RSF military group defects, joins Sudanese army: State media
MEMO | September 26, 2026
A military group affiliated with Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on Friday defected and joined the Sudanese Armed Forces, state news agency SUNA reported.
The force was led by Al-Tayeb Mohammed Ahmed, also known as Al-Tayeb Al-Wahido.
Senior officials from the Sudanese army and the General Intelligence Service received the defecting force.
Al-Wahido said in a press statement he had broken away from the RSF and joined the Sudanese army after witnessing “tragedies” within the paramilitary group’s ranks.
He called on RSF members to join the army, “return to the homeland” and reconsider their positions, saying “there is no cause that justified the continuation of the fighting.”
There was no immediate comment from the RSF on the announcement.
The latest defection follows a series of similar moves from the RSF in recent weeks. On Aug. 31, about 200 RSF fighters, including prominent field commanders, defected and joined the Sudanese army in Omdurman, bringing military equipment with them.
Earlier, on Aug. 19, the army said 318 RSF personnel, including four commanders, defected with as many as 50 combat vehicles.
On Aug. 13, Sudanese authorities announced that 21 commanders and 270 fighters had joined the army with 37 combat vehicles.
Sudan has been engulfed in war between the army and the RSF since April 2023. The conflict has killed tens of thousands of people and displaced millions of others.
The Geopolitical Balance in the Red Sea: The UAE Being Displaced by New Players
By Samyar Rostami – New Eastern Outlook – September 26, 2026
The persistence of current geopolitical alignments, the attention of Eastern actors to the region, the strengthening of Sanaa’s position in the Red Sea, and the expansion of regional opposition to the UAE’s role will diminish Abu Dhabi’s role in the region.
For the past ten years, the Southern Red Sea has been a pivotal factor in the UAE’s foreign policy. Over the past decade, the UAE has built a layered maritime, air, and commercial infrastructure network, including military bases, in the Red Sea or near Yemen, Somaliland, Somalia and Sudan, starting from 2015.
According to some estimates, the value of UAE investments along Africa’s coastal regions and the Arabian Peninsula amounts to $60 billion.
In September 2015, the UAE established its first military base in Africa, in Eritrea. These bases possessed strategic advantages: the ‘protection of interests’ and control over the security and economic architecture of international maritime routes.
With the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, cooperation between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi in the Red Sea intensified.
The UAE’s approach—channeled through companies such as DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports—is centered on controlling ports, strategic waterways, military bases, and key trade and energy routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, in coordination with the United States and its allies. Abu Dhabi’s approach also included engagement with non-state armed actors and separatist movements in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia.
Factors Behind the UAE’s Diminishing Role
Over the past decade, the UAE emerged as a party to the conflicts in the southern Red Sea. However, geopolitical developments over the past year signal a gradual decline in the UAE’s role in the southern Red Sea.
Several factors are also significant, stemming from US and Israeli military strikes against Iran, the war between Sanaa and Saudi Arabia, Saudi-Emirati rivalry in the region, and disputes among African states.
Sudan’s value lies in its geopolitics. With 853 kilometres of coastline and several key ports, Sudan constitutes a vital link in the Red Sea.
The Sudan war since April 2023 has created conditions for the expansion of the UAE’s role. The UAE faces accusations of providing training and logistical support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Human rights and political demands against the UAE has increased.
The UAE also maintains bases inside Sudanese territory. However, the ongoing war in Sudan and the support of allies for the Sudanese government have led to increased pressure on the UAE.
Riyadh regards the Red Sea as part of its strategic interests and its exclusive backyard. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh each view the other as a direct threat to their position and interests in parts of the southern Red Sea. Thus, the reduction of the UAE’s footprint in the southern Red Sea constitutes a strategic gain for Riyadh. Riyadh has effectively sought to weaken Abu Dhabi’s role.
In late 2025, Saudi Arabia’s support for Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) resulted in pressure being brought to bear on UAE-backed forces.
In July 2026, Saudi Arabia hosted talks among 14 countries—including Egypt, Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia—which established a multinational maritime defence alliance. The UAE and Ethiopia were excluded from the list.
The formation of a Riyadh-led Red Sea maritime task force—with the participation of Turkey, Egypt, Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea—without coordination with the UAE amounts to a further constriction of the UAE’s role in the region.
Despite ongoing Egyptian–Emirati consultations on guaranteeing maritime navigation security in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, Egypt’s foreign policy is not aligned with the UAE’s interests in Sudan and the Red Sea. Additionally, the alignment and coordination among Israel, India, the UAE, and Ethiopia are not particularly consonant with Egypt’s interests in Ethiopia and the Red Sea.
Until last September, the UAE played a significant role in the southern Yemeni islands of the Red Sea and in southwestern Yemen. However, Sanaa’s advance in the eastern Red Sea—the port of Mokha, Mayun Island, and other archipelagos north of the Bab al-Mandab Strait—in September 2026 inflicted negative and fundamental consequences on the UAE’s regional role.
Sanaa’s advance amounts to the nullification of the presence of Emirati actors in Yemen’s future political sphere. Sanaa is seeking to consolidate itself as a strategic “node” within the Iran-led Axis of Resistance.
Despite Cairo’s opposition to Sanaa’s proposal for maritime navigation coordination in the Red Sea, Sanaa—having secured control over the most important islands and cities overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait on the Yemeni side—is calling for the formulation of new rules to ensure security and navigation in the region. Ansar Allah’s control over Bab al-Mandab could put the UAE under pressure. Any expansion of Sanaa’s role in Sudan could likewise prove detrimental to the UAE.
Amid tensions between the United States and Iran, Abu Dhabi finds itself facing a more constrained strategic space.
The UAE’s alignment with the United States is, in a sense, also an intensification of Abu Dhabi’s tensions with Iran in areas such as the Red Sea. Unlike the UAE, Iran is seeking better relations with the Sudanese government. Many in Iran believe that Israel and the UAE are devising an economic and geopolitical plan to control the vital routes of the Red Sea and Yemen’s ports.
With Israel’s formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, many in the countries of the southern Red Sea have linked it to the UAE.
After years, Eritrea revoked the UAE’s access to its military infrastructure. Eritrean officials have recently made sharp statements about the UAE and Israel—particularly regarding Tel Aviv’s recognition of Somaliland.
Eritrea is providing frontline support to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Any deeper alliance between Eritrea and Sudan, Iran, Russia, China, and Sanaa could diminish the UAE’s regional role in the Red Sea. Additionally, some countries and actors near the Red Sea also hold a negative view of the UAE’s regional role.
The Somali government’s decision in January 2026 to sever relations with the UAE is, in a sense, a counter to the UAE’s role in the Somaliland and Puntland regions. Somalia has revoked all agreements with the UAE, including cooperation as well as security and defence arrangements. This move has negative implications for the UAE’s role in the southern Red Sea.
Moreover, the southern Red Sea plays a pivotal role in the regional strategy of Russia and Beijing. For example, apart from China’s role in Djibouti, Beijing is Eritrea’s principal creditor and has expanded its influence in Sudan.
The developments of the past year have also contributed to a decline in the standing of the UAE’s allies in the region.
Outlook
The US presence in the Red Sea’s African states is rooted in counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations.
The European Union’s presence in the region, via Operation ASPIDES, is limited to commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Despite the UAE’s formal withdrawal from some bases, its economic and security influence, as well as its soft-power instruments, remain strong.
A decrease in UAE military deployments in the region could negatively impact its support for allies in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan.
The UAE continues to have significant economic potential, secure partnerships, and influence in the southern Red Sea. In a way, this is considered a threat and a risk to certain African nations in the Red Sea region.
Certainly, a more extensive Sanaa presence over Bab al-Mandab, strategic coasts, and islands could confront Abu Dhabi’s maneuver and role in the southern Red Sea with a structural challenge.
The UAE’s approach in ports, logistics, energy, and other strategic infrastructure—along with deeper defense and security coordination with the West in the southern Red Sea—is likely to continue. However, the expansion of the UAE’s role also requires an extensive US presence in the Red Sea.
Moreover, the persistence of current geopolitical alignments, the attention of Eastern actors to the region, the strengthening of Sanaa’s position in the Red Sea, and the expansion of regional opposition to the UAE’s role will diminish Abu Dhabi’s role in the region.
Samyar Rostami is а political observer and senior researcher in international relations.
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Why Algeria finally shut the door on the UAE
Abu Dhabi’s alliance with Tel Aviv has pushed its rivalry with Algiers from quiet hostility into open regional confrontation
By Anis Raiss | The Cradle | September 14, 2026
On 10 September 2026, Algeria severed diplomatic relations with the UAE, giving the Emirati ambassador in Algiers 48 hours to leave. From midnight the following day, Algerian airspace was closed to UAE-registered aircraft, although commercial flights to and from Algiers were exempt until the end of the year.
The rupture had been signaled in advance. During a televised interview in July, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune described a Gulf state he declined to name in five words: “Wherever they set foot, blood flows.” He was referring to its role in Libya, Sudan, and Yemen.
Abu Dhabi answered within hours through Anwar Gargash, diplomatic advisor to Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ). Relations between states, he wrote, are managed “through reason, communication and clarity of interests, not through riddles and signals that require decoding.”
One week earlier, a UN fact-finding mission on Sudan had found “reasonable grounds to believe” that external networks, including some operating through the UAE, were supplying the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Darfur with fighters, weapons, and training.
The source of Algiers’s anger was therefore no riddle. Algeria had become the third government in nine months to take direct action against Abu Dhabi’s regional reach.
Abu Dhabi’s nine-month reckoning
The sequence began on 30 December, when a Saudi-led coalition struck weapons and vehicles that had arrived at Yemen’s Mukalla Port aboard two ships from Fujairah. Riyadh called its national security a red line and accused Abu Dhabi of arming Southern Transitional Council (STC) separatists who had swept into Hadhramaut and Al-Mahra.
The UAE denied that the shipment contained weapons but announced the withdrawal of its remaining forces after Yemen’s Saudi-backed presidential council issued a 24-hour ultimatum. A week later, STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi reportedly fled by sea toward Somaliland, then flew through Mogadishu before reaching Abu Dhabi.
Five days after that flight, Somalia’s federal government annulled its agreements with the UAE covering ports, security cooperation, and defense. Mogadishu cited “strong evidence” of actions undermining the country’s sovereignty, national unity, and political independence. The decision included Berbera, Bosaso, and Kismayo, although enforcement in Somaliland and Puntland remained uncertain. Two regional diplomats told Bloomberg that Saudi officials had pressed Mogadishu to act.
The same pattern surfaced in Sudan through an 83-page Human Rights Watch (HRW) report published in May, which found evidence that the Abu Dhabi-based Global Security Services Group appeared to have hired hundreds of Colombian contractors who fought alongside the RSF around El-Fasher.
On 3 September, the UN mission reported that as many as 2,000 former Colombian soldiers may have joined the conflict, some of whom had trained at a military-style facility in Ghayathi in the UAE before operating drones and artillery in Darfur. Abu Dhabi dismissed the findings as a “false media campaign.”
Kabylie enters Israel’s periphery map
Kabylie is the Amazigh mountain region east of Algiers, home to several million people with their own language and a long history of friction with the central state. Its separatist wing, the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylie (MAK), operates from Paris and was designated a terrorist organization by Algiers in 2021.
Algerian state media now alleges that UAE diplomats have been in contact with the movement, although no supporting evidence has been made public. Even a Semafor column written by a former Emirati government official conceded that point. The Kabylie project does, however, have documented patrons elsewhere.
On 14 December 2025, MAK’s government-in-exile proclaimed a “Federal Republic of Kabylie” at a ceremony in Paris. Twelve days later, Israel recognized Somaliland, becoming the first UN member to do so.
On 14 January 2026, Dan Illouz, a Likud member of the Knesset of Moroccan Jewish descent, tabled an urgent motion calling for a study of recognition for Kabylie and described Algeria as part of the “Iranian evil axis.”
The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security had already advocated “principled political support, leading over time to diplomatic recognition.” Ferhat Mehenni, the folk singer who founded MAK and styles himself as its president-in-exile, had addressed Knesset members as early as 2012.
The Somaliland precedent is where Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv converge. The UAE became the first Gulf state to normalize relations with Israel in 2020, while its port operator DP World holds a 30-year concession at Berbera, Somaliland’s main harbor, alongside a longstanding Emirati security presence.
When Arab and Islamic states issued a joint statement condemning Israel’s recognition, the UAE declined to sign. Reports have since pointed to an Emirati role in facilitating the move, leaving the breakaway territory recognized by Tel Aviv anchored to infrastructure controlled from Abu Dhabi.
These moves draw on a doctrine older than the states now applying it. David Ben Gurion’s periphery strategy sought to contain the Arab core through alliances with non-Arab states and minorities on its edges, including Iran under the Shah, Turkiye, Ethiopia, and Kurdish movements. Israel recognized Somaliland in December, and Kabylie reached the Knesset agenda the following month.
Rabat arms the western flank
The corridor linking Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv passes through Rabat, where, in November 2020, two months after the UAE signed the Abraham Accords, Abu Dhabi became the first Arab government to open a consulate in Laayoune, in occupied Western Sahara, whose independence Algeria has supported since 1975. Morocco restored its own relations with the occupation state one month later.
Military procurement soon gave that alignment material form. In early January 2026, the third session of the Morocco–Israel Joint Military Committee met in Tel Aviv to set the year’s work plan, while Israeli officials described Morocco to the Jerusalem Post as Israel’s most important security partner in Africa.
Rabat operates IAI’s Barak MX air defense system, Elbit’s ATMOS howitzers, and Hermes 900 drones. In November 2025, BlueBird Aero Systems, half-owned by IAI, opened a plant in Benslimane, outside Casablanca, to produce SpyX loitering munitions, described as the first facility of its kind in North Africa.
Spanish defense outlet Escudo Digital has also reported that Israeli-built surveillance and strike drones are stationed at Mahbes, a forward airstrip in Western Sahara close to the Algerian border. If accurate, it would place Israeli platforms within reach of Tindouf, where the Sahrawi refugee camps and Polisario leadership are based.
The economic leg of this alignment extends south through Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative, which offers landlocked Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad access to the sea through the $1.6 billion Dakhla Atlantic Port, reported to be 70 percent complete in November 2025.
The port lies in the same occupied territory where the Emirati consulate stands. On 24 July 2026, Bamako reaffirmed its commitment to the corridor, 13 days after restoring diplomatic relations with Algiers. Normalization has thus acquired its own infrastructure, running from the Gulf through the Maghreb and into the Sahel.
Algeria raises the military stakes
Algeria’s answer has centered on air power rather than competing corridors. Footage that surfaced in February 2026 appeared to show an Su-57 over northern Algeria, reinforcing reports that Algiers had become the first foreign operator of Russia’s fifth-generation fighter – a development that would alter the military balance in the Maghreb.
United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) had announced the delivery of two aircraft to an unnamed foreign customer in November 2025. Su-35 deliveries were reported to have begun in January 2025, followed by a fresh batch of Su-34 bombers in June 2026, even as Russia’s own air force continued to absorb wartime losses.
The hardware was accompanied by a senior Russian commander whose presence surfaced on 9 May 2025, when the Russian embassy in Algiers published photographs of a Victory Day wreath-laying led by an unnamed “head of the group of Russian military specialists in Algeria.”
Kommersant identified him as Sergei Surovikin, an assessment later echoed by British military intelligence. Surovikin had directed Russia’s Syrian air campaign, commanded its forces in Ukraine through the Kherson withdrawal, and vanished after the Wagner mutiny of June 2023. Moscow sent one of its most notorious commanders to Algiers without naming him in the caption.
Washington responded on 3 February 2026, when Robert Palladino, head of the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Algeria’s Su-57 purchase was “problematic” and could trigger CAATSA sanctions.
Marco Rubio – who is now the US secretary of state – had demanded sanctions over Algeria’s Russian arms purchases in 2022. Regional alignments do not divide cleanly. Moscow and Abu Dhabi both back Khalifa Haftar in Libya, while Russia’s Africa Corps supports the Malian junta whose drone Algeria shot down in April 2025. Across Western Sahara and the Maghreb, however, the fault lines are more clearly drawn.
The defense of Abu Dhabi
Abu Dhabi’s official response expressed hope that the break would be “temporary.” A fuller defense appeared the next day in Semafor‘s Gulf section, where a column said the government had “run out of enemies to blame for the dismal state of its economy.”
It portrayed Algeria’s decision as a domestic maneuver, arguing that Algiers needed a new adversary after decades of blaming Morocco and had chosen a wealthy, distant state unlikely to retaliate. The Kabylie allegation was treated as a pretext for rallying the street.
Absent from that account were Mukalla, Mogadishu, El-Fasher, and Ghayathi, along with the Saudi strike on an alleged Emirati shipment, Somalia’s annulment of its agreements with Abu Dhabi, and the UN mission’s findings on UAE-linked networks in Darfur eight days before the column appeared. The nine-month record that helps explain Algiers’s actions went unmentioned.
The column’s author, Tareq Alotaiba, is a fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center and a master’s student at Georgetown. According to his biography, he previously spent 12 years working in economic policy, foreign affairs, and national security for the Abu Dhabi and UAE federal governments. Algiers has its own weaknesses, including a parliamentary election turnout of 21.24 percent in July, the lowest recorded since independence. The column did not mention that figure either.
Algeria’s break with Abu Dhabi marks growing resistance to the network of ports, proxies, and separatist movements through which Emirati and Israeli power is projected across the region. Tel Aviv’s periphery doctrine depends on such footholds and on governments prepared to host them. Algiers has closed one more door.
Leaked chemical dossier reveals Israel’s role in Sudan’s civil war: Report
Press TV – September 11, 2026
A dossier of evidence alleging chemical weapons use by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) was compiled by Israeli intelligence and shared with Western media outlets in a coordinated operation to discredit the army and bolster its paramilitary rival, a report says.
The dossier, described by the New York Times and Washington Post over the weekend as “shared by a Middle Eastern intelligence agency,” contained nearly 150 documents, bomb blueprints, images, videos, voice notes and several thousand intercepted text messages allegedly detailing how a secretive SAF unit developed and produced chlorine bombs over six months in 2024.
Multiple Sudanese and US sources told Middle East Eye that the “Middle Eastern intelligence agency” is Israeli, and that the dossier was nearly identical to one Israel handed to the US government before Washington sanctioned Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, leader of the SAF, in January 2025.
A former US official described the interception of vast numbers of messages as “an advertisement for Pegasus,” the spyware developed by Israeli cyber-intelligence firm NSO Group to infiltrate mobile phones.
“The thing that is shocking is how much Mossad has been tracking this,” one Sudanese security analyst, who could not be named, told Middle East Eye.
“I knew Mossad had interests in Sudan… but the level and depth and length of surveillance suggests that Israel is more involved in Sudan than we think.”
The revelations raise serious questions about Israel’s role in Sudan’s civil war and appear to confirm that Israeli intelligence is actively siding with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) — whose main patron is the United Arab Emirates — against the Sudanese army.
On 13 September 2024, the RSF released a statement accusing the army of firing “toxic” missiles on al-Jaili, a crucial oil refinery north of Khartoum controlled at the time by the paramilitary.
There were no confirmed deaths in the attack, and there are no other confirmed occasions in which the SAF used chlorine bombs. The dossier does not contain medical evidence or testimony from any victims.
In a statement shared with Middle East Eye, the Sudanese government clarified that Sudan is a state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and “has remained committed to its provisions and procedures, including the non-production, non-stockpiling and non-use of chemical weapons.”
It said that “all chlorine stocks in the country are designated exclusively for water purification, civilian industrial uses and energy, and it stands ready to demonstrate this before any competent international body.”
Israeli sources involved in the Zionist regime’s decision-making in the Horn of Africa have previously sought to develop and maintain relationships with a variety of different players, rather than backing one side or another.
“The Israeli love story with Hemedti intensified in 2021,” one North African analyst told Middle East Eye, referring to RSF head Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo Musa. The RSF chief was believed at the time and afterwards to have developed ties with Mossad.
In the leadup to Sudan’s war, then-Israeli foreign minister Eli Cohen met Burhan as part of what the Israelis called a “historic diplomatic visit” intended to pave the way for the finalization of a peace agreement. The war scuppered this.
But Hemedti maintained his ties with Israel, whose key ally the UAE continued to support the Sudanese paramilitary — charges Abu Dhabi still denies, despite mounting evidence, including from the United Nations.
“This feels like they are picking sides,” a former US official said of Israel, the dossier and the RSF. “The intelligence they shared with Washington succeeded in getting Burhan and the SAF sanctioned.”
“The Israel-UAE relationship has only grown deeper,” the source said.
Last month, Africa Intelligence reported that two of Hemedti’s brothers, Abdul Rahim and Algoney, had travelled secretly to Tel Aviv in May 2025 and again in February this year to meet with Israeli intelligence and foreign ministry officials.
The dossier’s Israeli origins fit a broader pattern of Israeli intelligence operations aimed at shaping narratives, influencing Western media and undermining governments that refuse to align with its regional agenda.
By feeding selectively leaked and unverified material to American newspapers, Israeli intelligence has succeeded in manufacturing a chemical weapons scandal that has been used to justify sanctions against Sudan’s army leadership while its rival — accused of genocide by the UN — receives continued support from Israel’s Persian Gulf allies.
Israel provides covert intelligence, security assistance to Sudan’s RSF militia: Report
The Cradle | August 30, 2026
The leadership of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a militia accused of genocide in Sudan, has maintained secret, high-level security and intelligence contacts with Israel since before the start of the civil war in 2023, Africa Intelligence reported on 28 August.
According to the report, RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, secretly visited Tel Aviv in May 2025 and February 2026 for meetings with the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s Africa Division and Israeli intelligence officers.
Hemedti was joined by his two brothers, Abdul Rahim, the RSF’s second-in-command, and Algoney, on both trips.
Links between the RSF, which is fighting against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and Israel have emerged previously.
In 2022, Israeli newspaper Haaretz and Dutch investigative news outlet Lighthouse reported that a jet linked to former Israeli intelligence officer Tal Dilian delivered sophisticated EU-made phone-surveillance and hacking equipment to the RSF.
Dilian is the founder of the Intellexa network, a private intelligence firm based in Cyprus.
While Israel provides security and intelligence assistance to the RSF, the UAE remains the RSF’s principal backer.
Abu Dhabi provides the Sudanese militia with heavy weapons, drones, armored vehicles, ammunition, logistics, transit routes, and foreign mercenaries, in particular from Colombia.
The US government, UN, and various rights groups have documented that the RSF committed genocide in Sudan.
Last month, a coalition of rights groups led by the Raoul Wallenberg Center for Human Rights petitioned the International Criminal Court (ICC) to open an investigation into senior UAE officials and other regional figures for complicity in the genocide of non-Arab tribes in Sudan.
The submission accused them of enabling genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by supplying the RSF and the SAF with weapons, money, and mercenaries, and knowingly assisting crimes carried out by a group.
Sudanese survivors filed a separate request naming Emirati Vice President Mansour bin Zayed Al-Nahyan over his role in financing and supplying the RSF.
That filing sets out murder, torture, and rape, including fighters driving vehicles over fleeing civilians. It points to the fall of El-Fasher on 26 October 2025, where UN reports record 6,000 people killed in three days.
The UK has also covertly assisted the RSF.
London has licensed around $565 million worth of weapons sales to the UAE across the past three years, including British-manufactured equipment that has repeatedly ended up in the hands of the RSF.
Nathaniel Raymond of Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab told the House of Commons that British officials disregarded two years of real-time intelligence on the coming slaughter, which killed an estimated 60,000 people.
Raymond testified that the UK “prioritized HMG’s economic, security, and diplomatic relationships with the UAE above preventing the intentional starvation, forced displacement, and the genocidal slaughter” of civilians.
Trump Wants To Use A Deal With Iran To Further Isolate The Palestinians
Trump Wants Every Arab State To Abandon Palestine
The Dissident | May 25, 2026
Donald Trump on Truth Social, has announced his intention to pressure Qatar, Pakistan, Türkiye, Egypt, and Jordan to normalize relations with Israel- without Israel agreeing to a Palestinian state-as part of the potential deal with Iran.
On TruthSocial, Trump wrote, “Negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran are proceeding nicely! It will only be a Great Deal for all or, no Deal at all — Back to the Battlefront and shooting, but bigger and stronger than ever before — And nobody wants that!” adding, “after all the work done by the United States to try and pull this very complex puzzle together, it should be mandatory that all of these Countries, at a minimum, simultaneously, sign onto the Abraham Accords. Those Countries discussed are Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates (already a Member!), Qatar, Pakistan, Türkiye, Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain (already a Member!). It may be possible that one or two have a reason for not doing so, and that will be accepted, but most should be ready, willing, and able to make this Settlement with Iran a far more Historic Event than it would, otherwise, be.”
He added, “I am mandatorily requesting that all Countries immediately sign the Abraham Accords, and that, if Iran signs its Agreement with me, as President of the United States of America, it would be an Honor to have them also be part of this unparalleled World Coalition.”
For context, all members states of the Arab League and even Iran have long agreed to support the Arab peace initiative, which calls for all states who signed on to “Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region” and “Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace” in exchange for “The acceptance of the establishment of a Sovereign Independent Palestinian State on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4th of June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.”
Israel has long rejected this major compromise and instead pursues the Greater Israel Project and endless regime change wars against states that are too supportive of the Palestinians.
In 2020 Benjamin Netanyahu, Jared Kushner, and the Trump administration came up with a way for Israel to get normalization with Arab states without any concessions for Palestinians, dubbed the Abraham Accords.
The phony “peace deal” allowed Israel to normalize relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, without anything for Palestinians.
The real purpose of the deal, as the New Yorker David Remnick puts it , was “sidelining the Palestinians yet again”.
The deal, as Mother Jones noted , “essentially kicked the Palestinians and their grievances (the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, its apartheid policies, and its blockade of Gaza, which turned the strip, according to Human Rights Watch, into an ‘open-air prison’) to the curb”.
Benjamin Netanyahu- who wanted to expand the Accords to countries like Saudi Arabia- made it no secret that the deal was intended to isolate the Palestinians, to pave the way for an Israeli annexation of Gaza and the West Bank.
As Journalist Jeremy Scahill noted , “The Abraham Accords, launched under President Donald Trump, effectively excised the issue of Palestinian self-determination as a condition for normalization, a major victory for Israel. Israeli provocations and attacks against worshippers at Al Aqsa were becoming a regular occurrence. Israel was aggressively moving forward with its annexation of Palestinian land and armed settlers were conducting deadly paramilitary actions, often with the support or facilitation of the government, against Palestinian farms and homes in the occupied territories.”
Scahill noted that:
In the years preceding the October 7 attacks, under presidents Trump and Biden, Hamas watched as Israel became more emboldened as prospects for Palestinian liberation receded to the footnotes of Washington-led initiatives aimed at normalizing relations between Israel and Arab nations like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Netanyahu’s position was: “We must not give the Palestinians a veto over new peace treaties with Arab states.”
Just two weeks before the October 7 attacks, the Israeli leader delivered a speech at the UN general assembly in New York, brandishing a map of what he promised could be the “New Middle East.” It depicted a state of Israel that stretched continuously from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. Gaza and the West Bank, as Palestinian lands, were erased.
During that speech, Netanyahu portrayed the full normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia as the linchpin of his vision for this “new” reality, one which would open the door to a “visionary corridor that will stretch across the Arabian Peninsula and Israel. It will connect India to Europe with maritime links, rail links, energy pipelines, fiber-optic cables.”
Netanyahu’s open admission that Israel wanted to use the Abraham Accords to abandon the Palestinians and make way for an Israeli annexation of Gaza and the West Bank is a large part of what triggered the Al-Aqsa Flood operation from Hamas on October 7th.
But after the Israeli Holocaust in Gaza, most states that could have potentially signed onto the Abraham Accords refused to agree to full normalization with Israel without the establishment of a Palestinian state.
As the Times of Israel noted , “Riyadh has repeatedly said, however, that it will not join the accords before Israel commits to the establishment of a Palestinian state, an idea that the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vehemently refused to entertain,” adding, “Like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan has said it will not recognize Israel until the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Qatar, too, has no formal ties with Israel”.
Türkiye has similarly said, “When Israel stops the pressure and cruelty targeting Palestinians, Türkiye will have no problem with normalizing relations. As long as its regional policies continue, as long as they bomb cities, kill children and women, it is impossible to normalize ties with them”.
Through demanding that all of these states join the Abraham Accords, Trump is attempting to force countries desperate to see an end to the war in Iran to normalize relations with Israel and abandon the Palestinians, in order to lead the way for the final phase of Israel’s annexation and ethnic cleansing of Palestine.
UAE fuelling African conflicts while evading accountability, SWP finds

Al Mayadeen | May 17, 2026
A newly published report by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) has delivered a critical assessment of the United Arab Emirates’ role in African conflicts, describing Abu Dhabi as a systematic spoiler that arms proxy forces, manipulates diplomatic processes, and bears significant responsibility for some of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, all while facing virtually no political consequences from its Western partners.
The report, authored by researchers at one of Europe’s most influential foreign and security policy think tanks, which directly advises the German government and Bundestag, calls on Berlin and its European partners to fundamentally reassess their relationship with the UAE.
Sudan: The clearest case
The report presents Sudan as the most devastating example of Emirati interference. The UAE is identified as the most important military, logistical, and financial backer of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary group whose war against the Sudanese Armed Forces has produced what the UN reports as the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, with 33.7 million people dependent on aid, over 15 million displaced, and widespread extreme hunger.
The RSF’s conduct has been particularly brutal. The report details targeted violence against non-Arab minorities, including sexual violence, mass killings, attacks on medical facilities, and hostage-taking, primarily directed at groups such as the Masalit and Zaghawa.
When the RSF captured El-Fasher in North Darfur in October 2025, a UN fact-finding mission described its actions against the civilian population as bearing the hallmarks of genocide.
Emirati support for the RSF continued even after Iranian strikes on the UAE, with numerous cargo flights departing from Emirates airports to Ethiopia, apparently to ferry supplies across the border to RSF positions.
A UN panel of experts documented 458 flights involving heavy transport aircraft from Emirati military airports or the transhipment hub of Bosaso to eastern Libya between October 2024 and the end of 2025, 239 of them bound for Kufra, a key hub for RSF resupply, in likely violation of UN arms embargoes on both Libya and Darfur.
A proxy model built on plausible deniability
The UAE rarely deploys its own forces. Instead, it operates through a carefully constructed network of local proxies, private military contractors, and logistical intermediaries. Beyond the RSF in Sudan, its partners include Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces, the Puntland Maritime Police Force in Somalia, and, in a departure from the pattern, the Ethiopian government during its war against the Tigray people.
The report details how the UAE recruited and deployed hundreds of Colombian mercenaries to Sudan via an Emirati security firm, with the US government noting in 2025 that these fighters had served as infantry, artillery personnel, drone pilots, and even trained children for combat.
Supplies to the RSF have been routed through LAAF-controlled Libya, Chad, Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda, with Abu Dhabi deploying financial leverage to secure cooperation, including a 1.5 billion dollar loan to Chadian President Idriss Déby in 2023.
The UAE also profits from gold smuggling networks in conflict zones, with members of the ruling family reported to have personal ties to both Haftar and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo.
Why the UAE intervenes
SWP identifies several overlapping motives. Economic interests are central, as state-owned logistics giants DP World and AD Ports Group have port and infrastructure projects across the continent, and military interventions serve to protect access to trade routes and strategic resources.
But economics alone do not explain the pattern. The report points to the UAE’s drive to outcompete Saudi Arabia for regional influence, a rivalry that has only sharpened since Riyadh forced Abu Dhabi out of southern Yemen.
Ideological opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood also shapes policy, with the UAE consistently backing actors who suppress Islamist movements. Personal enrichment through resource networks and ruling family ties to conflict actors adds a further layer.
Diplomatic manipulation
The report scrutinises the UAE’s use of diplomatic engagement as cover, whereby Abu Dhabi participates in international peace processes while simultaneously intensifying support for belligerents.
In September 2025, the UAE joined the Sudan Quad format alongside Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, signing joint commitments to end external support for conflict parties. According to US intelligence reporting, however, the UAE was actively intensifying support for the RSF at the same time.
The UAE also pledged 200 million dollars at a February 2025 humanitarian conference and a further 500 million dollars at a US conference in 2026, while contributing only around 33 million dollars to the UN-coordinated humanitarian plan.
In November 2025, Emirati Minister of State Lana Nusseibeh spent four days meeting with Members of the European Parliament in Brussels. Nusseibeh’s endeavor was successful, as a Parliament resolution on Sudan adopted at the same time made no mention of the UAE’s support for the RSF, following opposition from the European People’s Party to amendments tabled by left-wing parliamentary groups.
The same pattern played out during the Berlin Libya Process in 2019-20, when the UAE pledged to halt arms transfers to Libyan conflict parties but continued them regardless. Transport aircraft flew from the Emirates to eastern Libya on the very day of the Berlin conference in January 2020.
European silence, eroded accountability
The report stresses that Western governments, including Germany, have consistently refused to name the UAE publicly in international forums, despite substantial documented evidence of its role in fuelling conflicts. No UN Security Council member has explicitly raised Emirati support for the RSF in formal meetings, either.
This reluctance, SWP argues, is not incidental but reflects a broader calculation in which trade ties, security cooperation, the UAE’s close relationship with “Israel,” and the strategic goal of preventing Abu Dhabi from drifting further toward China or Russia have consistently outweighed accountability concerns.
The UAE’s open disregard for the UN embargo on Libya from 2014 onward, the report notes, likely encouraged other states to adopt a similar approach, with the same dynamic now being repeated in Sudan.
Five recommendations
SWP outlines five concrete steps for Germany and its European partners:
- First, Abu Dhabi should be named explicitly in international forums rather than referenced in vague language about “external actors.”
- Second, EU financial sanctions should be expanded and applied more consistently where Emirati actors have documented embargo violations.
- Third, German arms export policy toward the UAE requires a fundamental review, given the documented transfer of German-chassis military equipment to conflict zones.
- Fourth, anti-money-laundering enforcement should be tightened, with greater focus on Emirati financial centres as hubs for conflict economies and sanctions evasion.
- Fifth, the strategic partnership Germany has maintained with the UAE since 2004 should, at a minimum, be suspended unless Abu Dhabi demonstrably reorients its policy toward de-escalation.
The report concludes that the war on Iran, mounting tensions with Saudi Arabia, and growing reputational vulnerabilities have made the UAE more susceptible to European pressure than at any previous point, and that this window should not go unused.
‘Little Sparta’: Why The UAE Attacked Iran for Israel’s Sake
By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle | May 9, 2026
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been accused of launching direct strikes targeting Iranian civilian infrastructure, while escalating its anti-Tehran rhetoric and having lobbied the US to return to all-out regional war. Although on the surface of things, it would appear nonsensical for such a small and fragile country to commit itself to reckless actions of these kinds, the UAE is no ordinary Gulf State.
While presenting itself as an innovative nation, one that is dissimilar to its neighbors in that its focus is the creation of wealth, “unity” and “peace”, the UAE fosters an image of a wise and inviting leadership that caters to outsiders. Utilizing their immense oil wealth, Abu Dhabi’s rulers have managed to construct an image of themselves that is almost as artificial as Dubai’s Skyline.
Behind the “tallest building” and “deepest pool” in the world are not talented Emirati architects, hard labor, and meticulous planners; instead, there are foreign experts and modern-day slaves. Although the Emirati rulers may be the ones who own everything and their people the ones who reap the benefits, even their prized oil industry would be nothing without all the foreigners who did everything for them.
Interestingly, both their foreign intelligence operations and oil industry have been heavily influenced by Palestinians, specifically from the Gaza Strip, and other non-Emirati Arabs, who helped make their nation run. Many of their police patrol officers are not their own nationals either, while 80% of their armed forces are foreigners.
The “peace” and “unity” that they promote are simply a Zionist project to attack the resistance to Israel’s expansionist endeavors. Not only were the ‘Abraham Accords’ lobbied for by the UAE, with it using its influence in Sudan and Morocco to bring even more States on board, but their entire national project has also been centered around assassinating pan-Arab and pan-Islamic unity.
Not only does the UAE use “inter-faith” projects to normalize Zionism and Zionists amongst Muslims, it actively controls a host of Islamic influencers, sheiks, Quran reciters, and scholars, whose role is to target impressionable Muslims. These individuals are used to push sectarianism, especially against Twelver Shias, but even against fellow Sunni Muslims who refuse to comply with their views.
Across the region, the UAE, known amongst its war hawk allies as ‘Little Sparta’, pursues a bloodthirsty approach, especially across the Horn of Africa. In Sudan, it is the primary backer of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of warlord Muhammad Dagalo (Hemedti), a militant group accused of committing genocide. In Gaza, they are also accused of backing the Israeli-controlled ISIS-linked death squads, used to fight against the Palestinian resistance.
In Libya, they provided support to warlord Khalifa Haftar’s men, while propping up the Southern Transitional Council (STC) separatists in Yemen. They claim to oppose “Islamists” and “Islamic extremism”, while they actively promote Wahhabi Islam, with the political goal of encouraging the most malignant forms of sectarianism. Their only true opposition to ‘Islamists’ is a stance against the Muslim Brotherhood and all groups who dare to challenge Israel, and/or the United States in any way.
To demonstrate the depths of their hypocrisy, consider that the toughest fighters belonging to their STC proxy forces in Yemen were former Al-Qaeda and ISIS militants. In the name of combating the so-called “Islamist threat” of the Ansarallah government in Sana’a, the UAE decided to throw its weight behind hardline Salafist militants.
When it comes to the Iran conflict, the UAE optical illusion is also in effect. It played victim, feigned neutrality, while simultaneously pushing claims that it managed to intercept more Iranian missiles and drones than the Israelis did. In this way, it becomes both the hero and victim, but in an even less believable way than the Zionists, who clearly have more believable propaganda.
In reality, the UAE not only provided a launching pad for the illegal US-Israeli attack on Iran, but had even fully integrated its air defense systems with Israel following their normalisation agreement. They were providing the Israelis with information used to help them combat Iranian retaliatory strikes on their territory, while the Emirati-owned Wing Loong II UAVs were used to monitor Iranian airspace in support of the US-Israeli aggression.
While the US certainly used other Persian Gulf Arab States to attack the Islamic Republic, none were so enthusiastic as Abu Dhabi’s leadership. Oman is the only country in the region that did not allow for its territory to be used for offensive action against Iran, while Qatar began developing a more neutral tone, especially as the war progressed, the UAE went the opposite direction. Eventually, the Emirati anti-Iran rhetoric escalated to the degree that the Emirati rulers began labeling Tehran as terrorists.
Understanding why is crucial to comprehending the nature of the UAE as an entity in the Persian Gulf. Contrary to its propaganda, Abu Dhabi is the means through which Israeli and Western imperial power is harnessed.
The British, who helped form the “Trucial States” that would later band together under the leadership of Abu Dhabi and become the United Arab Emirates in 1971, referred to them as “pirates”. This legacy of being a disrespected puppet of the empire is something that holds true until this day, where the ultra-rich Emirati leadership enthusiastically does the bidding of their superiors.
In only 54 years, the regime along the Persian Gulf has managed to present to the world a model of what unfettered materialism leads to. A regime that operates off of oil money, which wouldn’t exist without foreign know-how and intelligence. It looks down on other Arabs, despite it needing them to function or to have become what it is.
It claims to represent a moderate and peaceful version of Islam, promoting Madkhali Wahhabi voices who promote it as a model of socially conservative religion and claim it represents a leadership that follows the virtues of Tawheed (monotheism) above all others. Simultaneously, Dubai is a representation of everything that Islam opposes socially, while the same pro-UAE preachers who want to excommunicate ordinary Muslims from their religion over the slightest disagreements will sit back as Hindu Temples are openly constructed.
It has been involved in aiding two genocides, perhaps a third if you consider the 400,000 deaths in Yemen to constitute a genocide also. Even today in Somalia, only it and Israel recognize and back the Somaliland separatist movement, which could contribute to major future bloodshed.
All of this is relevant to keep in mind as the UAE is as artificial and malignant to the region as the Israelis are. Both have utter contempt for the people surrounding them, refuse to acknowledge the limits of their power, and have major narcissism complexes. In the UAE, they have to monitor every square inch of their territory, censor everyone’s thoughts, killing, deporting or imprisoning anyone who refuses to go along with stroking their fragile egos.
Ultimately, the UAE is just as complicit in regional atrocities as are the Israelis, which is why it is no surprise that they decided to directly join the illegal US-Israeli war on Iran. Their mission is to conquer, dominate and destroy the surrounding region, in order to come out on top, working hand in hand with the Zionists to do so. Now that their tourism industry has been devastated and they have taken significant blows, that only reinforces the idea of aiding the Israelis in pursuing their expansionist endeavors.
Recent history alone has demonstrated that the UAE is willing to clash with neighboring Saudi Arabia, however irrational that idea may have been, and how quickly Riyadh managed to quash their separatist proxy project in Yemen. They also demonstrated in 2017 that they were willing to push Qatar to the breaking point, in order to demand on Israel’s behalf that they stop providing financial support to Hamas, as well as using Al-Jazeera to air coverage favorable of Palestinians.
The UAE is not a normal country; it doesn’t have thousands of years of history like neighboring Oman, it is an aggressive asset that cares only for expanding the power of its monarchy. Therefore, it is to be assumed that it will participate in continued attacks on its neighbors, while wearing the cloak of plausible deniability.
However, the Emiratis are likely to find out against Iran, what they quickly learned when they recently clashed with Saudi Arabia, they are not Israel and can’t behave as such without consequences.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.
UAE received $80m in EU farming subsidies as calls grow for sanctions over Sudan genocide
MEMO | May 7, 2026
The United Arab Emirates’ ruling Al Nahyan family has benefited from more than €71 million (US $80 million) in European Union farming subsidies, even as campaigners intensify calls for sanctions against senior Emirati officials over Abu Dhabi’s alleged role in the Sudan genocide.
A cross-border investigation by DeSmog, shared with the Guardian, found that subsidiaries controlled by the Al Nahyan family collected more than €71 million over six years through farmland in Romania, Italy and Spain. The payments were made under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which distributes around €54 billion (US $60 billion) a year to farmers and rural areas across the bloc.
The investigation traced 110 subsidy payments between 2019 and 2024 to a network of companies and subsidiaries controlled by the UAE ruling family and Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund ADQ. The largest payments were linked to Agricost, a Romanian agricultural company which owns what the Guardian described as the EU’s single largest farm, covering 57,000 hectares.
The findings have raised fresh questions about how European public funds are being channelled to foreign state-linked investors and ultra-wealthy landowners. The UAE’s European agricultural holdings form part of Abu Dhabi’s wider food security strategy, aimed at securing crops and animal feed for a country which imports most of its food.
The revelations come as pressure grows in the UK for greater scrutiny of the UAE’s role in Sudan. Human rights organisation FairSquare has asked the British government to investigate links between Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE deputy prime minister and owner of Manchester City Football Club, and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
FairSquare’s sanctions submission alleges that the UAE has been the “prime external driver” of the Sudan conflict and cites evidence, including from the UN Panel of Experts, that Abu Dhabi has supplied weapons, ammunition and other support to the RSF since June 2023, in violation of a UN arms embargo. The UAE has repeatedly denied arming the RSF.
The RSF has been accused of mass atrocities in Sudan, including in Darfur. FairSquare’s submission notes that the UN has described RSF violence in El-Fasher as “shocking in its scale and brutality” and bearing “the hallmark of genocide”. The group argues that the UK should examine whether Sheikh Mansour’s alleged role meets the threshold for sanctions.
Sudan’s RSF leaders build Dubai property empire with UAE backing: Investigative group
Press TV – April 28, 2026
Leaders of Sudan’s so-called Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their network have amassed millions in luxury assets in Dubai, an investigation reveals, as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is accused of helping a financial lifeline for a militant group that committed genocide in the crisis-hit African country.
A detailed investigation by the Sentry, a US investigative group, showed that individuals tied to the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, have accumulated more than 20 high-end properties in Dubai worth £17.7 million.
The report further exposed a sprawling “paramilitary-industrial complex” stretching across Africa and West Asia, with the UAE functioning as a critical hub for both wealth storage and financial operations linked to the militant group.
The probe by the Sentry maintained that the UAE acted as a “safe haven” for RSF leaders and their relatives, as well as for wealth derived from smuggled Sudanese gold.
After seizing Darfur’s largest gold mine back in 2017, Hemedti and his network reportedly leveraged UAE-based companies to convert illicit gold into hard currency, taking advantage of Dubai’s booming gold trade.
“In addition to arming the militia, the UAE allows the RSF to base part of its paramilitary-industrial complex in Dubai. Our investigation shows the Dagalo family has also found a safe haven for its wealth in the Emirates,” Nick Donovan, senior investigator at the Sentry, said.
Leaked real estate records also indicate that properties linked directly to the RSF network are worth about £7.4 million, while assets held by sanctioned associates add another £10.3 million to it. Among them are luxury six-bedroom villas near Dubai’s Meydan racecourse acquired through a UAE-registered firm – Prodigious Real Estate Management Supervision Services – tied to an individual sanctioned by the United States for supplying funding and military equipment to the RSF.
According to the probe, Dagalo family members clustered in these compounds, while Hemedti’s wife purchased land worth £627,000 in the vicinity of Trump International Golf Club six months into Sudan’s war.
Sanctioned RSF-linked figure Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed is also reported to own a £516,000 apartment in Burj Khalifa.
The RSF – commanded by Hemedti and his sanctioned brothers – has been accused by both the United Nations and the US of atrocities amounting to genocide, including during an assault on El Fasher in the Darfur region.
Despite mounting evidence, the UAE, widely seen as the militant group’s chief foreign backer, “categorically rejects” claims that it has provided “weapons, funding, trainers or logistical support to the RSF.”
Citing a separate report last week, the Sentry also said that UAE-backed Colombian mercenaries played a decisive role in the fall of El Fasher.
Meanwhile, RSF-linked individuals deny any wrongdoing, insisting assets were legally obtained and commercial activities were legitimate, even as Sudan’s war drives what is now the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, with 33 million people of the country’s 50 million population needing aid and at least 19 million facing hunger.
The RSF, which has been fighting the Sudanese army over the past few years, currently controls large swathes of the country’s southwestern territories, including most of the region of Darfur.
The militants captured el-Fasher on October 26, 2025, with reports saying they massacred thousands of civilians who failed to flee the city.
A UN fact-finding mission found that RSF actions in el-Fasher show “hallmarks of genocide” against the Zaghawa and Fur ethnic communities.
Despite denials by the UAE, several reports have suggested that the Persian Gulf Arab country supports RSF militants in Sudan in a bid to get access to gold and secure control over Red Sea shipping lanes, as well as agricultural land.
Iran attacks on UAE leaves RSF militia high and dry
The Canary | March 12, 2026
Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are reportedly contributing to a rapid collapse of the genocidal so-called ‘Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) in Sudan.
The RSF, funded and armed by the UAE and Israel, had been making gains up to February 2026. It has murdered hundreds of thousands of people in Sudan. Rapes, sexual torture and executions have been common and almost 400,000 people are in starvation.
However, Sudanese government forces have achieved a string of military victories that appear to be turning into a rout.
With UAE shipments rerouted from the Hormuz Straight and the UAE to Saudi Arabia due to Iran’s counterattacks of shipping, the UAE economy, and it’s global financiers, have been dealt a major blow.
Meanwhile, Sudanese forces are targeting RSF arms and supply depots, crippling front-line RSF troops by cutting off ammunition, fuel, and essentials.
