Japan’s planned missile deployment near Taiwan island extremely dangerous: FM
Global Times | November 24, 2025
Japan’s planned deployment of offensive weapons on the southwestern islands close to China’s Taiwan region is a deliberate attempt to create regional tension and provoke military confrontation. When viewed together with the erroneous remarks on the Taiwan question recently made by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, this development is extremely dangerous and must arouse high vigilance from neighboring countries and the international community, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said at a press briefing on Monday, in response to Japanese defense minister Shinjiro Koizumi’s claims about the deployment of surface-to-air missiles on an island near China’s Taiwan island.
According to media reports, when speaking to reporters as he wrapped up his trip to the base on Yonaguni on Sunday, Koizumi claimed plans to deploy missiles on Yonaguni island would “lower the chance of an armed attack,” rejecting concerns that it would would heighten regional tensions.
Yonaguni island lies about 110 kilometers from Taiwan island. Japan plans to deploy a unit equipped with the Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile, which is capable of intercepting aircraft and ballistic missiles, according to Kyodo News.
Mao pointed out that the Potsdam Proclamation clearly stipulates that Japan is prohibited from rearmament, and Japan’s Peace Constitution establishes the principle of “exclusive defense.” Yet in recent years, Japan has drastically adjusted its security policies, substantially increased its defense budget year after year, relaxed restrictions on arms exports, sought to develop offensive weapons, and even attempted to abandon the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles.”
Japanese right-wing forces are making every effort to break free from the constraints of the Peace Constitution, going ever further down the path of militarism and dragging Japan and the entire region toward disaster, the spokesperson noted.
By emphasizing this year marks the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the 80th anniversary of Taiwan’s restoration to China, Mao said China will never allow Japanese right-wing forces to reverse the course of history, will never permit external forces to interfere in China’s Taiwan region, and will never tolerate the resurgence of Japanese militarism.
China has both the determination and the capability to safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, she added.
Beijing and Tokyo clash over ‘enemy state’ clause in UN Charter
RT | November 24, 2025
Japan has rebuked China for citing a UN Charter clause that permits action against former Axis powers without Security Council approval, insisting the provision is outdated and irrelevant.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s new government has been embroiled in an escalating diplomatic tit-for-tat with Beijing, beginning with remarks she made earlier this month supporting the self-governing administration on Taiwan. The Chinese side interpreted her comments that a cross-strait conflict would be a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan as signaling potential Japanese armed involvement and evidence of resurgent militarism.
Last week, the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo published an excerpt from the UN Charter which referred to “enemy states” – nations that fought against the original signatories, the Allied Powers of World War 2. Article 53 allows regional enforcement measures against such states in the event of a “renewal of aggressive policy,” without requiring prior authorization from the UN Security Council.
Beijing then lodged an official complaint with the UN over Takaichi’s statements. The embassy urged Japan “as a defeated country in World War II” to “reflect on its historical crimes” and change course on the Taiwan issue.
Japan’s Foreign Ministry dismissed that argument, accusing China of misinterpreting “obsolete clauses” that it claimed no longer align with UN practice. While the UN General Assembly recommended removing the “enemy state” references in 1995, the formal amendment process was never completed.
Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi visited a military base on Yonaguni over the weekend, an island about 110km east of Taiwan. He reiterated plans to deploy medium-range surface-to-air missiles there as part of a broader build-up on Japan’s southern island chain.
Russia also has outstanding issues with Japan, with whom it still has no formal peace treaty. Tokyo continues to insist on its claim to the four southernmost Kuril Islands, known in Japan as the “northern territories,” which became part of the USSR after World War 2 and remain a long-standing focal point for Japanese nationalists.
China threatens Japan over PM’s Taiwan comments
RT | November 14, 2025
China has warned that potential military involvement by Japan in the Taiwan issue would be treated as aggression and met with a forceful response. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi recently suggested her country could intervene in the Taiwan Strait.
Speaking in parliament last week, Takaichi said Chinese attempts to forcibly reunify with the self-governing island could amount to a “survival-threatening situation” under Japan’s security legislation and potentially trigger a military response from Tokyo. Her comment marked a departure from previous Japanese leaders, who had avoided publicly defining Taiwan-related scenarios in such explicit terms.
On Wednesday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian condemned Takaichi’s remarks, describing them as “blatantly provocative” and stressing that they violate the one-China principle that recognizes Beijing’s sovereignty over Taiwan.
“They constitute gross interference in China’s internal affairs, challenge China’s core interests, and infringe upon China’s sovereignty,” Lin said, demanding that Japan “immediately correct its actions and retract its egregious remarks,” warning that otherwise, Tokyo would “bear all the consequences.”
Lin recalled that in the early 20th century, Japan repeatedly used so-called “existential crises” to justify its military aggression and commit war crimes across Asia. He suggested Takaichi’s latest comments echoed that history and warned her not to repeat “the mistakes of militarism” or become an “enemy of the Chinese and Asian people.”
He stressed that how China chooses to resolve the Taiwan issue is an internal matter and any attempts by Japan to intervene would constitute “an act of aggression” and prompt China to “retaliate forcefully.”
Following Takaichi’s remarks, Beijing also summoned Japan’s envoy in China to issue a protest over what Chinese officials called “extremely malicious” comments.
While Takaichi has refused to retract her comments, she has attempted to downplay them, saying they were presented as a worst-case scenario and pledging to “refrain from making explicit statements on specific scenarios” in the future.
Takaichi was elected as Japan’s first female prime minister last month. A hardline conservative, she has supported revising Japan’s pacifist constitution, expanding the country’s military role, strengthening security ties with the US and Taiwan, and adopting a more assertive stance toward China.
Eurasian Integration as an Anti-Hegemonic Economic System
By Prof. Glenn Diesen | October 30, 2025
We are living in an era of economic disruptions as US-centric globalisation is replaced by a more decentralised format of globalisation spearheaded by the Greater Eurasian continent. The consequence of these disruptions during this transition period is instability in economics, politics, and international security, as economic coercion escalates into war.
The disruptions to the international economy were predictable—and indeed predicted—for decades. When immense economic power is concentrated in a hegemon, the hegemon has incentives to build trust in an economic architecture under its administration. This translates into an open international economic system with access to technologies, industries, energy, food, physical transportation corridors, banks, currencies, and payment systems. This is referred to as a benign hegemon, as building trust in an open system ensures that alternatives are not developed and the world becomes immensely dependent on the hegemon. Subsequently, globalisation meant Americanisation.
Hegemons are, however, inherently temporary. Over the years, the US economy became excessively rent-seeking, financialised, and debt-ridden as its competitive edge declined. A hegemon makes mistakes and fails to prioritise strategically, as it can absorb the costs—until it reaches a breaking point. Around the world, other countries climbed up global value chains and grew concerned about the fiscal irresponsibility and unsustainability of the hegemonic system.
A declining hegemon will predictably behave very differently. It will use its administrative control over the global economy to prevent the rise of rival centres of power. Economic coercion is the new normal—for example, restricting China’s access to key technologies, seizing Iranian tankers and preparing the establishment of maritime choke points, stealing Russia’s sovereign funds, etc. Trust collapses, and efforts to create a more decentralised international economic system only intensify.
The declining hegemon will also attempt to divide rival centres of power: Germany must be severed from Russia, Russia must be split from China, China should be kept at a distance from India, India should reduce its economic connectivity with Iran, Iran should not resolve its disputes with the Gulf States etc. Markets are captured as the declining hegemon, for example, pushes Europe to reduce cooperation with Chinese technology and Russian energy. As the Europeans and other allies develop excessive reliance on the US, economic and industrial power can be transferred to the US. Eventually, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Europe will recognise that hitching their wagon to a declining hegemon to preserve a unipolar order that is already gone, is inherently destructive. The option is to either diversify their economic connectivity for prosperity and political autonomy, or become captured markets that can be cannibalised by the declining hegemon.
The declining hegemon has—much like its adversaries and allies—strong incentives to embrace multipolar realities. New political forces within the declining hegemon will recognise that pursuing hegemonic policies under a multipolar international distribution of power will be punished by the international system. Exhausting its remaining resources and incentivising the rest of the world to collectively balance against the declining hegemon is unsustainable. The ideal strategy for the declining hegemon is to accept a more modest role in the international system as one among many great powers, reducing collective balancing and enabling socio-economic recovery to rebuild former strength.
The rise of Eurasia marks the end of 500 years of Western leadership and dominance in the world, since European maritime powers began connecting the world in the early 16th century. While some panic in the West is therefore understandable, there are nonetheless great opportunities.
Adam Smith famously wrote: “The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind… By uniting, in some measure, the most distant parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another’s wants, to increase one another’s enjoyments, and to encourage one another’s industry, their general tendency would seem to be beneficial”.
However, Adam Smith also recognised the problems of the skewed power distribution between the Europeans and the rest of the world. Adam Smith wrote: “To the natives however, both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits which can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned… At the particular time when these discoveries were made, the superiority of force happened to be so great on the side of the Europeans that they were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote countries”.
Adam Smith argued that a more even distribution of power could create a more harmonious international economy: “Hereafter, perhaps, the natives of those countries may grow stronger, or those of Europe may grow weaker, and the inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect for the rights of one another. But nothing seems more likely to establish this equality of force than that mutual communication of knowledge and of all sorts of improvements which an extensive commerce from all countries to all countries naturally, or rather necessarily, carries along with it”.
I conclude that the aspiration of Eurasian integration should be to make it anti-hegemonic but not anti-Western by descending into bloc politics.
Japan’s Green Energy Failures Serve as a Warning to the US
By Yoshihiro Muronaka | The Western Journal | October 6, 2025
In August 2025, Japanese media revealed that Mitsubishi Corporation was preparing to withdraw from three offshore wind projects off the coasts of Chiba and Akita prefectures.
In 2021, Mitsubishi had won these sites with remarkably low bids of 8 to 11 cents/kilowatt-hour (kWh), hailed as proof of Japan’s corporate strength and renewable ambition.
But reality was harsh. Costs for steel, turbines, and logistics surged. The yen weakened, interest rates rose, and certification processes faced delays. By 2025, Mitsubishi had already booked over $350 million in impairment losses, with more likely if the projects continued. The retreat is not just a corporate failure; it exposes apparent self-contradictions in Japan’s energy policy.
Across the Atlantic, offshore facilities have faced similar headwinds. On the U.S. East Coast, Ørsted cancelled two large projects in New Jersey, absorbing billions in losses. BP and Equinor abandoned contracts in New York after costs rose by 40 percent beyond estimates. In some cases, companies chose to pay hefty penalties rather than commit to losing ventures.
Europe, the pioneer of offshore wind, has also stumbled. In the U.K., Vattenfall halted its Norfolk Boreas project, citing a 40 percent cost increase. Even Denmark, often celebrated as a leader, has delayed new tenders.
Market signals in these regions were clear: When economics fail, projects are scaled back or canceled. Japan, however, continues to treat offshore wind as a central pillar of its 2040 roadmap, aiming for 45 gigawatts of capacity. Why the difference?
Once designated a national project, policies in Japan are difficult to reverse. Offshore wind has been tied to three goals at once: decarbonization, energy security, and industrial revitalization. Billions in subsidies through the Green Innovation Fund are already committed, while local governments and industries expect contracts and jobs.
In effect, offshore wind has become a new type of public works project. Ports, construction companies, heavy industry, and trading houses all benefit from government support. For politicians, it delivers regional development; for bureaucrats, it provides visible progress. Under these conditions, corporate withdrawal is treated as a temporary setback and prompts no policy review.
The debate over energy costs often centers on the Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE), which narrowly focuses on the cost of generating a kilowatt-hour of electricity. However, this metric fails to capture the broader economic realities encapsulated by the Full Cost of Electricity (FCOE).
FCOE provides a more comprehensive assessment by incorporating additional factors such as the expense of backup power from fossil or nuclear plants to address the intermittency of renewable sources, the costs associated with grid expansion and balancing services to maintain stability, as well as subsidies, premiums, and public support schemes that often prop up certain energy technologies. Furthermore, FCOE accounts for the long-term costs of decommissioning, recycling, and environmental restoration, ensuring a more accurate reflection of the true economic and environmental impact of electricity production.
When these are included, offshore wind’s cost can be double or triple its LCOE.
Offshore wind’s LCOE is around 12 to 16 cents/kWh, but when the full cost of electricity (FCOE) is considered, it rises to 20 to 30 cents/kWh. Nuclear and gas remain much lower, at roughly 12 to 14 cents/kWh and 10 to 12 cents/kWh, respectively.
OECD studies confirm that as “renewables” such as wind and solar rise from 10 percent to 30 percent of the grid, FCOE escalates sharply. Yet Japan highlights falling LCOE while downplaying FCOE, creating an illusion of competitiveness.
Because fixed-bottom projects face difficulties, Japanese policymakers increasingly promote floating offshore wind as a unique advantage. Japan’s deep coastal waters, they argue, make floating turbines more suitable.
Globally, however, floating wind remains at the developmental stage. Norway’s Hywind Scotland and France’s Provence Grand Large provide valuable data, but their costs remain far higher than fixed-bottom projects. Commercial viability has not yet been proven. Betting on floating wind as a “game-changer” risks repeating the same error: political enthusiasm without economic grounding.
Japan’s offshore wind experience is not just about Japan. It illustrates how energy policy everywhere can drift into policy inertia, selective cost reporting, technological optimism, and entrenched interests.
The lesson is clear. Policymakers should always assess the full costs, not just partial figures. They should heed market signals and adjust policy accordingly. Most importantly, they should avoid turning energy policy reliant on unproven technology into political patronage.
Mitsubishi’s retreat shows that even giants cannot overcome flawed policy frameworks. If Japan, with its formidable industrial base, struggles to make offshore wind viable, others should pay attention.
Japan’s offshore wind setback is more than a domestic issue. It is a global reminder of the dangers of ignoring full costs and clinging to illusions. Ambitious targets and political inertia can mask reality, but economics will always reassert itself.
For policymakers worldwide, Japan’s case should not be seen as an embarrassment, but as a warning and an opportunity: Energy transitions must be guided by facts, not hopes, if they are to be sustainable.
US likely already sent new light JLTV ‘Tomahawk’ launchers to Neo-Nazi junta
By Drago Bosnic | October 8, 2025
Supplying the “Tomahawk” cruise missiles to the Kiev regime has been “on the table” for years. The troubled Biden administration never delivered them, despite repeatedly suggesting it would. Interestingly, Donald Trump regularly criticized such moves as escalatory, insisting that the United States shouldn’t be involved and that it’s only antagonizing Russia. Ironically enough, as soon as he took office, this stance changed dramatically. In a matter of weeks, Trump’s initial promise of “ending the war in 24 hours” degenerated into the same sort of belligerent rhetoric (and moves) as during the Biden era. The new US administration increased American involvement, with military sources suggesting that the Pentagon is close to delivering the aforementioned “Tomahawk” missiles.
Worse yet, some claim that this has already happened and that Washington DC even raised the stakes by supplying new light launchers for the US-made cruise missiles. Namely, since 2019, the Pentagon has been acquiring the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), better known as the Oshkosh Light Combat Tactical All-Terrain Vehicle (L-ATV). It was designed to replace the AM General High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), better known as the Humvee. One version of the JLTV has been modified for use by the US Marine Corps (USMC) under the Long Range Fires (LRF) program, designed to launch cruise missiles, specifically the infamous “Tomahawk”. The Pentagon intended to give the USMC similar capabilities to those of the US Army, which has the ground-based “Typhon”.
There’s been some confusion even in the US Congress regarding the official designation for the program, with some documents referring to it as the Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF), while others still use the LRF. Either way, the US military’s ability to use operational and strategic weapons on such a small platform can certainly provide it with a significant advantage in terms of risk mitigation. Namely, because the launcher is essentially a modified JLTV truck that’s now in wide use (well over 20,000 have been delivered so far), it makes it very difficult to detect “Tomahawk” carriers. This enables shoot-and-scoot (sort of like hit-and-run) strikes at targets that are 1,600 km away, although some sources claim that it’s 2,500 km for the latest Block V iteration of the “Tomahawk”.
The latest reports suggest that these cruise missiles have already been delivered to the Neo-Nazi junta forces through the main logistics hub for NATO-occupied Ukraine in Rzeszów, southeastern Poland, and are now waiting for the “zero hour” somewhere in Western Ukraine. The Kiev regime lacks the necessary ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities to effectively use the “Tomahawk” to the maximum, meaning that the US/NATO would need to provide the targeting data. This has already been the case with other Western cruise missiles, most notably the Anglo-French “Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG” and the German “Taurus” (the latter is yet to be officially delivered and deployed). Both types are newer and more advanced than the 1980s-era US-made “Tomahawk”.
However, the aforementioned Block V would certainly give them a run for their money, especially if deployed from the highly mobile JLTV trucks. Its ability to move quickly through heavily forested areas makes it extremely difficult to detect, meaning that it could effectively act as some sort of a single-shot “Iskander-K” (uses the 9M728/R-500, with a range of up to 500 km and the Novator’s 9M729, which Western sources claim has a staggering range of up to 5,500 km). The launcher could instantly deploy at virtually any firing position, while its relatively low cost offers the key advantage in terms of mitigating losses. Military sources report that the US could produce 100-200 such units per month, while the number of missiles supplied in each batch can reach over 500 units.
In other words, such a mass production would make it a much bigger challenge than the expensive and overhyped Western European missiles that the United Kingdom, France and Germany can produce in single or double digits, at best. Obviously, this is not to say that the Russian military could be defeated solely with the use of “Tomahawks”, but it could certainly complicate logistics and other operations far behind the immediate frontline. The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) and its surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems have accumulated extensive experience in countering various types of missiles and drones; however, the mass deployment of different kinds of cruise missiles can pose a significant challenge. Namely, Russia is the largest country on the planet, making it extremely difficult to defend all of its territory.
Thus, the aviation, air defenses and ISR assets will need to work together and closely coordinate their actions in order to defend the most critically important areas (military-industrial facilities, bridges, thermal and nuclear power plants, substations, etc). A&WAC (airborne early warning and control) aircraft such as the A-50U will play a crucial role in this, as they can detect and track very low-flying cruise missiles. The sheer range of the “Tomahawk” puts virtually all of European Russia within striking distance, while the Block V expands that well into Western Siberia, putting even ICBM fields in jeopardy, including the Dombarovsky Red Banner Division of the 31st Missile Army of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN). This unit is armed with the monstrously destructive R-36M2 “Voyevoda” ICBMs (and likely the RS-28 “Sarmat”).
These missiles are also capable of deploying the Yu-71/74 “Avangard” HGVs (hypersonic glide vehicles), the world’s most advanced hypersonic weapon. The US calculus is pretty clear – deploying these missiles in NATO-occupied Ukraine puts Russia into an incredibly dangerous strategic position. It’s very similar to the geopolitical impact of having “Tomahawk” missiles permanently deployed in the Philippines and Japan, as these put Beijing and most major Chinese cities in range.
Thus, America has the capacity to strike both (Eur)Asian giants with medium-range weapons, while the two can only respond with their strategic arsenals. Although this effectively gives Washington DC the ability to dictate the pace of potential escalation, it still makes the world a far more dangerous place, forcing Moscow and Beijing to contemplate immediate strategic retaliation in order to defend themselves.
Drago Bosnic is an independent geopolitical and military analyst.
UK Digital ID Scheme Faces Backlash Over Surveillance Fears — Is a Similar Plan Coming to the U.S.?
By Michael Nevradakis, Ph.D. | The Defender |October 2, 2025
The U.K. plans to introduce a nationwide digital ID scheme that will require citizens and non-citizens to obtain a “BritCard” to work in the U.K., which includes England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Government officials say the plan, to take effect no later than August 2029, will help combat illegal immigration.
But critics like U.K. activist and campaigner Montgomery Toms said the scheme, “far from being a tool for progress,” is instead a “gateway to mass surveillance, control and ultimately the rollout of a centralised social credit system.”
The plan faces broad opposition in the U.K., according to Nigel Utton, a U.K.-based board member of the World Freedom Alliance, who said, “the feeling against the government here is enormous.”
A poll last week found that 47% of respondents opposed digital ID, while 27% supported the ID system and 26% were neutral. The poll was conducted by Electoral Calculus and Find Out Now, on behalf of GB News.
A petition on the U.K. Parliament’s website opposing plans to introduce digital ID may force a parliamentary debate. As of today, the petition has over 2.73 million signatures.
According to The Guardian, petitions with 100,000 signatures or more are considered for debate in the U.K. parliament.
As opposition mounts, there are signs the BritCard may not be a done deal. According to the BBC, a three-month consultation will take place, and legislation will likely be introduced to Parliament in early 2026.
However, U.K. Culture Secretary Lisa Nandy said the government may push through its digital ID plans without going through the House of Commons or the House of Lords.
Protesters plan to gather Oct. 18 in central London.
Digital ID will ‘offer ordinary citizens countless benefits,’ U.K. officials say
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced the digital ID scheme last week in a speech at the Global Progress Action Summit in London.
“A secure border and controlled migration are reasonable demands, and this government is listening and delivering,” Starmer said. “Digital ID is an enormous opportunity for the U.K. It will make it tougher to work illegally in this country, making our borders more secure.
The plan “will also offer ordinary citizens countless benefits, like being able to prove your identity to access key services swiftly,” Starmer said.
According to The Guardian, digital ID eventually may be used for driver’s licenses, welfare benefits, access to tax records, and the provision of childcare and other public services.
Darren Jones, chief secretary to Starmer, suggested it may become “the bedrock of the modern state,” the BBC reported.
Supporters of the plan include the Labour Together think tank, which is closely aligned with the Labour Party and which published a report in June calling for the introduction of the BritCard.
Two days before Starmer’s announcement, the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, led by Labour Party member and former U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, published a report, “Time for Digital ID: A New Consensus for a State That Works.”
Blair tried to introduce digital ID two decades ago as a means of fighting terrorism and fraud, but the plan failed amid public opposition. According to the BBC, Starmer recently claimed the world has “moved on in the last 20 years,” as “we all carry a lot more digital ID now than we did.”
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Blair endorsed a global digital vaccine passport, the Good Health Pass, launched by ID2020 with the support of Facebook, Mastercard and the World Economic Forum.
According to Sky News, French President Emmanuel Macron welcomed the BritCard for its ability to help fight illegal immigration into the U.K., much of which originates from France.
Critics: Digital ID marks ‘gateway to mass surveillance’
The BritCard, which would live on people’s phones, will use technology similar to digital wallets. People will not be required to carry their digital ID or be asked to produce it, except for employment purposes, the government said.
According to the BBC, BritCard will likely include a person’s name, photo, date of birth and nationality or residency status.
Digital wallets, which include documents such as driver’s licenses and health certificates, have been introduced in several countries, including the U.S.
Nandy said the U.K. government has “no intention of pursuing a dystopian mess” with its introduction of digital ID.
However, the plan has opened up a “civil liberties row” in the U.K., according to The Guardian, with critics warning it will lead to unprecedented surveillance and control over citizens.
“Digital ID systems are not designed to secure borders,” said Seamus Bruner, author of “Controligarchs: Exposing the Billionaire Class, their Secret Deals, and the Globalist Plot to Dominate Your Life” and director of research at the Government Accountability Institute. “They’re designed to expand bureaucratic control of the masses.”
Bruner told The Defender :
“All attempts to roll out digital ID follow a familiar pattern: corporate and political elites wield crises — such as mass migration, crime, or tech disruptions — as a pretext to expand their control … over private citizens’ identities, finances and movements into a suffocating regime.
“Once rolled out, these systems expand quietly, shifting from access tools to enforcement mechanisms. Yesterday it was vaccine passports and lockdowns; tomorrow it is 15-minute cities and the ‘universal basic income’ dependency trap. ‘Voluntary’ today becomes mandatory tomorrow.”
Tim Hinchliffe, editor of The Sociable, said digital ID is “not about tackling illegal immigration, it has nothing to do with job security and it definitely won’t protect young people online. Digital ID is all about surveillance and control through coercion and force.”
Hinchliffe said:
“Illegal immigration is just one excuse to bring it all online. Be vigilant for other excuses like climate change, cybersecurity, convenience, conflict, refugees, healthcare, war, famine, poverty, welfare benefits. Anything can be used to usher in digital ID.”
Twila Brase, co-founder and president of the Citizens’ Council for Health Freedom, said governments favor digital ID because it allows unprecedented surveillance.
The ID system “notifies the government every time an identity card is used, giving it a bird’s-eye view of where, when and to whom people are showing their identity,” she said.
According to Toms, “A digital ID system gives governments the ability to monitor, restrict, and ultimately punish citizens who do not comply with state directives. It centralises power in a way that is extremely dangerous to liberty.”
Experts disputed claims that digital ID is necessary to improve public services.
“The ‘improved efficiency’ argument is a technocratic fantasy used to seduce a public obsessed with convenience,” said attorney Greg Glaser. “Governments have managed to provide services for centuries without a digital panopticon. This is not about efficiency. It is about creating an immutable, unforgeable link between every individual and the state.”
Digital ID technology may create ‘an enormous hacking target’
London-based author and political analyst Evans Agelissopoulos said major global investment firms, including BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street, could combine their financial might with the power of digital ID.
“BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street are on a mission to buy properties to rent to people. Digital ID could be used against people they deem unfit to rent to,” he said.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the same firms supported digital vaccine passports in major corporations in which they are among the top shareholders. Some experts suggested digital ID may institutionalize a vaccine passport regime and central bank digital currencies.
“Digital identity is the linchpin to every dystopian nightmare under the sun,” Hinchliffe said. “Without it, there can be no programmable digital currencies, there can be no carbon footprint trackers, no social credit system.”
Other experts suggested that a centralized database containing the data of all citizens could be monetized. “By centralizing everything, they will have access to health, criminal, financial records. This data can be sold,” Agelissopoulos said.
According to Brase, those who will benefit from the centralization of this data include:
“Anybody who’s going to be the third-party administrator, academia and companies who are building biometric systems and what they call ‘augmented authentication systems’ that provide the cameras, the back system operations for biometric identification and for digital systems.”
Several major information technology (IT), defense and accounting firms, including Deloitte and BAE Systems, have received U.K. government contracts totaling 100 million British pounds ($134.7 million) for the development and rollout of BritCard.
U.S. tech companies, including Palantir, Nvidia and OpenAI, “have also been circling the UK government,” The Guardian reported.
Digital ID also raises security concerns, with IT experts describing the U.K.’s plan as “an enormous hacking target,” citing recent large-scale breaches involving digital ID databases in some countries, including Estonia.
“Government databases are frequently hacked — from healthcare systems to tax records,” Toms said. “Centralizing sensitive personal data into a single mandatory digital ID is a disaster waiting to happen.”
The public may also directly bear the cost of these systems. Italy’s largest digital ID provider, Poste Italiane, recently floated plans to levy a 5 euro ($5.87) annual fee for users.
Switzerland to roll out digital ID next year, amid controversy
In a referendum held on Sunday, voters in Switzerland narrowly approved the introduction of a voluntary national digital ID in their country.
According to the BBC, 50.4% of voters approved the proposal. Biometric Update noted that the proposal received a majority in only eight of the country’s 26 cantons, though the country’s government campaigned in favor of the proposal.
Digital ID in Switzerland is expected to be rolled out next year.
Swiss health professional George Deliyanidis said he “does not see any benefits for the public” from the plan. Instead, he sees “a loss of personal freedom.”
“There are suspicions of election fraud,” he added.
In a letter sent Tuesday to the Swiss government, a copy of which was reviewed by The Defender, the Mouvement Fédératif Romand cited “significant statistical disparities” in the referendum’s results and called for a recount.
In 2021, Swiss voters rejected a proposal on digital ID under which data would have been held by private providers, the BBC reported. Under the current proposal, data will remain with the state.
According to the Manchester Evening News, countries that have introduced nationwide digital ID include Australia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, India, Japan, South Korea, Spain, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates. Other countries with similar systems include France, Finland and Norway.
In July, Vietnam introduced digital ID for foreigners living in the country. In August, the Vietnamese government helped neighboring Laos launch digital ID.
The New York Times reported that, in 2024, China added an “internet ID” to its digital ID system, “to track citizens’ online usage.”
Bill Gates has supported the rollout of digital ID in several countries, including India.
The European Union plans to launch its Digital Identity Wallet by the end of 2026.
“When you see a nearly simultaneous worldwide push, like this digital ID agenda, people in all nations need to expect to be impacted to some extent,” said James F. Holderman III, director of special investigations for Stand for Health Freedom.
Is national digital ID coming to the U.S.?
Although the U.S. does not have a national identification card, the U.K. did not have one either — until digital ID was introduced. The U.K. scrapped national ID in 1952.
In May, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began Real ID enforcement for domestic air travelers in the U.S. In the months before, TSA engaged in a push to encourage U.S. citizens to acquire Real ID-compliant documents, such as driver’s licenses. Full enforcement will begin in 2027.
The REAL ID Act of 2005 established security standards for state-issued ID cards in response to the 9/11 attacks and the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. In the intervening years, its implementation was repeatedly delayed.
Last year, then-President Joe Biden issued an executive order for federal and state governments to speed up the adoption of digital ID.
Brase said Real ID “is really a national ID system for America, currently disguised as a state driver’s license with a star. The American people really have no idea that what’s in their pocket is a national ID and they have no idea that the [Department of Motor Vehicles offices] are planning to digitize them.”
Hinchliffe said 193 countries, including the U.S., accepted digital ID last year when they approved the United Nations’ Pact for the Future.
Earlier this month, Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) introduced the Safeguarding Personal Information Act of 2025 (S 2769), a bill to repeal the REAL ID Act of 2005.
“If digital ID is allowed to spread globally, future generations will never know freedom,” Hinchliffe said.
This article was originally published by The Defender — Children’s Health Defense’s News & Views Website under Creative Commons license CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Please consider subscribing to The Defender or donating to Children’s Health Defense.
Japanese Prime Minister Fails to Mention US as Country Responsible for Hiroshima Bombing
Sputnik – 06.08.2025
Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba did not name the United States as the country that dropped nuclear bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 during the commemorative ceremony in Hiroshima on Wednesday.
In August 1945, during WWII, US pilots dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Hiroshima blast killed up to 140,000 of the city’s 350,000 population on August 6 that year, with Nagasaki losing approximately 74,000 on August 9.
“Eighty years ago on this day, an atomic bomb exploded, and it is believed that more than 100,000 precious lives were lost,” Shigeru Ishiba said during the commemorative ceremony on Wednesday, without mentioning the United States as the country responsible for the bombing.
Hiroshima Mayor Kazumi Matsui mentioned the US only in the context of being one of the countries that possess nuclear weapons.
In his address dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the US bombing of Hiroshima, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres made no mention of the country responsible. The address was read out in Japanese by UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu and only mentioned that “the lives of tens of thousands of people were taken” in the Hiroshima tragedy.
Over 120 representatives of foreign nations, as well as Japanese politicians, participated in the Wednesday commemorative ceremony in Hiroshima marking 80 years since the atomic bombing.
US-led drills pose threat to peace in Asia – Lavrov
RT | July 12, 2025
The military activities of the US and its allies around the Korean Peninsula threaten the stability of the entire region, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said during his visit to North Korea.
The US, South Korea, and Japan are increasing the number of joint military drills, some of which involve “a nuclear component,” Lavrov told reporters at a press conference in Wonsan on Saturday.
“This does not contribute to peace and stability, not only on the Korean Peninsula but throughout Northeast Asia,” the diplomat said, expressing skepticism about Seoul’s intentions to normalize relations with Pyongyang.
Lavrov condemned what he described as “dangerous attempts by actors outside the Indo-Pacific to form exclusive alliances and expand NATO infrastructure in the region.” He emphasized that countries should not build alliances at the expense of others, adding that both Russia and North Korea are committed to “equal and indivisible security” for all nations in Eurasia.
The US, South Korea, and Japan conducted joint exercises this week involving the deployment of America’s nuclear-capable B-52H strategic bombers. In a joint statement, the allies accused Pyongyang of “unlawful activities” that “destabilize the Korean Peninsula.”
Russia and North Korea signed a defense pact in June 2024, after which Pyongyang dispatched troops to help expel Ukrainian forces from Russia’s Kursk region later that year. The cooperation is a testament to the “invincible brotherhood” between the two countries, Lavrov said.
How India-Pakistan war will affect global and regional political order
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – May 24, 2025
The recent India-Pakistan war, though limited in scope, has triggered significant geopolitical reverberations by showcasing Chinese military superiority and prompting a strategic reassessment in Washington.
The China angle in regional geopolitics
Beyond the oft-repeated rhetoric of the Pakistan-China relationship being “all-weather” and “iron-clad,” the recent India-Pakistan war may come to be seen as its first major demonstration in action. Pakistan’s use of Chinese PL-15 missiles, deployed from Chinese-made J-10C fighter jets to successfully engage French-made Rafale aircraft, has underscored the strategic depth of this partnership. This has received considerable international attention, both in the media and otherwise. This show of alignment is particularly notable given recent strains in the Pak-China bilateral relationship, including attacks on Chinese interests and infrastructure projects within Pakistan.
With Pakistan importing almost 80 per cent of its weapons—which also includes cooperation in the field of military technology—from Beijing, the supply ensured to help Islamabad maintain the balance of power vis-à-vis New Delhi. More than this, China’s policy was also motivated by its desire to counter-balance Washington’s efforts to boost India against China. Ironically enough, it was only days before the recent war that the US Vice-President was in India to discuss ways to collectively counter China. But China’s support for Pakistan meant that New Delhi remained preoccupied more with Pakistan than China in a strategic sense. With this war, New Delhi’s focus will be more on Islamabad than China for at least a few more years to come. By the same token, China will most likely continue to help Pakistan develop its defence capability. Even before the war took place, media reports in Pakistan and China reveled ongoing talks between Beijing and Islamabad for the sale and purchase of J-35 fifth-generation stealth fighter jets.
These developments highlight at least four key takeaways. First, China’s defense technology—likely tested in actual combat for the first time—has proven effective enough to attract interest from other regional powers. Its demonstrated performance could prompt these countries to purchase and integrate Chinese systems into their own militaries. This, in turn, would strengthen China’s position in the regional arms market and help it outcompete rival defense exporters. Second, China’s willingness to export advanced military technology—such as the PL-15 missile and J-35 fighter jets—signals a broader strategic intent to deepen its global partnerships. This approach is consistent with Beijing’s “no-limits” alliance with Moscow.
Third, the demonstrated effectiveness of Chinese weaponry against India could encourage regional states to reassess their foreign policy alignments, potentially fostering deeper integration with Beijing over New Delhi. This trend is already evident in countries like Sri Lanka and the Maldives, where pro-Beijing political shifts have gained momentum—most notably in the Maldives, where the new government compelled Indian troops to withdraw. Fourth, Pakistan’s military successes in this conflict challenge a common narrative in global discourse: that partnerships with China inevitably lead to economic “debt traps.” On the contrary, Pakistan’s economic ties with China appear to have laid the foundation for robust military-to-military cooperation, illustrating how economic integration can support broader strategic alignment.
India’s position in Washington’s arc
Can Washington still push—with enough confidence—India as its key ally? What is the material reality of India’s standing within the US-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)? If the QUAD was ever to become a military alliance, the only power in the region that the US expected to be effective on its own against China is/was India—not only because India and China have a long history of rivalry, but also because India remains a big military power. Needless to say, it is the only nuclear power part of the QUAD from the Indo-Pacific region. In this sense, it can maintain deterrence vis-à-vis Beijing. But nuclear deterrence can prevent a nuclear war, as is evident from the recent India-Pakistan conflict. It cannot necessarily prevent conventional conflict. Can India act as the front-line ally for Washington in the region in a conventional war?
The outcome of India-Pakistan was means Washington will have to rethink its strategy. It can take two shapes. First, it is very much possible that Washington will deepen its cooperation with New Delhi. Donald Trump has already offered to sell F-35 fifth-generation stealth fighters. (Russia has also offered New Delhi to sell its own fifth-generation Su-57 jets.) This, however, will necessarily involve China deepening its cooperation with Pakistan. As a result, an arms race will be triggered in the region.
A second strategic path for Washington could involve renewed engagement with China. While the timing of the Trump administration’s trade negotiations with Beijing may coincide with the outcome of the India-Pakistan conflict purely by chance, it nonetheless suggests that even a confrontational administration has not entirely ruled out dialogue as a preferred tool. Washington might also pursue a dual-track approach—engaging China while simultaneously strengthening military alliances elsewhere.
However, in the wake of shifting dynamics following the India-Pakistan conflict, the US will likely need to reassess its regional strategy and consider alternatives to India. Japan, for instance, emerges as a strong candidate. With its recent push toward military normalization and a growing appetite for deeper strategic engagement, Tokyo could become a more prominent partner in Washington’s Indo-Pacific security architecture.
To be clear, this does not imply a fundamental rupture in US-India relations. But it is increasingly likely that Washington will place India’s role under careful review, potentially redefining its status as the principal frontline ally in countering China. In response to China’s growing influence and military reach, the US will need to significantly bolster the defense capabilities of other regional actors—most notably Japan and Australia—as part of a broader strategic recalibration.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
Is North Korea a nuclear state?
By Konstantin Asmolov – New Eastern Outlook – February 4, 2025
The transition from the Biden to the Trump government was marked by an interesting discussion as to how the outgoing and coming administrations view North Korea’s nuclear potential.
Republicans: DPRK is a nuclear state and de-nuclearisation is unlikely
On January 14, US Secretary of Defence nominee Pete Hegseth called North Korea a “nuclear power” that poses a threat to global stability. He noted Pyongyang’s success in increasing its nuclear potential, bringing down the size of nuclear warheads and improving mobile launch platforms, which is of particular concern given North Korea’s proximity to the territories where US military contingents are located.
Also, Donald Trump intends to appoint Elbridge Colby, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Strategy and Force Development in his first term, to the post of Under Secretary of Defence for Policy. This is a man who believes that the de-nuclearisation of the DPRK is an ‘unlikely’ goal. In addition, Colby believes that US troops on the Korean peninsula should focus more on threats from China and that “North Korea is not the primary threat to the United States”. “It is irrational to sacrifice several American cities to fight the DPRK” and Washington should allow South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons or at least to seriously consider such a possibility.
Democrats: DPRK is not a nuclear state, de-nuclearisation remains the goal
On the same day, January 14, the outgoing US president’s national security adviser, John Kirby, noted that the White House’s policy on this issue had not changed. The current US administration, led by Joe Biden, does not agree with Pete Hegseth’s statement.
On January 7, former US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, Philip Goldberg, stated that, despite the issues associated with the development of Pyongyang’s nuclear and weapons capabilities, the de-nuclearisation of North Korea should remain a goal that must continue to be fought for.
The South Korean Foreign Ministry made similar statements: “North Korea’s de-nuclearisation has been a principle consistently upheld by South Korea, the United States and the international community” … Under the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), North Korea can never be recognised as a nuclear-armed state”.
The conservative media in South Korea also began to sound the alarm; such terminology ‘not only changes the international community’s understanding of North Korea’s nuclear status, but also undermines the long-standing efforts of South Korea and the United States to achieve the de-nuclearisation of the North’. “Recognising North Korea as a nuclear power is fundamentally different from recognising its technical nuclear capabilities”. Their writing show concerns that by shifting the conversation from de-nuclearisation to arms control, Washington and Pyongyang may eventually agree to freeze the nuclear programme, from which the US-ROK alliance would take a blow and which could also trigger a nuclear domino effect. “If North Korea is recognised as a nuclear power, countries like South Korea, Japan and even Taiwan may reconsider their non-nuclear positions”.
Marco Rubio’s views
A while later, on January 16, in response to statements that the US’ policy towards North Korea, including sanctions, is ‘ineffective’ and Pyongyang is only doubling down on its nuclear and missile programmes, Secretary of State nominee Marco Rubio has already noted that Washington should take a serious look at policy on North Korea to study how to reduce the risk of an ‘unintended’ war between the two Koreas and prevent a crisis on the Korean peninsula without encouraging countries to build their own nuclear weapons.
Note that the new Secretary of State does not make the North out to be a ‘threat to humanity’ and sets more practical tasks, avoiding what the author calls ‘conflict for irrational reasons’ and the likely fall of the nuclear non-proliferation regime due to the emergence of new nuclear actors (we shall not name them specifically, but all is clear to everyone).
Rubio admitted that he was initially sceptical about engaging with Pyongyang, but during his first term as president, Trump “stopped missile tests. This did not stop the development of the programme, but at least it calmed the situation down a bit”.
Rubio did not directly mention de-nuclearisation, but noted that Kim Jong Un “used nuclear weapons as an insurance policy to stay in power” and “no sanctions prevented him from developing this potential”.
The South Korean Foreign Ministry’s response to Rubio’s remark on January 16, 2025, was similar to the answer to Hegseth: the de-nuclearisation of North Korea is a “unanimous goal” shared by the international community. We have heard Rubio, but “the new Trump administration has yet to outline its policy towards Pyongyang” and South Korea “intends to maintain close contacts with the United States in the process of reviewing its policies to ensure a coordinated response to North Korea’s nuclear and other challenges”.
In summary…
Previously, US officials refused to publicly recognise North Korea as a nuclear power, even though Pyongyang has called itself a nuclear power in its constitution, adopted a nuclear doctrine and showed no willingness to discuss giving up its nuclear weapons. In their opinion, the use of this term can be interpreted as the recognition of the DPRK’s nuclear status and thus negatively affect US efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The Biden administration tried to look the other way and not acknowledge the reality, perceiving the North Korean regime as a country that does not yet have real nuclear potential and, importantly, may even be subject to de-nuclearisation. Although, it was clear by the end of the 2010s that such a process was possible only after a regime change.
The Trump administration is more realistic in this regard. Perhaps the fact of the matter is that there are quite a lot of military personnel who have worked in the field and are well aware of what real North Korean nuclear missile power is.
The question, however, is how US policy will be adjusted in relation to the idea of a nuclear North. Say Trump decides to recognise North Korea’s nuclear status; what practical steps will follow and how it will affect changes in sanctions? On the one hand, it becomes clear that de-nuclearisation, which was the main formal goal of the negotiations between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un at the previous stage, no longer makes sense. At best, it makes sense to talk about arms control and here there are some theoretical prospects. On the other hand, for American public opinion, North Korea remains an ‘evil state’ to which concessions are unacceptable. This means that Donald Trump will have to think very carefully to come up with a proposal that Pyongyang will actually be ready to discuss. Moreover, if such a proposal is formulated, the American deep state and public opinion will be strongly opposed to such concessions and it is unclear whether Donald Trump will be able to put his ideas into practice.
Nevertheless, it is still pleasant that the new US administration is beginning to recognise reality vis-à-vis Korea.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Modern Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
Kiev reveals terms of $20 billion US loan
RT | December 9, 2024
The Ukrainian government has approved the terms of a conditional agreement with the US Federal Financing Bank (FFB) for a 40-year loan of $20 billion which will be backed by profits from frozen Russian state assets.
It’s part of a broader $50 billion G7 loan deal, which includes a separate $20 billion EU commitment, and $10 billion to be split by G7 members Britain, Japan and Canada.
The money will be transferred to the Facilitation of Resources to Invest in Strengthening Ukraine Financial Intermediary Fund, established by the World Bank on October 10, “for the sake of the state,” a resolution issued by Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers on Friday stated.
The transfer will be based on a Certificate Purchase Agreement between Ukraine, the FFB, and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), along with a loan guarantee and repayment agreement between Ukraine and USAID.
Under the deal, Ukraine’s Finance Ministry will issue a certificate of indebtedness to the FFB, guaranteed by USAID, the government resolution said.
The loan, which has an annual interest rate of 1.3% plus the current average rate for one-year US Treasury bills, will be repaid using interest earned from immobilized Russian sovereign assets.
The US and its allies froze an estimated $300 billion in assets belonging to the Russian central bank following the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in February 2022. In June, G7 members pledged a $50 billion loan for Kiev, with the frozen Russian assets to be used as collateral, to help Kiev buy weapons and rebuild damaged infrastructure. The agreement was finalized in October.
Moscow has repeatedly denounced the asset freeze as “theft” and argued that tapping into these funds would be illegal and set a dangerous precedent. The Russian Finance Ministry has warned that it will initiate retaliatory measures mirroring the West’s actions against resources of Western investors held in the country.
The latest move is part of the current US administration’s last-minute strategy to bolster Kiev’s war effort, which includes a new $725 million military aid package to Kiev and another round of sanctions against Russia. It comes as uncertainty grows over Washington’s commitments under the upcoming presidency of Donald Trump, particularly after US House Speaker Mike Johnson dismissed President Joe Biden’s request to include $24 billion in additional aid to Ukraine in a government funding bill last week.
