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Yemen between two wars: A fragile truce and the shadow of a regional escalation

By Mawadda Iskandar | The Cradle | November 4, 2025

Since mid-October, Yemen has returned to the forefront of the regional scene. Political and military activity has intensified across several governorates, exposing the limits of the current ceasefire. From Sanaa’s view, the phase of “no war and no peace” cannot continue.

Any attack, it warns, will be met with a direct response. Deterrence, it insists, is now part of its core strategy.

Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, is trying to juggle two tracks – military pressure and renewed dialogue through Omani mediation. Riyadh wants to keep its weight on the ground while testing the possibility of a broader settlement.

The US and Israel have again inserted themselves into the mix, each working to block a negotiated outcome that might strengthen the Sanaa government. Washington has revived coordination channels with the coalition, while Tel Aviv watches the Red Sea front and pushes for the containment of Ansarallah-aligned armed forces. Yemen has once more become an overlapping arena of peace talks, foreign manoeuvring, and military threats.

Negotiations under fire 

Oman has returned as the main regional mediator, moving to calm tensions after both Sanaa and Riyadh accused each other of violating the 2024 economic truce – the backbone of the UN “road map.” On 28 October, Muscat announced new diplomatic efforts to prevent a wider clash and reopen a political track.

But the situation on the ground shows little restraint. In Saada governorate alone, monitors recorded 947 violations this year, leaving 153 dead and nearly 900 injured. On 29 October, Saudi artillery shelled border villages in Razeh.

Sanaa affirmed that the “reciprocal equation” remains in place, staging a large military parade near Najran to display readiness. Riyadh, in turn, tested civil-defence sirens in its major cities – a move mocked by Ansarallah figure Hizam al-Assad, who said no siren would protect Saudi cities while the aggression and siege continue.

Speaking to The Cradle, Adel al-Hassani, head of the Peace Forum, points out that the crisis is worsening due to the deterioration of the economic situation and sanctions, which have affected more than 25 million Yemenis, while Oman is intervening as a mediator for the de-escalation.

According to Hasani, the roadmap includes two phases: the first is humanitarian, including the lifting of the blockade, the payment of salaries, and the resumption of oil exports; the second is political – to form a unity or coalition government that would coincide with a declared coalition withdrawal. Only that, he says, could stabilize the situation.

Washington and Tel Aviv’s new strategy

After Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and the ensuing war on Gaza, the US-Israeli approach to Yemen has shifted toward hybrid operations – mobilizing local partners, information warfare, and targeted strikes rather than any open intervention.

Sanaa’s recent warning about hitting Saudi oil sites came after detecting moves to create a US-Israeli front against Ansarallah. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the resistance movement “a very big threat,” and Defense Minister Israel Katz threatened airstrikes on Sanaa itself.

The idea is to keep Saudi Arabia under pressure while allowing Israel to act indirectly. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said the “Yemeni threat” is unresolved and urged Arab allies to take part in containing it.

Western think tanks have echoed this, urging Washington to rebuild Riyadh’s military role after the failure of the Red Sea naval alliance. The head of Eilat Port, Gideon Golber, admitted that maritime trade has been badly hit, adding that “We need a victory image by restarting the port.” A US Naval Institute report also noted that despite spending over $1 billion on air defense and joint operations, control over the corridor remains weak.

Between November 2023 and September 2025, Yemeni forces carried out more than 750 operations in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean – part of what Sanaa calls a defensive response. Head of the Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat, urged Saudi Arabia to “move from the stage of de-escalation to ending aggression, siege, and occupation and implementing the clear entitlements of peace.”

He further accused Washington of using regional tensions to serve Israel. National Council member Hamid Assem added that an earlier de-escalation deal, signed a year and a half ago in Sanaa, was dropped by Riyadh under US direction after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.

A source close to Sanaa tells The Cradle:

“The movement’s leadership is firmly convinced that the responsibility for these tools cannot be separated from those who created, armed, and trained them since 2015. Therefore, Sanaa affirms that any movement of these tools in Marib, the west coast, or the south of the country will not remain isolated, and will carry with it direct consequences that will affect the parties that supported and supervised the preparation of these groups.”

The source adds that:

“America has long experience with Yemen and may be inclined to avoid direct ground intervention, as its priorities appear to be focused on protecting Israel by striking Ansarallah’s missile and naval capability without extensive land friction. Therefore, it has begun to implement a plan that adopts hybrid warfare: intensifying media pumping, distortion, information operations, and psychological warfare, in addition to logistical and coordination preparations to move internal fronts through local pro-coalition tools.”

This hybrid strategy may coincide with Israeli military and media steps, the source points out, through threats and statements by officials in Tel Aviv, so that the desired goal becomes to “blow up the scene from within” and weaken Sanaa through internal chaos that paves the way for pressing options or strikes targeting its arsenal without direct American ground intervention.

US and UAE movements in the south

Throughout October, the US, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE expanded their presence in the south, west coast, and Al-Mahra to reorganize coalition factions and tighten control. US and Emirati officers arrived in Lahj Governorate, supervising the restructuring of Southern Transitional Council (STC) units from Al-Kibsi Camp in Al-Raha to Al-Mallah district. Security around these areas was reinforced with barriers and fortifications.

In Shabwa and Hadhramaut, joint committees of American and Emirati officers inspected Ataq Airport and nearby camps, counting recruits, running medical checks, reviewing weapons stock, and mapping command chains. Sources say Latin American contractors and private military firms assisted, ensuring resources stayed under external supervision.

In Taiz, another committee visited Jabal al-Nar to evaluate the Giants Brigades, their numbers, and armaments. On the west coast – from Bab al-Mandab to Zuqar Island – construction work is ongoing: terraces, fortifications, and outposts operated by “joint forces” hostile to Sanaa, including Tariq Saleh’s formations. Coordination reportedly extended to naval meetings aboard the Italian destroyer ‘ITS Caio Duilio’ to secure sea routes and “protect Israeli interests” in the Red Sea.

Hasani, who follows these movements, informs The Cradle that “These committees are evaluation and supervisory, not training, and are directly supervised by the US to ensure the readiness of the forces and perhaps as a signal to pressure Sanaa.”

He adds that British teams have appeared in Al-Mahra, while groups trained on Socotra Island are being redeployed to Sudan and Libya under UAE management.

Saudi-aligned Salafi units known as “Homeland Shield” now operate from Al-Mahra to Abyan and Hadhramaut. “These forces are today a pillar of the coalition to reduce the ability of Ansarallah, taking advantage of its religious beliefs, as part of the coalition’s tendency to turn the conflict into a sectarian war,” Hasani explains.

In Al-Mahra, local discontent is growing. Ali Mubarak Mohamed, spokesman for the Peaceful Sit-in Committee, tells The Cradle that Al-Ghaydah Airport remains closed after being converted into a joint US-British base.

“The committee continues to escalate peacefully through field trips and meetings with sheikhs to raise awareness of the community about the danger of militias,” he says, noting that the US presence has been ongoing since the coalition was established, though the exact nature of its presence is unknown.

A map showing the distribution of control in Yemen

Where is Yemen heading?

These field movements are taking place as Washington and Abu Dhabi coordinate more closely with Tel Aviv. After meetings in October between the US CENTCOM commander and the Israeli chief of staff, a new plan began to take shape: build a joint ground network across southern Yemen to contain Sanaa and safeguard the Bab al-Mandab Strait – one of the world’s most critical shipping lanes.

At the same time, the US State Department appointed its ambassador to Aden’s Saudi-backed government, Steven Fagin, to lead a “Civil-Military Coordination Center” (CMCC) linked to ceasefire efforts in Gaza. Regional observers see this as a move to integrate the Palestinian and Yemeni fronts into one framework of US security control stretching from the Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea.

Reports circulating in Shabwa and Al-Rayyan say Emirati officers have been dispatched to Gaza to help organize local brigades – a claim still unconfirmed but consistent with the UAE’s wider operational pattern. Investigations by Sky News Arabia noted similarities in the slogans and structure of UAE-backed militias in Yemen and armed factions in Gaza, hinting at shared logistics and training links.

Adnan Bawazir, head of the Southern National Salvation Council in Hadhramaut, tells The Cradle that the scenario of recruiting mercenaries to fight in Gaza is not proven, but is possible – especially with the assignment of the interim administration in Gaza by Fagin, linking local moves to broader regional plans.

In Hadhramaut, Fagin’s visits to Seiyun, which includes the First Military Region, indicate preparations for a possible confrontation, especially since the area is still under the Saudi-backed Islah’s control in the face of the STC conflict, while Riyadh seeks to reduce Islah’s influence by transferring brigades and changing leadership.

Bawazir also points to suspicious movements in Shabwa and at Ataq airport, where field reports indicate flights transporting weapons to strengthen the front, given the governorate’s proximity to Marib and the contact fronts with Ansarallah, which makes it a hinge point for any regional or local escalation.

The moves are therefore part of three interrelated scenarios.

First, shifting pressure from Gaza to Yemen to compensate for the political and moral losses of Tel Aviv and Washington, while using the pro-coalition factions as a pressure arena against Sanaa. Second, preparing for possible military action in the event of the failure of the negotiations. Third, reorganizing the pro-coalition factions and building a central command that can be directed by Washington, thus turning the brigades into executive tools, ready to escalate the situation internally with a sectarian character.

Each scenario positions Yemen once again as a test field for foreign ambitions. The country remains divided between two trajectories: the possibility of a political settlement through Oman’s diplomacy, and the risk of a new conflict fed by regional competition and foreign control over its coasts and resources.

Whether the coming months bring a deal or another war will depend less on what Yemenis want and more on how their neighbors choose to use their soil.

November 5, 2025 - Posted by aletho | Wars for Israel | Israel, Middle East, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, UAE, United States, Yemen, Zionism