How Iran’s two-week retaliatory strikes exposed cracks in US military architecture in Persian Gulf
By Mohammad Molaei | Press TV | October 18, 2026
The two-week exchange of fire between the United States and Iran, triggered by Washington’s attempt to force open an illegal southern corridor through the Strait of Hormuz, represented the most consequential direct military confrontation between them since the 40-day war.
The Iranian response to the unprovoked and illegal American aggression was not a chaotic escalation but a methodical, layered military campaign that drew on years of doctrinal development, weapons investment, and operational planning.
The efforts of the Islamic Republic’s armed forces, spearheaded by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) aerospace and naval branches, executed a decisive and swift response.
What unfolded was a layered operation with nine distinct but interlocking lines of effort. Each line reinforced the others. Infrastructure degradation reduced American operational tempo; area denial forced repositioning that compounded the effects of that degradation; extended-range precision strikes demonstrated that repositioning offered no sanctuary; ISR attrition blinded American targeting systems; terrorist suppression closed the land flank, while strikes on utility infrastructure imposed costs on host nations and denied services to American bases.
One can employ the open-source reporting, satellite imagery, and the observable pattern of strikes to examine each dimension of Iran’s military response in detail, and construct a coherent operational picture. It is getting exceedingly clear that the ceasefire period has very likely translated to a window for reconstitution and preparation in Iranian strategic calculus.
The primacy of solid-fuel tactical ballistic missiles
Iran’s decision to anchor its retaliatory campaign in solid-fuel tactical ballistic missiles was not accidental. It reflected a decade-long investment in a specific capability designed precisely for this kind of confrontation. Solid-fuel ballistic missiles offer decisive operational advantages over their liquid-fuel predecessors. They require no fueling time at the launch site, dramatically compressing the window between a launch order and missile departure.
This matters enormously in a sensitive environment where adversary assets, particularly MQ-9 Reaper drones and maritime patrol aircraft, are actively hunting for launch preparations.
A liquid-fuel missile requires a visible, time-consuming fueling sequence that creates a detectable signature. A solid-fuel missile can be transported, erected, and fired in a fraction of that time, often before a targeting solution can be developed and a strike authorized.
These missiles are road-mobile, launched from transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) that can disperse across Iran’s mountainous terrain, making pre-emptive targeting extremely difficult.
Having destroyed much of the air defense systems belonging to the US and its Arab allies using the older, less sophisticated liquid fuel missiles in previous wars, Iran’s strikes this time primarily relied on its tactical solid-fuel ballistic missile inventory, meaning the various variants of the Fateh family.
Simply put, the choice of solid-fuel systems reflected a calculated assessment of the adversary’s weakened interception capacity, an assessment that proved accurate.
The air defense inventory crisis
Perhaps the single most consequential factor shaping the operational environment was the state of US and allied air defense missile inventories.
The United States entered this round of military aggression with critically depleted stocks of its most capable interceptors. The Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), which arm Aegis-equipped destroyers and cruisers and provide the American Navy’s primary ballistic missile defense capability at sea, have been drawn down through a combination of expenditure in the Red Sea campaign against Yemen, the costly defense of Israel during two previous wars, and the simple reality that production rates have never kept pace with consumption.
The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which provides upper-tier defense against medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, is similarly constrained.
The decision not to employ Aegis and THAAD at full capacity was therefore a forced one. The United States simply could not spend its remaining meager inventory of SM-3 and THAAD interceptors against Iranian tactical ballistic missiles, which, while accurate and damaging, are not the only threats to American interests.
Doing so would have left the United States strategically exposed against another serious contingency in East Asia or Europe. The calculus was that American military bases had to absorb more hits to preserve the interceptors.
Moreover, the Patriot system, which bore the brunt of terminal-phase defense in recent weeks across the region, was in no better condition. Years of expenditure across Ukraine, the occupied territories, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea mission have drawn PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE stocks to extremely low levels.
The Pentagon’s response was telling. Rather than accelerating full-capability PAC-3 MSE production, it has chosen to pursue the cheaper, less capable PAC-3ACE Cost Reduction Initiative variant. More revealing still were the recent PAC-2 GEM-T orders, an older interceptor not procured by the US in decades, signaling just how severely stocks had been exhausted.
That the world’s most sophisticated air defense enterprise was compelled to resurrect a 1990s-era design to sustain basic readiness is the starkest indicator of the American munitions crisis that Iranian planners appear to have understood, measured, and exploited with precision.
The situation among Persian Gulf states was equally dire. Saudi Arabia and the UAE had expended substantial portions of their Patriot PAC-3 interceptor stocks during years of Yemeni military missile and drone attacks, and entered the 40-day imposed war with depleted inventories. The situation is even direr in Kuwait and Bahrain, with the Persian Gulf microstates effectively running out of Patriots, being forced to solely rely on American-operated systems.
PAC-3, the most capable variant of the Patriot system against ballistic missiles, has effectively been exhausted in several batteries. PAC-2, the older and less capable variant, is the only available option in certain areas against Iranian missiles, and even that missile is running low as well. The collective air defense architecture of the Persian Gulf states, which had appeared formidable on paper, has been effectively hollowed out.
Iranian operational planners were aware of these facts. The sequencing and volume of Iranian missile salvos during the exchange reflected a deliberate attempt to exploit the gap between what the defense could theoretically intercept and what it could actually intercept given real-world inventory constraints.
Iran’s multi-layered operational strategy
What distinguished Iran’s response from a simple missile barrage was its architectural coherence. Iranian planners did not merely fire missiles at American targets; they executed a phased, multi-domain retaliatory campaign with distinct operational objectives at each stage, each phase creating the conditions for the next.
The campaign can be understood as having five interlocking lines of effort: infrastructure degradation, area denial and operational displacement, precision strike at extended range, ISR and logistics attrition, and proxy terrorist force suppression.
Together, they constituted a campaign design far more sophisticated than most Western analysts had publicly credited Iran with possessing.
The overarching logic was one of progressive operational constriction. Rather than attempting to destroy US forces – an objective beyond Iran’s reach given American conventional superiority – the campaign aimed to degrade, displace, and exhaust them.
Each successful strike reduced American operational capacity; forced repositioning that consumed time and resources, and demonstrated to regional partners that proximity to American occupation forces carried real costs.
Infrastructure degradation
The first phase of the Iranian retaliatory campaign targeted the physical infrastructure of American military power in the Persian Gulf region. This was not indiscriminate bombardment. Satellite imagery and post-strike assessments revealed a pattern of targeting that prioritized specific high-value nodes: radar installations, fuel and ammunition storage facilities, maintenance hangars, and communications infrastructure.
Radar systems were a particular priority. The ability to detect, track, and target Iranian missiles and UAVs depends on a layered network of radar systems. By striking radar installations at air bases, Iran degraded the situational awareness that underpins both offensive operations and defensive intercepts. A radar that is destroyed or forced offline creates a coverage gap that cascades through the entire air defense architecture.
Before-and-after imagery of an AN/FPS-117 early warning radar installation at Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base, Kuwait, showing structural damage
Logistics infrastructure was targeted with equal deliberateness. Fuel depots, ammunition storage sites, and maintenance facilities at American bases around the Persian Gulf were struck with sufficient accuracy to cause meaningful operational disruption.
An air force that cannot fuel its aircraft, rearm them, or repair battle damage cannot sustain sortie rates. The targeting of logistics was a direct attack on the tempo of American air operations to derail the American aggression against Iranian sites and reduce the pressure on Iranian forces.
The accuracy of these strikes, achieved at ranges of several hundred kilometers, validated the operational utility of Iran’s solid-fuel ballistic missile force and demonstrated that the IRGC aerospace force had developed the targeting data, launch procedures, and quality control necessary to achieve consistent results against fixed infrastructure.
The anti-access/area denial campaign
The most strategically significant dimension of the Iranian retaliatory campaign was its systematic execution of an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy that progressively pushed American air operations out of the Persian Gulf and into increasingly distant and operationally constrained locations.
The logic of A2/AD in this context was straightforward. The closer American aircraft operate to Iran, the shorter their flight times, the larger their payloads, the less refueling they require, and the more sorties they can generate per day.
Conversely, every additional hundred kilometers of distance imposes compounding costs: greater tanker support, longer mission times, reduced payload, increased crew fatigue, and more complex coordination. By rendering the Persian Gulf operationally untenable for American air assets, Iran systematically degraded the offensive capacity of the aggressors.
The first displacement was from the Persian Gulf itself. Sustained missile and drone attacks against air bases made sustained operations from those locations unfeasible. The American response was to shift primary air operations to bases in Jordan – Al-Azraq and Muwaffaq Salti –which offered greater distance from Iranian missile systems.
Iran’s response was to extend its reach to Jordan. Multiple strikes against American bases, documented by US casualties and satellite imagery showing damaged hangars and destroyed aircraft, demonstrated that Iran had the capability to contest operations from that distance.
The retaliatory strikes destroyed American aircraft, damaged infrastructure, and forced the US war machine to reconsider the viability of Jordan as a primary operating location.
The second displacement was to the occupied territories. American air assets, including tanker aircraft critical to sustaining long-range strike operations, were pushed further west to Israeli military bases.
This displacement carried its own operational costs. The distance from Iranian targets increased further, and the concentration of American assets in the occupied territories created its own targeting opportunities for Iran, which has demonstrated both the willingness and capability to strike at extended ranges.
A particularly telling indicator of this displacement dynamic was the repositioning of the RQ-4 Global Hawk strategic reconnaissance aircraft, which had been operating from Al Dhafra in the UAE and from Jordanian facilities, to Sigonella Naval Air Station in Sicily.
The Global Hawk, with its long endurance and high-altitude sensors, is a critical ISR asset for tracking Iranian missile launches and providing targeting data. Its displacement to Sicily represented a dramatic reduction in persistent surveillance coverage over Iran and the Persian Gulf, with direct consequences for the effectiveness of American strike operations.
A qualitative leap in extended-range precision
One of the most significant revelations of the recent round of US aggression and Iran’s retaliation was the demonstrated accuracy of Iranian ballistic missiles at ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers. Previous assessments of Iranian ballistic missile accuracy had generally been skeptical about the ability to achieve consistent precision at such distances. The strikes on Jordanian targets, located well over 1,000 kilometers from Iranian launch sites, completely shattered that skepticism.
The circular error probable (CEP) – the radius within which 50 percent of strikes fall – observed in the Jordanian strikes was dramatically smaller than what Iranian missiles had previously demonstrated at comparable ranges. Strikes that hit specific buildings, specific aircraft shelters, and specific sections of structures, rather than simply landing somewhere on a base, indicated a qualitative improvement in guidance accuracy that demands explanation.
Several hypotheses present themselves, and the evidence suggests that the answer likely involves a combination of all of them. First are technical improvements. Iran may have upgraded the terminal guidance systems on its Kheibarshekan, Haj Qasem, and Fattah variants, potentially incorporating improved inertial navigation, satnav receivers, or optical terminal seekers that allow the missile to better correct its trajectory in the final phase of flight.
Second are tactical improvements. Iranian launch crews may have refined their pre-launch survey procedures, improving the accuracy of the initial position fix that the missile’s inertial navigation system uses as its reference point. Third are software improvements, which mean updates to the missile’s flight control algorithms could improve trajectory optimization and reduce the accumulated errors that degrade accuracy over long distances.
The most likely explanation is a combination of all three – a systematic program of improvement across the technical, procedural, and software dimensions of missile accuracy that had been underway for years and was now being demonstrated operationally for the first time at this range, following the experiences of the 40-day war.
The MQ-9 hunt
The MQ-9 Reaper drone occupied a central and uniquely vulnerable position in American military offensives against Iran. The Reaper is not merely a strike platform but the primary persistent ISR asset used to locate and track mobile Iranian missile launchers, particularly after the heavy attrition of similar Israeli military systems.
Without the MQ-9’s ability to loiter for extended periods, the capacity to find and destroy TELs before they fire, or to conduct battle damage assessment after strikes, is dramatically reduced.
Iran understood this dependency and targeted it systematically during this campaign. The campaign against MQ-9 assets operated on multiple levels. Ground-based air defense systems, which had previously demonstrated the ability to engage high-altitude targets, were used to engage Reapers operating over Iranian territory and adjacent areas.
But Iran also struck the ground infrastructure that supports MQ-9 operations: the maintenance facilities, fuel systems, satellite communication ground stations, and launch-and-recovery equipment that allow the aircraft to operate.
Western media reporting confirmed the destruction of a number of MQ-9 aircraft on the ground at Jordanian bases and, in a particularly striking detail, the destruction of some aircraft while still in their transport canisters before assembly.
This achievement indicates that Iran has developed targeting intelligence on the logistics chain supporting drone operations, not merely the operational bases themselves. Destroying aircraft before they are assembled and made operational is a force multiplication achievement. It eliminates capability before it can be employed, at a point when the aircraft is most vulnerable and least defended.
The cumulative effect of the MQ-9 campaign was a significant degradation of American persistent ISR coverage over Iran. This directly reduced the effectiveness of the hunt for mobile missile launchers, allowing Iranian TELs greater freedom of movement and survivability.
Suppressing proxy terrorist forces in Iraq
From the first day of the exchange, Iran conducted daily retaliatory strikes against armed terrorist groups in Iraq that had the capability and potential motivation to conduct land attacks against Iranian territory or to serve as a forward platform for American-directed operations.
This campaign was methodical and comprehensive, targeting personnel concentrations, weapons storage facilities, and command infrastructure.
Iran’s western flank, which includes the border with Iraq, represents a potential vulnerability. Armed terrorist groups in Iraq, some with historical ties to American intelligence, could in theory conduct cross-border raids, provide intelligence for American strikes, or serve as a distraction that forced Iran to divert defensive resources.
By striking these groups preemptively and continuously, Iran sought to exhaust their operational capacity before it could be brought to bear.
The daily rhythm of these retaliatory strikes was itself a message. It demonstrated that Iran had persistent targeting intelligence on these groups’ locations, that it was willing to expend munitions on this secondary campaign even while conducting the primary campaign against American forces, and that it intended to maintain pressure regardless of any ceasefire negotiations that might be underway.
The logic of reciprocity
Iran’s retaliatory strikes on electrical and water infrastructure in Kuwait represented a deliberate response that operated on two distinct logics simultaneously.
The first was reciprocity: Iran’s own civilian infrastructure had been targeted, and the strikes on Kuwaiti infrastructure were a direct signal that such targeting would not be absorbed without response to the aggressor and its facilitators.
The second was military utility. American forces in the Persian Gulf region depend on host nations’ electrical grids and water supplies for base operations. Infrastructure that serves both civilian and military purposes is, under the laws of armed conflict, a legitimate military target when the military use is substantial and the strike is proportionate.
The targeting of Kuwait’s infrastructure was also a message to Persian Gulf states more broadly. Kuwait, like Bahrain, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, hosts American military facilities and had provided varying degrees of support to American operations.
By demonstrating the ability and willingness to strike Kuwaiti infrastructure, Iran was communicating that the costs of hosting American forces were not abstract. They were concrete, immediate, and would be borne by the host nation as well as the American military.
The pillars of operational success
Iran’s two-week retaliatory campaign against American aggression and attempts to force open an illegal southern corridor through the Strait of Hormuz largely succeeded on every dimension that its operational planners had identified.
The exchange demonstrated that Iran had developed, over decades of institutional study and investment, a military capability genuinely capable of contesting American power projection in the Persian Gulf region, even after two high-intensity wars.
It demonstrated something relevant to the strategic environment of the region – that the costs of American military aggression in the Persian Gulf had increased substantially; that the infrastructure of American power projection was more vulnerable than pre-war assessments had suggested; and that Iran possessed both the capability and the operational sophistication to exploit those vulnerabilities in a systematic and disciplined manner.
Seyed M. Marandi: US-Iran War Inevitable: Kuwait and Bahrain May Fall
Glenn Diesen – October 11, 2026
Prof. Seyed Mohammad Marandi is a professor at Tehran University and a former advisor to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team.
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Hezbollah denies Syria cell link, warns of Israeli plan to sow discord
Al Mayadeen | September 30, 2026
Hezbollah’s Media Relations Office categorically denied any relationship or affiliation between the party and the alleged cell that the Syrian Interior Ministry said it had apprehended in the Yarmouk Basin in Daraa.
In a statement, the Lebanese Resistance reiterated that it has no presence on Syrian territory and is not involved in any security or military activity there, stressing its longstanding commitment to Syria’s security and stability and the safety of its people.
Hezbollah points to Israeli regional scheme
The party called on the Syrian authorities to “remain vigilant against attempts to implicate its name in order to stoke tensions and sow discord between Lebanon and Syria.”
It urged the Syrian authorities to investigate the circumstances surrounding the allegations, identify those behind them and determine who stands to benefit from escalating tensions between the two countries.
Hezbollah pointed to “Israel”, accusing it of intensifying its attacks on Syria and Lebanon and seeking to undermine the security and stability of the region.
A recurring pattern
The denial follows months of similar accusations against Hezbollah from Syrian officials since the fall of the al-Assad government.
Earlier this month, Hezbollah’s Media Relations Office has categorically denied any connection to a security cell reportedly arrested on suspicion of seeking to destabilize Lebanon and Syria, dismissing the accusations as entirely baseless.
In July, Hezbollah rejected claims tying it to an attempt to smuggle weapons and missiles across the Syrian-Iraqi border, after Syrian authorities said they had intercepted a shipment concealed inside a fuel tanker arriving from Iraq. Also in April and May, the group denied allegations linking it to a cell accused of plotting to assassinate a religious figure.
Hezbollah has affirmed on each occasion that it maintains no activity, connection, or presence inside Syrian territory. The group has said the repetition of such claims raises serious questions and points to parties seeking to inflame tension between the Syrian and Lebanese peoples.
The Lebanese Resistance has also pointed to similar fabricated allegations emerging from Bahrain and Kuwait, warning of a foreign plot aimed at stoking tensions between Arab nations and the Axis of Resistance and destabilizing the wider region.
Iran’s Plan to Shut Down AI in the Persian Gulf
GCC internet will go dark if Trump renews hostilities
By Kurt Nimmo | Another Day in the Empire | September 18, 2026
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait—are heavily invested in AI as part of a strategy to diversify away from petroleum. National AI strategies across GCC countries emphasize investment in research and development, encourage public-private partnerships, and create regulatory frameworks that support innovation. The GCC AI market size increased from USD $6.22 billion in 2025 to USD $7.60 billion in 2026. It is projected to reach USD $23.03 billion by 2034.
In April, Iran’s Tasnim news agency mentioned the submarine cables, landing stations, and data hubs in the Gulf as strategic pressure points in the conflict initiated by the United States and Israel. According to the market research company IMARC Group, subsea internet data cables in the Gulf sit at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and Africa, and damage to these networks risks connectivity losses in one of the world’s most important internet traffic zones.
The economic importance of these cable systems extends far outside internet browsing or streaming services, notes Techstory, “because financial markets, payment systems and cloud computing firms depend on uninterrupted connections between continents every second of the day. Data centers in the Gulf and Asia also depend on those same cables to connect cloud systems serving businesses around the world.” Analysts estimate that networks linked to the GCC support roughly $10 trillion worth of financial transactions daily.
Iran claims the cables are within its territorial waters and fall under its jurisdiction. Tasnim and Fars suggest Iran may charge tech companies to use the internet cables, while Ebrahim Zolfaghari, a Brigadier General and the spokesperson for Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, said that “companies like Google, Microsoft, Meta, and Amazon” will be required to “comply with Iranian law” and pay licensing fees for cable passage, with repair and maintenance rights given exclusively to Iranian firms.
The Islamic Republic cited the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which includes provisions governing submarine cables. Article 79 of UNCLOS says coastal states have the right to establish conditions for cables or pipelines entering their territory or territorial sea.
On September 2, Iran’s Kayhan newspaper urged Iran’s IGRC to disrupt or sever international fiber-optic cables to pressure the United States and its allies. “Is it not our indisputable right, in order to bring these sources of evil to their knees and cut off their lifeline, to prevent internet cables from passing through the depths of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz?” asked Kayhan editor-in-chief Hossein Shariatmadari. “This necessary measure could be carried out by seriously disrupting the cables’ operation or even cutting them.”
Iran has the ability to take out key cable networks, including the Fibre in Gulf submarine cable system, which connects Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. The Falcon Network connects Bahrain, Egypt, India, Iraq, Kuwait, Maldives, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Yemen, while the the Gulf Bridge International links Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and has onward connectivity to India, and Europe.
The Islamic Republic may decide to retaliate for the imposition of crippling sanctions which have negatively affected its economy, causing an increase in inflation and unemployment. Iran’s minimum wage stands at approximately 104 million rials, equivalent to roughly $110 US monthly. Essential commodity prices have risen sharply, with the International Monetary Fund documenting an annual inflation rate of 42.4%, according to October 2025 figures. Most estimates suggest sanctions have cost Iran approximately $60 billion each year by limiting investments in the energy sector. The sanctions have also significantly reduced Iran’s petroleum exports.
In 2023, the Iranian navy unveiled the domestically developed and manufactured Chamrosh-4 VTOL, a remotely operated drone designed for detecting, locating, and destroying both anchored and sleeping naval mines. Furthermore, Iran operates an undersea fleet of roughly 4 to 6 diesel-electric attack submarines well-suited to operate in the shallow waters of the Strait of Hormuz. In short, Iran has the ability to sabotage subsea internet data cables.
On September 17, President Trump, frustrated by the current stalemate in his war, said he faces a major decision over whether to escalate military action against Iran. “I have a big decision to make,” Trump said. “Do I want to go in and eliminate them or not? That’s a big decision. Anything can happen with me.”
Iran has given the United States an ultimatum for a period of three to four weeks, during which the United States must satisfy all Iranian demands. Failure to comply will result in severe escalation within the Strait of Hormuz and the execution of Iran’s planned preemptive military action targeting United States-backed Gulf infrastructure as well as American and Israeli assets, according to a senior Iranian official based in Tehran with direct knowledge of the situation.
The demands include $300 billion in reconstruction funds, a full release of Iran’s frozen assets of up to $120 billion, lifting of the US naval blockade, an end to war on all fronts (including Gaza and Lebanon), lifting of all sanctions on Iranian oil and gas, and acceptance of Iran’s permanent control of the Strait of Hormuz, including up to 7% transit fees.
President Trump is unlikely to accept these conditions, and as previously mentioned, may intensify military operations before the midterm elections. Should Trump choose to escalate, Iran has indicated it will heighten the intensity of its assaults against remaining American military and commercial infrastructure throughout the GCC region and West Asia.
On September 15, Amazon Web Services disclosed that Iranian drone strikes caused substantial damage to the corporation’s data facilities located in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The preceding week, officials from the UAE declared that they were modifying their AI data center initiatives in response to the strikes, thereby underscoring a critical weakness that Iran continues to leverage with considerable facility.
Amazon says cloud infrastructure in Bahrain, UAE ‘beyond saving’
The Cradle | September 15, 2026
Amazon Web Services (AWS) says it cannot restore access to its cloud-computing facility in Bahrain or one of three data-hosting zones in the UAE due to the extensive damage caused by Iranian retaliatory strikes, Reuters reported on 15 September.
“The damage to our infrastructure spanned multiple Availability Zones and exceeded what our regional and multi-AZ services are designed to withstand,” AWS reported in its status update seen by Reuters.
In the UAE, resources and data held exclusively within one zone, labeled mec1-az2, have been damaged beyond hope of recovery, the company said, as engineers are still salvaging what they can from the two other battered zones and across the wider Emirati region.
An availability zone refers to a cluster of one or more data centers sitting inside the same geographic region, the structure AWS relies on to keep services running when a single site goes down.
The outages trace back to March, when the US and Israel attacked Iran, and Tehran responded with missile and drone salvos against Israel and Gulf states hosting US military bases.
AWS confirmed at the time that two of its UAE facilities took direct hits, while a drone strike near one of its Bahraini sites left the infrastructure there destroyed.
Most Bahrain-based customers shifted their workloads elsewhere on AWS advice before the region went dark in April, but the company says it has now exhausted every option for recovering whatever was left behind.
The losses have called into question the resilience of the Gulf’s fast-expanding cloud and AI infrastructure.
The UAE is already redrawing plans to war-proof a major AI data center project, weighing decentralized site building alongside underground and blast-resistant construction, and even equipping the data center itself with anti-air defenses.
Israel and the US have long ago transformed AI infrastructure into a weapon of war deployed extensively across West Asian theaters.
Cloud platforms, data centers, and high-capacity computing systems now help store intelligence, process intercepted communications, analyze surveillance, and support military operations across West Asia, extensively so in Gaza and Iran.
Iran maintains that data centers operated by US technology companies are not simply civilian facilities, but strategic assets supporting US and Israeli aggression, thereby making them legitimate targets for retaliation.
AI has become a central instrument of US and Israeli warfare across West Asia, embedded in how targets are chosen, tracked, and struck.
Israel has weaponized AI platforms including automated targeting systems like The Gospel, Lavender, and Where’s Daddy? to harvest mass data, autonomously generate kill lists, and orchestrate systematic airstrikes and assassinations against Palestinians.
Backed by corporate infrastructure like Microsoft Azure, which stored massive caches of intercepted Palestinian communications, the Israeli military has deployed AI-driven drone surveillance to track and assassinate Palestinians.
The US has run algorithmic warfare systems such as Palantir’s Maven to process satellite, drone, and radar intelligence, using machine learning to speed the production of targeting recommendations against Iranian forces.
More than 1,000 targets were designated within the first 24 hours of the war on Iran, one of which resulted in the massacre of at least 150 people, including at least 120 schoolchildren at the Shajareh Tayyebeh elementary school in Minab.
Jordanian police arrest Drop Site correspondent for ‘sedition’ over online post
The Cradle | August 25, 2926
Jordanian intelligence officers arrested Ali Younes, a Jordanian-American journalist and Drop Site News correspondent, for allegedly “undermining the national security” of the Hashemite kingdom by sharing an article on social media that called for cutting US assistance to Amman.
Younes, a former Al Jazeera journalist, was detained upon his arrival at Queen Alia International Airport on 17 August, where he was held for questioning prior to being released with orders to appear before prosecutors in Amman.
Security officials told Younes and his lawyer that the case rests on his sharing of an article published in July by the American Conservative, which called on Washington to halt the billions of dollars it sends to the kingdom.
Prosecutors have classed the post as undermining Jordan’s national security, an offense that could put him behind bars for a year.
At a court hearing, prosecutors widened the file to include sedition and hate crimes, and barred Younes from leaving the country.
The article at the center of the case, headlined “Stop Sending Billions in US Aid to Jordan,” challenged the scale of Washington’s support for the monarchy and questioned why US citizens should bankroll King Abdullah.
Jordan has received $33.8 billion in US assistance over the past 75 years, with additional sums due under existing agreements.
Drop Site News has demanded that Jordanian authorities drop the charges and lift the travel ban on their colleague, and called on Washington to assist Younes as a US citizen against the accusations.
Across the Gulf and the wider region, the US war on Iran has been used as a pretext for domestic repression, with Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar all turning cybercrime, counterterrorism, and nationality laws against their own populations.
Hundreds of citizens and residents have been detained over war-related speech, from filming strikes to expressing sympathy for Tehran, with penalties running to life imprisonment, mass revocations of nationality, and the expulsion of lawmakers from parliament.
In Kuwait, the Education Ministry stripped the country’s only Iranian private school of its license and ordered it closed on 6 August, telling parents to move their children elsewhere.
In Bahrain, activist Mohammad al‑Mousawi was arrested at a checkpoint and tortured to death in March after being accused of links to “secret Iranian cells,” with witnesses and medical evidence documenting beatings, cable whippings, and electrocution burns.
How Kuwait and Bahrain miscalculated by becoming launchpads for US strikes on Iran
By Mohammad Molaei | Press TV | July 27, 2026
On the afternoon of February 28, as the first dark clouds of joint Israeli-American military aggression gathered over Iran, a sports hall in the small southern city of Lamerd – a place that had once echoed with the squeak of sneakers and the thrill of competition – was transformed into a scene of unspeakable carnage.
Two American Increment One Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs), fitted with fragmentation warheads, tore through the facility while a women’s volleyball team was actively training inside. The gruesome and deliberate attack claimed many civilian lives, including dozens of children, and left scores more wounded and maimed.
In a grim parallel to the earlier attack on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School in Minab, the US war machine initially refused to acknowledge its culpability in both incidents, due to massive global outcry, particularly in Minab.
Instead, American officials went so far as to formally and cynically attribute the tragedy IN BOTH to an alleged malfunction of an Iranian Hoveyzeh cruise missile, a brazen attempt to absolve themselves of yet another unforgivable war crime.
The official American position attributed the civilian deaths in Lamerd to an Iranian Hoveyzeh cruise missile – a KH-55 derivative that bears no resemblance whatsoever to an American PrSM, differing fundamentally in shape, flight trajectory, and terminal dive profile.
This assertion proved deeply peculiar, particularly after Iranian media published CCTV footage showing impact patterns unmistakably consistent with PrSM fragmentation warheads, alongside visuals clearly depicting a ballistic projectile descending in a manner entirely characteristic of the American weapon system.
Identifying the probable staging ground for this attack and others like it proved to be a matter of straightforward deduction. The United States employs the tracked M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and the wheeled M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) to deploy two distinct families of short-range tactical ballistic missiles: the newer PrSM and the older MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), with maximum ranges of 500 and 300 kilometers, respectively.
Given these systems’ limited reach and the considerable operational threat posed by Iran-allied resistance groups throughout Iraq, it became increasingly evident that the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf had consented to allow American forces to utilize their territory as launch pads for aggression against Iran and its civilian population.
Liability for the strikes
In the weeks following the initial wave of US-Israeli military aggression against Iran, a substantial body of open-source evidence accumulated, enabling one to reconstruct the operational architecture behind the attacks with reasonable confidence.
Satellite imagery reviewed by independent researchers, munitions debris documented by Iranian media and corroborated by third-party analysts, and flight-path data derived from publicly accessible tracking sources collectively point to forward launch positions in Kuwait and Bahrain as the points of origin for a series of ballistic missile strikes against Iranian territory.
The ATACMS and the longer-range PrSM are neither cruise missiles nor air-launched munitions. They are ground-launched ballistic systems that demand substantial fixed or semi-fixed infrastructure, pre-positioned logistics, and complete host-nation cooperation – or at minimum, tacit acquiescence.
In practical terms, this arrangement extends far beyond granting overflight rights to American aircraft. The deployment of American artillery regiments fielding short-range ballistic missiles on Kuwaiti and Bahraini soil is not incidental but structural. Such weaponry would have served no purpose other than to strike at Iranian territory.
Diplomatically, Tehran delivered an explicit and time-bound demand to both Manama and Kuwait City: cease facilitating the war of aggression, expel the American military forces and their assets, or face the consequences.
The initial response from Bahrain and Kuwait was, in a word, silence – punctuated by formulaic statements affirming their alliance commitments while declining to confirm or deny the operational details that open-source evidence had already established.
It was not a neutral posture but represented a conscious and controversial choice to take sides in an active war, which carries inevitable consequences.
Lamerd sports hall attack
The denial and what came after
Both Kuwait and Bahrain moved quickly to deny the reports. Official statements from Kuwait City and Manama dismissed the open-source evidence as fabricated or misattributed, with Kuwaiti officials characterizing the satellite imagery and debris documentation as part of an Iranian information operation.
Bahraini authorities declined to comment on specific operational details, citing security considerations. The denials were categorical yet they did not survive the end of active hostilities.
In the weeks following the cessation of the initial combat phase, a more complete evidentiary picture emerged, placing Kuwait at the epicenter of the ballistic missile campaign against Iran.
CENTCOM released declassified strike footage confirming ground-launched ballistic operations, footage that independent analysts cross-referenced with geographic markers consistent with Kuwaiti territory.
The release, framed by US officials as a demonstration of operational effectiveness, had the unintended secondary effect of directly contradicting the categorical denials issued by Kuwait. More damaging still was the subsequent discovery of expended ATACMS canisters in the Kuwaiti desert, physical evidence that no official statement could plausibly explain away. The canisters confirmed not only the presence of the launch systems but also the scale and intensity of their operational use.
Kuwait’s role as the operational hub
With the resumption of active combat operations in recent weeks, following American attempts to establish an illegal maritime corridor in the Omani section of the Strait of Hormuz in brazen violation of the memorandum of understanding signed between the two sides, Kuwait’s role has intensified considerably.
The frequency of ballistic missile launches from Kuwaiti territory has increased markedly, a pattern fully consistent with Western reporting indicating that US PrSM stocks have been effectively depleted.
With PrSM availability now severely constrained, the operational burden of American ballistic missile attacks has shifted entirely back to the older ATACMS platform, and Kuwait has emerged as the primary launch hub for that capability.
The geographic logic is self-evident. Kuwait’s proximity to western Iran, and particularly to the southern province of Khuzestan, renders it the most efficient forward position for strikes targeting the military, economic, and energy infrastructure concentrated in that region.
Khuzestan is home to a substantial share of Iran’s oil production, refining capacity, and petrochemical industry, and has consequently emerged as a principal focal point of American military aggression. The volume of launches emanating from Kuwait reflects that strategic prioritization with unmistakable clarity.
The Incriminating Lights
The Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf have made every possible effort to suppress citizen documentation of military activity, imposing social media restrictions and punitive measures to limit the spread of footage that might complicate official denials.
Yet those efforts have proven increasingly ineffective. As the war has persisted, a steady and growing stream of video and photographic evidence has emerged from Kuwait, captured by residents documenting ballistic missile launches occurring with near-nightly regularity.
The imagery, showing missile contrails ascending over Kuwait and tracking northeast across or alongside Iraqi airspace before continuing toward Iranian territory, circulates widely across platforms such as Telegram.
Multiple photographs and video footage taken from different vantage points confirm the flight paths, the frequency, and the unmistakable signature of ground-launched ballistic systems operating from Kuwaiti soil with undeniable clarity.
The nightly launches have become, in a grim sense, a matter of public record, documented by ordinary Kuwaiti and Iraqi residents whose smartphones have captured what governments continue to officially deny.
The chasm between the official position and the visible reality has widened to a point where it functions less as a credible denial and more as a formal fiction, maintained by all parties for reasons of diplomatic convenience.
The Iranian counter-strike record
Iran has not absorbed this campaign passively. In the weeks following the intensification of launches from Kuwaiti territory, Iranian forces have conducted retaliatory strikes targeting the American military’s forward launch infrastructure.
A growing evidentiary record of these strikes, assembled from open-source footage, presents an intriguing visual signature involving what appear to be large secondary explosions following initial impact, characterized by the bright, fast-burning combustion profile associated with solid-propellant missile fuel.
The secondary detonations visible in circulating clips are inconsistent with conventional munitions storage and consistent with the ignition of solid rocket propellant – of the type utilized in ATACMS – either from fueled launcher vehicles or from stockpiled rounds awaiting deployment.
Several clips show fires burning after initial impact, with the characteristic white-orange flame column that propellant combustion produces distinguishing these events unmistakably from the black smoke of fuel or ordnance fires.
Survival and the limits of alignment
Small states make difficult choices under duress, caught precariously between a powerful patron’s operational requirements and a large neighbor’s legitimate security concerns.
Experts acknowledge that the constraints on Bahraini and Kuwaiti sovereignty, stemming from their profound dependence on the United States, are genuine and substantial.
But, they insist that acknowledgment of constraint is not the same as absolution from responsibility. Governments bear an obligation to their populations that supersedes alliance loyalties, an obligation to assess, without illusion, the risks that their choices are generating.
The current posture of the Persian Gulf states hosting American military bases and providing a launch pad for ballistic missile operations against Iran is deeply problematic.
It reflects, as per analysts, a perilous combination of structural dependency, institutional inertia, and a dangerous underestimation of Iranian anger, resolve, and military capability.
As one military expert told the Press TV website, these micro-states are not positioned to absorb the consequences of a sustained Iranian retaliatory campaign.
“Their small land masses, concentrated infrastructure, and limited strategic depth render them acutely vulnerable in ways that their larger patron is not. By gambling their national survival on the assumption that Iranian red lines are empty, and that US protection is everlasting, they are making a remarkably poor bet, one that history has rarely rewarded,” he noted.
No route around Hormuz: Why West Asia’s pipeline alternatives fall short
The rush to bypass Hormuz leads back to the same problem: Every alternative route remains hostage to war, rival chokepoints, or political disputes.
By Hussein Askary | The Cradle | July 23, 2026
“The only alternative to the Strait of Hormuz is the Strait of Hormuz.”
This blunt assessment, offered by an Iraqi expert in a recent interview, captures the central weakness in the rush to revive old pipeline schemes and promote new ones across West Asia. Since Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz after Israel and the US launched their second war against it in February 2026, the region has been flooded with proposals for alternative oil-export routes.
Washington has encouraged these plans, while several governments have presented dormant or unfinished pipelines as strategic solutions. Yet the closer one looks at geography, markets, costs, capacity, and security, the clearer it becomes that most of these projects cannot substitute for Hormuz.
Even if oil bypasses the strait, it still faces the rival chokepoint of Bab al-Mandab, where the Ansarallah-aligned armed forces have declared a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia and attacked Saudi tankers.
These expensive detours will remain exposed unless security in the Persian Gulf itself improves. Until the war on Iran ends and an inclusive regional security architecture is established, Iranian and Yemeni missiles and drones can reach the pipelines and loading terminals built to evade them.
Asia still runs through Hormuz
The first reason is straightforward. The Strait of Hormuz is the natural outlet of the Gulf energy system. In 2024, oil flows through the strait averaged about 20 million barrels per day (bpd), roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. The International Energy Agency (IEA) describes it as one of the world’s most important oil transit chokepoints.
Most of this oil is not heading west. About 80 percent of the oil moving through Hormuz is destined for Asia, with China, India, Japan, South Korea, and other Asian economies as the principal buyers. The pattern is even clearer for liquefied natural gas (LNG).
The US Energy Information Administration estimated that 83 percent of LNG moving through Hormuz in 2024 went from Persian Gulf exporters to Asian markets, especially China, India, and South Korea.
This market reality matters because many proposed alternatives send oil away from its main customers. Pipelines to the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, or the Levant may appear useful on a map, but they often move Gulf crude farther from Asia rather than closer to it.
Commercially, building multibillion-dollar infrastructure to move oil westward, only to redirect it by sea toward Asian markets, is inefficient. If Hormuz is open, the direct route remains cheaper and faster. If it is closed by war, the underlying problem is not a lack of pipelines but the collapse of regional security.
Old routes, unresolved disputes
The older pipeline options illustrate the point. The Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline once carried Iraqi oil across Syria to the Mediterranean. Built in the early 1950s, it had genuine strategic value in its time but has been largely inactive since it was damaged during the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Washington is now backing efforts to revive the route, with US companies expected to play a role. Yet the project still requires extensive reconstruction and years of work before it can provide meaningful export capacity.
Estimates for a full restoration and expansion to around 700,000 bpd run as high as $8 billion. It cannot answer an immediate crisis in Hormuz, and if regional peace is restored before completion, the commercial case for reviving it weakens sharply.
The Iraq–Turkiye pipeline faces a different but equally serious problem: politics. The route through the Kurdistan region to Turkiye’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan was repeatedly interrupted by disputes among Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Ankara, and international oil companies.
A 2023 arbitration ruling against Turkiye over unauthorized Kurdish exports led to a two-and-a-half-year shutdown. Flows resumed in September 2025, and exports have continued, but the route still depends on fragile agreements over contracts, payments, federal authority, and revenue sharing.
Its limited throughput and political vulnerability prevent it from becoming a structural replacement for a maritime passage that normally carries a vast share of the world’s seaborne oil.
The Iraqi pipeline in Saudi Arabia, known as IPSA, is another example of strategic nostalgia. Built in the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq war, it was designed to move Iraqi crude from the Basra region to the Red Sea.
It stopped operating after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia expropriated it in 2001. Reopening the line would therefore require a Saudi–Iraqi political settlement over ownership and control, as well as a major technical assessment after decades of disuse. In other words, IPSA is not an available alternative; it is a diplomatic and engineering problem dressed up as a solution.
The proposed Basra–Aqaba pipeline is even more controversial. Its advertised purpose is to move Iraqi oil from southern Iraq to Jordan’s Red Sea port of Aqaba, bypassing Hormuz. Yet it has faced intense objections inside Iraq because of its projected cost, uncertain financing, and questionable strategic value.
Since much of Iraq’s crude is sold to Asian customers, sending it westward to Aqaba would add distance and complexity rather than solve the basic market problem. The pipeline would also move Iraqi exports closer to another zone of instability, including the Israeli military sphere and the wider Red Sea security environment.
A bypass route that merely exchanges one security risk for another is no solution. Iraq’s severe fiscal pressures also leave Baghdad poorly placed to finance such an expensive project, while international investors are unlikely to embrace it without strong political and security guarantees.
Bypasses within missile range
The existing Saudi and Emirati bypasses are more credible but still limited. Saudi Arabia’s East–West Pipeline, or Petroline, moves crude from the eastern oil region to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline carries oil from Habshan to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman.
These systems reduce exposure to Hormuz for Saudi Arabia and the UAE and have become important national energy-security assets. But they cannot replace the strait for the region as a whole. They offer little to Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Iran, or most Iraqi exports, and they do not solve the LNG problem, especially Qatar’s dependence on Hormuz.
The IEA estimates that only 3.5 to 5.5 million bpd of spare pipeline capacity is available to bypass the strait. Neither Yanbu nor Fujairah are immune from attack; regional conflict has already shown the vulnerability of ports, tankers, and energy infrastructure.
The crisis pipelines cannot solve
This is why the alternative pipeline debate is misleading. It treats the closure of Hormuz as a logistical puzzle when it is primarily a political and security crisis. If the Persian Gulf remains militarized and unstable, no pipeline network can fully protect exports.
Pipelines cross vulnerable territory, depend on political agreements, and terminate at ports that can also be threatened. If Gulf security improves, however, Hormuz will almost certainly reopen because this serves the interests of producers and Asian consumers alike.
Once that happens, the commercial rationale for many alternative pipelines will fade. Why spend tens of billions of dollars duplicating a natural route with unmatched capacity and direct access to the main buyers?
The more honest conclusion is that alternative pipelines may offer limited resilience for individual states, but they are no strategic replacement for Hormuz. They are costly, slow, politically fragile, geographically inefficient, and in some cases obsolete before construction begins.
The answer to the crisis is a security arrangement that keeps the Persian Gulf open, prevents attacks on shipping, and restores normal trade through the strait.
Under such an arrangement, oil and LNG would continue to flow mainly to Asia by the most direct and economical route. Hormuz will remain indispensable, while the grand pipeline alternatives amount to expensive insurance policies against a crisis that only diplomacy and regional peace can resolve.
Iran’s New Onslaught on US Gulf Bases Exposes Devastating Success of Spring Counterstrikes
Sputnik – 17.07.2026
Iran’s March drone and missile attacks disabled numerous critical US radars and forced it to “expend a significant portion of their air and missile defense stockpiles,” military expert and CAST security think tank senior research fellow Yuri Lyamin told Sputnik.
Lyamin pointed out, for example, that “the AN/TPY-2 radar in Jordan destroyed by Iranian strikes in March, was part of the American THAAD missile defense system battery providing cover for American bases in Jordan against medium-range ballistic missiles. The destruction of the radar effectively rendered the THAAD battery inoperable, as it’s used to detect and track targets and guides interceptor missiles to them.”
Fast forward the present, and Iran is freely targeting US barracks, logistics bases and Air Force facilities in Kuwait and Bahrain using Arash heavy drones.
Lack of effective resistance on the US’ part signals that whatever efforts the Pentagon took to restore regional capabilities (like transferring THAAD from South Korea) proved insufficient, Lyamin says.
“Iran is currently primarily targeting various US bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan. The combination varies daily, as the US operates multiple bases [in these countries]. The selection of specific targets depends both on the pre-defined target list at these bases, and on operational intelligence,” Lyamin says.
“Relentless Iranian attacks on US-operated bases in the region generally complicate US operations against Iran that rely on them, and force the US to expend significant forces and resources to protect them. I’d even say that some of the bases nearest to Iran are now causing more problems for the US than they’re worth. For example, Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar was the largest US airbase in the region, but now the US has been forced to evacuate most of its aircraft because it’s too dangerous to keep them there.”
Arash drones have a range up to 2k km, variable warhead weight (up to 260 kg), and versions with advanced optoelectrical and other homing heads “for high-precision target engagement.” They are the Iranian Army’s long-range strike tool – distinct from the IRGC’s Shahed series of UAVs.
Revolutionary Guard Calls on Jordanians to Expel US Forces
Al-Manar | July 14, 2026
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced on Tuesday that it has targeted a major US military facility and site inside an airbase in Jordan with ballistic missiles.
In its ninth statement, the Guard directly addressed the Jordanian people, saying: “You know very well that we harbor no animosity towards your country; on the contrary, we hold you in the highest regard and affection. You are also aware of the suffering of the Palestinian people.”
The Guard added that “the Jordanian people, more than any other people, are aware of the crimes committed by the Israeli entity in the Gaza Strip – crimes carried out with the direct intervention of the United States.”
The IRGC called on Jordanians to demand “the removal of American military bases from the region,” describing this as “a significant contribution to saving the Palestinian people and restoring security and stability to the region.”
Earlier in the day, the Guard announced that it had targeted several American military installations in Bahrain as part of the second phase of Operation “Victory 2.”
The Guard stated that its naval forces, using missiles and drones, struck weapons supply depots, a satellite communications center, and a residential building for American forces at the Juffair base, confirming the complete destruction of these targets.
It added that the operation came in response to American aggression that targeted coastal stations and multiple military centers in Bahrain, as well as the southern regions of Iran, following Washington’s defeat in the Strait of Hormuz.
In a separate statement, the Revolutionary Guard also announced that two supertankers were damaged and disabled in the Strait of Hormuz after they ignored warnings from the strait’s security control center and crossed a mine-strewn waterway.
The Guard stated that the two tankers were “deceived by the United States” after they switched off their navigation systems and attempted to transit through an illegal route, thereby endangering maritime traffic.
These strikes follow American attacks over the past two days that targeted sites in Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Sirik, Qeshm, Jask, Konarak, and Chabahar – attacks which, according to the Guard, mostly struck civilian sites and economic facilities.
Iran strikes US military assets in Oman and Bahrain: IRGC
Al Mayadeen| July 13, 2026
The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) has destroyed long-range radar systems in Oman, among other US military assets and installations, as part of the fifth phase of its retaliatory operations.
In a statement published on Monday, the IRGC said that its naval forces carried out missile and drone strikes targeting an FPS long-range early warning radar and a ship-detection radar in Oman, destroying both systems. Concurrently, IRGC forces struck US military installations in the Al-Juffair area of Bahrain, where fires remain active.
“The decisive and powerful operations carried out by the Iranian armed forces have rendered the American military, which we have described as the aggressor, incapable,” the IRGC Public Relations Department stated.
US aggression reveals true anti-people nature: IRGC
The IRGC also condemned the sustained US aggression on Iran, asserting that American forces targeted an agricultural water pump in the city of Mahshahr.
“Targeting a farming water pump in Mahshahr reveals the true anti-people nature of the US military,” the statement said.
The IRGC further tied the status of international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz to US military behavior, declaring that “the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to shipping traffic is contingent upon stopping US military interventions in the strait and respecting the sovereignty of nations over their territorial waters.”
The IRGC issued a direct warning on global energy security, stating that “the continuation of these interventions will lead to greater repercussions for the global oil and gas sectors.”
Iran responds to US aggression, strikes US assets in Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain
Meanwhile, Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps announced a series of retaliatory strikes against US military facilities in Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait, responding to continued US attacks on Iranian positions.
The IRGC said its Aerospace Force targeted fuel depots, missile storage sites, air defense systems, radar installations, and command centers across multiple US-linked bases in the region.
In its first operation, missiles and drones struck Jordan’s Prince Hassan Air Base, setting fire to fuel tanks and ammunition depots, following US attacks on Iranian coastal positions.
A second wave targeted the Sheikh Isa base in Bahrain, destroying helicopter maintenance facilities, a P-8 reconnaissance aircraft hangar, and the US drone command center at the site.
The third phase hit Kuwait’s Ali Al-Salem Airbase and Ahmed al-Jaber Airbase, destroying fuel tanks, Patriot systems, and strategic radar, while the IRGC vowed further action and asserted Iran’s authority over the Strait of Hormuz.
The fourth phase struck two HIMARS missile launch platforms and ammunition depots filled with missiles at the US base in Kuwait.
OSINT data, Sat images show damage at US bases after Iranian strikes
Al Mayadeen| July 12, 2026
Iran’s retaliatory operation against US military positions across the region has inflicted damage on several strategic facilities, with satellite imagery privately acquired and later published by multiple OSINT accounts on X showing impacts at major US bases in Qatar, Bahrain, and Jordan following a wave of ballistic missile and drone strikes.
The strikes, launched in response to renewed US aggression against Iran and escalating military activity in the region, targeted key nodes of the US military presence, including air bases, naval infrastructure, radar facilities, and drone operations centers.
Iranian missiles penetrate defenses, strike Al Udeid Air Base
Satellite imagery indicates that Iran’s missile and drone strikes reached Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, one of the largest US military installations in West Asia and a central hub for American air operations.
According to the account, Egypt’s Intel Observer (@EGYOSINT), enhanced Sentinel-2 imagery shows damage to a hangar inside the base, with impact marks visible on the upper rear section of the structure. Additional ground disturbances and suspected burn scars were also identified across multiple areas of the facility.
Further imagery analysis revealed additional strike locations near US military accommodation buildings and other sections of the base, suggesting that the Iranian barrage reached multiple points within the installation.
The reported impacts highlight the ability of Iranian long-range strike systems to penetrate heavily protected military zones and reach critical US infrastructure despite the presence of advanced air defense systems in the region.
US Navy’s Bahrain headquarters struck
Iranian projectiles also reportedly struck a facility inside the US Navy’s 5th Fleet headquarters at Naval Support Activity Bahrain.
Satellite imagery identified damage to a warehouse located within the naval complex, marking a direct hit against a key command and logistics hub responsible for supporting US maritime operations throughout the Gulf.
The strike came amid heightened tensions surrounding naval movements in the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran has repeatedly warned against actions it views as threatening regional security.
MQ-9 drones in Jordan’s Prince Hassan Air Base targeted
Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that its forces struck Jordan’s Prince Hassan Air Base with multiple ballistic missiles, targeting command-and-control infrastructure and facilities used to house US MQ-9 Reaper drones.
Satellite imagery from the base showed significant damage, including a destroyed hangar and widespread disturbances across the aircraft apron, where military assets are typically stored and maintained.
Imagery analysts also identified signs of burning and continued activity at the site following the strike, raising questions over the status of assets stationed at the facility.
The base has been associated with US unmanned aerial operations, including the deployment of advanced surveillance platforms, making it a key target in Iran’s strike campaign.
Possible MQ-4C destroyed in Jordan
A costly mystery is unfolding at Jordan’s Prince Hassan Air Base. After Iran targeted the base, analysts noticed that the facility is home to the US-made MQ-4C Triton, a $240 million high-altitude surveillance drone that had reportedly been moved there from Al Dhafra Air Base due to its proximity to Iran.
According to an OSINT X account, MenchOsint (@MenchOsint), the IRGC said it struck MQ-9 drone hangars, but satellite imagery later appeared to show damage to a drone facility, with smoke still visible after the strike. While there is no confirmation yet, speculation is growing that a rare MQ-4C Triton may have been destroyed, which would represent a significant loss.
For now, the fate of the Triton remains unconfirmed, but the strike has raised questions about whether Iran managed to hit one of the US military’s most advanced surveillance assets.
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British weapons and personnel doing much of the killing in Yemen
Press TV – June 18, 2019
A detailed report published by the Guardian newspaper has shown how Britain is massively contributing to Saudi Arabia’s devastating war on Yemen as it suggests that London is not only supplying the bombs that fall on Yemenis, but it provides the personnel and expertise that keep the war going.
The comprehensive report by Arron Merat published on Tuesday showed that Britain was doing much of the killing in Yemen as the country continues to provide Saudi Arabia with everything it needs to turn its southern impoverished neighbor into a graveyard.
“Every day Yemen is hit by British bombs – dropped by British planes that are flown by British-trained pilots and maintained and prepared inside Saudi Arabia by thousands of British contractors,” said Merat in the report. … continue
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