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Regional security runs through Tehran

By Peiman Salehi | The Cradle | October 28, 2026

The presence of Saudi, Turkish, and Pakistani officials in Tehran on 26 October reflected a growing recognition that Iran cannot be excluded from any serious regional security arrangement. Despite the US–Israeli war against Iran, Tehran remains central to the region’s military and political balance.

For Riyadh and its partners, the meeting also exposed the limits of the Mecca defense pact, particularly as Saudi Arabia faces renewed confrontation with the Ansarallah-aligned Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF).

Much of the speculation surrounding the four-country meeting centered on what Iran might be expected to surrender, particularly its relationship with Sanaa. Such expectations rested on the assumption that Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan had established a regional security order into which Iran was now seeking admission, with Tehran potentially offering concessions over Yemen in return.

Yet the political and military circumstances that brought the participants to Tehran suggest a different calculation. Iran has withstood sustained American and Israeli attacks, while Saudi Arabia and its partners have struggled to contain the YAF’s military operations. Any agreement that disregards these realities risks reproducing the confrontations it seeks to resolve.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry had identified Israel’s expansionist policies, Lebanon, and the US war against Iran among the subjects for discussion. Yemen was absent from the announced agenda and the subsequent press statement.

Ali Bagheri, deputy secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said the gathering also served to congratulate Mohsen Rezaei, the council’s newly appointed secretary, and discuss regional security, including opposition to foreign interference, particularly by Washington. According to information obtained by The Cradle, Yemen was not discussed during the meeting.

On the morning of 27 October, a day after the talks, Rezaei met Yemen’s ambassador, Ibrahim Mohammad al-Dailami, in Tehran. Rezaei praised Yemen’s defense of Gaza and its confrontation with Israel, while the ambassador thanked him and the Iranian government for their positions.

The encounter came amid speculation that Tehran’s diplomatic engagement with Riyadh might come at the expense of its relationship with Sanaa. By publicly reaffirming those ties immediately after the summit, Iran signaled its intention to pursue regional diplomacy while maintaining its existing alliances.

Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of Iran’s conservative daily Kayhan, wrote in a 27 October editorial that “Yemen’s revolutionaries are allies of Islamic Iran.” He warned that the visiting delegations might seek to create the impression that Tehran was distancing itself from Sanaa, offering Washington and its allies “breathing room, however brief” by encouraging expectations of an imminent settlement.

The Mecca pact’s limits

Iran has good reason to approach the Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani framework, commonly known as the Mecca pact, with caution. The agreement brings together three states with substantial military capabilities and extensive relations with Washington, raising questions about whether their security cooperation could eventually be directed against the Axis of Resistance.

For Riyadh, Yemen remains a central concern. Years of confrontation with the YAF have demonstrated Sanaa’s ability to impose high military and economic costs beyond Yemen’s borders. Saudi Arabia’s renewed campaign has again brought its energy infrastructure and military installations within range of Yemeni retaliation, exposing the limits of the kingdom’s reliance on foreign military protection.

In Tehran, closer military coordination among the pact’s members could be seen as an attempt to contain the Axis of Resistance at a time when American security guarantees are becoming increasingly uncertain.

Iran’s participation in talks with the pact’s members carries no commitment to join their alliance. Tehran has made no such announcement, while Rezaei’s explanation of the summit emphasized the establishment of security through regional cooperation, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and an end to outside interference.

These objectives leave considerable differences between the participants. Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan maintain security relationships with Washington, while Iran regards the American military presence as a principal source of regional instability. Their respective positions on armed resistance movements, Israeli aggression, and the obligations of any collective defense arrangement also remain unresolved.

The meeting produced a brief press statement confirming the participants’ intention to continue their dialogue, without setting out binding commitments. Rezaei indicated that further meetings would follow, suggesting that the four governments were exploring the foundations of a wider regional accommodation.

The initiative itself emerged from Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran the previous week, according to information obtained by The Cradle. Iranian officials also confirmed Pakistan’s proposal, describing the gathering as an opportunity to advance regional security arrangements based on shared interests and mutual trust.

Riyadh’s security dilemma

The Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani alliance combines considerable military resources, diplomatic influence, and strategic relationships. Its effectiveness, however, depends on the willingness of its members to confront threats that may carry very different consequences for each country.

The limited assistance Pakistan and Turkiye have provided during the renewed confrontation between Yemen and Saudi Arabia illustrates these constraints. Although both countries have pledged support for Riyadh, their involvement has fallen short of the decisive intervention that might alter the military balance with the YAF.

Kayhan was more scathing in its assessment, accusing Turkiye and Pakistan of having “milked Saudi Arabia and done nothing.”

Saudi Arabia’s own account of the visit was more restrained. In a statement following the meeting, Riyadh said the talks formed part of efforts to de-escalate tensions, encourage diplomatic solutions, and support mediation by Qatar and Pakistan. It also reaffirmed the Mecca pact’s role in promoting regional security and stability.

Islamabad and Ankara have also sought to limit their military involvement. Turkish officials have ruled out offensive operations against Yemen, while Pakistan has denied reports that its aircraft carried out strikes on Yemeni forces. These restrictions expose the distance between the pact’s collective defense commitments and its members’ willingness to enter a wider war.

The continuing Yemeni operations against Saudi targets have consequently strengthened the argument for direct engagement with Tehran. Riyadh must weigh the costs of further confrontation against the possibility of reaching an understanding with Iran, whose regional relationships and military capabilities remain central to the wider balance of power.

Despite the damage inflicted during the war, Tehran has retained the ability to influence the course and costs of regional confrontation. Its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz and its capacity to retaliate against military infrastructure have complicated Washington’s efforts to impose a settlement on its own terms.

These developments have strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position, although translating military endurance into a durable security arrangement will require more than the recognition of its regional weight. Tehran must also demonstrate that cooperation with its neighbors can reduce the likelihood of renewed war without undermining the relationships that have helped it withstand external pressure.

For Saudi Arabia, the lesson is equally significant. Its security cannot be guaranteed indefinitely through military partnerships that exclude one of the region’s principal powers, particularly when those partnerships have struggled to prevent attacks on Saudi territory.

Yemen cannot be traded

The suggestion that Tehran might trade its relationship with Ansarallah for concessions from Riyadh overlooks the movement’s independent political interests and roots in Yemen. Ansarallah’s resistance to Saudi intervention grew out of a prolonged struggle over the country’s political future, during which its ties with Iran deepened.

The two sides share important strategic interests, but Yemen’s military and political decisions cannot be reduced to directives from Tehran. The YAF’s intervention in support of Gaza, its confrontation with Israel, and its continuing war with Saudi Arabia reflect calculations shaped by Yemen’s own circumstances.

Iran’s regional relationships have also evolved through years of confrontation with Washington and Tel Aviv. The Islamic Republic’s resistance to American and Israeli pressure has become inseparable from its wider regional security calculations, particularly as the war has intensified the threats facing its allies.

Sanaa has paid a substantial price for its military and political positions, enduring years of bombardment, blockade, and attempts to dismantle its authority. Ansarallah’s survival has given it considerable influence over Yemen’s future, making any settlement negotiated without its participation unlikely to produce lasting results.

The assumption that Tehran could simply secure Yemeni compliance also underestimates the political consequences of such an arrangement. The Sanaa government would have little reason to accept an agreement that disregards its security interests or leaves Saudi military pressure intact.

Rezaei’s meeting with the Yemeni ambassador therefore served an important political purpose. As Tehran opened discussions with the Mecca pact’s members, it reaffirmed a relationship whose continuity remains important to the wider Resistance Axis.

Israel’s declining leverage

The summit’s joint statement made no reference to Israel, but Rezaei’s subsequent account of the talks placed Israeli military operations among the issues discussed. He said the participants had emphasized ending Israeli attacks and securing Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine.

Before Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Saudi–Israeli normalization was a serious diplomatic prospect. Washington sought to advance Israel’s integration into a regional security and economic framework that would strengthen its position while isolating Iran and its allies.

The wars that followed have disrupted those calculations. Israel’s military campaigns across West Asia, alongside the American war against Iran, have exposed the risks associated with a regional order built around Israeli military superiority and US security guarantees.

Rezaei’s public emphasis on Israeli aggression reflects the changing circumstances in which the talks took place. Riyadh has not formally adopted his characterization in the joint statement and maintains its longstanding relationship with Washington, but Saudi security concerns have increasingly brought it into direct contact with Tehran despite years of hostility.

The contrast with 2017 is especially revealing. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) then threatened to take the confrontation inside Iran, reflecting Riyadh’s confidence in its ability to challenge Tehran through regional pressure and military alliances.

Nearly a decade later, Saudi officials are in Tehran discussing regional security with the same government Riyadh once threatened to attack. Years of confrontation have failed to break Iran’s regional influence, while Washington’s ability to shield its allies from another war is increasingly in doubt.

Yemen’s ability to remain a consequential military actor despite years of Saudi-led operations has also shaped this reassessment. Its continued resistance has demonstrated the limits of attempts to impose regional arrangements through military force.

Tehran’s next move

The summit’s lasting significance will depend on whether the participating governments can translate their discussions into practical security arrangements. Iran has an opportunity to advance its longstanding position that West Asia’s security must be determined by the countries of the region, without dependence on foreign military intervention.

Such an arrangement would require Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan to recognize Iran’s security concerns and its existing alliances. Tehran would also have to address its neighbors’ security concerns without compromising those relationships.

The presence of all four countries in Tehran suggests that these questions are now receiving serious attention. Rezaei’s subsequent meeting with Yemen’s ambassador also indicated the basis on which Iran intends to participate: regional cooperation alongside continued support for its established allies.

Any regional agreement must also account for Yemen and the other members of the Axis of Resistance. Their military and political weight cannot be ignored, nor can their futures be decided through negotiations between Tehran and its neighbors.

Iran has emerged from the war with its regional alliances intact and greater room to negotiate. The question now is whether Riyadh and its partners are prepared to reach an understanding with Tehran that recognizes those alliances rather than seeking to dismantle them.

October 29, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Regional security runs through Tehran

The Mecca Pact Courts Iran: Containment Comes Full Circle

Senior officials from Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia begin a security meeting in Tehran.
By Junaid S. Ahmad | MEMO | October 27, 2026

For nearly half a century, Iran’s adversaries have tried to isolate it, intimidate it, sanction it into submission and bomb it into irrelevance. Now, in a remarkable inversion of regional power politics, three countries historically invested in its containment have arrived in Tehran to discuss their security with the very state they were supposed to marginalise.

The country they could not defeat is becoming the country they cannot afford to ignore.

Yesterday, Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalın met Iranian officials in an encounter whose diplomatic courtesies barely concealed its strategic significance.

The Mecca Pact, the joint defence agreement that Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed in Mecca in August, was supposed to consolidate a formidable Sunni-led defence alignment. Yet its representatives have come to Tehran confronting an inconvenient reality: Iran cannot be excluded from regional security merely because Washington and its partners find its independence intolerable.

Apparently, the Islamic Republic has become considerably more respectable since demonstrating that it cannot be conveniently eliminated.

This is the distinction between military destruction and strategic defeat that Washington and Israel persistently confuse. Overwhelming firepower can devastate infrastructure, assassinate officials and inflict enormous suffering. It cannot manufacture political submission.

Iran has survived military confrontation, retained retaliatory capabilities and forced neighbouring governments to reconsider the potentially catastrophic consequences of another war.

Survival becomes strategic victory when your adversaries must reorganise their calculations around it.

For Saudi Arabia, the reckoning is particularly humiliating. Riyadh spent decades treating American military supremacy as an insurance policy against Iranian influence. Yemen exposed the bankruptcy of that assumption.

Ansar Allah, Yemen’s Houthi movement, demonstrated that superior arsenals cannot guarantee security against an adversary capable of imposing disproportionate costs. The Saudi monarchy possesses spectacular weaponry, immense wealth and powerful patrons. Yet none of these has eliminated its vulnerability to Yemeni retaliation.

Now Riyadh finds itself seeking Tehran’s cooperation to manage a conflict that its military superiority has failed to resolve.

Evidently, purchasing American weapons is considerably easier than purchasing strategic security.

Pakistan’s predicament is scarcely less revealing. Munir presides over a military establishment accustomed to presenting strategic dependency as diplomatic sophistication. Islamabad’s defence commitments to Riyadh now threaten to entangle Pakistan in confrontations with Iran and Yemen that serve neither its geography nor its national interests.

The Mecca Pact promises collective security. Its less advertised feature is collective exposure to somebody else’s strategic miscalculations.

Munir must now reconcile his obligations to Saudi patrons with the inconvenient realities of Iranian power. It is an awkward assignment for an establishment that has repeatedly mistaken proximity to foreign power for genuine strategic independence.

Türkiye confronts a different calculation but reaches a similar conclusion. Ankara understands that NATO membership, military capabilities and regional ambitions cannot abolish geography. No credible security architecture can be constructed by pretending Iran is dispensable.

The deeper contradiction, however, lies within the Mecca Pact itself.

Its members seek the reassurance of collective defence while attempting to avoid being dragged into another American-Israeli confrontation. An attack on one may formally constitute an attack on all. But such commitments become considerably less attractive when Iranian retaliation, Yemeni escalation and vulnerable Gulf infrastructure enter the equation.

Collective defence sounds magnificent until someone presents the collective bill.

Iran’s achievement is not that its neighbours have embraced its revolutionary worldview. They have not. Saudi Arabia remains deeply connected to Washington, Pakistan continues its elaborate balancing act, and Türkiye remains embedded in NATO.

The significance runs deeper: these governments increasingly recognise that excluding Iran from regional security may expose them to greater dangers than engaging it.

That realisation strikes at the foundations of the American security paradigm.

For decades, Washington cultivated regional dependence on American protection while organising strategic anxieties around Iranian power. Now those same governments are exploring cooperation with the country they were encouraged to regard as an existential threat.

The irony is devastating. Decades of attempting to contain Iran may have helped establish its indispensability.

And Tehran, displaying the composure of a state conscious of its diplomatic leverage, has welcomed its visitors graciously. No triumphalist declarations are necessary. The spectacle speaks adequately for itself.

The Mecca Pact arrived ostensibly to discuss regional stability. What it encountered was the strategic consequence of its own failed assumptions.

Iran did not have to join the alliance. The alliance had to come to Iran.

October 27, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on The Mecca Pact Courts Iran: Containment Comes Full Circle

Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia could advance region-led security framework in Tehran: FM spox

Press TV – October 26, 2026

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei says a meeting in Tehran with senior officials from Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia could lay the groundwork for a regional security framework based on the interests and decisions of countries in the region.

Speaking at a weekly press conference on Monday, Baghaei said Tehran would host Saudi Arabia’s defense minister, Pakistan’s army chief and Turkey’s intelligence chief as part of an initiative to discuss regional security.

He stated that the initiative was proposed during Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran and was welcomed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Responding to a question from IRNA about the purpose and format of the gathering, Baghaei said the participation of senior officials from the three countries reflected efforts to explore mechanisms for regional security.

“From our perspective, the fact that regional countries are seeking to establish, or at least consider, regional security mechanisms based on their own interests and concerns is a welcome development,” he said.

“This meeting could serve as a prelude to further steps toward shaping endogenous security, an issue we have insisted on for decades. We have consistently emphasized that regional security can only be ensured by relying on the will and security considerations of the countries of the region,” Baghaei added.

He noted that developments over the past two years, particularly the past eight months, had demonstrated the importance of cooperation among regional countries.

“Recent events have shown that sustainable and reliable security in our region can only be achieved through building trust and cooperation among regional countries,” the spokesman said.

Baghaei said the visiting officials would hold discussions with the Iranian president and the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

As this is the first meeting of its kind, he said, a range of issues would be on the agenda, with regional security challenges expected to feature prominently.

“Such a meeting cannot be held without taking into account the consequences of the United States’ military aggression against Iran for the security of the entire region,” Baghaei said, describing the issue as another important subject that should be considered within the framework of regional security discussions.

Deputy Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Bagheri Kani said the three senior officials are scheduled to meet with SNSC Secretary Major General Mohsen Rezaei and participate in a joint session on Monday.

Regional countries must strengthen capabilities to counter Israel

Responding to reports of disagreements between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli army chief over a possible attack on Iran, Baghaei said such differences would have no impact on Iran’s defensive preparedness.

“Despite possible differences in tactics, this group is united in its aggression and expansionism,” he said, adding that the regime’s actions across the region showed it was pursuing a common course aimed at undermining regional security.

He stressed that regional countries must enhance their capabilities to confront the Israeli regime’s threats and destabilizing actions.

Iran unconcerned about who rules in Israeli regime

Commenting on the upcoming Knesset elections in the occupied territories, Baghaei dismissed the process as a genuine democratic election, describing it instead as competition among rival groups seeking to commit greater crimes.

“For us, it makes no difference who ultimately takes the helm of the Zionist regime,” he said, noting that its record had brought nothing to the region but violence and bloodshed.

Armed forces will firmly counter threats

Responding to reports about the deployment of drone bases near Iran, Baghaei said Iran’s relevant authorities were closely monitoring developments surrounding the country, including reports of drone bases near its borders and Ukrainian activities in Iraq and the Iraqi Kurdistan region.

“Those responsible for monitoring these developments are following the situation carefully and will act whenever necessary to defend the country and repel hostile actions and threats,” he said.

He emphasized that Iran’s armed forces had firmly defended the country whenever threats or hostile activities targeted its territory and would continue to do so.

Europe part of the problem

Baghaei expressed doubt that European countries had genuinely changed their approach toward Iran, pointing out that their renewed emphasis on diplomacy could amount to a political gesture.

He slammed Europeans for contributing to the crisis by aligning with the United States over the so-called snapback mechanism and failing to condemn US-Israeli military aggression against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Baghaei said Tehran hoped the three European countries would assess regional developments more realistically and adopt an independent and constructive approach toward West Asian affairs.

Brazilian people resisted unfair pressure

Commenting on Brazil’s presidential election and the defeat of the right-wing camp aligned with US President Donald Trump, Baghaei said the outcome demonstrated the Brazilian people’s determination to make independent political choices.

“The people of Brazil showed that they would not submit to misleading narratives and unjustified pressure, and that they would choose what they consider to be in their country’s best interests,” he said.

October 26, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Comments Off on Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia could advance region-led security framework in Tehran: FM spox

AIPAC-led lobbying network opens branches in Cypriot, Greek parliaments

The Cradle | October 23, 2026

Cyprus hosted the leadership of the pro-Israel US lobbying group, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), in Nicosia on 21 October, pledging to deepen the island’s ties with Israel and the US.

Outgoing AIPAC president Bernard Kaminetsky and his successor, Yehuda Neuberger, led the delegation to the presidential palace for talks with Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides.

The talks focused on accelerating the 3+1 Mechanism, a partnership binding Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the US to coordinate on energy, security, and infrastructure.

AIPAC, in return, pledged to keep championing Cypriot interests in Washington.

Meanwhile, pro-Israel lobbies have been embedding themselves inside the Cypriot and Greek parliaments, with Israel Allies Foundation (IAF) launching caucuses in both legislatures to bring lawmakers into line with Israel’s regional agenda.

IAF president Josh Reinstein unveiled the Cypriot caucus on 14 October after meeting Christodoulides, explicitly pitting the initiative against Ankara by branding Turkiye a “common enemy” of Israel and Cyprus.

Cyprus’s main left-wing opposition party condemned the MPs for turning parliament into a lobby for Israel amid its ongoing genocide in Gaza, while in Greece, one left-wing party warned that it would turn parliament into a tool for whitewashing war crimes.

Israel’s deepening ties with Greece and Cyprus have developed over the past decade into a strategic alignment that combines energy cooperation, military coordination, and shared opposition to Turkish maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The US has encouraged the relationship through the 3+1 format, which brings Washington into the Israel–Greece–Cyprus trilateral partnership and frames it as a vehicle for regional stability, energy security, and cooperation among “like-minded” partners.

Through the arrangement, Israel gains a gateway to European markets through Greece and Cyprus, along with diplomatic backing in disputes over offshore gas fields.

Athens and Nicosia, in turn, receive Israeli military technology and a partner against Turkiye’s assertive stance on maritime zones, airspace, and the divided island of Cyprus.

Washington, meanwhile, sees the axis as part of a broader effort to anchor energy routes and security cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean while reducing reliance on rival powers, even as the US courts Ankara with offers of F-35 sales and sanctions relief.

Israeli hostility toward Ankara, and its efforts to curb Turkish power, stem from fear that Washington’s growing dependence on Turkiye will erode Israel’s regional dominance.

Despite the friction, Turkiye continued to serve as a conduit for Azerbaijani crude to Israel through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan Pipeline (BTC) and Ceyhan Port, even after cutting direct trade in May 2024 and throughout Israel’s genocide of the Palestinians in Gaza.

October 23, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism | , , , , , , | Comments Off on AIPAC-led lobbying network opens branches in Cypriot, Greek parliaments

Bombs for Tel Aviv, Promises for Riyadh

By Muhammad Hamid ad-Din – New Eastern Outlook – October 15, 2026

The Gaza Ceasefire Is Falling Apart. And So Is the American Plan to Expand the Abraham Accords.

The Gaza Ceasefire That Is Killing Palestinians

The ceasefire in Gaza, which took effect on October 10, 2025, was supposed to stop a two-year war. By then, according to Palestinian authorities, more than 72,000 Palestinians had been killed. A year after the document was signed, the picture was no more peaceful. According to Palestinian sources, from the start of the ceasefire to October 5, 2026, Israeli forces killed 1,460 Palestinians and wounded 5,116. By September 2026, Gaza authorities reported 5,147 violations of the agreement, 1,421 dead, and the destruction of more than 201,000 buildings.

The second phase of negotiations—the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the enclave and the disarmament of Palestinian factions—stalled almost immediately. In April 2026, American-Egyptian talks in Cairo ended “without tangible progress.” Hamas links disarmament to the end of the occupation. Israel demands disarmament as a precondition for any further step. Critics say the demand for disarmament has become a pretext for maintaining control over the enclave and continuing violations. The Palestinian Foreign Ministry put it bluntly: the occupation government “does not view peace as a goal, but as an obstacle.”

Diktat Instead of Diplomacy

Against this backdrop, the Trump administration is forcing the expansion of the Abraham Accords. In May 2026, the U.S. president publicly demanded that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey join the accords. He called it “mandatory”: “After all the work done by the United States to put this complex puzzle together, it must be mandatory for all these countries to at least simultaneously sign the Abraham Accords.” Pakistan publicly refused. The others remained silent.

Washington’s main interest is Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said at the White House in November 2025: “We want to be part of the Abraham Accords. But we also want to be sure that we secure a clear path to a two-state solution.” Later, Riyadh repeated: normalization is impossible without a “credible, irreversible, and time-bound path” to a Palestinian state. The Israeli government rejects this prospect. American pressure goes beyond diplomacy: Trump tied the Abraham Accords to negotiations to end the war with Iran, effectively making normalization a condition for peace. According to Axios, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan were “caught by surprise.”

Mutual Influence: Gaza as Leverage and as an Obstacle

Gaza and the reshaping of alliances are directly connected. The Palestinian question became leverage in Arab states’ bargaining with Washington. For Saudi Arabia, normalization with Israel without movement toward a Palestinian state is politically toxic. Riyadh is using the fragile ceasefire to postpone an unpopular step. Qatar, a key mediator, took an equally tough position. Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesman Majid al-Ansari said: “If the Palestinian question remains unresolved, joining the Abraham Accords is impossible.” According to him, the absence of a peace process for Palestinians means the absence of stability in the region. Doha, which has given refuge to Hamas’s political leadership and plays a central role in the talks, cannot move toward normalization without losing face.

There is also a reverse dependency. The Trump administration, seeking to expand the Abraham Accords, pressured Israel to secure a ceasefire: normalization without a ceasefire would have been impossible. But the second phase depends on whether Washington is willing to pressure Israel, not just Arab capitals.

Bombs Instead of Peace

The result of U.S. and Israeli policy looks increasingly contradictory. Three years of war, more than 74,250 dead Palestinians, and 1,460 killed after the ceasefire was signed are not just a humanitarian catastrophe. They are a verdict on America’s strategy in the Middle East. Trump tried to push through the expansion of the Abraham Accords by linking unrelated issues: normalization with Israel, a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, and ending the war with Iran. In July 2026, he stated directly that a U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear agreement “will depend entirely on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords.” Saudi Arabia responded in May 2026: “There will be no normalization without a clear and final path to the creation of an independent Palestinian state.” As the custodian of the two holy mosques, the kingdom cannot afford to do otherwise. Qatar refused. Pakistan publicly rejected it. Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey remained silent.

Criticism of Washington goes far beyond diplomatic missteps. The U.S. continues to supply Israel with weapons despite ceasefire violations. In September 2026, the Trump administration proposed a $2.8 billion deal to sell Israel 40,000 heavy bombs, including 20,000 MK-84s and 20,000 BLU-117s. Senator Chris Van Hollen vowed to block the transfer: “Trump is sending $2.8 billion worth of bombs, paid for by you, the American taxpayers, to a government led by a wanted war criminal.” Congressman Gregory Meeks, the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, also vetoed it: “The Trump administration has not provided sufficient assurances that these weapons will be used in accordance with American and international law. Therefore, I will not approve this sale.” Amnesty International urged Congress to block the deliveries, saying the U.S. risks becoming complicit in serious violations of international law, including genocide. New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani accused Washington of “complicity with every arms shipment” to Tel Aviv.

What Next: The Results of U.S. and Israeli Policy Against the Arab Region

Washington’s paradox is that it wants to expand the Abraham Accords but continues to support the Israeli occupation, which makes normalization politically impossible for Arab states. The U.S. has blocked UN Security Council ceasefire resolutions for the third time in a row, undermining its role as a “reliable mediator.” Public opinion in the Arab world is sharply opposed to normalization. Polls show that 89% of Moroccans oppose recognizing Israel. Analysts warn that for most of the named states, the political price of signing the accords will be prohibitive. The war in Gaza has strengthened this sentiment, not weakened it.

The main question is whether the ceasefire will hold. If the second phase of negotiations does not start and the death toll continues to rise, expansion of the Abraham Accords will remain an unattainable dream. Saudi Arabia will wait. Qatar will mediate. The UAE will increase oil production. Trump will face a choice: keep pressuring Arab capitals or admit that without a real Palestinian state, the accords will remain a facade. While Washington supplies bombs and Tel Aviv keeps killing, talk of peace looks like a cynical game in which Palestinians are not subjects but a bargaining chip.

Muhammad Hamid ad-Din is a well-known Palestinian journalist.

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October 15, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism | , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Bombs for Tel Aviv, Promises for Riyadh

Houthis Don’t Have to Conquer Saudi Arabia to Make It Pay

Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – October 7, 2026

October 7, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , , , | Comments Off on Houthis Don’t Have to Conquer Saudi Arabia to Make It Pay

The Makkah Pact Enters Into Force: The End of American Dominance or Its New Form?

By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – October 7, 2026

On October 5, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan activated the Makkah Pact, taking their new alliance to war for the first time, and potentially revealing the future of American power in the Middle East: Washington provides the security umbrella while regional partners increasingly do the fighting.

From treaty to military alliance

Only two months after Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, the new alliance has been activated. As representatives of the three countries met in Riyadh and Houthi missiles and drones targeted Saudi territory, Saudi-backed Yemeni forces launched a major counteroffensive around the strategically important Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Despite hundreds of strikes, the Saudi offensive has not been enough to push the Houthis back to their original position. In this context, the alliance’s Strategic-Political and Defense Committee agreed to move “immediately” toward implementing its collective-defence commitments and to provide agreed military forces and capabilities for rapid deployment in Saudi Arabia. The meeting also appointed retired Pakistani Lieutenant General Nauman Mahmood as the alliance’s first secretary-general.

The significance goes beyond additional military assistance for Riyadh. The Yemen war is transforming – and that, too, very rapidly – a remarkably young agreement into an operational military alliance. Signed on August 7, the Makkah Pact contains a collective-defence commitment under which an armed attack against one member is regarded as an attack against all three. Pakistan describes the agreement as defensive and grounded in the right to collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

That inevitably invites comparisons with NATO. The analogy should not be exaggerated. NATO possesses 32 members, an integrated command structure and more than seven decades of institutional development. The Makkah Pact possesses none of that depth.

But its institutional development has been unusually rapid. On August 31, the three governments established mechanisms for political and military coordination, agreed to create a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia and committed themselves to joint activities, defence-industrial cooperation and joint technology development and production. Now comes the most important stage in the evolution of any military alliance: responding to an actual threat.

Pakistan and Türkiye were already assisting Saudi Arabia before formal activation. Reports show that Pakistan had supplied air-defence systems, drones, anti-drone equipment and light artillery, while Pakistani advisers were working with Saudi counterparts supporting Yemeni forces. Türkiye had supplied drones. The October 5 decision potentially integrates such capabilities into something larger: collective military action undertaken because one alliance member has come under attack.

The distinction between defensive and offensive action consequently becomes blurred. Defending Saudi airspace against Houthi missiles is clearly defensive. Destroying the launchers firing those missiles from Yemen would involve offensive operations undertaken for a defensive purpose. Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has deliberately avoided ruling out that possibility, saying Pakistan would make “whatever means are available” at its disposal available to defend Saudi Arabia.

America stays, but its role changes

It would be tempting to interpret this development as evidence that Saudi Arabia is preparing for a post-American Middle East. That conclusion would be premature. The more interesting possibility is almost the opposite: the Makkah Pact may fit remarkably well into the kind of Middle Eastern security order the Trump administration itself wants to create. Trump welcomed the agreement shortly after it was signed. He called it’s a “big, bold and important first step” and argued that it demonstrated how regional countries could “defend themselves in a more meaningful way.” That language closely matches the administration’s formal defence strategy.

The 2026 National Defense Strategy says Washington wants regional allies and partners to assume “primary responsibility” for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies, while the United States supports them and deepens cooperation with Gulf partners. The administration’s arms-transfer strategy similarly argues that allies should assume more responsibility for regional security while Washington equips them with advanced American military capabilities. Yemen now offers an unusually clear illustration of what this division of labour can look like.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sought direct American military intervention against the Houthis in September. Trump declined to order US strikes. But Washington did not withdraw from the conflict. Instead, it offered intelligence and targeting assistance, while CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper travelled to Saudi Arabia for consultations. As the Saudi-backed offensive subsequently began, the same pattern continued. Saudi aircraft provided extensive air support to Yemeni government forces, while the United States supplied intelligence and targeting support. America therefore remains deeply involved. What has declined, at least for now, is direct participation in the fighting. This distinction matters.

The choice facing Washington is not simply between dominating Middle Eastern security and abandoning it. There is a third possibility: remaining the indispensable strategic enabler while shifting more of the immediate military burden onto regional states. That is precisely where the Makkah Pact becomes useful.

Saudi Arabia brings financial resources, geography and enormous investments in advanced weaponry. Türkiye contributes a large, NATO-trained military and a rapidly expanding defence industry. Pakistan brings substantial conventional forces, longstanding military relations with Saudi Arabia and extensive operational experience. Together, they can potentially perform missions that previously might have generated demands for more direct American intervention. The United States can remain above this architecture rather than outside it: supplying intelligence, weapons, logistical assistance, strategic deterrence and diplomatic backing while allies provide more of the personnel and firepower required to confront regional threats. Seen this way, the pact is not necessarily a rebellion against American primacy. It could become one mechanism through which that primacy is made less militarily expensive for the US.

A different kind of American order

This model also helps explain why describing the emerging Middle East as “post-American” can be misleading. American power has traditionally been measured partly through deployments, bases and direct military intervention. But primacy does not require Washington to fight every regional war itself. The Makkah Pact could push this transformation considerably further.

Its future significance will depend less on what its three members call the alliance than on what they build after Yemen, and whether their first experiment in collective defence proves sufficiently successful to encourage deeper cooperation. Regular military planning, interoperable forces, integrated air and missile defence, intelligence-sharing arrangements and joint weapons production would gradually give the agreement institutional substance.

Yet therein lies a paradox for Washington. The same burden-sharing that reduces America’s military responsibilities could eventually reduce its leverage. More capable allies are not necessarily more dependent allies. As regional powers acquire the institutions, experience and capabilities to conduct military operations with diminishing direct American involvement, they may also acquire greater freedom to pursue threats and strategic objectives that do not fully correspond with Washington’s preferences. An arrangement that initially reinforces the US security architecture could therefore gradually produce greater regional strategic autonomy.

The consequences could extend to military technology. Saudi Arabia’s armed forces remain heavily equipped with American weapons, but neither Pakistan nor Türkiye operates exclusively within a US defence ecosystem. Pakistan, for example, operates the JF-17 fighter aircraft jointly developed with China. In fact, Islamabad has deployed this jet in Saudi Arabia as part of the pact. While Türkiye has built an increasingly indigenous defence industry. A more deeply integrated Makkah alliance could therefore eventually combine American, Turkish, Pakistani and Chinese-origin military technologies rather than reproduce an exclusively US-centred weapons architecture.

That may prove more consequential for American primacy than the pact itself. If the Makkah alliance fades once the immediate Houthi threat recedes, it will remain another temporary regional alignment. But if Yemen produces permanent military integration, Washington could confront an unexpected consequence of its own burden-sharing strategy: the more successfully regional allies learn to defend the American-led order themselves, the less dependent that order may eventually become on America.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

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October 7, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on The Makkah Pact Enters Into Force: The End of American Dominance or Its New Form?

10K More U.S. Troops Deploy as Trump Weighs New Iran Strikes /Suliaman Ahmed

Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – October 3, 2026

October 2, 2026 Posted by | Video, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Comments Off on 10K More U.S. Troops Deploy as Trump Weighs New Iran Strikes /Suliaman Ahmed

Houthis condemn Saudi claims of attack on Medina

RT | October 2, 2026

Yemen’s Houthis have denied targeting a power station in the city of Medina. A Saudi-led coalition earlier accused the militant group of targeting the facility supplying power to the Prophet’s Mosque – one of the holiest sites in the Muslim world.

A senior Houthi official branded the accusation a “lie” aimed at tarnishing the group’s image and reinforcing similar claims made by the coalition in the past.

On Thursday, the Saudi coalition’s spokesman, Major General Turki al-Maliki, accused the Yemeni militants of striking the Taibah electricity distribution station in Medina earlier this week in what he called a “cowardly terrorist act” and a part of an alleged broader campaign by the Houthis to “target the Two Holy Mosques.”

In mid-September, Saudi Arabia accused the Houthis of launching a drone towards the holy city of Mecca. The unmanned aerial vehicle was intercepted and destroyed, it added. The Yemeni movement’s leader, Abdel-Malik al-Houthi, dismissed that claim as a “heinous lie” in a televised address at the time, claiming Riyadh was “weaponizing lies” to advance its own agenda.

The developments have sparked concerns in Türkiye and Pakistan, which signed a joint defense agreement with Saudi Arabia in August. Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly last week, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called any “threat to the sanctity” of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina a “red line that must never be crossed.”

Ankara denounced this week’s alleged Medina attack. “Any attack targeting the sanctity, peace, and security of the Two Holy Mosques is an unacceptable affront directed at the shared sensitivities of the entire Islamic world,” the Turkish government spokesman, Burhanettin Duran, said on X on Friday. He vowed that Türkiye “will continue to stand by Saudi Arabia.”

The developments come amid the continued escalation between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. Riyadh has backed Yemen’s internationally recognized government against the Houthis since intervening in the country’s civil war in 2015.

Large-scale fighting largely subsided after a UN-brokered truce in 2022, but the conflict erupted again this summer after an airport in the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital of Sanaa was bombed to prevent a returning Houthi delegation that had flown to Iran from landing.

October 2, 2026 Posted by | False Flag Terrorism, Wars for Israel | , , , | Comments Off on Houthis condemn Saudi claims of attack on Medina

Sheikh al-Asadi warns of Iraqi government compliance with US demands

Al Mayadeen | September 29, 2026

Head of the Political Council of the Iraqi Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Sheikh Ali al-Asadi, criticized Baghdad’s decision to prevent Iranian aircraft from landing at Iraqi airports, stressing that it constitutes compliance with US pressure and warning that popular action could follow if the decision is not reversed.

Speaking to Al Mayadeen, al-Asadi said, “We regret the decision by the Iraqi authorities to prevent Iranian aircraft from landing in Iraq.” He described the decision as “submission to American bullying,” adding, “The Iraqi decision-maker must reconsider it; otherwise there will be popular pressure aimed at changing the decision.”

He said the issue extends beyond Iraqi airports, invoking longstanding ties between Iraq and Iran. “The issue goes beyond airports. There are close relations with Iran, and therefore we must not bow to an irresponsible decision by America,” he said. “Popular options will be the most pressing, and all possibilities are on the table.”

Sheikh al-Asadi attributed growing US influence in Iraq to weaknesses among domestic political actors. “The weakness of the domestic political actor has allowed the American occupation to impose its decisions in Iraq,” he said, adding, “The decision-maker can choose not to implement American decisions, as some countries do.”

He stressed that “the decision must be sovereign and independent politically, economically, and in terms of security,” defining sovereignty as “complete independence, with Iraq being the decision-maker in all aspects of life.

According to Sheikh al-Asadi, “There are personal and partisan interests behind the absence of independence in decision-making.” He also accused Iraq’s political class of adopting contradictory positions toward Washington, slamming duality in the political class: on the one hand, it agrees to American decisions, while on the other, it condemns them.

He added, “The Resistance’s positions have been clear from the beginning, while the Iraqi politicians have ambiguity and complications.”

Iraq’s main problem is corruption

Turning to the issue of weapons and the debate over their regulation, Sheikh al-Asadi said his movement had held discussions with the Coordination Framework and rejected the term “weapons confinement”. “We discussed the matter with the Coordination Framework and rejected the term ‘weapons confinement.’ We established that the term is harmful and changed it to ‘weapons regulation,’” he said. “Iraq’s biggest problem is corruption, not weapons,” he asserted.

“We are in favor of the Dawn Strike against corruption, but we want it to continue. There are clearly identified corrupt figures, and the law must be applied to them,” the Iraqi leader said. He also expressed deep distrust of Washington, saying, “We do not trust the Americans one iota, and they do not keep their word.” He added, “What happened with Iran is the biggest proof that the Americans do not keep their word. They struck Iran during negotiations, and this is proof of their treachery.”

US assassination unit, like Blackwater

Shikh al-Asadi said Iraq should remain free of US interference in its internal affairs. “Iraq must be free, and the American envoy must not interfere in economic, security, or political affairs,” he said. He added that his movement had information about US activities in Iraq, saying, “We have information about all the American movements and about the division they established, which includes Iraqis under their supervision.”

“We know where this division is located and what its duties will be in the coming phase, and all of this is being monitored,” Sheikh al-Asadi warned. He revealed that the goal behind the creation of this division is to carry out assassinations and create discord, saying, “It is like ‘Blackwater’ under another name.”

He added, “The American movement is suspicious, and they have security companies that entered to compensate for the American military withdrawal.”

Al-Nujaba rejects political participation under current system

Sheikh al-Asadi said Nujaba had no decision to participate in Iraq’s political process. “We in Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba have no decision to engage in the political process, and we are not convinced by the way it is being managed,” he said.

On the issue of weapons, he told Al Mayadeen, “The conditions for handing over weapons are ending the American occupation and all foreign presence, including the Turkish presence.”

He added that the Peshmerga should fall under the command of Iraq’s commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces and warned that “the separatist factions are one of Iraq’s problems, and whenever Resistance intervention is necessary, we will intervene in every inch of Iraqi territory.”

Sheikh al-Asadi further argued that the continuation of armed resistance was linked to the circumstances that justify it: “The resistance has its justifications for resistance, and when these justifications end, so does resistance,” reminding that the justifications do not end with the mere withdrawal of the remaining foreign troops in the country.

Iraq’s leadership must use its leverage

Al-Nujaba’s top official said Iraq’s political leadership must understand the country’s sources of strength and leverage and use them to advance its independence and sovereignty.

Speaking about Iraq’s leadership, Sheikh al-Asadi said he believed the current political figure in question “wants to serve the public interest and do the required work,” describing him as someone who is acting “based on his Shia identity, if I may put it that way.” However, he said the figure is “new to politics” and lacks advisors genuinely committed to helping him succeed.

“Unfortunately, he does not have advisors who are genuinely committed to making his experience successful. Rather, his advisors are concerned with making themselves successful,” Sheikh al-Asadi said.

He stressed that the advisors attempt to influence the political leadership based on what they receive from Washington, adding, “They do not want to help him become a successful figure who can lead during this stage and perhaps the next stage.”

“Whoever leads Iraq must understand what Iraq truly is and what the cards of strength and leverage in Iraq are,” he said. He questioned the interests of foreign powers in Iraq, asking, “Who needs Iraq? Does Europe not need Iraq? Does Turkey not need Iraq?”

Sheikh al-Asadi also pointed to the Development Road project, asking, “Doesn’t the Development Road that they are talking about need Iraq?”

“All of these are leverage cards a political actor can use to achieve what he wants,” he said. “He can even use the cards held by the Resistance factions as leverage. We are offering him this card and telling him: Use us for the sake of serving Iraq.”

Al-Asadi says US sought to persuade factions to give up weapons

According to Sheikh al-Asadi, several US allies had contacted his movement seeking a truce. “Many of America’s allies sent us messages asking for a truce, including the American chargé d’affaires who “tried to contact us through one of the politicians and asked to meet with us.”

He also said US officials had offered projects and incentives in exchange for abandoning strategic weapons. “The Americans offered projects and incentives on condition that we give up our strategic weapons that reach Israel, but we rejected them,” the Iraqi official said. He warned that US pressure would continue even if armed factions surrendered their weapons, saying, “American pressure does not stop at any point. Even if the factions hand over their weapons, they will move on to the Popular Mobilization Forces and then to the Defense Ministry.”

He concluded by highlighting that Washington had sought for years to alter the leadership of the Popular Mobilization Forces. “The main American project for years has sought to change the leadership of the Popular Mobilization Forces and dilute it, but the religious authority and some politicians rejected that,” Sheikh al-Asadi said.

September 29, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Sheikh al-Asadi warns of Iraqi government compliance with US demands

Iran flights continue despite US aviation sanctions

Al Mayadeen | September 26, 2026

International flights from Iran to several destinations remain operational despite the expansion of US sanctions targeting the country’s aviation sector, according to Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport.

The airport said Saturday that flights to Turkey, Malaysia, China, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Afghanistan were continuing according to their previously announced schedules.

The announcement comes as Washington escalates economic pressure on Iran and seeks to restrict the ability of Iranian airlines to maintain international operations.

Iranian flights continue despite sanctions

Imam Khomeini International Airport said that, aside from flights already canceled, no additional cancellations had been announced.

The canceled services include flights involving the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Oman, and Georgia.

The airport also said it was working to restore suspended air connections as soon as possible.

The continued operation of several international routes comes despite growing restrictions on Iranian aviation following a new round of US sanctions announced on September 8.

The measures have affected Iranian airlines as well as companies and intermediaries involved in providing services to the country’s aviation sector.

Recent reporting indicates that Iranian carriers have continued operating some international services despite the sanctions, including flights to China, Turkey, Thailand, and Afghanistan.

US measures target Iran’s aviation sector

The US Treasury Department announced sanctions on September 8 against 36 targets linked to Iran’s aviation sector, including 27 Iranian airlines. Washington described the measures as an effort to target what it considers Iran’s remaining unsanctioned carriers and the networks supporting them.

The sanctions form part of a broader US campaign to restrict Iran’s access to international financial and commercial networks.

The measures have also placed pressure on foreign companies providing Iranian carriers with fuel, ground handling, aircraft-related services, and other forms of support.

The consequences, however, have varied by country. While some governments and companies have restricted Iranian aviation connections, other countries have continued to facilitate flights.

Iraq restrictions trigger backlash

In Iraq, the suspension of Iranian flights, particularly through Najaf International Airport, has triggered criticism from official, political, factional, and religious quarters.

Several Iraqi parties and figures have called for the decision to be reversed and rejected what they described as US pressure on Baghdad.

The Iraqi government is also moving toward dialogue with Washington in an effort to secure an exemption that would allow air links with Iran to resume.

Ali Akbar Velayati, international affairs advisor to Iran’s Leader, said the restrictions on Iranian flights were part of an effort by Iran’s enemies to compensate for their battlefield defeat by attempting to dismantle the “unity of the fronts” from within.

The Iranian Ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al-Sadegh, further told Iran’s ISNA news agency that a new decision surrounding Iranian flights to Iraq is likely to be announced soon.

He added that Iran is in contact with Iraqi officials and proposals on the matter have been submitted.

Al-e Sadegh noted that roughly 12,000 to 13,000 people travel between Iraq and Iran via Iranian airlines.

China maintains air links with Iran

China has maintained its opposition to unilateral US sanctions and continued to receive Iranian flights.

Flight-tracking data cited in recent reports showed Iranian services continuing to operate to Chinese destinations after the latest US measures took effect.

The continued connections with China also reflect the broader geopolitical divide over Washington’s unilateral sanctions policy, with Beijing maintaining economic and diplomatic ties with Tehran despite US pressure.

September 26, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Iran flights continue despite US aviation sanctions

Turkish parliament to review Saudi-Pakistan defense pact next month

Al Mayadeen | September 25, 2026

Turkey’s Parliament is expected to consider the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan next month, Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmus told reporters on Friday, as the three countries move to establish mechanisms for implementing the pact.

Kurtulmus said the agreement has not yet been submitted to Parliament for ratification and is expected to be formally presented once lawmakers return from recess next month. He added that international agreements require parliamentary approval to enter into force in Turkey, while meetings currently being held under the agreement remain preparatory.

Turkey prepares to ratify Mecca defense agreement

Kurtulmus made the remarks to reporters in Ankara, confirming that the agreement has yet to reach Parliament despite ongoing coordination among Ankara, Riyadh, and Islamabad.

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement was signed on August 7 by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in Mecca.

The agreement states that an armed attack against any one of the three countries would be regarded as an attack against all three, while providing for expanded defense cooperation and collective deterrence.

The pact is therefore moving from its initial political agreement toward institutional and legal implementation, with parliamentary approval constituting a key step for Turkey.

When asked about the claim that the Mecca agreement was against Iran, Kurtulmus denied the allegation and stated that the main source of the region’s problems was “Israel” and its aggressive policies.

He reminded parliamentarians that “Israel” launched multiple attacks on numerous nations without question as part of its hostile policies, and explained that the balance of power has completely changed following the US-Israeli war on Iran.

“We propose that the countries in the region increase their cooperation to establish and secure their own security,” he said. “We absolutely do not, and should never, view the Mecca Agreement as an agreement against Iran. The Mecca Agreement, and perhaps even its expansion to include Iran and other regional countries, should become an agreement that ensures the security of the regional countries and, more broadly, the Islamic world.”

Kurtulmus added that the agreement was not formed as a threat to any country as it’s an agreement for the promotion of unity, solidarity, and security of the region.

“It is still in its initial stages and is not yet fully formed,” he said. “We hope that with the participation of other regional countries, it will become a much stronger agreement.”

Saudi Arabia calls for military coordination

The development comes as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan prepare for an urgent meeting of their military chiefs, amid Saudi Arabia’s aggression on Yemen.

Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Ministry announced Friday that the chiefs of staff of the three countries would meet to discuss ways to support the Kingdom under the terms of the Mecca agreement.

The announcement followed a meeting in New York between Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. The Saudi statement did not specify when the military chiefs would meet or what form potential support could take.

Pact moves toward institutionalization

The three countries have already begun establishing mechanisms to implement the agreement.

At a Strategic Political and Defense Committee meeting in Istanbul on August 31, the three sides agreed to establish a secretariat in Saudi Arabia, initially headed by a Pakistani secretary-general for three years.

They also agreed to strengthen military capabilities through joint activities, defense-industry cooperation, technology development, and production.

September 26, 2026 Posted by | Aletho News | , , | Comments Off on Turkish parliament to review Saudi-Pakistan defense pact next month

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