Saudi Arabia’s militarization of Red Sea will not safeguard shipping in waterway: Yemen
Press TV – August 1, 2026
Saudi Arabia’s decision to build an international coalition and militarize the Red Sea will not protect its vessels in the waterway, says a prominent member of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council, warning that such move will mount regional tensions and complicate the security landscape.
Abdulaziz bin Habtour, in a statement issued on Friday, called the proposed Saudi maritime coalition a facade for persisting with the aggression and blockade against Yemen.
He stated that the Bab al-Mandab Strait continues to be accessible for international navigation, emphasizing that Yemen’s maritime measures target only Saudi vessels, calling them a reaction to the blockade placed on Yemen.
Bin Habtour said that earlier warnings to the US-led “Prosperity Guardian” coalition underscored that the Red Sea crisis couldn’t be resolved through military force, but by terminating Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza and removing the blockade.
He noted that removal of the Saudi blockade and cessation of the military campaign against Yemen, instead of militarizing the Bab al-Mandab Strait, is the sole method to ease regional tensions.
Reuters quoted people familiar with the deliberations that Saudi Arabia seeks to form an international coalition against Yemen in the Red Sea.
The coalition’s composition has not been finalized and discussions are ongoing with numerous countries, the sources were quoted as saying.
On July 20, the Sana’a government declared a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, stating that its authorities have enforced “an unjust and oppressive siege” on Yemen for almost 12 years, “looting our resources and enforcing a total blockade.”
Since then, the Yemeni Armed Forces said they have launched attacks on Saudi vessels in the Red Sea.
Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies launched the blockade on Yemen as part of a full-scale war since March 2015, with military, political, and logistical support from the United States and other Western states.
The war has killed tens of thousands of Yemenis, while consistently falling short of its main objective of restoring power to Yemen’s former Riyadh-friendly regime.
Following a fragile UN-brokered ceasefire in 2022, the United States, Britain, and the Israeli regime waged many rounds of aggression against Yemen. The attacks sought to cripple Sana’a’s capability to stage solidarity strikes against Israeli targets in response to Tel Aviv’s war of genocide on the Gaza Strip.
Yemen vs. Saudi Arabia: A Strategy of Strangulation and Asymmetric Response
By Mohammed ibn Faisal al-Rashid – New Eastern Outlook – August 1, 2026
The conflict in Yemen, now in its second decade, has entered a new and extremely perilous phase. Recent developments indicate that Sanaa has transitioned from defense to active deterrence, leveraging asymmetric capabilities to strike at the vital arteries of its powerful neighbor.
What once appeared to be a localized skirmish on the periphery of the Arabian Peninsula has now morphed into a direct threat to the Kingdom’s energy security and the stability of the entire region. This escalation unfolds against a backdrop of mounting tensions between the “Axis of Resistance” (Iran, the Houthis, Hezbollah) and the bloc led by the United States and Israel, lending the Yemeni crisis a geopolitical dimension that reaches far beyond the bilateral relationship between Sanaa and Riyadh.
The Bombing of Hodeidah as a Trigger for Escalation
The immediate catalyst for the sharp deterioration was Saudi airstrikes on targets in Hodeidah province, including telecommunications infrastructure and the strategically vital island of Kamaran. These actions, which Riyadh framed as a show of force and a preemptive measure against Houthi expansion, were interpreted by the Yemeni side as a flagrant violation of sovereignty and an act of aggression. The Saudi-led coalition had hoped to degrade the enemy’s military capacity; however, the outcome was precisely the opposite. The very next day, July 25, the Yemeni Armed Forces announced the execution of two large-scale operations targeting the Kingdom’s “energy engine.” This lightning-fast response demonstrated not only the Houthis’ high state of combat readiness but also their determination to carry the war onto enemy territory, employing a principle of “an eye for an eye.”
The retaliatory strikes targeted strategic Saudi Aramco facilities in the cities of Jizan and Yanbu. According to reports, the attacks employed dozens of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and swarms of drones. Footage circulating on social media captured plumes of smoke rising over the Jizan refinery complex, while satellite imagery and regional sources confirmed direct hits. The selection of targets represents a highly precise strategic move, indicating a deep analysis of Saudi economic vulnerabilities. Yanbu is a critical node for Saudi oil exports via the Red Sea, purpose-built to bypass the vulnerable Strait of Hormuz. By striking Yanbu and Jizan, Yemen is effectively attacking the “western escape route” of the Saudi economy, demonstrating an ability to project force up to a thousand kilometers away.
These attacks have also exposed glaring gaps in Saudi Arabia’s air defense network. Costly Western air defense systems, including American Patriot batteries, have proven vulnerable to coordinated, massed strikes employing inexpensive yet effective munitions. This is a classic example of asymmetric warfare, where the cost of the weapons used is incomparably lower than the cost of their interception and the damage inflicted. The cost-effectiveness of such tactics presents Riyadh with an excruciating dilemma: continue with expensive intercepts or absorb the damage from regular attacks, both of which lead to enormous financial losses and undermine the region’s investment appeal.
The Naval Blockade: An Equation of “Blockade for Blockade”
A central element of Yemen’s new strategy is the imposition of a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia. On July 20, the Houthis announced a prohibition on shipping for vessels flying the Saudi flag and any cargo destined for the Kingdom’s ports. They repeatedly stressed that the blockade does not apply to international shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and is directed exclusively against Saudi Arabia. Movement spokesman Mohammed Abdul Salam denied reports of closing the strait, framing the measures as a legitimate response to years of blockade against Yemen. Yemen’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abdulwahid Abu Ras stated that the decision establishes an equation of “blockade for blockade” and constitutes a right to self-defense guaranteed under international norms.
This move fundamentally alters the rules of engagement. For over a decade, the Saudi-led coalition has maintained an air, naval, and land blockade on Yemen, leading to a devastating humanitarian crisis, famine, and epidemics. Now that Sanaa is employing similar tactics, Western powers, which remained silent for years about the suffering of the Yemeni people, have suddenly voiced deep concern. This situation lays bare a glaring double standard in international law: the right to freedom of navigation suddenly becomes sacrosanct only when the interests of Western allies are threatened. The counter-blockade, beyond its military dimension, carries powerful political and economic weight, directly threatening Saudi Arabia’s ability to export goods via the Red Sea and jeopardizing its energy security.
General Mobilization and Internal Consolidation
Parallel to the naval and missile campaigns, Yemen is intensifying its domestic political mobilization. Ansar Allah leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi issued a decree for general mobilization, placing hundreds of thousands of tribal members and regular army units on combat alert. Mass rallies were held in the northern provinces, showcasing societal unity and a readiness for a protracted confrontation. Reports indicate the formation of a new internal structure—the “General Mobilization Forces”—modeled on Iran’s Basij, signaling long-term planning and an ambition to create deeply layered defensive and offensive capabilities. This militarization of civil society is transforming Yemen into a “fortress” where every resident is potentially a fighter, making occupation or a ground invasion an extremely risky undertaking for the Saudi coalition.
The Yemeni conflict is increasingly intertwined with the broader regional confrontation between the Axis of Resistance and the Western-backed bloc. The escalation is occurring amid tensions between the U.S. and Iran, as well as the ongoing war in Gaza. In response to the Saudi strikes, the Yemeni parliament expressed its full support for the actions of the armed forces, describing them as an inevitable response to the unjust blockade.
The New Reality and Prospects for Confrontation
Thus, the current conflict has far surpassed the bounds of a localized confrontation. Yemen, employing a strategy of asymmetric deterrence, has successfully seized the initiative, transforming years of blockade into a powerful tool of pressure on Saudi Arabia. Strikes on oil facilities and the imposition of a counter-blockade signal a new reality: the era of impunity for Saudi aggression has ended. Any further escalation by Riyadh will have catastrophic consequences for its own economic and energy security. Moreover, the Houthis’ success in confronting the technically advanced Saudi military serves as an inspiring example for other proxy forces in the region.
The situation is reaching a boiling point, and the world holds its breath awaiting the next moves from both sides. Several scenarios are possible, ranging from attempts to renew diplomatic contacts under UN auspices to a full-scale regional war involving external powers. However, one thing is clear: the balance of power in the region has irrevocably shifted, and the old methods of pressuring Yemen are no longer effective. Saudi Arabia will be forced to reconsider its strategy, recognizing that a military solution to the conflict is unattainable and that the economic cost of continuing the war has become prohibitively high. The era of cheap oil and unpunished airstrikes is a thing of the past, giving way to an era of complex negotiations and mutual deterrence.
Muhammad ibn Faisal al-Rashid, Political Scientist, Expert on the Arab World
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Saudi Arabia preps for ‘major’ land, sea operations against Ansarallah in Yemen: Report
The Cradle | July 31, 2026
Saudi Arabia is “preparing” for a massive and “major” military assault against Yemen, which would involve both land and sea operations aimed at breaking the Ansarallah-led Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) blockade on Saudi shipping, The Guardian reported on 30 July.
Yemeni sources claimed Saudi military troops have been “withdrawing from the east of Yemen in what could be preparation for a land offensive.”
“The troop movements inside Yemen involve concentrating forces for what could be an attack on Al-Bayda, a governorate in central southern Yemen captured by [Ansarallah]” between 2020 and 2021, the sources added.
The report coincided with a Saudi Defense Ministry statement saying the kingdom was preparing to form a multinational naval coalition for the Red Sea.
“The Ministry of Defense is hosting an international meeting to discuss the Kingdom’s initiative to establish a multinational maritime defense coalition,” it said, adding that “the meeting was attended by chiefs of staff and their representatives from 43 countries, along with the EU Delegation … out of a total of 51 invited countries and organizations.”
“The participation reflected the international community’s commitment to strengthening maritime defense cooperation and unifying efforts to safeguard the security of maritime routes.”
It added that 14 countries, including Turkiye, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, and Djibouti, issued a joint statement backing the Saudi-proposed multinational “maritime defense coalition,” as it is being called.
“Membership will remain open to all countries wishing to join the coalition,” the Saudi Defense Ministry statement went on to say.
The kingdom has reportedly asked the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, and others to join.
But international naval forces are “overstretched,” western diplomats were cited as saying in a Reuters report on 29 July.
Eleven days ago, the YAF announced a naval blockade on Saudi shipping in response to over a decade of war and siege imposed on Yemen by the kingdom. Saudi tankers have already been struck multiple times in recent days.
Sanaa has also struck a Saudi airport and a major Aramco energy facility in response to new Saudi airstrikes on Yemen this month – the kingdom’s first major attacks against Yemeni civilian infrastructure in years.
The Aramco facility was set ablaze and has been forced shut by Yemen’s operations.
Data released on 26 July revealed that Saudi crude oil loading volumes at the Red Sea port of Yanbu have plummeted by 40 percent due to Yemen’s blockade and retaliatory strikes.
Saudi Arabia waged war against Yemen in 2015 at the head of an Arab coalition, after Ansarallah seized the capital and ousted the Saudi-backed president from Sanaa. The UAE was a major part of this war, which was also supported logistically by the UK, US, and Israel.
A 2023 Saudi–Yemeni peace process nearly resulted in an agreement between the two sides. The peace talks stalled, yet prevented a major escalation from erupting.
The kingdom for years continued to attack Yemen and impose its illegal and deadly blockade on Yemeni ports and airports.
The Saudi-led war on Yemen that began over a decade ago resulted in an unprecedented famine and the deaths of hundreds of thousands.
Yet the war failed to bring about a defeat of Ansarallah as Riyadh had expected.
Following 7 October 2023, Ansarallah launched military operations against Israel and a naval blockade on ships heading to Israeli ports in response to the genocide.
It also carried out operations in support of Lebanon, which has been under Israeli attacks and occupation since Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.
Major EU naval operations, as well as the former US administration’s attempt to form a maritime coalition against Ansarallah following the start of the Gaza genocide, failed blatantly.
A summer 2025 campaign of US strikes against Ansarallah, under US President Donald Trump, also failed to impact the Ansarallah-led YAF.
Iraq cancels PM’s Riyadh visit after US-Saudi aggression amid calls for response
Press TV – July 29, 2026
Iraq has postponed Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s planned visit to Saudi Arabia after the joint US-Saudi attack on Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) positions across several Iraqi provinces, as officials and lawmakers called for a military response.
The strikes came as millions of Muslims from Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Azerbaijan and other countries around the world were converging on the Iraqi city of Karbala to mark Arbaeen, one of the largest religious gatherings in the world.
Some observers have viewed the timing of the attacks as a show of anger toward the gathering, which has been marked by expressions of solidarity with the Axis of Resistance and condemnation of US-Israeli wars and expansionist policies.
According to Iraqi media, al-Zaidi’s trip to Saudi Arabia was postponed indefinitely after the attack. The prime minister also ordered the country’s National Security Council to convene an emergency meeting following the security developments and the airstrikes on several areas across Iraq.
Former Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani said, “We condemn the Saudi-American aggression against the headquarters of the Popular Mobilization Forces in the strongest terms.”
“This aggression is a blatant violation of Iraq’s sovereignty and a clear violation of international law and the United Nations Charter,” Sudani said.
“Iraq reserves all of its legitimate rights guaranteed under international law, including the right to defend its sovereignty, territory and people.”
He added that “any violation of Iraq’s security and stability is unacceptable and cannot be met with silence.”
According to a statement carried by Iraq’s official news agency, the PMU said the casualty toll from the attacks remains preliminary and could rise as special committees continue field assessments and gather more accurate information.
The organization denounced the strikes as a “joint US-Saudi terrorist attack” targeting its official headquarters in the provinces of Baghdad, Wasit, Nineveh, Basra, Kirkuk, Karbala and Diyala.
The assaults caused extensive material damage to PMU headquarters, military vehicles, machinery and equipment in the targeted locations, the statement said.
The Iraqi resistance movement added that its investigative teams remain deployed to assess the full extent of the casualties and destruction, noting that the number of those killed and wounded may increase as rescue and assessment operations continue.
Earlier, the PMU announced that several of its bases in different parts of Iraq had come under attack, describing the strikes as “terrorist” and reporting casualties among its personnel.
The PMU said it viewed the attacks as “a highly dangerous escalation, a blatant violation of Iraq’s territorial integrity, and an attack on the country’s official security institutions.”
The attacks prompted growing calls from Iraqi lawmakers for a decisive response.
Two Iraqi lawmakers called on the government to respond decisively, with one urging military retaliation and another demanding the cancellation of al-Zaidi’s visit to Saudi Arabia.
Saud al-Saadi, a member of the Iraqi Parliament and the Huqooq Movement, called on the commander-in-chief of the armed forces to assume his responsibility and issue an order for a military response to the Saudi-American aggression.
“Show [Saudi Crown Prince] Mohammed bin Salman and the other slaves their true worth and size,” he said, according to Iraqi media.
“The blood of Iraqis is not cheap, and the dark record of Washington and Riyadh in our beloved country will not be erased without a response that preserves Iraq’s dignity. It is not acceptable to settle for disgraceful and humiliating statements,” he added.
Another Iraqi lawmaker, Faleh al-Khazali, described the strikes as “terrorist attacks” carried out by “the Saudi and American enemy,” saying they targeted Iraqi security positions in several provinces.
“The attacks on our security positions constitute blatant aggression and a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty,” al-Khazali said, adding that “the Iraqi government and its prime minister bear the responsibility to courageously defend the Iraqi people and the country’s national interests.”
Iraqi lawmaker Hussein Nima al-Battat also condemned the attacks as a “blatant violation of Iraq’s sovereignty and of international laws and norms,” warning that they constituted a dangerous escalation threatening the country’s security and stability.
Al-Battat urged the government to take all necessary military, political, diplomatic and legal measures to defend Iraq’s sovereignty and protect its people, while also calling for the cancellation of the prime minister’s scheduled visit to Riyadh as a demonstration of Iraq’s rejection of the attacks.
The Iraqi resistance had warned Saudi Arabia earlier against waging such strikes against Iraqi territory following Riyadh’s claims that its oil facilities were targeted from Iraq.
In a statement released on Monday, the resistance rejected the Saudi allegations as “baseless” and urged Saudi authorities to stop blaming Iraq and instead end Riyadh’s blockade on Yemen.
Political analyst Jumaa al-Atwani told Lebanon’s Al Mayadeen television that the joint US-Saudi attack was aimed at weakening the PMU and retaliating against Iraq over its solidarity with Iran.
“The American pressure on Iraq has intensified because of Iraq’s position in solidarity with Iran, especially after the massive funeral procession for the martyred leader of the Ummah,” he said.
Atwani said the millions who participated recently in the ceremonies in Karbala and Najaf for funeral of martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei reflected Iraq’s role within the Axis of Resistance.
Al-Atwani said Saudi Arabia maintains close coordination with the United States and described the PMU as “a major problem for Washington.”
He also suggested that regional plans involving Saudi Arabia and Syria have been discussed to justify attacks on Iraqi military positions.
Saudi oil loading volumes drop 40 percent at Red Sea port amid Yemeni blockade
The Cradle | July 27, 2026
Saudi crude oil loading volumes at the Red Sea port of Yanbu have plummeted by 40 percent in the past several days, with the kingdom using an Egyptian pipeline to avoid the recently imposed Yemeni blockade, according to data released by analytics platform Vortexa on 26 July.
The fall in loading volumes is a result of the Ansarallah-backed Yemeni Armed Forces’ (YAF) retaliatory operations and maritime blockade against Riyadh, which has been besieging and attacking the Arab world’s poorest nation for nearly 12 years.
The blockade is causing very significant losses, according to maritime data intelligence firm Windward.
“Saudi Arabia has established a working alternative export route via the SUMED pipeline and Cape of Good Hope,” Windward wrote in a report on Sunday, citing Vortexa’s data.
According to the report, this is “adding approximately $9 per barrel to transport cost.”
“Saudi crude has not stopped moving. It has bifurcated. Yanbu port has transitioned to entirely AIS-dark tanker operations at berth as vessels shield against [Ansarallah’s] hit list. Saudi Arabia established a working alternative export route via the SUMED pipeline and Cape of Good Hope, adding cost and voyage time but demonstrating the market’s adaptability,” the report added.
Saudi Arabia had established an alternate route via Yanbu at the start of the US-Israeli war, following Iran’s initial blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, according to reports at the time.
The Windward report coincided with the release of SoarAtlas satellite imagery showing major fires still burning at Saudi Aramco’s Jazan Oil Refinery due to YAF strikes.
Thick black smoke has continued to rise from a large oil storage tank following Ansarallah’s strikes on the $12 billion complex on Saturday, the images reveal.
The YAF had announced its latest operations against Saudi Arabia on 25 July. This was a response to renewed Saudi bombardment targeting Yemen’s port city of Hodeidah.
“In response to this blatant criminal aggression, the YAF carried out two specialized military operations. The first operation targeted sensitive facilities belonging to Saudi Aramco in Jazan, using dozens of ballistic missiles and drones,” the Ansarallah-led Yemeni army said.
“The second operation targeted sensitive Saudi Aramco facilities in Yanbu, using a number of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones,” it added.
The YAF stressed that the operations were “accurate” and “direct.” Reports from over the weekend said blasts were heard from Yanbu city as well.
Earlier on Saturday, Saudi airstrikes targeted fuel tanks and communication facilities in the western Yemeni city of Hodeidah.
Yemeni President Mahdi al-Mashat said on 27 July, “To the Saudi enemy, we say that those who offer you false hopes will not benefit you. Anything short of ending the aggression and lifting the blockade is mere illusion.”
The YAF had also struck two Saudi oil tankers several days ago as part of the new Yemeni blockade of Saudi shipping.
The Yemeni blockade was announced by Sanaa’s forces on 20 July. “Blockade for blockade,” the YAF said.
Earlier in July, Saudi Arabia carried out its first airstrike on Sanaa International Airport in years, prompting a serious Yemeni retaliation.
In response, the YAF targeted Saudi Arabia’s Abha Airport with missiles and drones. These were also the first direct Yemeni strikes against Saudi territory since 2021.
Saudi Arabia waged war against Yemen in 2015 at the head of an Arab coalition, after Ansarallah seized the capital and ousted the Saudi-backed president from Sanaa. The UAE was a major part of this war, which was also supported logistically by the UK, US, and Israel.
A 2023 Saudi–Yemeni peace process nearly resulted in an agreement between the two sides. The peace talks stalled, yet prevented a major escalation from erupting.
The kingdom for years continued its illegal and deadly blockade of Yemeni ports and airports. Sanaa International Airport in particular has been under Saudi blockade for more than a decade, with severe restrictions imposed on commercial flights.
Sick and wounded Yemenis have long faced restrictions when trying to leave the country for urgent treatment.
The Saudi-led war on Yemen that began over a decade ago resulted in an unprecedented famine and the deaths of hundreds of thousands.
Prior to Riyadh’s new escalation, Yemeni forces had already begun mobilizing to expel the Saudi-led coalition from the country.
US Can’t Come to Saudi Arabia’s Rescue in Bab el-Mandeb Without Risking Overstretch – Expert
By Ekaterina Blinova – Sputnik – 27.07.2026
Tensions in the Gulf are spilling over into the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, putting additional pressure on Saudi Arabia, but the US is unlikely to open a second front, Ankara-based security analyst Dr. Hasan Selim Ozertem tells Sputnik.
“Strategically, it would force Washington to choose between protecting energy chokepoints and maintaining deterrence against Iran, a choice that no administration would want to make before elections,” Ozertem says.
- Tackling the challenges posed by the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait “in a synchronized manner” is a difficult task even for the US Navy
- US interceptor stockpiles have already shrunk and emerged as one of the reasons the US has held back from a new wave of strikes on Iran
- The US is likely to seek de-escalation in the region ahead of the November 2026 midterm elections
“A two-front response would require not only a massive expenditure of interceptors, but also a redeployment of carrier strike groups, intelligence assets, and logistical support, which would inevitably leave other regions like the Pacific or Europe more thinly covered,” Ozertem sums up.
The Ansar Allah movement, also known as the Houthis, announced on July 20 that it was imposing a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia in response to the kingdom’s control of Yemen’s airspace and ports. The group later warned that the scale of its operations could increase if the Saudi government continued its blockade of the Yemeni people. The blockade applies to Saudi shipping in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden.
Seyed M. Marandi: Saudi Oil Is Burning & Trump Has No Way Out
Glenn Diesen | July 26, 2026
Prof. Seyed Mohammad Marandi is a former advisor to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. Prof. Marandi discusses Saudi Arabia’s miscalculation in terms of attacking Yemen. Trump has trapped himself in the Iran War, and his options keep getting worse.
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No route around Hormuz: Why West Asia’s pipeline alternatives fall short
The rush to bypass Hormuz leads back to the same problem: Every alternative route remains hostage to war, rival chokepoints, or political disputes.
By Hussein Askary | The Cradle | July 23, 2026
“The only alternative to the Strait of Hormuz is the Strait of Hormuz.”
This blunt assessment, offered by an Iraqi expert in a recent interview, captures the central weakness in the rush to revive old pipeline schemes and promote new ones across West Asia. Since Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz after Israel and the US launched their second war against it in February 2026, the region has been flooded with proposals for alternative oil-export routes.
Washington has encouraged these plans, while several governments have presented dormant or unfinished pipelines as strategic solutions. Yet the closer one looks at geography, markets, costs, capacity, and security, the clearer it becomes that most of these projects cannot substitute for Hormuz.
Even if oil bypasses the strait, it still faces the rival chokepoint of Bab al-Mandab, where the Ansarallah-aligned armed forces have declared a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia and attacked Saudi tankers.
These expensive detours will remain exposed unless security in the Persian Gulf itself improves. Until the war on Iran ends and an inclusive regional security architecture is established, Iranian and Yemeni missiles and drones can reach the pipelines and loading terminals built to evade them.
Asia still runs through Hormuz
The first reason is straightforward. The Strait of Hormuz is the natural outlet of the Gulf energy system. In 2024, oil flows through the strait averaged about 20 million barrels per day (bpd), roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. The International Energy Agency (IEA) describes it as one of the world’s most important oil transit chokepoints.
Most of this oil is not heading west. About 80 percent of the oil moving through Hormuz is destined for Asia, with China, India, Japan, South Korea, and other Asian economies as the principal buyers. The pattern is even clearer for liquefied natural gas (LNG).
The US Energy Information Administration estimated that 83 percent of LNG moving through Hormuz in 2024 went from Persian Gulf exporters to Asian markets, especially China, India, and South Korea.
This market reality matters because many proposed alternatives send oil away from its main customers. Pipelines to the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, or the Levant may appear useful on a map, but they often move Gulf crude farther from Asia rather than closer to it.
Commercially, building multibillion-dollar infrastructure to move oil westward, only to redirect it by sea toward Asian markets, is inefficient. If Hormuz is open, the direct route remains cheaper and faster. If it is closed by war, the underlying problem is not a lack of pipelines but the collapse of regional security.
Old routes, unresolved disputes
The older pipeline options illustrate the point. The Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline once carried Iraqi oil across Syria to the Mediterranean. Built in the early 1950s, it had genuine strategic value in its time but has been largely inactive since it was damaged during the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Washington is now backing efforts to revive the route, with US companies expected to play a role. Yet the project still requires extensive reconstruction and years of work before it can provide meaningful export capacity.
Estimates for a full restoration and expansion to around 700,000 bpd run as high as $8 billion. It cannot answer an immediate crisis in Hormuz, and if regional peace is restored before completion, the commercial case for reviving it weakens sharply.
The Iraq–Turkiye pipeline faces a different but equally serious problem: politics. The route through the Kurdistan region to Turkiye’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan was repeatedly interrupted by disputes among Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Ankara, and international oil companies.
A 2023 arbitration ruling against Turkiye over unauthorized Kurdish exports led to a two-and-a-half-year shutdown. Flows resumed in September 2025, and exports have continued, but the route still depends on fragile agreements over contracts, payments, federal authority, and revenue sharing.
Its limited throughput and political vulnerability prevent it from becoming a structural replacement for a maritime passage that normally carries a vast share of the world’s seaborne oil.
The Iraqi pipeline in Saudi Arabia, known as IPSA, is another example of strategic nostalgia. Built in the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq war, it was designed to move Iraqi crude from the Basra region to the Red Sea.
It stopped operating after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia expropriated it in 2001. Reopening the line would therefore require a Saudi–Iraqi political settlement over ownership and control, as well as a major technical assessment after decades of disuse. In other words, IPSA is not an available alternative; it is a diplomatic and engineering problem dressed up as a solution.
The proposed Basra–Aqaba pipeline is even more controversial. Its advertised purpose is to move Iraqi oil from southern Iraq to Jordan’s Red Sea port of Aqaba, bypassing Hormuz. Yet it has faced intense objections inside Iraq because of its projected cost, uncertain financing, and questionable strategic value.
Since much of Iraq’s crude is sold to Asian customers, sending it westward to Aqaba would add distance and complexity rather than solve the basic market problem. The pipeline would also move Iraqi exports closer to another zone of instability, including the Israeli military sphere and the wider Red Sea security environment.
A bypass route that merely exchanges one security risk for another is no solution. Iraq’s severe fiscal pressures also leave Baghdad poorly placed to finance such an expensive project, while international investors are unlikely to embrace it without strong political and security guarantees.
Bypasses within missile range
The existing Saudi and Emirati bypasses are more credible but still limited. Saudi Arabia’s East–West Pipeline, or Petroline, moves crude from the eastern oil region to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline carries oil from Habshan to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman.
These systems reduce exposure to Hormuz for Saudi Arabia and the UAE and have become important national energy-security assets. But they cannot replace the strait for the region as a whole. They offer little to Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Iran, or most Iraqi exports, and they do not solve the LNG problem, especially Qatar’s dependence on Hormuz.
The IEA estimates that only 3.5 to 5.5 million bpd of spare pipeline capacity is available to bypass the strait. Neither Yanbu nor Fujairah are immune from attack; regional conflict has already shown the vulnerability of ports, tankers, and energy infrastructure.
The crisis pipelines cannot solve
This is why the alternative pipeline debate is misleading. It treats the closure of Hormuz as a logistical puzzle when it is primarily a political and security crisis. If the Persian Gulf remains militarized and unstable, no pipeline network can fully protect exports.
Pipelines cross vulnerable territory, depend on political agreements, and terminate at ports that can also be threatened. If Gulf security improves, however, Hormuz will almost certainly reopen because this serves the interests of producers and Asian consumers alike.
Once that happens, the commercial rationale for many alternative pipelines will fade. Why spend tens of billions of dollars duplicating a natural route with unmatched capacity and direct access to the main buyers?
The more honest conclusion is that alternative pipelines may offer limited resilience for individual states, but they are no strategic replacement for Hormuz. They are costly, slow, politically fragile, geographically inefficient, and in some cases obsolete before construction begins.
The answer to the crisis is a security arrangement that keeps the Persian Gulf open, prevents attacks on shipping, and restores normal trade through the strait.
Under such an arrangement, oil and LNG would continue to flow mainly to Asia by the most direct and economical route. Hormuz will remain indispensable, while the grand pipeline alternatives amount to expensive insurance policies against a crisis that only diplomacy and regional peace can resolve.
US-Saudi nuclear pantomime is with eye on Iran
By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | July 24, 2026
The excitement over the US-Saudi nuclear deal has proved to be short-lived. Apparently, the US President Donald Trump himself poured cold water into it by adding a caveat on Thursday that in order for the deal to be advanced, Saudi Arabia must first join the Abraham Accords. That is, as things stand, may seem like asking for the moon.
However, it’s all but certain that Trump allowed the Saudi deal to be signed after consulting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as a last throw of dice to pin down Saudi Arabia as a participant / collaborator alongside Israel (and the UAE) for an all-out war against Iran that might at some point entail ground operations, which is not possible without first getting Riyadh on his side firmly, irrevocably.
If Saudi Arabia dissociates from Tump’s upcoming war and disallows the US to use the Saudi bases or work out the logistics accordingly, Pentagon generals will be hard-pressed to conduct the war. In political terms too, the Saudi stance will influence other regional oligarchies in the Persian Gulf in their own attitudes towards Iran, which is astride the Arab street like a colossus. The timing of the July 15 meeting of Trump with the visit of the pro-American prime minister of Iraq Ali al-Zaidi also needs to be factored in here. Simply put, Iraq has become a frontline in the US-Iran conflict.
Saudis won’t like the prospect of Iran emerging as a towering regional power. On its part, Iran is also closely watching the Saudi mood swings stemming out of its compulsions not to annoy Trump who is in a position to to play a helpful role in the event of the succession issue coming to the fore in Riyadh at any time. Of course, this is apart from the profound petrodollar linkages critical to both protagonists.
Meanwhile, the recent Pakistani advisory to Tehran to steer clear of targeting Saudi Arabia, the Houthi threat to Saudi Arabia and the potential closure of Strait of Bab el-Mandeb are tell-tale signs of latent tensions between Tehran and Riyadh, although both sides are maintaining a semblance of normalcy.
Most certainly, Trump’s remark on Thursday making the nuclear deal conditional on the Saudis normalising relations with Israel has thrown the deal as such into question barely 24 hours after it was signed. Is it a U-turn or is the episode just another confusing rollout that has become the trademark of Trump’s presidency? The truth could be somewhere in between.
According to an AP report, the White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters in a briefing yesterday that Trump has said if the Saudis don’t join the Abraham Accords, “the deal is off.” When asked why the condition wasn’t mentioned Wednesday when the Energy Department announced that the deal was signed, Leavitt said it was because Trump “is always the final dealmaker.”
My own reading is that Trump is backtracking according to a script. He could have taken credit for the condition on Abraham Accords, had it been a part of the deal. But it is within his ingenuity to try to increase his leverage with the Saudis by adding the caveat openly: that might even improve the deal in certain respects such as enrichment or verification clauses, for instance.
The Saudis appear to have been taken by surprise on Wednesday when US Energy Secretary Chris Wright signed the decades-long, multibillion-dollar deal with his Saudi counterpart, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Energy but that doesn’t have to be taken at face value. The deal reportedly includes a “123 Agreement” and an accompanying “bilateral safeguards agreement,” and the two agreed to a two-year study to see whether enrichment is necessary. This seems like kicking the can down the road. Interestingly, Netanyahu’s office said Saudis joining of the Abraham Accords “would be an historic leap forward for peace in the Middle East.”
On the whole, Trump has a deal here. The caveat of Abraham Accords may serve to delay the agreement from coming to fruition unless and until the Saudis jettison their bottomline [a Palestinian state] linking normalisation with Israel. On the other hand, Trump has the leverage insofar as the Saudis now have to address whether they want to normalise relations with Israel.
Indeed, the Saudis too are getting an optimal deal here, which doesn’t expressly block reprocessing and enrichment and doesn’t allow for the International Atomic Energy Agency to do its inspections. The Saudis have apparently got away with not having a customary additional protocol, which would have ensured there is no cheating, and it will stay a peaceful programme. On Truth Social, Trump maintained on Thursday that “there will be no enrichment of material,” but added that the US is “not opposed to Civil (Non-Enriched) Nuclear Facilities.” Conceivably, the US may have control of a Saudi enrichment facility and keep a military / security presence.
The Congress will be able to review the deal in a 90-day window. Lawmakers do not need to approve it, but they could oppose it, although that is unlikely. (See a Congressional Research Report Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation, March 11, 2026) All in all, the chances are of the agreement “staying in place and nothing substantive happening until Saudis agree to something” regarding Israel, as [per] Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, an influential pro-Trump DC-based think tank.
The most bizarre coincidence of the entire sequence of developments since Wednesday is the shadow this deal could potentially cast on the US-Iran agreement that is on the horizon. But that is only hypothetical. If Trump intends to launch an all-out war with Iran, there will be no more negotiations to be had on a nuclear deal.
Saudis, being stakeholders, may no longer resist Trump’s entreaties to collaborate with the war effort going forward, whose objective would be to destroy Iran comprehensively with all the military might at Washington’s command. The Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has said in the past that if Iran obtained a nuclear weapon, the kingdom would have to follow suit.
In such a scenario, there will be no conceivable reason for Israel at the present juncture to try to kill the US-Saudi deal that is struggling to be born.
Pakistan thought it won the peace. Now, it could be dragged into war.
By Elfadil Ibrahim | Responsible Statecraft | July 22, 2026
Four weeks ago, Pakistan looked like one of the biggest winners of the U.S.-Iran war.
Its army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, shuttled between Washington, Tehran and Gulf capitals for months. As part of his efforts, Pakistan hosted the first face-to-face U.S.-Iran talks in years and helped broker the Islamabad memorandum of understanding that Vice President JD Vance signed in June, thanking Munir and calling him one of the “very, very important people” in his life.
Islamabad hired a Washington lobbying firm to convert that goodwill into defense cooperation and minerals investment, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif spoke of a “sun of progress and prosperity” for Pakistan’s chronically stressed economy after the MoU between the U.S.and Iran brought an end to major military operations.
Pakistan’s fortunes have since reversed. Fighting between Washington and Tehran has resumed, and Islamabad’s dual goals of being Iran’s trusted interlocutor and the Arab Gulf states’ security guarantor are once again at odds.
President Donald Trump declared the deal was “over” in early July, after which the U.S. struck civilian and military targets in Iran. Iran, for its part, declared on July 18 through its deputy foreign minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, that it was “suspending all obligations” under the framework. The war has since widened into exactly the kind of multi-front regional conflict Pakistan spent the spring trying to prevent.
The clearest new exposure for Pakistan is in Saudi Arabia, where Iran struck Prince Sultan Air Base at al-Kharj — its first direct hit on Saudi territory since March — just days after the Houthis, Iran’s Yemeni ally, fired missiles on the kingdom, hitting Abha airport in the country’s south. That escalation occurred after Saudi-allied forces hit Sanaa airport in Yemen to prevent the landing of an Iranian airliner; the U.S. Treasury alleged without providing evidence that the plane is linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp. The strikes effectively enforced Riyadh’s airspace veto over the Houthi-controlled capital.
Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact with Riyadh last year. It deployed fighter jets and thousands of troops to the kingdom after earlier Iranian strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure. More recently, Islamabad has reportedly communicated to Tehran directly that attacks on Saudi Arabia will be treated as attacks on Pakistan itself. Sharif’s own statement in the aftermath called the Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia a violation of the kingdom’s sovereignty that Pakistan “strongly condemns,” pledging “unwavering support” for Riyadh’s security.
The tone is notable given that Pakistan’s parliament explicitly refused to get entangled in Yemen over a decade ago. In April 2015, faced with a nearly identical Saudi request to join the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis, Pakistan’s National Assembly voted unanimously to “maintain neutrality.” Islamabad’s calculus has not changed. If anything, recent events have sharpened Pakistan’s desire to broker a lasting peace.
Pakistan is home to the world’s second-largest Shia population after Iran, and the killing of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, in February set off deadly unrest in Karachi and Islamabad; Munir himself had to intervene to calm a wave of processions and pledges of allegiance to the new supreme leader across Shia neighborhoods.
Significantly, Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif attended Khamenei’s funeral in July, and Sharif posted after that “the late Supreme Leader’s wisdom, leadership and profound influence on Iran and the wider region will be remembered for generations” — a demonstration of the fine line Pakistan’s leadership has to walk, one no doubt delivered with a domestic audience in mind as much as an Iranian one.
That fine line becomes impossible to walk when a defense pact, triggered by Saudi-Houthi fighting or by further Iranian strikes on Saudi Arabia, would ask Pakistan to do the exact thing its parliament explicitly refused a decade ago: take a military side against a Houthi-Iran axis, and do so at a moment when its domestic Shia politics is highly combustible
Kuwait is now reportedly asking for the same kind of commitment that Saudi Arabia already has. Reuters reported last week that Islamabad is in early-stage talks with Kuwait — which has absorbed repeated Iranian strikes on its infrastructure in recent days — over an expanded defense agreement that would include “thousands of Pakistani troops on the ground, fighter jets, drones, an air defence system, and other defence-related facilities,” according to an anonymous Pakistani government official cited in the report.
Another anonymous Pakistani security official said the country “cannot consider a deployment of combat troops at this stage.” That hesitation suggests that stacking multiple defense commitments across Gulf states in Iran’s crosshairs makes Islamabad’s balancing act much harder to sustain. Each new pact narrows the room to claim neutrality the next time Tehran calls.
During this war, Pakistan discovered what happens when Gulf partners doubt its ability to balance between Tehran and the Arab Gulf states. The United Arab Emirates recalled a $3.5 billion loan in April and quietly began deporting Pakistani Shia workers by the thousands. The move was widely read as retaliation for Islamabad’s perceived tilt toward Tehran during the mediation. Saudi Arabia stepped in with $3 billion to cover the gap, but the lesson was clear: Pakistan’s neutrality satisfies no one fully, and the cost of disappointing any single Gulf patron is measured in the billions of dollars.
Economic self-preservation has been Pakistan’s primary motive for steering mediation and ending a war that has hobbled the economies of its creditors and choked the trade routes that power its own electric grid. Pakistan is on its 25th International Monetary Fund program; more than half of its tax revenue is put towards servicing its debts. It had barely stabilized its inflation before the Strait of Hormuz’s closure sent rates back into double digits.
In March, as the war’s first phase disrupted energy flows out of Hormuz, Islamabad ordered a two-week school closure and imposed a four-day work week to conserve fuel — measures the government has now indicated it may need to revive.
A parallel disruption to the Red Sea, like the blockade of Saudi Arabia declared by the Houthis Monday, would be highly disruptive to Pakistan’s energy security, and by extension, its economy. While Pakistan imports the overwhelming majority of its fuel from the Gulf, the closing of another critical chokepoint would simultaneously tighten global tanker capacity and insurance costs everywhere, pushing the same spot-market prices Pakistan is already struggling to afford even higher.
It would also add further pressure on Pakistan’s defense commitments to Saudi Arabia, given that Riyadh will not tolerate such a closure. In a recent statement, Riyadh pledged to deal with “Houthi threats against transiting vessels… firmly and swiftly.” The stakes for Saudi Arabia are high: Since the Strait of Hormuz was blocked, Saudi Arabia has relied on its East-West pipeline to divert roughly 5 million barrels per day of crude to the Red Sea Port of Yanbu — its only viable export outlet while Hormuz is all but closed.
None of this means Pakistan’s mediation was a mistake, or that its diplomatic capital has evaporated. Kuwait’s foreign minister still thanked Pakistan last week for its “constructive and mediatory role,” and Islamabad remains one of the few channels through which Washington and Tehran would resume talks, when the time comes. But the specific bet Pakistan made — that ending the war would allow it to bank the goodwill through commerce and financial aid — has not yet paid off.
Instead, the restart of the war has brought Saudi Arabia back into Iran’s crosshairs. At the same time, the Saudi-Houthi front has reopened, the Strait of Hormuz has been closed again, and a blockade of Saudi-linked ships on the Red Sea has been formally declared.
Each of these factors adds immense pressure on Pakistan, which now has every reason to double down on diplomacy, lest it be drawn in as a combatant.
Elfadil Ibrahim is a writer and analyst covering the politics of the Middle East and Africa, with a special focus on Sudan. His work has been featured in The Guardian, Al Jazeera, The New Arab, Open Democracy and other outlets.
Yemeni naval blockade forces six vessels to turn back
Press TV – July 21, 2026
Six ships have turned back in the past 24 hours after Yemen’s armed forces imposed a maritime ban on Saudi vessels, a military source confirmed to the Yemeni News Agency (Saba), as the “blockade for blockade” strategy against Riyadh takes effect.
The move came after Yemen’s Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center sent a warning to shipping companies, stating that vessels are banned from loading or discharging cargo at any Saudi ports and that violators “may be subject to targeting in any location within the operational reach of the Yemeni Armed Forces.”
Shipping data from LSEG confirmed that at least two oil tankers carrying Saudi crude to China and India have been forced to make U-turns in the Red Sea.
The Xin Long Yang, a Very Large Crude Carrier carrying 2 million barrels of Saudi crude loaded at Yanbu, reversed course and headed toward the Suez Canal rather than risk transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
The smaller tanker Rodos, carrying about 700,000 barrels of Saudi crude for India, also made a U-turn for Suez.
With the Strait of Hormuz transit blocked amid the illegal US’s war on Iran, Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu has become the main alternative route for West Asian oil, allowing exports of millions of barrels per day.
The Yemeni armed forces announced the naval blockade on Saudi Arabia on July 20, in response to the kingdom’s 12-year siege and aggression against Yemen.
“Vessels calling at Saudi Arabian ports are advised to reconsider transiting the Red Sea and to consider implementing enhanced mitigation measures,” British maritime security company Ambrey said, adding that it assessed vessels calling at Saudi ports “were at high risk.”
War risk insurance costs have already ticked higher in the past 24 hours, with risk assessments for Saudi ports being re-evaluated, insurance industry sources said.
In recent months, an average of 10 crude tankers have sailed through the Bab el-Mandeb daily.
The Yemeni blockade comes after more than a decade of Saudi-led aggression against Yemen.
Since March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition has imposed an air, land, and sea blockade on Yemen, strangling the country’s access to food, fuel, and medicine.
The coalition has conducted over a quarter of a million airstrikes across Yemen, causing widespread devastation and killing tens of thousands of civilians.
The United States has provided critical support throughout the war, including intelligence sharing, logistical assistance, target identification, in-flight refueling of coalition warplanes, and arms sales, making Washington a direct partner in the coalition’s actions.
The war has devastated Yemeni society. By 2026, millions faced acute food insecurity, with aid deliveries severely restricted and the healthcare system in collapse.
Despite the immense suffering, the coalition has maintained its chokehold, closing border crossings, grounding humanitarian flights, and ordering ships away from Yemeni ports.
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From the Archives
A short history of British torture
ICC | December 2005
When the House of Commons was debating how much to increase the time limit for detention without trial the question of torture came up. Officially this was limited to the nice considerations of whether it was all right to send people to places where torture is used and whether Britain can use information collected by the use of torture in other countries. This discussion gave an impression of democratic Britain as the home of civilised behaviour where the very idea of torture is repugnant to our legislators – unlike, say, the US with its secret CIA jails… In reality, the British state has a long history of using and developing a whole range of torture techniques. … continue
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