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Israel furious at Trump over Turkey, Syria to invade Lebanon – w/ Col. Macgregor

Mario Nawfal | June 26, 2026

June 26, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Video, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Comments Off on Israel furious at Trump over Turkey, Syria to invade Lebanon – w/ Col. Macgregor

IRGC says it struck US military positions, warns of broader response

Al Mayadeen | June 27, 2026

Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy said it targeted US military sites across the region in response to American aggression against Iran’s coastline, warning that any further attacks would prompt a significantly broader retaliation.

In a statement, the IRGC said the strikes came after the United States allegedly carried out air assuaults against Iran’s coastal areas under the pretext of responding to incidents involving navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

IRGC cites Strait of Hormuz and ceasefire commitments

The IRGC stressed that Washington violated its commitments under the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, arguing that Article 5 requires coordination with Iran on maritime monitoring and navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

The statement also linked the latest developments to continued Israeli violations of the ceasefire in southern Lebanon.

Warning of wider retaliation

The IRGC said navy had delivered an “appropriate response” by targeting US military sites and warned that any repeat of American attacks would be met with a much broader military response.

The force stressed that it remains prepared to respond to future actions targeting Iranian territory or interests.

Earlier, US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that it launched attacks on Iranian military targets after accusing Tehran of attacking a commercial vessel transiting the Strait of Hormuz, while Iranian media reported explosions near the southern port city of Sirik following warning fire directed at vessels in the strategic waterway.

June 26, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on IRGC says it struck US military positions, warns of broader response

Trump’s war on Iran becomes ‘most unpopular conflict’ in US history

The Cradle | June 26, 2026

An analysis of 153 public opinion surveys across seven major wars has concluded that the US-Israeli war against Iran is the most unpopular conflict in US history, surpassing the Vietnam War’s previous record, Responsible Statecraft (RS) reported on 26 June.

The report indicates that public support for the conflict has plummeted to a net negative 32 percent, dropping below the previous historical low of negative 31 percent recorded during the Vietnam War.

This finding directly contradicts testimony by US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who claimed during an April Senate hearing that the conflict maintained the support of the US public.

The analysis highlights three unprecedented ways that the war on Iran broke historical records in terms of unpopularity.

The first is that the war began with a net negative support from the very start, with the war launching with negative 13 percent public support.

The second is that the war has generated historic disapproval, currently holding the lowest level of public support of any major war in US history.

Finally, the war was defined by constant opposition throughout, making it the first where opponents outnumbered supporters for the entire duration of the fighting.

Researchers noted a significant “support gap” in the data, which utilized historical Gallup polls and recent Economist/YouGov surveys.

While 67 percent of Republicans polled expressed general support for the war, 54 percent of that same group called for a deal to end the war as quickly as possible.

Among the general US public, net support for prolonging the war rather than ending it immediately stood at negative 52 percent.

A recent Strength In Numbers/Verasight poll published on 24 June revealed that 59 percent of US adults back the agreement to end the war on Iran, while only 24 percent opposed it.

Respondents of the survey showed a deep skepticism about the outcomes of the war, with only 18 percent saying that the US has achieved its stated goals.

A Reuters/Ipsos poll released on 23 June revealed that only 24 percent of US citizens believed the war with Iran was worth its costs, while 50 percent said the war was not worth it.

This widespread disapproval has driven US President Trump’s approval rating to around 34 percent, marking an all-time low for his second term.

June 26, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , | Comments Off on Trump’s war on Iran becomes ‘most unpopular conflict’ in US history

The Middle East is wringing its hands of Washington. Finally

By Martin Jay | Strategic Culture Foundation | June 25, 2026

The unintended consequences of Trump’s Iran Deal are too many to list. Chief among them is that Trump’s own buffoonery has injected cash and power into the regime in Iran that it could only have previously dreamt of. But the “unconditional surrender” deal has also probably destroyed the petrodollar – leading, most likely, to a faster demise of the US as what was once called a “superpower”, or even sometimes the superpower. Trump’s idiotic outburst of “unconditional surrender” is, of course, the greatest irony of the entire fiasco, given that it is Trump who is on his knees and has given Iran so much simply to open the Straits of Hormuz, simply to bring down the global price of oil.

Yet what happens now in the region, both to Israel and the GCC countries? For Israel, many leading commentators like Alistair Crooke claim that its people are in a state of shock and that it will take some time before they wake up after the party the night before and realise that things got a little out of hand and that a certain process of cleaning up and repair needs to take place. Crooke and others even go further and believe that Israel can no longer continue to indulge itself in the delusional notion of ’Greater Israel’ – i.e. having regional ambitions of hegemony beyond its borders – and needs to recalibrate its goals, starting with the admission that it is not winning its war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. There is a general consensus among analysts that most Israelis are in a state of shock about how the war in Iran was lost, how America itself didn’t and couldn’t deliver on its military promises, and how even the IDF is no match for Hezbollah. This will take some time for them to sink in – that Israel has simply overstretched itself both politically and militarily, and that the reality is that it is in a deep hole and perhaps a solution might be to stop digging.

But a period of sombreness and solace is hardly what Netanyahu has in mind, and it is likely now that he will become a silent enemy of Trump, who needs him to stop fighting in Lebanon. This relationship between Washington and Israel will also come under strain and enter a new period of saliency, which might briefly mean Congress voting to withhold Israel’s funding, to remind Bibi and his coalition partners who really is the superpower (to coin Bill Clinton’s comment once in the White House when Bibi attended a press conference).

What is perhaps even more worrying is the region and how America now retreats. It is inconceivable that US forces will return to the dozen or so military bases in the Gulf, as it is unthinkable that those elites will keep the cash flowing into Wall Street. Indeed, a bundle of $3 trillion USD which Saudi Arabia and the UAE had earmarked for the US AI sector will now not make it, as those countries no longer have the cash flow in their economies, with hotels in Dubai only catering to about 10 percent capacity. Trump’s war literally sent missiles to these new economies, and the Donald cannot complain now that this cash will not make it to the US.

Yet remarkably, Trump is still dreaming. He is still delusional about who he is and what America currently is, and seems to be stuck with his own ideas which feel like they’re from the 1970s rather than 2026. What we are witnessing in the Middle East is the beginning of the end. The loss of the petrodollar and the GCC countries with their fast cash feels like the first domino falling for the old empire, while Trump obsesses with tiny minutiae details which take up time posting on social media late at night. In the last days of the Roman Empire, its emperor was said to have been concerned about “Rome” – but this was not a reference to a crumbling civilisation, but to his pet chicken of the same name. When we see the puerile, juvenile row between the diminutive Georgia Meloni and Trump, there is a sense of déjà vu with Rome. A row on X which Meloni keeps alive for days might be seen as incongruous to the bigger picture of the US and EU falling into the abyss, with the EU being such a dog’s breakfast that even bankrupt Britain wouldn’t even want to re-join it now, despite most Brits in polls conceding Brexit was a failure.

The recent comments by the Saudi foreign minister might signal that KSA and the UAE are looking for a completely different defence set-up which might actually bypass the US altogether. Other countries like Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt are stepping forward and taking on the challenge by themselves, while leading the anti-Israel doctrine. It is rumoured that Bibi complained to Trump recently about Turkey’s tough talking, but Trump told him to forget about even thinking about hitting the NATO country, as it is simply out of Israel’s league – or words to that effect. But Turkey is the new enemy of Israel. That ball has been rolling for some time.

June 26, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , | Comments Off on The Middle East is wringing its hands of Washington. Finally

13-18 DAYS: The PRACTICAL DIESEL BUFFER… Does It Preclude Bombing Iran?

By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | June 26, 2026

I am indebted to my new friend who is an energy expert ,and currently working in the Persian Gulf, for explaining why the US is facing a very serious risk of a domestic energy crisis. If ignorance is bliss then I’ve spent my last 71 years happily believing that the conversion of oil to fuel for cars, trucks and planes was a simple process. Boy, was I wrong. The United States is facing a potential crisis surrounding the production of diesel and aviation fuel. According to this person, who has 35 years experience in the oil industry:

The U.S. does not have a month of freely deliverable diesel in a stress event. The headline EIA number shows 106.1 million barrels of total distillate fuel oil stocks and 3.631 million b/d of four-week average distillate product supplied, implying 29.2 days on paper. But that national inventory includes barrels in pipelines, refineries, terminals, regional storage, and operational positions that cannot all be allocated immediately to critical distribution hubs.
Operational estimate: applying a 45%-60% practical deliverability factor to total distillate stocks leaves roughly 48-64 million barrels of usable, allocable diesel-equivalent supply. At 3.631 million b/d, that is approximately 13.1-17.5 days, rounded to 13-18 days.

So let me explain how he reached this conclusion. Think of the diesel buffer as the gap between when supply stops flowing and when the economy starts breaking. Thirteen days is not a comfortable cushion — it’s essentially no cushion at all, because the economy runs on diesel in ways that cannot be deferred.

Diesel is not a lifestyle fuel. It moves every truck on every highway, powers every locomotive, runs every tractor during planting and harvest, and drives every piece of heavy construction equipment. When a family decides gas prices are too high, they drive less. When a freight company decides diesel is too expensive or too scarce, it cannot defer the shipment — the grocery store shelves just go empty. Diesel demand is largely inelastic. The economy cannot negotiate with it the way it can with gasoline.

Let’s use the worst case: 13 days. Thirteen days means that if anything disrupts the supply chain — a refinery outage, a pipeline failure, a crude supply disruption — the effects reach the real economy within two weeks. There is no meaningful time to arrange alternatives. A tanker from a replacement crude source takes longer than 13 days to arrive. A refinery turnaround takes longer than 13 days to complete. The buffer is shorter than the lead time for almost every possible remedy.

The geography makes it worse. The 13-day figure is a national average, which means some regions have more and some have less. The Southeast is particularly exposed, being heavily dependent on the Colonial Pipeline, which is itself a single point of failure that demonstrated its criticality when it was shut down for six days in 2021. Six days is nearly half the total national buffer.

What about aviation fuel? Here is where the two problems collide mechanically, and why it creates a genuine bind rather than just a theoretical tradeoff.

Diesel and jet fuel are not different products from different parts of the refinery. They are competing claims on the same physical fraction of crude oil — the middle distillate cut that comes off the atmospheric distillation column in the same boiling range. Every refinery scheduling decision is, at its core, a daily argument about how to divide that fraction between the two products.

With a 13-day diesel buffer, the refinery cannot let diesel output fall. The economic and political consequences of a diesel shortage materialize too quickly and too severely. Diesel production becomes, in practical terms, the floor that cannot be breached.

Now layer in a wartime demand for military jet fuel. JP-8 is pulled from the same middle distillate fraction. The military’s operational requirements are also non-negotiable — aircraft do not fly on goodwill. So you now have two inelastic demands competing for one fixed supply of middle distillate from each barrel of crude processed.

The refinery’s response to this bind is constrained in every direction:

It cannot simply run more crude. Crude supply itself may be disrupted — this is precisely the scenario the Persian Gulf blockade creates. And even if crude is available, refinery throughput is limited by physical capacity. You cannot run 110% of nameplate capacity.

It cannot shift to lighter crude to get more barrels. Light crude produces proportionally more gasoline and less middle distillate. Running lighter crude when you need diesel and jet fuel makes the allocation problem worse, not better, because you are shrinking the pool of middle distillate that both are fighting over.

It cannot get more middle distillate out of sour crude than the chemistry allows. A barrel of sour crude from the Persian Gulf typically yields around 20–25% middle distillates by volume. That fraction is fixed by the molecular composition of the oil. You can optimize within a range, but you cannot double the yield through operational choices.

Hydrogen becomes a choke point. Making JP-8 from sour crude to military specification requires substantial hydrogen — for sulfur removal, for aromatic ring saturation to meet smoke point requirements, and for freeze point management. Making ULSD from the same sour crude also requires substantial hydrogen — even more, to reach the ≤15 ppm sulfur specification. A refinery’s hydrogen generation capacity is finite. Every cubic foot of hydrogen diverted to jet fuel processing is a cubic foot unavailable for diesel desulfurization. At the margin, maximizing JP-8 production makes the diesel quality problem worse, not just the diesel volume problem.

The certification delay adds time pressure. Switching refinery configuration between maximizing diesel and maximizing jet fuel is not instant. It takes days to a week to restabilize the unit operations and certify the product meets specification. In a 13-day buffer environment, a week of transition time is not a casual cost — it represents a material fraction of the entire safety margin consumed by the act of reconfiguring production.

Under normal peacetime conditions, refineries optimise their middle distillate split based on market prices — jet fuel commands a premium, so they lean toward jet. The diesel buffer stays comfortable and the system works.

The Iran war changes all of that simultaneously in three directions at once:

First, the diesel buffer starts shrinking. Persian Gulf sour crude — even though only 8% of US imports — supplied roughly 17% of the medium-sour grades that US complex refiners prefer for middle distillate production. That quality gap is not easily filled by Canadian heavy or domestic light sweet crude without refinery adjustment. Diesel output drops or becomes more expensive per barrel just as the buffer needs defending.

Second, military JP-8 demand spikes. A naval campaign in the Persian Gulf, sustained air operations, and a mobilised logistics tail consume enormous quantities of aviation fuel. The military doesn’t queue behind civilian demand — it has priority. So the refinery is simultaneously being squeezed from both ends of the middle distillate barrel: the military is claiming more jet fuel from the top, and the diesel buffer is bleeding out from the bottom.

Third, the refinery cannot easily solve this by running harder. As explained earlier, maximising JP-8 from sour crude requires pulling a lighter, narrower distillate cut. This is precisely the action that reduces diesel yield — the heavier tail of the middle distillate that would have become diesel is either lost to the vacuum unit or downcycled to fuel oil. The more aggressively refineries respond to military jet fuel demand, the faster the diesel buffer erodes.

This creates a three-way constraint with no clean solution:

  • Protect the diesel buffer → limit JP-8 output → constrain military operations
  • Maximise JP-8 for military → draw down diesel buffer → trigger civilian supply cascade before the war ends
  • Try to do both → run refineries at maximum utilisation → lose the ability to flex for any further shock, with no margin for equipment failures, maintenance, or a second disruption

The 13-day buffer is what makes this bind acute rather than manageable. With sixty days of diesel inventory, a refinery operator can tolerate shifting the middle distillate split toward jet fuel for several weeks without civilian consequences. With thirteen days, the same shift starts a visible countdown almost immediately. Now do you understand why Donald Trump signed the MoU with Iran?

If the United States decides to renew its bombing campaign of Iran, that would likely trigger the stress event outlined above. Based on that fact I believe that Donald Trump, notwithstanding his threats, will not run the risk of crashing the US economy by bombing Iran again.

Video interviews

June 26, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | Comments Off on 13-18 DAYS: The PRACTICAL DIESEL BUFFER… Does It Preclude Bombing Iran?

Prof Seyed Marandi: WILL the US COLLAPSE the GLOBAL ECONOMY?

Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – June 25, 2026

June 25, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Video, Wars for Israel | , , , | Comments Off on Prof Seyed Marandi: WILL the US COLLAPSE the GLOBAL ECONOMY?

Strait of Hormuz as strategic red line: Why Iran must confront Oman’s corridor plan and Trump’s threats

Press TV | June 25, 2026

The strategic calculus surrounding Iran’s ongoing negotiations with the United States within the framework of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) has reached a critical juncture.

Two concurrent developments demand a comprehensive and resolute response: Oman’s unilateral announcement of a separate shipping corridor through the Strait of Hormuz and President Donald Trump’s continued military threats against the Islamic Republic.

Taken together, these developments represent a concerted attempt to undermine Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz and weaken the fundamental security guarantees that give diplomatic engagement its meaning and value.

For Iran, the Strait of Hormuz is far more than a source of economic leverage; it constitutes a cornerstone of national security, a critical component of its deterrence posture, and a vital mechanism for preventing future acts of aggression.

The Strait of Hormuz: A matter of national sovereignty

The Strait of Hormuz represents one of the most strategically significant maritime chokepoints in the world, through which approximately 20 percent of global oil supplies transit. For Iran, control over this waterway is intrinsically linked to national security, economic sovereignty, and the capacity to deter any form of external aggression.

The recent visit of Iran’s parliament speaker and lead negotiator, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, to Muscat appears to have been exploited by Oman under US pressure to advance an agenda that directly contradicts Iran’s sovereign rights over the strategic waterway.

Oman’s unilateral announcement of a separate route requiring only coordination with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) constitutes a calculated maneuver to undermine Iran’s legal and legitimate authority over the Strait.

This action was taken without any coordination with Tehran and coincides with mine-clearing operations based on the memorandum signed between Iran and the United States.

The strategic logic suggests that by creating an alternative corridor, Oman has offered vessels a route that avoids Iran’s jurisdiction, effectively normalizing a system where Iran’s role in administering the Strait becomes irrelevant.

The timing is particularly significant. As mine-clearing operations proceed, Omani authorities have directed vessels toward this alternative corridor, whose route poses serious safety risks and is unacceptable, according to Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Navy.

This effectively undermines one of Iran’s most significant bargaining chips – the ability to control access through the Strait and ensure compliance with its security requirements.

IRGC’s warning: An essential but insufficient first step

In response to this challenge, the IRGC Navy issued a timely warning that “the only authorized routes for vessels’ passage through the Strait of Hormuz are the ones announced by Iranian authorities.”

The statement emphasized that “vessel traffic outside these routes is prohibited and highly dangerous,” adding that “coordination with the IRGC Navy via Channel 16 is mandatory for passage through the Strait of Hormuz.”

This response demonstrates Iran’s readiness to protect its sovereignty and maintain its authoritative position over one of the most critical energy chokepoints in the world.

However, as a purely military response, it is insufficient to address the full scope of the challenge. The Omani initiative is fundamentally a political maneuver, and it requires a coordinated response that includes diplomatic, legal, and security dimensions.

The existential implications cannot be overstated. The threat to Iran’s national security, the assassination of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, and the imposition of two illegal and unprovoked wars through the use of hostile American bases and the cooperation of Arab countries are not matters that can be ignored within diplomatic engagement.

The primary means of preventing their recurrence is firm control over the Strait of Hormuz. If Iran permits this condition to be eroded through political maneuvering, it risks losing a critical deterrent mechanism without receiving commensurate concessions in return.

Trump’s threats: A direct violation of clause 1

Concurrent with the challenge to Iran’s legal authority over the Strait, Trump has once again threatened that if Iran does not act according to his whims, he will impose war once again.

These statements go far beyond psychological warfare intended to weaken the morale of Iranian negotiators or serve domestic political purposes. They constitute a direct violation of Clause 1 of the memorandum signed by him and the Iranian president last week, which calls on signatories to “refrain from the threat or use of force against each other.”

Trump’s threat to “blow up the country, launch a full ground invasion to take it over, and assassinate Iranian negotiators” represents an explicit violation of the agreement.

When combined with the Zionist regime’s insistence on continuing its occupation of Lebanese territory – itself a clear violation of the memorandum’s provisions regarding the cessation of hostilities on all fronts – the pattern becomes unmistakable. The enemy is systematically testing the limits of Iran’s commitment to the negotiation process while violating its fundamental provisions.

The statement by US Treasury Secretary describing the $30 billion in frozen assets and sanctions relief as a “temporary carrot” that can be withdrawn whenever desired demonstrates that, from the enemy’s perspective, what it believes it will ultimately obtain from Iran far exceeds what it is offering during the negotiation process.

This perception must be neutralized through both the words and actions of Iranian officials.

The strategic importance of the Strait in the negotiations

The Strait of Hormuz’s importance extends beyond economic considerations. It serves as the primary mechanism for creating practical guarantees for the fulfillment of Iran’s conditions within the memorandum, similar to what occurred in Lebanon and immediately revealed its consequences. Control over the Strait enables Iran to compensate for war damages, provide security against future aggression, and prevent the passage of military and hostile vessels.

The memorandum commits Iran “to arrange for the safe passage of commercial vessels through the strait, with no charge for 60 days.” The subsequent joint statement with Oman “agreed to establish a joint working group to negotiate the future administration of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.”

However, Oman’s unilateral action effectively preempts this negotiation process by establishing a separate corridor that bypasses Iranian authorization.

The implementation of what Oman has announced would constitute a clear example of the enemy achieving through the political process what it failed to achieve through military means during the Third Imposed War.

If realized, it would increase the enemy’s appetite to obtain through diplomacy what it was unable to secure through all-out military aggression, a precedent that would embolden further violations of Iran’s sovereignty.

Available responses and strategic options

Various measures exist for responding to this new challenge, each with its own implications:

First, suspending mine-clearing operations would signal that Iran’s commitment to safe passage is conditional on recognition of its authority over the Strait. This would maintain pressure on global shipping and demonstrate that Iran retains the capacity to disrupt traffic if its sovereignty is not respected.

Second, imposing restrictions on vessel passage that deviate from Iranian-designated routes would enforce Iran’s jurisdictional claims directly. The IRGC Navy has already warned that “ships’ movement through other routes is dangerous and prohibited,” establishing the basis for enforcement actions.

Third, military action against violating ships, while potentially escalatory, would demonstrate Iran’s determination to protect its sovereignty. The IRGC Navy has already stated that “any vessel found in violation will be subject to enforcement measures,” establishing a credible deterrent against hostile entities.

Fourth, announcing a halt to negotiations or postponing the next round would signal that these developments have fundamentally altered the basis for continued engagement. This would be particularly appropriate given that Trump’s threats directly violate Clause 1 of the memorandum.

Fifth, escalating the political response through diplomatic channels while the armed forces maintain their deterrent posture. As the points above indicate, the first response by the IRGC Navy is timely and appropriate but insufficient; political responses must be added within the framework of the diplomatic negotiation process.

The risk of precedent and the nature of the enemy

What is at stake extends beyond the immediate question of the Strait. If Oman’s unilateral action is permitted to stand, it would establish a precedent that Iran’s sovereignty can be circumvented through coordinated political maneuvering.

That would fundamentally alter the balance of power in the region, demonstrating that Iran’s strategic assets can be neutralized through diplomatic means rather than requiring military confrontation.

The enemy’s objective in these negotiations appears to be:

1. Gaining access to Iran’s 60-percent enriched material

2. Obtaining complete intelligence regarding the remaining nuclear infrastructure and facilities

3. Reopening the Strait of Hormuz on terms favorable to the United States and its allies

4. Securing economic breathing space for the world and the United States

5. Preserving the Republican Party’s position in the November midterm elections

In return, Iran is offered temporary concessions such as oil exports, lifting the naval blockade, and releasing some assets, whose total financial value of approximately $30 billion is of very limited significance when compared with the strategic importance of Iran’s tools and capabilities, especially the Strait of Hormuz and the unified Resistance Front.

The comparison with Lebanon is instructive. When Iran demonstrated commitment to the ceasefire, it was met with continued Israeli occupation and attacks, demonstrating that the enemy seeks to exploit Iranian goodwill rather than reciprocate it.

The inadequate response to these violations, alongside discussions about the return of IAEA inspectors and Iran’s failure to publish a fact sheet regarding the agreement, increases ambiguity in public opinion and leads to greater polarization.

A coherent strategy for the negotiations

Iran’s response to these challenges must be coordinated, multifaceted, and proportionate to the gravity of the developments. The armed forces’ response, while necessary, must be supplemented by political actions within the diplomatic framework.

Several principles should guide this approach:

First, Iran must maintain its position that control over the Strait of Hormuz is non-negotiable and essential for national security. Any arrangement that circumvents Iranian authority must be rejected absolutely.

Second, the perception that Iran can be pressured into abandoning its strategic assets through diplomatic engagement must be countered through concrete actions that demonstrate the costs of violating Iran’s sovereignty.

Third, the link between the negotiation process and the security situation, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Resistance Front, must be maintained. Concessions on one issue cannot be made in isolation from progress on others.

Fourth, Iran must articulate clearly that the threatening rhetoric by US officials constitutes violations of the memorandum and will be met with appropriate responses, including the possibility of suspension or postponement of the negotiations.

Fifth, Iran should leverage the extraordinary strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz as the primary means of providing security guarantees and preventing future aggression. The existential threat against Iran’s national security demands that sovereignty over the Strait be maintained as a fundamental condition of any agreement.

The path forward requires rejecting the assumption that these challenges can be addressed through military responses alone.

The coordinated political and diplomatic maneuvering by the United States, its regional allies, and Oman demands a comprehensive response that integrates the armed forces’ capabilities with political diplomacy. Anything less would signal weakness and encourage further violations of Iran’s sovereignty and the terms of the memorandum.

Ultimately, Iran’s position must be clear: the Strait of Hormuz remains under Iranian authority, and any route that does not coordinate with Iran is unacceptable and will face appropriate measures.

The negotiations should not appear as an opportunity for the enemy to achieve through political means what it could not achieve through illegal war of aggression.

Iran’s strategic assets – the Strait of Hormuz, the Resistance Front, and its nuclear capabilities – are not negotiable items but fundamental components of the country’s national security that must be preserved.

The burden lies with the other parties to demonstrate their commitment to the agreement and respect for Iran’s sovereignty through their actions, not merely words.

June 25, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Comments Off on Strait of Hormuz as strategic red line: Why Iran must confront Oman’s corridor plan and Trump’s threats

House to vote on proposal ending $3.3bln in military aid to ‘Israel’

Al Mayadeen | June 25, 2026

A rare House vote on US military assistance to “Israel” is expected to force lawmakers to publicly defend or reject continued funding for the Israeli military, amid growing domestic debate over Washington’s role in the region.

A report by Responsible Statecraft stated on Wednesday that the proposal, introduced by Representative Thomas Massie, would remove $3.3 billion allocated to the Israeli military from federal spending legislation. Although the amendment faces long odds in the Republican-controlled House, the vote is expected to serve as a measure of congressional willingness to reassess one of Washington’s longest-standing foreign aid commitments.

The amendment targets funding contained in the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, which finances State Department operations, international assistance programs, and foreign military support.

Massie amendment reflects shifting political landscape

The vote comes amid increasing public scrutiny of unconditional US military support for “Israel”, particularly following the wars on Iran and Lebanon and Washington’s involvement in the negotiating process with Iran.

Tehran and Washington inked a series of ceasefire deals, which called for the total cessation of fighting across West Asia, but “Israel” continued to break the deals by continuing to launch attacks on Lebanon.

Supporters of the amendment argue that the measure reflects growing voter skepticism regarding the strategic costs and political consequences of continued military assistance.

According to the report, recent polling has indicated a notable shift in public attitudes toward US policy. Surveys have found increasing concern among both Democrats and younger Republicans regarding the scale of military aid provided to “Israel”, while criticism of Washington’s regional alignment has become more visible across the political spectrum.

The vote will provide one of the clearest indicators yet of whether these changing public attitudes are beginning to influence congressional decision-making.

Critics question strategic rationale for continued aid

Opponents of unconditional military assistance have increasingly challenged long-standing arguments used to justify the aid package.

Among the issues raised are concerns over the war on Gaza, attacks across the region, and the broader consequences of US support for Israeli military operations. Critics argue that continued assistance, regardless of regional developments, reduces Washington’s leverage and contributes to instability.

The report adds that questions have also been raised regarding the claim that “Israel” remains heavily dependent on US military support. The country has expanded its defense exports significantly in recent years, becoming one of the world’s largest arms exporters and reporting record defense sales.

Supporters of reducing aid contend that these developments undermine arguments that “Israel” requires substantial annual US military assistance to maintain its security capabilities.

Funding debate extends beyond current vote

The congressional battle over aid is taking place alongside a broader legislative effort that could alter how future military support is approved.

Lawmakers, including Massie and Representative Ro Khanna, have opposed provisions that would shift certain forms of military assistance away from direct appropriations and toward defense procurement mechanisms. Critics argue that such changes would reduce congressional oversight and make future funding less vulnerable to political opposition.

The dispute reflects growing concern among opponents of military aid that public opinion is moving faster than congressional policy, prompting efforts to insulate funding streams from future political challenges.

While the amendment is unlikely to secure enough votes for passage, observers view the vote itself as politically significant, particularly as lawmakers increasingly face questions from constituents regarding US military commitments abroad.

June 25, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, War Crimes, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on House to vote on proposal ending $3.3bln in military aid to ‘Israel’

Mission unaccomplished – Part I: America failed to achieve every war objective against Iran

Press TV – June 25, 2026

The recent war imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran by the United States and its Zionist ally was built around many sweeping and ambitious objectives, including “regime change,” dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program, destruction of its missile capabilities, and the containment of its regional influence.

Instead, Iran not only survived the most intense and no-holds-barred military onslaught in its modern history but emerged stronger, more cohesive, and more influential than ever before.

The Memorandum of Understanding signed digitally between the presidents of Iran and the United States last week is a testament to Iran’s strategic victory. Every clause reflects Tehran’s battlefield success and Washington’s battlefield failure.

Objective 1: “Regime change” – A fantasy that died on the battlefield

The United States launched the unprovoked and illegal war with the publicly declared goal of toppling the Islamic Republic. For decades, Washington had dreamed of a Tehran that would be compliant, pliable, and free of the ideological and strategic independence that has defined Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution led by Imam Khomeini.

The war was presented as the moment when that dream would finally become reality.

The strategy was classic American “regime-change” doctrine: all-out aerial bombardment, economic strangulation, psychological warfare, and the cultivation of a fifth column within Iranian society. The assumption was that sustained pressure would crack the system and trigger a popular uprising against the government.

Instead, the opposite occurred.

Iran’s leadership remained intact and unified. The assassination of the beloved Leader of the Islamic Revolution did not fracture the system but galvanized it.

The Iranian people, whom Western strategists had assumed would rise against their government under the pressure of war, instead poured into the streets by the millions.

Night after night, for over 110 consecutive days, Iranians have demonstrated in support of the country’s leadership and armed forces. The “Janfeda” (Self-Sacrifice) campaign became a nationwide phenomenon, with ordinary citizens expressing their unwavering commitment to the system governing the Islamic Republic and the armed forces.

The “regime-change” fantasy died not because of diplomatic maneuvering, but because it was never rooted in reality. The Iranian system proved resilient. Its institutions functioned under extreme duress. Its armed forces fought with cohesion and courage, maintaining operational effectiveness despite the loss of senior commanders.

And, most importantly, its people refused to betray their nation. The American intelligence community miscalculated catastrophically. They had assumed that economic pressure would translate into political discontent, but it translated into defiance. They had assumed that military strikes would break the people’s will, but they strengthened it.

The MoU contains no provision for “regime change” because the US simply could not achieve it. It is an admission from Washington that its project failed. The American dream of a post-Islamic Republic Iran is effectively dead, and the war proved it beyond any doubt.

Objective 2: Destruction of Iran’s nuclear program – A complete failure

The nuclear program was one of the primary justifications for the unprovoked war. Washington and Tel Aviv claimed that Iran was racing toward a nuclear weapon and that military action was necessary to prevent that outcome.

The strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities – first in June last year and now during the Ramadan War – were intended to set the program back years, if not destroy it entirely. The goal was “zero enrichment” – a complete cessation of Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, the dismantling of its centrifuges, and the removal of all enriched uranium from Iranian soil.

Yet Iran’s nuclear infrastructure remains intact. The enrichment facilities continue to operate. The centrifuges continue to spin. The “zero enrichment” goal, so cherished by Israel and its American backers, has been effectively abandoned.

Iran’s nuclear scientists, despite being targets of assassination campaigns for years, have continued their work even amid the war. The underground nuclear sites survived the bombardment, and the country’s nuclear program demonstrated its resilience.

The MoU reflects this reality. There is no commitment from Iran to dismantle its nuclear program. There is no suspension of enrichment. There is no transfer of enriched uranium. The only nuclear-related commitment in the agreement is Iran’s reaffirmation of its NPT pledge not to produce nuclear weapons – a commitment Tehran has always maintained and which is fully consistent with its peaceful nuclear program.

The United States has been forced to accept that Iran’s nuclear rights are not negotiable.

This represents a complete reversal of American objectives. The US launched the war intending to end Iran’s nuclear program. It ended the war by accepting that the nuclear program is permanent.

Objective 3: Weakening Iran’s defensive missile power – Strengthened instead

The missile program of the Islamic Republic was another primary target. American and Israeli strategists believed that relentless bombardment would cripple Iran’s production capabilities, destroy its stockpiles, and degrade its ability to project power.

The goal was to leave Iran defenseless and unable to retaliate. A thousand airstrikes were launched against missile production facilities, storage sites, and launch pads. The objective was to destroy Iran’s ability to threaten its adversaries or defend itself.

Instead, Iran’s missile industry has been strengthened. The war provided a real-world testing ground for Iranian technology. The use of older ammunition and equipment paved the way for newer, more advanced systems.

Iran’s underground missile cities – carved deep into mountains – proved resilient to bunker-busting bombs. The production lines never stopped. In fact, they accelerated.

The strategic calculus of Iranian planners proved prescient. By distributing production facilities across the country, by situating them deep underground, and by maintaining redundant supply chains, Iran ensured that no single bombing campaign could cripple its missile industry. The US could destroy surface targets, but it could not reach the heart of Iran’s missile production.

The MoU makes no mention of Iran’s missile program. It was not discussed or negotiated. It is not even on the table. Even Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif admitted on Tuesday that it was not on the agenda during the Islamabad-mediated talks.

The US has been forced to accept that Iran’s missile capabilities are a fact they have to live with. The program that was supposed to be destroyed is now stronger than ever, and the United States has signed an agreement that does not even mention it.

Objective 4: Containment of Iran’s regional influence – Expanded instead

Washington and Tel Aviv had hoped to use the war to roll back Iran’s regional influence. They wanted to break the Axis of Resistance, isolate Tehran, and redraw the regional map in their favor. The strategy was to sever Iran from its allies in Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen, and to create a new regional order that excluded Tehran.

Instead, Iran’s influence has significantly expanded. The Resistance Front is more cohesive and powerful than ever. The war demonstrated that Iran cannot be isolated, that its allies are strategic partners, and that any solution to regional security must include Iran.

Hezbollah, Ansarullah, Hamas, and Iraqi resistance groups fought alongside Iran’s military, coordinating their efforts and demonstrating the depth of the strategic relationship. This axis proved itself to be a genuine alliance, not a collection of clients.

The war also exposed the weakness of the American regional alliance system. The Persian Gulf states, having relied on the US security umbrella for decades, watched in horror as American bases were systematically targeted and American deterrence collapsed.

The “paper tiger” metaphor took on new meaning as Iranian missiles struck deep into the heart of US military infrastructure in the region. The Persian Gulf monarchies, facing the reality of Iranian military power, have been forced to recalibrate their regional calculations.

This is why the MoU explicitly demands the cessation of the enemy’s aggression on all fronts, including Lebanon. Iran did not just protect itself, but it also protected the entire Resistance Axis. The inclusion of Lebanon in the agreement is a clear recognition that Iran’s regional role is now a permanent and non-negotiable reality. The US has effectively acknowledged that it cannot eliminate Iran’s influence; it must accommodate it.

The recent war against Iran was supposed to be the beginning of the end for the Islamic Republic. Instead, it was the beginning of the end for American hegemony in the region.

June 25, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Mission unaccomplished – Part I: America failed to achieve every war objective against Iran

Iranian Victory – Gulf States Creating ‘Regional Security Framework’ With Iran

By Justin K.P. | The Dissident | June 24, 2026

The failed U.S./Israeli war on Iran was not only a major loss for the United States and Israel and an Iranian victory, but it has also helped Iran’s status as a serious regional power.

This is best underscored by the fact that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states,-after facing Iranian retaliatory strikes against U.S. bases and assets during the war, is no longer relying on the United States for protection and is looking to form a security alliance with Iran.

Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani, the Prime Minister of Qatar, told the Financial Times that “Part of what we are doing now, as regional countries, is to create this regional security framework between us and Iran, that will hopefully have economic co-operation in the future between all of us — to bring the region back to stability”.

He similarly told Al Jazeera, “Iran is a neighbouring country, and dialogue with it remains necessary to guarantee the security and stability of the region”.

This shows that the GCC no longer trust the United States to protect them, given that “Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar host US military bases and were attacked by Iran during the war. Washington struggled to supply its Gulf allies with enough interceptors to defend against Iranian missile attacks,” as journalist Kyle Anzalone noted.

As a result, the GCC states are seemingly deciding to stop relying on the United States for defence and make a security agreement with Iran, which has cemented itself as a serious regional power.

“They have to deal with Iran because it is not going anywhere”, Gawdat Bahgat, a professor of national security affairs at Washington’s National Defense University said referring to the Gulf nations new approach to Iran.

“Even while Iran attacked them, they kept diplomatic channels open because the day after, they and Iran have no choice but to live together” he noted.

“Our aim is that Iran flourishes and their economy grows; and our investment basically has always been purely on commercial decisions”, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani told the Financial Times.

This destroys the U.S./Israeli goal of isolating Iran, instead causing regional countries to forge closer ties to Iran for their own national security interests.

This is yet another way the U.S/Israeli war on Iran was a loss for the U.S. empire and a win for Iran and its influence as a serious regional power.

June 25, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Iranian Victory – Gulf States Creating ‘Regional Security Framework’ With Iran

Seyed M. Marandi: Trump Lost the Iran War – Must Sell It as a Victory

Glenn Diesen | June 24, 2026

Prof. Seyed Mohammad Marandi is a former advisor to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team.

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June 24, 2026 Posted by | Video, Wars for Israel | , , , | Comments Off on Seyed M. Marandi: Trump Lost the Iran War – Must Sell It as a Victory

Iran, Saudi FMs hold phone talks as Persian Gulf states rethink US ties

Press TV – June 24, 2026

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Saudi counterpart Prince Faisal bin Farhan have held a phone call to discuss regional developments, as Persian Gulf Arab states recalibrate their approach toward Tehran in the wake of the US-Israeli war that exposed the limits of American power.

Araghchi on Wednesday briefed the Saudi minister on the latest progress in implementing bilateral agreements and the ongoing negotiations following the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed on June 18.

The two top diplomats underscored the importance of maintaining diplomatic channels, strengthening joint cooperation to support regional stability, and achieving positive and sustainable outcomes.

The call came as French news agency AFP said Saudi Arabia is expected to host talks aimed at repairing relations between Iran and Persian Gulf countries following the US-Israeli war on Iran.

It cited a diplomat familiar with the arrangements as saying Wednesday that a regional summit was being planned in Riyadh and could also include other neighboring countries, but no date had yet been set.

The meetings would be separate from the ongoing negotiations between Iran and the United States, the diplomat added.

CNN, citing a senior Persian Gulf diplomat, reported that leaders are increasingly contemplating a future in which the US plays a much smaller role in the regional security architecture, with a possible framework involving a regional non-aggression pact with Iran.

According to Hasan Alhasan, senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “From the Arab states’ perspective, the Iran war is a disastrous turning point for the regional security order.”

The war, which began on February 28, exposed vulnerabilities in the Persian Gulf states’ security model, which is heavily dependent on the nearly 40,000 US troops stationed in the region and American-made air defense systems.

“The US security guarantee is no longer reliable in the way they thought it was,” one analyst at Chatham House told The New York Times.

Washington’s approach is increasingly perceived as selective and heavily centered on Israel’s security interest.

A classified CIA analysis found that US allies in the Persian Gulf are divided over their approach to Iran. According to the assessment, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain prefer continued pressure on Tehran, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait now support negotiations.

Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, noted that the UAE and Bahrain “made themselves frontline states against Iran” through the Abraham Accords and “now they’re in too deep and cannot extract themselves out of it”.

The Saudis, Parsi added, “were at the highest levels pushing for this war. They have come to regret it”.

Adding another layer of complexity is a widening gap between Arab governments and Arab public opinion over Iran.

According to a report by The Economist cited by DID Press, growing anger toward Israel and dissatisfaction with US policies have fueled increasing sympathy for Tehran across parts of the Arab world.

Despite sustained efforts by several Arab governments to reinforce anti-Iran narratives, recent developments have altered perceptions among sections of Arab society.

The report identifies two major drivers behind this shift: anger toward Israel, as many Arabs increasingly view Iranian actions against Israel as a legitimate response to regional military operations, and religious and cultural ties, particularly among Shia communities across the Persian Gulf.

The report concludes that sectarian narratives no longer resonate as strongly as in previous years, and that many Arabs increasingly view Iran as more assertive and resilient than several Arab governments.

Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani traveled to Muscat on Wednesday to initiate talks between Iran, Persian Gulf states, and Iraq on the future operation of the Strait of Hormuz.

The discussions aim to implement a provision of the MoU requiring Iran and Oman to hold talks with other Persian Gulf states on the future management of navigation and maritime services.

Earlier on Wednesday, Oman announced two temporary routes north and south of the existing shipping lane to facilitate safe passage of vessels departing the region, in coordination with the International Maritime Organization.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of global oil and liquefied natural gas normally transits, was heavily disrupted after the United States and Israel launched their war on Iran on February 28.

June 24, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Iran, Saudi FMs hold phone talks as Persian Gulf states rethink US ties

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