How Syria’s Kurds were erased from the US-led endgame
Paris marked the moment Washington quietly aligned with Ankara and Tel Aviv to close the Kurdish chapter in Syria’s war
By Musa Ozugurlu | The Cradle | January 21, 2026
For nearly 15 years, US flags flew over Syrian territory with near-total impunity – from Kurdish towns to oil-rich outposts. In the northeast, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) manned checkpoints, American convoys moved freely, and local councils governed as if the arrangement was permanent.
The occupation was not formal, but it did not need to be. So long as Washington stayed, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) had a state in everything but name.
Then, in the first week of January, that illusion was broken. What had passed for a military partnership was quietly dismantled in a Paris backroom – without Kurdish participation, without warning, and without resistance. Within days, Washington’s most loyal proxy in Syria no longer had its protection.
A collapse that looked sudden only from the outside
Since late last year, Syria’s political and military terrain shifted with startling speed. Former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s rule came to an end, and shortly afterward, the SDF – long portrayed as the most disciplined and organized force in the country – followed the same trajectory.
To outside or casual observers, the SDF collapse appeared abrupt, even shocking. For many Syrians, particularly Syrian Kurds, the psychology of victory that had defined the past 14 years evaporated in days. What replaced it was confusion, fear, and a growing realization that the guarantees they had relied on were never guarantees at all.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – an extremist militant group stemming from the Nusra Front – advanced with unexpected momentum, achieving gains few analysts had predicted. But the real story was the absence of resistance from forces that, until recently, had been told they were indispensable.
The question, then, is not how this happened so quickly, but why the ground had already been cleared.
The illusion of fixed positions
To understand the outcome, it is necessary to revisit the assumptions each actor carried into this phase of the war.
The SDF emerged in the immediate aftermath of the US-led intervention against Damascus. It was never intended to be a purely Kurdish formation. From the outset, its leadership understood that ethnic exclusivity would doom its international standing. Arab tribes and other non-Kurdish components were incorporated to project the image of a multi-ethnic, representative force.
Ironically, those same tribal elements would later become one of the fault lines that accelerated the SDF’s disintegration.
Militarily, the group benefited enormously from circumstance. As the Syrian Arab Army fought on multiple fronts and redeployed forces toward strategic battles – particularly around Aleppo – the SDF expanded with minimal resistance. Territory was acquired less through confrontation than through absence.
Washington’s decision to enter Syria under the banner of fighting Assad and later ISIS provided the SDF with its most valuable asset: international legitimacy. Under US protection, the Kurdish movement translated decades of regional political experience into a functioning de facto autonomous administration.
It looked like history was bending in their favor.
Turkiye’s red line never moved
From Ankara’s perspective, Syria was always about two objectives. The first was the removal of Assad, a goal for which Turkiye was willing to cooperate with almost anyone, including Kurdish actors. Channels opened, and messages were exchanged. At times, the possibility of accommodation seemed real.
But the Kurdish leadership made a strategic choice. Believing their US alliance gave them leverage, they closed the door and insisted on pursuing their own agenda.
Turkiye’s second objective never wavered: preventing the emergence of any Kurdish political status in Syria. A recognized Kurdish entity next door threatened to shift regional balances and, more importantly, embolden Kurdish aspirations inside Turkiye itself.
That concern would eventually align Turkiye’s interests with actors it had previously opposed.
Washington’s priorities were never ambiguous
The US did not hide its hierarchy of interests in West Asia. Preserving strategic footholds mattered. But above all else stood Israel’s security.
Hamas’s Operation Al-Aqsa Flood in October 2023 handed Washington and Tel Aviv a rare opportunity. As the Gaza genocidal war unfolded and the Axis of Resistance absorbed sustained pressure, the US gained a new and more flexible partner in Syria alongside the Kurds: HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Muhammad al-Julani when he was an Al-Qaeda chief.
Sharaa’s profile checked every box. His positions on Israel and Palestine posed no challenge. His sectarian background reassured regional capitals. His political outlook promised stability without resistance. Where the Assads had generated five decades of friction, Sharaa offered predictability.
For Washington and Tel Aviv, he represented a cleaner solution.
Designing a Syria without resistance
With Sharaa in place, Israel found itself operating in Syrian territory with unprecedented ease. Airstrikes intensified. Targets that once risked escalation now passed without response. Israeli soldiers skied on Mount Hermon and posted selfies from positions that had been inaccessible for decades.
Damascus, for the first time in modern history, posed no strategic discomfort.
More importantly, Syria under Sharaa became fully accessible to global capital. Sanctions narratives softened while reconstruction frameworks emerged. The war’s political economy entered a new phase.
In this equation, a Syria without the SDF suited everyone who mattered. For Turkiye, it meant eliminating the Kurdish question. For Israel, it meant a northern border stripped of resistance. For Washington, it meant a redesigned Syrian state aligned with its regional architecture.
The name they all converged on was the same.
Paris: Where the decision was formalized
On 6 January, Syrian and Israeli delegations met in Paris under US mediation. It was the first such encounter in the history of bilateral relations. Publicly, the meeting was framed around familiar issues: Israeli withdrawal, border security, and demilitarized zones. But those headlines were cosmetic.
Instead, the joint statement spoke of permanent arrangements, intelligence sharing, and continuous coordination mechanisms.
Yet these points were also clearly peripheral. The real content of the talks is evident in the outcomes now unfolding. Consider the following excerpt from the statement:
“The Sides reaffirm their commitment to strive toward achieving lasting security and stability arrangements for both countries. Both Sides have decided to establish a joint fusion mechanism – a dedicated communication cell – to facilitate immediate and ongoing coordination on their intelligence sharing, military de-escalation, diplomatic engagement, and commercial opportunities under the supervision of the United States.”
Following this, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office “stressed … the need to advance economic cooperation for the benefit of both countries.”
Journalist Sterk Gulo was among the first to note the implications, writing that “An alliance was formed against the Autonomous Administration at the meeting held in Paris.”
From that moment, the SDF’s fate was sealed.
Ankara’s pressure campaign
Turkiye had spent years working toward this outcome. Reports suggest that a late-2025 agreement to integrate SDF units into the Syrian army at the division level was blocked at the last minute due to Ankara’s objections. Even Sharaa’s temporary disappearance from the public eye – which sparked rumors of an assassination attempt – was linked by some to internal confrontations over this issue.
According to multiple accounts, Turkiye’s Ambassador Tom Barrack was present at meetings in Damascus where pro-SDF clauses were rejected outright. Physical confrontations followed. Sharaa vanished until he could reappear without explaining the dispute.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was present in Paris and played an active role in the negotiations. Its demands were clear: US support for the SDF must end, and the so-called “David Corridor” must be blocked. In exchange, Turkiye would not obstruct Israeli operations in southern Syria.
It was a transactional alignment – and it worked.
Removing the last obstacle
With the SDF sidelined, Sharaa’s consolidation of power became possible. Control over northeastern Syria allowed Damascus to focus on unresolved files elsewhere, including the Druze question.
What followed was predictable. Clashes in Aleppo before the new year were test runs. The pattern had been seen before.
In 2018, during Turkiye’s Olive Branch operation, the SDF announced it would defend Afrin. Damascus offered to take control of the area and organize its defense. The offer was refused – likely under US pressure. On the night resistance was expected, the SDF withdrew.
The same script replayed in Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh. Resistance lasted days. Supplies from east of the Euphrates never arrived. Withdrawal followed.
The American exit, again
Many assumed that the Euphrates line still mattered. That HTS advances west of the river would not be repeated in the east. That Washington would intervene when its Kurdish partner was directly threatened.
The shock came when HTS moved toward Deir Ezzor, and Arab tribes defected en masse. These tribes had been on the US payroll. The message was unmistakable: salaries would now come from elsewhere.
Meanwhile, meetings between Sharaa and the Kurds, which were expected to formalize agreements, were delayed twice, and clashes broke out immediately after.
Washington had already decided.
US officials attempted to sell a new vision to Kurdish leaders: participation in a unified Syrian state without distinct political status. The SDF rejected this, and demanded constitutional guarantees. It also refused to dissolve its forces, citing security concerns.
The Kurdish group’s mistake was believing history would not repeat itself.
Afghanistan should have been enough of a warning.
What remains
Syria has entered a new phase. Power is now organized around a Turkiye–Israel–US triangle, with Damascus as the administrative center of a project designed elsewhere.
The Druze are next. If Israel’s security is guaranteed under the Paris framework, HTS forces will eventually push toward Suwayda.
The Alawites remain – isolated and exposed.
The fallout is ongoing. On 20 January, the SDF announced its withdrawal from Al-Hawl Camp – a detention center for thousands of ISIS prisoners and their families – citing the international community’s failure to assist.
Damascus accused the Kurds of deliberately releasing detainees. The US, whose base sits just two kilometers from the site of a major prison break, declined to intervene.
Washington’s silence in the face of chaos near its own installations only confirmed what the Kurds are now forced to accept: the alliance is over.
Ultimately, it was not just a force that collapsed. It was a whole strategy of survival built on the hope that imperial interests might someday align with Kurdish aspirations.
No comments yet.

Leave a comment