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Why Trump’s war on Iran will fail

By Tamer Ajrami | MEMO | February 27, 2026

The United States has turned the talks with Iran upside down. What is happening now does not look like serious negotiations. It looks more like a way to buy time and prepare for a more dangerous phase. That is why two questions matter: Why Trump’s war on Iran will not succeed, and why would it be a dangerous choice for Washington? The answer is simple. The demands Washington is putting on the table are designed to be rejected, and because any military action, if it occurs, will reveal the limits of force, the logic of exhaustion, and the absence of a clear or achievable goal.

All the talk about a deal, gaps, and loopholes continues to go around in circles. On the ground, the US is moving in a completely different direction: it is raising the bar in a way that ruins the talks from the inside and pushes things toward escalation.

Washington now says it has clear conditions. In reality, these conditions make any settlement almost impossible. The first demand is that Iran hand over all its enriched uranium directly to the United States. Not to a third country, not through an international mechanism, not through gradual reductions. Just hand it over to Washington. This is not meant to produce a balanced agreement. It is meant to humiliate a state and force it to give up a highly sensitive part of its sovereignty.

The second demand is even clearer: dismantle Iran’s nuclear facilities and destroy them completely, including major sites like Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow, along with underground facilities hidden in mountains. The irony is that Washington and its allies do not have full certainty about what earlier strikes (12-day war, June 2025) actually achieved inside these deep facilities. So, the demand for dismantling and destruction looks like a political cover for the simple reality of what lies underground is not easy to reach.

On sanctions, the US offers no clear path. The talk is about lifting a limited set of sanctions imposed recently, while keeping the main sanctions in place under a long “test.” Has Iran truly surrendered, or is it only offering symbolic concessions? Then comes the most dangerous condition of all: the deal must be permanent, Iran must stop enrichment completely, and this must last forever. These are not terms for a fair agreement. They are terms of surrender.

That is why this round looks more like the round before war. The US military buildup in the region is still expanding, and the flow of aircraft, defence systems, and naval assets continues. Everyone is watching everyone through satellites. Almost nothing can be hidden. The real message is not in press statements. It is in the movements that create a new reality and make escalation feel closer than a settlement.

But if a strike happens, it will be full of risks. Even in the American media, one question keeps coming back: what exactly are Trump’s goals? Does he want a limited strike to force Iran into quick concessions? Does he want a wider campaign to bring down the regime? Or does he simply want to declare that he “destroyed” the nuclear program without being able to prove it? The problem is that these goals clash with each other, and each one requires different tools, different costs, and different timelines.

Time is part of the problem too. Some estimates suggest that the ability to keep up intense operations with the current level of forces may be limited. This connects with warnings about running down air defences and burning through advanced / expensive ammunition in a campaign that does not guarantee results. In other words, if war starts, it may quickly turn into a war of exhaustion. It is exactly the kind of fight Washington does not want.

If Iran can launch large waves of ballistic missiles, it can drain defensive stocks on US ships and at US bases in the region fast. Then comes the embarrassing question: how does the US keep fighting? And how does it stop without looking like it pulled back under fire? If Iran keeps firing while the US withdraws, the image inside America would be politically costly.

That is why the administration, based on what is being discussed in Washington, may look for a way to sell the war at home. One idea is for Israel to launch the first strike, and then for the US to step in later under the banner of “defending Israel”. That makes it easier to justify the intervention in Washington, because critics will face a ready-made slogan: we are defending an ally.

But on the ground, it is hard to separate who starts and who joins. US and Israeli forces operate in the same environment and in overlapping ways. The real difference is not in the sky. It is in the story Washington wants to tell its public.

Even if a strike happens, the main question remains: can airstrikes alone achieve big goals? Many analysts say hitting facilities becomes like a game of chasing a moving target. You destroy one site, it gets rebuilt. You hit a surface facility that was emptied beforehand. Equipment and materials are moved elsewhere. As for facilities buried deep in mountains, they remain a major problem. Access is not guaranteed, and photos alone cannot prove total destruction.

More importantly, a nuclear programme is not just concrete and steel. It is knowledge, technology, experience, and an industrial base. Even if part of it is damaged, Iran can repair it over time. Claims of “total destruction” therefore sound more like political messaging than a verifiable reality.

The missile program is an even bigger challenge. Iran produces missiles in large numbers and has the industrial and scientific base to rebuild its stock after any confrontation. Even if the US hits some production lines, wiping the program out completely would require long-term control on the ground and not just airstrikes.

Here is the truth that official speeches avoid: if Trump’s real goals are regime change, removing Iran’s missile power for good, or forcing “zero enrichment” forever, then airstrikes will not deliver that. Those goals require a major ground war and a long occupation. This then may bring huge losses, heavy costs, and years of deep involvement.

This would not serve the US at a time when competition with China is rising. Burning through advanced and expensive American capabilities in the Middle East without clear gains could give China a strategic advantage and push it to move faster on bigger priorities like Taiwan, while Washington remains stuck in a war with no clear ending.

There is also a constant operational risk in any large air campaign: an aircraft could be shot down, a pilot could be captured, or a major incident could happen in a sensitive strait. One such event can turn a limited strike into a wider war, and shift the focus from negotiating nuclear issues to negotiating prisoners and political humiliation.

So, Washington faces two costly paths: a full-scale war it does not have the political tools to sustain, or airstrikes that will not achieve the announced goals but could open the door to further escalation. In both cases, negotiations become a temporary cover while the region moves toward a dangerous test of power and its limits.

The bottom line is this: raising demands to the level of humiliation does not lead to an agreement. It pushes the other side toward rejection and then toward preparation for confrontation. When talks become terms designed to fail, they do not prevent war. They delay it to a moment chosen by Washington; after the battlefield is prepared and the political story is already written.

In the end, the problem is not that Washington has less power. The problem is that it is pursuing goals that are bigger than its tools. Airstrikes do not topple regimes, erase nuclear know-how, and do not end a missile program that can be rebuilt. The higher the US raises its demands, the more it closes the door to diplomacy and the closer the drift toward confrontation.

If war begins, it may quickly become a costly fight with no clear ending: defenses get drained, rare munitions get burned, markets shake, and bases come under attack. Then an unsolved question will rise inside the US: how do we end this without political defeat? Failure becomes likely because the goals cannot be achieved by bombing alone. And the danger is huge, because escalation may spiral beyond control. In a war like this, Washington might win a round in the air, but lose the bigger game on the ground.

February 27, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , | Comments Off on Why Trump’s war on Iran will fail

Lebanon: Between sovereignty and the mirage of normalization

By Ali Abou Jbara | The Cradle | February 26, 2026

The smoke had barely lifted from the latest Israeli bombardment of south Lebanon when another conversation began circulating in Beirut. While border villages buried their dead and families searched through rubble, a parallel discourse surfaced in studios and on digital platforms: normalization with Israel presented as a viable political path.

The ongoing war on Lebanon, marked by unprecedented Israeli escalation, daily raids, and widespread destruction, exposed more than military vulnerability. It revealed that certain voices inside the country no longer conceal their position toward Tel Aviv.

They now speak openly of public normalization as the cure for Lebanon’s crises – even as Israeli warplanes violate Lebanese skies, despite the so-called ceasefire. What is marketed as pragmatism begins to resemble political surrender.

Prominent personalities have amplified this shift. Journalist Marcel Ghanem declared live on his program “Sar al-Waqt” on MTV that he was considering speaking directly with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and suggested repealing Lebanese laws that criminalize dealings with Israel.

Digital platforms followed the same trajectory. “Hona Beirut” circulated videos of Israelis sending populist messages to Lebanese audiences – “We want peace with Lebanon. We want to visit Beirut and enjoy fattoush and shawarma” – carefully packaged to soften the image of a state whose aircraft continue to strike Lebanese territory.

Political figures moved even further. MP Paula Yacoubian stated publicly: “If salvation comes through Israel, let it come but save us.” Charles Jabbour, head of the Lebanese Forces (LF) party media apparatus, argued that Israel does not occupy Lebanon and does not attack the Lebanese, claiming instead that it monitors Hezbollah to ensure implementation of past agreements. He concluded: “If Hezbollah wins, Lebanon loses. If Israel wins, Lebanon wins.”

Such statements are deliberate. They substitute national consensus with partisan calculus and recast normalization as responsible governance.

Expansion as governing doctrine

Advocates of a “quick peace” treat Israel as a state seeking stability. The political current in Tel Aviv suggests something else entirely.

Under Netanyahu and his alliance with ultra-religious and nationalist forces, the “Greater Israel” vision operates as a strategic direction.

On 22 September 2023, Netanyahu stood before the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and presented a map that includes Gaza and the occupied West Bank as part of Israel, using the biblical name “Judea and Samaria” instead of the West Bank – in a symbolic dedication to the annexation project.

His coalition partner, Finance Minister and leader of “Religious Zionism” Bezalel Smotrich, had stated in 2016 that Israel’s borders “must extend to Damascus,” and appeared in Paris in  March 2023 in front of a map that considers Jordan part of the “Land of Israel.”

Since Menachem Begin and the Likud party came to power in 1977, the concept of “Greater Israel” has morphed into a political program based on settlement expansion and changing demographic realities. This current is based on interpretations from the Book of Genesis that consider the “Promised Land” to extend from the Nile to the Euphrates. Even Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, wrote in the 1930s that establishing a state on part of the land would serve as a first stage, not an endpoint.

Following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, expansionist language hardened. Military operations broadened in Gaza and the occupied West Bank while strikes intensified in Syria and Lebanon. “Security depth” expanded to encompass regional theaters.

On 21 February 2026, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee said in an interview with Tucker Carlson that, under a biblical interpretation of land promised in Genesis, it “would be fine if [Israel] took it all,” implicitly extending Israel’s reach across much of West Asia – remarks that sparked sharp regional condemnation.

Maps circulated by proponents of this project extend beyond historic Palestine. They incorporate Lebanon, Jordan, most of Syria, half of Iraq, and territories in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and even Kuwait.

Against that strategic horizon, Lebanese normalization rhetoric begins to feel profoundly detached from the lived reality of the country. Border villages remain scarred, Lebanese airspace is violated without consequence, and sovereignty is subjected to daily erosion, yet normalization is presented as transactional diplomacy, detached from geography and history.

It is precisely here that the Lebanese debate turns unsettling. What does it mean to pursue “peace” with a project whose declared maps stretch beyond its recognized borders? How does a state whose skies, waters, and land are routinely breached convince itself to trust assurances from a government that treats expansion as a generational mission?

The occupied West Bank as precedent

The occupied West Bank offers a concrete case study. Since the 1993 Oslo Accords, the settler population has grown from roughly 250,000 to more than 700,000. Hundreds of settlements and outposts now fragment the territory. Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen has described this as imposing “de facto sovereignty” – gradual annexation without formal declaration.

Land confiscations, bypass roads, settlement blocs, and armed settler protection have eroded the territorial basis for Palestinian statehood. Smotrich openly advocates annexation and rejects Palestinian sovereignty. Netanyahu presides over what observers describe as the most right-wing government in Israel’s history, with settlement expansion central to its agenda.

Three decades of negotiations unfolded alongside continuous territorial transformation. Diplomatic processes advanced in parallel with irreversible changes on the ground. This is how “peace” is managed when it is a tool to strengthen control, not to end it.

Despite this record, similar assumptions appear in Lebanese discourse. MP Camille Chamoun of the Free Patriots Party says he does not believe Israel has an interest in violating international agreements and Lebanese borders.

MP Sami Gemayel, head of the Kataeb Party, suggests that relations with Israel and western countries may protect Lebanon. Even Lebanese actress and writer Carine Rizkallah said on the TV program Al-Masar that she hoped there would be no new war with Israel and that “it’s time to end these problems between the two countries.”

The irony is that Lebanese rhetoric promoting normalization leans on an assumption of good faith from the other side, even though the occupied West Bank continues to show how such assumptions unfold in practice. There, decades of agreements, conferences, and international sponsorship did not halt expansion; they unfolded alongside it, as settlements multiplied, land was fragmented, and entire areas were quietly absorbed into a new reality.

If this is where the occupied West Bank has arrived after years of accords and external guarantees, on what basis is Lebanon encouraged to trust similar assurances? The experience is not abstract or distant. It is ongoing, visible, and instructive for anyone willing to look.

Regional patterns of influence

The broader region reinforces this reading. After the fall of the previous Syrian government on 8 December 2024, Israeli influence expanded in southern and central Syria, capitalizing on security vacuums and fragmentation. Strategic corridors between northern Syria and Israeli ports strengthened. Control over the occupied Golan Heights and adjacent water resources deepened.

Turkiye adopted a confrontational stance toward Israeli expansion, warning that the absence of clear red lines destabilizes Syria and opens space for broader intervention. Ankara expanded its diplomatic engagement on Palestine, strengthened regional alliances, and emphasized deterrence, demonstrating that even governments with formal ties to Israel are wary of unchecked expansion.

Across neighboring states, internal divisions have created entry points for influence. Settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank, strikes in Syria, and sustained violations in Lebanon reflect an interconnected strategy.

Normalization premised on unilateral concession narrows strategic space. In regional practice, asymmetrical engagement tends to consolidate the stronger party’s position.

Lebanon operates within that same environment. Any official normalization would unfold against Israel’s strategic framework and military advantage. Expectations of reciprocal restraint lack precedent in current regional dynamics.

Lebanon’s historical record

Lebanon’s experience with Israeli aggression remains documented. In April 1996, Israeli forces bombed a UN base in Qana, killing more than 100 civilians who had sought shelter. In September 1982, the Sabra and Shatila massacre occurred under the watch of the Israeli army. The 1982 Israeli invasion reached Beirut, and south Lebanon remained under occupation until 2000, liberated only through sustained resistance.

The July 2006 war resulted in more than 1,200 Lebanese deaths, extensive infrastructure destruction, and the displacement of nearly one million people. Airspace violations continued long after hostilities subsided.

Following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and Hezbollah’s decision to open a northern support front, strikes on southern villages resumed, placing Lebanon within a wider expansionist frame.

In this context, normalization proposals detach policy from cumulative experience. They assume recalibration without structural change. Historical precedent suggests otherwise.

Legal foundations

Lebanon’s stance toward Israel is codified in law. Since 1955, the Boycott of Israel Law has prohibited commercial, cultural, and political dealings with the Israeli enemy. The law remains in force and constitutes a foundational element of Lebanese state policy.

The penal code criminalizes espionage and communication with the enemy, including cooperation that provides political, media, or moral benefit. In contemporary circumstances, public statements or digital content that promote normalization may fall within this framework if deemed to confer advantage. Penalties can include imprisonment and fines.

Given ongoing Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty, normalization carries national security implications under existing legislation. Judicial and security institutions retain authority to investigate potential breaches.

This legal architecture reflects accumulated historical experience rather than abstract doctrine.

Sovereignty under pressure

The present debate concerns strategic direction under sustained pressure. An expansionist project operates openly in the region. Lebanon’s historical memory remains recent.

Calls for normalization at a moment of ongoing aggression raise structural questions about sovereignty, deterrence, and long-term stability. Strategic environments shaped by military asymmetry rarely reward unilateral accommodation.

Lebanon faces a clear dilemma. Defending sovereignty requires political coherence and deterrent capacity. Pursuing normalization without reciprocal structural change invites further testing of borders and institutions.

The chosen trajectory will shape more than just diplomatic posture. It will define how the state positions itself within a region undergoing forced transformation.

February 27, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism | , , , , , | Comments Off on Lebanon: Between sovereignty and the mirage of normalization

Ukraine Given $43Bln in Proceeds From Russian Assets Frozen by G7 Since 2024 – Estimates

Sputnik – 27.02.2026

The G7 nations have issued $3.8 billion in loans to Ukraine in 2026 using proceeds generated by frozen Russian state assets, bringing the total amount of loans given to Kiev since 2024 to almost $43 billion, according to calculations by Sputnik based on data from the Ukrainian Finance Ministry and national agencies.

In 2024, the G7 countries approved a $50-billion loan to Ukraine, funded by revenues from frozen Russian assets. By late February 2026, the countries had allocated $42.7 billion to Ukraine under this scheme.

The first billion was transferred to Ukraine by the United States in late 2024. Since then, Washington has not provided any new funding to Kiev from Russian asset proceeds. The other members of the G7 gave Ukraine $37.9 billion in 2025 and $3.8 billion in 2026.

Overall, the European Union has contributed $32 billion in funding to Ukraine as part of the loan secured by Russian assets. Canada has contributed $3.6 billion, while Japan and the United Kingdom have each contributed approximately $3 billion.

February 27, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , , | Comments Off on Ukraine Given $43Bln in Proceeds From Russian Assets Frozen by G7 Since 2024 – Estimates

The military is babying F-35s to hide their true cost to taxpayers

By Mike Fredenburg | Responsible Statecraft | January 23, 2026

Are the military services babying the F-35 to obscure its true costs while continuing to get enormous sums of taxpayer funding for a plane that has consistently failed to live up to performance expectations?

From the very beginning, the F-35 program has been plagued by hundreds of billions of dollars in cost overruns and repeated schedule delays.

Moreover, even as promised capabilities have been delayed by well over a decade, billions poured into fixes haven’t resolved ongoing reliability issues, crippling its operational effectiveness, and rocketing the program cost to over $2 trillion dollars — 400% more in inflation-adjusted dollars than its 2007 Government Accountability Office estimate.

The plane’s extreme unreliability has resulted in full mission capable rates (FMC) of only 36.4% , 14.9%, and 19.2% for the F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C, respectively. For F-35Bs and F-35Cs, only the newest planes have full mission availability rates above 10%.

Unsurprisingly, the services and Lockheed Martin don’t really like to talk about FMC; instead, they like to focus on mission-capable (MC) rates of roughly 50%. While much lower than the 90 percent promised by Lockheed Martin and its service partners, it certainly sounds much better than the dismal FMC rates. But MC is a very deceptive measure, and the services know it, as “mission capable” aircraft need only be capable of flying non-combat missions, such as training, ferrying, or public relations, etc.

But the MC deception is only part of the equation when it comes to just how little bang-for-the-buck taxpayers are getting for their dollar.

Strong circumstantial evidence, coupled with emerging data and the services’ long history of stonewalling when it comes to problems associated with major programs, suggest that the U.S. military services , as well as prime contractor Lockheed Martin, have been babying the F-35s to obscure just how unreliable and expensive they would be if not being nursed along.

This coddling of the F-35 lowers some costs and pushes other costs into the future, keeping current year expenses as low as possible. This makes the program look like it is more efficient and effective than it really is, improving the chances of selling and delivering more F-35s while decreasing the chances the program will be curtailed or even canceled.

Major maintenance cost factors

There are three major drivers of wear and tear on an aircraft like the F-35: how many missions (sorties) it carries out, how many flight hours it accumulates, and how it’s flown during a mission.

Missions/Sorties are the best predictors of maintenance-related costs. While accumulated flight hours are often discussed when it comes to aircraft age and maintenance, studies have shown that the number of sorties, on average, is a better predictor of the wear and tear on an aircraft. This is because each sortie involves the stresses of taking off and landing, as well as subjecting the engine to thermal cycles, the primary culprit when it comes to engine wear.

Once the plane is flying, its wear is minimal unless subjected to aggressive maneuvering and engine use. Hence, when it comes to minimizing wear, for the same number of flight hours, fewer sorties of longer duration will produce less wear than more sorties of shorter duration, 100 two-hour sorties vs. 200 one-hour sorties.

Flight hours and operating costs. While in most cases, the number of sorties will be a better predictor of when maintenance will be required, more flight hours still equal more maintenance. So, if you can keep the hours down, the absolute cost of maintaining the plane will be less. For context, modern fighters like the F-16 routinely flew 250–350 hours per year in their prime, but F-35s average only about 195 hours annually — well below their original targets of 250–316.

To note: the June 2025 Congressional Budget Office found that F-35 availability and hours being flown are “lower, in some cases much lower, than those of other fighter aircraft of the same age.” Interestingly, even at 17-years of age, legacy aircraft such as F-16s and F-15s blow away the mission readiness of brand-new F-35s, even though they are flying more hours annually.

Indeed, we know the hours flown each year by the F-35A and F-35B declined markedly over the first seven years of their lifetimes. This means aircraft just a few years old are being flown less than brand new planes and consequently being subject to less daily wear and tear, conveniently pushing the cost of replacing engines and other expensive depot-level work down the road, even as the services continue to buy new F-35s under what some, including myself, would call false cost metrics.

But beyond cost shifting, overall fewer hours being flown means less in-the-air training “stick time.” And while flight simulators are helpful, there is no substitute for training in a real plane, being subject to real flight forces. Sadly, due to unreliability and cost per flying hour, F-35 pilots are not getting the stick time they need to truly excel.

How the planes are flown during sorties matters. While the services do not typically report how the planes are actually being operated during a sortie, babying vs. pushing it to the limits of its airframe and engine will dramatically impact how much maintenance is required. Due to operational security concerns, exactly what non-combat operational limits are placed on the pilot and his plane is not available. But we do know now that there are very tight limits on how often and how long the F-35B and F-35C are permitted to go supersonic due to the damage done to their stealth coating and perhaps even structure during supersonic flight.

F-35 retrofits and upgrades kick costly engine overhauls down the road. By building and fielding aircraft even before final designs were complete, the F-35 program took concurrency to a level never seen before. This multibillion-dollar concurrency experiment resulted in an unprecedented number of retrofits and hardware modifications for early batches of F-35s — work that can take more than a year to complete for each affected plane. But while the plane is offline, it isn’t being used, so again, any necessary engine overhaul and associated maintenance costs will be kicked like a can into the future.

Putting it All Together

Consider a brand-new F-35A delivered to an Air Force squadron. In its first few years, it is assigned to training units where it generates many short-duration sorties of 1.5 hours or less, while generating over 200 or more flight hours per year. From there, it gets assigned to an operational squadron, flying fewer sorties of longer duration, but still racking up enough hours not to have a big negative impact on the fleet-wide average. Reduced sorties mean less monthly maintenance costs and less wear on the engine.

Then in year five and six, it undergoes refits and rework that take it out of service for a total of 12 months. While out of service it is not contributing hours and sorties, but it also is not putting wear on its engine, pushing a multi-million dollar engine overhaul out by another year. This cost shifting makes the program look better than it is. By year eight it is flying just over 150 hours per year, while the Air Force is counting on newer planes to keep the averages up.

While this kind of micromanagement can reduce maintenance costs due to fewer sorties and hours, it also shifts major costs into the future and depends on new planes to maintain average flight hours and sorties at a high rate. Once new planes stop entering the fleet, the number of hours and sorties pilots will be able to fly will have to be reduced to keep costs from going through the roof.

We don’t have the smoking gun, but…

Ultimately, due to legitimate operational security (OPSEC) concerns, the services won’t reveal full details on how the F-35 sorties and hours are being micromanaged or limitations and restrictions on how F-35 pilots are allowed to operate the aircraft. But we do know that the 2024 CBO report adjusted overall estimated sustainment costs for the F-35 program from $1.1 trillion to $1.58 trillion, while stating F-35s will be flying 21% less hours going forward due to reliability issues.

This is exactly what one would expect from the kind of cost shifting pattern we have described. What’s more, we can be sure sophisticated opponents like China and Russia have seen this report and have doubtlessly conducted in-depth analysis exposing the F-35’s inability to conduct high-tempo operations over a sustained period against a peer competitor, who, unlike opponents such as Venezuela and Iran, will regularly create situations in which we aren’t controlling the timing and tempo of our responses.

This lack of robustness also ensures that our pilots are shortchanged in skills development relative to what they could count on from a more reliable fighter.

By micromanaging F-35s, the true depth of their shortcomings can be concealed/minimized, helping to sustain support for a program diverting enormous resources from potentially more effective alternatives. It’s time to stop wallowing in sunk cost emotionalism and put a stop to buying planes whose reliability and costs make them a national security liability.

February 27, 2026 Posted by | Deception, Militarism | , | Comments Off on The military is babying F-35s to hide their true cost to taxpayers

Ukrainian military analyst praises use of drones against ‘Russian-Hungarian-Slovak friendship’

Remix News | February 27, 2026

Ukrainian analyst Valery Savchuk spoke in a video about Ukraine’s geopolitical pressure on Hungary by shutting down the Friendship oil pipeline, calling it a correct strategy. He added that drones should also be used to strike at the “Russian-Hungarian-Slovak friendship,” writes Hirado, based on a video the analyst published.

“I personally like this Ukrainian position: the position of a serious player who uses all opportunities to achieve his goals. Blackmail? Yes, geopolitics. It’s time for us to play these games too — on the condition that this game leads to the desired result for us.”

He then went on to say that Ukraine should also use drones against the Hungarians and Slovaks. “Now we will wait for the decision of the European Union. We will wait for the effective work of our diplomats, and most importantly: We will wait for new devastating blows of our drones to this Russian-Hungarian-Slovak friendship,” he said, presumably referring to the Friendship oil pipeline.

Ukraine has been blamed for various attacks on the Friendship pipeline and Russian energy producers, including a massive wave of drone strikes in Russia territory that destroyed the Kaleykino pumping station.

Meanwhile, Parliamentary State Secretary Balázs Hidvéghi posted his own video message on the importance of a new national petition, where Hungarians can say “no” to financing the Russian-Ukrainian war, 10 years of support for Ukraine, and a rise in utility costs.

The Fidesz politician stressed that “Brussels is planning €1.5 trillion in aid for Ukraine and wants its membership by 2027. Given the events of recent days, it is especially important now for Hungarians to make their voices heard: Ukraine has not resumed oil shipments to Hungary for political reasons, while the Brussels leadership has sided with Ukraine.”

“Hungary has become the target of serious threats and pressure, and therefore it cannot remain silent now. He added that the government is calling on Hungarians to stand up against the Brussels-Ukraine-Tisza Pact and join the national petition,” he added.

The petition can be filled out until March 23, and according to estimates, the number of returned forms could exceed one million.

February 27, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , | Comments Off on Ukrainian military analyst praises use of drones against ‘Russian-Hungarian-Slovak friendship’

Von der Leyen warns Hungary: We have ways of making you talk

By Finian Cunningham | Strategic Culture Foundation | February 26, 2026

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen arrived in Kiev this week empty-handed, and she was pissed. She had been planning to mark the fourth anniversary of the Ukraine war on February 24 with a new €90 billion loan to prop up the corrupt Kiev regime.

At the last minute, Hungary announced that it was vetoing the “Ukraine Support Loan.” So, von der Leyen, the former German defense minister and arch Russophobe, had nothing to show the puppet regime. The big anniversary occasion was an embarrassing flop. Hungary was accused of “betraying” European solidarity.

Putting a brave face on the debacle, von der Leyen made a promise, with menacing tone, about delivering the €90 bn “one way or another.” She said: “Let me be clear, we have different options, and we will use them.”

Those options would seem to include inciting regime change in Budapest. Hungary is going to the polls on April 12 for parliamentary elections. It is no secret that the European Union leadership would dearly like to see incumbent Prime Minister Viktor Orbán being turned out of office, and replaced by Péter Magyar, of the opposition Tisza party, who is more amenable to Brussels’ policy of supporting the Kiev regime in the proxy war against Russia.

Orbán’s government vetoed the €90 bn loan – 60 per cent of which is for military aid – because it accuses the Kiev regime of blocking vital oil supplies to Hungary. Slovakia has also joined Budapest in making the accusation. Both countries claim that Ukraine is using energy “blackmail” simply because they refuse to discontinue buying oil supplies from Russia, and because they are opposed to the ongoing war.

On January 27, Russian oil supplies to Hungary and Slovakia transiting Ukraine via the Drushba pipeline were suddenly stopped. The Kiev regime claims that the pipe was hit by a Russian drone.

However, Hungary’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó has bluntly accused Ukraine of lying. He disputes that a Russian attack on the infrastructure even took place. It doesn’t make sense that Russia would harm its customers.

The suspicion is that the Ukrainian regime is using a purported Russian strike as a pretext to cut off the oil supply. The suspicion is deepened by the fact that the Kiev regime has refused requests by Hungary and Slovakia for their inspectors to assess the alleged technical damage. And neither is the EU leadership putting any pressure on Kiev to prove its claims of Russian sabotage.

Ukraine’s nominal president, Vladimir Zelensky, who is mired in allegations of massive fraud, financial corruption, and racketeering, has for a long time been threatening to cut off Russian oil supplies to Hungary and Slovakia. He accuses Budapest and Bratislava of supporting Russia’s war machine by buying its oil. Hungary and Slovakia say that it is their sovereign right to continue obtaining vital energy imports from Russia. The Soviet-era Drushba (“Friendship) pipeline has been supplying Europe since 1964.

The European Union has also been pressuring Hungary and Slovakia to terminate the purchase of Russian crude oil and get in line with the rest of Europe to source alternative, more expensive American energy exports.

Last year, Zelenksy delivered on his threats when the NATO-backed Kiev regime bombed sections of the Drushba pipeline in Russian territory. Those attacks temporarily disrupted supply to Hungary and Slovakia. At the time, the European Union leadership did not condemn the Ukrainian attacks. In other words, Von der Leyen and the Brussels administration were effectively siding with a non-EU member that was harming the interests of two member nations. That indifference was tantamount to greenlighting more sabotage attacks.

The Kiev regime has a record of using attacks on energy as a political weapon against Hungary and Slovakia. It is therefore logical that it has taken such practice to a new level by blocking infrastructure that it can easily control on its own territory. There is no need to bomb the Drushba pipeline in Russia, hundreds of kilometers away. The Kiev regime can handily turn off the pumps of the pipeline section running through its territory – and then blame Russia for “drone strikes”.

Hungary and Slovakia have both accused Zelensky of “slow-walking” the alleged repairs to the pipeline. Zelensky claims that the repairs can’t be carried out because Russia keeps attacking the repair crews.

The Kiev regime has a habit of lying. It has been claiming that Russia is shelling the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant under its control, when in reality it is the  Kiev regime that has been carrying out the attacks, which Moscow has condemned as “nuclear blackmail”. Again, the European Union has indulged Kiev’s lies by ignoring the blatant evidence.

On the energy blackmail against Hungary and Slovakia, the knock-on effect has been a growing shortage of fuel and increasing prices for energy and transport.

Hungary’s European Affairs Minister Janos Boka has accused Ukraine and the European Union of deliberately disrupting oil supply to influence the upcoming election. He said: “Ukraine has clearly been reaching for the energy weapon for political reasons, interfering in the ongoing Hungarian elections… to create uncertainty and chaos, and thereby helping the [opposition, pro-EU] Tisza party to power.”

At a closed-door summit in Brussels this week for EU foreign ministers, it was notable that Ukraine’s top diplomat, Andrii Sybiha, was afforded the extraordinary privilege of being permitted to join the conference via video link. How is it that a non-EU member is allowed to participate in a private ministerial summit?

Hungary’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó reportedly complained that EU foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, prevented him from grilling the Ukrainian on the specific damage to the Drushba pipeline. Szijjártó said that the “mumbling response” from the Ukrainian official and his abrupt disconnection from the summit demonstrated guilty responsibility.

What the whole saga illustrates is the dictatorship that has emerged in the European Union. Countries like Hungary and Slovakia are not allowed to have independent positions on their energy trade or their opposition to the war in Ukraine.

The Kiev regime is using the disruption of vital energy supply to EU members as a form of blackmail to coerce those members into handing over tens of billions of euros to prolong a bloody conflict, a conflict that could spiral into a nuclear world war. And the EU leadership is effectively supporting this terrorist tactic against its own members to enforce subordination.

When von der Leyen warns that “we have other options,” the inimical image conjured up is that of a Gestapo interrogator twirling pliers in hand.

The strategic defeat of Russia is paramount for the European Russophobic elites, even if it means gouging out the democratic rights of its own member states and endangering international peace.

February 27, 2026 Posted by | Civil Liberties, Deception, Economics, Full Spectrum Dominance | , , , | Comments Off on Von der Leyen warns Hungary: We have ways of making you talk

EU manipulating polls in bid to oust Orban – German opposition leader

RT | February 27, 2026

The EU is desperately attempting to engineer “regime change” against Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban in next month’s parliamentary election, employing tactics such as poll manipulation and energy blackmail, German opposition leader Alice Weidel has claimed.

In a post on X on Wednesday, the co-chair of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party accused Brussels of using “their puppet,” Hungarian opposition leader Peter Magyar, in a bid to remove Orban.

“They want Orban gone, and they are willing to use any means to achieve it,” Weidel wrote, pointing to the ongoing “blockade of oil supplies” from Ukraine to Hungary through the Druzhba pipeline, and “manipulation of election polls.”

Weidel was responding to a recent survey by Hungarian pollster Median showing Magyar’s opposition Tisza Party with a 55% to 35% lead over Orban’s ruling Fidesz-KDNP alliance. Irish economist Philip Pilkington dismissed the figures as “really crazy polls,” comparing them to surveys in Georgia ahead of elections in 2024, which were followed by unrest.

Hungarian opposition pollsters have a track record of significant inaccuracies. In 2022, left-leaning polling firm Publicus was wide of the mark by 20 points, while Median itself underestimated Fidesz by 7 points in its final pre-election survey. Orban ultimately secured a 20-point victory.

Budapest and Brussels have been in an escalating standoff over Hungary’s continued opposition to EU policy on Ukraine and Russia. Budapest has repeatedly blocked or vetoed EU initiatives, including a recent €90 billion ($106 billion) emergency loan for Kiev and the bloc’s latest sanctions package against Moscow.

Orban has also vehemently opposed Ukraine joining the EU, arguing that Brussels’ support for Kiev draws the bloc closer to direct war with Russia and ignores Ukraine’s failure to meet requirements for candidates.

The Hungarian leader has described recent attempts to offer Kiev a form of ‘membership lite’ as “an open declaration of war against Hungary,” accusing Brussels of disregarding the will of the Hungarian people and being “determined to remove the Hungarian government by any means necessary.”

Orban has also accused Brussels of using “censorship, intervention, and manipulation” to undermine his government, framing the upcoming April 12 election as a choice between “war or peace.”

February 27, 2026 Posted by | Civil Liberties, Deception | , , | Comments Off on EU manipulating polls in bid to oust Orban – German opposition leader

Daniel Davis: China & Russia Will Defend Iran

Glenn Diesen | February 26, 2026

Lt. Col. Daniel Davis is a 4x combat veteran, the recipient of the Ridenhour Prize for Truth-Telling, and is the host of the Daniel Davis Deep Dive YouTube channel. Lt. Col. Davis discusses why diplomacy in Iran has failed, how there is no off-ramp, and why this war will likely be a disaster.

Daniel Davis Deep Dive: https://www.youtube.com/@DanielDavisDeepDive/videos

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February 27, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Video | , , , | Comments Off on Daniel Davis: China & Russia Will Defend Iran