US likely already sent new light JLTV ‘Tomahawk’ launchers to Neo-Nazi junta
By Drago Bosnic | October 8, 2025
Supplying the “Tomahawk” cruise missiles to the Kiev regime has been “on the table” for years. The troubled Biden administration never delivered them, despite repeatedly suggesting it would. Interestingly, Donald Trump regularly criticized such moves as escalatory, insisting that the United States shouldn’t be involved and that it’s only antagonizing Russia. Ironically enough, as soon as he took office, this stance changed dramatically. In a matter of weeks, Trump’s initial promise of “ending the war in 24 hours” degenerated into the same sort of belligerent rhetoric (and moves) as during the Biden era. The new US administration increased American involvement, with military sources suggesting that the Pentagon is close to delivering the aforementioned “Tomahawk” missiles.
Worse yet, some claim that this has already happened and that Washington DC even raised the stakes by supplying new light launchers for the US-made cruise missiles. Namely, since 2019, the Pentagon has been acquiring the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), better known as the Oshkosh Light Combat Tactical All-Terrain Vehicle (L-ATV). It was designed to replace the AM General High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), better known as the Humvee. One version of the JLTV has been modified for use by the US Marine Corps (USMC) under the Long Range Fires (LRF) program, designed to launch cruise missiles, specifically the infamous “Tomahawk”. The Pentagon intended to give the USMC similar capabilities to those of the US Army, which has the ground-based “Typhon”.
There’s been some confusion even in the US Congress regarding the official designation for the program, with some documents referring to it as the Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF), while others still use the LRF. Either way, the US military’s ability to use operational and strategic weapons on such a small platform can certainly provide it with a significant advantage in terms of risk mitigation. Namely, because the launcher is essentially a modified JLTV truck that’s now in wide use (well over 20,000 have been delivered so far), it makes it very difficult to detect “Tomahawk” carriers. This enables shoot-and-scoot (sort of like hit-and-run) strikes at targets that are 1,600 km away, although some sources claim that it’s 2,500 km for the latest Block V iteration of the “Tomahawk”.
The latest reports suggest that these cruise missiles have already been delivered to the Neo-Nazi junta forces through the main logistics hub for NATO-occupied Ukraine in Rzeszów, southeastern Poland, and are now waiting for the “zero hour” somewhere in Western Ukraine. The Kiev regime lacks the necessary ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities to effectively use the “Tomahawk” to the maximum, meaning that the US/NATO would need to provide the targeting data. This has already been the case with other Western cruise missiles, most notably the Anglo-French “Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG” and the German “Taurus” (the latter is yet to be officially delivered and deployed). Both types are newer and more advanced than the 1980s-era US-made “Tomahawk”.
However, the aforementioned Block V would certainly give them a run for their money, especially if deployed from the highly mobile JLTV trucks. Its ability to move quickly through heavily forested areas makes it extremely difficult to detect, meaning that it could effectively act as some sort of a single-shot “Iskander-K” (uses the 9M728/R-500, with a range of up to 500 km and the Novator’s 9M729, which Western sources claim has a staggering range of up to 5,500 km). The launcher could instantly deploy at virtually any firing position, while its relatively low cost offers the key advantage in terms of mitigating losses. Military sources report that the US could produce 100-200 such units per month, while the number of missiles supplied in each batch can reach over 500 units.
In other words, such a mass production would make it a much bigger challenge than the expensive and overhyped Western European missiles that the United Kingdom, France and Germany can produce in single or double digits, at best. Obviously, this is not to say that the Russian military could be defeated solely with the use of “Tomahawks”, but it could certainly complicate logistics and other operations far behind the immediate frontline. The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) and its surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems have accumulated extensive experience in countering various types of missiles and drones; however, the mass deployment of different kinds of cruise missiles can pose a significant challenge. Namely, Russia is the largest country on the planet, making it extremely difficult to defend all of its territory.
Thus, the aviation, air defenses and ISR assets will need to work together and closely coordinate their actions in order to defend the most critically important areas (military-industrial facilities, bridges, thermal and nuclear power plants, substations, etc). A&WAC (airborne early warning and control) aircraft such as the A-50U will play a crucial role in this, as they can detect and track very low-flying cruise missiles. The sheer range of the “Tomahawk” puts virtually all of European Russia within striking distance, while the Block V expands that well into Western Siberia, putting even ICBM fields in jeopardy, including the Dombarovsky Red Banner Division of the 31st Missile Army of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN). This unit is armed with the monstrously destructive R-36M2 “Voyevoda” ICBMs (and likely the RS-28 “Sarmat”).
These missiles are also capable of deploying the Yu-71/74 “Avangard” HGVs (hypersonic glide vehicles), the world’s most advanced hypersonic weapon. The US calculus is pretty clear – deploying these missiles in NATO-occupied Ukraine puts Russia into an incredibly dangerous strategic position. It’s very similar to the geopolitical impact of having “Tomahawk” missiles permanently deployed in the Philippines and Japan, as these put Beijing and most major Chinese cities in range.
Thus, America has the capacity to strike both (Eur)Asian giants with medium-range weapons, while the two can only respond with their strategic arsenals. Although this effectively gives Washington DC the ability to dictate the pace of potential escalation, it still makes the world a far more dangerous place, forcing Moscow and Beijing to contemplate immediate strategic retaliation in order to defend themselves.
Drago Bosnic is an independent geopolitical and military analyst.
UK Digital ID Scheme Faces Backlash Over Surveillance Fears — Is a Similar Plan Coming to the U.S.?
By Michael Nevradakis, Ph.D. | The Defender |October 2, 2025
The U.K. plans to introduce a nationwide digital ID scheme that will require citizens and non-citizens to obtain a “BritCard” to work in the U.K., which includes England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Government officials say the plan, to take effect no later than August 2029, will help combat illegal immigration.
But critics like U.K. activist and campaigner Montgomery Toms said the scheme, “far from being a tool for progress,” is instead a “gateway to mass surveillance, control and ultimately the rollout of a centralised social credit system.”
The plan faces broad opposition in the U.K., according to Nigel Utton, a U.K.-based board member of the World Freedom Alliance, who said, “the feeling against the government here is enormous.”
A poll last week found that 47% of respondents opposed digital ID, while 27% supported the ID system and 26% were neutral. The poll was conducted by Electoral Calculus and Find Out Now, on behalf of GB News.
A petition on the U.K. Parliament’s website opposing plans to introduce digital ID may force a parliamentary debate. As of today, the petition has over 2.73 million signatures.
According to The Guardian, petitions with 100,000 signatures or more are considered for debate in the U.K. parliament.
As opposition mounts, there are signs the BritCard may not be a done deal. According to the BBC, a three-month consultation will take place, and legislation will likely be introduced to Parliament in early 2026.
However, U.K. Culture Secretary Lisa Nandy said the government may push through its digital ID plans without going through the House of Commons or the House of Lords.
Protesters plan to gather Oct. 18 in central London.
Digital ID will ‘offer ordinary citizens countless benefits,’ U.K. officials say
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced the digital ID scheme last week in a speech at the Global Progress Action Summit in London.
“A secure border and controlled migration are reasonable demands, and this government is listening and delivering,” Starmer said. “Digital ID is an enormous opportunity for the U.K. It will make it tougher to work illegally in this country, making our borders more secure.
The plan “will also offer ordinary citizens countless benefits, like being able to prove your identity to access key services swiftly,” Starmer said.
According to The Guardian, digital ID eventually may be used for driver’s licenses, welfare benefits, access to tax records, and the provision of childcare and other public services.
Darren Jones, chief secretary to Starmer, suggested it may become “the bedrock of the modern state,” the BBC reported.
Supporters of the plan include the Labour Together think tank, which is closely aligned with the Labour Party and which published a report in June calling for the introduction of the BritCard.
Two days before Starmer’s announcement, the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, led by Labour Party member and former U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, published a report, “Time for Digital ID: A New Consensus for a State That Works.”
Blair tried to introduce digital ID two decades ago as a means of fighting terrorism and fraud, but the plan failed amid public opposition. According to the BBC, Starmer recently claimed the world has “moved on in the last 20 years,” as “we all carry a lot more digital ID now than we did.”
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Blair endorsed a global digital vaccine passport, the Good Health Pass, launched by ID2020 with the support of Facebook, Mastercard and the World Economic Forum.
According to Sky News, French President Emmanuel Macron welcomed the BritCard for its ability to help fight illegal immigration into the U.K., much of which originates from France.
Critics: Digital ID marks ‘gateway to mass surveillance’
The BritCard, which would live on people’s phones, will use technology similar to digital wallets. People will not be required to carry their digital ID or be asked to produce it, except for employment purposes, the government said.
According to the BBC, BritCard will likely include a person’s name, photo, date of birth and nationality or residency status.
Digital wallets, which include documents such as driver’s licenses and health certificates, have been introduced in several countries, including the U.S.
Nandy said the U.K. government has “no intention of pursuing a dystopian mess” with its introduction of digital ID.
However, the plan has opened up a “civil liberties row” in the U.K., according to The Guardian, with critics warning it will lead to unprecedented surveillance and control over citizens.
“Digital ID systems are not designed to secure borders,” said Seamus Bruner, author of “Controligarchs: Exposing the Billionaire Class, their Secret Deals, and the Globalist Plot to Dominate Your Life” and director of research at the Government Accountability Institute. “They’re designed to expand bureaucratic control of the masses.”
Bruner told The Defender :
“All attempts to roll out digital ID follow a familiar pattern: corporate and political elites wield crises — such as mass migration, crime, or tech disruptions — as a pretext to expand their control … over private citizens’ identities, finances and movements into a suffocating regime.
“Once rolled out, these systems expand quietly, shifting from access tools to enforcement mechanisms. Yesterday it was vaccine passports and lockdowns; tomorrow it is 15-minute cities and the ‘universal basic income’ dependency trap. ‘Voluntary’ today becomes mandatory tomorrow.”
Tim Hinchliffe, editor of The Sociable, said digital ID is “not about tackling illegal immigration, it has nothing to do with job security and it definitely won’t protect young people online. Digital ID is all about surveillance and control through coercion and force.”
Hinchliffe said:
“Illegal immigration is just one excuse to bring it all online. Be vigilant for other excuses like climate change, cybersecurity, convenience, conflict, refugees, healthcare, war, famine, poverty, welfare benefits. Anything can be used to usher in digital ID.”
Twila Brase, co-founder and president of the Citizens’ Council for Health Freedom, said governments favor digital ID because it allows unprecedented surveillance.
The ID system “notifies the government every time an identity card is used, giving it a bird’s-eye view of where, when and to whom people are showing their identity,” she said.
According to Toms, “A digital ID system gives governments the ability to monitor, restrict, and ultimately punish citizens who do not comply with state directives. It centralises power in a way that is extremely dangerous to liberty.”
Experts disputed claims that digital ID is necessary to improve public services.
“The ‘improved efficiency’ argument is a technocratic fantasy used to seduce a public obsessed with convenience,” said attorney Greg Glaser. “Governments have managed to provide services for centuries without a digital panopticon. This is not about efficiency. It is about creating an immutable, unforgeable link between every individual and the state.”
Digital ID technology may create ‘an enormous hacking target’
London-based author and political analyst Evans Agelissopoulos said major global investment firms, including BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street, could combine their financial might with the power of digital ID.
“BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street are on a mission to buy properties to rent to people. Digital ID could be used against people they deem unfit to rent to,” he said.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the same firms supported digital vaccine passports in major corporations in which they are among the top shareholders. Some experts suggested digital ID may institutionalize a vaccine passport regime and central bank digital currencies.
“Digital identity is the linchpin to every dystopian nightmare under the sun,” Hinchliffe said. “Without it, there can be no programmable digital currencies, there can be no carbon footprint trackers, no social credit system.”
Other experts suggested that a centralized database containing the data of all citizens could be monetized. “By centralizing everything, they will have access to health, criminal, financial records. This data can be sold,” Agelissopoulos said.
According to Brase, those who will benefit from the centralization of this data include:
“Anybody who’s going to be the third-party administrator, academia and companies who are building biometric systems and what they call ‘augmented authentication systems’ that provide the cameras, the back system operations for biometric identification and for digital systems.”
Several major information technology (IT), defense and accounting firms, including Deloitte and BAE Systems, have received U.K. government contracts totaling 100 million British pounds ($134.7 million) for the development and rollout of BritCard.
U.S. tech companies, including Palantir, Nvidia and OpenAI, “have also been circling the UK government,” The Guardian reported.
Digital ID also raises security concerns, with IT experts describing the U.K.’s plan as “an enormous hacking target,” citing recent large-scale breaches involving digital ID databases in some countries, including Estonia.
“Government databases are frequently hacked — from healthcare systems to tax records,” Toms said. “Centralizing sensitive personal data into a single mandatory digital ID is a disaster waiting to happen.”
The public may also directly bear the cost of these systems. Italy’s largest digital ID provider, Poste Italiane, recently floated plans to levy a 5 euro ($5.87) annual fee for users.
Switzerland to roll out digital ID next year, amid controversy
In a referendum held on Sunday, voters in Switzerland narrowly approved the introduction of a voluntary national digital ID in their country.
According to the BBC, 50.4% of voters approved the proposal. Biometric Update noted that the proposal received a majority in only eight of the country’s 26 cantons, though the country’s government campaigned in favor of the proposal.
Digital ID in Switzerland is expected to be rolled out next year.
Swiss health professional George Deliyanidis said he “does not see any benefits for the public” from the plan. Instead, he sees “a loss of personal freedom.”
“There are suspicions of election fraud,” he added.
In a letter sent Tuesday to the Swiss government, a copy of which was reviewed by The Defender, the Mouvement Fédératif Romand cited “significant statistical disparities” in the referendum’s results and called for a recount.
In 2021, Swiss voters rejected a proposal on digital ID under which data would have been held by private providers, the BBC reported. Under the current proposal, data will remain with the state.
According to the Manchester Evening News, countries that have introduced nationwide digital ID include Australia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, India, Japan, South Korea, Spain, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates. Other countries with similar systems include France, Finland and Norway.
In July, Vietnam introduced digital ID for foreigners living in the country. In August, the Vietnamese government helped neighboring Laos launch digital ID.
The New York Times reported that, in 2024, China added an “internet ID” to its digital ID system, “to track citizens’ online usage.”
Bill Gates has supported the rollout of digital ID in several countries, including India.
The European Union plans to launch its Digital Identity Wallet by the end of 2026.
“When you see a nearly simultaneous worldwide push, like this digital ID agenda, people in all nations need to expect to be impacted to some extent,” said James F. Holderman III, director of special investigations for Stand for Health Freedom.
Is national digital ID coming to the U.S.?
Although the U.S. does not have a national identification card, the U.K. did not have one either — until digital ID was introduced. The U.K. scrapped national ID in 1952.
In May, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began Real ID enforcement for domestic air travelers in the U.S. In the months before, TSA engaged in a push to encourage U.S. citizens to acquire Real ID-compliant documents, such as driver’s licenses. Full enforcement will begin in 2027.
The REAL ID Act of 2005 established security standards for state-issued ID cards in response to the 9/11 attacks and the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. In the intervening years, its implementation was repeatedly delayed.
Last year, then-President Joe Biden issued an executive order for federal and state governments to speed up the adoption of digital ID.
Brase said Real ID “is really a national ID system for America, currently disguised as a state driver’s license with a star. The American people really have no idea that what’s in their pocket is a national ID and they have no idea that the [Department of Motor Vehicles offices] are planning to digitize them.”
Hinchliffe said 193 countries, including the U.S., accepted digital ID last year when they approved the United Nations’ Pact for the Future.
Earlier this month, Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) introduced the Safeguarding Personal Information Act of 2025 (S 2769), a bill to repeal the REAL ID Act of 2005.
“If digital ID is allowed to spread globally, future generations will never know freedom,” Hinchliffe said.
This article was originally published by The Defender — Children’s Health Defense’s News & Views Website under Creative Commons license CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Please consider subscribing to The Defender or donating to Children’s Health Defense.
Japanese Prime Minister Fails to Mention US as Country Responsible for Hiroshima Bombing
Sputnik – 06.08.2025
Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba did not name the United States as the country that dropped nuclear bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 during the commemorative ceremony in Hiroshima on Wednesday.
In August 1945, during WWII, US pilots dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Hiroshima blast killed up to 140,000 of the city’s 350,000 population on August 6 that year, with Nagasaki losing approximately 74,000 on August 9.
“Eighty years ago on this day, an atomic bomb exploded, and it is believed that more than 100,000 precious lives were lost,” Shigeru Ishiba said during the commemorative ceremony on Wednesday, without mentioning the United States as the country responsible for the bombing.
Hiroshima Mayor Kazumi Matsui mentioned the US only in the context of being one of the countries that possess nuclear weapons.
In his address dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the US bombing of Hiroshima, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres made no mention of the country responsible. The address was read out in Japanese by UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu and only mentioned that “the lives of tens of thousands of people were taken” in the Hiroshima tragedy.
Over 120 representatives of foreign nations, as well as Japanese politicians, participated in the Wednesday commemorative ceremony in Hiroshima marking 80 years since the atomic bombing.
US-led drills pose threat to peace in Asia – Lavrov
RT | July 12, 2025
The military activities of the US and its allies around the Korean Peninsula threaten the stability of the entire region, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said during his visit to North Korea.
The US, South Korea, and Japan are increasing the number of joint military drills, some of which involve “a nuclear component,” Lavrov told reporters at a press conference in Wonsan on Saturday.
“This does not contribute to peace and stability, not only on the Korean Peninsula but throughout Northeast Asia,” the diplomat said, expressing skepticism about Seoul’s intentions to normalize relations with Pyongyang.
Lavrov condemned what he described as “dangerous attempts by actors outside the Indo-Pacific to form exclusive alliances and expand NATO infrastructure in the region.” He emphasized that countries should not build alliances at the expense of others, adding that both Russia and North Korea are committed to “equal and indivisible security” for all nations in Eurasia.
The US, South Korea, and Japan conducted joint exercises this week involving the deployment of America’s nuclear-capable B-52H strategic bombers. In a joint statement, the allies accused Pyongyang of “unlawful activities” that “destabilize the Korean Peninsula.”
Russia and North Korea signed a defense pact in June 2024, after which Pyongyang dispatched troops to help expel Ukrainian forces from Russia’s Kursk region later that year. The cooperation is a testament to the “invincible brotherhood” between the two countries, Lavrov said.
How India-Pakistan war will affect global and regional political order
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – May 24, 2025
The recent India-Pakistan war, though limited in scope, has triggered significant geopolitical reverberations by showcasing Chinese military superiority and prompting a strategic reassessment in Washington.
The China angle in regional geopolitics
Beyond the oft-repeated rhetoric of the Pakistan-China relationship being “all-weather” and “iron-clad,” the recent India-Pakistan war may come to be seen as its first major demonstration in action. Pakistan’s use of Chinese PL-15 missiles, deployed from Chinese-made J-10C fighter jets to successfully engage French-made Rafale aircraft, has underscored the strategic depth of this partnership. This has received considerable international attention, both in the media and otherwise. This show of alignment is particularly notable given recent strains in the Pak-China bilateral relationship, including attacks on Chinese interests and infrastructure projects within Pakistan.
With Pakistan importing almost 80 per cent of its weapons—which also includes cooperation in the field of military technology—from Beijing, the supply ensured to help Islamabad maintain the balance of power vis-à-vis New Delhi. More than this, China’s policy was also motivated by its desire to counter-balance Washington’s efforts to boost India against China. Ironically enough, it was only days before the recent war that the US Vice-President was in India to discuss ways to collectively counter China. But China’s support for Pakistan meant that New Delhi remained preoccupied more with Pakistan than China in a strategic sense. With this war, New Delhi’s focus will be more on Islamabad than China for at least a few more years to come. By the same token, China will most likely continue to help Pakistan develop its defence capability. Even before the war took place, media reports in Pakistan and China reveled ongoing talks between Beijing and Islamabad for the sale and purchase of J-35 fifth-generation stealth fighter jets.
These developments highlight at least four key takeaways. First, China’s defense technology—likely tested in actual combat for the first time—has proven effective enough to attract interest from other regional powers. Its demonstrated performance could prompt these countries to purchase and integrate Chinese systems into their own militaries. This, in turn, would strengthen China’s position in the regional arms market and help it outcompete rival defense exporters. Second, China’s willingness to export advanced military technology—such as the PL-15 missile and J-35 fighter jets—signals a broader strategic intent to deepen its global partnerships. This approach is consistent with Beijing’s “no-limits” alliance with Moscow.
Third, the demonstrated effectiveness of Chinese weaponry against India could encourage regional states to reassess their foreign policy alignments, potentially fostering deeper integration with Beijing over New Delhi. This trend is already evident in countries like Sri Lanka and the Maldives, where pro-Beijing political shifts have gained momentum—most notably in the Maldives, where the new government compelled Indian troops to withdraw. Fourth, Pakistan’s military successes in this conflict challenge a common narrative in global discourse: that partnerships with China inevitably lead to economic “debt traps.” On the contrary, Pakistan’s economic ties with China appear to have laid the foundation for robust military-to-military cooperation, illustrating how economic integration can support broader strategic alignment.
India’s position in Washington’s arc
Can Washington still push—with enough confidence—India as its key ally? What is the material reality of India’s standing within the US-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)? If the QUAD was ever to become a military alliance, the only power in the region that the US expected to be effective on its own against China is/was India—not only because India and China have a long history of rivalry, but also because India remains a big military power. Needless to say, it is the only nuclear power part of the QUAD from the Indo-Pacific region. In this sense, it can maintain deterrence vis-à-vis Beijing. But nuclear deterrence can prevent a nuclear war, as is evident from the recent India-Pakistan conflict. It cannot necessarily prevent conventional conflict. Can India act as the front-line ally for Washington in the region in a conventional war?
The outcome of India-Pakistan was means Washington will have to rethink its strategy. It can take two shapes. First, it is very much possible that Washington will deepen its cooperation with New Delhi. Donald Trump has already offered to sell F-35 fifth-generation stealth fighters. (Russia has also offered New Delhi to sell its own fifth-generation Su-57 jets.) This, however, will necessarily involve China deepening its cooperation with Pakistan. As a result, an arms race will be triggered in the region.
A second strategic path for Washington could involve renewed engagement with China. While the timing of the Trump administration’s trade negotiations with Beijing may coincide with the outcome of the India-Pakistan conflict purely by chance, it nonetheless suggests that even a confrontational administration has not entirely ruled out dialogue as a preferred tool. Washington might also pursue a dual-track approach—engaging China while simultaneously strengthening military alliances elsewhere.
However, in the wake of shifting dynamics following the India-Pakistan conflict, the US will likely need to reassess its regional strategy and consider alternatives to India. Japan, for instance, emerges as a strong candidate. With its recent push toward military normalization and a growing appetite for deeper strategic engagement, Tokyo could become a more prominent partner in Washington’s Indo-Pacific security architecture.
To be clear, this does not imply a fundamental rupture in US-India relations. But it is increasingly likely that Washington will place India’s role under careful review, potentially redefining its status as the principal frontline ally in countering China. In response to China’s growing influence and military reach, the US will need to significantly bolster the defense capabilities of other regional actors—most notably Japan and Australia—as part of a broader strategic recalibration.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
Is North Korea a nuclear state?
By Konstantin Asmolov – New Eastern Outlook – February 4, 2025
The transition from the Biden to the Trump government was marked by an interesting discussion as to how the outgoing and coming administrations view North Korea’s nuclear potential.
Republicans: DPRK is a nuclear state and de-nuclearisation is unlikely
On January 14, US Secretary of Defence nominee Pete Hegseth called North Korea a “nuclear power” that poses a threat to global stability. He noted Pyongyang’s success in increasing its nuclear potential, bringing down the size of nuclear warheads and improving mobile launch platforms, which is of particular concern given North Korea’s proximity to the territories where US military contingents are located.
Also, Donald Trump intends to appoint Elbridge Colby, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Strategy and Force Development in his first term, to the post of Under Secretary of Defence for Policy. This is a man who believes that the de-nuclearisation of the DPRK is an ‘unlikely’ goal. In addition, Colby believes that US troops on the Korean peninsula should focus more on threats from China and that “North Korea is not the primary threat to the United States”. “It is irrational to sacrifice several American cities to fight the DPRK” and Washington should allow South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons or at least to seriously consider such a possibility.
Democrats: DPRK is not a nuclear state, de-nuclearisation remains the goal
On the same day, January 14, the outgoing US president’s national security adviser, John Kirby, noted that the White House’s policy on this issue had not changed. The current US administration, led by Joe Biden, does not agree with Pete Hegseth’s statement.
On January 7, former US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, Philip Goldberg, stated that, despite the issues associated with the development of Pyongyang’s nuclear and weapons capabilities, the de-nuclearisation of North Korea should remain a goal that must continue to be fought for.
The South Korean Foreign Ministry made similar statements: “North Korea’s de-nuclearisation has been a principle consistently upheld by South Korea, the United States and the international community” … Under the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), North Korea can never be recognised as a nuclear-armed state”.
The conservative media in South Korea also began to sound the alarm; such terminology ‘not only changes the international community’s understanding of North Korea’s nuclear status, but also undermines the long-standing efforts of South Korea and the United States to achieve the de-nuclearisation of the North’. “Recognising North Korea as a nuclear power is fundamentally different from recognising its technical nuclear capabilities”. Their writing show concerns that by shifting the conversation from de-nuclearisation to arms control, Washington and Pyongyang may eventually agree to freeze the nuclear programme, from which the US-ROK alliance would take a blow and which could also trigger a nuclear domino effect. “If North Korea is recognised as a nuclear power, countries like South Korea, Japan and even Taiwan may reconsider their non-nuclear positions”.
Marco Rubio’s views
A while later, on January 16, in response to statements that the US’ policy towards North Korea, including sanctions, is ‘ineffective’ and Pyongyang is only doubling down on its nuclear and missile programmes, Secretary of State nominee Marco Rubio has already noted that Washington should take a serious look at policy on North Korea to study how to reduce the risk of an ‘unintended’ war between the two Koreas and prevent a crisis on the Korean peninsula without encouraging countries to build their own nuclear weapons.
Note that the new Secretary of State does not make the North out to be a ‘threat to humanity’ and sets more practical tasks, avoiding what the author calls ‘conflict for irrational reasons’ and the likely fall of the nuclear non-proliferation regime due to the emergence of new nuclear actors (we shall not name them specifically, but all is clear to everyone).
Rubio admitted that he was initially sceptical about engaging with Pyongyang, but during his first term as president, Trump “stopped missile tests. This did not stop the development of the programme, but at least it calmed the situation down a bit”.
Rubio did not directly mention de-nuclearisation, but noted that Kim Jong Un “used nuclear weapons as an insurance policy to stay in power” and “no sanctions prevented him from developing this potential”.
The South Korean Foreign Ministry’s response to Rubio’s remark on January 16, 2025, was similar to the answer to Hegseth: the de-nuclearisation of North Korea is a “unanimous goal” shared by the international community. We have heard Rubio, but “the new Trump administration has yet to outline its policy towards Pyongyang” and South Korea “intends to maintain close contacts with the United States in the process of reviewing its policies to ensure a coordinated response to North Korea’s nuclear and other challenges”.
In summary…
Previously, US officials refused to publicly recognise North Korea as a nuclear power, even though Pyongyang has called itself a nuclear power in its constitution, adopted a nuclear doctrine and showed no willingness to discuss giving up its nuclear weapons. In their opinion, the use of this term can be interpreted as the recognition of the DPRK’s nuclear status and thus negatively affect US efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The Biden administration tried to look the other way and not acknowledge the reality, perceiving the North Korean regime as a country that does not yet have real nuclear potential and, importantly, may even be subject to de-nuclearisation. Although, it was clear by the end of the 2010s that such a process was possible only after a regime change.
The Trump administration is more realistic in this regard. Perhaps the fact of the matter is that there are quite a lot of military personnel who have worked in the field and are well aware of what real North Korean nuclear missile power is.
The question, however, is how US policy will be adjusted in relation to the idea of a nuclear North. Say Trump decides to recognise North Korea’s nuclear status; what practical steps will follow and how it will affect changes in sanctions? On the one hand, it becomes clear that de-nuclearisation, which was the main formal goal of the negotiations between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un at the previous stage, no longer makes sense. At best, it makes sense to talk about arms control and here there are some theoretical prospects. On the other hand, for American public opinion, North Korea remains an ‘evil state’ to which concessions are unacceptable. This means that Donald Trump will have to think very carefully to come up with a proposal that Pyongyang will actually be ready to discuss. Moreover, if such a proposal is formulated, the American deep state and public opinion will be strongly opposed to such concessions and it is unclear whether Donald Trump will be able to put his ideas into practice.
Nevertheless, it is still pleasant that the new US administration is beginning to recognise reality vis-à-vis Korea.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Modern Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
Kiev reveals terms of $20 billion US loan
RT | December 9, 2024
The Ukrainian government has approved the terms of a conditional agreement with the US Federal Financing Bank (FFB) for a 40-year loan of $20 billion which will be backed by profits from frozen Russian state assets.
It’s part of a broader $50 billion G7 loan deal, which includes a separate $20 billion EU commitment, and $10 billion to be split by G7 members Britain, Japan and Canada.
The money will be transferred to the Facilitation of Resources to Invest in Strengthening Ukraine Financial Intermediary Fund, established by the World Bank on October 10, “for the sake of the state,” a resolution issued by Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers on Friday stated.
The transfer will be based on a Certificate Purchase Agreement between Ukraine, the FFB, and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), along with a loan guarantee and repayment agreement between Ukraine and USAID.
Under the deal, Ukraine’s Finance Ministry will issue a certificate of indebtedness to the FFB, guaranteed by USAID, the government resolution said.
The loan, which has an annual interest rate of 1.3% plus the current average rate for one-year US Treasury bills, will be repaid using interest earned from immobilized Russian sovereign assets.
The US and its allies froze an estimated $300 billion in assets belonging to the Russian central bank following the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in February 2022. In June, G7 members pledged a $50 billion loan for Kiev, with the frozen Russian assets to be used as collateral, to help Kiev buy weapons and rebuild damaged infrastructure. The agreement was finalized in October.
Moscow has repeatedly denounced the asset freeze as “theft” and argued that tapping into these funds would be illegal and set a dangerous precedent. The Russian Finance Ministry has warned that it will initiate retaliatory measures mirroring the West’s actions against resources of Western investors held in the country.
The latest move is part of the current US administration’s last-minute strategy to bolster Kiev’s war effort, which includes a new $725 million military aid package to Kiev and another round of sanctions against Russia. It comes as uncertainty grows over Washington’s commitments under the upcoming presidency of Donald Trump, particularly after US House Speaker Mike Johnson dismissed President Joe Biden’s request to include $24 billion in additional aid to Ukraine in a government funding bill last week.
Indo-Pacific braces for Trump 2.0
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – November 10 2024
The victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election is far from unexpected. Yet, the fact that he has won means that many countries across the world will brace for the impact this win will have on them.
This is especially true for countries in Asia – in particular, in the Asia Pacific region – where the Biden administration, despite its flawed plans, appeared willing to invest US resources, both economic and military, to offset China. Although Donald Trump is, in many ways, more anti-China than Joe Biden is, his anti-China geopolitics is confined primarily to one arena: the US-China trade (im)balance.
It means that the Trump administration will be far less interested in extending military and economic assistance to the regional countries than the Biden administration has been in the past four years. On the contrary, his administration is likely to slap heavy tariffs, which will negatively affect Washington’s bilateral trade with regional countries. In such a scenario, regional countries will have one key policy option: turn more towards China to resolve bilateral ties via diplomatic means and reduce their dependence on Washington.
The Aftermath of the Victory
If Trump’s previous four years in office are any guides to the future, Washington’s Indo-Pacific allies, such as Japan and South Korea, are deeply worried. As former officials of the Trump administration, such as the former National Security Adviser John Bolton, revealed later in their memoirs, Trump had plans to withdraw US military forces from South Korea, keep up with his planned rapprochement with North Korea, and demand massive payments from Japan to pay for the American defence role. During his campaign, Trump defended his foreign policy and repeatedly vowed to continue after assuming the presidency.
For Japan, defence payments are, however, only one of the major areas of concern. Trump will hit trade as well. A key Trump campaign pledge is slapping 10- to 20-percent tariffs on all imports to the United States. Trump has also vowed to “absolutely” block Nippon Steel Corp.’s proposed 2-trillion-yen ($13 million) acquisition of US Steel Corp. More importantly, the US-Japan trade gap has widened to the disadvantage of the US – a situation that Trump would like to reset. According to US official data,
“In 2022, both U.S. exports to Japan and imports from Japan continued to grow for a third year in a row. U.S. exports totaled $80.3 billion, an increase of 7.7% ($5.8 billion), and U.S. imports totaled $148.3 billion, an increase of 10.0% ($13.5 billion). The trade deficit was $68.0 billion, increasing 12.8% ($7.7 billion) from 2021”.
“Our allies have taken advantage of us more than our enemies,” Trump said in a media interview on October 15, referring to the US trade deficit and other issues. With Trump having repeatedly referred to cutting off US support for NATO, Japan’s idea of an ‘Asian NATO’, too, seems in deep trouble. The military pacts Joe Biden made with Japan, South Korea, and Australia are likely to face the same fate. According to Trump, one of the key reasons why the Biden administration entered into these pacts was the pressure the Ukraine conflict generated on these states.
Therefore, he believes, that if he can end the Ukraine conflict – which he promised to end quickly by cutting off US aid to Ukraine – this will allow for the US to divest its sources away from these countries. On the other hand, Trump would not only want South Korea and Japan to spend more on defence but also push them to join him in slapping tariffs on China, thus pushing them into a ‘trade war’ with Beijing. Given South Korea’s and Japan’s trade (im)balance with China, they are bound to suffer from such a policy step because China has the leverage to retaliate. Therefore, they are unlikely to initiate their ‘trade war’. Alternative routes, however, exist.
The Alternative Option
Official Think Tanks in India are already proposing that India should join the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement. This policy shift probably speaks volumes about the direction that most regional countries might be willing to take. India is also one country that recently signed an agreement to jointly manage the disputed border. Now, this pact is crucial – not only because it signifies peaceful management of tensions, but also because the India-China border dispute is probably one major issue where China actually fought. This is unlike the South and East China Seas. Therefore, if China is able to diplomatically resolve its tense issues with India, there is little denying that other countries can do the same. There is, thus, a silver lining for countries like Japan, the Philippines, etc. to resolve their issues without relying on the US (or any other external power, such as the EU or NATO).
In some ways, an inward-looking approach, i.e., an approach that does not seek external mediation, would help push external powers permanently out of the region. Knowing that the Trump administration will itself be looking for disengagement, regional countries wouldn’t have to worry about annoying the US too.
For China, it presents an excellent opportunity to capitalise on US disengagement and deepen its ties with countries in the Indo-Pacific. Although China will probably be fighting a ‘trade war’ in the Atlantic, it can still find a major leeway in the Indo-Pacific. Its willingness and openness will only find regional countries ready to jump on the regional bandwagon of free trade for growth and diplomacy for dispute resolution.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.
India does not share Japan’s vision of NATO-like alliance in Asia: FM
By Ahmed Adel | October 4, 2024
Japan’s new Prime Minister, Shigeru Ishiba, on October 1 stressed the need to seek deeper ties with allied nations, especially to create a NATO-like organisation in Asia. However, this pursuit is not shared by India, the second most powerful military in Asia, which is also projected to overtake Japan economically in the next few years.
Ishiba has repeatedly called for a more balanced relationship with Washington, including greater oversight of bases in Japan used by the US military, but he has also proposed creating an Asian version of NATO’s collective security group to deter China, an idea that could draw Beijing’s ire and has already been dismissed by a senior US official as hasty, Reuters reported.
On the same day, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said he does not share Ishiba’s vision of an “Asian NATO.” Jaishankar said at an event at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington that, unlike Japan, India has never been a treaty ally of another country.
“We don’t have that kind of strategic architecture in mind. We have … a different history and different way of approaching,” Jaishankar said when asked about Ishiba’s call.
In addition to the creation of a NATO-like organisation in Asia, the new premier has called for the stationing of Japanese troops on US soil and even shared control of Washington’s nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Japan’s nuclear-armed neighbours, namely China, Russia and North Korea.
“In his victory speech [on September 28], he spoke about the need to beef up Japan’s security after recent territorial incursions by Chinese and Russian military vessels,” Reuters reported.
Since a so-called Asian NATO would also target Russia, India clearly wants to distance itself from any notion of being involved, considering the burgeoning relations the two countries share, which are only growing stronger.
In his address at the 79th United Nations General Assembly on September 28, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed his country’s support for India’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, stressing that a “fairer world order” requires the expansion of the representation of the Global South.
“A fairer world order undoubtedly requires the expansion of the representation of the Global South in the UN Security Council. We support our position in favour of the candidacies of Brazil and India, while at the same time taking a positive decision on the well-known initiatives of the African Union,” Lavrov said.
Meanwhile, during his appearance at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Jaishankar answered a question about helping Russia and Ukraine resolve their differences: “I’m glad you used the word communication because I think at the moment perhaps (it) is the best description for what we are currently.”
At the same time, Russia was again the largest crude supplier to India in September, registering an increase of 11.5% to 1.79 million barrels per day against 1.61 million barrels per day in August, data from Vortexa showed. This comes as the two countries continue efforts to conduct trade in their respective currencies rather than the US dollar.
Given New Delhi’s traditional and long-held ties with Moscow, it is little surprise that Jaishankar has announced his reservations about Japan’s idea to establish a NATO-like alliance in Asia, which would target not only China but also Russia.
With the US expressing scepticism and India, as Asia’s second power, creating distance, Tokyo has humiliatingly backtracked from immediately pursuing Ishiba’s vision.
Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya on October 2 described Ishiba’s proposal for a NATO-like alliance in Asia as a “future vision” for longer-term consideration, downplaying the idea to avoid provoking China and Russia.
“It is quite difficult to immediately set up an organisation that would impose mutual defence obligations in Asia,” the 67-year-old former defence minister said during a press conference after Ishiba formed his Cabinet a day before.
“This is an issue to consider in the medium- to long-term, spending some time,” he added.
In an attempt to avoid backlash from Beijing and Moscow, Iwaya claimed that the Asian NATO idea is “not something directed toward any particular country.” However, the Chinese and Russians obviously would not believe this for a moment.
Although some regional states, such as South Korea, would obviously support the formation of such an alliance to oppose China, Ishiba’s idea was put to bed the moment the US and India expressed scepticism. However, the US is highly occupied by events in Ukraine and the Middle East and can very well activate Ishiba’s proposal once these other fronts have been pacified. This would leave India as the only major power without a stake in opposing a NATO-like alliance in Asia.
Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.
Biden’s Last QUAD summit: All substance and no real Action
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – September 27, 2024
When Biden hosted the leaders of the Quadrilateral Security Group (QUAD) from India, Australia, and Japan in the US in 2021, they did not directly mention China. Still, the emphasis on “shared security and prosperity” was an unmistakable reference to a joint mechanism to counter Beijing’s influence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly.
One would have expected the Biden administration to leave a legacy of a significantly functional mechanism producing collective security and prosperity at the end of its era in 2024. But, as it turns out, QUAD remains where it was in 2021: a club that hosts little more than tea parties to mean anything. The club, as the Indian Prime Minister remarked after the latest summit, is “here to stay”. The question, however, is: will it, or can it, turn into more than a club for occasional gatherings to talk about abstract geopolitics? It is quite unlikely. Donald Trump’s victory will dampen it even further. If Harris wins, she is unlikely to introduce any major changes from the Biden administration, for obvious reasons (she is currently part of the same administration!).
The Last Summit: What is new?
The last summit is, therefore, no different from the earlier ones insofar as it offers little more than a set of “commitments”, and occasional references to “unity”, “democracy” and certain joint ventures, such as Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI). Apparently a new initiative, MAITRI is backed by little to nothing actionable and concrete. It aims to equip partner countries with “tools” that they will use “to monitor and secure their waters, enforce their laws, and deter unlawful behavior”. Who will fund this initiative? What counts as “unlawful behaviour” and what exact action will be taken against those involved in any unlawful activity are some of the ‘black holes’ that need massive filling before this initiative can qualify to acquire any geostrategic significance. There are other concerns too.
While the joint statement mentions China several times, it does not mention Russia at all. Although it refers to Ukraine, the fact that it does not refer to Russia is due to the nature of Indian ties with Moscow. What does this mean for the future of QUAD? No references to any threats other than those emerging from, or associated with, China leave QUAD a club squarely and singularly focused on China. Is this an advantage or a disadvantage?
The China Factor
Being squarely anti-China means QUAD can never sell itself to the wider region as a framework of security. Had QUAD been a general framework of security, it could have attracted several other countries from the region. However, it is unable to do this because a large number of countries in the region do not wish to gang up against China due to the nature of their ties with Beijing. For instance, there is probably not a single example where a country from this region, which is not a QUAD member, ever endorsed anything QUAD said or did. In other words, QUAD operates in a disconnected regional space as an abstract idea rather than as a force to be reckoned with.
This is despite the fact that the latest QUAD summit categorically said China is “testing us”. Conversely, QUAD is “testing” China, but China’s advantage is that it does not have many real regional rivals. That includes India too.
Now, PM Modi thinks that QUAD is here to stay, but the exact purpose it will serve for him is far from clear to other QUAD members. Consider the bilateral trade volume, for instance. It has already reached US$118 billion in 2024. Despite so-called “tensions”, the overall trade grew by 1.5 per cent in terms of year-on-year growth. More significantly, QUAD downplays the role – and the possibility – of regional countries utilising bilateral channels for dispute resolution. Is QAUD the only mechanism that, for instance, PM Modi might depend upon in the wake of another border clash with China?
Bilateralism Trumps QUAD’s Multilateralism
Let’s see what both India and China have done in the past two years. Instead of relying on QUAD, New Delhi happens to have preferred meetings and regular interaction with China at the Corps Commander level. According to data shared by India’s Ministry of Home Affairs, 21 meetings have been held until February 2024. None of these meetings either involved any third party, nor did New Delhi stress a multilateral approach for ‘effective’ dispute resolution. The Indian readout stressed the friendly and amicable nature of talks.
This is not the only mechanism. Since 2012, the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination (WMCC) on India-China Border Affairs has been another key bilateral avenue of dispute resolution, and it has remained relevant despite the border clashes. On August 29, the WMCC held its 31st meeting. The meeting’s aim was “to narrow down the differences and find early resolution of the outstanding issues”.
Now, the emphasis on narrowing down existing differences not only signals success, but also the willingness to remain nonviolent in their approaches to conflict resolution. Nonviolence directly implies the irrelevance of the securitised approach of the QUAD vis-à-vis China’s position in the Indo-Pacific.
There is, in simple words, a lesson for countries in the region. Many countries in Southeast Asia, for instance, have concerns about China’s dominance in the South and East China seas. Should they opt for a military approach considering that India, a much bigger military power than any country in Southeast Asia, is itself following dialogue and diplomacy to resolve disputes? The lesson, in other words, is to emphasise bilateral approach and talk directly to China.
All of these factors combine to produce the utter inability of QUAD to evolve, since its establishment in 2004, as a significant military or economic alliance. Much to Washington’s disappointment, it still does not have a regional mechanism to ‘contain’ China.
Salman Rafi Sheikh is a research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.



