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Iran’s NPT exit debate: How repeated attacks exposed the failures of global nuclear safeguards

Press TV | November 12, 2026

The growing debate in Iran over withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) reflects a fundamental question: What purpose does membership serve if the treaty offers no meaningful protection for a country’s peaceful nuclear facilities, even as it obliges that country to uphold its commitments?

The issue goes beyond Iran’s legitimate security concerns, striking at the credibility of the international nuclear order itself.

When an NPT signatory’s nuclear infrastructure can be subjected to unprovoked and illegal military aggression without any accountability for those responsible, the treaty’s underlying premise of reciprocal obligations and protections is called into question.

The Assembly of Experts’ latest call for a review of Iran’s defence doctrine, including consideration of withdrawal from the NPT, signals a significant shift in the country’s strategic debate that has been gaining momentum since the 40-day imposed war.

What was once largely confined to discussions among lawmakers and security officials is now increasingly being articulated as a broader national security concern, especially in the wake of continued sabre rattling by the enemy.

While Iran is expected to uphold its international obligations as an NPT signatory, its adversaries face absolutely no accountability for openly violating the most fundamental principles of international law.

The repeated attacks on Iranian nuclear installations, assassinations of nuclear scientists and failure of international institutions to respond decisively have intensified questions about the effectiveness, fairness and credibility of the existing non-proliferation framework.

This is no longer a debate about the future of Iran’s nuclear program, which is entirely peaceful. It has evolved into a much broader question of national sovereignty, strategic deterrence, the credibility of international law and, ultimately, a state’s inherent right to defend itself against external aggression.

From nuclear safeguards to strategic vulnerability

Iran’s grievances did not emerge overnight. For years, its peaceful, energy-focused nuclear programme has been subjected to sabotage, cyberattacks, assassinations of scientists and, ultimately, direct military strikes against facilities under international monitoring.

This pattern long predates the two recent wars of aggression against Iran. In 2010, nuclear scientist Masoud Ali Mohammadi was assassinated in Tehran. Later that year, Majid Shahriari was killed in a bombing, while Fereydoun Abbasi survived an assassination attempt. Abbasi was subsequently martyred on the first day of the 12-day war in June 2025.

Dariush Rezainejad was assassinated in 2011, followed by Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan in January 2012. In November 2020, prominent nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated on the outskirts of Tehran. Israeli spying agency Mossad was involved in these attacks, with the stamp of approval from CIA.

During the 12-day war of aggression in June 2025, Israel assassinated several more of Iran’s leading nuclear scientists, yet the UN nuclear watchdog refrained from condemning these targeted killings. In fact, it was the politically motivated resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors shortly before the war that was instrumental in paving the way for the aggression at a time when Iran and the US were engaged in indirect nuclear negotiations.

The attacks have not been confined to individuals. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has on numerous occasions been targeted through sophisticated sabotage operations, most notably the Stuxnet cyberattack against the Natanz enrichment facility in 2010.

The escalation reached an entirely different level in June 2025, when Israel, backed by the United States, launched an unprovoked and illegal military aggression against Iran, targeting nuclear installations alongside military and civilian infrastructure. Washington subsequently joined the war directly, bombing the three key nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan on June 22.

These were neither clandestine installations nor facilities operating outside the international nuclear framework. Iran’s nuclear program has for years been subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and verification arrangements.

The attacks thus raised a fundamental and logical question: if nuclear facilities under international monitoring can be bombed with sheer impunity, what practical protection does the safeguards system offer countries that remain committed to the NPT?

The IAEA itself confirmed the damage. Director General Rafael Grossi, who is now vying for the top UN post, reported that the above-ground section of Natanz’s pilot enrichment plant had been destroyed in the initial Israeli strikes. Following the US attacks, the agency confirmed that Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan had been hit, with extensive additional damage reported at the Isfahan complex.

The repercussions extended well beyond physical destruction. The IAEA subsequently suspended its field verification activities, while inspectors were withdrawn from Iran for safety reasons. In effect, military attacks on safeguarded nuclear installations undermined the very monitoring arrangements that the international community repeatedly demands Iran uphold.

This glaring contradiction lies at the heart of intensifying calls in Iran to withdraw from NPT. Iran is expected to honour its nuclear commitments even as the international framework designed to safeguard them offers no protection against external military aggression.

The IAEA’s credibility crisis

Iran’s criticism of the IAEA stems from a glaring double standard in its approach to nuclear security, compliance and accountability.

The agency has repeatedly demanded access and cooperation from Tehran, while its response to military attacks against Iranian nuclear installations has largely remained confined to tokenistic statements expressing concern and warnings about nuclear safety.

Grossi did state that nuclear facilities must never be attacked, regardless of the circumstances. He also warned that such attacks could have serious consequences for nuclear safety, security and international peace. However, the agency he heads did not produce a meaningful accountability mechanism capable of deterring or penalising those responsible for the unprovoked attacks.

The distinction between expressing concern and ensuring accountability is particularly important. The IAEA applies extensive mechanisms for inspecting nuclear facilities, verifying declared nuclear material and reporting safeguards violations. Yet it lacks the mechanism to hold rogue states accountable for attacks against nuclear facilities.

This exposes a structural weakness in the international nuclear order: compliance is rigorously monitored, but the security of compliant states is not equally guaranteed.

The timing of the June 2025 aggression made this contradiction even more glaring. Just a day before Israel launched its attacks, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution claiming Iran was in “non-compliance” with its safeguards obligations.

The move was politically motivated and reflected Israeli pressure on the agency and Grossi’s attempt to appease Washington with an eye on top UN position. The fact that the attacks followed almost immediately proved that diplomatic and monitoring mechanisms had become instruments of pressure on Iran rather than impartial safeguards.

There is also an important distinction here: the IAEA’s June 2025 finding concerned Iran’s safeguards obligations, not a finding that Iran had decided to build nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the episode reinforced the fact that Iran’s rights and obligations under the treaty were being interpreted selectively.

The credibility problem is further complicated by the nuclear status of the Israeli regime, which is not a signatory to the NPT and which possesses nuclear weapons, while maintaining a policy of nuclear ambiguity. Israel’s nuclear arsenal remains outside the treaty’s safeguards framework, while Iran, a non-nuclear-weapon state party, faces extensive inspections and international scrutiny for no reason.

Withdrawal from NPT becomes serious policy debate

Against this backdrop, calls for the Iranian leadership to reconsider the country’s NPT membership have gained momentum. Recent countywide polls, including those conducted by the state broadcaster IRIB, show an overwhelming majority of people in favor of the country’s exit from the treaty.

The statement by the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member constitutional body tasked with electing and supervising the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, is particularly significant because it elevates the issue beyond individual parliamentary interventions.

The body has called for a decisive review of Iran’s defence doctrine, consideration of withdrawal from the NPT and the establishment of the necessary deterrence capabilities. It has described these measures as an unavoidable necessity and an emerging national demand.

The statement also warned that any renewed aggression against the country would trigger an immediate and effective Iranian response without geographical limitations, echoing the position articulated by Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei in his meeting with top military commanders recently.

The message is twofold: Iran is reconsidering the assumptions underpinning its existing security arrangements, and it intends to ensure that any future attack carries consequences beyond the immediate battlefield.

The Assembly of Experts’ intervention follows similar remarks from senior officials and lawmakers. Major General Mohsen Rezaee, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, also addressed the growing debate over the country’s nuclear doctrine recently.

On November 1, he acknowledged that public and political demands to reconsider the doctrine have emerged following attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities despite extensive IAEA inspections and monitoring. He clarified, however, that no official decision has so far been taken by the Supreme National Security Council to change the doctrine.

Earlier, on September 20, Iranian lawmaker Hossein Ali Hajideligani announced that a three-urgency parliamentary motion calling for withdrawal from the NPT had been submitted to the parliament’s presiding board. He said the proposal was awaiting permission to be introduced in an open parliamentary session.

He maintained that after repeated attacks against the country, including the nuclear sites, continued membership of the treaty was delivering more disadvantages than benefits.

These developments suggest that withdrawal is no longer merely an occasional political threat deployed during diplomatic confrontations. It has become a subject of institutional debate involving lawmakers, senior security officials and now the Assembly of Experts.

What does withdrawal from NPT actually mean

The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, is built around three central pillars: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting peaceful nuclear cooperation and advancing nuclear disarmament.

Under Article IV, member states retain the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, provided they comply with their treaty obligations. Article III establishes the safeguards framework through which the IAEA verifies that nuclear material is not diverted towards weapons programmes.

Article X, meanwhile, explicitly recognises a member state’s sovereign right to withdraw. It states that a party may withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter have jeopardised its national interests. The withdrawing state must provide three months’ notice to all other parties and the UN Security Council, explaining the extraordinary events behind its decision.

This provision is particularly relevant to Iran’s current position. It could contend that repeated military attacks against its safeguarded nuclear facilities, the assassination of its scientists and the failure of international mechanisms to provide effective protection have fundamentally undermined the security rationale for continued membership.

In such circumstances, withdrawal becomes an exercise of national sovereignty under a provision explicitly written into the treaty.

Why Iran is reconsidering its defence doctrine

The debate over NPT membership is closely connected to a wider reassessment of Iran’s defence doctrine. For decades, it has maintained and demonstrated that its nuclear program is peaceful and that nuclear weapons have no place in the country’s defence strategy. Iranian officials have repeatedly invoked a decree by the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei against acquiring such weapons.

Iran reiterated this position in its submission to the 2026 NPT review process, describing the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the placement of peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards as central elements of its commitment to the treaty.

However, the strategic environment has changed dramatically. The February 28, 2026, US-Israeli aggression against Iran, following the earlier attacks in June 2025, has reinforced the argument that the country’s existing deterrence arrangements need fundamental reassessment, especially amid continued threats from the US-Israeli war machine.

The central concern is that conventional military capabilities and international diplomatic commitments have not been sufficient to prevent repeated attacks against Iranian territory and strategic infrastructure. Hence, deterrence must be credible enough to convince adversaries that another military adventure would carry unacceptable costs.

This is the context in which Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei’s warning about an immediate response without geographical limitations should be understood. It communicates that Iran would not necessarily confine its response to the location of an attack or accept geographical restrictions imposed by its adversaries in the event of new aggression.

The Assembly of Experts has effectively connected this deterrence argument with the NPT debate. Its position suggests that Iran cannot continue relying on an international framework that has failed to protect its security while limiting its strategic options.

The question is not simply whether Iran should acquire additional military capabilities. It is whether the country’s defence doctrine should be adjusted to reflect the realities of a regional and international order in which military force has increasingly been used against it despite the existence of diplomatic agreements and international safeguards.

Wider implications for international nuclear order

Iran’s potential withdrawal would have consequences extending well beyond West Asia. The NPT is often described as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Its credibility depends not only on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons but also on maintaining confidence that member states can exercise their peaceful nuclear rights without becoming targets of military aggression.

If a state that has remained within the treaty concludes that membership offers inadequate protection against attacks on its safeguarded facilities, other countries may question the practical value of the existing arrangements. This would create a dangerous precedent.

The international community cannot consistently demand that countries accept intrusive inspections and comply with non-proliferation obligations while treating attacks against their peaceful nuclear infrastructure as an issue that can be addressed through tokenistic expressions of concern alone.

There is also a broader contradiction involving nuclear-armed states and those outside the treaty. Israel’s continued refusal to join the NPT, combined with its widely acknowledged nuclear arsenal, highlights the uneven application of international nuclear rules.

Meanwhile, the five states recognised as nuclear-weapon states under the NPT have not fulfilled the disarmament expectations embedded in Article VI to the satisfaction of many non-nuclear-weapon states.

This imbalance has long undermined confidence in the treaty’s underlying bargain: non-nuclear states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons, while nuclear-weapon states commit to pursuing disarmament and all parties retain the right to peaceful nuclear technology.

Iran’s current debate brings these unresolved contradictions into sharper focus. A withdrawal would not necessarily mean that Iran would immediately pursue nuclear weapons. Nor should such an outcome be presented as inevitable. But it would represent a serious setback for a non-proliferation framework already facing considerable challenges.

It would also complicate the work of the IAEA, reduce transparency and potentially create new uncertainties about nuclear material, verification and regional security.

For the United States and its European allies, as well as the Zionist regime, the prospect of Iranian withdrawal from the NPT should therefore be a warning about the consequences of relying excessively on sanctions, military threats and coercive diplomacy.

A test for international institutions

Ultimately, Iran’s NPT debate is about more than nuclear policy. It is a test of whether international institutions can uphold the principles they were established to defend.

The NPT cannot remain credible if its obligations are enforced selectively, peaceful nuclear facilities are exposed to dastardly military attacks and the perpetrators face no meaningful consequences.

Nor can the IAEA maintain its standing as an impartial international watchdog if its ability to monitor nuclear activities is accompanied by an inability to meaningfully address threats to the safety and security of safeguarded facilities.

Washington and its European allies must recognise that military aggression against a member state’s safeguarded nuclear facilities fundamentally undermines the very non-proliferation system they claim to defend.

The IAEA, too, must demonstrate that its mandate extends beyond demanding compliance from non-nuclear states to consistently defending nuclear safety and the inviolability of peaceful nuclear installations.

Iran’s growing reconsideration of NPT membership is, in this sense, a consequence of a much deeper crisis of confidence. The international community now faces a fundamental question: Can the global nuclear order survive when compliance offers no credible protection against aggression, and when the institutions responsible for safeguarding it can’t ensure accountability?

If that question remains unanswered, Iran’s debate may prove to be part of a much wider challenge to the foundations of the international non-proliferation regime.

November 12, 2026 - Posted by aletho | Timeless or most popular | IAEA, Iran, Israel, NPT, United States