The Rebirth of ISIS, Israel and the Continuation of Syria’s Civil War
By Robert Inlakesh | Palestine Chronicle | December 25, 2025
The chaotic predicament in which Syria now finds itself was, in many ways, predictable, yet this makes it nonetheless tragic. Despite the recent removal of the US’s crushing Caesar Act sanctions, the challenges ahead are so numerous as to render this a minor victory for the country.
In order to begin to understand what is happening inside Syria, we first have to begin to comprehend what happened following the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Although the moment that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) entered Damascus, and Ahmed al-Shara’a declared himself leader, was dubbed a liberation of the country, thus interpreted as the end to the nation’s civil war, what had really happened was the birth of a new chapter in the Syrian war.
On December 8, 2024, the Israeli air force saw its opportunity and hatched a long-planned strategy to destroy Syria’s strategic arsenal and occupy key portions of territory in the south of the nation. That day, however, much of the Arabic language world’s media completely ignored the historic event and refused to cover its ramifications.
Another key point was that, beyond Israel’s land grab, the country’s territory still remained divided, as the US-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) maintained its control over the northeast of the country. This movement believes that the territory it controls, with Washington’s backing, is called Rojava and is part of the land of Kurdistan.
Türkiye, to the north, views the Kurdish movement as a strategic threat and treats the SDF as an extension of other Kurdish organizations it deems terrorist groups. The majority of the people living inside SDF-controlled territory are Arabs, an issue that can also not be overlooked.
HTS Ascendant and the Collapse of the State
Then we have the HTS government that took over Damascus, which originally pledged to rule for all Syrians and not just the Sunni majority. However, HTS is a rebranding of Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot. Understanding this fact is key, because HTS was the de facto government in the territory called Idlib, in northwestern Syria; although a secular leadership was on paper, supposed to be the ruling authority.
In 2018, when Bashar al-Assad’s forces halted their offensive and sent all the armed groups opposing them on “Green Buses” to the Idlib enclave, Ahmed al-Shara’a, who called himself Abu Mohammed al-Jolani at the time, had started to consolidate power. This led to HTS establishing its own prisons and undergoing a process whereby it managed to control various al-Qaeda-affiliated Salafist armed groups inside the territory.
When HTS took Damascus, it did so with a ragtag army composed of militants from dozens of armed groups from inside Idlib, including many former ISIS fighters and others from different groups that were given the options to join forces with HTS, lay down their weapons, or face fierce crackdowns.
The way these crackdowns on dissidents were carried out, along with corruption in the governance of Idlib, even led to protests inside the province against HTS. Many hardline militants had also accused al-Shara’a of providing the US with details on the whereabouts of former ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Keep in mind now that when HTS took over Damascus, they did so without a fight and the former regime simply collapsed in on itself. So here was HTS, now tasked with managing the majority of Syria and had to do so without any army, because the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) had been disbanded.
Many elements of the former government, intelligence, and military under Bashar al-Assad were told they had been granted amnesty, yet forces aligned with HTS, and in some cases those within it, decided to take the law into their own hands through brutal field executions.
This eventually led to a group of former SAA fighters in the coastal region taking up arms against the new HTS security forces, triggering a response from a broad range of sectarian groups and others who were seeking “revenge” in blood feuds. The result was the mass murder of Alawite civilians across the coast.
Israel, the Druze File, and Syria’s External Fronts
Earlier this year, Israel also took advantage of tensions between Syria’s Druze community and sectarian militants aligned with Damascus, backing Druze separatist militias. This had been a strategy that Tel Aviv attempted to implement all the way back in 2013, when Israel began backing some dozen opposition groups, including al-Qaeda- and ISIS-linked militants that were committing massacres against the Druze.
The Syrian Druze population is primarily situated in the Sweida province in southern Syria. Israel long sought to create a Druze rump state there, which would serve as a land bridge to the Euphrates and allow for the total Israeli domination of the south. The Israelis are also allied with the SDF, although not as overtly as the Americans are, meaning that if their strategy works, then they have secured their domination all the way through to the Iraqi border.
This Monday, tensions again flared up between the Syrian forces aligned with Damascus and HTS in eastern Aleppo, with both sides blaming each other for the violence. Periodically, tensions continue to escalate in Sweida, yet come short of the large-scale sectarian battles we saw earlier this year.
Meanwhile, US forces have now expanded their footprint throughout Syria and have taken over more military air bases, even working alongside Damascus as a partner in the “fight against ISIS,” or “Operation Inherent Resolve.”
On December 13, an attack that killed three US servicemembers was blamed on a lone-wolf ISIS fighter. In response, the US then declared it was launching a retaliatory bombing campaign across the country.
The narratives of both Washington and Damascus make little sense, regarding this being a lone-wolf ISIS attack. Instead, the evidence suggests that the attack was carried out by a member of the HTS security forces, but this is perhaps a story for another day.
Now we hear report after report about the rise of ISIS. And while it is certainly true that ISIS is on its way back, even if in a weaker state, the context is never mentioned.
Internal Fractures, ISIS, and an Unstable Future
Not only has the current Syrian administration managed to play right into Israel’s hands with the management of the situation in Sweida, set up a shadow governance model that is even more corrupt than the previous regime, while isolating all of Syria’s minority communities in one way or another, but it has also effectively turned many of its own allies against it.
There is no actual “Syrian Army” to be spoken of right now, at least there isn’t one that is professionally trained or big enough to handle any major war. Instead, the Syrian state will rely on its allies, like major tribes and a range of militant groups. However, as time goes on, more and more of HTS’s allies and even many who now fill the ranks of its own security forces are growing tired of the government’s antics.
A large component of their anger comes from issues concerning tight Syrian relations with the US, leading to the hunting down of Sunni militants across the country, but particularly in and around Idlib. As mentioned above, HTS had integrated many ISIS fighters and those belonging to other hardline Salafist Takfiri fighting groups, but many of these militants have never been willing to sacrifice their core beliefs for a secular state.
For years, the man they knew as Jolani had preached against the United States and Israel, yet, after taking power, he began cozying up with them and targeting Sunni militants alongside the US military. In addition to this, the large number of foreign fighters inside the country have not been granted citizenship and feel as if their futures are threatened.
In other words, the conditions are ripe for some kind of revolt, and Ahmed al-Shara’a is surrounded by countless threats. If ISIS were to begin gaining traction, there is a good chance many of these fighters, currently allying themselves with the Damascus government, will switch sides. In fact, this is something that has already been happening, although in small numbers and isolated cases.
What we see is a recipe for disaster, one which could explode in any direction, triggering a much larger chain of events in its wake. So far, it appears as if there are four primary threats to the stability of the HTS government. These are the Sweida front, the Israel front, the SDF front, and the potential for an internal insurgency.
Mike Huckabee, the US ambassador to Israel, recently gave an interview during which he commented that Ahmed al-Shara’a “does know that any pathway for stability in Syria, his pathway for survival, is that he has to be able to have peace with Israel.”
It is important to understand that the two most powerful influences on Damascus are Washington and Ankara, yet it is clear that the US has the edge and could quickly overthrow the HTS regime at any time of its choosing.
Türkiye now has enormous influence inside Syria, where it is competing with the Israelis and attempting to set red lines, yet has failed to impose any equations as of yet. Perhaps the only way that the Turkish state could deter the Israelis is through backing a resistance front in the south of the country, yet it is clear that the US will not allow such a scenario to develop.
Even if a rather weak resistance group, or collection of groups, were to be formed and pose little strategic threat to Israel, this could also end up presenting a challenge to the rule of HTS in the long run. This is because such a resistance organization would enjoy enormous popular support and likely encourage other armed actors inside the country to join forces, creating a Lebanon-style system, whereby the forces of the state are incapable of confronting the occupier, and instead a resistance group would handle security.
The United States and Israel would never permit something like this to evolve, likely moving to commit regime change before such a plot is even conceived.
This leaves Ahmed al-Shara’a in an impossible position. He has no confidence in him as a ruler from the country’s minorities, growing anguish amongst the majority Sunni population, and no real army to be spoken of. Instead of resisting the Israelis, as his men and population at large seek, he sends his officials to sit around the table with them, while Syria’s official social media pages publish images of Syria without including the occupied Golan Heights.
Since 1967, most of the Syrian Druze living in the occupied Golan Heights had refused to take Israeli citizenship. After the sectarian bloodshed that occurred earlier this year, these Syrian Druze began applying for Israeli citizenship en masse. This is the impact that the rulers in Damascus have had on their own people; they have pushed Syrians who resisted Israeli citizenship for decades to switch sides, playing right into Tel Aviv’s hands.
Meanwhile, little is being done to reassure the disillusioned militants who had fought alongside HTS and believed they were fighting for a liberation cause and/or Islamic Caliphate, only to realize that they fought for a regime that negotiates with Israel and bows to the White House. Therefore, it is no wonder that when a group like ISIS appeals to them through its propaganda, it manages to convince them to join the organization’s fight.
What’s more is that this outcome was barely difficult to predict; only days after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, militants from Idlib were posting photos on Facebook of themselves holding up pictures of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in the Umayyad Mosque, the most important mosque to Sunni Muslims in Syria.
Not only this, while ISIS networks on social media were, in the past, blocked almost instantly, they began popping up in the open on places like Facebook again. This begs the question as to why such obvious ISIS glorification and supporters were permitted to begin operating so openly online during this period.
When it comes to Takfiri Salafist doctrine, whether someone is affiliated with ISIS or al-Qaeda offshoots, they do not simply abandon this ideology overnight because of changing political circumstances.
Now, Takfiri militants idolize a man named Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, which is why these Salafi groups are often referred to as Wahhabis. Historically speaking, this ideology was the bedrock on which the Saudi family launched their offensives to conquer Arabia, declaring the Ottomans kafir (disbelievers) and justifying their alliance with Britain, against other Muslims, on this basis. Therefore, some may justify the actions of al-Shara’a on the basis of their doctrine, but only to a certain extent.
When HTS began killing fellow Sunni Muslims, alongside the United States and cozying up to individuals responsible for the mass murder of their co-religionists, this started to become a major problem. It could no longer be branded an “alliance with the people of the book,” especially when fellow Salafists were kidnapped and killed by HTS government forces.
Some attention has recently been placed on the comments of the US envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack, who remarked that Syria should not be a democracy and instead a monarchy, even explicitly stating that this plan could include merging Syria with Lebanon. Such a system would certainly please many allies of al-Shara’a, and comments like these could be made in the interest of restoring faith in the leader.
Nonetheless, the current system is still operating on a knife-edge and is far from achieving a monarchy that rules the northern Sham region. In the distance, the Israelis are watching on and simply waiting for the next opportunity to achieve even more of their goals.
This is all because the war in Syria never truly ended; the only thing that changed is that Bashar al-Assad’s government fell, and perhaps if that had occurred during the first years of the war, there wouldn’t have been so many issues.
As is normally the case with human psychology, we seek to frame things in a favorable way to our worldview, meaning that we simply ignore evidence to the contrary. Yet, the case of Syria is really not all that dissimilar from the post-US-backed regime change realities currently existing in Libya, although there are key differences, of course.
So long as Syria remains without an effective resistance front against the Israelis, it will never recover and remain trapped. In Lebanon, it took years before such a resistance force truly took off in the south, and even then, it took decades to expel and then deter the Israelis. Syria is a much more complex picture, which makes predicting outcomes even more difficult.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.
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