jordanian border. The weakest link in the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance had dealt the Israeli military its most embarrassing defeat. Deterrence was dead, and former Secretary General of Hezbollah, Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, was proven correct: “Israel is weaker than a spider’s web”.
The decision to commit genocide was therefore ordered. Israel believed it had to show the Arab World what it was truly capable of, as a means of asserting its control. In the cases of the Arab populations in Jordan, Egypt, and even the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem, the fear tactics appeared to have worked. Then they made an irreversible mistake.
In September 2024, they assassinated Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, a move that completely changed the thinking of Iran and its allies. Now, the message had been received loud and clear; preparations for the last war had to be made. Up until then, the Axis of Resistance had been attempting to close the chapter of the Gaza genocide; now, they understood that destroying Gaza wasn’t the end goal of Israel.
Israel had decided it would accelerate its national project of gradual expansion, meaning that the Islamic Republic of Iran had to be deposed. A failure to overthrow the Iranian government would represent an existential threat to this project.
Israel’s Iran War Strategy
As I have been writing in the Palestine Chronicle for the past eight months, the only viable strategy that the Israelis could hope to use, in order to see any gains, is one where Iran’s civilian infrastructure is the primary target.
That means: taking out power stations, desalination plants along with other key water facilities – less than 3% of Iran’s water needs come from desalination – while blowing up oil and gas facilities, bombing factories, destroying agricultural lands, inflicting costly environmental catastrophes, and attempting to cripple the Iranian State’s ability to function. In other words, a policy that replicates the Gaza model on a much wider scale, impacting a nation of 92 million people.
Tel Aviv’s goal here is a long-term regime change operation, one that will happen gradually following the war itself. Israel knows that destroying Iran’s military capabilities was never going to be possible. Yes, they may have some successes, but totally crippling their missile and drone programs through strikes alone won’t work.
Therefore, they seek to try and force Tehran to expend a large portion of its missile arsenal, making it more difficult for them to start a new war in the near future following the conflict’s conclusion.
If you look at Syria, for example, the government of Bashar al-Assad did not collapse during the war. Instead, the Syrian State slowly eroded from the inside, due to its isolation and the US-EU’s maximum pressure sanctions.
In the end, the Syrian State was largely bought out and was so corrupt that there was little left. When Ahmed al-Shara’a marched into Aleppo and then Damascus, he did so without any fight, although there were some exceptions where a few units resisted.
Now, Damascus is open for Israeli citizens, the leadership in Syria meets with Israeli officials face-to-face, and has even set up a joint normalizing mechanism between both sides. Therefore, using the long game strategy against Iran makes the most sense in Israel’s strategic thinking.
Then there comes the convenient side effect of the strategy, which begins to explain how the US leadership is not in the driver’s seat at all. That being the weakening of the Persian Gulf Arab nations.
Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are experiencing untold economic devastation as a result of this war. The reason for this, evidently, is that they all host US bases and have permitted a large presence of American military and intelligence personnel inside their countries.
Oman, and to a lesser extent Qatar, have been the only Gulf nations that appear to be pushing back against the true culprits in this war, the Israelis and US. Muscat in particular has blasted the “security arrangements” in the region and condemned normalising efforts with Tel Aviv, pointing their fingers in the right direction.
Bahrain and especially the UAE have gone in the opposite direction. They are only increasing their pro-Israeli and anti-Iran rhetoric, which comes as little surprise given that both have normalized relations with the Zionists. Riyadh, on the other hand, appears to be on a separate trajectory, with its rhetoric being diplomatic, while its actions suggest it is hostile towards Iran.
The Israelis, despite their efforts to normalize ties with the Gulf States, do not want strong nations to exist anywhere in West Asia under their accelerationist approach to achieving an Israel Empire. This appears to be something that the leadership in Abu Dhabi and Manama have not proven intelligent enough to figure out.
That is why the Israeli leadership had started to announce their next targets, following Iran, were the leaderships in Turkiye and even Pakistan. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is not a threat in the way that Iran is, but he does command one of the most powerful military forces in the region and rules over a developing economy, working towards transforming itself into a key global trade hub.
Alone, the idea that Turkiye would begin to build an economic or defence alliance with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Egypt, poses a direct threat to the Greater Israel Project. In Syria, we see a similar thing; although Ankara does not present a clear and present military challenge to the Israelis as a result of its influence in Damascus, it acts as a potential competitor, a nation that may seek to curtail Israeli expansionist plots.
The GCC countries, which are in alliance with one another, maintain immense economic power. As we see today, if the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted, the entire world is impacted. Back in 1973, these Persian Gulf Arab States exercised that power temporarily. One thing to keep in mind with the Israelis is that they never forget history and are infamous for holding grudges.
So, the dismantlement of the Gulf Arab nations’ economies, or at the very least, the weakening of these countries, is viewed as a positive development in Tel Aviv. As for the US, this war is similarly disastrous, but Israel fails to care less.
This war has destroyed US power projection, making it open to its top chosen adversaries – Russia and China – in a number of other arenas. Donald Trump personally has business ties in the Gulf, which don’t benefit from this conflict, so even on a personal level, it isn’t exactly a victory. The entire Western World, allying itself with the US and Israel, is suffering economically, and as a result, this will mean social unrest is possible, even if it takes time to come to fruition.
An embarrassment has already been dealt to the US military, which is being made to look like a paper tiger, as Mao Zedong once called it. Its future in the Gulf region may have just been ruined, along with those billions, or trillions as Trump believes, of investments – from Gulf States – may no longer materialize. The entire White House Security Doctrine, published last year, has been torn up and set on fire.
In terms of soldier casualties, the Trump administration is evidently hiding the true figure, but it goes without saying that this isn’t good news. NATO has been forced to flee Iraq. The US has even lifted sanctions on Moscow and a limited number of sanctions on Iranian oil. There is simply nothing that the US stands to gain from this war, even if it were to somehow pull off a victory; at this point, it would prove pyrrhic.
With all of this being said, what the Israelis are doing is making a massive gamble. A series of risks that appear so far to be backfiring, as Tehran appears to have pre-empted the conspiracies set against it. The final results of the war are not yet in, but the odds appear to be on the side of Iran.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine. He contributed this article to The Palestine Chronicle.
Iraqi resistance conducts drone strike on US-run base in Syria
Press TV – March 28, 2026
Fighters from the anti-terror group Islamic Resistance in Iraq have conducted a drone strike against an installation operated by US occupation forces in Syria’s southwestern al-Tanf region, close to the borders with Iraq and Jordan.
The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported that air defense systems manned by members of the ruling Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militant group had intercepted and shot down an unmanned aircraft as it was flying in the skies over the base.
It added that the drone had most likely set off from an area in neighboring Iraq, without specifying the exact location.
Back on March 20, Iraqi resistance groups destroyed three critical sites at the US-run Harir base in Erbil — the capital of Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region, sharply reducing American military activities there.
An informed source said the positions were targeted simultaneously with missile strikes on the Victory Airbase close to the Baghdad International Airport.
Over the past two weeks, coordinated drone and missile attacks have repeatedly struck key infrastructure at Harir, including its central radar system, which was hit at least four times and ultimately destroyed.
Failing to Defeat Hezbollah, Israel & US Pressure Syria’s Ahmed al-Sharaa to Join War
By Robert Inlakesh | MintPress News | March 27, 2026
Openly declaring its intent to illegally occupy southern Lebanon, Israel finds itself in a costly ground battle with Hezbollah, from which there are indications Syria may soon be roped in. This is born from the understanding that in order to successfully weaken the Lebanese resistance, the Israeli military must penetrate the Bekaa Valley area.
Understanding the costly price of attempting to physically take all of south Lebanon militarily, both Washington and Tel Aviv have been attempting to devise strategies that would help achieve Israel’s war goals of weakening Hezbollah.
One possible option that has been placed on the table is the use of Syria’s military to invade Lebanon’s border and attack Hezbollah, aiming to go after what is labelled critical infrastructure belonging to the Lebanese group. According to reports, the US Trump administration has directly put pressure on Syrian leader Ahmed al-Shara’a to do just that.
In the event of such an assault, the Beka’a Valley would be the target territory. The Beka’a is what Israel’s Alma Research and Education think-tank calls “Hezbollah’s strategic depth”, which it argues is the group’s “operational and logistical center of gravity”. If Tel Aviv truly seeks to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities, a ground incursion into this region is the only way to truly achieve such a goal.
Another plausible option is that Israel itself will use Syrian territory in order to invade Lebanon’s eastern border. This would appear possible, as the current Hayat Tahrir al-Sham administration in Damascus has allowed Israel to use Lebanese territory on two occasions so far.
Although al-Shara’a doesn’t grant direct permission, he refuses to deploy his forces to prevent the Israelis from violating Syria’s sovereignty. Earlier this year, the leadership in Damascus agreed to setting up a soft normalisation understanding with the Israelis. According to US State Department press release, the following was agreed upon:
“Both Sides have decided to establish a joint fusion mechanism—a dedicated communication cell—to facilitate immediate and ongoing coordination on their intelligence sharing, military de-escalation, diplomatic engagement, and commercial opportunities under the supervision of the United States.”
It suffices to say that Syria’s current leader, who once spoke of conquering occupied Jerusalem, has clearly aligned himself with the United States and now openly states he will pose no threat to Israel. Instead of fighting back against Israel’s ever growing occupation of more Syrian lands, or responding to civilian massacres inside his territory, he has instead sought to disarm those Syrians who are threatened by the belligerent occupying force in the south.
Despite this, Israel has continually attacked Syrian territory, including bombing the ministry of defence in Damascus. Recently, it also attacked Syrian military positions in the Damascus countryside, citing renewed sectarian clashes between Israeli-aligned Druze separatists and HTS allied forces.
In December of last year, parades were held in Damascus and other Syrian cities, where armed factions making up the country’s new armed forces held marches in the streets to mark the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Notably, these soldiers chanted in solidarity with Gaza and issued threats to Israel.
Some groups belonging to the new Syrian security forces, also burned Israeli flags and expressed solidarity with the village of Beit Jinn, where a group of locals had organised an ambush against Israeli invading forces. Israel then bombarded the village, which is home to both Palestinians and Syrians, murdering at least 13 civilians.
A series of Syrian Resistance groups have also popped up in the country’s south, occasionally carrying out rocket attacks or opening fire on Israeli soldiers with light weapons. The most prominent group has been ‘Jabhat al-Moqowameh al-Islammiya Fe Souriya’ [The Islamic Resistance Front In Syria].
The newest group to emerge is called ‘Kataeb Jund al-Karrar Fe Balad as-Sham’ [Soldiers of the Karrar Brigades in the Levant] also emerged on March 8, publishing a video of themselves firing rockets at US military positions in Syria’s Palmyra. The group has additionally claimed attacks on Israel.
If Syrian President Ahmed al-Shara’a orders an attack on Lebanon, this could immediately trigger an incursion into Syria by the powerful Iraqi groups aligned with Hezbollah. An official statement issued by The Islamic Resistance Coordination Committee in Iraq explicitly threatened that:
“We see the treachery of the new authority in Syria and are monitoring its coordination with the enemy. We say clearly: if you dare violate the sovereignty of Lebanon and its patient, resisting people, we will turn your land into an open arena of fire. He who warns has given fair notice.”
On the other hand, due to the fragile security situation inside Syria, if the Israeli military does attempt to launch an offensive from inside Syrian territory, there is always a chance that they will come under attack from a whole myriad of forces. It is possible that what currently constitutes the Syrian Army, may even break ranks and refuse to listen to the leadership in Damascus.
On March 6, a botched Israeli special forces raid targeted the Lebanese village of Nabi Cheet, located east of Beirut. In order to conduct this infiltration operation – which was successfully repelled due to a joint effort from Hezbollah, local militias and the Lebanese Army – it used Syrian territory. Notably, it launched its assault from an area located north-west of Damascus.
Israel has so far displaced over a million people in Lebanon, openly declaring its intent to expand what it calls a military “buffer zone”. Israeli defence minister Israel Katz doesn’t mince his words however, openly declaring that he is seeking to occupy southern Lebanon up to the Litani River.
To this effect, the Israeli military has not only ordered the entire population of southern Lebanon to evacuate the territory, but also bombed five primary bridges connecting the south to the rest of the country. And yet, on the ground, the Israeli army is having a difficult time simply passing the border villages, where Hezbollah has damaged or destroyed around 70 Merkava tanks so far.
If the Israelis come under attack from forces inside Syria itself, they could be dragged into a painful quagmire there. This could also come about in the event that Syria’s al-Shara’a decides to seize the opportunity of Israel being distracted in Lebanon, to launch an offensive against the Druze separatist militias in Sweida. In order to save their Druze militia allies from suffering a major defeat, the Israeli army itself could get roped into direct clashes with Syrian forces.
Therefore, if the Israeli leadership makes the decision to escalate the Lebanon conflict by making a move towards the Bekaa Valley, they could very easily find themselves dealing with a totally new reality inside Syria too.
No time for losers: Why the war meant to save Israel may destroy it
By Ramzy Baroud | MEMO | March 16, 2026
When Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu launched their military aggression against Iran on 28th February, they appeared convinced that the war would be swift. Netanyahu reportedly assured Washington that the campaign would deliver a decisive strategic victory—one capable of reordering the Middle East and restoring Israel’s battered deterrence.
Whether Netanyahu himself believed that promise is another matter.
For decades, influential circles within Israel’s strategic establishment have not necessarily sought stability, but rather “creative destruction.” The logic is simple: dismantle hostile regional powers and allow fragmented political landscapes to replace them.
This idea did not emerge overnight. It was articulated most clearly in a 1996 policy paper titled A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm, prepared for then-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by a group of US neoconservative strategists, including Richard Perle.
The document argued that Israel should abandon land-for-peace diplomacy and instead pursue a strategy that would weaken or remove hostile regimes in the region, particularly Iraq and Syria. The goal was not merely military victory but a geopolitical restructuring of the Middle East in Israel’s favor.
The logic is simple: dismantle hostile regional powers and allow fragmented political landscapes to replace them.
In many ways, the subsequent decades seemed to validate that theory—at least from Tel Aviv’s perspective.
The Middle East Reordered
The 2003 US invasion of Iraq was widely considered a catastrophe for Washington. Hundreds of thousands died, trillions of dollars were spent, and the United States became entangled in one of the most destabilising occupations in modern history.
Yet the war removed Saddam Hussein’s government, dismantled the Baath Party, and destroyed what had once been the strongest Arab army in the region. For Israel, the strategic consequences were significant.
Iraq, historically one of the few Arab states capable of confronting Israel militarily, ceased to exist as a coherent regional power. Years of instability followed, leaving Baghdad with a fragile political system struggling to maintain national cohesion.
Syria, another central concern in Israeli strategic thinking, would later descend into its own devastating war beginning in 2011. Libya collapsed earlier after NATO’s intervention in 2011 as well. Across the region, once-formidable Arab nationalist states fractured into weakened or internally divided systems.
From Israel’s vantage point, the theory of regional fragmentation appeared to be paying dividends.
Without strong Arab states capable of projecting military power, several Gulf governments began reconsidering their long-standing refusal to normalise relations with Israel.
The result was the Abraham Accords, signed in September 2020 under the Trump administration, which formalised normalisation between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, later followed by Morocco and Sudan. For a moment, it seemed that the geopolitical transformation envisioned decades earlier had been realised.
Gaza changed the equation
But history rarely moves in straight lines. Israel’s genocide in Gaza did not produce the strategic victory Israeli leaders had anticipated. Instead, the war exposed deep vulnerabilities in Israel’s military and political standing.
More importantly, Palestinian resistance demonstrated that overwhelming military force could not translate into decisive political control.
The consequences reverberated far beyond Gaza.
The war galvanized resistance movements across the region, deepened divisions within Arab and Muslim societies between governments aligned with Washington and those opposed to Israeli policies, and ignited an unprecedented wave of global solidarity with Palestinians. Israel’s international image suffered dramatically.
For decades, Western political discourse framed Israel as a democratic outpost surrounded by hostile forces. That narrative has steadily eroded. Increasingly, Israel is described—even by major international organizations—as a state engaged in systematic oppression and, in Gaza’s case, genocidal violence.
The strategic cost of that reputational collapse cannot be overstated. Military power relies not only on weapons but also on legitimacy. And legitimacy, once lost, is difficult to recover.
Netanyahu’s final gamble
Against this backdrop, the war on Iran emerged as Netanyahu’s most consequential gamble.
If successful, it could restore Israel’s regional dominance and reassert its deterrence. Defeating Iran—or even severely weakening it—would reshape the balance of power across the Middle East. But failure carries equally profound consequences.
Netanyahu, now facing an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court in 2024 over war crimes in Gaza, has tied his political survival to the promise of strategic victory.
In multiple interviews over the past year, he has framed the confrontation with Iran in almost biblical terms. In one televised address in 2025, Netanyahu declared that Israel was engaged in a “historic mission” to secure the future of the Jewish state for generations. Such rhetoric reveals not confidence but desperation.
What was supposed to be a rapid campaign increasingly resembles a prolonged conflict. Israel cannot wage such a war alone. It never could. Thus, Netanyahu worked tirelessly to draw the United States directly into the conflict—a familiar pattern in modern Middle Eastern wars.
The paradox of Trump’s war
For Americans, the question remains: why did Donald Trump—who repeatedly campaigned against “endless wars”—allow the US to enter yet another Middle Eastern conflict?
During his 2016 presidential campaign, Trump famously declared: “We should have never been in Iraq. We have destabilised the Middle East.”
Yet nearly a decade later, his administration has plunged Washington into a confrontation whose potential consequences dwarf those of the earlier wars.
The precise motivations matter less to those living under the bombs.
Across the region, the scenes are painfully familiar: devastated cities, mass graves, grieving families, and societies once again forced to endure the violence of foreign intervention.
But this war is unfolding in a fundamentally different geopolitical environment.
The US no longer commands the unchallenged dominance it once enjoyed. China has emerged as a major economic and strategic actor. Russia continues to project influence. Regional powers have gained confidence in resisting Washington’s dictates.
The Middle East itself has changed.
A war already going wrong
Early signs suggest that the war is not unfolding according to the expectations of Washington or Tel Aviv.
Reports from US and Israeli media indicate that missile-defense systems in Israel and several Gulf states are facing a serious strain under sustained attacks. Meanwhile, Iran and its regional allies have demonstrated missile capabilities far more extensive than many analysts had anticipated.
Energy markets provide another indication of shifting dynamics. Rather than securing greater control over global energy flows, the war has disrupted supplies and strengthened Iran’s leverage over key maritime routes.
Strategic assumptions built on decades of uncontested American military power are colliding with a far more complex reality.
Even the political rhetoric emanating from Washington has become noticeably defensive and increasingly angry—often a sign that events are not unfolding as planned.
Within the Trump administration itself, the intellectual poverty of the moment is difficult to miss. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, whose public persona is built on television bravado rather than strategic literacy, has often framed the conflict in language that sounds less like military doctrine and more like locker-room theatrics.
Hegseth’s style is symptomatic of a broader intellectual collapse within Washington’s war-making circles—where historical knowledge is replaced by slogans, and strategic planning by theatrical displays of toughness.
In speeches and interviews, he has repeatedly reduced complex geopolitical realities into crude narratives of strength, masculinity, and domination. Such rhetoric may excite partisan audiences, but it reveals a deeper problem: the people directing the most dangerous war in decades appear to understand very little about the forces they have unleashed.
In such an environment, wars are not analyzed; they are performed.
The end of an era?
Netanyahu sought to dominate the Middle East. Washington sought to reaffirm its position as the world’s unrivaled superpower. Neither objective appears within reach.
Instead, the war may accelerate the very transformations it was meant to prevent: a declining US strategic role, a weakened Israeli deterrent posture, and a Middle East increasingly shaped by regional actors rather than external powers.
Trump, despite the lofty and belligerent language, is in reality a weak president. Rage is rarely the language of strength; it is often the mask of insecurity. His administration has overestimated America’s military omnipotence, undermined allies and antagonized adversaries alike, and entered a war whose historical, political, and strategic dimensions it scarcely understands.
How can a leadership so consumed by narcissism and spectacle fully grasp the magnitude of the catastrophe it has helped unleash?
One would expect wisdom in moments of global crisis. What we have instead is a chorus of slogans, threats, and self-congratulation emanating from Washington—an administration seemingly incapable of distinguishing between what power can achieve and what it cannot.
They do not understand how profoundly the world has changed. They do not understand how the Middle East now perceives American military adventurism. And they certainly do not understand that Israel itself has become, politically and morally, a declining brand.
Of course, Trump and his equally arrogant administration will continue searching for any fragment of ‘victory’ to sell to their constituency as the greatest triumph in history. There will always be zealots ready to believe such myths.
But most Americans—and the overwhelming majority of people around the world—no longer do. Partly because this war on Iran is immoral. And partly because history has very little patience for losers.
Syrian president vows ‘absolute support’ to disarm Hezbollah
The Cradle | March 11, 2026
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun received a phone call on 10 March from his Syrian counterpart, ex-Al-Qaeda chief Ahmad al-Sharaa, who expressed his support for Beirut’s efforts in disarming Hezbollah.
The Lebanese Presidency said Aoun and Sharaa discussed regional developments and stressed that “the current delicate situation requires activating coordination and consultation between the two countries, especially with regard to the need to control the borders and prevent any security breaches from any side.”
The Syrian Presidency also released its own statement on the call with Aoun. “President Sharaa expressed his explicit and absolute support for the efforts led by President Joseph Aoun to disarm ‘Hezbollah.’ He affirmed that this step is essential for solidifying Lebanese state sovereignty and shielding the region from the repercussions of ongoing regional armed conflicts,” the statement said.
It also called for “joint action” between Lebanon and Syria, “to ensure the safety of the Syrian and Lebanese peoples and to protect the gains of stability achieved recently.”
The phone call comes hours after Damascus claimed that it came under attack by Hezbollah on the Syrian–Lebanese border.
The Syrian army said “Hezbollah militias” fired shells toward its positions near Serghaya, adding that reinforcements from the Lebanese resistance group had been observed arriving along the Syrian–Lebanese border.
Syrian officials said they were monitoring the situation, coordinating with the Lebanese army, and studying possible responses, warning that the Syrian army “will not tolerate any attack targeting Syria.”
Hezbollah, which is busy fighting an Israeli invasion in the south, has not released any statements commenting on the matter.
The Lebanese resistance fought in Syria for years alongside the former government, and took part in the recapture of several parts of the country from groups including Al-Qaeda’s Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham, and other extremist organizations who were at the time considered the Syrian opposition.
The Nusra Front was later rebranded into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group that toppled former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s government in 2024 and now dominates Syria’s Defense Ministry.
Nusra occupied large swathes of the northern and eastern Lebanese border region for years at the start of the Syrian war, and was eventually expelled by Hezbollah and the Lebanese army.
Clashes broke out between the Lebanese army and Syrian troops earlier this year, after Damascus’s forces advanced against the border under the pretext of dealing with smuggling.
Heavy clashes also erupted between the Syrian army and Lebanese tribes on the border in 2025. Damascus falsely claimed at the time that it was fighting Hezbollah.
Since the start of the war in Iran and the entry of Hezbollah into the conflict, the Syrian military has been building up its presence along the Lebanese border, claiming the measures are aimed at “combating smuggling.”
The new authorities in Damascus have allied themselves with Washington. Damascus has been working, at the request of the US, to prevent any Hezbollah-bound weapons from entering Lebanon.
It has also been cracking down on Palestinian resistance factions.
US envoy Tom Barrack threatened Lebanon last year with a Syrian incursion, and said Damascus would “actively assist us in confronting and dismantling the remnants of ISIS, the IRGC [Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps], Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist networks.”
“Burnt Bridges”: Why Trump’s Plan to Use Kurds Against Iran Is Doomed to Fail
By Mohammed ibn Faisal al-Rashid – New Eastern Outlook – March 7, 2026
Following a series of devastating U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, Tehran is engulfed in uncertainty. However, the White House, facing the prospect of a ground operation in mountainous terrain, is betting on an old, tested, but extremely risky tool—Kurdish forces. The Donald Trump administration views the Kurds as ideal “cannon fodder” to ignite a civil war in Iran. But will this plan work? Given Trump’s history of betrayals, deceit, and cynical pragmatism, the attempt to play the Kurdish card might not only fail but could also backfire on the United States itself.
A Proxy Army for a Big War
While the U.S. Air Force continues to bomb Iranian cities and Donald Trump boasts about destroying the enemy’s navy, Washington is soberly assessing the risks. Sending thousands of American soldiers into Iran would be political suicide for a president who promised voters an end to “endless wars.” Analysts agree: the U.S. will not launch a full-scale invasion like in Iraq or Afghanistan due to the mountainous terrain, the risk of high casualties, and a lack of public support.
A solution was quickly found. As early as March 4th, the South Korean publication Donga Ilbo reported that thousands of Kurdish fighters had begun a ground offensive into Iran from Iraqi territory. According to Fox News and CNN, cited by the publication, the operation is coordinated with active participation from the CIA, which is providing weapons and equipment.
But is this really the case? Currently, data on a massive invasion by thousands of Kurdish fighters is contradictory.
The scenario appears logical: The Kurds, who make up about 10% of Iran’s population (approximately 9 million people), have historically faced discrimination within the Shia theocracy. They are concentrated in the western provinces bordering Iraq, making them an ideal foothold. Kurdish parties based in Iraqi Kurdistan have already united into the “Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan,” establishing a unified military command.
Israel: Old Ties and New Opportunities
The role of Israel deserves special attention. Tel Aviv has long-standing, complex but generally positive relations with Kurdish movements, viewing them as a natural counterweight to hostile Arab and Iranian regimes. In the current conflict, Israel has taken on the role of “igniter.” According to Middle East Eye, the Israeli Air Force is striking positions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) precisely in Iran’s western provinces, effectively preparing a corridor for the advancement of Kurdish forces.
According to experts, Israeli strategists are actively exploring the option of using Iranian Kurds (specifically groups like PAK, linked to the PKK) as manpower instead of American soldiers. For Israel, this is an opportunity to inflict maximum damage on its primary enemy without getting bogged down in a protracted ground conflict. The calculation is that the Kurdish national movement could become the “Trojan horse” capable of exploding Iran from within.
However, a fundamental contradiction lies here: the interests of Israel and the U.S. are often situational. And if Washington decides its goals are achieved, the Kurds could once again be left alone to face an enraged adversary.
“I Don’t Like the Kurds”: A Bloody History of Betrayals
This is precisely where Trump’s plan begins to unravel. To understand why the Kurds are unlikely to become a pliable tool in the White House’s hands, one need only look at Trump’s relationship with these people.
As early as 2020, the world learned shocking details from the memoirs of former National Security Advisor John Bolton. According to Bolton, Trump stated in a small circle, “I don’t like the Kurds. They run from the Iraqis, they run from the Turks. The only time they don’t run is when we’re bombing everything around them with F-18s.” This statement isn’t mere rudeness; it’s the quintessence of Trump’s approach: he despises those he considers weak and feels no moral obligation towards allies.
The most cynical example was the betrayal of the Syrian Kurds in October 2019. Trump then ordered the withdrawal of American troops from northern Syria, effectively giving a “green light” to the Turkish invasion. The Kurds, who had lost 11,000 fighters battling ISIS and were America’s only reliable partner on the ground, were abandoned to their fate. American officers on the ground were shocked: “They trusted us, and we betrayed that trust,” one of them told The New Arab at the time.
The “1991 Syndrome” is also vivid in Kurdish memory. Then, President George H.W. Bush called on Iraqi Kurds to rise up against Saddam Hussein but abandoned them when the uprising began, allowing the regime’s army to brutally crush the rebellion with helicopters. Now, this nightmare seems poised to repeat itself in Iran.
Can the U.S. Ignite a Civil War in Iran?
Formally, the prerequisites for unrest exist. Besides ethnic Kurds, Iran is home to disaffected Baluch, Azeris, and Arabs. Following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the initial strikes, a power vacuum could emerge in the country. The White House has already openly stated its readiness to deal with a “new government” and is discussing who should lead Iran after regime change.
Trump personally called on Iranian diplomats worldwide to seek asylum, promising to help “form a new, better Iran.” It would seem this is the moment of truth: Kurds and other minorities should rise up and overthrow the hated regime.
But reality is more complex.
Fear of History Repeating. As analyst Oral Toga noted in a comment to Middle East Eye, the fact that the U.S. abandoned the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) will serve as a lesson for Kurds in Iraq and Iran. “The airstrikes will end someday, but Tehran will remain there forever,” he reminds us.
Lack of Strategy. The U.S. and Israel have no clear vision for Iran’s future. Do they want a unitary state, a federation, or the complete disintegration of the country? Using the Kurds as a battering ram without guaranteeing them autonomy or protection after the war would condemn the region to a bloodbath. The Kurdish leaders themselves understand this. As activist Golaleh Sharafkandi stated, “We have a political program supported by an army, not the other way around.”
Regional Opposition. The creation of a new Kurdish zone of influence in northern Iran would be opposed not only by Iran but also by Turkey and even Azerbaijan, which see it as a threat to their sovereignty and a risk of separatism. Ankara already brutally suppresses any pro-Kurdish movements near its borders. Azerbaijan, which has strategic relations with Turkey and Israel, has already expressed condolences to Iran and called for peace, fearing destabilization.
Operational Difficulties. Several sources, including the Turkish agency Anadolu, report that the information about the offensive has been denied or clarified. The Kurdish factions themselves deny starting a full-scale invasion, and Iranian media report that the border is under control. The groups ready to fight number, by various estimates, between 8,000 and 10,000 people—insufficient to conquer territory without direct air support and U.S. special forces, which Trump is not yet ready to provide.
Dreams of a Caliphate and the Bitter Truth
Donald Trump’s attempt to use the Kurds as a match to ignite the powder keg of Iran appears to be an adventure based on a denial of reality. Yes, the Kurds hate the Ayatollahs’ regime. Yes, they want autonomy and rights. But they do not want to once again become bargaining chips in a high-stakes game where their physical survival is on the line.
Trump has already twice demonstrated his true attitude towards Kurdish allies—in Iraq and Syria. A third time could be the last, not for the American president’s reputation, but for hundreds of thousands of civilians who would find themselves caught between the hammer of the Iranian army and the anvil of American geopolitical ambitions. The Kurdish leaders, united in a coalition, understand perfectly well: when the situation gets hot, the White House might once again throw up its hands and say, “This is not our war.”
Therefore, despite the loud headlines and CIA leaks, the active use of Kurds in full-scale combat operations is unlikely. Kurds might try to expand their autonomy amidst the chaos, but playing the role of a disciplined U.S. proxy army that can be unleashed on Tehran and then written off—they won’t buy that anymore. The price of trust in America under Trump has proven too high, and paying off those debts may take decades.
Muhammad ibn Faisal al-Rashid, political scientist, expert on the Arab world
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