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Why a New European Security Architecture Will Be Born Through War

By Prof. Glenn Diesen | November 12, 2026

As the world has shifted from unipolarity to multipolarity, the security architecture must also change to ensure peace. From Europe to the Middle East and East Asia, existing security architectures are collapsing, and new arrangements are needed to prevent great-power wars that could destroy humanity. The problem is that new security architectures have historically been established only after major wars that have shattered the previous status quo.

War as the Catalyst for Change

After the Napoleonic Wars, the Concert of Europe was established and organised relations from 1815 to 1914. After the First World War, a new security architecture was developed with the League of Nations, yet it collapsed in 1939 with the outbreak of the Second World War. After the Second World War, the United Nations was established to manage relations and develop shared international law. Yet, throughout the Cold War, we had a dual system, as the international system was organised under the UN, while the bipolar international distribution of power organised competing alliance systems under NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

When the Cold War came to an end, the dual system continued to exist. The West initially signed agreements for a new, inclusive pan-European security architecture based on indivisible security and without dividing lines, as outlined in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990 and the establishment of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1995 – both based on the Helsinki Accords of 1975. Yet, these agreements were hollowed out by expanding NATO as an instrument of hegemonic peace, creating a new Europe without Russia as the largest country in Europe. The redivision of Europe and the undermining of the principle of indivisible security have been at the heart of the conflict between NATO and Russia for the past three decades, and this was the trigger for the Ukraine War.

New security architectures are historically born through war, as the former status quo disappears and there is a recognition of the need to establish a system to avoid war and build peace. Institutions are usually effective and problem-solving in their early phases, as their objectives are clear. In the later stages, they become decadent and institutionalised, consumed by bureaucracy and institutional self-preservation, while resisting adaptation to new realities. NATO’s transformation is an interesting example of an effort at institutional adaptation and self-preservation, as open debates focused on finding a new purpose for the military bloc that had lost its Soviet adversary – with the slogan for embracing internationalism and expansionism being “out of area or out of business”.

Europe Searching for a Role in the Multipolar World

All the major actors are finding new roles in the multipolar world. China and Russia are taking the lead in establishing a new geoeconomic architecture and political institutions such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to facilitate a greater role for rising powers in the multipolar world. The US seeks to preserve or revive its former hegemonic position, yet is reluctantly adjusting to new realities by shifting its focus to the Western Hemisphere and East Asia.

The Europeans are the most reluctant to adjust to new realities, as their former role as the principal partner of the US in an international system defined by collective hegemony ensured Europe’s unity and relevance. There is also a lack of options in terms of what Europe can transition towards, as the US provided Europe with an economic model, security model, and political model, and was indeed the pacifier that ensured unity on the continent over the past decades. The Europeans can throw their full weight behind the US and face vassalage, although the failure to diversify their ties will only weaken Europe further, while a retreating US will see Europe as increasingly less relevant in the new world. Alternatively, Europe must adjust to a new international distribution of power and find unity through a geoeconomic logic of collective bargaining power and the pursuit of collective technological sovereignty. Yet, a geoeconomic Europe must adjust to realities and seek connectivity with the other centres of power – which includes Russia.

This will not happen. The institutions of the former status quo, such as NATO, are still present, which keeps alive the hope of returning to the unipolar order. On 6 November 2026, the EU foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, made this argument explicitly as she dismissed Russia’s call for reforming the European security architecture, stating: “We already have European security architecture in place. NATO and the European Union both have their respective roles. We must make sure Ukraine is integrated into this architecture.” The massive war in Europe, which could quickly spiral into nuclear war, did not seem to affect her assessment of the stability of the former status quo.

War is Coming

As history has demonstrated, former security architectures remain in place long after they have outlived their function and decadence has set in. In an act of desperation and self-delusion, the Europeans embrace absurd narratives of being confronted with another Hitler to reinvent a purpose for the outdated and decadent security architecture that no longer provides security. Unwilling to accept new realities and discuss a new European security architecture, the Europeans will choose war as their Ukrainian proxy army collapses on the battlefield. Any pathway to peace that entails recognising the security concerns of Russia has been rejected as it will undermine the former hegemonic security architecture. As in the past, a new security architecture will be built after the coming war between Europe and Russia – if we survive it.

November 12, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , | Comments Off on Why a New European Security Architecture Will Be Born Through War

Moscow, Kabul Planning to Sign Intergovernmental Agreement on Trade – Official

Sputnik – 11.11.2026

MOSCOW – Russia and Afghanistan plan to sign a large-scale intergovernmental agreement on trade and economic cooperation, Rustam Khabibullin, head of the Russian Business Center in Afghanistan, told Sputnik.

“An agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the government of the Russian Federation and the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is being prepared for signing. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk and Afghan Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar are expected to sign the agreement [during Overchuk’s upcoming visit],” Khabibullin said.

He noted that the agreement provides for cooperation in trade, energy, transport, healthcare, agriculture, and information technology.

“This large-scale agreement will cover all areas of the economy, including logistics, trade, investment, and simplified business visas. This will be a unique agreement,” Khabibullin added.

November 12, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , | Comments Off on Moscow, Kabul Planning to Sign Intergovernmental Agreement on Trade – Official

The Leak That Arrived Right on Cue

By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | November 10, 2026 

In the intelligence business, timing is everything. On February 5, 2026, Finland’s National Defence University, which is hardly a Kremlin front, posted a paper by Alexander Grable titled “Irretrievable Losses: Casualties in the Russo-Ukraine War (2022–present).” Grable concluded that Ukraine’s dead far outnumber Russia’s and that Kyiv is losing the war of attrition. In polite Western company, that is heresy.

The paper was presented at the university’s Russia Seminar a week later. It was folded into the seminar’s proceedings volume this fall and began circulating widely in late October. Then, right on cue, the cavalry arrived. Two hacker groups announced they had breached Rosstat, Russia’s state statistics agency, and come away with numbers showing between 393,881 and 450,100 Russian dead. The Moscow Times and Euronews ran the story on November 8. Narrative restored. Everyone can relax.

I don’t relax that easily. I spent enough years at the CIA to know what a planted story smells like. This one smells. But before I get to the leak, let me get to something the casualty accountants keep leaving out of their spreadsheets: who has been shooting more.

The math nobody wants to do

Weapons cause casualties, so a casualty estimate that ignores the weapons is guesswork. In this war, Russia has held a lopsided edge in nearly every category that kills soldiers: artillery, mortars, missiles and FAB glide bombs. For most of the war it also led in drones.

Start with artillery. Estonia’s foreign intelligence service, no friend of Moscow, estimates that Russia produced or refurbished about 400,000 rounds in 2022 and 4.5 million in 2024, an elevenfold increase. That same year the United States and Europe together managed about 1.2 million. Then add North Korea: leaked South Korean intelligence, reported in the press last year, put Pyongyang’s deliveries at 12 million rounds of 152mm ammunition. By my count, that adds up to roughly 24 million shells on the Russian side since 2022, against about 7 million for Ukraine. That is better than three to one.

The glide bombs and missiles tell the same story. Ukraine has nothing remotely comparable to Russia’s FAB-500s and FAB-1500s fitted with wing kits, dropped by the thousands on Ukrainian positions from beyond the reach of air defenses.

Timing matters here too. Artillery was the main killer at the start of the war, causing roughly 80 percent of casualties, and that is exactly when Russia’s lead in shells was widest. Drones did not overtake artillery until 2024. The widely quoted estimate that drones cause 70 to 80 percent of battlefield casualties dates from 2025, not from 2022. Kyiv now insists it outproduces Russia in FPV drones. Maybe so. But even a Ukrainian official has conceded that Ukraine was far from parity with Russia in strike drones through the first half of 2025.

The drone race is also being fought at the factory. Russia has repeatedly hit Ukrainian drone production: assembly sites around Kyiv for the Liutyi long-range drone, industrial zones in Kharkiv and Dnipro that make guidance and communications parts, and in October a plant belonging to the manufacturer General Chereshnya. Ukraine has hit back, striking the Atlant Aero drone plant in Taganrog three times between January and April and repeatedly targeting the Alabuga zone in Tatarstan. Yet Russian output keeps climbing. By Ukraine’s own intelligence estimates, Russian drone production in April was up 117 percent from a year earlier, and Moscow plans to build 7.3 million FPV drones this year. Kyiv’s raids have not bent that curve.

The standard Western reply is that attackers lose more men than defenders, and Russia has been attacking. That rule of thumb assumes both sides can shoot back at roughly the same rate. When one side fires three or four shells for every one it receives, the rule goes out the window. Defending under that kind of fire is how armies get ground down.

What Grable actually found

Grable worked from amputations, which is a clever approach because amputees are harder to hide than the dead. He applied historical ratios of deaths to amputations to the amputation counts for each side. For Ukraine, 93,566 to 120,000 amputations yield an estimate of 403,269 to 517,200 dead by November 2024. He also cites body exchanges in which Ukraine got back about 12.5 of its dead for every Russian returned.

Grable also puts Russian dead at about 35,264 by mid-2024. I’ll be candid: that figure is too low. It sits below the number of Russian dead that Mediazona and BBC Russian had already identified by name at that point. His Vietnam-derived multiplier for Russia doesn’t hold up, and his critics are right to hammer it.

But notice what the critics do next. They take one weak number and use it to throw out the whole paper, including the half that matches the firepower. If Russia has been firing three or four times as much ordnance, Ukrainian dead running several times higher than Russian dead is not a wild claim. It is what the physics predicts. Grable’s Ukrainian estimate fits the weight of fire. That is the part that had to be buried.

Consider the source

Now the leak. Look at who delivered it. One group is Silent Crow, which claims about 450,100 Russian dead. The other is the Belarus Cyber Partisans, which claims 393,881. Neither is a neutral archivist. Both are openly at war with Moscow and Minsk, and they say so with pride. We are asked to believe that these partisans pulled 23 terabytes out of Rosstat, sorted it and produced clean totals, all within days. Then Western newsrooms printed the result as “official data.”

Official according to whom? Meduza and Mediazona, which have no love for the Kremlin, say they are still checking whether the data is genuine. Nobody outside the hackers themselves has verified the totals.

The Moscow Times reports that it checked 50 names from the Mediazona list of named Russian dead and found every one in the leaked files. That is supposed to settle it. It settles nothing. The Mediazona list is public. Anyone building a forgery would start by seeding it with names a fact-checker can find. Matching names proves the forger did his homework. It does not prove the totals.

How an influence operation is built

The defenders of the leak have one more argument: the timing is too tight. Grable’s paper went viral on October 26 and 27, and the hacks are dated October 29 and November 1. Nobody, they say, could build a 23-terabyte operation in a week.

That argument assumes the people who counter inconvenient research learn about it from Substack. They don’t. The paper sat in a Finnish government repository from February 5. Anyone working Russia for a Western service, and certainly anyone in the information-warfare shops, had it in hand within days. That gave them eight months, not one week. Public attention is when an operation launches, not when the planning starts.

I worked on this kind of thing at the CIA. My assessment is that this leak has the classic hallmarks of an influence operation. There is a source that cannot be checked, delivered through a cutout with a cause. The material is laundered through outlets that readers trust. It drops just as an unwelcome analysis starts to gain traction. And it comes with a big round number that ends the debate before anyone asks about the weapons. I can’t prove who wrote the script. I have seen enough scripts to recognize one.

The question they’d rather you not ask

Here is the test I’d put to anyone waving the Rosstat numbers. Explain how an army that has been outgunned three or four to one in artillery, with no answer to glide bombs and, until recently, outmatched in drones, somehow lost fewer men than the side doing most of the shooting. If you can’t answer that, a spreadsheet from a hacker collective won’t answer it for you.

Grable got the Russian number wrong. He got the big picture right, and the big picture is what the leak was built to bury. Ukraine is bleeding faster than Russia because Russia has more guns, more shells, more bombs and, for most of this war, more drones. No amount of stolen data changes the ballistics.

November 11, 2026 Posted by | Mainstream Media, Warmongering | , | Comments Off on The Leak That Arrived Right on Cue

Ukraine Already Carved Up… Before Talks Begin? /Prof. Richard Sakwa

Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – November 9, 2026

Daniel Davis: Trump’s New Iran Land Blockade Is a Dangerous Fantasy

Glenn Diesen – November 9, 2026

Lt. Col. Daniel Davis is a 4x combat veteran, the recipient of the Ridenhour Prize for Truth-Telling, and is the host of the Daniel Davis Deep Dive YouTube channel. Daniel Davis Deep Dive: https://www.youtube.com/@DanielDavisDeepDive/videos

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00:00 The West’s “1992” mindset and a changing balance of power
03:59 Unattainable objectives, morality, and the rules-based order
09:38 Operation Iron Gate: Can Iran’s land borders be sealed?
13:12 Why Davis calls the proposed blockade a fantasy
17:26 Show of strength, negotiation, or a path back to war?
21:02 Two possible exits from the Iran conflict
25:28 Why the Strait of Hormuz changes the stakes
28:59 Russia and Ukraine: the same strategic miscalculation
33:40 Closing thoughts on Western policy toward Russia

November 9, 2026 Posted by | Video, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Comments Off on Ukraine Already Carved Up… Before Talks Begin? /Prof. Richard Sakwa

Russia backs Tehran’s conditions in talks with US, Iran’s envoy says

Al Mayadeen | November 7, 2026

Moscow understands and supports Tehran’s firm position on negotiations with the United States, Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali said on Saturday, stressing that dialogue alone cannot advance diplomacy without the fulfillment of Iran’s strategic conditions.

Speaking about a three-hour meeting between Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Jalali said the discussions addressed strategic cooperation between Tehran and Moscow, as well as Iran’s position on Washington’s failure to honor its commitments.

Jalali explained that Rezaei conveyed to Putin that direct negotiations with Washington would serve no purpose without guarantees, adding that the fundamental condition for any diplomatic initiative is the full and unconditional acceptance of Iran’s seven conditions by the US.

According to Jalali, Rezaei stressed that “negotiations will not be the basis for ending the war, and experience has proven that Washington uses the dialogue process to commit aggression.”

Iran and Russia discuss strategic and military cooperation

Jalali also said Russia supports Tehran’s position that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) treats Iran with “discriminatory and irregular conduct.”

He further confirmed that military cooperation between Iran and Russia remains ongoing, pointing to consultations at the highest levels on deepening military and defense ties between the two countries.

Meanwhile, a senior Iranian political and security source told Al Mayadeen on Thursday that Tehran sees no point in taking any step to advance diplomacy before Iran’s seven conditions are fully and simultaneously implemented.

The source also dismissed reports claiming that Rezaei had presented a new political initiative to Putin, saying they are “pure fabrication.”

Rezaei also revealed that discussions with Putin covered a proposed pipeline project to transport Russian gas to Iran, which he said would meet Tehran’s domestic needs while allowing it to resell part of the supply.

He further said Putin condemned attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, said that the war on Iran is unjust, and pledged to help bring it to an end. “President Putin said that he would do everything possible to help end the war,” Rezaei stated.

An Iranian source told Al Mayadeen that Tehran would not reopen the Strait of Hormuz until its seven conditions were met, adding that the decision was not open to negotiation. The source said the talks between Rezaei and Putin focused on efforts to end the US war on Iran.

Separately, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi highlighted the depth of bilateral ties, saying, “Never in the history of cooperation between Iran and Russia have we been this close.” He also praised his talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Tehran, which covered various areas of cooperation between the two countries.

November 7, 2026 Posted by | Aletho News | , , , | Comments Off on Russia backs Tehran’s conditions in talks with US, Iran’s envoy says

The Endgame: When the CIA Proxy War Runs Out of Ukrainians!

By Seth Ferris – New Eastern Outlook – November 7, 2026

From Napoleon’s march on Moscow to Hitler’s catastrophic invasion of the Soviet Union, strategic arrogance, political miscalculation and the underestimation of Russia’s capacity to absorb punishment have repeatedly produced consequences far removed from the expectations of those who started the wars.

As battlefield realities shift and diplomatic negotiations expose growing divisions in Washington and Europe, the Ukraine conflict is approaching a strategic reckoning. Trump talks peace, Moscow holds its ground, Kyiv faces mounting manpower and political pressures, and the U.S. intelligence establishment appears to be pursuing a far more confrontational agenda.

I think it’s no secret the Ukraine war is a CIA war. I doubt Trump can do anything himself anyway. I’ve wondered for a while if the anti-Russia pro-war EU isn’t also being manipulated by the CIA. When they run out of Ukrainians, they need another source of cannon fodder.

All the while Trump talks peace as the CIA fuels the war in Ukraine, as the title of a recent commentary explains so well. The central problem is not Trump or Putin. It is an intelligence apparatus that appears to have an agenda of its own. The war continues not simply because of political disagreements between Washington and Moscow, but because elements of the U.S. national security establishment have institutional interests that run counter to ending it.

While Trump calls Zelensky “more difficult to deal with” than Putin and urges Ukrainians to elect new leadership, his CIA is reportedly pursuing operations against Russia more aggressively than under Biden. The contradiction is striking: the CIA is helping Ukraine target Russian oil refineries even as Trump pursues deals to sell Russian diesel.

Meanwhile, his intelligence chief travels to Moscow to tell the Russians they cannot win, while reports suggest intelligence analysts are reluctant to tell the president what they actually think. This is not a coherent peace strategy. It is a government sending contradictory signals, with an intelligence agency seemingly operating according to its own rules and priorities.

Lack of Good Intentions

In reviewing the Ukraine playbook, whereby the Minsk accords were never intended to be honored by the west or their Ukrainian proxies, but were merely, in the words of the former German chancellor, Angela Merkel, to buy time for Ukraine to rearm and retake the Donbas by force. The rest is history that CIA concocted plan was destroyed by the Russian SMO starting in February 2022.

But still most of Europe, NATO were center stage to the mayhem that followed. They were like Hitler’s Willing Executors in having planned such a course of action. But now they cannot face facts, i.e., the situation on the ground, now that Russia is nearing a final push in reaching its strategic objectives. Turning away from Russia to the EU and US ruin has been brought upon Ukraine, and like a desperate gambler, Zelensky may now be betting the whole house in trying to recoup his losses and survive politically and physically.

It Is Time to End the War.

Even now, some of the more liberal news publications, including The Nation, are calling for an end to the war. Yet even in doing so, they wrap their arguments in a thick layer of political subterfuge. Rather than confront the underlying failures of Western policy toward Russia and Ukraine, they continue trying to shift responsibility onto Trump and Putin, portraying them as though they were somehow on the same team.

The article goes on to explain the failure of the proposed peace initiative largely through the prism of American domestic politics, while recycling the familiar and increasingly questionable narrative that Putin is somehow on his last legs. This is a convenient political storyline, but it is not a substitute for an honest assessment of the military balance, Russia’s strategic position, or the realities unfolding on the battlefield.

The central question is no longer who can win the propaganda war or which political faction can claim the moral high ground. It is how many more lives must be sacrificed before Washington and its European partners acknowledge that prolonging this conflict is not the same thing as winning it.

What Comes Next?

We shall have to wait and see what will happen—if anything. It is ironic that the pundits of war and peace are in denial in tandem with Ukrainian denials, one only has to check out the site of the Institute for the Study of War, which as of October 31, 2026 gives a narrow perspective of Russian offensives alongside claimed Ukrainian counterattacks and some localized advances.

History may ultimately judge the Ukraine conflict not simply by who prevailed on the battlefield, but by whether the governments that helped shape the confrontation ever seriously considered the political, economic and human fallout of a shooting war that diplomacy should have prevented—if that had been the desire.

Ukraine may now be confronting its own version of that historical reckoning.

The Minsk revelations, particularly Merkel’s acknowledgment that the agreements gave Ukraine time to strengthen its military, raise a fundamental question: was diplomacy ever intended to produce a lasting political settlement, or had it become an instrument of strategic postponement? If the CIA and other Western intelligence and security institutions were instrumental in shaping a longer-term strategy to weaken Russia through Ukraine, the battlefield has exposed the extraordinary risks of that calculation.

The extent of direct CIA operational control remains a question that will merit academic research as history is written. It is clear that Washington’s extensive intelligence sharing, military and its financial support prolonged the fighting Ukraine far beyond the point of diminishing returns.

And what of Europe?

Having committed its political credibility, economic resources and security architecture to this confrontation, European leaders now face an uncomfortable dilemma. How does one acknowledge strategic failure without admitting that years of policy, enormous financial commitments and Ukrainian lives may have been sacrificed to assumptions that proved disastrously wrong?

There is an even more disturbing question: if Ukraine can no longer sustain the human cost of the conflict, will European governments seek to expand their own military commitments rather than reconsider the strategy that brought them here?

Meanwhile, Zelensky faces a particularly consequential choice. Continuing the war carries mounting military, demographic and economic costs; negotiating carries enormous political risks. Yet prolonging a conflict simply to avoid confronting an unfavourable negotiating position could leave Ukraine with even less leverage and fewer options.

A government cannot indefinitely gamble the future of its country in the hope that the next Western weapons package, intelligence assessment or political promise will reverse the strategic and tactical reality on the ground.

And perhaps this is the most uncomfortable question of all: when the supply of Ukrainian soldiers, public patience and Western political goodwill begins to run out, who will be expected to pay the next installment of this war?

If this conflict began as an attempt to contain Russia, it has become a test of the strategic judgment of the very governments that embraced that objective. The ultimate irony may be that, in seeking to weaken Moscow, the West has helped produce a militarized, devastated Ukraine, a more dangerous European security environment and a confrontation that has exposed the limits of Western power.

Who Decides the Endgame?

The endgame may not be determined by Washington’s rhetoric or Brussels’ declarations, but by what is happening on the ground—and what Russia is prepared to accept at the negotiating table.

The historical verdict will not be determined by press conferences in Washington, Brussels or Kyiv. It will be written by the territorial realities and the people left to live with the consequences.

A proxy war can be prolonged by outside powers, financed by taxpayers and fought by another country’s population. But it cannot be made winnable simply by refusing to acknowledge that the original strategy has failed.


Seth Ferris, investigative journalist and political scientist, expert on Middle Eastern affairs

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November 7, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , | Comments Off on The Endgame: When the CIA Proxy War Runs Out of Ukrainians!

De-escalating the conflict: What the OSCE, the UN, and Europe are (not) doing to prevent war

By Lorenzo Maria Pacini | Strategic Culture Foundation | November 4, 2026

Three signs of the same crisis

I want to ask all our readers – and you, the one reading this – a question: Do you want war?

Regardless of political, military, national, or ideological preferences, this is a serious question. Who really wants war?

We must all ask ourselves this question – and even more so, it should be asked by the politicians, technocrats, and power brokers in European chancelleries who continue to foment war.

We won’t discuss moral issues right now – we’ll write about those on another occasion. Let’s start with the institutional facts and try to understand whether and how anyone has attempted to bring about de-escalation – or not. Because when we read the Western press, there’s a constant impression that European leaders are the world’s best diplomats, constantly striving to solve global problems and ensure peace. Yet, there is a lack of sources, data, and concrete evidence. And where are all those institutions that were supposedly created to ensure peace for the entire world?

On September 30, 2026, Moscow delivered a non-paper to NATO declaring its readiness to deploy its entire arsenal, including nuclear weapons, should the Alliance attempt to isolate the Kaliningrad region. The document explicitly mentions the possibility of striking the decision-making centers of member countries from the very early stages of a conflict, and a senior European defense official noted that a threat phrased in these terms had not been heard since the end of the Cold War. Two weeks later, in Warsaw, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe responded that a Russian attack would be entirely futile. That same month, Russian border guards detained a German merchant ship in the Gulf of Finland for several hours.

Taken together, these incidents reflect the current dynamic: verbal deterrence on both sides, low-intensity incidents, and the absence of any mechanism capable of defusing them before they escalate into a crisis. This article argues that de-escalation between Europe and Russia does not depend primarily on the goodwill of governments. It depends on rebuilding a risk-containment architecture that Europe has allowed to erode over the course of twenty years. That architecture does not need to be invented from scratch: it already exists, in a dormant form, within the mechanisms of the OSCE and the United Nations system. These are the only multilateral forums in which Europe and Russia still sit together as full members, and for this very reason, they are the only ones capable of producing agreements that both sides can consider their own.

Each side interprets the other’s rearmament as offensive preparation. In Moscow, it is claimed that NATO and the European Union are preparing for a confrontation around 2030; in various Western military circles, the 2028–2030 window is specifically identified as the period during which a Russian attack would become possible. These are mirror-image predictions, and mirror-image predictions tend to become self-fulfilling, because every defensive measure confirms the adversary’s suspicion. It’s the security dilemma – elementary, Watson.

Compared to the Cold War, however, one decisive element is missing. Back then, the rivalry was framed by treaties, hotlines, notifications of military exercises, and mutual inspections. That framework has largely disappeared today. The INF Treaty expired in 2019, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe has been abandoned, the Open Skies regime has been gutted, and New START is set to expire in February 2026 without a successor. Two armed powers face off along a line stretching from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, and they do so without a safety net.

Added to this is a more strictly political problem. Europe is the object of the conflict but not a party to the negotiations. Talks on Ukraine are mediated by Washington: on October 11, the U.S. president announced an energy truce that neither Moscow nor Kiev has confirmed; at the end of the month, a local ceasefire went into effect in Oleški, and a new round of negotiations is expected in mid-November. Europe appears in this context as a financier and potential guarantor, but remains far from the table where the terms are being defined. Yet whatever agreement emerges from that table will reshape the continent’s security order. The paradox is clear: Europeans have institutions built precisely for this purpose, yet they have stopped using them.

The absurdity of a conventional war – repetition helps

Before discussing the tools, it is worth stating frankly what rarely appears in official statements: for Europe, a conventional war against Russia would be a strategic absurdity, and Europe is not willing to fight it. We have already written this many times, it is true, but as the ancients used to say, “repetita iuvant” – repetition helps. This statement holds true in three respects.

The first is material. Four and a half years of war in Ukraine have shown that high-intensity conflict in our century is a war of attrition: victory is achieved by producing ammunition, drones, and equipment faster than the adversary can destroy them, and by replacing troops faster than they are lost. Russia has restructured its economy for this purpose. At the 2025 Hague Summit, European allies decided to raise defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035: a ten-year timeframe that amounts to an implicit admission that such capacity does not exist today. Industries remain fragmented into dozens of incompatible weapons systems, stockpiles have been depleted to support Kiev, and the capabilities that make a modern campaign possible – from satellite intelligence to in-flight refueling – depend largely on the United States.

The second aspect is social and political. European societies are neither prepared nor willing to endure losses in the tens of thousands of men. Debates over the reinstatement of conscription in Germany and other countries show just how open and divisive the issue remains. No European government could ask its citizens to make a sacrifice on that scale for any purpose other than the immediate defense of its national territory.

The third implication is the most serious. A conventional war with a nuclear power does not remain conventional for long. The September non-paper states this in no uncertain terms: in a conflict of this kind, there would be no distant front line and no safe rear, because European capitals would be the front line. Preparing to defend oneself is legitimate and necessary. Believing that one can win such a war – or even simply fight it without losing what one intends to defend – is a miscalculation. For this reason, de-escalation is not just one moral choice among many: it is the only rational policy available to Europe. It remains to be determined what tools to use to achieve it.

The institutions Europe seems to have forgotten

The OSCE is the successor to the 1975 Helsinki Conference, the only forum in which, at the height of the bipolar confrontation, rival blocs managed to codify common principles: the inviolability of borders, the non-use of force, economic cooperation, and human rights. The 1990 Charter of Paris and the Charter on European Security adopted in Istanbul in 1999 added the principle of the indivisibility of security, according to which no state may strengthen its own security at the expense of others’. It is a principle that both Moscow and Western capitals invoke today, interpreting it in opposite ways. Precisely for this reason, it serves as a starting point: the parties do not debate whether security is indivisible, but rather what this entails in practice.

Behind these principles lies a technical framework that few outside of experts are familiar with. The Vienna Document governs the prior notification of military activities, the annual exchange of information on military forces, and assessment visits. The Forum for Security Cooperation is the venue where participating States discuss conventional arms control. The Conflict Prevention Center manages the communications network linking the capitals and can activate urgent consultation mechanisms in the event of unusual military activities. In 2016, the OSCE also launched a Structured Dialogue on threat perceptions, doctrines, and force deployments: an exercise that was discontinued but which nevertheless constitutes the closest precedent to what Europe needs today. Finally, it should be noted that the Organization has declared itself a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter: its initiatives can therefore operate within a framework of universal legitimacy.

The most significant operational experience is the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, active from 2014 to 2022 with several hundred unarmed civilian observers. Its limitations were real: restricted access, no coercive power, and reports contested by both sides. Yet for eight years, it was the only impartial, daily source of information on ceasefire violations in the Donbas, and its end – when Russia refused to consent to the renewal of its mandate – coincided with the transition to the full-fledged SMO. The Organization emerged weakened, with budgets approved only with great difficulty and presidencies hampered by cross-vetoes, but it is not dead. Russia neither withdrew nor was expelled, and the Swiss presidency for 2026 has openly stated its intention to prepare the OSCE to monitor a potential ceasefire: monitoring the contact line, verifying violations, and even providing electoral assistance. Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis has acknowledged that the Organization can deploy only a few dozen people on short notice, while the front line stretches for about 1,300 kilometers. What is needed, therefore, is a significant political and financial commitment from the participating states. That commitment is exactly what Europe could and should offer.

Alongside the OSCE is the United Nations system, which Europeans tend to view as paralyzed by the Russian veto. This is an incomplete assessment. The Security Council adopted Resolution 2202 in 2015 in support of the Minsk Agreements and, in February 2025, Resolution 2774 calling for a swift end to the conflict – with Russia voting in favor. In July 2022, the Black Sea Grain Initiative, negotiated by the United Nations together with Turkey, demonstrated that even in the midst of fighting, a functional and limited agreement can hold for an entire year if it is managed by a joint coordination center with verifiable rules. Since September 2022, experts from the IAEA, a UN agency, have maintained a permanent presence at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant – the only stable international presence on a front line. Geneva, the European headquarters of the United Nations, already hosted trilateral talks between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine in 2026.

From this perspective, the veto power takes on a new meaning. An observation mission authorized by the Security Council would require Russian consent, and for this very reason, Moscow could not view it as a hostile measure. The same applies to the consensus rule within the OSCE. What appears to be a limitation is in fact the condition of legitimacy: a safeguard mechanism that the other party helped establish is one that the other party has an interest in not sabotaging. This is the essential difference between a reassurance force composed of European national contingents – which Moscow has already declared unacceptable – and a multilateral presence with a UN mandate and an OSCE operational structure.

Four levels of de-escalation

On this basis, four levels of intervention can be distinguished, ordered from the most urgent to the most ambitious. For each, European multilateral forums already offer a starting point.

The first is incident management. The Baltic Sea is currently the theater most vulnerable to unintended escalation: heavy traffic, the Kaliningrad enclave, the so-called “shadow fleet,” undersea cables, and nearly daily aerial intercepts. In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on Incidents at Sea at the height of the bipolar rivalry. It worked because it did not require trust, but only predictability, with rules on distances, maneuvers, and communications. A Baltic agreement modeled on that agreement, along with a direct line of communication between regional military commands and an identification system for military flights, would cost little and reduce tensions significantly. In February, Washington and Moscow agreed to reestablish military dialogue. Europeans, who live along the front lines, have even stronger reasons to demand their own channel, and the communications network of the Center for Conflict Prevention could provide the infrastructure without having to create anything new.

The second level concerns the transparency and clarity of red lines. The non-paper on Kaliningrad, regardless of its tone, makes clear where Moscow draws its line. Responding with equal clarity is not a concession. Thomas Schelling demonstrated this precisely: clear commitments stabilize, while ambiguity regarding limited actions destabilizes, because it invites testing the limits. Europe can explicitly state that it does not intend to isolate the enclave, reaffirm the transit guarantees already tested during the 2022 Lithuanian crisis, and revive – even on a voluntary and reciprocal basis – the notifications of major exercises provided for in the Vienna Document. The Forum for Security Cooperation is the natural venue for doing so.

The third level is arms control, where the vacuum is most dangerous. The end of the INF Treaty has reopened the issue of ground-based intermediate-range missiles: on the one hand, the announced deployment of U.S. long-range systems in Germany; on the other, Russian delivery systems in Belarus. These are weapons with flight times of just a few minutes, which compress the time available for political decision-making to the point of virtually eliminating it. A mutual and verifiable moratorium on their deployment on the continent would be the step offering the best cost-benefit ratio. Moscow had put forward such a proposal in 2019, but it was rejected due to the lack of verification guarantees. The challenge, then, is to establish a verification mechanism, and the resumption of the Structured Dialogue within the OSCE would allow this to be done in a format where Europeans are participants – not mere spectators – in Russian-American negotiations.

The fourth level is the political framework, and the crux of the matter remains Ukraine. There can be no de-escalation between Europe and Russia without a ceasefire in Ukraine, nor a stable ceasefire without a guarantee mechanism that Moscow does not interpret as a NATO advance. Three recommendations follow from this. Europe must secure a seat at the table, through a contact group or a small-group format with a clear mandate. It must prepare a package for the gradual easing of sanctions linked to verifiable steps, because sanctions are also a bargaining chip, and a chip that is never spent eventually loses its value. Above all, it must propose, as a guarantee mechanism, an OSCE-led monitoring mission authorized by the United Nations Security Council and substantially funded by European states. This would be the most concrete way to translate the financial burden that Europe already bears into political influence.

Fears, hopes, risks

A deliberate attack by Russia against an Alliance country – or vice versa – remains unlikely in the short term. More likely is the possibility that an incident in the Baltic – a drone straying off course, a ship-to-ship collision, a severed cable – could escalate into a crisis due to a lack of mechanisms capable of containing it. That is where the greatest risk lies, and that is where diplomacy can act immediately: an agreement on incident response, a direct hotline, declared red lines, and mutual notifications. The rest – the missile moratorium, a seat at the table, a guarantee mission under the auspices of the UN and the OSCE – requires time and political courage.

In 2025, the Helsinki Final Act marked its fiftieth anniversary, in a climate that made the occasion almost embarrassing. Yet that document was signed by adversaries who did not trust one another, and it was precisely for this reason that they established rules.

Europe – probably, perhaps, maybe, who knows – does not need to invent a new security order; it needs to go back to using the one it already has, and to do so before an incident renders that choice unnecessary.

November 4, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , | Comments Off on De-escalating the conflict: What the OSCE, the UN, and Europe are (not) doing to prevent war

Moscow mocks Kiev’s language hypocrisy exposed by ‘torture chamber’ scandal

RT | November 3, 2026

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has questioned Kiev’s enforcement of mandatory Ukrainian-language rules for officials after Vladimir Zelensky’s top aide was filmed speaking Russian while trying to defuse a riot over a suspected “torture chamber” site.

Kirill Budanov, the head of Zelensky’s office, was filmed on Monday evening speaking Russian during a confrontation sparked by shocking revelations about a black site operated by the neo-Nazi-linked Azov unit, which is part of Ukraine’s National Guard.

Several other people at the scene also spoke Russian, including a distressed teenager who was escorted out of the facility, the exact purpose of which remains disputed.

In a social media post on Tuesday, Zakharova asked Ukrainian language commissioner Elena Ivanovskaya whether she intended to fine Budanov, the teenager and the media outlets that broadcast their exchange.

Budanov did speak Ukrainian when addressing reporters during the same events, as required by Kiev’s language policy. However, footage from the scene shows him switching to Russian during more tense moments of the confrontation.

Ivanovskaya previously launched an official investigation into officers from Ukraine’s military intelligence agency HUR and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) who spoke Russian during a volatile argument that eventually escalated into a gunfight in September.

The Ukrainian government has pursued policies aimed at removing Russian culture from public life and promoting Ukraine’s national identity. The measures are supported by ultranationalist groups, which played a prominent role in the 2014 overthrow of the government, but have faced opposition from more moderate sections of Ukrainian society.

Many senior officials in Zelensky’s administration, including Zelensky himself, are widely believed to speak Russian in private, with occasional slips of the tongue caught on camera lending credence to that perception.

Russian is also frequently heard in recordings involving figures suspected of profiting from corruption networks within the Ukrainian government. Surveillance tapes released by anti-corruption agencies investigating members of Zelensky’s inner circle have repeatedly featured suspects discussing their alleged criminal activities in Russian.

Moscow has cited Kiev’s language policies as evidence of systemic discrimination against ethnic Russians in Ukraine and identified the issue as one of the underlying causes of the conflict between the two countries.

The riot in the village of Petropavlovskaya Borshchagovka, where the alleged secret Azov prison was located, erupted following accusations that military deserters were being detained, tortured and held for ransom at the facility.

Budanov acknowledged that there were “many” similar places across Ukraine and welcomed the exposure of suspected abuses at the site.

Azov commander Denis Prokopenko, meanwhile, accused the civilians involved in the confrontation of “sabotage” and “creating imagery that benefits Russia.” He delivered his video statement in angry Ukrainian.

The teenager’s role in the incident remains unclear. He told Budanov that he was 14 years old and had arrived at the facility “with guys” who subsequently fled, leaving him behind.

November 3, 2026 Posted by | Civil Liberties, Full Spectrum Dominance, Subjugation - Torture | , , | Comments Off on Moscow mocks Kiev’s language hypocrisy exposed by ‘torture chamber’ scandal

There is cautious optimism about ending the Ukraine War – Part 2

Peace comes in driblets in Ukraine

By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | November 2, 2026

The famous line of Irish poet WB Yeats from the poem The Lake Isle of Innisfree comes to mind: ‘And I shall have some peace there, for peace comes dropping slow…” Yeats was expressing his longing for the peace and tranquility of Innisfree, an uninhabited island in Ireland near which he spent his summers as a child while residing in an urban setting. And that is how Ukraine’s search for peace is meandering – not in a sudden, overwhelming wave; rather, in tiny, quiet increments, much like a gentle rain or a slow leak.

The ‘leak’ by Russia’s presidential aide for foreign policy Yuri Ushakov is no doubt an increment of potentially immense consequence when he told Kremlin’s preferred reporter Pavel Zarubin on Sunday that President Vladimir Putin never refused to speak with Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky. Replying to a pointed question whether Putin would answer a call from Zelensky, Ushakov foretold, “I think he would answer, of course. Putin has never refused to talk. He [Zelensky] is sending signals through various sources. If he really wants to negotiate, he is free to come [to Moscow].”

The remark comes within a week of the joint phone call on October 27 by Finland’s President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre to Putin during which, per a subsequent disclosure by Ushakov, the Nordic leaders discreetly broached the subject of direct contact between Putin and Zelensky. Zelensky later appreciated their debriefing. This is the first thing. Apparently, Putin repeated the refrain that Zelensky can always visit Moscow and that the Kremlin would ensure his personal safety and security. Now, an addendum, as it were, has appeared for the first time to Putin’s standing offer. Presumably, it was an orchestrated Q&A. This is the first thing.

Secondly, the Kremlin closely studied the commotion in Europe that the two Nordic leaders’ impudent behavior triggered — as if the wolf entered the hay pen. The two Nordic leaders broke ranks. Denmark and Sweden protested they were not consulted. However, the two EU heavyweights — France, Germany – simply looked away, and the super hawkish European Commission (EC) leadership under Ursula von der Leyen and her fiery foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, were uncharacteristically subdued.

How to explain it? As Guardian newspaper (no friend of Russia or Putin) noted, “The confusion reflects a wider disagreement across Europe over how to approach Putin, even as governments remain broadly united in their support for Ukraine… France has long advocated keeping a channel to Putin open, while Germany and Britain have been more cautious. The Baltic states and Kaja Kallas fear that renewed high-level engagement could ease pressure on Moscow without securing concessions.”

Thirdly, the dissonance is at its loudest when it came to the question of who should lead any European outreach. Von der Leyen insists on nominating someone who will faithfully execute her policy line – in sum, put her in the driving seat. It is excruciatingly painful for Von der Leyen to dismount the high horse she has been riding to demonize Putin and insist Russia can be defeated in the war.

This is the crux of the matter: the EU, with its narrative on the war collapsing, is not able to come up with any peace proposals. Its one-point demand is to have a physical presence at the high table of negotiations. Moscow has said it does not make sense unless the EU has something to bring to the peace table. Trump agrees.

In fact, across the Atlantic no one is paying attention to the acrimony in Europe regarding the seating arrangement at the peace table. The American elites are busy with domestic politics and if at all on the US’ war with Iran. Generally speaking, the Ukraine war has ceased to be a hot button foreign-policy issue among the elites. The ease with which Trump could mothball the Graham Act sanctions on Russia is telling. Zelensky’s support base in the US is also steadily shrinking. In practical terms, it turns out to be the CIA’s war.

Clearly, the trilateral meeting in Abu Dhabi will go ahead without any European participation. Meanwhile, Slovakia says Bratislava will represent itself. The house that Von der Leyen built to centralize all decision-making seems far too fragile as multipolarity gains ground in Europe. This trend can only gather pace as incumbent governments may be replaced in four of the EU’s biggest member states in national elections during 2027 – France, Italy, Poland and Spain. A recent Carnegie paper in mid-September assessed that radical-right parties with Eurosceptic orientation and which are Russia friendly are expected to do well.

The Carnegie paper titled How Europe’s 2027 Elections could Test EU Governance reluctantly admitted that the war in Ukraine “is likely to remain the EU’s most urgent security challenge. Radical-right parties are sharply divided on this issue, but as the cost of the EU’s support for Ukraine rises, resistance in several countries will increase. Locking in the union’s backing for Kyiv through multiannual programs would reduce the risk of a new constellation of political forces putting the union’s commitment to Ukraine in doubt.”

Overall, therefore, the Kremlin’s overture to engage Zelensky in a phone conversation comes not a day too soon. The catch is, Zelensky is a protégé of Britain’s MI6’s but here too, Britain’s ability to sustain the present momentum of the war is increasingly debatable. A BBC report gave a stark warning of “painful and depressing few years ahead” for the British people “after forecasts showed growth in living standards grinding almost to a halt.”

Ushakov’s remark testifies to the suppleness of the Kremlin’s strategy of not being an impediment to peaceful settlement in Ukraine but with no let-up in the frontline. Large scale Russian troop movements, the destruction of bridges over the Dnieper, the focus on Odessa and Kharkov, etc message that in the Kremlin’s estimation, there might be no alternative but to seek a military victory.

In a Substack piece, Gordon Hahn, the US security expert and specialist on Russia, visualised that Moscow may “add to its original demands” by pushing the ante on territorial issues, including the seizure of Kiev (“the mother of all Russian cities”) and Odessa (which Putin calls a Russian city’) – ie., gain control of the territory east of Dnieper (what Russians call the ‘Left Bank’) letting western Ukraine collapse into warlordism.

November 2, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , | Comments Off on There is cautious optimism about ending the Ukraine War – Part 2

German Imperialism: An Urgent Explainer

By Kit Klarenberg | Global Delinquents | November 1, 2026

The fate of Central and Eastern Europe after the People’s Democracies’ post-1989 fall cannot be fully appreciated without reference to the EU as an extension of German imperialism. Berlin’s drive to ensure the region remains composed of weak, frequently mutually-resentful microstates has endured for well-over a century. Over time, battlefield conquest and occupation has been supplanted by economic and monetary union, and ever-rising military, security and intelligence “interoperability” and “cooperation”, all conducted under “internationalist” auspices.

Comprehending this process and the consistent needs of German imperialism provides a typically absent, critical lens through which to view events such as Yugoslavia’s destruction, the rise and recent demise of Hungary’s Viktor Orban, and seen and unseen political machinations throughout the Balkans old and new. German imperialism is a potent, dangerous force frequently overlooked due to its nigh-invisible operation. With US global hegemony irreversibly faltering, it is vital to truly understand the phenomenon as it threatens to emerge in its own militarised right again.

Today, German imperialism is little-understood even in countries and regions intimately shaped if not outright created by Berlin’s colonial meddling and concomitant hegemonic expansion. Its historic apotheosis was the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The terms and consequences provide an eerily precise blueprint for the EU’s modern day role as German empire via other means. Despite Brest-Litovsk’s seismic import, mainstream English language accounts are comparatively rare. A highly compelling, informative synthesis is nonetheless provided by Adam Tooze’s much-overlooked 2014 work The Deluge.

Tooze writes of how “Brest gave birth to the precursors to the Baltic states in their modern form,” and an “independent Ukraine” for the very first time in history. Resource-rich territory that over prior centuries comprised much larger dynastic land empires was broken up into easily exploitable chunks. The newly-formed nations, and corresponding nationalisms, spread throughout ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse swaths of Central and Eastern Europe constituted a formidable stronghold. Self-determination facilitated Germany’s untrammelled economic, military, and political penetration.

Commenting on Eurasia’s 21st century map, Tooze observes how since the Soviet Union’s 1991 dissolution, all Brest-Litovsk’s “creations” have “come to be regarded as legitimate members of the family of nations.” Moreover, states such as the Baltics and Poland then as now “look to protectors in the West,” being “keen members of an American-dominated NATO and the European Union, in which Germany is the dominant force.” Via Brest-Litovsk, “all of these polities fell willy-nilly under the ‘protection’ of Imperial Germany.”

Treaties of Brest-Litovsk | Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary | Britannica

Brest-Litovsk delegates negotiate, early 1918

The Treaty was signed between Moscow and Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany and the Ottoman Empire in March 1918, following months of tense negotiations produced the previous December by revolutionary Russia signing an armistice with Berlin. At Brest-Litvosk, both sides had advanced their respective visions of “self-determination” for the Central and Eastern European components of the Tsar’s collapsed empire. Vladimir Lenin hoped newly-independent states in the region would be free to turn Bolshevik. Yet, Imperial Germany had no intention of letting that happen.

Instead, the country’s “more intelligent strategic thinkers” realised “there was no better means to dynamite the Tsarist Empire than for Berlin to espouse the demand for self-determination” at Brest-Litovsk. This “manipulative ruse” would allow Germany to extend her hegemony imperceptibly throughout enormously profitable territories. It was “a vision of negotiated sovereignty in which economic and military independence was pooled by smaller states with larger states.” Tooze reports how German imperialists argued “full, unfettered sovereignty” was “always a chimera” – “the real choice was one between hegemons”:

“Germany would secure power on a continental scale not through annexation, but through the formation of an economic and military bloc of smaller Eastern European states… The autonomous Polish entity carved by Germany and Austria out of Russian territory in the autumn of 1916 was a start. While in economic and military terms the new Poland would be bound tightly and irrevocably to Germany, in the social and cultural sphere it would be given the freedom ‘to express itself nationally’.”

‘Military Protection’

From the Central Powers’ perspective, self-determination’s colonial windfall was immense. In territorial terms, Moscow lost control of today’s Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. This prime former Tsarist real estate accounted for 34% of the fallen empire’s population, 54% of its industrial land, 89% of its coalfields, and 26% of its railways. Berlin well-knew the regional treasure trove would be hotly contested, and could easily “fall into the orbit of another great power” – “if not Germany or Russia, then Britain”.

Hence, Brest-Litovsk’s terms exclusively allowed for ‘independence’ under formal “German military protection.” This transformed millions of people throughout the region into potential proxy warriors arrayed against Russia, or other major powers threatening Berlin’s local hegemony, in the manner of NATO today. Rapidly collapsing into civil war, with Franco-British intervention to reverse the Revolution impending, the incipient Soviet Union acquiesced to the Treaty’s harsh stipulations. Lenin believed the Bolsheviks would eventually recapture the lost territories, by sheer force of radical gravity.

Contemporary map of Central and Eastern European states created by Brest-Litovsk

Brest-Litovsk was torn up by the June 1919 Treaty of Versailles, compelling Berlin to grant independence to assorted German-conquered protectorates that had been established throughout the region. Chaotic, violent struggles unfolded over the next three years between Red Army-assisted local revolutionary elements and ‘independent’ states led by collaborationist puppets. Belarus and Ukraine were successfully absorbed as republics, while the Baltics and Poland remained autonomous. Meanwhile, the seed of German hegemony via self-determination had been decisively sown throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

German colonialism particularly left its mark post-Brest-Litovsk via the emergence of nationalisms and according national creation myths throughout the region, which were innately and rabidly antagonistic toward Moscow. In Poland in 1916, Berlin’s invading forces had successfully portrayed themselves as liberators. In the Baltics, Russians represented a large proportion of the country’s urban, land-owning elite. They were easily framed by German propagandists, and in ultranationalist imaginations, as parasitic overlords of largely illiterate ethnic Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian peasantry, who overwhelmingly resided in rural steppes.

Convincing Ukraine’s multiethnic population to embrace an anti-Russian ‘independence’ was considerably more difficult, given their similar backgrounds, customs and languages, and the substantial influence of each others’ culture in both directions since Kiev’s 1654 union with Moscow. Ukraine’s contemporaneous veneration of genocidal fascists, and indeed the wider ongoing proxy war, are direct upshots of efforts by German imperialists to promote enmity and antagonism between Russians and Ukrainians. This strategy was maintained throughout the Cold War by the CIA and MI6, with Nazi-riddled West Berlin’s assistance.

‘Civilising Mission’

Another enduring legacy of Brest-Litovsk was the transformation of “self-determination” from a liberal German imperialist crusade, to a fundamental principle of Anglo-American-dominated international relations. The cause was eagerly and cynically seized upon first by British Prime Minister Lloyd George, then US President Woodrow Wilson. The right to minority self-determination globally became absolutely central to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The world over, anti-colonial and nationalist movements saw an opportunity to achieve independence from foreign subjugation.

At the Conference, Austro-Hungary brutally fell victim to this self-determination push, with Britain successfully ordering its constituent territories be “liberated” via the empire’s total breakup. This created the independent states of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. The latter pair were entirely new countries, with Yugoslavia forged from Austro-Hungary’s southern Slavic regions – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia – and the revolutionary kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. In a bitter irony, Austro-Hungary herself had previously encouraged self-determination regionally à la Brest-Litovsk, to entrench her imperial rule.

In June 1878, the little-known Congress of Berlin was convened. Major European powers sought to reorganise the Balkans, in the wake of Russia’s victory over the Ottoman Empire three months earlier. The conflict ended with Moscow asserting hegemony over Constantinople’s remaining holdings in Southeastern Europe, via an allied Greater Bulgaria, and the newly-formed, independent states of Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia. However, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, rapidly expanding host empire Germany, and Italy, wished for these terms to be revised.

Map of the Balkans to illustrate the Treaty of Berlin 1878.

While the Congress recognised the three new Balkan states’ independence, attendees demanded Bosnia and Herzegovina become an Austro-Hungarian protectorate into the bargain, much to Serbia’s chagrin. Vienna’s resultant takeover of Sarajevo sent tens of thousands of Muslim inhabitants fleeing to Turkey. This exodus intensified in 1881, after the imposition of military conscription. The move was inspired by Serbia and Montenegro supporting local anti-imperial elements. It was just one Austro-Hungarian connivance intended to transform harmoniously multiethnic, multifaith Bosnia and Herzegovina into a fractious powder keg.

In service of this goal, Sarajevo’s Austro-Hungarian occupation authorities actively nurtured a nationhood centred exclusively on Bosniak – Bosnian Muslim – identity. The local Serbo-Croatian dialect was proclaimed a separate Bosnian language, Cyrillic text got suppressed, while Serbian books and newspapers were banned. Vienna’s meddling failed to incite violent, separatist division between Bosnia’s diverse peoples. It nonetheless created a vast army of conscripts for any future regional war, while providing Austro-Hungary with an imperial public relations victory. Per historian Maximilian Georg:

“[Vienna’s] objects were to teach the population their supposed Bosnian, pro-Habsburg identity, legitimise the Austro-Hungarian rulers as the new Romans, and demonstrate to Europe and the world the success of Austro-Hungary’s ‘civilising mission’ in an ‘oriental’ country. This ‘civilising mission’ under military occupation was the strongest indicator of an Austro-Hungarian colonialism.”

‘Yugoslav Nationalist’

Austro-Hungary and Germany alike considered independent Serbia’s mere existence a permanent irritant to their Eastern European supremacy, in need of eventual neutralisation. Tensions constantly mounted after the turn of the century, leading in 1908 to Bosnia’s formal annexation by Vienna. All along, imperialists in Berlin were spectating Austro-Hungary’s colonial machinations with intense interest. In 1888, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck prophetically foresaw “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans” upsetting Europe’s delicate balance of power, and precipitating a major global conflict.

Serbia and Montenegro’s October 1912 invasion of Albania, in the wake of her declaration of independence from Ottoman rule, almost proved that “damned foolish thing.” Serb and Montenegrin forces sought to permanently capture territory, but retreated a year later under threat of Austro-Hungarian intervention. In the aftermath, Kaiser Wilhelm II visited Vienna, declaring to colonial officials “war between East and West was in the long run inevitable.” As Slavs “were born not to rule but to obey,” their anti-imperialist tendencies couldn’t be tolerated much longer.

Wilhelm II moreover pledged to “back” Austro-Hungary in any future conflict in Eastern Europe, assuring his Viennese counterparts Berlin was “ready to draw the saber any time your action makes it necessary.” Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip’s June 1914 assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo provided an ideal pretext for the Kaiser’s long-desired showdown between Slavs and Teutons. Pressured by Austro-Hungarian authorities to implicate Belgrade directly in his actions while on trial, Princip instead insisted he was ideologically motivated:

“I am a Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslavs, and I do not care what form of state, but it must be free from Austria…The plan was to unite all South Slavs. It was understood that Serbia as the free part of the South Slavs had the moral duty to help in the unification, to be to the South Slavs as the Piedmont was to Italy…In my opinion every Serb, Croat and Slovene should be an enemy of Austria.”

In post-World War I Yugoslavia, Princip was elevated to national hero. In early 1930, a plaque was erected on the site of Ferdinand’s assassination, celebrating a foundational event in the new country’s creation. It was the sole trophy claimed by the Nazis following the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, presented to Adolf Hitler at a formal ceremony on his 52nd birthday in April 1941, two days after Belgrade’s surrender. A potent totem of German embarrassment expunged, it was now time to erase Yugoslavia permanently.

Adolf Hitler inspects the plundered plaque commemorating Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination by Gavrilo Princip

Carving up the country relied heavily on constructing genocidal, ethnonationalist puppet entities. Painful memories of these attempts to exert hegemony over the Balkans under the banner of “self-determination” remained visceral for many residents of Yugoslavia in December 1991. Then, newly-reunified Germany unilaterally recognised federation members Croatia and Slovenia as ‘independent’ states, while encouraging other republics comprising the collapsing country to follow the pair’s secessionist lead. It was widely predicted Yugoslavia’s demise would produce bloodshed, on a grand scale.

‘Fundamental Subordination’

Dissolving Yugoslavia began waging war on Croat and Slovene secessionists six months earlier. The latter conflict lasted just 10 days, but the former was still simmering. The European Community and UN futilely struggled all along to achieve peaceful settlements to Yugoslavia’s gravely worsening crisis, while formally committed to preserving the country in some form. Berlin’s recognition summarily sabotaged those efforts, removing any incentive for Yugoslav republics to negotiate their futures with Belgrade, while emboldening nationalists in every republic.

Fears of Berlin’s resurgent imperialism were not confined to Yugoslavia. As TIME contemporaneously observed, “it used to be a given of European political life Germany… would not take a leading or controversial role in world affairs,” which “suited its neighbors very well indeed.” While occupied West Germany operated throughout the Cold War as “an economic giant and a political dwarf,” unified Berlin’s “unexpected show of diplomatic muscle” in recognising Croatia and Slovenia as ‘independent’ countries was now causing “discomfort” throughout Western capitals.

In Britain’s parliament, then-Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd explicitly evoked the World Wars as disquieting precedents for Germany’s modern-day “self-determination” push in the soon-to-be former Yugoslavia. “There is a tradition of the main states of Western Europe splitting in rivalry on these Balkan questions, and this all ending up on the battlefield. I don’t think that tradition is a good one,” Hurd cautioned. Washington, immensely irritated by Berlin belligerently “getting out ahead of the US,” duly assumed management of the Yugoslav crisis, with disastrous consequences.

Fratricidal conflicts that subsequently engulfed Yugoslavia forged a highly invasive beachhead, via which German economic and political hegemony throughout the region surged, without direct military engagement. While Berlin framed her support for Croat and Slovene ‘independence’ in terms of human rights, the rich financial rewards of shattering the federation were plain. As by far the two wealthiest republics, Germany effectively granted herself access to “the best productive assets” in the soon-to-be former country by kickstarting its practical and physical collapse, per a 2008 academic paper.

The authors write of how Berlin’s “hegemonic relationship” with Yugoslav successor nations was thereafter writ considerably larger than even Germany’s imperial infiltration of “smaller states” elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. This is due to the “specific dependence” of Balkan countries on Berlin’s “structural power”. In economic terms, this means vast national trade deficits with Germany across the region, with “Balkan pre-products and raw materials” flowing in vast, constant profusion to Berlin, while German corporations and products dominate many commercial, financial and industrial sectors locally.

Undergirding this extraordinary economic colonisation was adoption by Yugoslavia’s successor states of ‘independent’ currencies, pegged first to the former Deutschmark, now Euro. This proved pivotal to the “fundamental subordination of the political economies of the region to the ideological and operational norms” of the EU – or German empire, via other means. New national and private banking systems of post-Yugoslav countries were structured specifically according to Berlin’s own, with German banks ascendant, as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. That’s not all:

“[Deutschmark/Euro pegging] was an essential precondition for the shaping of the macro-economic policies of these (and other transition) states, for their foreign economic relationships, for the further development of their capital markets and the programmes of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation which ensued.”

‘European Continent’

Berlin’s Balkan banking takeover moreover fundamentally “facilitates the penetration of all German enterprises into the commercial life of the Balkan economies.” Berlin has gluttonously feasted on local resources and industry alike ever since, its investment regionally “characterised by takeovers.” For example, throughout Central and Eastern Europe German supermarkets are a near-monopoly, with prices of goods frequently higher than back home, despite meagre local purchasing power. Low wages, vast structural unemployment, and mass brain drain are all interlinked, ruinous inheritances.

The Balkans’ Western “transition” has been far more destructive than even the horrors unleashed upon the former Warsaw Pact in the 1990s. Heavily influenced “by prescriptive programmes emanating from the EU and from the World Bank,” Brussels has since 1999 also been “actively involved” in advising and guiding every country in the region towards bloc membership. After so much imposed impoverishment, it isn’t precisely clear what meaningful benefits Balkan states or populations will reap from their vassalage under German imperialism becoming formalised.

In late 2019, a Balkan liberal who once eagerly supported their country joining the EU wrote a sorrowful ode to “the process of so-called integration” Yugoslav successor states suffered by adopting “measures”, “instruments”, and “reforms” dictated by “Western technocrats”. Freshly ‘independent’ countries “were expected to build a fully developed Western liberal democracy from scratch… upon the ruins of a different yet fully developed system… while dragging behind us the burden of deepening poverty and trauma.” Several were and remain deeply scarred by Berlin and Brussels-encouraged ‘independence’ wars.

However, “this excruciating process of destroying and building anew a whole system… went neither fast enough nor successfully enough” for the new German empire. What’s more, “competition was not fair” – “opening our markets to the developed capitalism of the West and undertaking neoliberal reforms drained our human and economic resources while we kept trying to stay apace.” Socialism’s vestiges were eradicated, state industries sold off, and social spending slashed. The op-ed mysteriously failed to mention how Germany’s contemporary Balkan economic assault has a “strong security dimension”.

06/18/99: KFOR Sectors

Kosovo’s original KFOR occupation map, June 1999

The 2008 paper notes Berlin exerts direct colonial-style control across the region, for example via Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU-chosen Office of the High Representative, which traditionally serves as Germany’s imperial viceroy in Sarajevo. Moreover, Berlin has always been a key contributor to NATO’s Kosovo peacekeeping force KFOR, sustaining a military occupation under which Pristina controversially declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. This summer, Washington’s KFOR contingent began departing Kosovo after 27 years.

Meanwhile, the Americans are openly signalling Bosnia’s abandonment, raising potentially urgent questions about the unified country’s future. In April, Ursula von der Leyen made clear the EU and she personally intend to “[complete] the European continent so it does not fall under Russian, Turkish or Chinese influence,” in explicit reference to the former Yugoslavia. History shows us such declarations by German imperialists frequently result in world-threatening catastrophe. Meanwhile, “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans” could evidently today yet again trigger war.

November 1, 2026 Posted by | Timeless or most popular | , , | Comments Off on German Imperialism: An Urgent Explainer

Lies, Damn Lies, and Ukraine News

By William Dunkerley | Ron Paul Institute | October 29, 2026

It’s been said that truth is the first casualty of war. What about the Ukraine war? I’ve followed the news closely, and have found ample evidence in headlines and storylines that the old adage holds true today. Too often the Ukraine news stories we see are misleading instead of informative.

For instance, in March 2014 CNN reported that Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution was “standing up on behalf of democracy.” A month earlier, The Week cited many pundits and policymakers also characterizing events as a victory for democracy. It was a clear and compelling news theme.

But what’s misleading about that? It creates an impression that is contrary to reality. The truth is that the immediate result of the revolution was an abrupt end to constitutional democracy, not a victory for democracy.

The uprising totally dismantled the constitutional democracy that Ukraine had operated under since its independence from the USSR in 1991. The sequence of events makes it clear. Out went the democratic constitution; in came rule by force under the unelected revolutionaries. That’s what Ukrainians were stuck with for months. The stories about a boost for democracy were completely misleading.

This is a good example of truth being a casualty of war. The news celebrated an advance of democracy while in reality democracy itself had been lost.

Media distortion like that is not unique to the Ukraine war. Here’s an example dating back to the Cold War.

The issue was Soviet missiles showing up in Cuba in 1962. Upon discovery, President Kennedy railed against their presence.

On national TV he demanded that en route Soviet ships presumed to be carrying still more missiles be turned around. And Khrushchev complied.

Still there was the issue of removing the missiles from Cuba. How did that turn out?

“We’re eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked,” reportedly said Secretary of State Dean Rusk. News reports characterized JFK as staring down the menacing Soviet leader and winning this round with the communists. The imagery seemed to play upon the title of Kennedy’s book, Profiles in Courage. It all was emblematic of the American Way. The story was almost poetic.

Indeed, this story seems so perfect that it is hard to believe it was actually a hoax. True, there were missiles. But here is a factual account of how that crisis really unfolded:

In late 1961 President Kennedy began placing nuclear missiles in Turkey, strategically close to the Soviet border. Full deployment was completed in 1962. It would take less than 15 minutes for the missiles to hit Moscow.

Then in July of that year Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev sealed a secret agreement with Cuba to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles there, just 90 miles from Florida. It would take them less than 15 minutes to hit Washington DC.

What ended this standoff was something far less poetic than the Kennedyesque example I cited earlier. Khrushchev proposed a quid pro quo: He would remove his missiles from Cuba if Kennedy would remove his from Turkey. Kennedy privately agreed. But he insisted on a significant proviso: the quid pro quo must be kept secret. Khrushchev conceded and Kennedy’s fanciful story of standing tall in the face of a threatening adversary prevailed.

The Cuban missile story thus joins the Ukraine democracy story as another example of truth being a casualty of war.

Now consider this next example from back in Ukraine.

“Parliament votes 328-0 to impeach Yanukovych” reported the Kyiv Post on February 23, 2014. A day earlier the New York Times claimed, “Ukraine’s Parliament voted to remove President Viktor F. Yanukovych from office hours after he abandoned his office.”

Both reports further demonstrate how truth becomes a casualty of war. Neither accurately portrays what really happened.

Radio Liberty was quick to set things straight. In a report titled “Was Yanukovych’s Ouster Constitutional?” staffer Daisy Sindelar presented an in-depth analysis showing that parliamentarians tried to remove Yanukovych from the presidency but failed to achieve a sufficient vote.

She also pointed out that Yanukovych’s alleged abandonment of the presidency was not even a possible basis for declaring the office vacant. Radio Liberty’s corrections are backed up by Constitutional Coup in Ukraine in 2014, a thorough academic study published under the auspices of the Polish Parliament.

Clearly all the examples cited above represent fabricated stories masquerading as the truth. But the news stories are also examples of something much more insidious: the collective impact that a persistent manufactured narrative can have on a given public.

They paint a picture, a vivid narrative, that shapes the cultural schema through which people understand and interpret future events.

This can be seen in how the media have portrayed the fates of Crimea and Donbas. At issue is the question: Did the revolutionary government automatically inherit all the territorial authority of the constitutional democracy they had overthrown?

Crimea, for example, has been a significant stumbling block in discussions of a peaceful settlement of the war. In March 2014 Secretary of State John Kerry told CNN, “Crimea is part of Ukraine. Crimea is Ukraine.” But how is that true? What made Crimea part of revolutionary Ukraine?

Before the revolution, Crimea’s place within Ukraine was established by the democratic constitution. But the revolutionaries abandoned that constitution and claimed authority through force. Their rule by force never extended into Crimea. What, then, was the basis for their claim to Crimea? There was none that holds up to scrutiny. Even the eventual election of Poroshenko as president did not undo the constitutional destruction caused by the revolutionaries.

Why didn’t CNN challenge Kerry’s story? The assumption behind his statement illustrates how an ongoing series of fabricated stories can predispose us to interpret each new story in a particular way. If one can believe that a takeover by force is an advancement of democracy, why question an unsupported claim regarding Crimea? This shows that a lack of scrutiny can lead to creating or reinforcing a cultural schema that impedes our understanding of what is really happening.

The same principle applies to Donbas, but the words are different. Here Ukraine news stories portrayed the situation as “Russia invading Donbas.” But the facts show that notion to be a sensationalized misdirection from the truth.

The actual story can be understood by asking this question: What made Donbas, meaning the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, a part of revolutionary Ukraine?

The logic that clarified the status of Crimea applies here too. Donetsk and Luhansk were not part of revolutionary Ukraine for the same reason. Additionally, their populations actively rejected revolutionary rule. They fought against it when the revolutionaries attacked them. If there were, as reports claimed, Russian volunteers, mercenaries, or regulars helping the population defend their territories, it does not alter the basic scenario.

Calling the territories breakaway regions is a misnomer, as is calling the people separatists. It is not possible to break away or separate from something to which one was not attached in the first place. The Russia invades Donbas story is just sensationalistic fabrication.

What’s worse is that this obscures what really happened there. February 2022 is often cited as the start of the Ukraine war. The facts tell a different story. The hostilities in Donbas beginning in 2014 marked the actual start of the Ukraine war, years before the massive escalation in 2022. Reports say that this Donbas phase of the conflict claimed over 14,000 lives and displaced roughly 1.5 million people.

“Truth is the first casualty of war?” Once again we see that axiom is borne out. The mainstream story about Donbas leaves out the critical parts of the truth. But who will notice that? The facts are obscured from view by the now well-established, yet fundamentally misleading cultural schema.

The false claim of a democratic revolution. The lie about how Yanukovych was dismissed. The false and misleading narratives about the status of Crimea and Donbas. These and other stories have given the American public and our leaders a politically contorted view of the entire Ukraine war dilemma.

These narratives — and the false cultural schema they help create — can also lead people to draw unwarranted conclusions about the reasons behind political leaders’ decisions. As peace-treaty talks approach, there is a danger that proposals and decisions about ending the war might be built on a house of cards — that is, the series of misleading Ukraine news stories and the dysfunctional cultural schema that they helped to create. Together they distort perceptions of how the war began and what is at stake. If negotiators fail to break free of that schema, any resulting peace could prove unsustainable for Ukrainians and their country. What a waste that would be. Haven’t the Ukrainian people suffered enough?

October 29, 2026 Posted by | Deception, Mainstream Media, Warmongering | , | Comments Off on Lies, Damn Lies, and Ukraine News

The interest of the House of Rothschild in Ukraine

By Raphael Machado | Strategic Culture Foundation | October 29, 2026

This week, Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance, led by Sergey Marchenko, signed an agreement with the financial group Rothschild & Co for the purpose of preparatory consultancy for the privatization of the Ukrainian state banks Ukrgasbank and Sense Bank, two of the largest banks in the Ukrainian financial system. Rothschild & Co will carry out an inventory of these banks’ assets, as well as an assessment of their financial health, organize the information, and attract buyers for the acquisition. In practice, Rothschild & Co will end up determining the buyer(s), thanks to its privileged role in this operation, as well as its institutional weight.

The Ukrainian government claims that the operation is necessary to reduce the role of the State in the Ukrainian banking-financial system and to attract foreign investment, in accordance with recommendations forwarded by the IMF.

In most other countries, these sudden privatization operations always generate large waves of protest organized by unions, social movements, and opposition parties, but the privatization of some of the main Ukrainian banks is advancing without any popular reaction, a symptom of Ukraine’s transformation into a dictatorship through the recourse to a permanent state of exception.

This is not the first Rothschild operation in Ukraine.

Since at least 2015, the financial advisory institution Rothschild & Co has acted practically as an “appendage” of Ukraine, assuming the responsibility of “guiding” the Ukrainian government in financial matters, especially in relation to the restructuring and renegotiation of its debts. In the past, Rothschild & Co also acted in the unbundling of Naftogaz, Ukraine’s main state oil and gas company. This unbundling consists of the “separation” of Naftogaz’s various activities into subsidiaries to facilitate the sale or concession of activities considered “non-essential.” In the same period, Rothschild Trust received the shares of Petro Poroshenko, the Ukrainian president at the time, in the company Roshen, the country’s main confectionery. “Received” here is a key verb because, in fact, there was no “sale” of the shares, but a simple handover, which is extremely peculiar and suggests the existence of some kind of more obscure relationship between Poroshenko and Rothschild Trust.

Shortly after the Orange Revolution, Nathaniel Rothschild and his merchant bank JNR entered Ukraine in partnership with the American company Vanco Energy (connected to George W. Bush and Dick Cheney) to take control of Ukrainian oil in the Black Sea.

This is the same Nathaniel Rothschild who in April 2022 said that Vladimir Putin was the most dangerous man since Hitler, and that “Ukraine is an essential piece that we cannot lose on the geopolitical chessboard.” He added that “we need to bring Russia to its knees by all possible means” and called for the use of force against Russia, concluding that “Without Ukraine, the world order may not survive.”

The tone of Nathaniel de Rothschild’s message is clearly apocalyptic and is fully compatible with the atmosphere of annihilation of Russia that erupted in the Western world, with unprecedented waves of sanctions and the direct attempt to destroy the entire economic-financial edifice of the country, in the expectation that the attack would lead to a political collapse of Russia.

Why is Ukraine so important to Nathaniel de Rothschild? This is a mystery difficult to resolve.

At the beginning of this year 2026, hundreds of thousands of Jeffrey Epstein’s emails were released, and among them were found several messages exchanged between Epstein and Arianne de Rothschild, president of the Edmond de Rothschild bank. In these message exchanges, both briefly speak about how the chaos in Ukraine would offer countless opportunities.

The Rothschild interest in Ukraine seems much older, however. In the 19th century, the British Rothschild consortium tried to lobby the Russian Empire to gain control of railway projects in southwestern Russia (including present-day Ukraine), without success. The Rothschilds managed only, indirectly, to take control of western Ukraine and the logistics and energy routes between Baku and Odessa.

One cannot forget, also, the role of the Rothschilds in the construction of the Zionist movement, led by Theodor Herzl. Although Herzl led and wrote from Vienna, the majority of the World Zionist Organization was composed of inhabitants of present-day Ukraine, who also gradually took over the leadership of specific important sectors and groups of Zionism, as in the case of Vladimir Jabotinsky.

Which leads us, finally, to the Round Table society, a British secret society founded at the beginning of the 20th century by Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Milner, and financed by Lord Rothschild. The Round Table aimed to spread and entrench British influence around the world and to strengthen the alignment between the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and served as the seed of other “elite clubs,” such as Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations.

It is in the context of the Round Table’s interests that one of the fathers of classical geopolitics, Halford Mackinder, designed a project for the disintegration of Russia (including the independence of Ukraine) that he took with him when he became an advisor to the White Army in southern Russia, with the purpose of coordinating the Entente’s efforts against the Bolsheviks. Mackinder’s effort failed in 1920.

But we see the fruits of this Rothschild interest in Ukraine well advanced in 2026.

October 29, 2026 Posted by | Timeless or most popular | , , , | Comments Off on The interest of the House of Rothschild in Ukraine