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Eight Arab and Muslim states reject Israeli displacement plans for Gaza

Palestinian Information Center – September 6, 2026

GAZA – Eight Arab and Muslim countries have condemned remarks by far-right Israeli ministers Itamar Ben Gvir and Israel Katz on plans to forcibly displace Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.

The foreign ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Pakistan, Türkiye and Qatar said in a joint statement released on Sunday that such Israeli plans violate international and humanitarian law and pose a direct threat to the Palestinian people’s legitimate and inalienable rights.

The ministers voiced rejection of any Israeli attempt to displace Palestinians from or within the occupied territory, warning against transforming extremist rhetoric on forced displacement into official state policy.

The ministers warned that the displacement of Gazans would destabilize the region and derail global peace efforts, undermining US president Donald Trump’s plan to end the Gaza war, which clearly rejects forced population transfers.

The ministers stressed that Gaza is an integral part of the occupied Palestinian territories, calling for preserving the unity of Gaza, the West Bank and east Jerusalem.

They reiterated their countries’ support for a two-state solution establishing an independent Palestinian state along the June 4, 1967 lines, with east Jerusalem as its capital.

They urged the international community and UN Security Council to oppose Israeli attempts to impose a new demographic or geographic reality in the occupied Palestinian territories.

September 6, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Illegal Occupation | , , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Eight Arab and Muslim states reject Israeli displacement plans for Gaza

US approves $5 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia as it renews aggression against Iran

Press TV | September 5, 2026

Washington has approved a potential $5 billion arms package for Saudi Arabia that would sharply expand the kingdom’s precision-strike capabilities as the United States escalates its war of aggression against Iran.

The deal includes more than 10,000 guidance kits designed to convert conventional bombs into extended-range, steerable precision weapons.

The State Department cleared the sale on Friday. The package also covers more than 10,000 general-purpose bombs requested by Riyadh, both 500-pound (230 kg) and 2,000-pound (900 kg) variants.

These guidance systems would turn unguided “dumb bombs” into accurate munitions capable of striking targets at greater distances with far higher precision.

Washington claims the transfer serves US foreign-policy and national-security interests by strengthening Saudi Arabia, which it calls a major non-NATO ally and an important contributor to political stability and economic development in the Persian Gulf.

The State Department said the weapons would enhance Saudi Arabia’s ability to conduct airborne strikes against current and potential regional threats, improve the kingdom’s defensive capabilities, and increase compatibility between Saudi systems and those used by US forces and other Persian Gulf partners.

Boeing, the Virginia-based US defense contractor, has been designated the principal contractor for the potential sale.

The approval comes as Washington expands arms transfers and military cooperation across the Persian Gulf while renewing its illegal war against Iran.

On February 28, the United States and Israel launched another round of aggression against Iran, eight months after carrying out unprovoked attacks on the country. Iran swiftly retaliated with barrages of missiles and drones against Israeli-occupied territories as well as US bases and interests across the region.

A ceasefire took effect on April 7. On June 18, the presidents of Iran and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding to end the war and begin a 60-day diplomatic process to resolve outstanding differences.

Renewed US strikes have once again triggered Iranian retaliation.

September 5, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Wars for Israel | , | Comments Off on US approves $5 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia as it renews aggression against Iran

Saudi Arabia reaffirms no normalisation with Israel without Palestinian state

MEMO | August 27, 2026

Saudi Arabia has reiterated that it will not establish diplomatic relations with Israel without the creation of an independent Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, amid reports that US President Donald Trump is seeking to link a civil nuclear agreement with Riyadh to Saudi normalisation with Israel.

According to a report by The Wall Street Journal, Trump has referred the US-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement to Congress for review but has stipulated that it will not take effect unless Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords.

“The president’s position has not changed, and the agreement will not move forward unless Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords,” the newspaper quoted a US administration source as saying.

The reported condition follows the signing of the nuclear agreement last month by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman.

A Saudi source quoted by Israel’s Channel 12 rejected linking the nuclear agreement to normalisation, saying Riyadh’s position on relations with Israel remained unchanged.

“The Saudi position is clear, firm and unwavering,” the source said. “There will be no diplomatic relations with Israel without the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.”

The source maintained that Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear program forms part of its broader strategic partnership with Washington and should not be conditional on establishing relations with Israel.

August 27, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism | , , , | Comments Off on Saudi Arabia reaffirms no normalisation with Israel without Palestinian state

After 6 months of war, why aren’t oil prices even higher?

By Sam Fraser | Responsible Statecraft | August 25, 2026

For decades, the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz has been considered the ultimate doomsday scenario for global oil markets. So, when Iran effectively closed the Strait earlier this year in response to the joint U.S.-Israeli assault, many analysts warned that oil prices could skyrocket to record highs.

The logic was straightforward. Prior to the war, about 20% of the global oil supply transited the Strait. A loss of supply on this scale could easily have pushed oil prices to $150 or even $200 per barrel — but it didn’t. Instead, prices peaked around $120 per barrel in April and have largely stayed below $100 since June.

To understand the dynamics that have so far prevented an even higher price spike, and to get a sense of where oil supply and prices may be headed as the conflict drags on, I spoke with Rory Johnston, a leading oil markets analyst and the author of the Commodity Context blog. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Sam Fraser: Let’s talk about why we haven’t seen the $150-200 per barrel oil prices that you warned about early in the war. You’ve pointed to a few reasons, including China’s massive import cuts. As we understand it, what has China done with their oil imports and how have they managed it?

Rory Johnston: It’s a bit of a mystery. At this stage, what we know for sure is that China reduced its crude oil imports by over five million barrels a day, roughly 45% of their total pre-war import appetite. For China, there’s two endpoints of that crude oil balance: into a refinery or into storage. We know that China had been building up a massive volume of strategic reserves prior to the war.

Essentially half of the 5 million barrels a day reduction can be explained roughly by reductions in refining runs in China. The remainder is a question of balancing in and out of stockpiles. Some of it would’ve been likely a drawdown of less visible or underground stockpiles. And the other portion of it is the halting of that prior pace of stockpile building. The main debate is how much each of these factors is contributing. If, let’s say, 80% of that remainder is a halt to prior purchases that were building strategic stocks, that is a bearish outcome for oil prices because it means that Beijing doesn’t need to replace those volumes anytime soon. But if they are aggressively drawing down less visible strategic stocks right now, that’s a much more bullish interpretation because it means they can’t keep going on forever and they’re going to need to replace those stockpiles.

On the refined product side, they cut refining runs by about 2.5 to 3 million barrels a day. What are they doing with that prior flow of diesel, jet fuel, et cetera? And that’s where we start to get even more speculative. Above-ground storage tanks for refined products don’t have floating roofs. We can’t independently verify their fill.

It comes down to the apparent consumption and the apparent available supply of these fuels within China. For gasoline and diesel, each of those supplies have apparently fallen by about 20%, which is a stark reduction. There’s no evidence that people in China are just driving a fifth less. If they aren’t actually cutting back that much on consumption, where is the fuel coming from? Prior to the war, we suspected that China was also building strategic reserves of refined fuels. Again, we can’t verify that, but if they had built that up, they could be drawing it down. We’re then faced with that same question as in crude oil, how much of this is a cessation of prior stock building and how much of this is the drawdown of existing stock?

For reference, the last moment we saw anything like this in terms of apparent consumption collapse was COVID zero in 2022 when the country was entirely locked down.

Fraser: So we can say that stockpiles of refined products must exist, but we have no insight into their size or how much is being drawn down or how sustainable those drawdowns would be?

Johnston: Correct. There are mixed estimates, but I think they are at best estimates. It’s funny, I think in some ways the lack of verifiable data allows people to speak very confidently about what’s happening in China, because there’s no data to rebut virtually any argument. That’s just allowing people to run with it without any kind of real pushback.

Fraser: How have we seen the Chinese buying patterns change since the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding and since it collapsed?

Johnston: What we saw following the MOU was a surge of exiting cargoes from Hormuz. The vast majority of that seems to have routed towards China. What we saw was that, at the very bottom, Chinese crude oil imports fell to around 6 million barrels a day in June. And then those spiked back up to more than 10 million barrels a day in July, or at least that was the high point in July. Roughly a month later, those imports are back down around six. You’ve seen a rollover back to where we stood pre-MOU.

Fraser: Do we know how long this import suppression can continue?

Johnston:. Let’s say this has been entirely a drawdown of stocks, which seems implausible. Even then, they have more than a billion barrels of crude oil stocks that we know about for sure. If they want to support the market to their maximum ability, they can do that for months further. But in doing so, they would deplete the entirety of the energy security blanket they’ve spent almost two decades constructing.

Fraser: Let’s move on to the strategic petroleum reserve releases by the U.S. and other partners. To what degree have those been instrumental in keeping prices from going a lot higher?

Johnston: It’s part of the suite that the world has kind of engaged in to blunt those effects. This is the largest release of strategic stocks on record. Depending on the exact month you’re talking about, it has potentially been over 3 million barrels a day of incremental supply coming from OECD SPRs. Without that, the market would’ve been much tighter and we likely wouldn’t have experienced the same relief even with China’s import cut at the same time.

Fraser: Last week the U.S. SPR dipped under 300 million barrels. There’s a lot of discussion of what the physical limits on those stockpiles are given that they’re stored in salt caverns. They need a certain amount of fill to maintain structural integrity. Are we anywhere close to pushing up against the U.S. ability to continue drawing down from those stockpiles?

Johnston: I do not believe we are. I think that you have probably at least another 200 million barrels that can be readily drawn down. With the required fill level, absolutely it would be a massive issue if you just drew it down and left a vacuum in there. It would implode on itself. But they don’t do that. They one-to-one replace a barrel of crude oil extracted with a barrel of saturated brine. So theoretically it should maintain the same fill. The issue for SPRs is not necessarily fill level, but number of refill and empty cycles. It’s the actual up-and-down motion that disturbs and further erodes the walls and structural integrity.

I think that the SPR caverns can get below 100 million barrels of fill before we run into any issues.

Fraser: So if we continued the current rate of drawdown, that would take us well into next year.

Johnston: Correct.

Fraser: Over the course of the war, Trump or someone in his administration will make a statement about how diplomacy is progressing or about how much oil is coming out of the strait. And even if those are quickly disproven, there is a downward impact on prices. So why do these traders keep listening to Trump? Has there been a change in the reaction of markets over the course of this war?

Johnston: You definitely get smaller drawdowns to these kinds of jawboning attempts today than you would have, say, in March and April, where there are multiple days that you saw $15 to $20 per barrel reductions in the span of a day.

When you look at the history of oil, there’s a tendency on these geopolitical events to overdo it. That’s a natural kind of fear-driven phenomenon. In some ways Trump has short-circuited that normal behavior in oil markets. Because while you’re right that it’s never coming true, the price action is coming true. At the end of the day, for prices to go higher, you need traders to bid higher. And if they bid higher and they get blown out of the water and they lose their jobs, they’re going to be replaced by someone that doesn’t bid higher on geopolitical risk. It has successfully arrested the upside volatility. But if we keep getting tighter, markets will continue to respond higher; we just won’t get those runaway phenomena that we would’ve seen historically.

Fraser: Since the start of the war, we’ve seen Saudi Arabia and the UAE successfully use pipelines as an alternative route to get oil out of the Gulf. How much oil are those getting out at this point? And has the Houthi blockade of Saudi shipping in the Red Sea had a meaningful effect on this?

Johnston: The total volume coming out of Emirates at Fujairah and then the west coast of Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea rose to about 6-7 million barrels. It was about 2-3 million before, so that was an incremental change of 4-5 million barrels.

To your question with the Houthis, it has absolutely been having an effect. As soon as they started attacking Saudi ships, the entire Red Sea fleet went dark. Everyone turned off their transponders, making it much harder to verify flows out of Saudi Arabia. Verifiable transits of Saudi tankers through the Bab al-Mandab have gone functionally to zero. They still are probably getting some out, but we’re also seeing evidence of flows north into the Mediterranean. Pre-war flows here were around a million barrels a day, give or take. That’s jumped over the past week or two to around 2.5 million barrels a day, presumed Saudi flow.

Over the past two weeks, we’ve also seen Saudi Arabia begin loading tankers in the Gulf again, which they hadn’t done since the collapse of the MOU. And the question is, does Riyadh know something? Is something big going to break in the Hormuz negotiations? Or are they being forced back into the Gulf? You’re seeing reports now that they are participating in the Emirati-led shuttle trade, ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman. It seems likely that some of that is displaced barrels coming back from the Red Sea. So Saudi Arabia is needing to diversify away from its diversification. There’s a poetic side to it.

Fraser: Pulling all these factors together, where are we left in terms of a kind of global supply shortage? And what kinds of price impacts can we expect if that persists over the next few months?

Johnston: It’s very hard to estimate global balance right now. My bet would be 2-4 million barrels a day undersupplied on a global basis.

The rub on top of that is that we now have a parallel crisis that’s emerging on the refining side of the slate. So even if we’ve sorted out what was happening on the crude oil side, we have the Ukrainian hammering of Russian refineries, the attacks in the Black Sea, the reduction in U.S. exports now that stocks have drawn down, and China is not exporting refined products either. All together this further tightens global refined product markets.

If this persists and we keep drawing down crude oil stocks, the crude oil price is going to keep rising. On top of that, we could see refined product prices independently going higher. So that’s just an amplification. For consumers, it’s refined product prices and not crude oil that are going to drive those economic issues.

Fraser: So even though these factors we’ve discussed have kept oil prices down so far, and the biggest of these can persist for a while, we could still be looking at those extremely elevated prices by a few months from now.

Johnston: Easily. We’re already feeling it. Refined prices are already at demand-destructive levels. It’s just a question of whether they are at sufficiently demand-destructive levels. It’s the same fundamental concern I would’ve had back in April, playing out on a much longer timeline and now more on the product side than the entire oil complex.

Sam Fraser is a writer based in New York City. He holds a Master’s in International Finance and Economic Policy from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, where his studies focused on the changing global trade system. Previously, Sam worked as Senior Communications Associate and Publications Manager at the Quincy Institute.

August 25, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on After 6 months of war, why aren’t oil prices even higher?

Burning America’s Cards One by One: What is Iran’s Strategy?

By Robert Inlakesh – The Palestine Chronicle – August 16, 2026

While the US Trump administration insists that the very much closed Strait of Hormuz is in fact open and grapples with domestic pushback against his war losses, Iran has been busy pursuing a military strategy that is placing a chokehold on their opposition.

Although the ongoing regional war has been experiencing a lull in direct confrontations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the US-Israeli alliance, a series of other fronts have become the focus of Tehran’s recent efforts.

Contrary to what you would be led to believe by the corporate media, Iran’s ballistic missile and drone fire has not ceased. Instead, officials belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have made it clear that there is no ceasefire in effect and that their operations are therefore being carried out in a coordinated fashion.

One of the fronts Iran has chosen to keep open is northern Iraq, where it has consistently launched short-range ballistic missiles and drone waves, targeting headquarters, hideouts, bases and weapons depots belonging to Kurdish-Iranian opposition factions backed by the United States. Powerful blasts are being reported on a near-daily basis in Suleimaniyeh and Erbil, with footage often confirming direct impacts on strategic targets.

US President Donald Trump has been vocal since the first weeks of the war on Iran, which began on February 28 of this year, that he was expecting action from his Kurdish allies that he armed during the riots in Iran a month prior. Leaked reports in the American press suggested that a plan was being drawn up that would see the use of these Kurdish militant groups to invade the Iranian mainland, triggering a process that would – in their minds – lead to the disintegration of the Islamic Republic.

A Kurdish breakaway State project was one major card that the US and Israel – which was revealed to have established bases in Iraqi Kurdistan – were hoping to play against Tehran. The IRGC and Iranian Regular Army have not let that go, choosing to launch persistent strikes and even deploy special forces units to carry out operations on the ground against these groups.

Meanwhile, Iran’s Yemeni allies have mobilized their forces and are committing major offensive operations against their Saudi-backed opposition. They have also imposed an unprecedented equation on Saudi Arabia, where they are now implementing a counter-blockade that places a further chokehold on global oil supplies, while striking Saudi oil facilities in retaliation to violations of Yemeni airspace alone.

The threats of Iraqi factions to intervene in Syria, if the leadership in Damascus follows Trump’s orders to attack Lebanon, combined with reports that Iran will launch strikes on targets belonging to the Syrian regime, also appear to be an effort to prevent this step from taking place.

In the Strait of Hormuz, the IRGC Navy continues to take out tankers with drones and missiles if they choose to attempt to break the blockade with US coordination. When this occurs, US Central Command refrains from even making regular comments, a far cry from its previous threats to bomb Iranian civilian infrastructure in retaliation for every tanker struck.

As this has all been happening, the US is scrambling to replace its USS Abraham Lincoln Aircraft Carrier, after reports emerge that chaos is erupting on board. The vessel has been deployed for over 9 months and is now facing a food shortage that has impacted around 5,000 sailors. The situation is so bad that some reports even indicated that the first fights broke out on the ship, deaths have occurred, and that some service members either attempted or were considering suicide.

Recent reports also indicate that Iran has destroyed at least 45 US MQ-9 Reaper Drones, costing roughly $1.3 billion in total; this is on top of the US military expending most of its long-range precision missiles and depleting 80% of its THAAD interceptor stockpile.

The Israelis are currently refusing to budge when it comes to Lebanon, Gaza and Syria, while escalating their attacks on Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, fronts that could all escalate very quickly and drain more resources.

Iran has demonstrated that it is far from depleting its weapons stockpiles and even Israeli intelligence estimates assess that it has rapidly recovered from the 40-day war period. What has become clear is that the US President has to make a choice sooner or later: either he signs what will effectively be a surrender agreement and pushes back against the Israel Lobby, or he decides to try an all-out war one last time.

August 18, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Burning America’s Cards One by One: What is Iran’s Strategy?

Iran war marks end of US Middle East order: Foreign Affairs

Al Mayadeen | August 18, 2026

A decades-old regional system built around US military supremacy, support for “Israel”, and the containment of Iran has reached a breaking point following Washington and Tel Aviv’s war on Tehran, political scientist Marc Lynch argued in Foreign Affairs.

In an extensive analysis titled “The End of the American Middle East”, Lynch said the war has exposed fundamental weaknesses in the security architecture Washington constructed after the 1991 Gulf War, particularly its ability to protect allies, impose military outcomes, and guarantee access to strategic waterways.

“The American Middle East is finished,” Lynch wrote, arguing that the regional order prevailing since 1991 has become “one of the many casualties of the US-Israeli war with Iran”.

According to Lynch, Washington spent more than three decades attempting to build a regional bloc centered on protecting “Israel” while containing Iran, Iraq, and later Tehran’s regional allies. President Donald Trump’s decision to go to war with Iran, he argued, was not a break with that strategy but its culmination.

Trump’s administration sought to eliminate the Iranian challenge through overwhelming military force, but the campaign failed to remove the government in Tehran or prevent Iran from retaliating throughout the region.

“The American and Israeli failure to dislodge the regime in Tehran has proved the bankruptcy of decades of sanctions and violence,” Lynch wrote.

Gulf security bargain shaken

At the center of Lynch’s argument is the erosion of confidence among Washington’s Gulf partners.

The US military presence in the region has long been justified by Washington’s ability to deter attacks, defend allied governments, secure energy infrastructure, and ensure navigation through strategic waterways, particularly the Strait of Hormuz.

The war with Iran put those guarantees under unprecedented pressure.

Gulf governments opposed the war and were angered that Washington and “Israel” launched military operations while Oman was mediating negotiations with Tehran, Lynch noted. Those states then found themselves exposed to Iranian retaliation despite having little influence over the decision to begin the confrontation.

US missile defenses intercepted part of Iran’s retaliation, but enough strikes penetrated defensive systems to cause significant damage and disrupt Gulf states’ sense of security.

Iran also demonstrated that it could severely restrict maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, threatening a key artery for global energy exports and the economies of Washington’s Gulf allies.

Lynch argued that the experience raised a fundamental question for regional governments: whether hosting US military infrastructure continues to provide security or increasingly exposes them to wars initiated by Washington.

“What the Gulf took away from all this was that American security guarantees, the heart of the regional bargain, were no longer reliable,” he wrote.

Gaza and Iran deliver ‘death blow’

Lynch identified two developments as particularly damaging to Washington’s position: US support for the Israeli war on Gaza and the subsequent war against Iran.

The devastation of Gaza, he argued, eliminated much of the remaining credibility Washington claimed among Arab populations, while the Iran conflict challenged assumptions about overwhelming US military superiority.

“The dual crisis of Israel’s destruction of Gaza and the U.S.-Israeli war in Iran may seem like just another episode in this cycle,” Lynch wrote. “But in truth, these events together have dealt a death blow to the American Middle East.”

Washington’s attempts to build closer cooperation between Arab governments and “Israel” were already under strain because of Gaza, particularly as successive US administrations pursued normalization without resolving the Palestinian issue.

Lynch argued that US policymakers misjudged the continued importance of Palestine to Arab public opinion and underestimated opposition to normalization. At the same time, unconditional US support enabled “Israel” to act with increasing military freedom across the region, including in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran.

According to Lynch, Washington is consequently confronting a contradiction of its own making: a regional order partly designed to guarantee Israeli security has helped produce an increasingly interventionist “Israel” that US governments struggle to restrain.

Iran adapted to decades of pressure

The strategy of isolating Tehran also produced unintended consequences, according to the analysis.

Cut off from Western military technology and subjected to sanctions, Iran invested heavily in comparatively inexpensive drones, ballistic missiles, and asymmetric warfare capabilities capable of imposing substantial costs on technologically superior adversaries.

Tehran also developed relationships with armed movements across the region, allowing it to expand its influence in environments destabilized by US, Israeli, and regional wars.

Although Iran suffered major damage during the latest fighting, Lynch argued that its leadership survived and demonstrated that the country could withstand direct military confrontation with the United States and “Israel”. It also proved capable of striking US partners and challenging Washington’s ability to guarantee uninterrupted passage through Hormuz.

The outcome, Lynch suggested, weakened decades of arguments that a large-scale attack could decisively eliminate the Iranian threat.

Washington’s ‘Suez moment’

Lynch compared the Iran war to the 1956 Suez Crisis, when Britain, France, and “Israel” attacked Egypt in an unsuccessful effort to regain control over the Suez Canal and weaken Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Although Britain and France maintained significant regional influence for years afterward, Suez came to symbolize the irreversible decline of their imperial dominance. The same process could now be underway for Washington, Lynch argued. “The full effects of the US disaster in Iran will similarly take time to materialize”, he wrote.

American forces, military bases, arms sales, and alliances are unlikely to disappear immediately. Gulf governments could even seek additional US weapons or security guarantees in response to growing uncertainty. But Lynch warned that such developments should not be interpreted as a restoration of the previous system.

Instead, regional states are likely to exercise greater independence, pursuing arrangements with Iran while expanding political and economic relations with China and Russia when doing so serves their interests.

Gulf states could seek accommodation with Tehran

Rather than maintaining the anti-Iran coalition envisioned by Washington, Lynch expects regional alignments to become more fluid.

Gulf states seeking to avoid becoming targets in another confrontation could negotiate bilateral understandings with Tehran rather than depend exclusively on US protection.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates could also increasingly compete for regional influence, further complicating Washington’s attempts to maintain a unified bloc.

Before the latest war, Lynch noted, Riyadh had already begun strengthening relations with Egypt, Pakistan, Qatar, and Turkey, while Abu Dhabi maintained close ties with “Israel”. Those rival alignments could become increasingly important as US primacy weakens.

The emerging Middle East, in Lynch’s assessment, would therefore be less centered around a single external hegemon and more defined by shifting coalitions, regional competition, and countries pursuing multiple partnerships simultaneously.

Lynch urges shift from domination to diplomacy

The decline of the old order does not necessarily mean the United States will disappear from the region, Lynch argued, but Washington would have to abandon the assumption that regional stability depends on American domination. He called for a policy based on diplomacy and collective defense rather than regime change, military intervention, and permanent containment.

That would include reducing dependence on large Gulf military bases, concentrating on missile defense and intelligence cooperation, securing freedom of navigation, and eventually incorporating Iran into a broader regional security framework. “The United States must pursue stability in the Middle East through diplomacy and collective defense, not militarized containment”, Lynch wrote.

He also called for Washington to place greater pressure on “Israel” over the occupied Palestinian territories and its military interventions in Lebanon and Syria, while reconsidering unconditional support for authoritarian allies throughout the region.

Ultimately, Lynch argued, the Iran war did not itself create the crisis facing US regional leadership. Rather, it revealed the consequences of weaknesses that had accumulated over decades. “Washington struggles to conceive of a Middle East it does not dominate,” he concluded.

The question now, according to Lynch, is whether US policymakers accept that transformation and seek a different relationship with the region or continue attempting to preserve a system whose foundations have already eroded.

August 18, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Timeless or most popular, Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Comments Off on Iran war marks end of US Middle East order: Foreign Affairs

Why you are being lied to about Yemen and the implications of its liberation

By Robert Inlakesh – Al Mayadeen – August 16, 2026

The Yemeni Armed Forces’ campaign to liberate their nation and end the Saudi-led blockade could be one of the most important events for the Arab world in decades. Not only will it have major implications for the ongoing regional war, but it also has the potential to dramatically reshape the region.

In July, the collapse of the Yemen-Saudi ceasefire agreement, which had been in place since 2022, was triggered by a strategic mistake committed by Riyadh. While Iran sought to break the inhuman blockade on Yemen through landing civilian airliners in the nation’s capital, Saudi Arabia’s air force rushed to bombard Sanaa International Airport. The Saudis may not have known it, but their irrational actions strung them up in a strategically placed trap.

Not only had the Sanaa government been coordinating a general mobilization, but its Armed Forces decided to directly retaliate by striking vital Saudi oil infrastructure and imposing a counter-blockade on their opponents to the north. The Yemeni Armed Forces then decided to take it a step further, committing round-the-clock ballistic missile and drone strikes that inflicted hundreds of casualties on Saudi-proxy forces inside Yemen and even advanced to liberate more of their nation’s territory.

Saudi Arabia is now unable to transit the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and its ability to export oil has been severed, representing a serious economic blow. Riyadh is now facing an unprecedented predicament, as Ansar Allah imposes an equation whereby Saudi violations of Yemeni airspace are met with direct strikes on oil infrastructure.

The reason why this all matters so much is that since 2015, the so-called “International Community” has rallied behind Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies. The global media have also participated in the facade, pretending as if some rebel group that they call “the Houthis” were fighting against an “internationally recognized government.” Why they kept up their lies is simple: without full control over their nation and its resources, the Sanaa government was simply not as valuable a partner as the Arab Gulf States, so everyone played along.

Nobody cared to point out that “the Houthis” is not an accurate name for Ansar Allah, that they aren’t simply a group of “rebels” but run a government that rules over the largest portion of the Yemeni population, or that two-thirds of the nation’s Armed Forces sided with them. Neither will they tell you that the so-called “Yemen Presidential Leadership Council” was created in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Riyadh and that its undemocratically selected leader lives in Saudi Arabia.

In fact, the idea that the Saudi-proxy forces in Yemen are the legitimate representatives of the nation and are somehow a sovereign government is even more outlandish than when most of the Western world randomly decided that Juan Guaidó was the “internationally recognised” President of Venezuela.

But none of this will even end up mattering if Ansar Allah succeeds in uniting Yemen and reaching an agreement to liberate its territory from its US-Israeli-backed aggressors. The reason why the Arab regimes, alongside the US-UK-EU-Israeli alliance, have fought against the government in Sanaa is that they all fear the consequences of their success.

Yemen will be the only Arab nation that will not only oppose US imperialism and support the regional resistance, but will also actively fight the Israelis and work to combat the “Greater Israel Project.” The only Arab government that dared to open fire on the Israelis or impose a blockade on them, in support of Gaza, was the Sanaa government in Yemen. All the others that fought for Gaza were non-state actors.

A strong and united Yemen, with access to its resources and the ability to continue developing its military capabilities, will without a doubt be the biggest threat to US-Israeli hegemony in the Arab World. Yet, it will also spell another equation: it could well serve as an example to populations throughout the region, as to what is possible if the people fight for their liberation. No prospect frightens the Arab regimes more than this.

The impact Yemen can have on global trade, oil markets, regional power equations and ultimately the Palestinian cause for national liberation, all have the Zionist allied powers shaking in their boots. For so long, the Yemeni issue has been ignored, but that could soon dramatically change.

August 16, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Why you are being lied to about Yemen and the implications of its liberation

The Mecca pact and the limits of a ‘Muslim NATO’

Divergent threats, US ties, and economic interests leave the collective-defense pact’s real purpose open to dispute.

By F.M. Shakil | The Cradle | August 13, 2026

The oil-rich Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, nuclear-armed Pakistan, and Turkiye, which commands NATO’s second-largest army, signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement on Friday, 7 August. The accord arrived as fighting again intensified in Yemen. Days later, the Ansarallah-aligned Yemeni armed forces (YAF) launched ballistic missiles at Marib and the Red Sea port of Mokha, the latest escalation against Saudi-backed forces.

Iran noted the turn toward regional security arrangements, saying it showed a growing recognition that security cannot be guaranteed by foreign powers. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said the accord reflected a rapidly changing understanding of security across the region.

Pakistan welcomed the accord and said the Mecca agreement stipulates that an attack on any member will be treated as an attack on all. Islamabad described it as a major step toward stronger strategic relations, regional security, and cooperation in mutual defense.

Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar called the accord a defensive document that does not target any one country. Posting on X on 9 August, Dar said it remained open to any regional state willing to commit to its founding principles.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan went further, insisting that neither Iran nor any other country was the pact’s designated target. In an online discussion, he also expressed hope that Egypt would eventually join.

Veteran Pakistani diplomat Riffat Masood offered a narrower reading. In a discussion with Saudi-American researcher Dr Hamza al-Kanani, Pakistan’s former ambassador to Iran and Norway said the phrase “an attack on one is an attack on all” applies specifically to external threats.

“It does not have any regional implications, which means that this clause would apply whenever any country signing this agreement came under attack from Israel, the US, or any external force,” she claimed.

Masood added that the article does not cover intra-regional rivalries involving Iran or the YAF.

Egypt was conspicuous by its absence from the Mecca signing ceremony, despite taking part in months of foreign minister-level consultations with the grouping.

Cairo’s apparent disenchantment rests on the belief that the military agreement is driven more by political alignment than deployable defense capability. Egypt retains positive bilateral relations with the three signatories, but is wary of joining a Saudi-led bloc that could narrow its room for maneuver across the region.

“I expect more countries will join this alliance in the future. The alliance may expand beyond the military sphere to encompass economic and strategic dimensions in the future,” Sajjad Azhar, an Islamabad-based analyst, tells The Cradle.

Riyadh looks beyond Washington

Saudi Arabia’s security partnership with Washington dates to the closing years of World War II, when oil and strategic access became bound up with US protection. But Washington’s shift toward competition with China, coupled with its uneven responses to attacks on Persian Gulf partners, has pushed Riyadh to look for additional options.

The September 2019 attack on Abqaiq and Khurais, claimed by the YAF, temporarily knocked out around half of Saudi oil production. Washington did not retaliate militarily, despite US and Saudi accusations that Iran was responsible. For Riyadh, the episode exposed the limits of the US security umbrella.

The Hamas-led Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October 2023, and the regional war that followed added to Saudi concerns. Those concerns deepened after Israel’s September 2025 attack on Doha, which targeted Hamas negotiators in the capital of a US-allied Gulf state. Eight days later, Riyadh signed a bilateral defense pact with Pakistan.

The US-Israeli war on Iran launched on 28 February 2026 further exposed Arab states to retaliation without providing them with any clear say over Washington’s war aims. According to Azhar, the conflict reinforced the sense that reliance on a single external guarantor had become increasingly dangerous:

“The attacks launched by Tehran and its allies, including the Houthis [YAF] and Iraqi Shia armed organizations [PMU], against Saudi Arabia changed the situation. In this perspective, an end to recurring Iranian threats seems to have been the main strategic purpose behind the new alliance.”

Collective defense, undefined obligations

At the signing ceremony, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan displayed copies of the Mecca agreement, but its full provisions have not been made public. Beyond the collective-defense formula contained in the joint statement, analysts still lack details on command structures, activation procedures, force commitments, and the geographical reach of the pact.

Dr Muqtedar Khan, a US-based analyst and professor at the University of Delaware, tells The Cradle that the pact rests on two pillars: a collective-defense commitment and joint deterrence and defense cooperation. The first treats an armed attack against one of the three states as an attack against all three.

“This sets up a mutual-defense duty that is similar to NATO’s Article 5, but the details about how quickly and strongly they will respond are mostly unclear,” he says. The second pillar, he adds, resembles the bilateral Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan last year.

Khan says the Mecca accord marks an important step in the region’s security evolution, showing how middle powers are seeking greater autonomy and a wider range of partnerships instead of relying almost entirely on the US:

“While it is premature to label it a fully fledged ‘Muslim NATO,’ the pact creates a new framework for collective deterrence and defense cooperation among three of the most consequential Sunni-majority states.”

Its durability and effectiveness, he says, will ultimately depend on how the parties define an “attack,” what each is prepared to do when the commitment is tested, and whether other countries join.

“For now, it functions as both a political signal of reduced dependence on external patrons and a practical platform for deeper military collaboration,” Khan says.

A pact made with Washington’s blessing? 

Washington’s public response to the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement has been notably restrained.

For some observers, the pact signals that US partners want to diversify their security arrangements after a succession of regional crises exposed the limits of depending on one external guarantor.

Others argue that, if the agreement produces stronger missile defense, maritime patrols, and a wider sharing of regional security burdens, it could advance Washington’s stated goals rather than threaten them.

The pact may therefore loosen exclusive dependence on the US without displacing the vast American military architecture already embedded in the region.

Retired Pakistani diplomat Abdul Basit, who served as high commissioner to India and as Foreign Office spokesperson, argued in a television interview that the trilateral agreement had Washington’s backing.

“Without US consent, these three regional actors could not succeed in creating a trilateral defense mechanism that challenges the US’s hegemonic security apparatus in the region,” he argued.

Other analysts likewise see an implicit US role in the creation of a large regional force whose likely purpose is not confrontation with Israel but containment of Iranian influence.

Imtiaz Gul, executive director of the Islamabad-based Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), tells The Cradle that Washington’s lack of opposition suggests the coalition was formed with at least tacit US approval and a clear assurance that it would not be directed against Israel:

“This alliance doesn’t significantly deter Iran from attacking US bases in Saudi Arabia. Iran is not attacking these countries but only hitting the US bases wherever they exist. As long as these bases remain there, Iran will continue targeting them in one way or another.”

Three states, three threat maps

The pact is also burdened by conflicting threat perceptions. Pakistan and Turkiye are unlikely to enter a direct clash with Israel while maintaining close strategic ties with Washington. This has fed suspicions that the bloc was established with US backing precisely because it does not challenge the regional red lines enforced by Washington.

Gul says the alliance is no uncomplicated marriage. Its central ambiguity remains unresolved: is it primarily a political declaration, or does it impose binding military obligations on its members?

“The three countries have different threat assessments and priorities. Pakistan’s focus is mostly on India and Afghanistan, but Turkiye or Saudi Arabia will not build deterrence for Israel or India due to their strategic and commercial interests. For Saudi Arabia, the emphasis is on maintaining stability in the Gulf area and promoting economic diversification. Turkiye is seeking to sell its military hardware, even though it has obligations as a NATO member.”

Pakistan and Turkiye also stand to gain financially from the pact as both manage strained economies. Turkiye has found a lucrative regional market for drones and aircraft, while Pakistan secures badly needed Saudi financing.

In August 2023, Saudi Arabia signed a record $3 billion deal with the Turkish defense firm Baykar to procure Bayraktar Akinci unmanned combat aerial vehicles (drones).

Saudi Arabia also committed a fresh $3 billion support package to Pakistan. The funding came in addition to $5 billion in Saudi deposits previously placed with Pakistan and extended through 2028. The new support helped Islamabad repay roughly $3.5 billion owed to the UAE later that month.

“The public relations advantages for Pakistan are evident, but only time will reveal whether the alliance will yield any financial benefits that trickle down to the poor masses,” Gul remarks.

For now, the Mecca pact’s signatories have announced collective defense without revealing who would command it, which threats would activate it, or what each capital would actually risk for the others.

Until those questions are answered, the Mecca pact remains more a declaration of intent than a functioning military alliance.

August 13, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism | , , , , , , | Comments Off on The Mecca pact and the limits of a ‘Muslim NATO’

Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani military alliance shaped by fear of Israel, not Iran: Analyst

Press TV – August 9, 2026

Underlying regional calculations behind the new military alliance between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan have been shaped by fear of Israel, not Iran, says an analyst.

Speaking to the Press TV website, Anusar Farooqui, a US-based writer and commentator who is also the founder and CEO of Systematic Portfolios LLC, said the newly signed “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement” is aimed at the Israeli regime.

“The alliance politics of the Sunni Arab powers is driven by fear of Israel, not Iran,” he said.

“The Saudis and especially the Turks are very fearful of Israeli plans,” he added, noting that Israeli discussions about confronting Turkey, including talk of a possible surprise attack intended to cripple the Turkish air force, had contributed to Ankara’s concerns.

The agreement was signed on Friday in Mecca by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.

The three countries said an armed attack against any one of them would be regarded as an attack against all, while describing the pact as a means of strengthening collective deterrence and regional stability.

The agreement did not specify the practical obligations of its members. A Turkish official said it was not directed against any particular actor, remained open to other regional countries and did not replace existing bilateral or multilateral arrangements.

Farooqui said the absence of Egypt from the initial agreement was particularly significant.

“The important thing about the announcement is the conspicuous absence of Egypt,” he told the Press TV website, adding that the possibility of a Turkish-Egyptian military pact was central to understanding the regional balance.

“The Egyptian question is paramount: why has it taken a pass,” the analyst asked.

He added that such a pact would represent a much stronger counterweight to Israel and said the United States understood the implications.

“So it seems to have intervened to prevent the nightmare from happening,” he said.

Egypt’s position, however, has not been presented as permanently outside the arrangement. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said Saturday Egypt could eventually join the pact after several technical issues were resolved.

He described Egypt as Ankara’s “natural partner” and said other countries had also expressed interest in joining, although the founding members were still discussing how expansion should be handled.

The new military alliance comes amid US-Israeli destabilizing actions in the region. Since October 2023, Israel has waged a genocidal war on Gaza, invaded southern Lebanon and occupied territory in Syria, while also launching two wars of aggression with the United States against Iran that triggered massive retaliatory strikes against US and Israeli assets in the region.

Meanwhile, the regime’s bellicose agenda has raised concerns about the so-called “Greater Israel” scheme that regards Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories as well as parts of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon as part of the Zionist entity.

Israeli regime prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in October 2025 that he feels a deep connection to “this vision”, describing it as “a historical and spiritual mission.”

On the other hand, some analysts have linked the growing Turkish-Israeli rivalry to a broader contest over regional influence. Turkey and Israel have maintained diplomatic relations since 1949 and their strategic and commercial ties have survived tense rhetoric.

Yet tensions seem to have intensified recently over Gaza, Syria, energy routes, maritime issues and Ankara’s expanding regional role.

Pakistan’s position has added another dimension to the emerging security alignment.

Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said on Saturday, following the signing of the agreement, that Israel was “a threat to the entire Muslim world” and called for “a united military front” against it, while noting that the regime poses a direct threat to countries across the region.

The broader security environment has also been affected by changes in the US military posture. Washington has reportedly withdrawn warplanes and other military equipment from countries including Qatar and the United Arab Emirates following Iranian retaliatory strikes.

Asked whether the new alliance could eventually contribute to a region without US military presence and with Israel more contained, Farooqui said the current arrangement is insufficient.

“Not without Egypt,” he told the Press TV website. “The Saudi-Turkish-Pakistan pact is mostly for show. By itself, it is not an effective balancing coalition against Israel.”

August 9, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism | , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani military alliance shaped by fear of Israel, not Iran: Analyst

Saudi Arabia, Turkey & Pakistan Sign Defence Pact

Mario Nawfal & Glenn Diesen | August 7, 2026

August 8, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Video, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Saudi Arabia, Turkey & Pakistan Sign Defence Pact

Turkiye, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia Sign Memorandum on Collective Defense – Statement

Sputnik – 07.08.2026

Turkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum on collective defense on Friday, according to a joint statement from the countries seen by Sputnik.

According to the Turkiye newspaper, the joint defense agreement provides for cooperation in the field of intelligence sharing and regional security coordination. Turkiye’s accession to the system of strategic defense cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, an agreement on which was signed in 2025, may become an important stage in changing the balance of power in the Middle East.

“Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Shahbaz Sharif and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed an agreement in Mecca on collective defense, showing the countries’ shared commitment to further enhance collective security,” the joint statement said.

The purpose of the agreement is to strengthen collective deterrence of any act of aggression, the statement read.

According to the document, an attack on any of the three countries would be considered as an attack on all of them. It also implies strengthening all aspects of defense cooperation between the three countries, the statement said.

August 7, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , | Comments Off on Turkiye, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia Sign Memorandum on Collective Defense – Statement

Seyed M. Marandi: Morocco Invades Spain?

Glenn Diesen | August 1, 2026

Prof. Seyed Mohammad Marandi is a former advisor to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. Prof. Marandi discusses the 60,000 Moroccans storming into Spain and the possible encouragement from the US and Israel to reward Morocco and punish Spain.

August 1, 2026 Posted by | Video, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Seyed M. Marandi: Morocco Invades Spain?

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