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BACK TO BATTLE: Iran, US, Israel, Lebanon & Hezbollah /Lt Col Daniel Davis

Full interview:

Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – June 27, 2026

June 28, 2026 Posted by | Video, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Comments Off on BACK TO BATTLE: Iran, US, Israel, Lebanon & Hezbollah /Lt Col Daniel Davis

Strait of Hormuz as strategic red line: Why Iran must confront Oman’s corridor plan and Trump’s threats

Press TV | June 25, 2026

The strategic calculus surrounding Iran’s ongoing negotiations with the United States within the framework of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) has reached a critical juncture.

Two concurrent developments demand a comprehensive and resolute response: Oman’s unilateral announcement of a separate shipping corridor through the Strait of Hormuz and President Donald Trump’s continued military threats against the Islamic Republic.

Taken together, these developments represent a concerted attempt to undermine Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz and weaken the fundamental security guarantees that give diplomatic engagement its meaning and value.

For Iran, the Strait of Hormuz is far more than a source of economic leverage; it constitutes a cornerstone of national security, a critical component of its deterrence posture, and a vital mechanism for preventing future acts of aggression.

The Strait of Hormuz: A matter of national sovereignty

The Strait of Hormuz represents one of the most strategically significant maritime chokepoints in the world, through which approximately 20 percent of global oil supplies transit. For Iran, control over this waterway is intrinsically linked to national security, economic sovereignty, and the capacity to deter any form of external aggression.

The recent visit of Iran’s parliament speaker and lead negotiator, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, to Muscat appears to have been exploited by Oman under US pressure to advance an agenda that directly contradicts Iran’s sovereign rights over the strategic waterway.

Oman’s unilateral announcement of a separate route requiring only coordination with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) constitutes a calculated maneuver to undermine Iran’s legal and legitimate authority over the Strait.

This action was taken without any coordination with Tehran and coincides with mine-clearing operations based on the memorandum signed between Iran and the United States.

The strategic logic suggests that by creating an alternative corridor, Oman has offered vessels a route that avoids Iran’s jurisdiction, effectively normalizing a system where Iran’s role in administering the Strait becomes irrelevant.

The timing is particularly significant. As mine-clearing operations proceed, Omani authorities have directed vessels toward this alternative corridor, whose route poses serious safety risks and is unacceptable, according to Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Navy.

This effectively undermines one of Iran’s most significant bargaining chips – the ability to control access through the Strait and ensure compliance with its security requirements.

IRGC’s warning: An essential but insufficient first step

In response to this challenge, the IRGC Navy issued a timely warning that “the only authorized routes for vessels’ passage through the Strait of Hormuz are the ones announced by Iranian authorities.”

The statement emphasized that “vessel traffic outside these routes is prohibited and highly dangerous,” adding that “coordination with the IRGC Navy via Channel 16 is mandatory for passage through the Strait of Hormuz.”

This response demonstrates Iran’s readiness to protect its sovereignty and maintain its authoritative position over one of the most critical energy chokepoints in the world.

However, as a purely military response, it is insufficient to address the full scope of the challenge. The Omani initiative is fundamentally a political maneuver, and it requires a coordinated response that includes diplomatic, legal, and security dimensions.

The existential implications cannot be overstated. The threat to Iran’s national security, the assassination of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, and the imposition of two illegal and unprovoked wars through the use of hostile American bases and the cooperation of Arab countries are not matters that can be ignored within diplomatic engagement.

The primary means of preventing their recurrence is firm control over the Strait of Hormuz. If Iran permits this condition to be eroded through political maneuvering, it risks losing a critical deterrent mechanism without receiving commensurate concessions in return.

Trump’s threats: A direct violation of clause 1

Concurrent with the challenge to Iran’s legal authority over the Strait, Trump has once again threatened that if Iran does not act according to his whims, he will impose war once again.

These statements go far beyond psychological warfare intended to weaken the morale of Iranian negotiators or serve domestic political purposes. They constitute a direct violation of Clause 1 of the memorandum signed by him and the Iranian president last week, which calls on signatories to “refrain from the threat or use of force against each other.”

Trump’s threat to “blow up the country, launch a full ground invasion to take it over, and assassinate Iranian negotiators” represents an explicit violation of the agreement.

When combined with the Zionist regime’s insistence on continuing its occupation of Lebanese territory – itself a clear violation of the memorandum’s provisions regarding the cessation of hostilities on all fronts – the pattern becomes unmistakable. The enemy is systematically testing the limits of Iran’s commitment to the negotiation process while violating its fundamental provisions.

The statement by US Treasury Secretary describing the $30 billion in frozen assets and sanctions relief as a “temporary carrot” that can be withdrawn whenever desired demonstrates that, from the enemy’s perspective, what it believes it will ultimately obtain from Iran far exceeds what it is offering during the negotiation process.

This perception must be neutralized through both the words and actions of Iranian officials.

The strategic importance of the Strait in the negotiations

The Strait of Hormuz’s importance extends beyond economic considerations. It serves as the primary mechanism for creating practical guarantees for the fulfillment of Iran’s conditions within the memorandum, similar to what occurred in Lebanon and immediately revealed its consequences. Control over the Strait enables Iran to compensate for war damages, provide security against future aggression, and prevent the passage of military and hostile vessels.

The memorandum commits Iran “to arrange for the safe passage of commercial vessels through the strait, with no charge for 60 days.” The subsequent joint statement with Oman “agreed to establish a joint working group to negotiate the future administration of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.”

However, Oman’s unilateral action effectively preempts this negotiation process by establishing a separate corridor that bypasses Iranian authorization.

The implementation of what Oman has announced would constitute a clear example of the enemy achieving through the political process what it failed to achieve through military means during the Third Imposed War.

If realized, it would increase the enemy’s appetite to obtain through diplomacy what it was unable to secure through all-out military aggression, a precedent that would embolden further violations of Iran’s sovereignty.

Available responses and strategic options

Various measures exist for responding to this new challenge, each with its own implications:

First, suspending mine-clearing operations would signal that Iran’s commitment to safe passage is conditional on recognition of its authority over the Strait. This would maintain pressure on global shipping and demonstrate that Iran retains the capacity to disrupt traffic if its sovereignty is not respected.

Second, imposing restrictions on vessel passage that deviate from Iranian-designated routes would enforce Iran’s jurisdictional claims directly. The IRGC Navy has already warned that “ships’ movement through other routes is dangerous and prohibited,” establishing the basis for enforcement actions.

Third, military action against violating ships, while potentially escalatory, would demonstrate Iran’s determination to protect its sovereignty. The IRGC Navy has already stated that “any vessel found in violation will be subject to enforcement measures,” establishing a credible deterrent against hostile entities.

Fourth, announcing a halt to negotiations or postponing the next round would signal that these developments have fundamentally altered the basis for continued engagement. This would be particularly appropriate given that Trump’s threats directly violate Clause 1 of the memorandum.

Fifth, escalating the political response through diplomatic channels while the armed forces maintain their deterrent posture. As the points above indicate, the first response by the IRGC Navy is timely and appropriate but insufficient; political responses must be added within the framework of the diplomatic negotiation process.

The risk of precedent and the nature of the enemy

What is at stake extends beyond the immediate question of the Strait. If Oman’s unilateral action is permitted to stand, it would establish a precedent that Iran’s sovereignty can be circumvented through coordinated political maneuvering.

That would fundamentally alter the balance of power in the region, demonstrating that Iran’s strategic assets can be neutralized through diplomatic means rather than requiring military confrontation.

The enemy’s objective in these negotiations appears to be:

1. Gaining access to Iran’s 60-percent enriched material

2. Obtaining complete intelligence regarding the remaining nuclear infrastructure and facilities

3. Reopening the Strait of Hormuz on terms favorable to the United States and its allies

4. Securing economic breathing space for the world and the United States

5. Preserving the Republican Party’s position in the November midterm elections

In return, Iran is offered temporary concessions such as oil exports, lifting the naval blockade, and releasing some assets, whose total financial value of approximately $30 billion is of very limited significance when compared with the strategic importance of Iran’s tools and capabilities, especially the Strait of Hormuz and the unified Resistance Front.

The comparison with Lebanon is instructive. When Iran demonstrated commitment to the ceasefire, it was met with continued Israeli occupation and attacks, demonstrating that the enemy seeks to exploit Iranian goodwill rather than reciprocate it.

The inadequate response to these violations, alongside discussions about the return of IAEA inspectors and Iran’s failure to publish a fact sheet regarding the agreement, increases ambiguity in public opinion and leads to greater polarization.

A coherent strategy for the negotiations

Iran’s response to these challenges must be coordinated, multifaceted, and proportionate to the gravity of the developments. The armed forces’ response, while necessary, must be supplemented by political actions within the diplomatic framework.

Several principles should guide this approach:

First, Iran must maintain its position that control over the Strait of Hormuz is non-negotiable and essential for national security. Any arrangement that circumvents Iranian authority must be rejected absolutely.

Second, the perception that Iran can be pressured into abandoning its strategic assets through diplomatic engagement must be countered through concrete actions that demonstrate the costs of violating Iran’s sovereignty.

Third, the link between the negotiation process and the security situation, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Resistance Front, must be maintained. Concessions on one issue cannot be made in isolation from progress on others.

Fourth, Iran must articulate clearly that the threatening rhetoric by US officials constitutes violations of the memorandum and will be met with appropriate responses, including the possibility of suspension or postponement of the negotiations.

Fifth, Iran should leverage the extraordinary strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz as the primary means of providing security guarantees and preventing future aggression. The existential threat against Iran’s national security demands that sovereignty over the Strait be maintained as a fundamental condition of any agreement.

The path forward requires rejecting the assumption that these challenges can be addressed through military responses alone.

The coordinated political and diplomatic maneuvering by the United States, its regional allies, and Oman demands a comprehensive response that integrates the armed forces’ capabilities with political diplomacy. Anything less would signal weakness and encourage further violations of Iran’s sovereignty and the terms of the memorandum.

Ultimately, Iran’s position must be clear: the Strait of Hormuz remains under Iranian authority, and any route that does not coordinate with Iran is unacceptable and will face appropriate measures.

The negotiations should not appear as an opportunity for the enemy to achieve through political means what it could not achieve through illegal war of aggression.

Iran’s strategic assets – the Strait of Hormuz, the Resistance Front, and its nuclear capabilities – are not negotiable items but fundamental components of the country’s national security that must be preserved.

The burden lies with the other parties to demonstrate their commitment to the agreement and respect for Iran’s sovereignty through their actions, not merely words.

June 25, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Comments Off on Strait of Hormuz as strategic red line: Why Iran must confront Oman’s corridor plan and Trump’s threats

IRGC Navy rejects new Strait of Hormuz shipping routes

Al Mayadeen | June 25, 2026

Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy has warned that safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz is only possible via routes announced by Iran, rejecting newly declared navigation lanes and insisting that vessels coordinate directly with Iranian naval authorities.

In a statement issued in the name of the IRGC Navy, Tehran said that “some authorities” had recently announced new shipping routes in the strategic waterway “without informing or coordinating with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” saying the move is “unacceptable and completely dangerous.”

The statement stressed that the only authorized passage routes through the Strait of Hormuz are those designated by Iran, warning that navigation outside these channels is “very dangerous and prohibited.”

“All vessels are warned to strictly avoid any navigation outside the notified routes,” the IRGC Navy said, adding that coordination via Channel 16 with Iranian naval forces is mandatory and that “violator vessels will be dealt with.”

The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow maritime chokepoint linking the Gulf to the Arabian Sea, remains one of the world’s most sensitive shipping corridors, with competing claims over navigation management and maritime safety procedures.

Regional diplomatic efforts underway

The warning comes amid renewed diplomatic activity involving Gulf states, Iran, and regional mediators aimed at reshaping maritime governance in the strait.

On Wednesday, Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani arrived in Muscat for talks with Omani officials on launching a new round of negotiations involving Iran, Iraq, and Gulf Arab states on the future management of the waterway, according to Reuters, citing a diplomat briefed on the discussions.

The proposed talks are reported to be separate from ongoing Iran-US negotiations and existing de-mining arrangements. According to the same source, Gulf states are expected to push for the removal of transit fees, while Iran may propose alternative charges linked to environmental, navigation, and security services.

The initiative is said to stem from a recent memorandum of understanding calling for structured discussions between Iran, Oman, Gulf states, and Iraq on maritime governance in the strait, with Pakistan floated as a potential mediator.

Separately, broader regional reconciliation talks are expected to be held in Riyadh involving Iran, Gulf Arab states, and other regional actors.

Oman announces new shipping lanes

Earlier on Wednesday, Oman announced the establishment of two temporary shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz, positioned north and south of the existing lane, in coordination with the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

Under a phased operational plan, vessels will be grouped and contacted individually with navigation instructions, including designated routes and departure timings. Oman’s maritime authorities said shipmasters remain responsible for conducting independent risk assessments, and vessels are required to keep Automatic Identification Systems active while reporting hazards to the Oman Maritime Security Centre.

Oman also confirmed that no transit tolls would be imposed on ships passing through the strait, in line with understandings reached in recent Iran-US discussions.

Joint Iran-Oman framework

The developments follow earlier agreements between Iran and Oman to establish a joint committee tasked with discussing the future management of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

The committee is part of broader consultations between Tehran and Muscat aimed at enhancing maritime safety, coordinating navigation rules, and addressing associated services and costs in line with international law and sovereign rights of coastal states.

Both sides have previously reiterated their commitment to keeping the strait open for international navigation while maintaining sovereignty over territorial waters, underscoring the strategic importance of continued coordination to ensure stability in the waterway.

June 25, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , | Comments Off on IRGC Navy rejects new Strait of Hormuz shipping routes

Iran, Saudi FMs hold phone talks as Persian Gulf states rethink US ties

Press TV – June 24, 2026

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Saudi counterpart Prince Faisal bin Farhan have held a phone call to discuss regional developments, as Persian Gulf Arab states recalibrate their approach toward Tehran in the wake of the US-Israeli war that exposed the limits of American power.

Araghchi on Wednesday briefed the Saudi minister on the latest progress in implementing bilateral agreements and the ongoing negotiations following the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed on June 18.

The two top diplomats underscored the importance of maintaining diplomatic channels, strengthening joint cooperation to support regional stability, and achieving positive and sustainable outcomes.

The call came as French news agency AFP said Saudi Arabia is expected to host talks aimed at repairing relations between Iran and Persian Gulf countries following the US-Israeli war on Iran.

It cited a diplomat familiar with the arrangements as saying Wednesday that a regional summit was being planned in Riyadh and could also include other neighboring countries, but no date had yet been set.

The meetings would be separate from the ongoing negotiations between Iran and the United States, the diplomat added.

CNN, citing a senior Persian Gulf diplomat, reported that leaders are increasingly contemplating a future in which the US plays a much smaller role in the regional security architecture, with a possible framework involving a regional non-aggression pact with Iran.

According to Hasan Alhasan, senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “From the Arab states’ perspective, the Iran war is a disastrous turning point for the regional security order.”

The war, which began on February 28, exposed vulnerabilities in the Persian Gulf states’ security model, which is heavily dependent on the nearly 40,000 US troops stationed in the region and American-made air defense systems.

“The US security guarantee is no longer reliable in the way they thought it was,” one analyst at Chatham House told The New York Times.

Washington’s approach is increasingly perceived as selective and heavily centered on Israel’s security interest.

A classified CIA analysis found that US allies in the Persian Gulf are divided over their approach to Iran. According to the assessment, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain prefer continued pressure on Tehran, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait now support negotiations.

Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, noted that the UAE and Bahrain “made themselves frontline states against Iran” through the Abraham Accords and “now they’re in too deep and cannot extract themselves out of it”.

The Saudis, Parsi added, “were at the highest levels pushing for this war. They have come to regret it”.

Adding another layer of complexity is a widening gap between Arab governments and Arab public opinion over Iran.

According to a report by The Economist cited by DID Press, growing anger toward Israel and dissatisfaction with US policies have fueled increasing sympathy for Tehran across parts of the Arab world.

Despite sustained efforts by several Arab governments to reinforce anti-Iran narratives, recent developments have altered perceptions among sections of Arab society.

The report identifies two major drivers behind this shift: anger toward Israel, as many Arabs increasingly view Iranian actions against Israel as a legitimate response to regional military operations, and religious and cultural ties, particularly among Shia communities across the Persian Gulf.

The report concludes that sectarian narratives no longer resonate as strongly as in previous years, and that many Arabs increasingly view Iran as more assertive and resilient than several Arab governments.

Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani traveled to Muscat on Wednesday to initiate talks between Iran, Persian Gulf states, and Iraq on the future operation of the Strait of Hormuz.

The discussions aim to implement a provision of the MoU requiring Iran and Oman to hold talks with other Persian Gulf states on the future management of navigation and maritime services.

Earlier on Wednesday, Oman announced two temporary routes north and south of the existing shipping lane to facilitate safe passage of vessels departing the region, in coordination with the International Maritime Organization.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of global oil and liquefied natural gas normally transits, was heavily disrupted after the United States and Israel launched their war on Iran on February 28.

June 24, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Iran, Saudi FMs hold phone talks as Persian Gulf states rethink US ties

No return to pre-war status for Strait of Hormuz – Iran’s top diplomat

RT | June 13, 2026

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has said that control over the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz will not return to its pre-war status.

The minister made the remarks as the US and Iran are finalizing a deal to end the conflict, which began on February 28 with joint US-Israeli bombardments of Iranian territory and the assassination of senior officials, including the country’s longtime supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.

The waterway, which normally handles around a quarter of the world’s seaborne oil and LNG trade, has largely remained closed throughout the war, although President Donald Trump said the US military had helped guide more than 200 ships through the strait.

“The Strait of Hormuz lies under the sovereignty of Iran and Oman. The administration of the waterway will not return to its pre-war arrangement. Iran and Oman will soon issue a joint statement outlining a new framework for the administration of the Strait of Hormuz,” Araghchi said on Friday, according to Iranian media.

The diplomat said Iran would charge passing ships service fees. Tehran had previously insisted that it maintained full sovereignty over the strait and would collect tolls.

Araghchi said that, under the memorandum of understanding awaiting final approval, the US would, “for the first time in 47 years,” commit to respecting Iran’s sovereignty and non-interference in its domestic affairs. The agreement would also declare an end to the conflict on all fronts, including in Lebanon, he said.

Iran most recently declared the strait closed to all ships in response to US strikes on Tuesday and Wednesday. Trump later said he had called off the attack in an effort to advance peace talks, expressing confidence that an agreement could be signed as early as this weekend.

June 12, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Comments Off on No return to pre-war status for Strait of Hormuz – Iran’s top diplomat

How Iran’s Strait of Hormuz cable sovereignty could reshape global internet governance

By Yousef Ramazani | Press TV | May 11, 2026

In the wake of the US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran and the subsequent maritime banditry and piracy, the Islamic Republic is reportedly moving to assert its long-dormant sovereign rights over the submarine internet cables that traverse the waters of the Strait of Hormuz.

This strategic reorientation – as confirmed by some reports – promises to generate hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenue while fundamentally reshaping the legal and economic architecture of global data transmission.

The unprovoked military aggression against Iran, which halted with a ceasefire on April 8, 2026, has fundamentally altered the strategic calculus of the Persian Gulf.

During the 40 days of aggression against Iran, a previously overlooked dimension of the country’s sovereign territory emerged as a critical vulnerability for the global digital economy.

Beneath the waters of the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran’s territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles and overlaps completely with Omani jurisdiction, leaving no high seas whatsoever, lie at least five major submarine fibre-optic cable systems.

These cables carry approximately 99 percent of all intercontinental internet traffic and an estimated 10 trillion US dollars in daily financial transactions.

Now, in the aftermath of the aggression, which came in the middle of nuclear talks, Iran is moving to exercise its full and legal sovereign authority over this hidden infrastructure.

The plan is increasingly centered on a comprehensive governance model that would include permit requirements, transit fees, Iranian legal jurisdiction over foreign technology companies, and exclusive Iranian control over cable maintenance and repair operations.

Forgotten dimension of the Strait of Hormuz

For decades, international discourse surrounding the Strait of Hormuz focused almost exclusively on traditional dimensions: freedom of navigation for oil tankers, security of energy flows, and the legal regime governing the passage of commercial and military vessels.

This narrow framing, however, systematically ignored one of the most vital emerging dimensions of this strategic corridor: the fibre-optic communication infrastructure and submarine data transmission cables that lie on the seabed of Iran’s territorial waters.

These cables, which include major systems such as FALCON (owned by Tata Communications of India), the Gulf Bridge International (GBI) system, and the TGN-Gulf system, form the backbone of the digital economy, not just for the Persian Gulf region but the entire world.

They carry international internet traffic, cloud data centre synchronization, enterprise virtual private networks, voice-over-IP communications, and – most critically – international banking and financial transactions, including SWIFT messages.

Any disruption to these communication highways, whether from natural disasters, ship anchoring, or military action, could cause irreparable damage to the tune of tens to hundreds of millions of dollars daily.

What makes this issue particularly significant for Iran is the undisputed legal reality that the Strait of Hormuz is not, and has never been, international waters.

The careful repetition of the phrase “international waters” by Western media and think tanks is part of a cognitive and legal battle designed to diminish the legitimate sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran over one of the world’s most vital waterways.

Why is the Strait Iranian territory

The legal status of the Strait of Hormuz must be understood through the precise geometry of international maritime law.

According to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, each coastal state has the right to determine the width of its territorial sea up to a maximum distance of 12 nautical miles from its baselines.

Iran has never ratified this convention, but it serves as a reference point for international practice. Within these 12 miles, the coastal state exercises absolute sovereignty over the water column, the seabed, the subsoil, and even the airspace above.

This is exactly the same sovereignty it exercises over the territory of its capital city.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has determined the width of its territorial sea in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman to be 12 nautical miles. The Kingdom of Oman has adopted exactly the same procedure.

The Strait of Hormuz, at its narrowest point between Iranian islands and the Omani coast, measures approximately 21 nautical miles in width.

When Iran extends its territorial sea 12 nautical miles southward from its northern coast, and Oman extends its territorial sea 12 nautical miles northward from the Musandam Peninsula, the combined territorial waters of the two countries total 24 nautical miles.

This exceeds the total width of the strait at that point by three nautical miles.

The result is geometrically inevitable: the territorial seas of Iran and Oman collide and overlap in the middle of the Strait of Hormuz.

There is not a single drop of water in the narrowest points of the strait and its main shipping channels that can be legally classified as high seas or even as an exclusive economic zone.

Any vessel, submarine, or cable that passes through this point is legally passing within the sovereign borders of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

To this geometric reality must be added the clarifying force of Article 34 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea.

That article states definitively that the regime of passage through straits used for international navigation does not in any way affect the legal status of the waters forming these straits.

Nor does it affect the exercise of sovereignty and jurisdiction by the bordering states over those waters, their airspace, their bed, and their subsoil.

The international community possesses only the right of passage through these waters under the rules set by Iran. This right of passage is limited to the rapid and continuous movement of ships and aircraft.

It does not extend to the laying of fixed infrastructure such as internet cables or energy pipelines on the seabed.

Sovereignty over the seabed, for laying communication cables, energy pipelines, and conducting research, remains entirely the exclusive preserve of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Value of what passes through Iranian waters

The economic significance of the cables transiting the Strait of Hormuz is staggering.

According to data from the TeleGeography database updated to January 2026, the main cable systems crossing the strait form a complex network connecting the Persian Gulf countries to the global network spanning Europe, India, and East Asia.

These systems carry not only public internet traffic but also the most sensitive and valuable data streams in the global economy.

Global content providers known as hyperscalers, companies including Google, Microsoft, Amazon, and Meta, use these fibre-optic cables to connect their local nodes to the core of their global networks.

The traffic these companies carry consists primarily of cloud data centre synchronization, including real-time copies of distributed databases, virtual machine migrations, internal application programming interface traffic, and user-generated content.

In cloud computing architecture, maintaining stability and reliability at the level of 99.999 percent uptime, known as the “five nines” standard, is a mandatory requirement in service level agreements.

Rather than purchasing small amounts of bandwidth, these companies lease long-term dark capacity or purchase irrevocable rights to use submarine cables for periods of 15 to 25 years, keeping network latency in the millisecond range.

Level 1 and Level 2 telecommunications operators, including Etisalat of the UAE, Ooredoo of Qatar and Oman, the Telecommunications Infrastructure Company of Iran, and STC of Saudi Arabia, are responsible for transporting international internet traffic.

This traffic includes Border Gateway Protocol routing information, enterprise virtual private networks, international mobile roaming traffic, and network-based voice packets.

These operators are the gateway to the internet for the countries of the region, receiving terabits per second of capacity from the submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and then distributing it to smaller operators and end users.

These cables form the backbone of the digital economy of the Persian Gulf countries, creating a near-total dependence on connectivity to the global network.

Most critically, global financial institutions and content distribution networks, including Akamai, Cloudflare, and the SWIFT financial messaging network, depend on these cables.

Bank settlement messages and high-frequency transactions require dedicated, encrypted, low-latency paths with minimal signal variability.

In global stock market trading, a delay of even one millisecond can result in millions of dollars in losses. Submarine cables are the safest, fastest, and most reliable physical medium for transporting these sensitive intercontinental financial transactions.

According to analytical reports from British think tanks and transaction data from international payment networks, including SWIFT and the Central Interbank Dollar Payments System CHIPS, submarine cables carry more than 10 trillion US dollars in financial transactions every single day.

This colossal figure represents bank settlements, stock market transactions, foreign exchange operations, and all financial activities that form the lifeblood of the global economy.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development confirms in its annual Digital Economy Reports that more than 99 percent of all international data traffic is transmitted through this cable network.

At the regional level, the West Asia international broadband market, for which the Strait of Hormuz serves as the main thoroughfare, is worth several billion dollars annually.

This value derives from the bulk sale of capacity by cable owners such as FALCON, GBI, and TGN-Gulf to national telecommunications operators.

The damage caused by a disruption or complete outage at this strategic bottleneck, however, is far larger than the direct revenues of this market.

Modelling based on studies of transatlantic cable outages estimates that a five-day disruption of cables through the Strait of Hormuz could inflict tens to hundreds of millions of dollars in damage daily to the combined economies of the Persian Gulf countries.

Failure of alternatives

In response to Iran’s assertion of its sovereign rights, some Western analysts have suggested that alternative routes or technologies could bypass the Strait of Hormuz.

The technical reality, however, offers no fast and reliable alternative.

Next-generation low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations such as Starlink offer lower latency than fibre-optic cables for very long distances, because lasers in space travel at actual light speed while light in glass fibres travels at roughly two-thirds of that speed.

However, while a single submarine cable can carry terabits of data per second, an entire satellite constellation offers bandwidth measured in gigabits.

Satellites cannot yet handle the massive bandwidth demands of artificial intelligence training, high-definition streaming for millions of users, or cloud backups. They are, in the assessment of industry experts, a boutique solution not scalable to millions of users.

Terrestrial overland corridors represent the most practical alternative, with massive land cables running through Iraq to Turkey or through Syria to the Mediterranean.

Ambitious projects such as Saudi Arabia’s SilkLink and Qatar’s FiG are underway. However, these routes must cross war-torn regions, including Syria and Iraq, where West-backed wars have previously destroyed similar infrastructure and where local militias and unstable governments remain capable of seizure, taxation, or sabotage.

These are not peaceful alternatives; they merely exchange one set of vulnerabilities for another. Free-space optical systems using lasers transmitted through air or vacuum are not a solution for the Strait of Hormuz at all.

Such systems are extremely susceptible to weather interference, including the fog and sandstorms common to the Persian Gulf, and have a limited range of less than 50 kilometres.

The verdict is clear: there exists no single alternative that is simultaneously fast, high-capacity, and secure. The Strait of Hormuz remains an irreplaceable chokepoint for global digital communications.

Repair regime and Iran’s essential role

The maintenance and repair of submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz present another dimension of Iran’s sovereign authority.

According to International Cable Protection Committee technical documents and performance reports, the repair process for a complete cable cut follows a well-established sequence: fault location using optical time-domain reflectometer tools, application for navigation permits under international law, and dispatch of a cable repair ship.

The process of dispatching a ship, retrieving the two ends of the cable from the seabed, performing the reconnection, and returning the cable to the seabed typically requires between 7 and 30 days, depending on weather conditions and the availability of repair vessels.

In the Strait of Hormuz specifically, the exceptionally high volume of maritime traffic requires intensive traffic coordination during cable laying and repair operations.

Under normal conditions with full cooperation from the countries exercising sovereignty over the strait, the repair process would be expected to take up to 45 days.

During the recent joint US-Israeli aggression, however, major cable installation contractors, including Alcatel Submarine Networks, declared force majeure on Persian Gulf operations, halting both new installations and maintenance of existing systems.

Billions of dollars’ worth of cable projects were suspended or abandoned, with some reportedly 90 percent complete before work stopped.

Given that the Strait of Hormuz lies entirely within Iranian territorial waters, the logical conclusion is inescapable: the user companies whose cables transit Iranian sovereign territory must conclude contracts for cable repair and maintenance exclusively with Iranian companies, specifically companies owned more than 50 percent by Iranian entities and operating entirely under the laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

This is not a matter of political choice but of legal necessity arising from the undisputed fact that foreign vessels, including cable repair ships, cannot operate in Iranian territorial waters without Iranian permission.

Global recognition of the new reality

The world media has taken notice of Iran’s digital sovereignty initiative. Indian media outlets, including ABP Live and the Economic Times, have warned that a significant portion of India’s internet passes through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, and that any disruption to these routes could disrupt online services, digital banking, and communications, pressuring the digital economy of countries, including India.

Russian media outlet AIA Daily reported that Iran has effectively conveyed the message that it possesses physical access to vital routes of the global internet, emphasizing that at least seven major internet cables pass through the Strait of Hormuz and serve as the backbone of e-commerce, cloud services, and international communications.

Asian media, including Korea’s Asia Business Daily and the English-language Asia Times, have described the Strait of Hormuz as one of the world’s most important internet bottlenecks.

Asia Times wrote that data infrastructure and fibre-optic cables have become part of the deterrence equation in the region, warning that an attack on cables could disrupt the global economy without firing a missile, and that future wars may take place on the seabed and over data cables rather than traditional battlefields.

Western media have also acknowledged the vulnerability. Reuters reported in a piece that Iran’s warning about the vulnerability of undersea cables has raised concerns, emphasizing that several important fibre-optic cables lie in the Strait of Hormuz connecting countries in Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Europe, and that any damage in this area would disrupt cloud services, online communications, and the digital economy.

The Washington Post warned that submarine cables have become one of the most vulnerable parts of the world’s digital economy, with Western governments concerned that undersea cables could be used as a tool of strategic pressure.

The French newspaper Le Monde wrote that the joint US-Israeli aggression against Iran has placed infrastructure, including submarine cables, data centres, and cloud computing networks under the simultaneous pressure of geopolitical and security crises.

Three practical steps

Based on the legal, technical, and economic factors, the Islamic Republic of Iran can implement three practical steps to generate hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenue from the Strait of Hormuz internet cables while exercising its full sovereign rights.

First, all companies wishing to use this infrastructure must obtain an initial license from Iranian authorities, and because this license must be renewed annually, these companies must pay all outstanding amounts on a recurring basis.

The fee model can draw from international precedents, including the Egyptian model based on providing exclusive services, the Singaporean model based on policy-making and administrative licensing, the Indonesian bureaucratic model based on permits and corridors, and the Russian model based on strategic control and state participation.

Egypt, for example, earns between 250 million and 400 million US dollars annually from submarine cable infrastructure alone, representing 15 to 20 percent of the Egyptian Telecommunications Company’s total operating revenues.

Second, all cross-border communications and information technology companies operating in the region, including US companies such as Meta, Amazon, and Microsoft that transfer Iranian user data abroad through these cables, must be subject to the laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran and supervised and regulated by the Iranian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology.

With the official activities of these companies and their cooperation with the Iranian side, there would no longer be any need for filtering or blocking of their platforms.

Third, because the Strait of Hormuz is entirely part of Iranian territory, the user companies must conclude contracts for cable repair and maintenance exclusively with an Iranian company, meaning a company owned more than 50 percent by the Iranian side and operating fully under the laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The proceeds from this entire framework will flow to the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, specifically to the Fibre-Optic Development Fund, and will be used to create and improve the country’s information technology infrastructure.

May 11, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Timeless or most popular | , , , | Comments Off on How Iran’s Strait of Hormuz cable sovereignty could reshape global internet governance

The Larak Corridor: Iran’s Rial Gate With No US, No Israel, and No Way Around

By Freddie Ponton | 21st Century Wire | April 1, 2026

While MOW Secretary Pete Hegseth was telling other nations to “step up” in the Strait of HormuzDonald Trump was already backing away, insisting its security was “not for us.” In between those contradictions, Washington dumped a fog of conflicting slogans on the public—slogans that never looked like strategy so much as panicked improvisation. That confusion is not a sideshow to the war, but the political static masking a brutal reality. While the White House and its zionist neocon war camp lurch between bluff and retreat, Iran has been moving with cold discipline, quietly building what Iranian reporting calls the Larak Corridor and what maritime trackers have identified as a tightly managed lane through the Qeshm-Larak gap inside Iranian waters.

Around Larak, Tehran is no longer just reacting to an illegal war launched against it. It is turning battlefield pressure into procedure, selective access, and proposed law, using a controlled corridor and a wider Hormuz management plan to show that the old fantasy of automatic Western command over this chokepoint is breaking down in real time. The truth of the war is not found in the bombast coming out of Washington; instead you will find it in the places where power is actually shifting, and right now, one of those places is a narrow strip of water off Larak, where Iran looks calmer, more deliberate, and more in command of events than the people who thought they could bomb it into submission.

The Day Hormuz Moved on Iran’s Terms

The Strait of Hormuz has not been shut, and that is exactly why what Iran has done matters more. What has emerged around Larak is not a crude blockade but a controlled passage system, a wartime checkpoint laid across one of the most important arteries of the world economy. Iranian reporting most often calls it the Larak Corridor. At the same time, the broader phrase Larak-Qeshm Corridor is best understood as a geographic description of the lane running through the narrow gap between those two islands inside Iranian waters.

Names are not cosmetic here. Western and trade coverage tend to speak of a route between Qeshm and Larak. Iranian coverage roots it in Larak itself, in Iranian-managed waters, under Iranian rules. That is the quiet shift the war has produced. For decades, the story of Hormuz was told from the deck of a U.S. carrier. Today, one of its key arteries is being renamed and reorganised from a small island most Western audiences have never been asked to think about.

Iran appears to be building a differentiated transit regime, not a universal shutdown. That means the market consequence is not simply “less supply,” but a more political energy map in which some buyers and shippers face privileged access while others face delay, denial, or sharply higher costs.

That is the part of the story that cuts through the propaganda. A total closure would have been easy to denounce and easy to rally against. A selective corridor is harder to attack because it allows Tehran to say that passage has not ended, only the assumption that ships can move through Iranian waters during an illegal war on Iran without submitting to Iranian conditions.

This is why Larak matters. It is where Iran stopped merely threatening the map and started administering it.

The lane at Larak

The outlines of the new lane are now visible. The Larak Corridor is not a return to normal traffic. It is a filtered, low-volume, politically segmented route for approved movement. Trade and maritime analysis has traced authorised vessels through the five-mile gap between Qeshm and Larak, close to the Iranian coast and under a web of Iranian surveillance and intervention capacity. Iranian and Arabic reporting has described a safe corridor around or between Larak and Qeshm, never a full reopening of the strait, even though yesterday the Wall Street Journal reported that the Bahman pier on the eastern side of Qeshm Island was attacked, according to a statement from Hormozgan governor’s office relayed by Iranian state-affiliated media ISNA. Qeshm overlooks the Clarence Strait in the Strait of Hormuz and is referred to by the locals as “Kuran”,  Iran’s main launchpad for its asymmetric naval warfare. In early March, the Israeli/US war machine had targeted a desalination plant on Qeshm Island, leaving 30 villages without water.

That low-volume point changes everything. The lane exists in deliberate contrast to prewar patterns. UN-linked reporting put pre-crisis traffic through Hormuz at roughly 130 ships a day. Against that baseline, the authorised trickle through Larak is not evidence of restored normality but a clear indication that normality has been replaced by a rationed flow that Iran alone can modulate.

The lane also stratifies states. Some governments have secured negotiated passage, some ships have moved after prior coordination and documentation, and others have been turned back or discouraged from approaching in the first place. The result is not an open sea but a tiered system in which diplomatic posture, sanctions alignment, and wartime behaviour shape access to one of the world’s central energy routes.

Calling this a blockade is comfortable for Western officials, but it is wrong. A blockade denies passage to provoke a fight. The Larak Corridor functions more like a wartime border crossing, granting passage conditionally, keeping discretionary power in Iranian hands, and making political hierarchy visible on the water.

Force became law

The story becomes more serious once you see that Tehran is not leaving this system in the realm of ad hoc force, but instead the Islamic Republic of Iran is building a legal scaffold around it.

Parliamentary reporting confirms that Iran’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee has approved an eight-point Strait of Hormuz Management Plan. The plan is built around eight clear pillars: securing the strait, ensuring ship safety, addressing environmental risks, establishing financial arrangements with a rial-based toll system, banning American and Israeli vessels from passage, asserting Iran’s sovereign authority and that of its armed forces, cooperating with Oman on the legal framework, and prohibiting entry to any state that participates in unilateral sanctions against Iran.


Iran’s Strait of Hormuz Eight Pillars Management Plan

A parallel description from Xinhuanet states that the measure gathered more than 250 signatures and outlines four immediate objectives: ensuring shipping security, charging environmental polluters, collecting fees for guidance services, and establishing a regional development fund funded by the toll regime. Those details matter as they show that Tehran is not marketing this as a simple wartime levy, but as sovereign administration over safety, environmental protection, navigational management, revenue, and regional development.

It is crucial to be precise. The plan is not yet fully enacted into law. Committee approval is significant because it codifies the logic of the corridor and signals an intention to turn military practice into statute, but Iranian reporting makes clear that key elements are still in the phase of initial measures and continued drafting. That does not weaken the argument. It actually strengthens it. The turning point is not when the last procedural stamp is applied, but when a state under attack openly decides to legislate the war’s new realities into its domestic legal order.

The Oman clause is one of the plan’s sharpest edges. Iranian reporting says Oman must be present in the legal regime and coordination structure because the southern side of the strait is Omani. At the same time, a parliamentary voice emphasised that in matters of toll collection “the essence of the matter is in Iran’s hands,” and that Iran is the party positioned to collect fees, while Oman’s place is in cooperation and coordination, not revenue capture.

In other words, Tehran is regionalising the legal façade without diluting operational control. Omani decrees from 2025 ratifying broader cooperation and legal-judicial accords with Iran give this move a pre-existing legal context, making the Hormuz framework look less like a unilateral edict and more like a hard extension of bilateral agreements into wartime management.

This is what it means for force to become law. Iran is not simply blocking ships. It is regulating them, invoicing them, and giving itself the legal language to defend that behaviour once the guns fall quiet.

Islands’ sovereignty and the human layer

Strip Larak from its geography and you miss half the story. Hormuz cannot be seen as just another free-floating blue line on an analyst’s map. It is a dense, lived space of islands, coastlines, fishing ports, naval outposts, and communities that have grown up under the shadow of foreign fleets and sanctions.

For half a century, the world has been taught to treat the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs as footnotes, little “disputed” specks on the map. In reality, they, along with Qeshm and Larak, sit inside a network of surveillance and reach that allows Iran to watch, shape, and, when necessary, squeeze movement at the mouth of the Gulf. The Larak Corridor is not a freakish one-off. It grows out of a sovereignty geography that has been quietly undermining the fiction of an “American lake” in Hormuz for decades.

There is a human layer that rarely makes it into Western press. Iran’s maritime posture is not only the work of admirals in Tehran, but it also rests on coastal communities, port workers, pilots, and the broader ecosystem that includes the Naval Basij, the volunteer maritime defence network you researched earlier. That network, with its small craft, its local knowledge, and its political symbolism, has always been part of how Iran thinks about defending the strait, not simply by hardware but by socialised resistance.

For people living on those coasts, the corridor is not a theoretical legal innovation. It is one of the few visible signs, in the middle of bombardment and assassination, that their state can still impose some order at the place where global power once promised them none. Seen from there, the Larak Corridor looks less like opportunism and more like a resilient country insisting that sovereignty is not an abstract word but something that can be exercised in a specific channel of water under fire.

The Gulf pays for the war

The political brilliance of the Larak move is in who gets billed for it: not Washington first, not Tel Aviv first, but the Gulf order that enabled this war and is now trapped in its consequences.

Gulf governments were not properly warned, their objections were ignored, and Europe was largely marginalised from the decision-making that triggered the regional blowback they are now paying for.

That one sentence punctures the comforting story that the old security architecture still works. Some Gulf capitals had urged Washington not to attack Iran. Some tried to keep a distance from the opening salvo. Europe itself was treated less like a partner than a spectator told to brace for impact.

The cost has not been theoretical. Freight risk exploded. Insurance premiums climbed. Cargo timetables turned into contingency plans. The “guarantee” on offer from Washington turns out to be a package in which Gulf states host bases, bankroll weapons, and then absorb the retaliation and economic shock once the trigger is pulled.

The evidence of fatigue is patchy but real. Saudi Arabia has intensified direct contacts with Iran. Regional diplomacy has tried to put some sort of brake on escalation. At the same time, influential Gulf voices still speak of the need to degrade Iranian capabilities, not simply to stop the war. That tension is important as it shows a region caught between fear of Iran and a growing recognition that the American-led order is no longer a stable shelter.

Larak turns that contradiction from an argument into a daily experience. Every tanker that has to negotiate with Tehran, every nervous call from an insurer, or every investor wondering whether to avoid Gulf exposure. All of it drives home the same lesson. A war on Iranian sovereignty will not remain confined to Iranian soil or to the screens of Western news shows. It will leak into ports, pipelines, desalination plants, stock exchanges, and households across the Gulf.

From a pro-peace, pro-sovereignty perspective, that is the real indictment. The architecture that claimed to keep the region safe has delivered a crisis that no one can turn off without Iran’s involvement.

Beyond the dollar and toward the Global South

Although it may sound like a speculative slogan about some future yuan world, it is a description of an experiment already underway. Iran’s proposed Hormuz management plan speaks in the language of rial-based tolls and financial arrangements. Broader analysis around the corridor connects that direction of travel to non-Western settlement channels and to the wider de-dollarisation agenda now running through BRICS and the Global South.

The point is not that the petrodollar disappears tomorrow. It is that under bombardment, and with its conventional military apparatus under fire, Iran is still moving a slice of energy trade onto monetary rails where Washington’s sanctions power is weaker.

Hormuz is doubling as a testbed for de-dollarized energy payments.

China’s experiment with yuan-settled LNG from Qatar in 2023 showed that Gulf energy can clear outside dollar channels when states choose to build the infrastructure. Iran’s 2023 agreement with the UAE to use the dirham in bilateral trade, while imperfect because of the dirham’s peg, still represents a deliberate shift into regional banking circuits that cost Washington more to police. Meanwhile, BRICS has been advancing alternative payment mechanisms and settlement systems designed precisely to chip away at dollar centrality.

The Larak Corridor slots into this picture with unnerving ease. It rewards states willing to engage with Tehran rather than join the sanctions chorus. It opens space for deals denominated in rial, dirham, or yuan. It demonstrates that a Global South state under open attack can still exert leverage over the physical and financial pathways through which the world’s energy moves.

Tehran is not claiming a clean victory over the dollar. What it is doing is more subversive. It is using the war to erase the assumption that Washington can both close and reopen Hormuz at will, militarily and financially. Every transaction that clears outside Western rails, every ship that goes through a lane managed on Iranian terms, is another chip knocked out of a system that has long treated Gulf energy as an American instrument first and a regional lifeline second.

That is why the story of Larak is not simply a regional shipping story, but rather a frontline in the contest over who writes the rules of the global economy.

The old order is cracking

What has happened at Larak is not the final victory of a new world, but it is one of the clearest signs that the old one is cracking in real time.

For decades, the script ran on autopilot. The United States secured the sea lanes. The Gulf monarchies supplied the fuel. The dollar priced it. Everyone else adjusted. The war on Iran was supposed to be another scene in that familiar play. Instead, it exposed how much of it had become theatre.

Iran’s answer didn’t need to be polite, and it was never meant to be. It was disciplined, coercive, and grounded in the one thing Washington cannot replace with rhetoric, the geographic reality of where Hormuz actually lies. Tehran avoided the trap of a universal shutdown and built a mechanism that punishes enemies, rewards accommodation, and keeps the region inside a rolling uncertainty that no press conference in Washington can dispel.

That is why the phrase differentiated transit regime carries so much weight in this war. It captures the fact that what is happening off Larak is not chaos. It is governance under attack. It is a sovereign state, bombed and sanctioned, insisting that it still has the right to decide who crosses its doorstep and on what terms.

For people in the Gulf, it is about whether their ports can stay open, whether their desalination plants keep running, and whether their economies can withstand another cycle of manufactured crisis. For people in Iran, it is about whether anything in their immediate environment still belongs to them after decades of war, sanctions, and threats of regime change.

Seen from that angle, the Larak Corridor is not a provocation. It is a verdict. Peace will not come from pretending the old arrangement can simply be restored. It will come, if it comes at all, when the region and the wider world accept the reality written into the water off Larak. A Gulf built on assaults against Iranian sovereignty cannot remain prosperous, stable, or truly sovereign itself. Not now, and not in the long term.

Iran’s navy has been battered. Its cities have been hit. Its leaders have been hunted. Yet at the most critical chokepoint on earth, the war machine that promised to reopen the map still cannot make Hormuz move on its own terms.

Sovereignty, once attacked, does not always retreat. Sometimes it answers by redrawing the map and forcing those who lit the fire to live with the new lines.

April 1, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , , , , | Comments Off on The Larak Corridor: Iran’s Rial Gate With No US, No Israel, and No Way Around

Iran denies responsibility for ‘depraved’ attack on Kuwait desalination plant

The Cradle | March 30, 2026

The Iranian military denied on 30 March the recent attack, which hit a desalination plant in Kuwait, labeling the strike a US-Israeli false-flag operation aimed at “destabilizing and destroying the region.”

“The brutal aggression by the Zionist regime against the desalination facility in Kuwait, carried out in recent hours under the pretext of accusing the Islamic Republic of Iran, is a sign of the vileness and depravity of the Zionist occupiers,” the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters of the Iranian army said in a statement.

“We declare that US bases, personnel, and their interests in the region, as well as the military, security, and economic infrastructure of the Zionist regime in the occupied Palestinian territories, remain powerful targets for us,” it added.

The Iranian military went on to urge “countries of West Asia must remain vigilant against the sedition of the US–Zionist axis aimed at destabilizing and destroying the region.”

Regional states “must put an end to the presence of the criminal US army and occupying Zionists in the region,” it stressed.

The attack on the desalination plant took place on Sunday.

“A service building at a power and water desalination plant was attacked as part of the Iranian aggression against the State of Kuwait, resulting in the death of an Indian worker and significant material damage to the building,” said a spokesperson for the Kuwaiti Electricity Ministry.

This is not the first attack Tehran has labeled a false flag.

Iran has also denied recent strikes on fuel tankers in Oman and a refinery in Iraq’s Erbil, as well as one that targeted an Aramco facility in Saudi Arabia at the start of the month.

US journalist Tucker Carlson reported earlier in March that Mossad agents were detained in Gulf states for planning bombings.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on 15 March that the US has been using its new Lucas drone – modeled after the Iranian Shahed – to carry out false-flag attacks in the region and attribute them to the Islamic Republic.

Tehran has said only US and Israeli-linked military and economic assets in the Gulf will be struck by its forces.

Iran is warning Gulf governments against allowing Washington to use their bases for attacks on the Islamic Republic.

Iranian drone and missile strikes targeted the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia on 27 March, wounding at least 12 US troops and damaging aircraft and buildings.

A senior Iranian intelligence official told The Cradle on 26 March that the Islamic Republic is preparing a “strong response” against the UAE due to the “active role” it has played in the US-Israeli war on it.

“A decision has been made at the leadership level to end the weeks-long tolerance toward this country. In addition to US military barracks and bases in the UAE, which were targeted in Iran’s defensive attacks, the Emiratis also provided some of their own air bases to the US to be used in attacking Iran,” the intelligence officials went on to say, citing security reports.

“The UAE is considered a foothold for Israel in the region,” the source continued, adding that Abu Dhabi has “carried out misleading operations against Oman and other countries” – likely a reference to false-flag operations pinned on Iran.

March 30, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, False Flag Terrorism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Comments Off on Iran denies responsibility for ‘depraved’ attack on Kuwait desalination plant

War on Iran threatens global Gulf capital flows: FT analysis

Al Mayadeen | March 23, 2026

The war on Iran could disrupt the flow of Gulf capital across global markets, raising concerns about broader financial stability, according to economist Mohamed El-Erian, writing to the Financial Times.

While much attention has focused on energy markets and the resumption of oil production and shipments, El-Erian argued that an equally important issue is how the war may affect the Gulf’s relationship with international capital markets in the short term.

The six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, have become major global financial players over decades, investing heavily across international markets.

El-Erian noted that there is a risk of a temporary shift in capital flows as Gulf countries face increased domestic financial demands amid the war, even if their long-term investment role remains intact. Such a shift could impact global interest rates and the distribution of funding, given the world’s growing reliance on GCC capital.

Before the US-Israel war on Iran, GCC countries had already established themselves as influential forces in global finance, not only as energy suppliers but also as major hubs for transport, tourism, and liquidity.

The region generated a current account surplus exceeding $800 billion over the past four years and has deployed its financial resources across global markets, including public and private investments.

GCC’s growing role in global finance

El-Erian highlighted the growing presence of global financial institutions in the Gulf, where sovereign wealth funds, offices, pension funds, and banks actively manage and allocate capital internationally.

Over time, GCC countries have expanded their investment strategies, now playing a leading role in sectors such as artificial intelligence, life sciences, and robotics.

However, the war on Iran has caused a near “sudden stop” in the energy sector, creating short-term revenue pressures. Governments are expected to increase spending to shield populations from the impact of the war, even as some expenditures decline.

El-Erian emphasized that GCC countries are not uniform, noting that outcomes will depend on financial reserves, revenue recovery speed, and the balance between domestic spending and international investments.

He also warned that any disruption in global capital flows comes at a difficult time, with advanced economies facing large deficits and rising debt issuance, alongside major financing needs driven by technological shifts such as artificial intelligence.

The result is sustained high borrowing costs, which could affect countries, companies, and households, while amplifying financial risks and exposing new vulnerabilities.

Despite the challenges, El-Erian said the GCC will recover its energy exports and maintain its role as a global financial and logistical hub, but stressed that temporary shifts in capital flows must be considered in assessing the broader economic impact of the Iran war.

March 23, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , | Comments Off on War on Iran threatens global Gulf capital flows: FT analysis

US dragged by Israel into ‘unlawful war’ with Iran – Gulf state

RT | March 19, 2026

The US has been drawn by Israel into an “unlawful war” against Iran and needs help to disengage, Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi has said.

In an opinion piece published in The Economist on Wednesday, the Middle East nation’s top diplomat called on US allies in the region to “tell the truth” about the conflict and admit that Washington “has lost control” of its own foreign policy. “There are two parties to this war who have nothing to gain from it,” he wrote, referring to the US and Iran.

The US maintains close security and defense partnerships with six Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman – and has a significant military presence in the region, including bases and naval facilities.

The escalation has had economic and security consequences for these states, with Iran retaliating against targets on their territory. Gulf officials have reportedly complained they were not consulted or warned before the US and Israel launched the campaign against Iran on February 28.

Albusaidi, who acted as a mediator in nuclear talks between Washington and Tehran, wrote that the parties had twice come close to a deal in nine months, noting that the airstrike campaign began immediately after the most substantive talks.

”Israel and America again launched an unlawful military strike against the peace that had briefly appeared really possible,” he wrote, adding that Iran’s retaliation was “inevitable.”

He argued that Washington’s greatest mistake was “entering a war that is not its own,” adding that Israel seeks regime change in Iran, while US interests lie in ending nuclear proliferation and securing energy supplies.

The US leadership must “decide where its national interests really lie, and act accordingly,” Albusaidi wrote. He acknowledged that while returning to talks may prove difficult for both sides, renewed negotiations, potentially mediated by the Gulf states, may provide a path forward.

Tehran has described the negotiations as a US-Israeli deception operation. Former US National Counterterrorism Center head Joe Kent said that Israel and allied media figures ran a “misinformation campaign” to push Washington toward war with Iran, according to his resignation letter published on Thursday.

Former Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki al-Faisal, also blamed the conflict on Israel, claiming that Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu “somehow convinced” US President Donald Trump “to support his views.”

March 19, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Comments Off on US dragged by Israel into ‘unlawful war’ with Iran – Gulf state

US-Israeli war of aggression on Iran meant to reshape region: Omani FM

Press TV – March 12, 2026

Oman’s Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi says that the United States and Israel launched an all-out coordinated aggression against Iran to block the Palestinian statehood and reshape the West Asia region.

Albusaidi said on Thursday that the “real objective of the war” is to “weaken Iran, reshape the region, and push the normalization agenda,” including efforts “to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.”

The top Omani diplomat warned that the ongoing US and Israeli attacks on Iran are part of a “dangerous chain of violations.”

The war on Iran has undermined the legal framework that has provided regional stability for decades, he added.

Albusaidi also pointed out that Iran is not the only target of the ongoing aggression.

“There is a broader plan targeting the region, and Iran is not the only target. Many regional actors are aware of this, but they are betting that aligning with the United States may push it to revise its decisions and policies,” he said.

In recent months, the Tel Aviv regime has displayed its ill intention by releasing maps which show several areas of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq as part of “Greater Israel,” a vicious Zionist project, widely supported by the administration of US President Donald Trump.

The Israeli regime’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu and members of his extremist cabinet have already announced a plan to annex the occupied West Bank in order to steal more Palestinian land and block the possibility of a Palestinian statehood.

Albusaidi also warned the war could drive higher oil prices and major supply chain disruptions globally.

The US-Israeli aggression has already driven the oil and gas prices much higher and caused food inflation.

Oman is seeking to stop the war and return to diplomacy, he stressed.

Albusaidi said the war may end soon, but called for reconsidering Persian Gulf security strategies and preparing for worst-case scenarios.

The US and Israel attacked Iran on February 28 in an unprovoked act of aggression, targeting sites across Iran, including schools, hospitals, and sports halls.

Iran responded by launching missiles and drones at targets inside Israel as well as at American bases across the region.

Senior Iranian officials have asserted that any deliberate assault by the United States and Israeli regime on Iran’s civilian and cultural heritage sites constitutes a “flagrant breach of international humanitarian law and an undisputed war crime.”

Elsewhere in his remarks on Thursday, the Omani foreign minister said Oman will not join Trump’s so-called “Board of Peace” and will not normalize relations with Israel.

The remarks come as Trump keeps pushing more Arab states of the Persian Gulf region to join the Abraham Accords and normalize their ties with Israel despite the regime’s brutal more than to-year long Israeli assault against Palestinians in Gaza.

March 12, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, War Crimes, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Comments Off on US-Israeli war of aggression on Iran meant to reshape region: Omani FM

Iran pledges to ‘respect sovereignty of neighbors’, declares US-Israel assets ‘primary targets’

The Cradle | March 7, 2026

The Iranian armed forces warned that US and Israeli military installations across the region remain legitimate targets, as officials seek to ease tensions with neighboring countries.

“Should the previous hostile actions continue, all military bases and interests of criminal America and the fake Zionist regime on land, at sea, and in the air across the region will be considered primary targets and will come under the powerful and crushing strikes of the mighty armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said in a statement on Saturday.

The warning came alongside a declaration by Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters that Iranian forces “respect the national interests and sovereignty of neighboring countries” and “have not carried out any act of aggression against them.”

Nevertheless, military officials emphasized that installations used by the US or Israel to launch attacks against Iran remain fair game. Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim Zolfaghari said that at least 21 US personnel have been killed and many more injured in attacks on the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet infrastructure, while additional casualties occurred during strikes on Al-Dhafra Air Base.

He also said Iranian forces targeted a US-owned oil tanker in the northern Persian Gulf.

Earlier in the day, President Masoud Pezeshkian announced that Iran’s interim leadership council had ordered the armed forces to cease striking neighboring countries unless attacks originate from their territory.

“The temporary leadership council approved yesterday that neighboring countries should no longer be targeted and missiles should not be fired unless an attack on Iran originates from those countries,” Pezeshkian said in a pre-recorded address.

Pezeshkian’s statement was made amid increasing tensions over regional airspace with Iran’s neighboring countries.

Turkish authorities claimed this week that NATO missile defenses intercepted a ballistic projectile allegedly launched from Iran that crossed Iraqi and Syrian airspace before approaching the northwestern Syria-Turkiye border.

In Azerbaijan, officials accused Tehran of launching a drone attack that struck the Nakhchivan airport terminal, prompting President Ilham Aliyev to warn Iran “will regret it,” while Iranian authorities denied involvement.

Tehran vehemently denied involvement in either of these attacks.

Saudi journalist Adhwan al-Ahmari said in a recent interview with Asharq News that “not all attacks” targeting Gulf states come from Iran, warning the war could be “an American-Israeli trap to implicate the Gulf countries and draw them into a confrontation with Iran.”

Iranian officials told Middle East Eye (MEE) that some recent drone strikes on Gulf energy infrastructure were not carried out by Tehran, with one official describing the attack on Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura facility as “an Israeli effort to sabotage regional peace and alliances between neighbours.”

“I can categorically say that some of the attacks were not carried out by us [Iran],” the anonymous official told MEE.

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman have all sustained strikes within their territories due to the presence of US assets within their borders.

March 7, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Iran pledges to ‘respect sovereignty of neighbors’, declares US-Israel assets ‘primary targets’