The German parliament has passed sweeping legislation granting the country’s intelligence agencies unprecedented powers to conduct sabotage, secretly enter homes, and expand surveillance. The controversial law has prompted comparisons with the Gestapo and Stasi, the notorious secret police organizations of Nazi Germany and Communist East Germany.
The legislation, championed by Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s governing coalition, was approved on Friday by 300 votes to 190, with 71 abstentions. Only the ruling CDU/CSU bloc and Social Democrats backed the reform. The right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) and The Left opposed it, while the Greens abstained.
Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt hailed the overhaul as a “reform of the century,” declaring a “new era” for German intelligence agencies that would put them on an “equal footing with our European partners.”
He defended the measures by citing alleged threats from espionage, sabotage, cyberattacks and other hostile activities aimed at destabilizing Germany.
From surveillance to sabotage
The legislation fundamentally changes the role of Germany’s two principal intelligence agencies: the foreign intelligence service (BND) and the domestic Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV).
Previously focused primarily on gathering and analyzing intelligence, both agencies would gain powers to actively intervene against perceived threats.
The BND would be authorized to penetrate foreign computer networks, disable servers used by suspected hackers and delete data. Its new powers could extend to sabotaging foreign chemical laboratories and drone production facilities or disrupting supply chains by introducing defective components into shipments linked to potential threats.
The domestic intelligence agency would gain extensive surveillance and intervention powers, including covert access to smartphones and computers, interception of encrypted communications and examination of stored data.
BfV operatives could also secretly enter private homes to install surveillance software or neutralize suspected weapons.
The agency would additionally be able to obtain information from payment providers, online platforms, and vehicle manufacturers, while deploying AI-assisted facial recognition and biometric searches to identify potential suspects.
Oversight of the expanded powers would be consolidated under the Independent Oversight Council, a 12-member body established in 2021 and appointed by the Bundestag’s Parliamentary Oversight Panel.
Previously focused largely on the legality of BND surveillance, the council would gain authority to approve intervention operations by both agencies, including proactive sabotage abroad.
It would also be required to report to parliamentary overseers at least annually and publish public reports excluding classified information.
Return of the secret police?
The overhaul has triggered fierce criticism from opposition lawmakers, who warn that it threatens constitutional protections and dismantles safeguards established after the fall of Nazi Germany.
AfD lawmaker Christian Wirth condemned the reform as an “attack on the rule of law with truly totalitarian characteristics.”
He particularly criticized provisions allowing the BfV to exclude regional intelligence offices from information-sharing networks, warning that they could be used against politically “undesirable” state authorities.
In September, fellow AfD lawmaker Gottfried Curio accused Merz’s government of preparing to systematically violate fundamental rights, invoking Germany’s history under the Gestapo and East Germany’s Stasi.
“Manipulating, sabotaging, deceiving – with these subversive measures, the [BfV] is being transformed into Stasi 2.0,” he warned.
The criticism has extended beyond the AfD.
Green lawmaker Konstantin von Notz supported strengthening the BND but accused the government of lacking “any sensitivity to civil rights” in its domestic intelligence overhaul. He warned that the legislation could face “serious problems” before Germany’s Constitutional Court.
The Left’s Clara Buenger went further, accusing Dobrindt of undermining democracy through nationwide AI-powered mass surveillance and laying the groundwork for a “new German secret police.”
At the heart of the controversy is Germany’s longstanding separation principle, designed to prevent intelligence agencies from acquiring police powers.
The safeguard traces its origins to the Allied powers’ 1949 ‘Police Letter,’ which sought to prevent the re-emergence of an organization resembling the Gestapo. The distinction between intelligence gathering and law enforcement was subsequently incorporated into legislation governing Germany’s security services.
Critics argue that allowing intelligence operatives to secretly enter homes, interfere with property and conduct sabotage erodes that historical barrier.
Dobrindt has dismissed accusations that the reform threatens democracy as “madness.”
Russian threat narrative
The intelligence overhaul comes as Berlin accelerates its military buildup, with Merz’s government repeatedly invoking an alleged Russian threat to justify increased defense spending and expanded security capabilities.
German officials have increasingly warned of a possible military confrontation with Moscow, while accusing Russia of conducting espionage, sabotage, and other hostile operations across Europe.
Last month, BND chief Martin Jaeger warned that Germany could become “embroiled in a violent conflict with Russia,” accusing Moscow of waging a “shadow war” against Berlin.
Defense Minister Boris Pistorius and senior-most military commander General Christian Freuding have likewise warned that Russia could attack NATO before the end of the decade.
Moscow has repeatedly rejected claims that it intends to attack NATO members, dismissing such speculation as “nonsense” and “political schizophrenia.” Russian officials have instead accused Berlin of pursuing further escalation.
The controversy also has a domestic political dimension.
Merz has described the AfD as “Russia-backed” without publicly substantiating the allegation, while his Social Democratic coalition partners have pushed for a ban on the opposition party.
The AfD, which advocates stricter immigration controls and opposes German military assistance to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, has become a major target of political scrutiny.
Defending the intelligence overhaul on Friday, Chancellor’s Office official Nina Warken argued that Germany faces daily threats from foreign powers that “disguise sabotage as an accident, espionage as business dealings, and propaganda as an opinion.”
A Franco-Palestinian association has asked a Paris court to ban an Israeli real estate fair scheduled for Sunday in the French capital, alleging that it promotes properties in occupied Palestinian territories, broadcaster FranceInfo reported.
The NIDAL association filed an emergency petition with the Paris Administrative Court seeking to prohibit the ninth Icube real estate and investment fair or, alternatively, bar exhibitors from promoting properties in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem.
The group pointed to the participation of Israeli real estate company BH Nadlan, which advertises apartments in both areas, and alleged that the event’s promotional materials offer financial incentives to people seeking to settle in the West Bank.
The association said it had previously requested intervention from the Paris police prefecture but received no response.
The fair is scheduled for Nov. 15 at the European Center for Judaism in Paris.
A court hearing was held Thursday, with a ruling expected before the event.
There has been much debate in Britain in recent years about symbols of empire – pulling down statues, or returning museum artefacts.
But we rarely talk about the fact that British foreign policy is still run by the same institutions which ran the empire.
The Secretary of State for Business and Trade is still called ‘President of the Board of Trade’, referring to an institution involved in the triangular slave trade.
Perhaps the most obvious remnant of the empire is Britain’s outsized military bootprint. Most countries with foreign bases largely have them in neighbouring territories; only Britain, the US and France have genuinely global militaries.
With at least 145 bases in forty-two countries, Britain likely has the second-biggest military footprint on earth. Many of these bases are in former or remaining colonies (i.e. British overseas territories).
Many of the most important ones are in small authoritarian monarchies, with royal families we’ve helped prop up for decades, a direct relic of the empire.
These bases are important outposts of the British state. And yet, there is almost no democratic scrutiny of how they are used. Indeed, many of them are officially secret, and remained so until the journalistic website Declassified revealed their existence. There may well be more.
Look at how they are used, and we begin to see that this large swathe of British state power, left over from empire, is used – often violently – to prop up a global system not of British dominance, but of US hegemony and the corporate control which comes with it.
Projecting US power
Bases on British overseas territories – namely, Gibraltar; Ascension Island; Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus; and Diego Garcia – play particularly important roles in projecting US power.
These bases are all vital nodes in the Pentagon’s global surveillance system. For example, there are four main ‘ground antennae’ in the Global Positioning System (GPS). Two of these are on US territory, in Florida and Hawaii, and two are on British territory, on Ascension Island and Diego Garcia, providing circumglobal spread.
Akrotiri and Dhekelia are a significant hub for UK/US surveillance efforts across the Middle East and North Africa, allowing GCHQ and the NSA to intercept phone calls, text messages and internet communications across the region. The US Air Force’s main intelligence squadron also has a base there, and throughout Israel’s genocide of Gaza, Britain sent surveillance flights over Gaza from these bases, likely spying for Israel.
Similarly, the bases have more direct military use. During the genocide, Cypriots reported a surge in flights from Akrotiri, and the government admitted many were heading to Israel. There was also a significant increase in the supply of arms coming into the bases. The US was almost certainly rearming Israel using British sovereign territory.
Likewise, Diego Garcia is the major US military base from which its attacks on the Middle East and South Asia are conducted – including, for example, the initial bombing raids on Baghdad in 2003.
Beyond accountability
While the US has military bases on foreign soil across the planet, it needs to negotiate the domestic politics of most other states when it wishes to use them, and so becomes slightly accountable to global public opinion.
British territories, on the other hand, offer a space beyond accountability. Cypriots might protest against the US seemingly using Britain’s military bases to re-arm Israel, but they can’t vote out the regime allowing it.
Unlike the other overseas territories, the Cyprus military bases are run through the Ministry of Defence rather than the Foreign Office, and have no democratic structures. An administrator, officially appointed by the British monarch on the recommendation of the MoD, is in practice always the head of UK armed forces there, governing over Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
The 11,000 Cypriots who live on British sovereign land are subject to the old legal system imposed when Cyprus was a British colony, and effectively live under military dictatorship. Cyprus has repeatedly asked Britain to leave; Britain refuses.
For British voters, this is out of sight in some constitutional quirk. And when MPs do take an interest, the government can simply ignore them: in 2025, one frustrated MP told me, the government issued a block on MPs asking questions about the use of RAF flights to conduct surveillance in Israel and Gaza. It can do so, as my book Abolish Westminster explores in further detail, because it is operating under royal prerogative, not parliamentary authority.
Surveillance and shipping
Particularly significant is the role these territories play in signals intelligence, and the surveillance processes used by the US to project its global power and undermine self-determination and, sometimes, democracy around the world.
In the 1950s, British intelligence services developed a vast network of interception stations across the globe, tapping phone lines of anti-imperialist leaders and the like. As colonies started to win freedom, there was a panicked reaction about how to maintain this surveillance infrastructure. GCHQ solved this problem by maintaining control over overseas territories and footholds in informally dependent regimes in strategically important places.
Nowadays, because the internet relies on fibre-optic cables across the planet, this network has become more important than ever, providing the UK and US with the capacity to tap phone and internet communications across a large portion of the planet – and particularly in former colonies.
Similarly, these toeholds provide stopping points on many of the world’s most important shipping routes – such as Singapore and Bahrain – providing bases for the Royal Navy from which it can protect Britain’s oil industry, which is partly why Britain still hosts two of the world’s four biggest publicly listed oil companies.
This network is then justified by turning some of these territories – particularly the Falklands and Gibraltar with their whiter populations – into trinkets for Britons to remember their past power, and so demand an oversized military.
It’s often forgotten that the supposed justification for the onslaught on Iraq launched from one British overseas territory – and the disastrous war that followed – included a claimed threat to another British overseas territory: ‘the forty-five-minute claim’ screeched by The Sun, the Evening Standard and other establishment outriders was that, according to (they claimed) an intelligence dossier, Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction capable of deployment against British targets within forty-five minutes of an order to do so.
What many might not have realised from the headlines is that the British targets of these (as it transpired) invented weapons weren’t London. They were, at least according to some of the lie’s iterations, Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
Voters in the dark
The impact on the people who live under the dictators Britain props up to maintain this power is immense, while British voters have almost no say in what’s going on, and rarely even know about it: the British foreign policy machine largely continues its work, unfettered by democracy.
Oman and Bahrain, Singapore and Brunei – these aren’t formally British colonies, but their regimes are propped up by the British state, in ways that aren’t properly accountable either to the people of those countries, or those of the UK.
While the MoD refuses to disclose figures, the cost of maintaining this bootprint is one of the reasons Britain has the world’s fifth-highest total military expenditure. Only Russia, China, India and the US spend more. Apart from the US, virtually the only democracies that spend more of their GDP on the military are those fighting wars within or on their borders. Britain spends more of its wealth on its military than any other Western European country.
This level of expenditure is partly accepted because of the impact of memories of empire on our national identity – a plurality of British people think we should ‘punch above our weight’. And it is partly self-perpetuating, in that it creates interests which then lobby for themselves.
Imagine a defence secretary suggesting at a departmental meeting that Britain cut military spending to the same level as Japan – from 2.3% to 1.6% of GDP – including axing military bases outside sovereign territory.
Would this be taken calmly? Or would there be leaks, denunciations from unnamed generals in the press, screams that our national security was at risk and rapid ministerial backpedalling?
The spending’s primary purpose, though, is to protect a mix of US global dominance, and the interests of a handful of vast corporations which are – only sort of – British.
The EU risks driving investors and their money out of Europe over plans to use frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine, Euroclear CEO Valerie Urbain has warned.
The bloc has frozen around €210 billion ($232 billion) in Russian central bank assets since 2022, most of it held at Belgian-based Euroclear. While the EU has already diverted profits from the funds to Ukraine, it has stopped short of seizing the assets outright over legal concerns. Moscow has condemned both measures as theft.
In an interview with Belgian newspaper Le Soir published on Friday, Urbain said previous debates over the assets had already unsettled international investors.
“I have noticed that many investors followed last year’s debates and are now wondering whether Europe is still capable of respecting the rule of law,” she said.
Urbain warned of a “reputational risk” that could lead to “some deposits leaving Europe,” stressing that investor confidence depends on legal certainty and the protection of assets.
She also rejected proposals to transfer the frozen funds to the EU or another entity without accounting for Euroclear’s obligations.
“You cannot simply ‘transfer’ the assets and forget about the liabilities. That would create an enormous imbalance and lead to Euroclear’s bankruptcy,” she said.
Urbain explained that Russian securities had matured into cash under sanctions, leaving Euroclear liable to repay Moscow around €185 billion – more than 80% of its balance sheet. Transferring both assets and liabilities would still carry legal risks, she added.
Belgium has repeatedly resisted confiscation proposals. Last month, Prime Minister Bart De Wever said he did not expect the European Commission to revive the plan, although individual member states could still push for it. EU leaders instead agreed last December to borrow €90 billion jointly to support Ukraine.
In May, a Moscow court awarded the Russian central bank around €200 billion in damages in a lawsuit against Euroclear. Earlier this month, Belgian newspaper L’Echo reported that the bank had sought a court order to seize documents from Euroclear’s Brussels headquarters over alleged coordination with EU institutions on sanctions.
Urbain also warned of possible retaliation, including the confiscation of Euroclear assets in Russia and countries friendly to Moscow.
The European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund have previously raised concerns that seizing Russian assets could undermine financial stability and confidence in the euro.
Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) issued a similar warning in September, saying confiscation would damage Europe’s standing among major investors, including China, India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Singapore.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has accused Western nations of “outright robbery,” declaring that trust in them has been “completely lost.”
Russia will not sit by idly as NATO builds up a military presence near its borders and prepares to send troops into Ukraine, Moscow’s envoy to the OSCE, Dmitry Polyansky, has warned.
Speaking at the organization’s Permanent Council in Vienna on Thursday, Polyansky said European powers were laying the groundwork for a direct military confrontation with Russia by putting industries on a war footing, upgrading troop transport infrastructure and expanding weapons production near its territory.
He said plans by the Western-backed “coalition of the willing” to station troops in Ukraine amounted to preparations for an intervention and an inevitable clash with Russia.
“Why do European politicians believe that we will watch all this and sit idly by?” he asked.
Polyansky pointed to drone factories being built in the Baltic states, including a plant in Latvia near the Russian and Belarusian borders, and new military transport corridors in Scandinavia.
NATO is also developing an automated defense network along its eastern flank, equipped with surveillance systems, robotic platforms and counter-drone weapons. The network, which he said will use technology from Palantir, a US surveillance and data analytics company with major military and intelligence contracts, is due to be completed by late 2027.
The diplomat also cited Western military plans to strike targets deep inside Russia, including bases, weapons factories and infrastructure. He also mentioned statements by Polish and Finnish commanders about attacking Russian territory.
Responding to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s claim that Russia understands only the “language of force,” Polyansky warned that such an approach would “inevitably rebound in the other direction.”
He also warned Poland against “playing with fire” after Prime Minister Donald Tusk declared that “the Baltic Sea is becoming a Polish sea.”
“I hope Europe remembers that threats to our border regions, as well as the appearance of foreign troops in Ukraine, will receive the most decisive military response,” Polyansky said.
Beyond plans to send troops, the envoy said European governments were prolonging the Ukraine conflict by continuing to arm Kiev. He argued that Vladimir Zelensky and his European backers wanted a ceasefire to “catch their breath, lick their wounds, rearm and resume the war against Russia.”
Polyansky contrasted Europe’s position with the latest Russian-US talks in Abu Dhabi, where the two sides discussed both the Ukraine conflict and the wider European security order.
Moscow remains ready to negotiate a new security framework based on “equal and indivisible security” and mutual respect for national interests, including those of Russia and Ukraine, Polyansky said. However, he stressed that Russia would accept no “breathing spaces” or “ceasefires” designed to give Kiev time to rearm.
EU leaders want to prolong the Ukraine conflict because they stand to lose their jobs if peace is achieved, Swiss journalist and Forum Geopolitica founder Peter Hansler has told RT.
During the two-day Russia-Ukraine-US talks in Abu Dhabi earlier this week, European officials held separate consultations with the US and Ukrainian delegations but were not included in the main negotiations. On Thursday, US President Donald Trump’s envoy Jared Kushner said Moscow agreed to expand the next round of negotiations to include “our European partners.”
Russia has not, however, confirmed that it agreed to direct European participation. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has accused European governments of sending mixed signals, with their calls for peace contrasting with plans to deploy troops to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire. Moscow has consistently said it would oppose any such move.
“All the leaders in Europe, they will lose their job if there is peace. So does [Ukraine’s Vladimir] Zelensky,” Hansler told RT, arguing that the involvement of European governments in negotiations would be “highly problematic.”
“They will block any peace. This is my personal opinion,” the journalist added.
Hansler claimed that European leaders are not interested in negotiating an end to the conflict. “They will prolong the war. That’s their interest. Because all the European leaders, they are dependent on this war,” he said.
He also pointed to divisions within the EU over further financial support for Kiev, saying European governments are “running out of money” and lack unity on whether to continue financing Ukraine.
Hansler argued that there would be no meaningful negotiations or prospect of peace if German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, and British Prime Minister Andy Burnham took part, accusing them of being “pro-war against Russia.” He also noted that European governments have thus far failed to name a negotiator to represent them in any potential talks.
A car exploded on a Moscow street while the official spokesperson for a former Ukrainian prime minister was inside, Al Mayadeen’s Moscow bureau chief reported on Friday.
The bureau chief said the incident appeared to be an [attempted] assassination targeting Ukrainians who oppose the current Ukrainian government’s policies, adding that suspicion would fall on Ukrainian intelligence services.
The Kommersant newspaper reported that Sergei Zavorotniy, once a top aide of Mykola Azarov, who served as Ukraine’s prime minister from 2010 to 2014, was hospitalized after a car exploded on a street in Chertanovo, a district of the Russian capital.
It was the second car bombing in Russia in successive days. Moscow has blamed Ukraine for previous assassinations of senior military officials and people linked to Russia’s war effort. There was no immediate comment from Ukraine on Friday.
Ren TV and the 112 Telegram channel both reported that Zavorotniy had lost his left arm in the attack, and that he was in hospital with a concussion, rib fractures and other injuries. The Baza Telegram channel published a photograph of a black four-door car with a smashed windshield, doors and front bumper on a city street.
Russia’s Investigative Committee, which handles serious crimes, said it had opened an investigation into the incident.
Zavorotniy’s former boss Azarov fled to Russia in 2014, when Ukraine’s Maidan Coup ousted pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych after he broke a promise to develop closer ties with the European Union.
Azarov told Russia’s TASS state news agency on Friday that he had no information about the car bomb, except that Zavorotniy had survived.
The explosion was the latest in a series of apparent assassination attempts inside Russia. On November 12, 2026, a Russian Air Force colonel was killed when an explosive device detonated beneath his car in Shushary, near St. Petersburg. The incident came less than three months after another Russian serviceman, Major Sergei Sechkov, was killed in a car explosion in the same area on August 27.
In February 2026, Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, deputy head of Russia’s military intelligence agency, was shot and wounded inside his residential building in Moscow. Russian investigators opened an investigation into the attack, while Moscow accused Ukraine of involvement.
Yemen’s Armed Forces have managed to make major advances against Saudi-backed militants south of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, officially completing the encirclement of Aden Province.
Reports said on Friday that the Yemeni forces reached the coastal strip connecting Aden to Lahij Province.
Saudi-sponsored mercenaries in the areas of al-Suqiya and Ras al-Ara were given two options, surrender and face capture, or withdraw without their weapons, the reports added.
The advances come as Saudi fighter jets have carried out dozens of airstrikes to prevent the Yemeni forces from cementing their gains.
On Thursday, fierce clashes erupted along several fronts near Kharaz Camp, which is considered one of the main military support bases for Saudi-backed militants and houses a large number of warehouses containing various types of weapons.
Mohammad al-Farah, a member of the Ansarullah political bureau, announced that the Yemeni forces continue to advance in Lahij while Saudi-sponsored elements are experiencing confusion and disarray in their ranks.
Major General Ahmed al-Turki, a commander of Saudi-backed militants left the frontline without coordination, according to recent reports. Mahmoud al-Subaihi, a member of the so-called presidential leadership council, departed Aden for Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia waged a devastating war on Yemen in March 2015, but it failed to reinstall a Riyadh-friendly regime there. In 2022, the kingdom agreed to a ceasefire with Ansarullah, but maintained its land, sea, and air blockade of the country.
A few months ago, Yemen launched operations in response to illegal Saudi airstrikes and announced a maritime blockade in retaliation for the 12-year inhumane siege of the country by the kingdom.
Since then, Yemen’s Armed Forces have pushed back Saudi-backed militants and taken control of several areas, strengthening control over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a strategic maritime passage between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Trita Parsi is the co-founder and Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Follow his excellent Substack: https://tritaparsi.substack.com/
00:00 The Current State of the Iran War
02:55 Escalation Risks and Political Dynamics
06:11 The Swiss Cheese Scenario
08:54 Iran’s Response and Regional Implications
11:51 The Dilemma of U.S. Sanctions
15:06 The Future of U.S.-Iran Relations
18:08 The Multipolar World and Sanctions Efficacy
20:56 Israel’s Position and Regional Stability
23:49 The Saudi-Yemen Conflict and U.S. Involvement
26:58 The Shift in U.S. Foreign Policy
29:50 Conclusion and Future Outlook
The growing debate in Iran over withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) reflects a fundamental question: What purpose does membership serve if the treaty offers no meaningful protection for a country’s peaceful nuclear facilities, even as it obliges that country to uphold its commitments?
The issue goes beyond Iran’s legitimate security concerns, striking at the credibility of the international nuclear order itself.
When an NPT signatory’s nuclear infrastructure can be subjected to unprovoked and illegal military aggression without any accountability for those responsible, the treaty’s underlying premise of reciprocal obligations and protections is called into question.
The Assembly of Experts’ latest call for a review of Iran’s defence doctrine, including consideration of withdrawal from the NPT, signals a significant shift in the country’s strategic debate that has been gaining momentum since the 40-day imposed war.
What was once largely confined to discussions among lawmakers and security officials is now increasingly being articulated as a broader national security concern, especially in the wake of continued sabre rattling by the enemy.
While Iran is expected to uphold its international obligations as an NPT signatory, its adversaries face absolutely no accountability for openly violating the most fundamental principles of international law.
The repeated attacks on Iranian nuclear installations, assassinations of nuclear scientists and failure of international institutions to respond decisively have intensified questions about the effectiveness, fairness and credibility of the existing non-proliferation framework.
This is no longer a debate about the future of Iran’s nuclear program, which is entirely peaceful. It has evolved into a much broader question of national sovereignty, strategic deterrence, the credibility of international law and, ultimately, a state’s inherent right to defend itself against external aggression.
From nuclear safeguards to strategic vulnerability
Iran’s grievances did not emerge overnight. For years, its peaceful, energy-focused nuclear programme has been subjected to sabotage, cyberattacks, assassinations of scientists and, ultimately, direct military strikes against facilities under international monitoring.
This pattern long predates the two recent wars of aggression against Iran. In 2010, nuclear scientist Masoud Ali Mohammadi was assassinated in Tehran. Later that year, Majid Shahriari was killed in a bombing, while Fereydoun Abbasi survived an assassination attempt. Abbasi was subsequently martyred on the first day of the 12-day war in June 2025.
Dariush Rezainejad was assassinated in 2011, followed by Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan in January 2012. In November 2020, prominent nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated on the outskirts of Tehran. Israeli spying agency Mossad was involved in these attacks, with the stamp of approval from CIA.
During the 12-day war of aggression in June 2025, Israel assassinated several more of Iran’s leading nuclear scientists, yet the UN nuclear watchdog refrained from condemning these targeted killings. In fact, it was the politically motivated resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors shortly before the war that was instrumental in paving the way for the aggression at a time when Iran and the US were engaged in indirect nuclear negotiations.
The attacks have not been confined to individuals. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has on numerous occasions been targeted through sophisticated sabotage operations, most notably the Stuxnet cyberattack against the Natanz enrichment facility in 2010.
The escalation reached an entirely different level in June 2025, when Israel, backed by the United States, launched an unprovoked and illegal military aggression against Iran, targeting nuclear installations alongside military and civilian infrastructure. Washington subsequently joined the war directly, bombing the three key nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan on June 22.
These were neither clandestine installations nor facilities operating outside the international nuclear framework. Iran’s nuclear program has for years been subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and verification arrangements.
The attacks thus raised a fundamental and logical question: if nuclear facilities under international monitoring can be bombed with sheer impunity, what practical protection does the safeguards system offer countries that remain committed to the NPT?
The IAEA itself confirmed the damage. Director General Rafael Grossi, who is now vying for the top UN post, reported that the above-ground section of Natanz’s pilot enrichment plant had been destroyed in the initial Israeli strikes. Following the US attacks, the agency confirmed that Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan had been hit, with extensive additional damage reported at the Isfahan complex.
The repercussions extended well beyond physical destruction. The IAEA subsequently suspended its field verification activities, while inspectors were withdrawn from Iran for safety reasons. In effect, military attacks on safeguarded nuclear installations undermined the very monitoring arrangements that the international community repeatedly demands Iran uphold.
This glaring contradiction lies at the heart of intensifying calls in Iran to withdraw from NPT. Iran is expected to honour its nuclear commitments even as the international framework designed to safeguard them offers no protection against external military aggression.
The IAEA’s credibility crisis
Iran’s criticism of the IAEA stems from a glaring double standard in its approach to nuclear security, compliance and accountability.
The agency has repeatedly demanded access and cooperation from Tehran, while its response to military attacks against Iranian nuclear installations has largely remained confined to tokenistic statements expressing concern and warnings about nuclear safety.
Grossi did state that nuclear facilities must never be attacked, regardless of the circumstances. He also warned that such attacks could have serious consequences for nuclear safety, security and international peace. However, the agency he heads did not produce a meaningful accountability mechanism capable of deterring or penalising those responsible for the unprovoked attacks.
The distinction between expressing concern and ensuring accountability is particularly important. The IAEA applies extensive mechanisms for inspecting nuclear facilities, verifying declared nuclear material and reporting safeguards violations. Yet it lacks the mechanism to hold rogue states accountable for attacks against nuclear facilities.
This exposes a structural weakness in the international nuclear order: compliance is rigorously monitored, but the security of compliant states is not equally guaranteed.
The timing of the June 2025 aggression made this contradiction even more glaring. Just a day before Israel launched its attacks, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution claiming Iran was in “non-compliance” with its safeguards obligations.
The move was politically motivated and reflected Israeli pressure on the agency and Grossi’s attempt to appease Washington with an eye on top UN position. The fact that the attacks followed almost immediately proved that diplomatic and monitoring mechanisms had become instruments of pressure on Iran rather than impartial safeguards.
There is also an important distinction here: the IAEA’s June 2025 finding concerned Iran’s safeguards obligations, not a finding that Iran had decided to build nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the episode reinforced the fact that Iran’s rights and obligations under the treaty were being interpreted selectively.
The credibility problem is further complicated by the nuclear status of the Israeli regime, which is not a signatory to the NPT and which possesses nuclear weapons, while maintaining a policy of nuclear ambiguity. Israel’s nuclear arsenal remains outside the treaty’s safeguards framework, while Iran, a non-nuclear-weapon state party, faces extensive inspections and international scrutiny for no reason.
Withdrawal from NPT becomes serious policy debate
Against this backdrop, calls for the Iranian leadership to reconsider the country’s NPT membership have gained momentum. Recent countywide polls, including those conducted by the state broadcaster IRIB, show an overwhelming majority of people in favor of the country’s exit from the treaty.
The statement by the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member constitutional body tasked with electing and supervising the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, is particularly significant because it elevates the issue beyond individual parliamentary interventions.
The body has called for a decisive review of Iran’s defence doctrine, consideration of withdrawal from the NPT and the establishment of the necessary deterrence capabilities. It has described these measures as an unavoidable necessity and an emerging national demand.
The statement also warned that any renewed aggression against the country would trigger an immediate and effective Iranian response without geographical limitations, echoing the position articulated by Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei in his meeting with top military commanders recently.
The message is twofold: Iran is reconsidering the assumptions underpinning its existing security arrangements, and it intends to ensure that any future attack carries consequences beyond the immediate battlefield.
The Assembly of Experts’ intervention follows similar remarks from senior officials and lawmakers. Major General Mohsen Rezaee, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, also addressed the growing debate over the country’s nuclear doctrine recently.
On November 1, he acknowledged that public and political demands to reconsider the doctrine have emerged following attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities despite extensive IAEA inspections and monitoring. He clarified, however, that no official decision has so far been taken by the Supreme National Security Council to change the doctrine.
Earlier, on September 20, Iranian lawmaker Hossein Ali Hajideligani announced that a three-urgency parliamentary motion calling for withdrawal from the NPT had been submitted to the parliament’s presiding board. He said the proposal was awaiting permission to be introduced in an open parliamentary session.
He maintained that after repeated attacks against the country, including the nuclear sites, continued membership of the treaty was delivering more disadvantages than benefits.
These developments suggest that withdrawal is no longer merely an occasional political threat deployed during diplomatic confrontations. It has become a subject of institutional debate involving lawmakers, senior security officials and now the Assembly of Experts.
What does withdrawal from NPT actually mean
The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, is built around three central pillars: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting peaceful nuclear cooperation and advancing nuclear disarmament.
Under Article IV, member states retain the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, provided they comply with their treaty obligations. Article III establishes the safeguards framework through which the IAEA verifies that nuclear material is not diverted towards weapons programmes.
Article X, meanwhile, explicitly recognises a member state’s sovereign right to withdraw. It states that a party may withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter have jeopardised its national interests. The withdrawing state must provide three months’ notice to all other parties and the UN Security Council, explaining the extraordinary events behind its decision.
This provision is particularly relevant to Iran’s current position. It could contend that repeated military attacks against its safeguarded nuclear facilities, the assassination of its scientists and the failure of international mechanisms to provide effective protection have fundamentally undermined the security rationale for continued membership.
In such circumstances, withdrawal becomes an exercise of national sovereignty under a provision explicitly written into the treaty.
Why Iran is reconsidering its defence doctrine
The debate over NPT membership is closely connected to a wider reassessment of Iran’s defence doctrine. For decades, it has maintained and demonstrated that its nuclear program is peaceful and that nuclear weapons have no place in the country’s defence strategy. Iranian officials have repeatedly invoked a decree by the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei against acquiring such weapons.
Iran reiterated this position in its submission to the 2026 NPT review process, describing the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the placement of peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards as central elements of its commitment to the treaty.
However, the strategic environment has changed dramatically. The February 28, 2026, US-Israeli aggression against Iran, following the earlier attacks in June 2025, has reinforced the argument that the country’s existing deterrence arrangements need fundamental reassessment, especially amid continued threats from the US-Israeli war machine.
The central concern is that conventional military capabilities and international diplomatic commitments have not been sufficient to prevent repeated attacks against Iranian territory and strategic infrastructure. Hence, deterrence must be credible enough to convince adversaries that another military adventure would carry unacceptable costs.
This is the context in which Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei’s warning about an immediate response without geographical limitations should be understood. It communicates that Iran would not necessarily confine its response to the location of an attack or accept geographical restrictions imposed by its adversaries in the event of new aggression.
The Assembly of Experts has effectively connected this deterrence argument with the NPT debate. Its position suggests that Iran cannot continue relying on an international framework that has failed to protect its security while limiting its strategic options.
The question is not simply whether Iran should acquire additional military capabilities. It is whether the country’s defence doctrine should be adjusted to reflect the realities of a regional and international order in which military force has increasingly been used against it despite the existence of diplomatic agreements and international safeguards.
Wider implications for international nuclear order
Iran’s potential withdrawal would have consequences extending well beyond West Asia. The NPT is often described as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Its credibility depends not only on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons but also on maintaining confidence that member states can exercise their peaceful nuclear rights without becoming targets of military aggression.
If a state that has remained within the treaty concludes that membership offers inadequate protection against attacks on its safeguarded facilities, other countries may question the practical value of the existing arrangements. This would create a dangerous precedent.
The international community cannot consistently demand that countries accept intrusive inspections and comply with non-proliferation obligations while treating attacks against their peaceful nuclear infrastructure as an issue that can be addressed through tokenistic expressions of concern alone.
There is also a broader contradiction involving nuclear-armed states and those outside the treaty. Israel’s continued refusal to join the NPT, combined with its widely acknowledged nuclear arsenal, highlights the uneven application of international nuclear rules.
Meanwhile, the five states recognised as nuclear-weapon states under the NPT have not fulfilled the disarmament expectations embedded in Article VI to the satisfaction of many non-nuclear-weapon states.
This imbalance has long undermined confidence in the treaty’s underlying bargain: non-nuclear states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons, while nuclear-weapon states commit to pursuing disarmament and all parties retain the right to peaceful nuclear technology.
Iran’s current debate brings these unresolved contradictions into sharper focus. A withdrawal would not necessarily mean that Iran would immediately pursue nuclear weapons. Nor should such an outcome be presented as inevitable. But it would represent a serious setback for a non-proliferation framework already facing considerable challenges.
It would also complicate the work of the IAEA, reduce transparency and potentially create new uncertainties about nuclear material, verification and regional security.
For the United States and its European allies, as well as the Zionist regime, the prospect of Iranian withdrawal from the NPT should therefore be a warning about the consequences of relying excessively on sanctions, military threats and coercive diplomacy.
A test for international institutions
Ultimately, Iran’s NPT debate is about more than nuclear policy. It is a test of whether international institutions can uphold the principles they were established to defend.
The NPT cannot remain credible if its obligations are enforced selectively, peaceful nuclear facilities are exposed to dastardly military attacks and the perpetrators face no meaningful consequences.
Nor can the IAEA maintain its standing as an impartial international watchdog if its ability to monitor nuclear activities is accompanied by an inability to meaningfully address threats to the safety and security of safeguarded facilities.
Washington and its European allies must recognise that military aggression against a member state’s safeguarded nuclear facilities fundamentally undermines the very non-proliferation system they claim to defend.
The IAEA, too, must demonstrate that its mandate extends beyond demanding compliance from non-nuclear states to consistently defending nuclear safety and the inviolability of peaceful nuclear installations.
Iran’s growing reconsideration of NPT membership is, in this sense, a consequence of a much deeper crisis of confidence. The international community now faces a fundamental question: Can the global nuclear order survive when compliance offers no credible protection against aggression, and when the institutions responsible for safeguarding it can’t ensure accountability?
If that question remains unanswered, Iran’s debate may prove to be part of a much wider challenge to the foundations of the international non-proliferation regime.
One of the main reasons Israel’s “Hasbara” has been so easy to debunk is the fact that Israelis in Hebrew widely showcase their genocidal hatred towards the Palestinian people for the world to see.
The latest example, uncovered by historian Zachary Foster, shows two hosts on the mainstream Israeli outlet Channel 14- the Channel most closely connected with the ruling Likud party- laughing at and celebrating the deadly floods in Gaza that have killed four children in the past few days.
In the clip, the sadistic Israeli hosts play a song with the lyrics “rain, rain is dripping, rain rain how fun”, over images of displaced Palestinians civilians dealing with flooding in refugee camps.
The hosts sadistically laugh at footage of a Palestinian woman desperately scooping water out of her flooded tent with a cup, saying “within six years you’ll get it all out of the tent”, while laughing hysterically at her suffering.
The two evil hosts continue to laugh and mock Palestinian suffering, suggesting that Palestinians “open a water park”, while displaying a superimposed image of a water park over the ruins of Gaza, caused by Israel’s ongoing genocide.
The two hosts continue to dance and sing as they speculate what to call this “water park”.
This sadistic display of mocking and celebrating Palestinian suffering is not an isolated incident and is just another example of the sadism broadcast daily on Israeli TV.
Channel 14, where this genocidal screed was broadcast, is not a fringe network within Israel either, and actually emerged as one of Israel’s “most-watched news sources” in 2024, even beating the more mainstream Channel 12 in ratings.
Indeed, it is exactly this sort of genocidal barbarism that makes the channel popular with the Israeli public, which overwhelmingly supports genocide of the Palestinian people.
Former Irish Prime Minister Charles Haughey was warned by loyalist paramilitaries that they were once tasked with murdering him in an assassination plot purportedly dreamt up by the British secret service.
The sensational disclosure was sent in a letter to the Irish government, newly released under the Public Records Act, which requires documents of historical value to be published by the National Archives within 30 years.
Written on Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) signature paper, the warning claims the terrorist organization was asked by an MI5 operative about the prospect of carrying out an attack on Republic of Ireland leader Haughey in 1985.
At the time, Haughey would have been in opposition as head of political party Fianna Fáil, but details of the solicitation did not become known to Irish authorities until 1987.
“In 1985 we were approached by a M15 officer attached to the Northern Ireland Office and based in Lisburn, Alex Jones was his supposed name,” the letter reads, according to the Irish Times. “He asked us to execute you.”… continue
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