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No route around Hormuz: Why West Asia’s pipeline alternatives fall short

The rush to bypass Hormuz leads back to the same problem: Every alternative route remains hostage to war, rival chokepoints, or political disputes.

By Hussein Askary | The Cradle | July 23, 2026

“The only alternative to the Strait of Hormuz is the Strait of Hormuz.”

This blunt assessment, offered by an Iraqi expert in a recent interview, captures the central weakness in the rush to revive old pipeline schemes and promote new ones across West Asia. Since Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz after Israel and the US launched their second war against it in February 2026, the region has been flooded with proposals for alternative oil-export routes.

Washington has encouraged these plans, while several governments have presented dormant or unfinished pipelines as strategic solutions. Yet the closer one looks at geography, markets, costs, capacity, and security, the clearer it becomes that most of these projects cannot substitute for Hormuz.

Even if oil bypasses the strait, it still faces the rival chokepoint of Bab al-Mandab, where the Ansarallah-aligned armed forces have declared a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia and attacked Saudi tankers.

These expensive detours will remain exposed unless security in the Persian Gulf itself improves. Until the war on Iran ends and an inclusive regional security architecture is established, Iranian and Yemeni missiles and drones can reach the pipelines and loading terminals built to evade them.

Asia still runs through Hormuz

The first reason is straightforward. The Strait of Hormuz is the natural outlet of the Gulf energy system. In 2024, oil flows through the strait averaged about 20 million barrels per day (bpd), roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. The International Energy Agency (IEA) describes it as one of the world’s most important oil transit chokepoints.

Most of this oil is not heading west. About 80 percent of the oil moving through Hormuz is destined for Asia, with China, India, Japan, South Korea, and other Asian economies as the principal buyers. The pattern is even clearer for liquefied natural gas (LNG).

The US Energy Information Administration estimated that 83 percent of LNG moving through Hormuz in 2024 went from Persian Gulf exporters to Asian markets, especially China, India, and South Korea.

This market reality matters because many proposed alternatives send oil away from its main customers. Pipelines to the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, or the Levant may appear useful on a map, but they often move Gulf crude farther from Asia rather than closer to it.

Commercially, building multibillion-dollar infrastructure to move oil westward, only to redirect it by sea toward Asian markets, is inefficient. If Hormuz is open, the direct route remains cheaper and faster. If it is closed by war, the underlying problem is not a lack of pipelines but the collapse of regional security.

Old routes, unresolved disputes

The older pipeline options illustrate the point. The Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline once carried Iraqi oil across Syria to the Mediterranean. Built in the early 1950s, it had genuine strategic value in its time but has been largely inactive since it was damaged during the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Washington is now backing efforts to revive the route, with US companies expected to play a role. Yet the project still requires extensive reconstruction and years of work before it can provide meaningful export capacity.

Estimates for a full restoration and expansion to around 700,000 bpd run as high as $8 billion. It cannot answer an immediate crisis in Hormuz, and if regional peace is restored before completion, the commercial case for reviving it weakens sharply.

The Iraq–Turkiye pipeline faces a different but equally serious problem: politics. The route through the Kurdistan region to Turkiye’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan was repeatedly interrupted by disputes among Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Ankara, and international oil companies.

A 2023 arbitration ruling against Turkiye over unauthorized Kurdish exports led to a two-and-a-half-year shutdown. Flows resumed in September 2025, and exports have continued, but the route still depends on fragile agreements over contracts, payments, federal authority, and revenue sharing.

Its limited throughput and political vulnerability prevent it from becoming a structural replacement for a maritime passage that normally carries a vast share of the world’s seaborne oil.

The Iraqi pipeline in Saudi Arabia, known as IPSA, is another example of strategic nostalgia. Built in the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq war, it was designed to move Iraqi crude from the Basra region to the Red Sea.

It stopped operating after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia expropriated it in 2001. Reopening the line would therefore require a Saudi–Iraqi political settlement over ownership and control, as well as a major technical assessment after decades of disuse. In other words, IPSA is not an available alternative; it is a diplomatic and engineering problem dressed up as a solution.

The proposed Basra–Aqaba pipeline is even more controversial. Its advertised purpose is to move Iraqi oil from southern Iraq to Jordan’s Red Sea port of Aqaba, bypassing Hormuz. Yet it has faced intense objections inside Iraq because of its projected cost, uncertain financing, and questionable strategic value.

Since much of Iraq’s crude is sold to Asian customers, sending it westward to Aqaba would add distance and complexity rather than solve the basic market problem. The pipeline would also move Iraqi exports closer to another zone of instability, including the Israeli military sphere and the wider Red Sea security environment.

A bypass route that merely exchanges one security risk for another is no solution. Iraq’s severe fiscal pressures also leave Baghdad poorly placed to finance such an expensive project, while international investors are unlikely to embrace it without strong political and security guarantees.

Bypasses within missile range

The existing Saudi and Emirati bypasses are more credible but still limited. Saudi Arabia’s East–West Pipeline, or Petroline, moves crude from the eastern oil region to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline carries oil from Habshan to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman.

These systems reduce exposure to Hormuz for Saudi Arabia and the UAE and have become important national energy-security assets. But they cannot replace the strait for the region as a whole. They offer little to Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Iran, or most Iraqi exports, and they do not solve the LNG problem, especially Qatar’s dependence on Hormuz.

The IEA estimates that only 3.5 to 5.5 million bpd of spare pipeline capacity is available to bypass the strait. Neither Yanbu nor Fujairah are immune from attack; regional conflict has already shown the vulnerability of ports, tankers, and energy infrastructure.

The crisis pipelines cannot solve

This is why the alternative pipeline debate is misleading. It treats the closure of Hormuz as a logistical puzzle when it is primarily a political and security crisis. If the Persian Gulf remains militarized and unstable, no pipeline network can fully protect exports.

Pipelines cross vulnerable territory, depend on political agreements, and terminate at ports that can also be threatened. If Gulf security improves, however, Hormuz will almost certainly reopen because this serves the interests of producers and Asian consumers alike.

Once that happens, the commercial rationale for many alternative pipelines will fade. Why spend tens of billions of dollars duplicating a natural route with unmatched capacity and direct access to the main buyers?

The more honest conclusion is that alternative pipelines may offer limited resilience for individual states, but they are no strategic replacement for Hormuz. They are costly, slow, politically fragile, geographically inefficient, and in some cases obsolete before construction begins.

The answer to the crisis is a security arrangement that keeps the Persian Gulf open, prevents attacks on shipping, and restores normal trade through the strait.

Under such an arrangement, oil and LNG would continue to flow mainly to Asia by the most direct and economical route. Hormuz will remain indispensable, while the grand pipeline alternatives amount to expensive insurance policies against a crisis that only diplomacy and regional peace can resolve.

July 24, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , , , | Comments Off on No route around Hormuz: Why West Asia’s pipeline alternatives fall short

US-Saudi nuclear pantomime is with eye on Iran

By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | July 24, 2026

The excitement over the US-Saudi nuclear deal has proved to be short-lived. Apparently, the US President Donald Trump himself poured cold water into it by adding a caveat on Thursday that in order for the deal to be advanced, Saudi Arabia must first join the Abraham Accords. That is, as things stand, may seem like asking for the moon.

However, it’s all but certain that Trump allowed the Saudi deal to be signed after consulting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as a last throw of dice to pin down Saudi Arabia as a participant / collaborator alongside Israel (and the UAE) for an all-out war against Iran that  might at some point entail ground operations, which is not possible without first getting Riyadh on his side firmly, irrevocably.

If Saudi Arabia dissociates from Tump’s upcoming war and disallows the US to use the Saudi bases or work out the logistics accordingly, Pentagon generals will be hard-pressed to conduct the war. In political terms too, the Saudi stance will influence other regional oligarchies in the Persian Gulf in their own attitudes towards Iran, which is astride the Arab street like a colossus. The timing of the July 15 meeting of Trump with the visit of the pro-American prime minister of Iraq Ali al-Zaidi also needs to be factored in here. Simply put, Iraq has become a frontline in the US-Iran conflict.

Saudis won’t like the prospect of Iran emerging as a towering regional power. On its part, Iran is also closely watching the Saudi mood swings stemming out of its compulsions not to annoy Trump who is in a position to to play a helpful role in the event of the succession issue coming to the fore in Riyadh at any time. Of course, this is apart from the profound petrodollar linkages critical to both protagonists.

Meanwhile, the recent Pakistani advisory to Tehran to steer clear of targeting Saudi Arabia, the Houthi threat to Saudi Arabia and the potential closure of Strait of Bab el-Mandeb are tell-tale signs of latent tensions between Tehran and Riyadh, although both sides are maintaining a semblance of normalcy.

Most certainly, Trump’s remark on Thursday making the nuclear deal conditional on the Saudis normalising relations with Israel has thrown the deal as such into question barely 24 hours after it was signed. Is it a U-turn or is the episode just another confusing rollout that has become the trademark of Trump’s presidency? The truth could be somewhere in between.

According to an AP report, the White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters in a briefing yesterday that Trump has said if the Saudis don’t join the Abraham Accords, “the deal is off.” When asked why the condition wasn’t mentioned Wednesday when the Energy Department announced that the deal was signed, Leavitt said it was because Trump “is always the final dealmaker.”

My own reading is that Trump is backtracking according to a script. He could have taken credit for the condition on Abraham Accords, had it been a part of the deal. But it is within his ingenuity to try to increase his leverage with the Saudis by adding the caveat openly: that might even improve the deal in certain respects such as enrichment or verification clauses, for instance.

The Saudis appear to have been taken by surprise on Wednesday when US Energy Secretary Chris Wright signed the decades-long, multibillion-dollar deal with his Saudi counterpart, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Energy but that doesn’t have to be taken at face value. The deal reportedly includes a “123 Agreement” and an accompanying “bilateral safeguards agreement,” and the two agreed to a two-year study to see whether enrichment is necessary. This seems like kicking the can down the road. Interestingly, Netanyahu’s office said Saudis joining of the Abraham Accords “would be an historic leap forward for peace in the Middle East.”

On the whole, Trump has a deal here. The caveat of Abraham Accords may serve to delay the agreement from coming to fruition unless and until the Saudis jettison their bottomline [a Palestinian state] linking normalisation with Israel. On the other hand, Trump has the leverage insofar as the Saudis now have to address whether they want to normalise relations with Israel.

Indeed, the Saudis too are getting an optimal deal here, which doesn’t expressly block reprocessing and enrichment and doesn’t allow for the International Atomic Energy Agency to do its inspections. The Saudis have apparently got away with not having a customary additional protocol, which would have ensured there is no cheating, and it will stay a peaceful programme. On Truth Social, Trump maintained on Thursday that “there will be no enrichment of material,” but added that the US is “not opposed to Civil (Non-Enriched) Nuclear Facilities.” Conceivably, the US may have control of a Saudi enrichment facility and keep a military / security presence.

The Congress will be able to review the deal in a 90-day window. Lawmakers do not need to approve it, but they could oppose it, although that is unlikely. (See a Congressional Research Report Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation, March 11, 2026) All in all, the chances are of the agreement “staying in place and nothing substantive happening until Saudis agree to something” regarding Israel, as [per] Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, an influential pro-Trump DC-based think tank.

The most bizarre coincidence of the entire sequence of developments since Wednesday is the shadow this deal could potentially cast on the US-Iran agreement that is on the horizon. But that is only hypothetical. If Trump intends to launch an all-out war with Iran, there will be no more negotiations to be had on a nuclear deal.

Saudis, being stakeholders, may no longer resist Trump’s entreaties to collaborate with the war effort going forward, whose objective would be to destroy Iran comprehensively with all the military might at Washington’s command. The Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has said in the past that if Iran obtained a nuclear weapon, the kingdom would have to follow suit.

In such a scenario, there will be no conceivable reason for Israel at the present juncture to try to kill the US-Saudi deal that is struggling to be born.   

July 24, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Comments Off on US-Saudi nuclear pantomime is with eye on Iran

Pakistan thought it won the peace. Now, it could be dragged into war.

By Elfadil Ibrahim | Responsible Statecraft | July 22, 2026

Four weeks ago, Pakistan looked like one of the biggest winners of the U.S.-Iran war.

Its army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, shuttled between Washington, Tehran and Gulf capitals for months. As part of his efforts, Pakistan hosted the first face-to-face U.S.-Iran talks in years and helped broker the Islamabad memorandum of understanding that Vice President JD Vance signed in June, thanking Munir and calling him one of the “very, very important people” in his life.

Islamabad hired a Washington lobbying firm to convert that goodwill into defense cooperation and minerals investment, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif spoke of a “sun of progress and prosperity” for Pakistan’s chronically stressed economy after the MoU between the U.S.and Iran brought an end to major military operations.

Pakistan’s fortunes have since reversed. Fighting between Washington and Tehran has resumed, and Islamabad’s dual goals of being Iran’s trusted interlocutor and the Arab Gulf states’ security guarantor are once again at odds.

President Donald Trump declared the deal was “over” in early July, after which the U.S. struck civilian and military targets in Iran. Iran, for its part, declared on July 18 through its deputy foreign minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, that it was “suspending all obligations” under the framework. The war has since widened into exactly the kind of multi-front regional conflict Pakistan spent the spring trying to prevent.

The clearest new exposure for Pakistan is in Saudi Arabia, where Iran struck Prince Sultan Air Base at al-Kharj — its first direct hit on Saudi territory since March — just days after the Houthis, Iran’s Yemeni ally, fired missiles on the kingdom, hitting Abha airport in the country’s south. That escalation occurred after Saudi-allied forces hit Sanaa airport in Yemen to prevent the landing of an Iranian airliner; the U.S. Treasury alleged without providing evidence that the plane is linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp. The strikes effectively enforced Riyadh’s airspace veto over the Houthi-controlled capital.

Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact with Riyadh last year. It deployed fighter jets and thousands of troops to the kingdom after earlier Iranian strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure. More recently, Islamabad has reportedly communicated to Tehran directly that attacks on Saudi Arabia will be treated as attacks on Pakistan itself. Sharif’s own statement in the aftermath called the Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia a violation of the kingdom’s sovereignty that Pakistan “strongly condemns,” pledging “unwavering support” for Riyadh’s security.

The tone is notable given that Pakistan’s parliament explicitly refused to get entangled in Yemen over a decade ago. In April 2015, faced with a nearly identical Saudi request to join the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis, Pakistan’s National Assembly voted unanimously to “maintain neutrality.” Islamabad’s calculus has not changed. If anything, recent events have sharpened Pakistan’s desire to broker a lasting peace.

Pakistan is home to the world’s second-largest Shia population after Iran, and the killing of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, in February set off deadly unrest in Karachi and Islamabad; Munir himself had to intervene to calm a wave of processions and pledges of allegiance to the new supreme leader across Shia neighborhoods.

Significantly, Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif attended Khamenei’s funeral in July, and Sharif posted after that “the late Supreme Leader’s wisdom, leadership and profound influence on Iran and the wider region will be remembered for generations” — a demonstration of the fine line Pakistan’s leadership has to walk, one no doubt delivered with a domestic audience in mind as much as an Iranian one.

That fine line becomes impossible to walk when a defense pact, triggered by Saudi-Houthi fighting or by further Iranian strikes on Saudi Arabia, would ask Pakistan to do the exact thing its parliament explicitly refused a decade ago: take a military side against a Houthi-Iran axis, and do so at a moment when its domestic Shia politics is highly combustible

Kuwait is now reportedly asking for the same kind of commitment that Saudi Arabia already has. Reuters reported last week that Islamabad is in early-stage talks with Kuwait — which has absorbed repeated Iranian strikes on its infrastructure in recent days — over an expanded defense agreement that would include “thousands of Pakistani troops on the ground, fighter jets, drones, an air defence system, and other defence-related facilities,” according to an anonymous Pakistani government official cited in the report.

Another anonymous Pakistani security official said the country “cannot consider a deployment of combat troops at this stage.” That hesitation suggests that stacking multiple defense commitments across Gulf states in Iran’s crosshairs makes Islamabad’s balancing act much harder to sustain. Each new pact narrows the room to claim neutrality the next time Tehran calls.

During this war, Pakistan discovered what happens when Gulf partners doubt its ability to balance between Tehran and the Arab Gulf states. The United Arab Emirates recalled a $3.5 billion loan in April and quietly began deporting Pakistani Shia workers by the thousands. The move was widely read as retaliation for Islamabad’s perceived tilt toward Tehran during the mediation. Saudi Arabia stepped in with $3 billion to cover the gap, but the lesson was clear: Pakistan’s neutrality satisfies no one fully, and the cost of disappointing any single Gulf patron is measured in the billions of dollars.

Economic self-preservation has been Pakistan’s primary motive for steering mediation and ending a war that has hobbled the economies of its creditors and choked the trade routes that power its own electric grid. Pakistan is on its 25th International Monetary Fund program; more than half of its tax revenue is put towards servicing its debts. It had barely stabilized its inflation before the Strait of Hormuz’s closure sent rates back into double digits.

In March, as the war’s first phase disrupted energy flows out of Hormuz, Islamabad ordered a two-week school closure and imposed a four-day work week to conserve fuel — measures the government has now indicated it may need to revive.

A parallel disruption to the Red Sea, like the blockade of Saudi Arabia declared by the Houthis Monday, would be highly disruptive to Pakistan’s energy security, and by extension, its economy. While Pakistan imports the overwhelming majority of its fuel from the Gulf, the closing of another critical chokepoint would simultaneously tighten global tanker capacity and insurance costs everywhere, pushing the same spot-market prices Pakistan is already struggling to afford even higher.

It would also add further pressure on Pakistan’s defense commitments to Saudi Arabia, given that Riyadh will not tolerate such a closure. In a recent statement, Riyadh pledged to deal with “Houthi threats against transiting vessels… firmly and swiftly.” The stakes for Saudi Arabia are high: Since the Strait of Hormuz was blocked, Saudi Arabia has relied on its East-West pipeline to divert roughly 5 million barrels per day of crude to the Red Sea Port of Yanbu — its only viable export outlet while Hormuz is all but closed.

None of this means Pakistan’s mediation was a mistake, or that its diplomatic capital has evaporated. Kuwait’s foreign minister still thanked Pakistan last week for its “constructive and mediatory role,” and Islamabad remains one of the few channels through which Washington and Tehran would resume talks, when the time comes. But the specific bet Pakistan made — that ending the war would allow it to bank the goodwill through commerce and financial aid — has not yet paid off.

Instead, the restart of the war has brought Saudi Arabia back into Iran’s crosshairs. At the same time, the Saudi-Houthi front has reopened, the Strait of Hormuz has been closed again, and a blockade of Saudi-linked ships on the Red Sea has been formally declared.

Each of these factors adds immense pressure on Pakistan, which now has every reason to double down on diplomacy, lest it be drawn in as a combatant.

Elfadil Ibrahim is a writer and analyst covering the politics of the Middle East and Africa, with a special focus on Sudan. His work has been featured in The Guardian, Al Jazeera, The New Arab, Open Democracy and other outlets.

July 22, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , , | Comments Off on Pakistan thought it won the peace. Now, it could be dragged into war.

Yemeni naval blockade forces six vessels to turn back

Press TV – July 21, 2026

Six ships have turned back in the past 24 hours after Yemen’s armed forces imposed a maritime ban on Saudi vessels, a military source confirmed to the Yemeni News Agency (Saba), as the “blockade for blockade” strategy against Riyadh takes effect.

The move came after Yemen’s Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center sent a warning to shipping companies, stating that vessels are banned from loading or discharging cargo at any Saudi ports and that violators “may be subject to targeting in any location within the operational reach of the Yemeni Armed Forces.”

Shipping data from LSEG confirmed that at least two oil tankers carrying Saudi crude to China and India have been forced to make U-turns in the Red Sea.

The Xin Long Yang, a Very Large Crude Carrier carrying 2 million barrels of Saudi crude loaded at Yanbu, reversed course and headed toward the Suez Canal rather than risk transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

The smaller tanker Rodos, carrying about 700,000 barrels of Saudi crude for India, also made a U-turn for Suez.

With the Strait of Hormuz transit blocked amid the illegal US’s war on Iran, Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu has become the main alternative route for West Asian oil, allowing exports of millions of barrels per day.

The Yemeni armed forces announced the naval blockade on Saudi Arabia on July 20, in response to the kingdom’s 12-year siege and aggression against Yemen.

“Vessels calling at Saudi Arabian ports are advised to reconsider transiting the Red Sea and to consider implementing enhanced mitigation measures,” British maritime security company Ambrey said, adding that it assessed vessels calling at Saudi ports “were at high risk.”

War risk insurance costs have already ticked higher in the past 24 hours, with risk assessments for Saudi ports being re-evaluated, insurance industry sources said.

In recent months, an average of 10 crude tankers have sailed through the Bab el-Mandeb daily.

The Yemeni blockade comes after more than a decade of Saudi-led aggression against Yemen.

Since March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition has imposed an air, land, and sea blockade on Yemen, strangling the country’s access to food, fuel, and medicine.

The coalition has conducted over a quarter of a million airstrikes across Yemen, causing widespread devastation and killing tens of thousands of civilians.

The United States has provided critical support throughout the war, including intelligence sharing, logistical assistance, target identification, in-flight refueling of coalition warplanes, and arms sales, making Washington a direct partner in the coalition’s actions.

The war has devastated Yemeni society. By 2026, millions faced acute food insecurity, with aid deliveries severely restricted and the healthcare system in collapse.

Despite the immense suffering, the coalition has maintained its chokehold, closing border crossings, grounding humanitarian flights, and ordering ships away from Yemeni ports.

July 21, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , | Comments Off on Yemeni naval blockade forces six vessels to turn back

Houthi Blockade Against Saudi Arabia Creates Geopolitical, Economic Dilemma for Pakistan

Sputnik – 21.07.2026

Any threat to the Kingdom’s stability is a threat to Pakistan’s strategic and economic interests, experts stress.

Pakistan is grappling with the potential fallout from a Houthi threat to blockade Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast, a development that could activate one of the region’s most consequential defense agreements.

“For Pakistan, the implications are direct and serious,” Abdullah Khan, director of the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, tells Sputnik.

The reason is a binding defense pact signed in September 2025. Under its terms, an attack on Saudi Arabia is treated as an attack on Pakistan and vice versa.

“Pakistan’s interest lies in preventing further escalation through restraint and diplomacy while remaining fully committed to Saudi Arabia’s security under the mutual defense framework. Any threat to the Kingdom’s stability is a threat to Pakistan’s strategic and economic interests,” Khan stresses.

The Houthi threat is no bluff, according to Khan. They possess ballistic missiles, long-range drones, and explosive-laden unmanned boats. They have already hit Saudi oil facilities and struck commercial ships in the Red Sea. Their capabilities allow them to choke energy exports, spike insurance costs, and force billions in defensive spending – a reality that extends far beyond Yemen’s borders.

The economic consequences for Pakistan could be severe also, Ali Ehsan, an economic policy analyst, warns. With Bab el-Mandeb now under threat, Pakistan loses its alternative route for Saudi oil shipments. That means higher petrol and electricity prices, disrupted textile exports to Europe, and mounting pressure on an already fragile economy.

“Pakistan’s trade with Europe, which is an export market, will get highly affected by this situation and Pakistan’s economy will come under more pressure,” Ehsan says.

July 21, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , | Comments Off on Houthi Blockade Against Saudi Arabia Creates Geopolitical, Economic Dilemma for Pakistan

Yemen imposes naval blockade against Saudi Arabia in tit-for-tat move

Press TV – July 20, 2026

Yemen has declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia, with the country’s military spokesman stressing that it will come into effect immediately.

In a statement on Monday, Yemeni armed forces spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Saree announced “a maritime embargo against the criminal Saudi enemy, based on the equation of ‘siege for siege,’” adding that “it will come into force from the moment this statement is issued.”

According to the statement, the blockade was imposed in response to Saudi Arabia’s continued “unjust and oppressive siege on our dear people for nearly 12 years, plundering our resources and imposing a comprehensive blockade on [the country’s] ports and airports by land, sea, and air” as well as the recent attacks on the Sana’a International Airport.

The spokesman affirmed the Yemeni armed forces’ “complete readiness for all options,” warning that “any foolish act” by Riyadh will be met with a “harsh” response.

The statement hailed the steadfastness of the Yemeni nation and its participation in million-strong demonstrations in support of the Sana’a government, saying “we assure them that we will spare no effort in restoring their plundered rights and ending the unjust siege against them, regardless of the results and repercussions.”

Tensions flared earlier this month when Saudi Arabia tried to prevent the return of an Iranian plane carrying a delegation of Yemeni officials, who had traveled to Tehran for the funeral of Iran’s martyred Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei. The plane was diverted after the Sana’a airport was bombed and landed safely in the city of Hudaydah.

Yemen prepared to enter all-out war: Official

Meanwhile, Hizam al-Assad, a senior member of Ansarullah’s political bureau, warned that Yemen is prepared to escalate to all-out war if the 11-year siege of Yemen is not lifted.

He said it is unacceptable for Riyadh to continue exporting oil and purchasing weapons to bomb and blockade Yemen while the Yemeni people remain silent.

“We are today facing a difficult dilemma: either we die of starvation, or we reclaim our right by resorting to force,” al-Assad said in remarks cited by Al-Mayadeen.

Al-Assad warned that Yemen’s armed forces are ready to target Saudi oil facilities, refineries, and export ports with missiles and drones if the blockade continues.

He said that Saudi Arabia bears responsibility for the environmental consequences of burning oil wells, pipelines, and petrochemical plants.

On Sunday, Abdullah al-Nu’ami, another member of Ansarullah’s political bureau, said Saudi Arabia is full of “valuable targets” within reach of Yemen’s armed forces. He added that the region is on the brink of explosion and Saudi Arabia is aware of that fact.

Ansarullah official says aggression against Iran and the blockade on Yemen is pushing the region toward a major blast.

The official said Ansarullah is studying its options and is prepared to pay the highest price to lift the blockade. He warned that if the United States joins Saudi Arabia in a war against Yemen, it will find itself in a predicament.

“We are ready to pay the highest price to lift the blockade, and the region is on the brink of explosion, and Saudi Arabia is aware of this,” al-Nu’ami told Al-Mayadeen.

Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies launched the blockade on Yemen as part of a full-scale war on March 26, 2015, with military, political, and logistical support from the United States and other Western states.

The war has killed tens of thousands of Yemenis, while consistently falling short of its main objective of restoring power to Yemen’s former Riyadh-friendly regime.

The government had fled the country amid a power struggle, prompting Ansarullah, Yemen’s popular resistance movement, to start running state affairs.

Following a fragile UN-brokered ceasefire in 2022, the United States, Britain, and the Israeli regime waged many rounds of wholesale aggression against Yemen.

The attacks sought to cripple Sana’a’s capability to stage solidarity strikes against Israeli targets in response to Tel Aviv’s war of genocide on the Gaza Strip.

July 20, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Yemen imposes naval blockade against Saudi Arabia in tit-for-tat move

Pakistan, Kuwait hold early talks on defense-for-energy partnership

The Cradle | July 17, 2026

Pakistan and Kuwait have entered early-stage negotiations to expand defense cooperation, with Islamabad seeking deeper energy ties and greater investment from the Gulf monarchy in return, Reuters reported on 17 July.

“Kuwait’s wish list includes everything,” said a Pakistani security official familiar with the negotiations. “But let me be clear about one thing: We are not and we cannot consider a deployment of combat troops at this stage.”

One source confirmed the talks have covered defense procurement, but noted it was “not clear this will amount to a defense pact per se.”

In exchange for any deal, Islamabad wants expanded cooperation on energy security as it builds up its strategic oil and fuel reserves as part of a wider initiative led by Pakistan’s Energy Ministry.

Over the past year, Pakistan and the Gulf monarchies have moved toward new regional defense arrangements.

The realignment was accelerated by the US’s war on Iran, which saw Gulf countries absorb the brunt of the retaliatory impact, and called into question the reliability of the US as a defense partner.

Meanwhile, Islamabad commands one of the region’s largest armies and manufactures its own fighter jets, credentials that have positioned it as a potential supplement, or even alternative, to US protection.

For Kuwait, Pakistan represents a dependable partner, according to a source in the region familiar with Kuwaiti security planning.

“They are already in with the Saudis, they have a long history of defense development, they are Muslim Sunni, they have a good relationship with the Americans, so it’s not as sensitive as some other options,” the source said.

Turkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have been preparing a draft agreement for a three-way mutual defense pact, distinct from the existing accord between Islamabad and Riyadh.

Bahrain is pursuing a similar arrangement, one source said, while Jordan has signaled interest in a weapons and training deal.

Last year, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement committing each to treat an attack on one as an attack on both – a pact widely understood to place Riyadh under a de facto Pakistani nuclear umbrella, after Pakistan’s defense minister said all the country’s capabilities “will be made available under this agreement.”

July 18, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , | Comments Off on Pakistan, Kuwait hold early talks on defense-for-energy partnership

Yemen to confront Saudi blockade militarily, official to Al Mayadeen

Al Mayadeen| July 16, 2026

Sanaa’s Deputy Information Minister Mohammed Mansour told Al Mayadeen on Thursday that the positions laid out by Ansar Allah leader Sayyed Abdul-Malik al-Houthi effectively amount to a formal declaration that Yemen has decided to end the US-Saudi blockade imposed on it.

He said Yemen will see massive demonstrations tomorrow in response to Sayyed al-Houthi’s call, giving the Yemeni people a chance to make their position on lifting the Saudi blockade unmistakably clear.

“The Yemenis have grown tired of negotiations. Either the blockade is lifted in practice, or we move to break it by force,” he said.

Yemen moving toward confronting Saudi blockade militarily

Mansour told Al Mayadeen that Saudi Arabia bombed Sanaa International Airport just nine minutes before an Iranian aircraft was due to land. “By striking Sanaa International Airport, Saudi Arabia made clear that this blockade is its own doing, and that it has no intention of lifting it,” he said.

He added that Yemen is preparing, within days, to confront the Saudi economic blockade through military action. “If political channels fail to force Saudi Arabia to lift the economic blockade, we will confront it militarily,” he said.

He stressed that Yemen never raises a slogan it doesn’t have the means to back up. “Today, we have what it takes to dismantle this economic aggression,” he asserted.

On mediation, Mansour told Al Mayadeen, “We’ve grown tired of mediation, though we do appreciate Oman’s role, since it has not been party to the aggression against our country.”

“This is a matter between Yemen and Saudi Arabia,” he stressed.

He also said Saudi Arabia would do well to take note of Yemen’s positions on Palestine and reconsider the blockade it has imposed.

Yemen will not leave Hezbollah to face the enemy alone

Mansour also voiced regret over the Lebanese government’s stance toward the Lebanese Resistance, insisting that Hezbollah is an asset Lebanon cannot afford to squander.

He affirmed that no party within the Axis of Resistance will ever be left to face the enemy alone, and that Yemen will not abandon Hezbollah.

He recalled that the loudest voice in support of Yemen once belonged to the martyred Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, affirming that Yemen will never forget it.

Sayyed al-Houthi: Saudi escalation will be met in kind

Ansar Allah leader Sayyed Abdul-Malik al-Houthi said Thursday that Saudi Arabia’s aggression against Yemen has dragged on for years with no legal basis, framing it as an extension of Riyadh’s subservience to Washington and Tel Aviv.

In his weekly speech, Sayyed al-Houthi confirmed that “surrender is not an option in Yemen,” warning that if Saudi Arabia moves toward full-scale escalation, Yemen will respond in kind, “and blockade for blockade.”

Sayyed al-Houthi accused Riyadh of stalling and evading responsibility over the past several years, depriving Yemen’s people of their sovereign wealth and subjecting them to suffering under a severe blockade, and revealing that Saudi Arabia has cooperated with “Israel” against Yemen throughout that entire period.

“Saudi Arabia is reneging on all the obligations arising from the de-escalation phase, which are, above all, humanitarian obligations and inalienable rights of our people,” he said, accusing Riyadh of seeking to control every aspect of Yemenis’ lives, down to deciding who may travel abroad for medical treatment and who may not.

He added that no one, regardless of position or capacity, has the right to deprive the Yemeni people of their oil rights or freedom of movement.

He said Saudi Arabia wants Yemen’s people to remain trapped in an economic crisis, with betraying their homeland presented as their only means of earning money.

“Saudi Arabia should not imagine that this is a picnic,” he concluded. “It will be something else entirely.”

‘Israel’ aided Saudi interception efforts

Israeli aircraft assisted Saudi forces in their attempts to intercept Yemen’s retaliatory strike, which was launched in response to the Saudi bombardment of Sanaa Airport, a senior military source within the Yemeni Ministry of Defense revealed to Al Mayadeen.

According to the Yemeni source, the Israeli deployment consisted of specialized Gulfstream intelligence-gathering aircraft equipped for communications interception, wiretapping, and reconnaissance.

The aircraft took off from “Israel’s” Nevatim Airbase and operated primarily along a flight path over the Red Sea, where they actively participated in tracking and mapping the trajectories of incoming Yemeni missiles and drones, the source said.

July 16, 2026 Posted by | Solidarity and Activism, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Yemen to confront Saudi blockade militarily, official to Al Mayadeen

Preparing for Regional Escalation: Iran Appears to Be Pre-Empting the US’ Attack Strategy

By Robert Inlakesh | Palestine Chronicle | July 15, 2026

The US Trump administration sought to weaponize diplomacy once again against the Islamic Republic of Iran and implement a surprise attack strategy – this time, Tehran appears to have preempted the American-Israeli plot.

The Iran-US Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) officially died this week, but in reality it was terminated on June 26 with the Lebanon-Israel deal that Washington brokered. The reason why was simple: the United States decided to print on paper a new deal that violated the former by granting Israel de facto permission to maintain a belligerent occupation of southern Lebanese lands.

Throughout the month that the MoU technically held, the US committed various violations of a number of clauses of the agreement, including by direct threats from Donald Trump himself to assassinate the entire Iranian negotiating team. But the Lebanon issue was far more indicative of where things were heading than the limited skirmishes in the Persian Gulf and threats to commit war crimes.

Clause 1 of the MoU concerned the ensuring of the war’s termination on all fronts, with Lebanon being explicitly mentioned. Tehran made it clear that this meant a full withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from southern Lebanon and the protection of Lebanese sovereignty.

Instead of implementing the clause, Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu coordinated a careful approach to the Lebanon war, one that would not result in a withdrawal or end to the war, while simultaneously being careful not to provoke any Iranian retaliatory strikes. Therefore, the US worked with Israel to develop a new conspiracy. This involved the use of the US-proxy regime in Beirut to stir division within Lebanon, an attempt to force the Lebanese army to clash with Hezbollah, combined with an initiative to pressure neighboring Syria to invade the Bekaa Valley region in order to take on Hezbollah.

Meanwhile, as this plot was developing, the Israelis returned to the pre-March 2 status quo more or less in Lebanon – Hezbollah froze its retaliatory operations, while Israel continued to blow up civilian homes, bomb on a lower scale, while maintaining its presence inside south Lebanon.

A US military advisory force is being deployed to Beirut in order to guide the Lebanese army on its newly agreed-upon mission to clash with Hezbollah, the stated goal of which is to disarm the movement. Speculation also has it that the US may even be considering deploying thousands of combat troops into Lebanon in order to help prop up the regime in Beirut if the situation goes sideways, although this assertion is yet to be fully substantiated.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) has been documenting the ongoing mobilization and military buildup along the Lebanese-Syria border, as Trump himself has repeatedly stated in public that he seeks to use Syria’s forces to invade Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s sudden silence and lack of operations indicate that it has been taking these threats very seriously. Fighting Israel alone has been a battle that it has proven capable of managing, but preparations to fight US-proxies inside Lebanon, the possible collapse of the Lebanese Army into warring factions, and combating a Syrian invasion all demand new defensive and even perhaps offensive preparations.

Iran, for its part, was clearly also coordinated more heavily with Yemen’s Ansarallah leadership. The Yemen front never fully opened during the war earlier this year. Tehran openly challenged Saudi Arabia’s blockade on Yemen, while Ansarallah was mobilizing its forces and declared that it would fight to break the blockade. When Riyadh took the decision to strike Sana’a International Airport, this reopened the Yemen-Saudi War for the first time since early 2022, collapsing the UN-brokered ceasefire.

Yemen’s role in the renewal of the regional war will add major pressure, especially as it holds the card to shut down the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, imposing a blockade in the Red Sea that will choke the global economy further than it has been under the pressure of the Strait of Hormuz blockade. Ansarallah’s capabilities have also significantly developed since 2022, meaning that they will be able to aid Iran in their war efforts against targets in the Arabian Peninsula.

If the US succeeds in pressuring Damascus to launch an assault on Lebanon, then Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) have already threatened to enter the fight on the ground. The PMU would likely seek to seize areas in eastern Syria, like Deir Ezzor, which would open up new supply lines inside Syrian territory and put enormous pressure on its forces.

A US-Israeli plot to collapse the Lebanese State in order to weaken Hezbollah is a major gamble to say the least, one which will inevitably lead to a rise in regional sectarianism. It is also very likely that Arab Gulf media will also act to portray the conflict as a new Sunni-Shia war, as they begin to take more active roles in support of the US-Israeli war effort.

Ultimately, it appears as if the Iranians are not taking any chances and are being proactive, which has been reflected in the scale of their strikes on US assets in the region, including a surprise attack that took out US ATACMS missiles in Kuwait earlier this week.

A return to full-scale war this time around could trigger a series of conflicts that will spiral out of control and thus make any easy off-ramp impossible. The Global economic repercussions will be horrendous, as the only end to the war is total victory or total defeat. The US will be put in a position where it will be forced to withdraw from the region, while Israel is betting on the idea of Iran being significantly weakened as a result of the conflict’s continuation.

No side appears to be backing down, so unless the US suddenly decides to perform a 180-degree pivot in its approach, West Asia is about to erupt into total chaos.

– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine. He contributed this article to The Palestine Chronicle.

July 16, 2026 Posted by | Aletho News | , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Preparing for Regional Escalation: Iran Appears to Be Pre-Empting the US’ Attack Strategy

Sitting ducks: Why the US security umbrella no longer protects the Gulf?

By Dr Mustafa Fetouri| MEMO | July 16, 2026

In Kuwait alone—less than 150 kilometres across the Gulf from Iran—the United States maintains a major military hub of approximately 13,500 personnel spread across installations such as Camp Arifjan and Ali Al Salem Air Base. To its south, Saudi Arabia hosts roughly 2,700 U.S. troops, centered at Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj. Elsewhere in the Gulf, every state hosts either a US military presence or provides access and defence cooperation under bilateral agreements: Qatar houses more than 10,000 personnel at CENTCOM’s sprawling forward headquarters at Al Udeid; Bahrain hosts around 9,000 personnel at the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet; the UAE accommodates approximately 3,500 personnel at Al Dhafra while providing deep-water naval access at Jebel Ali; and Oman offers strategic port and airfield access under bilateral agreements, despite having no large permanent US troop presence.

Beyond the Gulf monarchies, Washington maintains approximately 2,500 troops in Iraq and around 900 in northeastern Syria under Operation Inherent Resolve. To Iran’s northwest, the US operates from Incirlik Air Base in Türkiye— a NATO logistics and intelligence hub too. Until its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, American forces also maintained a major military presence along Iran’s eastern frontier, supported for two decades by extensive supply routes and intelligence cooperation through Pakistan. Although the US lies nearly 10,000 kilometres from Iran, it has constructed an unparalleled regional military architecture of permanent bases, rotational deployments, naval facilities, pre-positioned equipment, access agreements, and security partnerships that stretches from the Eastern Mediterranean across the Gulf to the western Indian Ocean. Combined with the military capabilities of close allies—including Britain, France, and Türkiye—this network almost literally surrounding Iran from all sides. The common thread underpinning this posture has long been the protection of regional partners, the safeguarding of global energy routes, and the defence of US strategic interests.

Yet, this foundational premise has collapsed under the weight of the US-Israeli war on Iran, which has fundamentally transformed the entire regional security landscape. This “war of choice” has exposed how a security arrangement once marketed as an ironclad insurance policy has devolved into a primary strategic liability.

Rather than serving as an effective deterrent, large and static American military installations now act as strategic liability—drawing Iranian retaliatory strikes while denying host states true autonomy or the promised protective shield.

The Gulf states have discovered, at a heavy price, that they are trapped in an impossible paradox: their sovereign territory serves as a staging ground for military operations they were never consulted about—at least that is what they say publically –instantly transforming their critical infrastructure, oil facilities, and urban centers into high-priority targets. Compounding this vulnerability is the stark geopolitical reality that while Washington may eventually pivot away or withdraw—much as it did from Afghanistan—Iran is a permanent neighbour that is going nowhere.

Beyond the immediate threat of missile strikes, the presence of these US installations directly undermines the core national strategies of the Gulf monarchies. Mega-development projects and economic diversification plans—from Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 to Dubai’s global trade hubs—rely entirely on an image of absolute regional stability, investor confidence, and open maritime transit. By hosting forward US bases, host nations inadvertently tie their economic futures to Washington’s military posture, creating an environment of perpetual crisis. Furthermore, defending these expansive American footprints forces host militaries to consume their own finite air-defense interceptors and defense budgets to guard US assets rather than securing their own national borders.

At the same time, while almost all Gulf States have, at least publicly, refrained from taking direct offensive action against Iran to avoid total escalation, they recognise that they are already viewed as passive participants in the wider conflict.

Maintaining this precarious balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult against rising domestic anti-war sentiment, as public anger over regional devastation steadily erodes the host governments’ domestic credibility.

For Washington, this massive network of forward-deployed bases has produced a profound strategic paradox. What was designed to project uninhibited American power now ties US freedom of action to the political consent of cautious host nations. When host governments impose strict sovereignty restrictions—refusing permission for US forces to launch offensive sorties or intelligence missions against regional adversaries from their soil—the Pentagon finds its multi-billion-dollar installations functionally sidelined during critical military surges. Instead of providing seamless operational flexibility, these fixed, highly vulnerable outposts transform into costly “imperial entrapment” liabilities: requiring thousands of US troops, high-end missile defense batteries, and constant naval escort deployments simply to protect the bases themselves, rather than executing broader strategic objectives or enabling Washington’s long-sought pivot to the Indo-Pacific. With the conflict between the US and Iran reigniting, Trump is demanding that the Gulf states pay once again to protect the Strait of Hormuz—a vital transit route that never closed until the war was started by Trump, not Iran.

This strategic calculus becomes infinitely more complex when factoring in Israel’s role in the regional security outlook. In recent years, certain Gulf states—most notably the UAE—operated under the premise that normalization and closer security alignment with Israel via the Abraham Accords would yield a net security dividend. Yet, this belief was never shared across the Gulf; nations like Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia maintained a far more cautious, sceptical stance toward Tel Aviv. The outbreak of the US-Israeli war on Tehran on February 28 utterly shattered any illusion that an Israeli-linked security architecture could bring regional stability. Instead, it exposed deep internal fault lines among the entire region. Reaching a collective, long-term security understanding with Iran was already a formidable challenge; doing so now, in the wake of a devastating conflict that forced Gulf States into the crossfire, is immensely more complicated. Moving forward, no regional framework can hold if it relies on a anti-Tehran pact anchored in Washington and Tel Aviv while ignoring the permanent reality of Iranian geographic power.

Ultimately, the fallout from the US-Israeli war on Iran exposes a fundamental reality that Washington and its regional allies can no longer ignore: the entire Middle Eastern security architecture must be fundamentally re-evaluated.

The core dilemma facing the region is that no collective security arrangement can ever be viable or effective if it seeks to exclude Iran—an indispensable, geographically permanent power armed with increasingly sophisticated offensive, defensive, and asymmetric capabilities.

Moving forward, any stable regional order must not only account for Tehran’s military leverage, but also accommodate its non-negotiable strategic demands. This includes addressing governance and transit rights over the vital Strait of Hormuz—through which one-fifth of global oil flows—and reaching a durable, pragmatic framework on its nuclear program. Regardless of the final outcome of ongoing US-Iran negotiations, the lesson for the Gulf is clear: true security cannot be built on an external garrison model that marginalizes the region’s principal indigenous power.

July 16, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Sitting ducks: Why the US security umbrella no longer protects the Gulf?

The Saudis Back Down

By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | July 16, 2026

On Monday July 13, airstrikes hit the runway at Sanaa International Airport shortly after a Houthi delegation returned from the funeral in Iran for the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yemen’s Defense Minister Gen. Taher al-Aqili said on X that the runway was struck to stop a plane carrying the Houthi delegation returning from Khamenei’s funeral. The IRG defense ministry said it had exhausted diplomatic efforts to persuade Iran and the Houthis to stay out of Yemeni airspace, that it would respond to hostile aircraft “by all available means,” and held Iran responsible.

However, Israel’s mouthpiece on Axios, Barak Ravid, citing two US officials, reported that Trump gave Saudi leader MBS his backing for the strike in a phone call last Friday — MBS asked for support for military action against the Houthis and received it. The White House declined to comment directly and the Saudi embassy didn’t respond.

The proximate cause is aviation, not ground war. About ten days ago a Mahan Air flight landed in Sanaa — the first Iran–Sanaa flights in over a decade — and picked up a Houthi delegation traveling to the funeral of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Saudi Arabia blocked subsequent flights, fearing they’d be used to move weapons or Iranian military advisers to the Houthis. (Note the airport itself has been largely destroyed and out of action since Israeli strikes in May.)

Following the Saudi Attack on Sanaa, the Houthis retaliated by firing ballistic missiles and drones at Abha International Airport in Saudi Arabia’s southwestern Asir region — a mountainous area near the Yemeni border and a domestic summer destination. Saree claimed the strike. The Saudi-led coalition spokesman said air defenses “dealt with a threat from ballistic missiles” launched toward the southern region. No casualties reported.

This exchange marked the first Saudi Arabian attacks on the Houthis since the informal truce took effect in March 2022. I thought that the Saudis would retaliate on Tuesday or Wednesday for the Houthi strike on Monday … Thankfully, I was wrong. The Saudis did not follow up by launching new attacks at Houthi positions.

The Saudi attack was foolish and reckless. At present, the Saudis are able to export a bit of oil from Yanbu, a Saudi city that sits on the shores of the Red Sea. This attack on Yemen — albeit an airfield — carried the risk that the Houthis would attack the Saudi oil facility at Yanbu and close the Bab al Mandab Strait. Given the Saudi vulnerabilities if their operation in the Red Sea is suspended or closed, you would think that MBS government would be engaged in further confidence building exercises with Yemen. Nope!! The Saudis almost touched off a renewal of the war with the Houthis.

I don’t know who convinced MBS to put a full stop to further attacks on the Houthi-controlled portion of Yemen, but the Saudis have not attacked again. The Saudis are in no position financially to handle the simultaneous closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab strait. It appears that cooler heads in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia prevailed… for now at least.

July 16, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , | Comments Off on The Saudis Back Down

Yemen warns airlines to avoid Saudi airspace until Sana’a blockade is lifted

Press TV – July 14, 2026

The Yemeni armed forces have renewed their warning to all airlines against using Saudi airspace, urging carriers to take the advisory seriously until the blockade on Sana’a International Airport is lifted.

The warning was republished in Arabic and English on the social media platform X on Tuesday, reaffirming the Yemeni armed forces’ stance on the continued restrictions affecting the airport.

“We warn all airlines against crossing in Saudi airspace, and they should take our warnings seriously until the blockade of Sana’a International Airport is lifted,” the post read.

The warning came hours after the release of an audio-visual message addressed to Saudi Arabia titled “Siege for Siege.”

In a separate development on Tuesday, Yemeni armed forces spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Saree said Yemeni air defenses shot down a Saudi Wing Loong 2 reconnaissance drone over Al-Bayda Governorate, located in south-central Yemen.

“The drone was carrying out hostile missions when it was intercepted at dawn using appropriate weaponry,” he said.

Saree reaffirmed the Yemeni armed forces’ readiness to respond to any violation of Yemen’s airspace and sovereignty.

He stressed that the armed forces would remain vigilant and would not stand idly by in the face of any aggression.

The latest developments follow a military operation carried out by the Yemeni armed forces on Monday targeting Saudi Arabia’s Abha International Airport with ballistic missiles and drones.

The operation followed multiple Saudi airstrikes on Sana’a International Airport, which were aimed at shutting down the country’s main gateway for humanitarian flights.

According to Yemeni officials, air defenses engaged the Saudi warplanes, preventing further strikes on the airport.

Yemeni authorities described the attack on Sana’a International Airport as the most serious cross-border aggression since 2022.

They warned that the strikes could bring an end to the unofficial four-year ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and the Sana’a-based Yemeni government.

July 14, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , | Comments Off on Yemen warns airlines to avoid Saudi airspace until Sana’a blockade is lifted

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