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Seven US allies endorse Hormuz ‘coalition,’ offer ‘no commitment’ for military action

The Cradle | March 20, 2026

The UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, and Canada issued a joint statement on 20 March in support of a potential “coalition” to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, while specifying “no commitment” to a concrete military role.

“We express our readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage through the strait,” the close US allies announced.

The joint statement did not, however, touch on any military involvement or the commitment of any forces to the initiative.

One political reporter writing for Axios said the statement was “largely a gesture to placate [US] President [Donald] Trump, who has railed against allies for declining to help secure the strait and warned that a failure to do so could undermine the future of NATO.”

The allies condemned attacks on commercial vessels and energy infrastructure, citing “the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iranian forces,” and called on Tehran to “cease immediately its threats, laying of mines, drone and missile attacks and other attempts to block the strait.”

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said no state is considering “a military mission to forcibly break the Iranian blockade,” adding the EU favors “diplomacy and de-escalation.”

She clarified that any contribution would apply to a “post-conflict phase” and require agreement among all parties.

Other governments echoed this position, with Germany confirming “no military participation,” while France said its deployments remain strictly defensive.

The UK ruled out a NATO mission, focusing instead on negotiations, though it has sent planners to coordinate options.

Despite the political backing and global panic over soaring energy prices , maritime data shows the strait is only partially restricted, as roughly 90 vessels crossed in early March.

Iran has established a controlled “safe” shipping corridor through its territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz, allowing only approved vessels – mainly from countries like India, Pakistan, China, Iraq, and Malaysia – to transit after IRGC vetting, while ships linked to the US or Israel are effectively excluded.

Access is currently negotiated on a case-by-case basis but is moving toward a formal system requiring detailed disclosures of ownership and cargo, often coordinated through intermediaries and, in at least one case, involving a reported $2-million payment.

So far, at least nine vessels have used the route, which passes near Larak Island for inspection, but traffic remains minimal.

The US remains largely the only country carrying out direct military operations, deploying forces and striking Iranian positions along the strait, as well as conducting offensive strikes inside Iran.

Earlier US-led efforts to secure regional shipping routes followed a similar trajectory, with coalitions struggling to gain meaningful participation as several allies refused or limited involvement, leaving only a small number of naval deployments.

Efforts to secure maritime routes during the Israeli genocide on Gaza in 2024 faced the same constraints, as US and EU resources proved insufficient to deter Yemeni strikes across the Red Sea.
Officials had warned that strikes on Yemen were “not contributing to the solution,” while Yemeni attacks on vessels continued, raising pressure on global trade routes.

Yemeni forces maintained their stance as a support front for Gaza, persisting with attacks until Washington ended its campaign under an Omani-brokered truce, with President Trump claiming Yemeni forces “don’t want to fight anymore.”

March 20, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Seven US allies endorse Hormuz ‘coalition,’ offer ‘no commitment’ for military action

Even The Neo-Cons Admit The Iran War Is Failing

The Dissident – March 16, 2026

The current U.S./Israeli war on Iran is, in many ways, a product of the policies long advocated by U.S. neoconservatives, most importantly the clean break strategy drafted by the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), which advocated taking out “Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and, finishing off, Iran” on behalf of Israel.

But many of the original Neo-cons who first drafted this plan, including John Bolton and even Robert Kagan and Bill Kristol, the founders of the Project for a New American Century, are now jumping ship and admitting that the U.S./Israeli war on Iran is failing.

In an interview with NPR, longtime Neo-con John Bolton, despite saying he has “been a supporter of efforts at regime change in Iran for a long time” was forced to admit that the regime change plan has failed and that the U.S. underestimated Iran’s response.

Bolton was forced to admit that Trump underestimated Iran’s ability to effectively close the Strait of Hormuz and disrupt oil shipping in response to the U.S/Israeli bombing, saying:

… it was questionable whether he was cooperating effectively with and assisting the opposition inside Iran. That’s what I said, I think, in our last conversation. Since then, I’m very worried that there are now signs that they haven’t thought about a lot of other things. For example, there’s reporting that the White House was surprised at how quickly oil prices went up.

And all I can say to that is I’m surprised that they’re surprised. If they weren’t planning for that both economically, politically and militarily, then that’s a huge hole in the planning. I am worried that they apparently didn’t take as seriously as they should have the potential to mine the Strait of Hormuz. Trump said several days ago that the Iranian navy had been completely destroyed. And despite years of listening to that kind of thing, I should have known better. I actually sort of believed in for a while. But now we learned that it was only yesterday that we got around to destroying 16 mine-laying vessels. Of course, they’ve got the capability to mine via drones going over the strait and dropping mines in it.

Even more shocking than Bolton’s admission was a podcast released by the founders of PNAC, Robert Kagan and Bill Kristol, where they essentially admitted that the U.S. war on Iran was destroying the U.S. empire.

Robert Kagan, in the podcast, admitted that the Iran war was debilitating America’s ability to wage a new Cold War on Russia and China, and isolating the U.S. empire globally.

The “undoubted effect of the Iran war has been to drive a deeper wedge between the United States and pretty much all of its allies or at least all of its traditional allies, both in Europe and in Asia, and I would say potentially even in the Middle East” Kagan Said.

Kagan lamented that the Iran war was crippling the U.S.’s ability to continue the proxy war in Ukraine saying, “the skyrocketing oil prices … are even before Trump took the action of lifting sanctions against Russia was going to increase Russian income” and “American forces are … burning through major stocks of weaponry and particularly Patriot and other forms of interceptors on which Ukraine depends heavily because those are the interceptors that defend their major cities from constant Russian attacks.”

Kagan also lamented that the war was taking away the U.S. empire’s ability to wage a new Cold War on China, saying, “very few countries in the world are more dependent on Middle East oil, including the oil that comes directly through the Strait of Hormuz, than Japan. Japan I think, depends on something like 95% of its oil supplies come from the Middle East and 70% of that runs through the Strait of Hormuz. So once again the Japanese were not consulted”, adding, that the prime minister of Japan is “very upset” and “ talked about how this crisis has severely impacted Japanese interests”.

He also added “the Japanese will notice that the United States has sent significant forces that are dedicated both to the defense of Japan and are sort of critical to any response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Those forces are now being sent or some of them are already there, and some are being sent to the Middle East.”

Kagan also admitted that the war in Iran is isolating the Gulf States from the U.S. and potentially moving them towards China.

He said, “I just wonder whether the Gulf States in particular are wondering whether they’ve joined the right team here because they have, by the way, been very on background, very vocal in saying that they were against the war. … They did not favor it. They thought they had a pretty good deal going with the Iranians, that kind of an agreement that they would get to, they would leave each other alone for the most part,” adding, “it turns out the United States can’t really protect them. I mean they have suffered the worst in some respects because it’s not only that they’ve been targets and that they’re shipping you know they’ve lost money on oil, but you know they with the tremendous cooperation of the Trump and I would say in this case the Trump family and social circle have been very deeply involved in the United States making investments in AI and other things but particularly AI they’re hosting data centers for all kinds of companies and in general, they’ve been trying to make themselves an attractive place for investment and also tourism.”

Citing the example of Dubai, Kagan said, “You watch the UAE is basically arresting people for taking pictures of damage that may have been done by Iranian drone strikes and other things on things in Dubai. For instance, I think they’ve arrested foreigners who took pictures of these things. Why? Because they don’t want people to see that it’s risky to be in Dubai, because then people won’t invest and they won’t come, and so it’s kind of a disaster for them,” adding, “the bottom line for the Gulf States is that the United States undertook this war and then was not able actually to protect them”.

He added, “I don’t think it’s hard to persuade certain Gulf states like the UAE and others that maybe China is also a pretty good partner or at least as much of a reliable partner as the United States has turned out to be.”

In other words, Kagan and his host Bill Kristol are essentially admitting that the Iran war is destroying and isolating U.S. empire and destroying the U.S.’s ability to project power in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East through proxy states.

This is why Kagan- as journalist Max Blumenthal described it – essentially “describes Israel as a strategic liability leading the US into a quagmire” saying, “I find it a little bit it’s kind of a syllogism when people talk about what a great ally Israel is. It it is a great ally in defense of Israel” adding, “at the end of the day, Iran is a much greater threat to Israel than it is to the United States.”

Kagan also admitted that Iran, “were deliberately not closing the straits for all these years precisely because we did not confront them with the prospect of complete annihilation” adding, “it was only when both the Israelis and the United States made it clear that their goal was the annihilation of regime, assassinated the entire leadership with a bombing strike that they then did this. So we are now solving a problem that we clearly provoked.”

Make no mistake about it, John Bolton, Robert Kagan, Bill Kristol, and their fellow Neo-cons set the stage for this war with Iran, but the fact that even they are now jumping ship shows that war is not at all going as planned for the U.S.

March 16, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Even The Neo-Cons Admit The Iran War Is Failing

‘Not our war’: Trump’s naval coalition to reopen Strait of Hormuz dead in the water

The Cradle | March 16, 2026

Several countries have either rejected or expressed serious concerns about US President Donald Trump’s plan to form a coalition aimed at escorting vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, which Tehran has closed to Washington and its allies in retaliation for the brutal US-Israeli strikes on the Islamic Republic.

Germany’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Johann Wadephul, said on 15 March that he was “skeptical” of Trump’s plan.

“Will we soon be an active part of this conflict? No,” he went on to say.

German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said, “What does Trump expect a handful of European frigates to do that the powerful US Navy cannot?” adding, “This is not our war, and we did not start it.”

Meanwhile, France officially rejected the US request to send warships to the Strait of Hormuz.

The French Foreign Ministry rejected reports that it was gearing up to send vessels, saying, “No. The carrier strike group remains in the Eastern Mediterranean. France’s position remains unchanged: defensive and protective.”

Australia has also denied the request, as have Japan, China, Norway, and Spain. The UK and South Korea said they were reviewing options.

The US president had demanded that NATO states join his proposed coalition, threatening that they would face a “very bad future” if they did not.

Trump had also expressed hope that “China, France, Japan, South Korea, the UK, and others, that are affected by this artificial constraint, will send ships to the area so that the Hormuz Strait will no longer be a threat by a nation that has been totally decapitated.”

Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz to Washington and its allies in response to the US-Israeli war against the Islamic Republic. Several vessels trying to cross in violation of Iranian warnings have been targeted.

A number of countries have reached out to Tehran for access to the Strait, through which 20 to 30 percent of the world’s energy passed prior to the war.

India has confirmed that two of its ships passed after talks with Iran. Tehran also allowed a Turkish vessel to pass through the strait.

“The Strait of Hormuz has not been militarily blocked and is merely under control,” said Alireza Tangsiri, naval commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated, “The Strait of Hormuz is open. It is only closed to the tankers and ships belonging to our enemies, to those who are attacking us and their allies. Others are free to pass.”

After Yemen began its pro-Palestine blockade in the Red Sea following the start of the Gaza genocide in 2023, Washington launched a naval operation under the name Prosperity Guardian – aimed at deterring Sanaa’s forces and facilitating the transit of vessels.

The US failed to secure enough partners, and the mission ultimately failed.

The Ansarallah-led Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) has recently vowed that it is ready to intervene alongside Iran’s other allies – meaning the potential closure of another vital energy route, the Bab al-Mandab strait.

March 16, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on ‘Not our war’: Trump’s naval coalition to reopen Strait of Hormuz dead in the water

Japan to Sign Up For NATO’s Ukraine Arms Pipeline

Sputnik – February 10, 2026

Japan has allegedly pledged significant financial support for Ukraine, and committed to providing specialized equipment, with reports indicating long-term assistance.

Doubling down on its US-pushed militarization drive, Japan is moving closer to NATO by signing on to the alliance’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) program, which facilitates the flow of military equipment to Ukraine, according to NHK.

Sources cited by the outlet claim Japan will soon officially announce its participation in the initiative, announced during the NATO Summit in July 2024 and headquartered in Wiesbaden, Germany.

The equipment that Japan is expected to procure for Ukraine reportedly includes body armor, vehicles, and, potentially, radar systems.

The NSATU mechanism coordinates the donation of military equipment from Allied and partner nations to Ukraine’s armed forces, aligning their capabilities with NATO standards.

Russia has repeatedly argued that Western weapons shipments to Ukraine undermine any prospects for a negotiated settlement and amount to NATO’s direct involvement in the conflict. Russia has also warned that convoys delivering arms to Ukraine would be treated as legitimate military targets.

February 10, 2026 Posted by | Aletho News | , , | Leave a comment

Pentagon downgrades China threat, shifts focus to homeland, hemisphere

Al Mayadeen | January 24, 2026

The United States Department of War has released its long-delayed 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), signaling a major shift in Washington’s military priorities by no longer treating China as the “primary threat” to US national security.

The document, published late Friday, places the defense of the US homeland and the Western Hemisphere at the center of Pentagon planning, a sharp departure from strategies issued under both former President Joe Biden and President Donald Trump’s first term, which identified China as the foremost strategic challenge.

According to the strategy, past US administrations “ignored American interests,” allowing strategic vulnerabilities to emerge in areas such as the Panama Canal, Greenland, and the broader Western Hemisphere. The document explicitly calls for abandoning what it describes as “grandiose strategies” in favor of policies rooted in the “practical interests” of the US public.

Reduced emphasis on China, conciliatory tone in the Pacific

While China remains a key concern, the 2026 NDS no longer characterizes Beijing as an “acute” or “existential” threat. Instead, it refers to China as a “settled force” in the Indo-Pacific that must be deterred from dominating the US or its allies.

The document adopts a notably conciliatory tone, stressing that Washington does not seek to “strangle or humiliate” China. It argues that a “decent peace” is achievable under terms favorable to the US and acceptable to Beijing, emphasizing diplomacy, stable relations, and expanded military-to-military communication channels to avoid escalation.

Although the Pentagon continues to advocate a “strong denial defense” in the Pacific, the strategy does not specify what military assets will be deployed. Notably, Taiwan is not mentioned by name, marking a significant shift from the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which explicitly framed Taiwan as a central security concern.

Europe’s declining importance, new DPRK strategy

In contrast to the National Security Strategy released last month, the defense document avoids describing Europe as being in “civilizational decline”, but it nonetheless downplays the continent’s strategic importance.

“Although Europe remains important, it has a smaller and decreasing share of global economic power,” the strategy states, adding that while US engagement will continue, Washington will prioritize defending the homeland and its immediate sphere of influence.

The strategy also outlines a reduced US military role in deterring the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, shifting primary responsibility to South Korea, which currently hosts around 28,500 US troops.

“South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited US support,” the document states.

The strategy notably omits any reference to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, reinforcing speculation that Washington is moving toward managing the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities rather than seeking their elimination.

“This shift in the balance of responsibility is consistent with America’s interest in updating US force posture on the Korean Peninsula,” the strategy explains, noting that Washington seeks to make its forces more flexible and better positioned to respond to a wider range of contingencies across the region.

Burden-sharing and regional rebalancing in the Pacific

Across the broader Pacific region, the Pentagon is urging allies to assume greater responsibility for their own defense, linking continued US cooperation to increased military spending by allies, with benchmarks as high as 5% of GDP. The strategy emphasizes economic and maritime security over regime-change policies, describing the Indo-Pacific as the world’s most dynamic economic region and underscoring the need to protect trade routes and strategic access points.

Japan and South Korea are identified as central to this regional balancing approach, with the US seeking to “incentivize and enable” allies to play a more assertive role in collective defense.

Meanwhile, South Korea has raised its defense spending to 7.5% of GDP and continues to field upwards of 500,000 regular troops with approximately 3.1 million reservists. On its part, Japan is moving to decisively break with decades of post-war pacifism, accelerating a historic military buildup and adopting a more assertive security posture.

Tokyo is on track to reach defense spending equivalent to 2% of GDP by March 2026, abandoning the long-standing 1% cap, as part of a five-year rearmament plan totaling 43 trillion yen. The shift is accompanied by the development of “counterstrike” capabilities, marking a transition from an exclusively defense-oriented doctrine toward deterrence by punishment and the fielding of overtly offensive weapons. While Japanese officials frame the change as strategic maturity and greater alliance responsibility, critics have denounced it as a revival of Japanese militarism.

The release of the 2026 NDS comes after months of internal delays. US media reported that a draft reached War Secretary Pete Hegseth as early as September, but disagreements within the administration over how to characterize China’s threat, particularly amid ongoing trade negotiations, stalled its publication.

Despite references to Russia, Iran, and DPRK as sources of risk, the strategy treats these threats as secondary, reinforcing the Pentagon’s pivot toward homeland defense and regional retrenchment rather than expansive global confrontation.

January 24, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , | Leave a comment

What’s on Trump’s mind as US adjusts to multipolarity

By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | December 12, 2025

The world order’s transformation to multipolarity is a work in progress with the variables at work, but its outcome will be largely determined by the alignment of the three big powers — the United States, Russia and China. Historically, the ‘triangle’ appeared as the lid came off the Sino-Soviet schism in the 1960s and a ferocious public acrimony erupted between Moscow and Beijing, which prompted the Nixon administration to moot Henry Kissinger’s secret mission to Beijing to meet up face to face with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou En-lai and, hopefully, work out a modus vivendii to jointly counter Russia. 

Revisiting the Sino-Soviet schism, it is well understood by now that the US-Soviet – China triangle never really ran the course that Kissinger had envisaged. Kissinger’s failure to consolidate the opening of relations with China was partly due to his loss of power by January 1977 and, in a systemic sense, inevitably so, given the complexity of the boiling cauldron of Sino-Soviet schism where ideology mixed with politics and geopolitics — and realpolitik.  

While the western mythology was that the US built up the foundations of China’s rise, historiography points in another direction, namely, that Beijing always had in mind the dialectics at work and even as a degree of compatibility of Chinese and American interests in checking the expansion of Soviet power existed, Beijing was determined to avoid military conflict with the Soviet Union and concentrated its attention on improving its tactical position within the US-Chinese-Soviet triangle. 

On its part, the Soviet Union also consistently promoted increased exchanges with China despite the bitter acrimony and even military clashes with a view to undercut perceived advantages the US derived from the Sino-Soviet split — and even sought to persuade China to accept the military and territorial status quo in Asia. 

In fact, to retard Sino-US cooperation against them in the early 1970s, the Soviets offered at one point to modify their territorial claims along their border, to sign non-aggression pacts and / or agreements prohibiting the use of force, to base Sino-Soviet relationship on the five principles of peaceful co-existence, and to restore high-level contacts, including party ties, in the interests of their common opposition to the US. 

If China largely ignored these overtures, it was almost entirely due to the great turbulence in its internal politics. Suffice to say, no sooner than Mao, the Soviet Union’s nemesis, died in September 1976 (and the curtain descended on the Cultural Revolution), Moscow followed up quickly with several gestures, including Brezhnev sending a message of condolence (the first CPSU message to China in a decade), followed by another Party message in October congratulating the newly-elected CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng, and shortly thereafter in November sending their chief negotiator for border talks Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev back to China in an attempt to resume the border talks. But, again, if nothing came of it, that was because of China’s invasion of Vietnam and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan soon thereafter in 1980. 

Indeed, looking back, the main legacy of the 1970s viewed through the prism of the US-China-Russia ‘triangle’ was the reorientation of China’s defence policy and its geopolitical realignment with the West. China made no contribution significantly to weaken the Soviet Union or to aggravate the stagnation and brewing crisis in the Soviet political economy.

Meanwhile, the Sino-US differences over Taiwan and other issues had reemerged by 1980-1982, compelling China to reassess its foreign policy strategy, which manifested in Beijing’s announcement in 1982 of its “independent” foreign policy — plainly put, an attempt to rely less explicitly on the US as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union — and the move to open “consultative talks” with Moscow, and a growing receptiveness towards the numerous pending Soviet overtures for bilateral exchanges (in sports, cultural and economic areas, etc), the overall direction being to reduce tensions with the Soviets and increase the room for manoeuvre for Beijing within the China-US-Soviet triangle. 

Indeed, a broader detente between China and the Soviet Union had to wait till the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan following the Geneva Accords signed in April 1988. Nonetheless, a basic change in the Sino-Soviet relations through the 1980s appeared, which included regular scheduled summit meetings; resumption of cooperative ties between the CCP and the CPSU; Beijing’s acceptance of the pending Soviet proposals for non-aggression / non-use of force; and resumption of Sino-Soviet border questions at vice-foreign minister level. 

Washington could sense the shift in Chinese policy directions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Notably, reviewing the marked  shift in the Chinese strategy, a CIA assessment noted:

“More recently, Moscow followed Brezhnev’s call in 1982 for improved relations with China with a halt in most authoritative Soviet statements critical of China. When Sino-Soviet discussions resumed in October 1982, Soviet media cut back sharply on criticism of China. And they have remained restrained on this subject, although occasional polemic exchanges marked Sino-Soviet coverage at the time of Premier Zhao Ziyang’s visit to the United States in January 1984. Moscow has continued to be critical of China through the Soviet-based clandestine radio Ba Yi… China for its part has continued criticism of Soviet foreign policy, although past attention to Soviet “revisionist” internal policies has all but disappeared since China’s own economic policies have been significantly changed after Mao’s death.”  

Succinctly put, with CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev consolidating power circa late 1988 by his election to the chairmanship of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet and on a parallel track, Deng had outmaneuvered political rivals and become China’s paramount leader by 1978 — and had launched the Boluan Fanzheng program to restore political stability, rehabilitate those persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, and reduce ideological extremism —  the door had opened for the two erstwhile adversaries to enter the rose garden of reconciliation. 

Significantly, the timing of Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing to meet up with Deng in 1989 was far from ideal by virtue of the Tiannenmen Square incidents, but neither side proposed to postpone or reschedule the meeting. Such was the intensity of their mutual desire for reconciliation.    

Today, the above résumé has become necessary when we assess the future directions of the Trump administration’s China policies. The common perception is that Trump is attempting to create a wedge between Putin’s Russia and Xi Jinping’s China with a view to isolate the latter and thwart it from surpassing the US. But there is no shred of evidence available hinting at the potential for decoupling Russia from China. 

All the signs are to the contrary in the direction of the steady integration of the two countries. Last week, the Kremlin announced a visa-free regime for Chinese citizens to visit Russia. Interestingly, this was a reciprocal move. FT reported recently that a Chinese businessman has been given equity in Russia’s biggest manufacturer of drones which supplies the military — in the first known collaboration in the area of defence industry.

With the Power of Siberia 2 on the anvil, China’s dependence on Russia for its energy security will increase further. Russia’s foreign trade is undergoing a profound shift, with China replacing the EU as Russia’s main trading partner. Overall, Sino-Russian relations are closer today than they have been in decades. 

On the other hand, there is no credible suggestion that the Trump administration is preparing for a war with China. Japan under its new leadership is whistling in the dark. 

So, what is on Trump’s mind? In his revolutionary agenda for the remaking of the new world order, Trump aims at a strategic concord between the US on one side and Russia and China on the other. The recent US National Security Strategy strongly points in that direction, too. The implications of this revolutionary thinking for multipolarity are going to be profound — for partners such as India or allies like Japan or Germany alike.            

December 12, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , , , | Leave a comment

A “ripple-on” effect following Sanae Takaichi’s remark

By Vladimir Terehov – New Eastern Outlook – December 7, 2025

The scandal triggered by a comment made by Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on November 7, 2025 about the Taiwan issue is still reverberating and shows no sign of dying down.

The “ripples on the water” provoked by her remark on the global political arena not only refuse to fade, they keep reaching new actors.

Japan’s Defense Minister visits an island near Taiwan

The NEO has already touched upon Takaichi’s earlier statements about the probability of Beijing opting for a military solution to the Taiwan issue and thus posing an “existential threat” to Japan. Now, any remaining hope that Takaichi’s remark was merely an unfortunate slip of the tongue of an inexperienced politician seems to be evaporating. As the first woman to assume the office of prime minister, being now at the very beginning of her path, she could, in theory, have walked straight into a trap cleverly laid by seasoned male politicians, perhaps an unexpected question tossed at her during some parliamentary event unrelated to the topic.

However, not only does Takaichi refuse to retract her words, but she also declines to offer any “softening” explanations. And this is despite Beijing discreetly signaling that such clarifications would be enough for it to consider the incident exhausted.

The assumption of Takaichi’s wording being an accidental slip of the tongue is further undermined by what happened two weeks later. Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi appeared on the small island of Yonaguni—Japan’s westernmost inhabited island, home to 1,500 people, lying closest to Taiwan’s eastern coast. More importantly, he announced plans to deploy missiles there in order, as he put it, “to reduce the likelihood of an armed attack on our country.”

He did not specify what kind of missiles he was taking about. Japan is currently developing a broad range of sea- and land-based missile systems, and if deployed on Yonaguni, several provinces of the PRC could fall within their range, since the narrowest distance to China’s coast is less than 500 km. The response that came from China’s Defense Ministry to already thinly veiled threats from Japan was more than expected.

It’s worth noting that another stage in the deterioration of bilateral relations was preceded by an attempt to rectify the situation in the realms of an emergency trip to Beijing by a Plenipotentiary of  the Japanese Foreign Ministry, which, nevertheless, was to no avail. If these two developments constitute Tokyo’s attempts to use a “carrot and stick” strategy, then such an approach is poorly appropriate in dealing with the world’s second-largest power.

Deepening and widening the emerging crisis

There are currently no hints at the possibility of reversing the deterioration of the relations between the region’s two leading states set in motion by Takaichi’s remark. Her previously arranged meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in South Africa never took place. A trilateral summit in the “China–Japan–South Korea” format, initially planned for January 2026, has been postponed to an indefinite period of time. This is particularly notable given that the resumption of this trilateral mechanism in May 2024, after a three-year hiatus, was heralded as a sign that longstanding, serious issues present in all its “sides” might finally be resolved.

Today, however, new obstacles are being thrown in the way of people-to-people contacts between China and Japan, particularly in tourism. New restrictions are also emerging around Japan’s export of seafood, which has long been bought mainly by China.

Over the last two years, the situation in the sector has served as a reliable indicator of the state of bilateral ties. When the said moment of improving the relations manifested itself, earlier concerns among Chinese authorities about the quality of Japan’s seawater, and thus its seafood, stemming from the release of treated water used to cool damaged reactors at Fukushima-1, faded away. Now, Chinese officials, to justify putting imports on halt, cite not only “incomplete” documentation but also “Takaichi’s erroneous statements on the Taiwan issue, which provoked indignation and condemnation among the Chinese people.”

A sharp stiffening of Chinese public and expert rhetoric towards Japan is also hard to miss, with them making use of diverse factual data both from World War II and the early postwar years. Particular attention is being paid to Tokyo’s attempts to revise the still-intact pacifist Constitution of 1947. Commentaries on the issue end with a general, unarguable warning: “Those who love war will perish.” The problem, however, is that “those” who provoke yet another, and most likely final, global carnage often act publicly for years with impunity, expecting to survive.

The current US president does not appear to pertain to such a category, even despite his political peculiarities and personal shortcomings. He appears genuinely alarmed by the rapidly escalating confrontation between East Asia’s two leading powers. Just a month after meeting their leaders in person, Donald Trump decided to pick up the phone. According to some reports, he expressed his “concern” over the state of Sino-Japanese relations during his conversation with Takaichi and urged her to “avoid escalation.” Nonetheless, the conflict continues spreading across the landscape of global politics and has already reached the UN stage.

The issue surfaced in late November during a phone call between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Emmanuel Bonne, diplomatic adviser to the French president, as well as during Wang Yi’s meeting with UK National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell that came to China on a visit. Notably, Bonne himself had visited China only a month earlier.

Reaction in Taiwan

It is worth reiterating that Taiwan is far from being a passive pawn in the geopolitical games of major powers around the Taiwan-related problem. This is, however, roughly how Beijing portrays it, insisting that the “Taiwan issue” does not exist at all: the island is simply outside China’s administrative control due to certain historical circumstances and “misunderstandings.”

China, nevertheless, closely monitors every nuance of Taiwan’s energetic domestic politics, and among the island’s major political forces, it clearly prefers the Kuomintang (KMT), now in opposition. Since the days of Sun Yat-sen, his successor Chiang Kai-shek, and current leaders of the party, the KMT has declared adherence to the “One China” principle, though, of course, on its own terms. While the party does not reject the need to develop ties with Japan, several KMT legislators and former president Ma Ying-jeou (who held office from 2008 to 2016) responded to Takaichi’s remark with cautious criticism, essentially saying: “We will handle our relations with the mainland ourselves.”

By contrast, the representatives of Taiwan’s current administration, starting with President Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party, have expressed full understanding of both Takaichi’s comments and Japan’s defense plans mentioned above. Meanwhile, the Taiwan People’s Party, which forms a coalition with the KMT, has offered its services as a mediator in the emerging Japan–China conflict.

Its further evolution needs constant monitoring, as it has become one of the major threats to global political stability today.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia-Pacific affairs

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December 7, 2025 Posted by | Militarism | , | Leave a comment

Japan’s planned missile deployment near Taiwan island extremely dangerous: FM

Global Times | November 24, 2025

Japan’s planned deployment of offensive weapons on the southwestern islands close to China’s Taiwan region is a deliberate attempt to create regional tension and provoke military confrontation. When viewed together with the erroneous remarks on the Taiwan question recently made by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, this development is extremely dangerous and must arouse high vigilance from neighboring countries and the international community, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said at a press briefing on Monday, in response to Japanese defense minister Shinjiro Koizumi’s claims about the deployment of surface-to-air missiles on an island near China’s Taiwan island.

According to media reports, when speaking to reporters as he wrapped up his trip to the base on Yonaguni on Sunday, Koizumi claimed plans to deploy missiles on Yonaguni island would “lower the chance of an armed attack,” rejecting concerns that it would would heighten regional tensions.

Yonaguni island lies about 110 kilometers from Taiwan island. Japan plans to deploy a unit equipped with the Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile, which is capable of intercepting aircraft and ballistic missiles, according to Kyodo News.

Mao pointed out that the Potsdam Proclamation clearly stipulates that Japan is prohibited from rearmament, and Japan’s Peace Constitution establishes the principle of “exclusive defense.” Yet in recent years, Japan has drastically adjusted its security policies, substantially increased its defense budget year after year, relaxed restrictions on arms exports, sought to develop offensive weapons, and even attempted to abandon the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles.”

Japanese right-wing forces are making every effort to break free from the constraints of the Peace Constitution, going ever further down the path of militarism and dragging Japan and the entire region toward disaster, the spokesperson noted.

By emphasizing this year marks the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the 80th anniversary of Taiwan’s restoration to China, Mao said China will never allow Japanese right-wing forces to reverse the course of history, will never permit external forces to interfere in China’s Taiwan region, and will never tolerate the resurgence of Japanese militarism.

China has both the determination and the capability to safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, she added.

November 24, 2025 Posted by | Militarism | , | Leave a comment

Beijing and Tokyo clash over ‘enemy state’ clause in UN Charter

RT | November 24, 2025

Japan has rebuked China for citing a UN Charter clause that permits action against former Axis powers without Security Council approval, insisting the provision is outdated and irrelevant.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s new government has been embroiled in an escalating diplomatic tit-for-tat with Beijing, beginning with remarks she made earlier this month supporting the self-governing administration on Taiwan. The Chinese side interpreted her comments that a cross-strait conflict would be a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan as signaling potential Japanese armed involvement and evidence of resurgent militarism.

Last week, the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo published an excerpt from the UN Charter which referred to “enemy states” – nations that fought against the original signatories, the Allied Powers of World War 2. Article 53 allows regional enforcement measures against such states in the event of a “renewal of aggressive policy,” without requiring prior authorization from the UN Security Council.

Beijing then lodged an official complaint with the UN over Takaichi’s statements. The embassy urged Japan “as a defeated country in World War II” to “reflect on its historical crimes” and change course on the Taiwan issue.

Japan’s Foreign Ministry dismissed that argument, accusing China of misinterpreting “obsolete clauses” that it claimed no longer align with UN practice. While the UN General Assembly recommended removing the “enemy state” references in 1995, the formal amendment process was never completed.

Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi visited a military base on Yonaguni over the weekend, an island about 110km east of Taiwan. He reiterated plans to deploy medium-range surface-to-air missiles there as part of a broader build-up on Japan’s southern island chain.

Russia also has outstanding issues with Japan, with whom it still has no formal peace treaty. Tokyo continues to insist on its claim to the four southernmost Kuril Islands, known in Japan as the “northern territories,” which became part of the USSR after World War 2 and remain a long-standing focal point for Japanese nationalists.

November 24, 2025 Posted by | Militarism | , , | Leave a comment

China threatens Japan over PM’s Taiwan comments

RT | November 14, 2025

China has warned that potential military involvement by Japan in the Taiwan issue would be treated as aggression and met with a forceful response. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi recently suggested her country could intervene in the Taiwan Strait.

Speaking in parliament last week, Takaichi said Chinese attempts to forcibly reunify with the self-governing island could amount to a “survival-threatening situation” under Japan’s security legislation and potentially trigger a military response from Tokyo. Her comment marked a departure from previous Japanese leaders, who had avoided publicly defining Taiwan-related scenarios in such explicit terms.

On Wednesday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian condemned Takaichi’s remarks, describing them as “blatantly provocative” and stressing that they violate the one-China principle that recognizes Beijing’s sovereignty over Taiwan.

“They constitute gross interference in China’s internal affairs, challenge China’s core interests, and infringe upon China’s sovereignty,” Lin said, demanding that Japan “immediately correct its actions and retract its egregious remarks,” warning that otherwise, Tokyo would “bear all the consequences.”

Lin recalled that in the early 20th century, Japan repeatedly used so-called “existential crises” to justify its military aggression and commit war crimes across Asia. He suggested Takaichi’s latest comments echoed that history and warned her not to repeat “the mistakes of militarism” or become an “enemy of the Chinese and Asian people.”

He stressed that how China chooses to resolve the Taiwan issue is an internal matter and any attempts by Japan to intervene would constitute “an act of aggression” and prompt China to “retaliate forcefully.”

Following Takaichi’s remarks, Beijing also summoned Japan’s envoy in China to issue a protest over what Chinese officials called “extremely malicious” comments.

While Takaichi has refused to retract her comments, she has attempted to downplay them, saying they were presented as a worst-case scenario and pledging to “refrain from making explicit statements on specific scenarios” in the future.

Takaichi was elected as Japan’s first female prime minister last month. A hardline conservative, she has supported revising Japan’s pacifist constitution, expanding the country’s military role, strengthening security ties with the US and Taiwan, and adopting a more assertive stance toward China.

November 14, 2025 Posted by | Militarism | , | Leave a comment

Eurasian Integration as an Anti-Hegemonic Economic System

By Prof. Glenn Diesen | October 30, 2025

We are living in an era of economic disruptions as US-centric globalisation is replaced by a more decentralised format of globalisation spearheaded by the Greater Eurasian continent. The consequence of these disruptions during this transition period is instability in economics, politics, and international security, as economic coercion escalates into war.

The disruptions to the international economy were predictable—and indeed predicted—for decades. When immense economic power is concentrated in a hegemon, the hegemon has incentives to build trust in an economic architecture under its administration. This translates into an open international economic system with access to technologies, industries, energy, food, physical transportation corridors, banks, currencies, and payment systems. This is referred to as a benign hegemon, as building trust in an open system ensures that alternatives are not developed and the world becomes immensely dependent on the hegemon. Subsequently, globalisation meant Americanisation.

Hegemons are, however, inherently temporary. Over the years, the US economy became excessively rent-seeking, financialised, and debt-ridden as its competitive edge declined. A hegemon makes mistakes and fails to prioritise strategically, as it can absorb the costs—until it reaches a breaking point. Around the world, other countries climbed up global value chains and grew concerned about the fiscal irresponsibility and unsustainability of the hegemonic system.

A declining hegemon will predictably behave very differently. It will use its administrative control over the global economy to prevent the rise of rival centres of power. Economic coercion is the new normal—for example, restricting China’s access to key technologies, seizing Iranian tankers and preparing the establishment of maritime choke points, stealing Russia’s sovereign funds, etc. Trust collapses, and efforts to create a more decentralised international economic system only intensify.

The declining hegemon will also attempt to divide rival centres of power: Germany must be severed from Russia, Russia must be split from China, China should be kept at a distance from India, India should reduce its economic connectivity with Iran, Iran should not resolve its disputes with the Gulf States etc. Markets are captured as the declining hegemon, for example, pushes Europe to reduce cooperation with Chinese technology and Russian energy. As the Europeans and other allies develop excessive reliance on the US, economic and industrial power can be transferred to the US. Eventually, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Europe will recognise that hitching their wagon to a declining hegemon to preserve a unipolar order that is already gone, is inherently destructive. The option is to either diversify their economic connectivity for prosperity and political autonomy, or become captured markets that can be cannibalised by the declining hegemon.

The declining hegemon has—much like its adversaries and allies—strong incentives to embrace multipolar realities. New political forces within the declining hegemon will recognise that pursuing hegemonic policies under a multipolar international distribution of power will be punished by the international system. Exhausting its remaining resources and incentivising the rest of the world to collectively balance against the declining hegemon is unsustainable. The ideal strategy for the declining hegemon is to accept a more modest role in the international system as one among many great powers, reducing collective balancing and enabling socio-economic recovery to rebuild former strength.

The rise of Eurasia marks the end of 500 years of Western leadership and dominance in the world, since European maritime powers began connecting the world in the early 16th century. While some panic in the West is therefore understandable, there are nonetheless great opportunities.

Adam Smith famously wrote: “The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind… By uniting, in some measure, the most distant parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another’s wants, to increase one another’s enjoyments, and to encourage one another’s industry, their general tendency would seem to be beneficial”.

However, Adam Smith also recognised the problems of the skewed power distribution between the Europeans and the rest of the world. Adam Smith wrote: “To the natives however, both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits which can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned… At the particular time when these discoveries were made, the superiority of force happened to be so great on the side of the Europeans that they were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote countries”.

Adam Smith argued that a more even distribution of power could create a more harmonious international economy: “Hereafter, perhaps, the natives of those countries may grow stronger, or those of Europe may grow weaker, and the inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect for the rights of one another. But nothing seems more likely to establish this equality of force than that mutual communication of knowledge and of all sorts of improvements which an extensive commerce from all countries to all countries naturally, or rather necessarily, carries along with it”.

I conclude that the aspiration of Eurasian integration should be to make it anti-hegemonic but not anti-Western by descending into bloc politics.

October 30, 2025 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Japan’s Green Energy Failures Serve as a Warning to the US

By Yoshihiro Muronaka | The Western Journal | October 6, 2025

In August 2025, Japanese media revealed that Mitsubishi Corporation was preparing to withdraw from three offshore wind projects off the coasts of Chiba and Akita prefectures.

In 2021, Mitsubishi had won these sites with remarkably low bids of 8 to 11 cents/kilowatt-hour (kWh), hailed as proof of Japan’s corporate strength and renewable ambition.

But reality was harsh. Costs for steel, turbines, and logistics surged. The yen weakened, interest rates rose, and certification processes faced delays. By 2025, Mitsubishi had already booked over $350 million in impairment losses, with more likely if the projects continued. The retreat is not just a corporate failure; it exposes apparent self-contradictions in Japan’s energy policy.

Across the Atlantic, offshore facilities have faced similar headwinds. On the U.S. East Coast, Ørsted cancelled two large projects in New Jersey, absorbing billions in losses. BP and Equinor abandoned contracts in New York after costs rose by 40 percent beyond estimates. In some cases, companies chose to pay hefty penalties rather than commit to losing ventures.

Europe, the pioneer of offshore wind, has also stumbled. In the U.K., Vattenfall halted its Norfolk Boreas project, citing a 40 percent cost increase. Even Denmark, often celebrated as a leader, has delayed new tenders.

Market signals in these regions were clear: When economics fail, projects are scaled back or canceled. Japan, however, continues to treat offshore wind as a central pillar of its 2040 roadmap, aiming for 45 gigawatts of capacity. Why the difference?

Once designated a national project, policies in Japan are difficult to reverse. Offshore wind has been tied to three goals at once: decarbonization, energy security, and industrial revitalization. Billions in subsidies through the Green Innovation Fund are already committed, while local governments and industries expect contracts and jobs.

In effect, offshore wind has become a new type of public works project. Ports, construction companies, heavy industry, and trading houses all benefit from government support. For politicians, it delivers regional development; for bureaucrats, it provides visible progress. Under these conditions, corporate withdrawal is treated as a temporary setback and prompts no policy review.

The debate over energy costs often centers on the Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE), which narrowly focuses on the cost of generating a kilowatt-hour of electricity. However, this metric fails to capture the broader economic realities encapsulated by the Full Cost of Electricity (FCOE).

FCOE provides a more comprehensive assessment by incorporating additional factors such as the expense of backup power from fossil or nuclear plants to address the intermittency of renewable sources, the costs associated with grid expansion and balancing services to maintain stability, as well as subsidies, premiums, and public support schemes that often prop up certain energy technologies. Furthermore, FCOE accounts for the long-term costs of decommissioning, recycling, and environmental restoration, ensuring a more accurate reflection of the true economic and environmental impact of electricity production.

When these are included, offshore wind’s cost can be double or triple its LCOE.

Offshore wind’s LCOE is around 12 to 16 cents/kWh, but when the full cost of electricity (FCOE) is considered, it rises to 20 to 30 cents/kWh. Nuclear and gas remain much lower, at roughly 12 to 14 cents/kWh and 10 to 12 cents/kWh, respectively.

OECD studies confirm that as “renewables” such as wind and solar rise from 10 percent to 30 percent of the grid, FCOE escalates sharply. Yet Japan highlights falling LCOE while downplaying FCOE, creating an illusion of competitiveness.

Because fixed-bottom projects face difficulties, Japanese policymakers increasingly promote floating offshore wind as a unique advantage. Japan’s deep coastal waters, they argue, make floating turbines more suitable.

Globally, however, floating wind remains at the developmental stage. Norway’s Hywind Scotland and France’s Provence Grand Large provide valuable data, but their costs remain far higher than fixed-bottom projects. Commercial viability has not yet been proven. Betting on floating wind as a “game-changer” risks repeating the same error: political enthusiasm without economic grounding.

Japan’s offshore wind experience is not just about Japan. It illustrates how energy policy everywhere can drift into policy inertia, selective cost reporting, technological optimism, and entrenched interests.

The lesson is clear. Policymakers should always assess the full costs, not just partial figures. They should heed market signals and adjust policy accordingly. Most importantly, they should avoid turning energy policy reliant on unproven technology into political patronage.

Mitsubishi’s retreat shows that even giants cannot overcome flawed policy frameworks. If Japan, with its formidable industrial base, struggles to make offshore wind viable, others should pay attention.

Japan’s offshore wind setback is more than a domestic issue. It is a global reminder of the dangers of ignoring full costs and clinging to illusions. Ambitious targets and political inertia can mask reality, but economics will always reassert itself.

For policymakers worldwide, Japan’s case should not be seen as an embarrassment, but as a warning and an opportunity: Energy transitions must be guided by facts, not hopes, if they are to be sustainable.

October 9, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Malthusian Ideology, Phony Scarcity | | Leave a comment

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