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Iran Army hits US base in Kuwait as satellite images show fresh damage

Press TV – July 31, 2026

The Iranian Army says it has targeted key facilities at US-run Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base in Kuwait, as newly analyzed satellite imagery also points to fresh damage at another US-operated base in the Persian Gulf state.

The Army’s Public Relations Office said the strike marked the 27th phase of Operation Sa’eqeh and was carried out in response to recent US military attacks on Iran, including an airstrike on a residential home on Qeshm Island.

According to the statement, loitering drones targeted aircraft shelters, satellite communications systems and equipment storage facilities at Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base. It described the installation as a major hub for US air and surveillance operations and a vital center for the logistical support of American forces.

The retaliation comes as the US has been targeting southern Iranian provinces since earlier in July after violating the terms of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.

Tehran has responded with repeated missile and drone attacks targeting US-operated military facilities across the region under Operation Nasr 2 and Operation Sa’eqeh (Lightning).

The Army condemned the US strike on civilian homes in Qeshm, calling it “a clear violation of humanitarian principles and another example of the enemy’s war crimes.”

It added that “crimes, sanctions and threats will only make Iran more united and cohesive in its sacred defense.”

The statement further said the “decisive, extensive and heavy” attacks carried out by the Army and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps have made it “very costly and difficult” for the United States to intercept Iranian drones and missiles despite deploying advanced air defense systems and reinforcing them.

It also noted that Washington has imposed strict censorship to prevent information about damage, casualties and injuries from becoming public.

The operation followed a deadly US strike on a residential building on Iran’s southern Qeshm Island on Thursday. A local official said three members of a family—a mother, a father and their two-year-old son—were killed in the attack. Two other children were pulled alive from the rubble and taken to hospital after receiving emergency treatment at the scene. The father was identified as a taxi driver, and the neighborhood was a working-class residential area.

Satellite imagery shows damage to US-run base in Kuwait

Meanwhile, satellite imagery has indicated new damage at another US-operated military installation in Kuwait.

Soar Atlas, specializing in maps and satellite imagery, said its assessment of newly released satellite images suggested fresh damage at Ali Al Salem Air Base.

According to the analysis, part of a storage area used by US forces appeared blackened in the latest imagery, indicating that the facility may have sustained damage.

The developments come as The Wall Street Journal reported on Thursday that Washington is reassessing the scale of its military presence in Kuwait.

Citing US officials familiar with the deliberations, the newspaper said the Pentagon had already been considering reducing its troop presence before the war on Iran began and has since scaled back personnel in Kuwait to minimize the risk posed by Iranian attacks on US military bases.

Analysts quoted by the newspaper said US officials increasingly believe that maintaining a large permanent force in Kuwait is no longer militarily necessary.

July 31, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , | Comments Off on Iran Army hits US base in Kuwait as satellite images show fresh damage

How Kuwait and Bahrain miscalculated by becoming launchpads for US strikes on Iran

By Mohammad Molaei | Press TV | July 27, 2026

On the afternoon of February 28, as the first dark clouds of joint Israeli-American military aggression gathered over Iran, a sports hall in the small southern city of Lamerd – a place that had once echoed with the squeak of sneakers and the thrill of competition – was transformed into a scene of unspeakable carnage.

Two American Increment One Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs), fitted with fragmentation warheads, tore through the facility while a women’s volleyball team was actively training inside. The gruesome and deliberate attack claimed many civilian lives, including dozens of children, and left scores more wounded and maimed.

In a grim parallel to the earlier attack on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School in Minab, the US war machine initially refused to acknowledge its culpability in both incidents, due to massive global outcry, particularly in Minab.

Instead, American officials went so far as to formally and cynically attribute the tragedy IN BOTH to an alleged malfunction of an Iranian Hoveyzeh cruise missile, a brazen attempt to absolve themselves of yet another unforgivable war crime.

The official American position attributed the civilian deaths in Lamerd to an Iranian Hoveyzeh cruise missile – a KH-55 derivative that bears no resemblance whatsoever to an American PrSM, differing fundamentally in shape, flight trajectory, and terminal dive profile.

This assertion proved deeply peculiar, particularly after Iranian media published CCTV footage showing impact patterns unmistakably consistent with PrSM fragmentation warheads, alongside visuals clearly depicting a ballistic projectile descending in a manner entirely characteristic of the American weapon system.

Identifying the probable staging ground for this attack and others like it proved to be a matter of straightforward deduction. The United States employs the tracked M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and the wheeled M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) to deploy two distinct families of short-range tactical ballistic missiles: the newer PrSM and the older MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), with maximum ranges of 500 and 300 kilometers, respectively.

Given these systems’ limited reach and the considerable operational threat posed by Iran-allied resistance groups throughout Iraq, it became increasingly evident that the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf had consented to allow American forces to utilize their territory as launch pads for aggression against Iran and its civilian population.

Liability for the strikes

In the weeks following the initial wave of US-Israeli military aggression against Iran, a substantial body of open-source evidence accumulated, enabling one to reconstruct the operational architecture behind the attacks with reasonable confidence.

Satellite imagery reviewed by independent researchers, munitions debris documented by Iranian media and corroborated by third-party analysts, and flight-path data derived from publicly accessible tracking sources collectively point to forward launch positions in Kuwait and Bahrain as the points of origin for a series of ballistic missile strikes against Iranian territory.

The ATACMS and the longer-range PrSM are neither cruise missiles nor air-launched munitions. They are ground-launched ballistic systems that demand substantial fixed or semi-fixed infrastructure, pre-positioned logistics, and complete host-nation cooperation – or at minimum, tacit acquiescence.

In practical terms, this arrangement extends far beyond granting overflight rights to American aircraft. The deployment of American artillery regiments fielding short-range ballistic missiles on Kuwaiti and Bahraini soil is not incidental but structural. Such weaponry would have served no purpose other than to strike at Iranian territory.

Diplomatically, Tehran delivered an explicit and time-bound demand to both Manama and Kuwait City: cease facilitating the war of aggression, expel the American military forces and their assets, or face the consequences.

The initial response from Bahrain and Kuwait was, in a word, silence – punctuated by formulaic statements affirming their alliance commitments while declining to confirm or deny the operational details that open-source evidence had already established.

It was not a neutral posture but represented a conscious and controversial choice to take sides in an active war, which carries inevitable consequences.
Lamerd sports hall attack

The denial and what came after

Both Kuwait and Bahrain moved quickly to deny the reports. Official statements from Kuwait City and Manama dismissed the open-source evidence as fabricated or misattributed, with Kuwaiti officials characterizing the satellite imagery and debris documentation as part of an Iranian information operation.

Bahraini authorities declined to comment on specific operational details, citing security considerations. The denials were categorical yet they did not survive the end of active hostilities.

In the weeks following the cessation of the initial combat phase, a more complete evidentiary picture emerged, placing Kuwait at the epicenter of the ballistic missile campaign against Iran.

CENTCOM released declassified strike footage confirming ground-launched ballistic operations, footage that independent analysts cross-referenced with geographic markers consistent with Kuwaiti territory.

The release, framed by US officials as a demonstration of operational effectiveness, had the unintended secondary effect of directly contradicting the categorical denials issued by Kuwait. More damaging still was the subsequent discovery of expended ATACMS canisters in the Kuwaiti desert, physical evidence that no official statement could plausibly explain away. The canisters confirmed not only the presence of the launch systems but also the scale and intensity of their operational use.

Kuwait’s role as the operational hub

With the resumption of active combat operations in recent weeks, following American attempts to establish an illegal maritime corridor in the Omani section of the Strait of Hormuz in brazen violation of the memorandum of understanding signed between the two sides, Kuwait’s role has intensified considerably.

The frequency of ballistic missile launches from Kuwaiti territory has increased markedly, a pattern fully consistent with Western reporting indicating that US PrSM stocks have been effectively depleted.

With PrSM availability now severely constrained, the operational burden of American ballistic missile attacks has shifted entirely back to the older ATACMS platform, and Kuwait has emerged as the primary launch hub for that capability.

The geographic logic is self-evident. Kuwait’s proximity to western Iran, and particularly to the southern province of Khuzestan, renders it the most efficient forward position for strikes targeting the military, economic, and energy infrastructure concentrated in that region.

Khuzestan is home to a substantial share of Iran’s oil production, refining capacity, and petrochemical industry, and has consequently emerged as a principal focal point of American military aggression. The volume of launches emanating from Kuwait reflects that strategic prioritization with unmistakable clarity.

The Incriminating Lights

The Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf have made every possible effort to suppress citizen documentation of military activity, imposing social media restrictions and punitive measures to limit the spread of footage that might complicate official denials.

Yet those efforts have proven increasingly ineffective. As the war has persisted, a steady and growing stream of video and photographic evidence has emerged from Kuwait, captured by residents documenting ballistic missile launches occurring with near-nightly regularity.

The imagery, showing missile contrails ascending over Kuwait and tracking northeast across or alongside Iraqi airspace before continuing toward Iranian territory, circulates widely across platforms such as Telegram.

Multiple photographs and video footage taken from different vantage points confirm the flight paths, the frequency, and the unmistakable signature of ground-launched ballistic systems operating from Kuwaiti soil with undeniable clarity.

The nightly launches have become, in a grim sense, a matter of public record, documented by ordinary Kuwaiti and Iraqi residents whose smartphones have captured what governments continue to officially deny.

The chasm between the official position and the visible reality has widened to a point where it functions less as a credible denial and more as a formal fiction, maintained by all parties for reasons of diplomatic convenience.

The Iranian counter-strike record

Iran has not absorbed this campaign passively. In the weeks following the intensification of launches from Kuwaiti territory, Iranian forces have conducted retaliatory strikes targeting the American military’s forward launch infrastructure.

A growing evidentiary record of these strikes, assembled from open-source footage, presents an intriguing visual signature involving what appear to be large secondary explosions following initial impact, characterized by the bright, fast-burning combustion profile associated with solid-propellant missile fuel.

The secondary detonations visible in circulating clips are inconsistent with conventional munitions storage and consistent with the ignition of solid rocket propellant – of the type utilized in ATACMS – either from fueled launcher vehicles or from stockpiled rounds awaiting deployment.

Several clips show fires burning after initial impact, with the characteristic white-orange flame column that propellant combustion produces distinguishing these events unmistakably from the black smoke of fuel or ordnance fires.

Survival and the limits of alignment

Small states make difficult choices under duress, caught precariously between a powerful patron’s operational requirements and a large neighbor’s legitimate security concerns.

Experts acknowledge that the constraints on Bahraini and Kuwaiti sovereignty, stemming from their profound dependence on the United States, are genuine and substantial.

But, they insist that acknowledgment of constraint is not the same as absolution from responsibility. Governments bear an obligation to their populations that supersedes alliance loyalties, an obligation to assess, without illusion, the risks that their choices are generating.

The current posture of the Persian Gulf states hosting American military bases and providing a launch pad for ballistic missile operations against Iran is deeply problematic.

It reflects, as per analysts, a perilous combination of structural dependency, institutional inertia, and a dangerous underestimation of Iranian anger, resolve, and military capability.

As one military expert told the Press TV website, these micro-states are not positioned to absorb the consequences of a sustained Iranian retaliatory campaign.

“Their small land masses, concentrated infrastructure, and limited strategic depth render them acutely vulnerable in ways that their larger patron is not. By gambling their national survival on the assumption that Iranian red lines are empty, and that US protection is everlasting, they are making a remarkably poor bet, one that history has rarely rewarded,” he noted.

July 27, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, War Crimes, Wars for Israel | , , , | Comments Off on How Kuwait and Bahrain miscalculated by becoming launchpads for US strikes on Iran

Kuwait Ratifies Landmark Defense Agreement with Pakistan

Sputnik – 27.07.2026

Kuwait has officially ratified a broad defense cooperation pact with Pakistan that was signed in June 2023. The ratification follows high-level military contacts between the two countries.

“This agreement reintroduces Pakistan as a direct security stakeholder in the Gulf, beyond its traditional role of providing manpower and training,” said Sultan M. Hali, writer and retired Group Captain of the Pakistan Air Force.

Key points from his commentary:

1️. New role. Pakistan ceases to be merely a supplier of troops. The pact positions Islamabad as a direct security stakeholder in the Gulf.

2️. Hedging strategy. Kuwait is reducing excessive dependence on the US and NATO by relying on a nuclear-armed Muslim-majority ally.

3️. Multipolarity. Arab monarchies are turning to China, Turkiye, and South Asia in response to a fragmented world order.

4️. Basing. Permanent bases are unlikely, but joint exercises, rotational deployments, and maritime patrols are realistic scenarios.

5️. Defense industry. Kuwait may consider the Pakistani-Chinese JF-17 Thunder — cheaper than Western analogs and less vulnerable to embargoes.

6️. Forward presence. Expands Pakistan’s capability to monitor Gulf maritime traffic, including energy chokepoints.

7️. Defense diplomacy. Strengthens Pakistan’s leverage in Gulf councils and its position vis-à-vis India.

8️. Economic dividends. Military cooperation often accompanies labor, trade, and energy agreements, boosting Pakistan’s regional integration.

“Kuwait’s move signals recognition that multipolarity in defining relations is now essential for resilience in an increasingly fragmented regional order,” Hali said.

July 27, 2026 Posted by | Aletho News | , , | Comments Off on Kuwait Ratifies Landmark Defense Agreement with Pakistan

Fars: US evacuates bases in Qatar and UAE, satellite images show

Al Mayadeen | July 25, 2026

Iranian news agency Fars reported, citing satellite imagery, that the United States has evacuated two military bases in the UAE and Qatar.

According to the agency, US forces evacuated Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE and Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

Fars said satellite images from Sentinel-2, dated July 24, 2026, showed the evacuation of the US military base in the UAE. The agency said five US military aircraft had been stationed at Al Dhafra three days earlier, while the satellite images showed that they had since been evacuated.

US reportedly evacuates Al Dhafra Air Base

Al Dhafra Air Base is located south of Abu Dhabi and hosts the US Air Force’s 380th Air Expeditionary Wing. It is considered a key strategic hub for reconnaissance, aerial refueling, and air defense operations, as well as a major center supporting military operations in the region and providing intelligence coverage across West Asia.

Fars also reported that satellite images showed Washington had fully evacuated Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

Al Udeid Air Base is located west of Doha and is considered the largest US military base in West Asia. It hosts the forward headquarters of US Central Command (CENTCOM) and the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing.

The two bases played a key role in US military operations during the latest US aggression against Iran, which began on February 28 and resumed more than three weeks ago.

Destruction of fighter jets at Azraq base and acknowledgment of casualties

The developments coincided with the release earlier on Sunday of additional satellite images documenting the destruction of a military aircraft hangar inside Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, also known as Azraq Air Base, in Jordan, which hosts US forces.

Earlier today, the IRGC conducted a simultaneous missile and drone strike against the US base in Azraq, Jordan, targeting fighter shelters and a large parking ramp, according to the IRGC’s Public Relations Office.

In a statement, the IRGC reported that the operation was carried out in the early morning hours as part of the 20th wave of Operation Nasr 2. The strike was launched in response to the US aggression the previous night, the statement said.

“With a crushing and simultaneous missile and drone attack on the fighter shelters and a large parking ramp at the American base in Azraq, Jordan,” the IRGC said, “at least two American fighter jets and three American aircraft were completely destroyed while inflicting major damage on a number of others.”

The strikes came shortly after a series of successive attacks launched by Iranian armed forces against US bases in the region, including Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, where the US side acknowledged the deaths of two American soldiers and the loss of another.

Earlier, US network Fox News reported that at least 13 American soldiers had been injured as a result of recent Iranian attacks targeting US bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan.

Damage in Erbil and fires at a Kuwaiti power station

As part of the simultaneous Iranian attacks, footage circulated showing a fire breaking out at a Kuwaiti power station following an Iranian strike.

Additional footage and satellite images also showed the extent of damage inflicted on the US military base in the city of Erbil, the capital of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, after it was targeted by Iranian missile strikes.

In this context, media outlets reported that US officials acknowledged that Iran’s missile capabilities had undergone significant qualitative development, enabling them to effectively bypass US interception and defense systems deployed across the region.

The officials explained that Tehran now possesses advanced missiles capable of traveling at extremely high speeds and maneuvering during the final phase of their trajectory before striking their designated targets.

It is worth noting that Tehran maintains that it harbors no hostility toward the peoples of the region, stressing that its strikes are aimed at US bases in response to repeated US aggression on Iranian territory that has killed and wounded civilians, including women and children.

July 25, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Fars: US evacuates bases in Qatar and UAE, satellite images show

No route around Hormuz: Why West Asia’s pipeline alternatives fall short

The rush to bypass Hormuz leads back to the same problem: Every alternative route remains hostage to war, rival chokepoints, or political disputes.

By Hussein Askary | The Cradle | July 23, 2026

“The only alternative to the Strait of Hormuz is the Strait of Hormuz.”

This blunt assessment, offered by an Iraqi expert in a recent interview, captures the central weakness in the rush to revive old pipeline schemes and promote new ones across West Asia. Since Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz after Israel and the US launched their second war against it in February 2026, the region has been flooded with proposals for alternative oil-export routes.

Washington has encouraged these plans, while several governments have presented dormant or unfinished pipelines as strategic solutions. Yet the closer one looks at geography, markets, costs, capacity, and security, the clearer it becomes that most of these projects cannot substitute for Hormuz.

Even if oil bypasses the strait, it still faces the rival chokepoint of Bab al-Mandab, where the Ansarallah-aligned armed forces have declared a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia and attacked Saudi tankers.

These expensive detours will remain exposed unless security in the Persian Gulf itself improves. Until the war on Iran ends and an inclusive regional security architecture is established, Iranian and Yemeni missiles and drones can reach the pipelines and loading terminals built to evade them.

Asia still runs through Hormuz

The first reason is straightforward. The Strait of Hormuz is the natural outlet of the Gulf energy system. In 2024, oil flows through the strait averaged about 20 million barrels per day (bpd), roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. The International Energy Agency (IEA) describes it as one of the world’s most important oil transit chokepoints.

Most of this oil is not heading west. About 80 percent of the oil moving through Hormuz is destined for Asia, with China, India, Japan, South Korea, and other Asian economies as the principal buyers. The pattern is even clearer for liquefied natural gas (LNG).

The US Energy Information Administration estimated that 83 percent of LNG moving through Hormuz in 2024 went from Persian Gulf exporters to Asian markets, especially China, India, and South Korea.

This market reality matters because many proposed alternatives send oil away from its main customers. Pipelines to the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, or the Levant may appear useful on a map, but they often move Gulf crude farther from Asia rather than closer to it.

Commercially, building multibillion-dollar infrastructure to move oil westward, only to redirect it by sea toward Asian markets, is inefficient. If Hormuz is open, the direct route remains cheaper and faster. If it is closed by war, the underlying problem is not a lack of pipelines but the collapse of regional security.

Old routes, unresolved disputes

The older pipeline options illustrate the point. The Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline once carried Iraqi oil across Syria to the Mediterranean. Built in the early 1950s, it had genuine strategic value in its time but has been largely inactive since it was damaged during the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Washington is now backing efforts to revive the route, with US companies expected to play a role. Yet the project still requires extensive reconstruction and years of work before it can provide meaningful export capacity.

Estimates for a full restoration and expansion to around 700,000 bpd run as high as $8 billion. It cannot answer an immediate crisis in Hormuz, and if regional peace is restored before completion, the commercial case for reviving it weakens sharply.

The Iraq–Turkiye pipeline faces a different but equally serious problem: politics. The route through the Kurdistan region to Turkiye’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan was repeatedly interrupted by disputes among Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Ankara, and international oil companies.

A 2023 arbitration ruling against Turkiye over unauthorized Kurdish exports led to a two-and-a-half-year shutdown. Flows resumed in September 2025, and exports have continued, but the route still depends on fragile agreements over contracts, payments, federal authority, and revenue sharing.

Its limited throughput and political vulnerability prevent it from becoming a structural replacement for a maritime passage that normally carries a vast share of the world’s seaborne oil.

The Iraqi pipeline in Saudi Arabia, known as IPSA, is another example of strategic nostalgia. Built in the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq war, it was designed to move Iraqi crude from the Basra region to the Red Sea.

It stopped operating after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia expropriated it in 2001. Reopening the line would therefore require a Saudi–Iraqi political settlement over ownership and control, as well as a major technical assessment after decades of disuse. In other words, IPSA is not an available alternative; it is a diplomatic and engineering problem dressed up as a solution.

The proposed Basra–Aqaba pipeline is even more controversial. Its advertised purpose is to move Iraqi oil from southern Iraq to Jordan’s Red Sea port of Aqaba, bypassing Hormuz. Yet it has faced intense objections inside Iraq because of its projected cost, uncertain financing, and questionable strategic value.

Since much of Iraq’s crude is sold to Asian customers, sending it westward to Aqaba would add distance and complexity rather than solve the basic market problem. The pipeline would also move Iraqi exports closer to another zone of instability, including the Israeli military sphere and the wider Red Sea security environment.

A bypass route that merely exchanges one security risk for another is no solution. Iraq’s severe fiscal pressures also leave Baghdad poorly placed to finance such an expensive project, while international investors are unlikely to embrace it without strong political and security guarantees.

Bypasses within missile range

The existing Saudi and Emirati bypasses are more credible but still limited. Saudi Arabia’s East–West Pipeline, or Petroline, moves crude from the eastern oil region to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline carries oil from Habshan to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman.

These systems reduce exposure to Hormuz for Saudi Arabia and the UAE and have become important national energy-security assets. But they cannot replace the strait for the region as a whole. They offer little to Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Iran, or most Iraqi exports, and they do not solve the LNG problem, especially Qatar’s dependence on Hormuz.

The IEA estimates that only 3.5 to 5.5 million bpd of spare pipeline capacity is available to bypass the strait. Neither Yanbu nor Fujairah are immune from attack; regional conflict has already shown the vulnerability of ports, tankers, and energy infrastructure.

The crisis pipelines cannot solve

This is why the alternative pipeline debate is misleading. It treats the closure of Hormuz as a logistical puzzle when it is primarily a political and security crisis. If the Persian Gulf remains militarized and unstable, no pipeline network can fully protect exports.

Pipelines cross vulnerable territory, depend on political agreements, and terminate at ports that can also be threatened. If Gulf security improves, however, Hormuz will almost certainly reopen because this serves the interests of producers and Asian consumers alike.

Once that happens, the commercial rationale for many alternative pipelines will fade. Why spend tens of billions of dollars duplicating a natural route with unmatched capacity and direct access to the main buyers?

The more honest conclusion is that alternative pipelines may offer limited resilience for individual states, but they are no strategic replacement for Hormuz. They are costly, slow, politically fragile, geographically inefficient, and in some cases obsolete before construction begins.

The answer to the crisis is a security arrangement that keeps the Persian Gulf open, prevents attacks on shipping, and restores normal trade through the strait.

Under such an arrangement, oil and LNG would continue to flow mainly to Asia by the most direct and economical route. Hormuz will remain indispensable, while the grand pipeline alternatives amount to expensive insurance policies against a crisis that only diplomacy and regional peace can resolve.

July 24, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , , , | Comments Off on No route around Hormuz: Why West Asia’s pipeline alternatives fall short

Pakistan thought it won the peace. Now, it could be dragged into war.

By Elfadil Ibrahim | Responsible Statecraft | July 22, 2026

Four weeks ago, Pakistan looked like one of the biggest winners of the U.S.-Iran war.

Its army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, shuttled between Washington, Tehran and Gulf capitals for months. As part of his efforts, Pakistan hosted the first face-to-face U.S.-Iran talks in years and helped broker the Islamabad memorandum of understanding that Vice President JD Vance signed in June, thanking Munir and calling him one of the “very, very important people” in his life.

Islamabad hired a Washington lobbying firm to convert that goodwill into defense cooperation and minerals investment, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif spoke of a “sun of progress and prosperity” for Pakistan’s chronically stressed economy after the MoU between the U.S.and Iran brought an end to major military operations.

Pakistan’s fortunes have since reversed. Fighting between Washington and Tehran has resumed, and Islamabad’s dual goals of being Iran’s trusted interlocutor and the Arab Gulf states’ security guarantor are once again at odds.

President Donald Trump declared the deal was “over” in early July, after which the U.S. struck civilian and military targets in Iran. Iran, for its part, declared on July 18 through its deputy foreign minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, that it was “suspending all obligations” under the framework. The war has since widened into exactly the kind of multi-front regional conflict Pakistan spent the spring trying to prevent.

The clearest new exposure for Pakistan is in Saudi Arabia, where Iran struck Prince Sultan Air Base at al-Kharj — its first direct hit on Saudi territory since March — just days after the Houthis, Iran’s Yemeni ally, fired missiles on the kingdom, hitting Abha airport in the country’s south. That escalation occurred after Saudi-allied forces hit Sanaa airport in Yemen to prevent the landing of an Iranian airliner; the U.S. Treasury alleged without providing evidence that the plane is linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp. The strikes effectively enforced Riyadh’s airspace veto over the Houthi-controlled capital.

Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact with Riyadh last year. It deployed fighter jets and thousands of troops to the kingdom after earlier Iranian strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure. More recently, Islamabad has reportedly communicated to Tehran directly that attacks on Saudi Arabia will be treated as attacks on Pakistan itself. Sharif’s own statement in the aftermath called the Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia a violation of the kingdom’s sovereignty that Pakistan “strongly condemns,” pledging “unwavering support” for Riyadh’s security.

The tone is notable given that Pakistan’s parliament explicitly refused to get entangled in Yemen over a decade ago. In April 2015, faced with a nearly identical Saudi request to join the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis, Pakistan’s National Assembly voted unanimously to “maintain neutrality.” Islamabad’s calculus has not changed. If anything, recent events have sharpened Pakistan’s desire to broker a lasting peace.

Pakistan is home to the world’s second-largest Shia population after Iran, and the killing of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, in February set off deadly unrest in Karachi and Islamabad; Munir himself had to intervene to calm a wave of processions and pledges of allegiance to the new supreme leader across Shia neighborhoods.

Significantly, Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif attended Khamenei’s funeral in July, and Sharif posted after that “the late Supreme Leader’s wisdom, leadership and profound influence on Iran and the wider region will be remembered for generations” — a demonstration of the fine line Pakistan’s leadership has to walk, one no doubt delivered with a domestic audience in mind as much as an Iranian one.

That fine line becomes impossible to walk when a defense pact, triggered by Saudi-Houthi fighting or by further Iranian strikes on Saudi Arabia, would ask Pakistan to do the exact thing its parliament explicitly refused a decade ago: take a military side against a Houthi-Iran axis, and do so at a moment when its domestic Shia politics is highly combustible

Kuwait is now reportedly asking for the same kind of commitment that Saudi Arabia already has. Reuters reported last week that Islamabad is in early-stage talks with Kuwait — which has absorbed repeated Iranian strikes on its infrastructure in recent days — over an expanded defense agreement that would include “thousands of Pakistani troops on the ground, fighter jets, drones, an air defence system, and other defence-related facilities,” according to an anonymous Pakistani government official cited in the report.

Another anonymous Pakistani security official said the country “cannot consider a deployment of combat troops at this stage.” That hesitation suggests that stacking multiple defense commitments across Gulf states in Iran’s crosshairs makes Islamabad’s balancing act much harder to sustain. Each new pact narrows the room to claim neutrality the next time Tehran calls.

During this war, Pakistan discovered what happens when Gulf partners doubt its ability to balance between Tehran and the Arab Gulf states. The United Arab Emirates recalled a $3.5 billion loan in April and quietly began deporting Pakistani Shia workers by the thousands. The move was widely read as retaliation for Islamabad’s perceived tilt toward Tehran during the mediation. Saudi Arabia stepped in with $3 billion to cover the gap, but the lesson was clear: Pakistan’s neutrality satisfies no one fully, and the cost of disappointing any single Gulf patron is measured in the billions of dollars.

Economic self-preservation has been Pakistan’s primary motive for steering mediation and ending a war that has hobbled the economies of its creditors and choked the trade routes that power its own electric grid. Pakistan is on its 25th International Monetary Fund program; more than half of its tax revenue is put towards servicing its debts. It had barely stabilized its inflation before the Strait of Hormuz’s closure sent rates back into double digits.

In March, as the war’s first phase disrupted energy flows out of Hormuz, Islamabad ordered a two-week school closure and imposed a four-day work week to conserve fuel — measures the government has now indicated it may need to revive.

A parallel disruption to the Red Sea, like the blockade of Saudi Arabia declared by the Houthis Monday, would be highly disruptive to Pakistan’s energy security, and by extension, its economy. While Pakistan imports the overwhelming majority of its fuel from the Gulf, the closing of another critical chokepoint would simultaneously tighten global tanker capacity and insurance costs everywhere, pushing the same spot-market prices Pakistan is already struggling to afford even higher.

It would also add further pressure on Pakistan’s defense commitments to Saudi Arabia, given that Riyadh will not tolerate such a closure. In a recent statement, Riyadh pledged to deal with “Houthi threats against transiting vessels… firmly and swiftly.” The stakes for Saudi Arabia are high: Since the Strait of Hormuz was blocked, Saudi Arabia has relied on its East-West pipeline to divert roughly 5 million barrels per day of crude to the Red Sea Port of Yanbu — its only viable export outlet while Hormuz is all but closed.

None of this means Pakistan’s mediation was a mistake, or that its diplomatic capital has evaporated. Kuwait’s foreign minister still thanked Pakistan last week for its “constructive and mediatory role,” and Islamabad remains one of the few channels through which Washington and Tehran would resume talks, when the time comes. But the specific bet Pakistan made — that ending the war would allow it to bank the goodwill through commerce and financial aid — has not yet paid off.

Instead, the restart of the war has brought Saudi Arabia back into Iran’s crosshairs. At the same time, the Saudi-Houthi front has reopened, the Strait of Hormuz has been closed again, and a blockade of Saudi-linked ships on the Red Sea has been formally declared.

Each of these factors adds immense pressure on Pakistan, which now has every reason to double down on diplomacy, lest it be drawn in as a combatant.

Elfadil Ibrahim is a writer and analyst covering the politics of the Middle East and Africa, with a special focus on Sudan. His work has been featured in The Guardian, Al Jazeera, The New Arab, Open Democracy and other outlets.

July 22, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , , | Comments Off on Pakistan thought it won the peace. Now, it could be dragged into war.

Pakistan, Kuwait hold early talks on defense-for-energy partnership

The Cradle | July 17, 2026

Pakistan and Kuwait have entered early-stage negotiations to expand defense cooperation, with Islamabad seeking deeper energy ties and greater investment from the Gulf monarchy in return, Reuters reported on 17 July.

“Kuwait’s wish list includes everything,” said a Pakistani security official familiar with the negotiations. “But let me be clear about one thing: We are not and we cannot consider a deployment of combat troops at this stage.”

One source confirmed the talks have covered defense procurement, but noted it was “not clear this will amount to a defense pact per se.”

In exchange for any deal, Islamabad wants expanded cooperation on energy security as it builds up its strategic oil and fuel reserves as part of a wider initiative led by Pakistan’s Energy Ministry.

Over the past year, Pakistan and the Gulf monarchies have moved toward new regional defense arrangements.

The realignment was accelerated by the US’s war on Iran, which saw Gulf countries absorb the brunt of the retaliatory impact, and called into question the reliability of the US as a defense partner.

Meanwhile, Islamabad commands one of the region’s largest armies and manufactures its own fighter jets, credentials that have positioned it as a potential supplement, or even alternative, to US protection.

For Kuwait, Pakistan represents a dependable partner, according to a source in the region familiar with Kuwaiti security planning.

“They are already in with the Saudis, they have a long history of defense development, they are Muslim Sunni, they have a good relationship with the Americans, so it’s not as sensitive as some other options,” the source said.

Turkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have been preparing a draft agreement for a three-way mutual defense pact, distinct from the existing accord between Islamabad and Riyadh.

Bahrain is pursuing a similar arrangement, one source said, while Jordan has signaled interest in a weapons and training deal.

Last year, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement committing each to treat an attack on one as an attack on both – a pact widely understood to place Riyadh under a de facto Pakistani nuclear umbrella, after Pakistan’s defense minister said all the country’s capabilities “will be made available under this agreement.”

July 18, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , | Comments Off on Pakistan, Kuwait hold early talks on defense-for-energy partnership

Iran’s New Onslaught on US Gulf Bases Exposes Devastating Success of Spring Counterstrikes

Sputnik – 17.07.2026

Iran’s March drone and missile attacks disabled numerous critical US radars and forced it to “expend a significant portion of their air and missile defense stockpiles,” military expert and CAST security think tank senior research fellow Yuri Lyamin told Sputnik.

Lyamin pointed out, for example, that “the AN/TPY-2 radar in Jordan destroyed by Iranian strikes in March, was part of the American THAAD missile defense system battery providing cover for American bases in Jordan against medium-range ballistic missiles. The destruction of the radar effectively rendered the THAAD battery inoperable, as it’s used to detect and track targets and guides interceptor missiles to them.”

Fast forward the present, and Iran is freely targeting US barracks, logistics bases and Air Force facilities in Kuwait and Bahrain using Arash heavy drones.

Lack of effective resistance on the US’ part signals that whatever efforts the Pentagon took to restore regional capabilities (like transferring THAAD from South Korea) proved insufficient, Lyamin says.

“Iran is currently primarily targeting various US bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan. The combination varies daily, as the US operates multiple bases [in these countries]. The selection of specific targets depends both on the pre-defined target list at these bases, and on operational intelligence,” Lyamin says.

“Relentless Iranian attacks on US-operated bases in the region generally complicate US operations against Iran that rely on them, and force the US to expend significant forces and resources to protect them. I’d even say that some of the bases nearest to Iran are now causing more problems for the US than they’re worth. For example, Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar was the largest US airbase in the region, but now the US has been forced to evacuate most of its aircraft because it’s too dangerous to keep them there.”

Arash drones have a range up to 2k km, variable warhead weight (up to 260 kg), and versions with advanced optoelectrical and other homing heads “for high-precision target engagement.” They are the Iranian Army’s long-range strike tool – distinct from the IRGC’s Shahed series of UAVs.

July 17, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Comments Off on Iran’s New Onslaught on US Gulf Bases Exposes Devastating Success of Spring Counterstrikes

Sitting ducks: Why the US security umbrella no longer protects the Gulf?

By Dr Mustafa Fetouri| MEMO | July 16, 2026

In Kuwait alone—less than 150 kilometres across the Gulf from Iran—the United States maintains a major military hub of approximately 13,500 personnel spread across installations such as Camp Arifjan and Ali Al Salem Air Base. To its south, Saudi Arabia hosts roughly 2,700 U.S. troops, centered at Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj. Elsewhere in the Gulf, every state hosts either a US military presence or provides access and defence cooperation under bilateral agreements: Qatar houses more than 10,000 personnel at CENTCOM’s sprawling forward headquarters at Al Udeid; Bahrain hosts around 9,000 personnel at the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet; the UAE accommodates approximately 3,500 personnel at Al Dhafra while providing deep-water naval access at Jebel Ali; and Oman offers strategic port and airfield access under bilateral agreements, despite having no large permanent US troop presence.

Beyond the Gulf monarchies, Washington maintains approximately 2,500 troops in Iraq and around 900 in northeastern Syria under Operation Inherent Resolve. To Iran’s northwest, the US operates from Incirlik Air Base in Türkiye— a NATO logistics and intelligence hub too. Until its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, American forces also maintained a major military presence along Iran’s eastern frontier, supported for two decades by extensive supply routes and intelligence cooperation through Pakistan. Although the US lies nearly 10,000 kilometres from Iran, it has constructed an unparalleled regional military architecture of permanent bases, rotational deployments, naval facilities, pre-positioned equipment, access agreements, and security partnerships that stretches from the Eastern Mediterranean across the Gulf to the western Indian Ocean. Combined with the military capabilities of close allies—including Britain, France, and Türkiye—this network almost literally surrounding Iran from all sides. The common thread underpinning this posture has long been the protection of regional partners, the safeguarding of global energy routes, and the defence of US strategic interests.

Yet, this foundational premise has collapsed under the weight of the US-Israeli war on Iran, which has fundamentally transformed the entire regional security landscape. This “war of choice” has exposed how a security arrangement once marketed as an ironclad insurance policy has devolved into a primary strategic liability.

Rather than serving as an effective deterrent, large and static American military installations now act as strategic liability—drawing Iranian retaliatory strikes while denying host states true autonomy or the promised protective shield.

The Gulf states have discovered, at a heavy price, that they are trapped in an impossible paradox: their sovereign territory serves as a staging ground for military operations they were never consulted about—at least that is what they say publically –instantly transforming their critical infrastructure, oil facilities, and urban centers into high-priority targets. Compounding this vulnerability is the stark geopolitical reality that while Washington may eventually pivot away or withdraw—much as it did from Afghanistan—Iran is a permanent neighbour that is going nowhere.

Beyond the immediate threat of missile strikes, the presence of these US installations directly undermines the core national strategies of the Gulf monarchies. Mega-development projects and economic diversification plans—from Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 to Dubai’s global trade hubs—rely entirely on an image of absolute regional stability, investor confidence, and open maritime transit. By hosting forward US bases, host nations inadvertently tie their economic futures to Washington’s military posture, creating an environment of perpetual crisis. Furthermore, defending these expansive American footprints forces host militaries to consume their own finite air-defense interceptors and defense budgets to guard US assets rather than securing their own national borders.

At the same time, while almost all Gulf States have, at least publicly, refrained from taking direct offensive action against Iran to avoid total escalation, they recognise that they are already viewed as passive participants in the wider conflict.

Maintaining this precarious balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult against rising domestic anti-war sentiment, as public anger over regional devastation steadily erodes the host governments’ domestic credibility.

For Washington, this massive network of forward-deployed bases has produced a profound strategic paradox. What was designed to project uninhibited American power now ties US freedom of action to the political consent of cautious host nations. When host governments impose strict sovereignty restrictions—refusing permission for US forces to launch offensive sorties or intelligence missions against regional adversaries from their soil—the Pentagon finds its multi-billion-dollar installations functionally sidelined during critical military surges. Instead of providing seamless operational flexibility, these fixed, highly vulnerable outposts transform into costly “imperial entrapment” liabilities: requiring thousands of US troops, high-end missile defense batteries, and constant naval escort deployments simply to protect the bases themselves, rather than executing broader strategic objectives or enabling Washington’s long-sought pivot to the Indo-Pacific. With the conflict between the US and Iran reigniting, Trump is demanding that the Gulf states pay once again to protect the Strait of Hormuz—a vital transit route that never closed until the war was started by Trump, not Iran.

This strategic calculus becomes infinitely more complex when factoring in Israel’s role in the regional security outlook. In recent years, certain Gulf states—most notably the UAE—operated under the premise that normalization and closer security alignment with Israel via the Abraham Accords would yield a net security dividend. Yet, this belief was never shared across the Gulf; nations like Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia maintained a far more cautious, sceptical stance toward Tel Aviv. The outbreak of the US-Israeli war on Tehran on February 28 utterly shattered any illusion that an Israeli-linked security architecture could bring regional stability. Instead, it exposed deep internal fault lines among the entire region. Reaching a collective, long-term security understanding with Iran was already a formidable challenge; doing so now, in the wake of a devastating conflict that forced Gulf States into the crossfire, is immensely more complicated. Moving forward, no regional framework can hold if it relies on a anti-Tehran pact anchored in Washington and Tel Aviv while ignoring the permanent reality of Iranian geographic power.

Ultimately, the fallout from the US-Israeli war on Iran exposes a fundamental reality that Washington and its regional allies can no longer ignore: the entire Middle Eastern security architecture must be fundamentally re-evaluated.

The core dilemma facing the region is that no collective security arrangement can ever be viable or effective if it seeks to exclude Iran—an indispensable, geographically permanent power armed with increasingly sophisticated offensive, defensive, and asymmetric capabilities.

Moving forward, any stable regional order must not only account for Tehran’s military leverage, but also accommodate its non-negotiable strategic demands. This includes addressing governance and transit rights over the vital Strait of Hormuz—through which one-fifth of global oil flows—and reaching a durable, pragmatic framework on its nuclear program. Regardless of the final outcome of ongoing US-Iran negotiations, the lesson for the Gulf is clear: true security cannot be built on an external garrison model that marginalizes the region’s principal indigenous power.

July 16, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Sitting ducks: Why the US security umbrella no longer protects the Gulf?

Iran strikes US military assets in Oman and Bahrain: IRGC

Al Mayadeen| July 13, 2026

The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) has destroyed long-range radar systems in Oman, among other US military assets and installations, as part of the fifth phase of its retaliatory operations.

In a statement published on Monday, the IRGC said that its naval forces carried out missile and drone strikes targeting an FPS long-range early warning radar and a ship-detection radar in Oman, destroying both systems. Concurrently, IRGC forces struck US military installations in the Al-Juffair area of Bahrain, where fires remain active.

“The decisive and powerful operations carried out by the Iranian armed forces have rendered the American military, which we have described as the aggressor, incapable,” the IRGC Public Relations Department stated.

US aggression reveals true anti-people nature: IRGC

The IRGC also condemned the sustained US aggression on Iran, asserting that American forces targeted an agricultural water pump in the city of Mahshahr.

“Targeting a farming water pump in Mahshahr reveals the true anti-people nature of the US military,” the statement said.

The IRGC further tied the status of international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz to US military behavior, declaring that “the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to shipping traffic is contingent upon stopping US military interventions in the strait and respecting the sovereignty of nations over their territorial waters.”

The IRGC issued a direct warning on global energy security, stating that “the continuation of these interventions will lead to greater repercussions for the global oil and gas sectors.”

Iran responds to US aggression, strikes US assets in Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain

Meanwhile, Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps announced a series of retaliatory strikes against US military facilities in Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait, responding to continued US attacks on Iranian positions.

The IRGC said its Aerospace Force targeted fuel depots, missile storage sites, air defense systems, radar installations, and command centers across multiple US-linked bases in the region.

In its first operation, missiles and drones struck Jordan’s Prince Hassan Air Base, setting fire to fuel tanks and ammunition depots, following US attacks on Iranian coastal positions.

A second wave targeted the Sheikh Isa base in Bahrain, destroying helicopter maintenance facilities, a P-8 reconnaissance aircraft hangar, and the US drone command center at the site.

The third phase hit Kuwait’s Ali Al-Salem Airbase and Ahmed al-Jaber Airbase, destroying fuel tanks, Patriot systems, and strategic radar, while the IRGC vowed further action and asserted Iran’s authority over the Strait of Hormuz.

The fourth phase struck two HIMARS missile launch platforms and ammunition depots filled with missiles at the US base in Kuwait.

July 13, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Comments Off on Iran strikes US military assets in Oman and Bahrain: IRGC

Iran, Saudi FMs hold phone talks as Persian Gulf states rethink US ties

Press TV – June 24, 2026

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Saudi counterpart Prince Faisal bin Farhan have held a phone call to discuss regional developments, as Persian Gulf Arab states recalibrate their approach toward Tehran in the wake of the US-Israeli war that exposed the limits of American power.

Araghchi on Wednesday briefed the Saudi minister on the latest progress in implementing bilateral agreements and the ongoing negotiations following the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed on June 18.

The two top diplomats underscored the importance of maintaining diplomatic channels, strengthening joint cooperation to support regional stability, and achieving positive and sustainable outcomes.

The call came as French news agency AFP said Saudi Arabia is expected to host talks aimed at repairing relations between Iran and Persian Gulf countries following the US-Israeli war on Iran.

It cited a diplomat familiar with the arrangements as saying Wednesday that a regional summit was being planned in Riyadh and could also include other neighboring countries, but no date had yet been set.

The meetings would be separate from the ongoing negotiations between Iran and the United States, the diplomat added.

CNN, citing a senior Persian Gulf diplomat, reported that leaders are increasingly contemplating a future in which the US plays a much smaller role in the regional security architecture, with a possible framework involving a regional non-aggression pact with Iran.

According to Hasan Alhasan, senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “From the Arab states’ perspective, the Iran war is a disastrous turning point for the regional security order.”

The war, which began on February 28, exposed vulnerabilities in the Persian Gulf states’ security model, which is heavily dependent on the nearly 40,000 US troops stationed in the region and American-made air defense systems.

“The US security guarantee is no longer reliable in the way they thought it was,” one analyst at Chatham House told The New York Times.

Washington’s approach is increasingly perceived as selective and heavily centered on Israel’s security interest.

A classified CIA analysis found that US allies in the Persian Gulf are divided over their approach to Iran. According to the assessment, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain prefer continued pressure on Tehran, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait now support negotiations.

Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, noted that the UAE and Bahrain “made themselves frontline states against Iran” through the Abraham Accords and “now they’re in too deep and cannot extract themselves out of it”.

The Saudis, Parsi added, “were at the highest levels pushing for this war. They have come to regret it”.

Adding another layer of complexity is a widening gap between Arab governments and Arab public opinion over Iran.

According to a report by The Economist cited by DID Press, growing anger toward Israel and dissatisfaction with US policies have fueled increasing sympathy for Tehran across parts of the Arab world.

Despite sustained efforts by several Arab governments to reinforce anti-Iran narratives, recent developments have altered perceptions among sections of Arab society.

The report identifies two major drivers behind this shift: anger toward Israel, as many Arabs increasingly view Iranian actions against Israel as a legitimate response to regional military operations, and religious and cultural ties, particularly among Shia communities across the Persian Gulf.

The report concludes that sectarian narratives no longer resonate as strongly as in previous years, and that many Arabs increasingly view Iran as more assertive and resilient than several Arab governments.

Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani traveled to Muscat on Wednesday to initiate talks between Iran, Persian Gulf states, and Iraq on the future operation of the Strait of Hormuz.

The discussions aim to implement a provision of the MoU requiring Iran and Oman to hold talks with other Persian Gulf states on the future management of navigation and maritime services.

Earlier on Wednesday, Oman announced two temporary routes north and south of the existing shipping lane to facilitate safe passage of vessels departing the region, in coordination with the International Maritime Organization.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of global oil and liquefied natural gas normally transits, was heavily disrupted after the United States and Israel launched their war on Iran on February 28.

June 24, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Iran, Saudi FMs hold phone talks as Persian Gulf states rethink US ties

Iran denies attacking Saudi Arabia, warns of Israeli false-flag

The Cradle | June 8, 2026

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei denied reports alleging that Iran targeted Saudi Arabia on 8 June, cautioning that such claims could be linked to potential “false-flag operations” conducted in Iran’s name.

Baghaei stressed that Tehran publicly takes responsibility for any military action it carries out and noted that no statement had been issued by Iran confirming the reported incident.

He further said Iran has repeatedly warned about the possibility of false-flag operations, claiming that Israel and other actors have previously carried out similar actions, including during the most recent US-Israeli war on the Islamic Republic.

His comments came after missile alert sirens were activated in the Saudi city of Al-Kharj, home to Prince Sultan Air Base, a facility long used by US forces, just hours after Israel launched renewed strikes against Iran on Monday morning.

Since the US-Israeli war on Iran began in late February, Tehran has frequently argued that many of the strikes blamed on its forces were actually “false-flag” operations staged by its enemies, designed to draw Gulf states further into the war.

On 4 June, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) dismissed reports that it targeted the terminal at Kuwait International Airport, saying the alleged visual evidence was a “crude fabrication.”

While acknowledging midnight strikes on regional US bases, Iranian officials noted that footage of the airport explosion was recorded in daylight.

In April, the IRGC accused Israel of being behind the strike on a Kuwaiti desalination plant to incite regional tensions further.

This followed a similar denial regarding a 30 March attack on a Kuwaiti power facility, which Tehran also blamed on Israel.

On 4 April, the IRGC further rejected claims that it struck the US Embassy in Riyadh in the opening days of the war, asserting the drone attack was “certainly carried out by Zionists.”

Iran’s Foreign Ministry said on 15 March that the US and Israel were using “Lucas” drones – modeled after the cheap and effective Iranian Shahed – to conduct false-flag operations and attribute them to Tehran.

The IRGC military headquarters, Khatam al-Anbiya, stated that such “deceptions” included attacks in Turkiye and Iraq.

Earlier in March, Iranian military sources described a drone strike on the Ras Tanura refinery in Saudi Arabia as an Israeli false flag designed to distract from strikes inside Iran and draw the Gulf states into further hostilities against the Islamic Republic.

Tucker Carlson also claimed in March that Saudi Arabia and Qatar had detained Israeli agents who were planning bombings in their countries.

June 8, 2026 Posted by | False Flag Terrorism | , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Iran denies attacking Saudi Arabia, warns of Israeli false-flag

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