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Why no power can undermine Iran’s eternal dominance over the Strait of Hormuz

By Mohammad Molaei | Press TV | April 10, 2026

The Strait of Hormuz, a strategic waterway nestled between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, is not merely a geographical passageway or a shipping lane on the world map to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It is a strategically vital waterway that forms the pulse of the global energy economy and, simultaneously, a potent asset for the Islamic Republic to fundamentally reshape the balance of power in the Persian Gulf and around the world.

Iran seeks not merely to protect or monitor this strait but to exercise absolute, intelligent and legitimate control that, in the short term, applies economic pressure on any adversary to force it into retreat, negotiation, or acceptance of Iranian terms, and in the long term, to convert this control into permanent and inexhaustible strategic advantage.

This unchallenged authority on the strategic chokepoint, which carries around a quarter of global seaborne oil trade, includes regulating maritime traffic, collecting passage tolls, influencing global supply chains, and reconfiguring power dynamics in the region in alignment with the Axis of Resistance.

Backed by immutable geographical realities, international legal frameworks, precise economic data, and Iran’s asymmetric military capabilities, we examine how no military threats nor diplomatic pressure can alter this fundamental and unalterable reality.

Geographically, the narrowest point of the Strait of Hormuz measures just 21 nautical miles — roughly 39 kilometers — in width. This extremely narrow gap places all key shipping routes, including two two-mile-wide carriageways and a two-mile buffer strip, entirely within Iranian and Omani exclusive territorial economic waters.

Iran is uniquely positioned to exert absolute control over the northern and most critical part of the strait, with its coastline stretching more than 1,600 kilometers along the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman. This extensive coastline includes not only mainland shores but also numerous strategic islands that serve as natural strongpoints.

Unlike the Suez Canal or Panama Canal — artificial waterways that can be circumnavigated — the Strait of Hormuz is the only natural, mandatory route for crude oil, liquefied natural gas, and chemical products exiting the Persian Gulf en route to the Indian Ocean and global markets.

No viable alternative to bypass Iran’s control

There is no economically viable or practically feasible alternative to bypass it.

The geography is also immutable: the mountains, rocky coasts, and shallow water depths in key formations make it impossible or prohibitively expensive to open parallel routes or construct new canals. No power on earth, irrespective of its military prowess, can overcome this geographical reality through insignificant actions, the occupation of tiny islands, or even the deployment of naval forces.

Iran’s long and impenetrable coastline is a natural wall that would require manpower and logistical support far beyond the capacity of the world’s largest armies to capture or hold.

Legally, the Strait of Hormuz falls under the purview of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), though its interpretation has consistently and appropriately followed the line advanced by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Because the strait’s width is less than 24 nautical miles, the entire waterway is not considered part of international waters or an international shipping route. The governing legal regime is not free and compulsory transit passage, but rather innocent passage.

Iran, having signed but not fully ratified the 1982 Convention, has always maintained that vessel passage must not prejudice the sovereignty of coastal states in any way, and that any passage threatening Iran’s national security is invalid.

This unique legal status grants Tehran the option of selective and conditional control over vessel traffic without necessarily infringing upon international law as interpreted by Western powers.

This is why the Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s real unsinkable aircraft carrier: an inseparable asset that costs virtually nothing to maintain daily, yet offers strategic and deterrent value inestimable to the global economy.

This legal position, combined with its geographical reality, has placed Iran in a situation where it can exercise practical dominance and unquestionable authority over the waterway without maintaining a permanent surface force presence.

Economically, the Strait of Hormuz is rightly called the true chokepoint of the world economy.

According to the most recent data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA), approximately 20.9 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products transit through the strait daily — equivalent to 20 percent of all oil consumed worldwide and 25 to 27 percent of global oil imports and exports.

Moreover, over 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade — roughly 11.4 billion cubic feet per day, mostly from Qatari fields — also passes through this route.

Influence of the Strait of Hormuz beyond oil

But the waterway’s influence extends far beyond the oil industry. Iran is the world’s largest source of urea — a nitrogen fertilizer vital to agriculture — and the broader Persian Gulf region dominates this trade.

Iran alone ranks among the top five urea exporters globally, and any disruption in transit automatically drives international urea prices up by 25 to 30 percent.

This price surge directly disrupts fertilizer supply chains for major importing countries such as India, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and most African countries. The consequence is a large-scale food crisis: soaring wheat, rice, and other agricultural commodity prices, worldwide food inflation, and a direct threat to the food security of billions of people.

Thus, the Strait of Hormuz is the chokepoint of the global food supply — a weapon Iran can use to influence the currents of the global economy and generate unprecedented pressure by seizing control of food and energy chains without launching a single missile or drone.

For the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Strait of Hormuz serves as an asymmetric weapon or economic nuclear. It can hold the world economy at ransom by the implementation of selective but intelligent control of the waterway, without the requirement that involves direct war, without incurring huge costs of armaments and even the use of advanced nuclear weapons.

This strategy can be used to impose colossal and rapid economic strain that compels the opposing side to either flee in haste, bargain, or accept Iran’s terms, with no other options.

The long-term goal could be to transform this temporary control into a structural and permanent arrangement: collecting passage tolls from vessels, selectively regulating traffic (free passage for friendly ships in the Persian Gulf, restrictions and bans on hostile ones), and completely redefining the rules of engagement in the Persian Gulf in alignment with the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Axis of Resistance.

During periods of tension, Iran implements a calculated approach by raising the threat to the point of execution without necessarily ever closing the waterway completely, as was seen in operations True Promise 1, True Promise 2, and True Promise 3.

This strategy imposes continuous economic costs on the enemy without inflicting any harm on Iran. Even though Iranian oil exports and its own products are indirectly affected in the short term, selective transit management and toll collection create new revenue streams, ultimately swinging the economic war in Tehran’s favor.

Iran’s balance of action closely mirrors that of Gamal Abdel Nasser when he nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956. Nasser dared to seize the canal, scuttled ships at its entrance, and effectively closed the oil lifeline to Europe.

That action brought the British and French empires to their knees, triggered the Suez Crisis, and symbolized the fall of British colonial rule in the West Asia region.

Just as Nasser, with a single strategic stroke, turned a major energy canal into an instrument of influence and power shift, Iran has now moved to nationalize the Strait of Hormuz through actual action, asymmetric military strength, and unyielding political determination.

This nationalization of the Strait of Hormuz can be seen as the beginning of the de facto demise of American power in the Persian Gulf region, just as the nationalization of Suez heralded the end of the British Empire. The only difference is that Iran employs less advanced, less costly, and more efficient means to enforce this power and authority.

Iran’s efforts to implement a passage toll system in the operational and executive spheres have been intelligent and multifaceted. Enemies or vessels lacking the required permission face direct threats, while friendly vessels — particularly those from Eastern countries and key allies like China, Russia or Pakistan — pay tolls in Chinese yuan, Russian rubles, or cryptocurrencies such as USDT or Bitcoin, securing safe and uninterrupted passage.

This policy not only provides a direct and permanent revenue stream for the Iranian economy but also significantly reduces Iran’s reliance on the US dollar, which is dying a slow death.

Through the comprehensive use of China’s international payment system (CIPS), other banking networks, and digital payment systems, Tehran has successfully moved to eliminate the dollar from the commercial equations of the Strait of Hormuz and is working toward currency multipolarity and the dismantling of Western financial supremacy.

Iran’s legitimate control over Strait of Hormuz

This initiative is part of a broader economic warfare strategy that renders further struggle or pressure on Iran far more expensive and burdensome for the opponent than capitulating to Tehran’s demands. Iran’s intelligent and legitimate control over the Strait of Hormuz is thus absolute and enduring, resting on three unchangeable foundations.

First is the irrevocable nature of geography and the impossible cost of seizing it by force. Iran is literally impregnable with its 1,600-kilometer coastline. Any invading force attempting to assert control over a 100-kilometer front and fully reopen the strait would require over one million men, a vast naval fleet, and unparalleled logistical support — a force that even the world’s strongest military would struggle to assemble.

Moreover, Iran’s control over the strait does not depend on fixed ground positions surrounding the waterway; complete control can be exercised through anti-ship missiles, long-range drones with a range of nearly 2,000 kilometers, and integrated radar command systems.

The second justification is Iran’s absolute superiority in both low-intensity and high-intensity asymmetric warfare. Large-scale mining of the Strait — not using surface ships but rather Fajr-5 rockets fired from a range of 70 kilometers — is entirely within Iran’s capabilities.

These rockets can deploy magnetic, intelligent, and advanced mines along the entire length of the strait, rendering shipping traffic completely uneconomical. Clearing such mines from this waterway would require no less than six months, during which the global economy would be crippled in terms of energy supply and food security.

The ancillary cost of such warfare to Iran is minimal — thousands of dollars per mine — while the enemy suffers billions of dollars in daily losses, not to mention the devastating disruption to global supply chains.

The third foundation is Iran’s long history and precise strategic calculus. Iran has on many occasions in the past spoken of shutting down the Strait but has not acted on it, as demonstrated during the crises of the 1980s, in 2011-2012, and the last few years.

The threat itself is an effective deterrent. Any force that attempts to respond to Iran’s language of direct threat with its own language of direct threat instantly faces the prospect of a global energy shock, extreme inflation, economic downturn, and domestic opposition.

Records in the contemporary world have revealed that Iran will push the threat to the final stage of execution and will ultimately compel the opponent to withdraw and accept new realities, and it has been clearly and unquestionably demonstrated in the past 40 days.

Finally, Iran does not insist on a permanent and destructive closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but rather on intelligent and selective control. This domination includes non-dollar toll collection, selective passage management of vessels, and the transformation of all external threats into opportunities to reformulate the rules of engagement in the Persian Gulf.

Iran soars above this waterway because its permanence — rooted in immutable natural geography, low-cost and effective asymmetric technology, and most importantly, its unshakable determination — has secured it forever.

This fact cannot be altered by any power on earth, regardless of massive military pressure or international coercion. Any attempt to counter Iran in the Strait of Hormuz would simply cost the global economy far more and ultimately force adversaries to accept the new reality in the Persian Gulf: this waterway will no longer be anyone’s backyard, but rather the territory of the established, solid, and indestructible deterrent power of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

April 10, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , | Comments Off on Why no power can undermine Iran’s eternal dominance over the Strait of Hormuz

Is The War Against Iran Over?

It is easier to start than end wars, but this one appears to have run its course

By Mouin Rabbani | April 8, 2026

Is the war against Iran over?

The aerial massacre conducted by Israel in Beirut Wednesday, the Iranian response further limiting passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and a number of other incidents suggest the agreement reached Tuesday is not only fragile but on the verge of collapse.

Yet the more likely scenario is that these are the death throes of a failed war, and that Israel’s furious efforts to re-ignite a full-scale war will fail.

Let’s recall what happened on Tuesday. That morning the US leader, Donald Trump, threatened that “A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again”.

Shortly before the 8pm deadline for yet another genocide in the Middle East, Pakistan announced that the US and Iran had agreed to a ceasefire. Iranians celebrated, Arabs and particularly those in the Gulf breathed an enormous sigh of relief, and Israel and its flunkies went into meltdown.

What changed?

As recent reporting in the New York Times makes clear, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in February successfully sold this war to Trump as one that would be short, decisive, and guaranteed to succeed. A quickie like no other.

With the exception of self-styled Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, Trump’s advisors all had serious doubts about the Israeli plan, with one describing it as “farcical” and another dismissing the associated optimism as “bullshit”. But being loyal yes-men, they all signed off on it.

The war was intended to achieve Iranian capitulation or collapse within days, and failing that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities were to be successfully eliminated within a few short weeks.

The Iranians would be so overwhelmed they would be unable to meaningfully retaliate, and the Islamic Republic would cease to exist before it could choke off the Strait of Hormuz and affect global energy supplies.

Success was so certain there was no need to prepare for any contingencies, let alone develop a Plan B.

More than a month later the US has accepted a ceasefire without any of its objectives achieved. Nor have Israel’s been. No regime change, no state collapse, no de-nuclearization, not even a significant degradation of Iran’s ballistic missile program. An attempted operation near Isfahan last week, the purpose of which appears to have been to establish a base within Iranian territory, went disastrously wrong.

More importantly, Iran was not only able to absorb a series of devastating blows and consistently retaliate against states throughout the region, and target and credibly threaten vital infrastructure, but Tehran also established unilateral control over the Strait of Hormuz. In response, the most powerful navy in history went out of its way to stay well over the horizon.

Iran, in other words, managed to transform the war against it into first a regional crisis and then a global economic crisis. While the US-Israeli bombing campaign continued to focus on the degradation of Iran’s military and industrial and civilian infrastructure, and although it inflicted enormous damage and killed thousands, the US focus visibly shifted to the economic ramifications of its war and re-opening the Strait of Hormuz by hook or by crook.

Washington shifted from achieving its original objectives to addressing the consequences of its own actions.

The US came to the realization that it had too eagerly purchased the counterfeit goods offered at a bargain basement price by Israel, and that achieving its objectives through warfare would require a massive commitment of additional resources. Not only was success still not guaranteed, but the disruption even success would entail would be prohibitively costly.

All the indications are that it was the US which called it a day, and that it was the US that engaged Pakistan, China, and others to bring its adventure to an end.

Trump’s genocidal threats about ending Iranian civilization appear to have been made after he knew a ceasefire was imminent, and as such may well have primarily reflected his need to look tough before accepting reality.

The suggestions that the US and Israel are using the two-week ceasefire to re-arm and resupply doesn’t really make sense. The equipment and weaponry most needed will take months if not years to replace, and the active war did not prevent the US from deploying tens of thousands of additional forces to the Middle East.

The coming days will demonstrate whether or not Iran is serious about bringing Israeli aggression against not only Iran but also Lebanon to an end. Indications are that it is. If indeed so, and as it has stated, Washington will need to choose between Israeli aggression and the Strait of Hormuz.

If that proves an insufficient incentive, and Tehran is serious, it has other options it can deploy. It is unlikely that the US will choose to fall into an Israeli trap, at even greater cost, yet again. Unlikely, but not impossible.

Over the course of the past six weeks Iran has sustained much more damage than it has inflicted. Yet strategically it emerges in a strengthened position relative to where it stood in late February. It neither capitulated, nor collapsed, nor sued for peace.

More to the point, absent this war Iran would not have been able to establish unilateral control over the Strait of Hormuz, and it is not going to fully relinquish this new-found power and leverage over the global economy. In real terms, this is worth more to Iran than a nuclear weapons arsenal, which it may well now develop anyway if negotiations do not result in a satisfactory agreement.

If and when negotiations commence, Iran will put less on the table, and demand more, than it accepted in either the 2015 JCPOA unilaterally renounced by the first Trump administration, or in negotiations with the US during the past year.

The US can make a deal, or refuse one, but at present it does not seem that resuming the war for the purpose of unattainable objectives is a realistic option for Washington. A return to maximum pressure is also no longer an option, because in the Strait of Hormuz Iran can now respond with maximum pressure of its own.

I’ve been wrong before and will of course be wrong again, and perhaps by tomorrow morning Israel or the US will have dropped a nuclear bomb on Iran or are preparing a ground invasion for next month.

Never underestimate the willingness of Americans to be led to disaster by their Israeli proxy. With actors as fanatic, irrational, and hubristic as the US and Israel, anything is possible.

Two issues to look for are Lebanon and Hegseth. Will Washington continue to indulge Israeli aggression against Lebanon, or will it order it to stop in order to wind this crisis down? As for Hegseth, if he is sent back to Rupert Murdoch to drown his sorrows in a succession of bottles, it means the US recognizes it has failed and has sacrificed him as its scapegoat.

The larger question is whether there will be a reckoning for Israel and the central role it played in this fiasco. If and when this reckoning arrives, this should start from the premise that it was Israel’s determination to permanently dispossess the Palestinian people that produced this crisis.

The refusal to properly address the question of Palestine, and the assumption that it can be resolved by armed force and slaughter, remains the root cause of the crisis that has now engulfed the entire region and beyond.

April 10, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Is The War Against Iran Over?

Iran war will leave long-term ‘scar’ on Wall Street, investors warn

Al Mayadeen | April 10, 2026

Investors have warned that the US-Israeli war on Iran will leave “scar tissue” in global markets, with commodity prices and bond yields unlikely to quickly return to prewar levels even if a lasting deal is reached.

Energy prices remain far above prewar levels even after the United States and Iran announced a fragile two-week ceasefire on Tuesday, with investors saying that damage to Gulf infrastructure and the loss of confidence after Tehran’s de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz will weigh on any recovery.

“It goes beyond the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. I think there would be longer-lasting scar tissue that would need a higher risk premium in markets, even if a permanent ceasefire was agreed,” said James Vokins, head of core income and investment grade credit at Aviva Investors.

Markets rallied but remain fragile

Stocks and bonds tumbled throughout March as US and Israeli attacks on Iran led Tehran to close the narrow waterway through which a fifth of the world’s oil and gas transits. Markets rallied quickly on the truce, with European government bonds and stock markets posting their best day for years on Wednesday.

Yet the international oil benchmark Brent crude remains nearly 35 percent higher than its price on the eve of the war, despite falling sharply in recent trading sessions. Bond yields, which have surged as traders slashed their bets on interest rate cuts by major central banks, remain elevated.

The yield on the interest rate-sensitive two-year Treasury note is 0.4 percentage points higher than it was before the aggression began. In Europe, where energy-importing economies are particularly vulnerable to global oil prices, yields have risen even further. Two-year yields in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy remain more than 0.5 percentage points higher than they were on the eve of the war.

A worse outlook than before the war

Bill Papadakis, macro strategist at Lombard Odier, said: “Even if the ceasefire proves to be a lasting one, the conflict was long enough, and leaves enough damage behind, that any reasonable macro scenario as of today looks meaningfully worse than the pre-conflict outlook.”

The US dollar and Treasuries have historically been seen as risk-free assets, used around the world for reserves. But President Trump’s alienation of allies and the ballooning national debt, made worse by the war on Iran, has lifted risk levels on those assets.

“Absolutely there is a bigger risk premium priced into US assets than before the war,” said George Pearkes, macro strategist at Bespoke Investment Group.

International investors losing confidence in the dollar

Andrew Jackson, head of investments at Vontobel, said his firm’s clients were increasingly concerned about the US dollar. “International investors are worried about the US dollar because of debt sustainability and the US’s relationship with the rest of the world. The US dollar curve is probably not the risk-free curve now,” he said.

Bill Campbell, a bond portfolio manager at DoubleLine, added that the conflict had encouraged him to further diversify away from the United States.

As the war on Iran enters its seventh week, the economic consequences continue to ripple outward. Even with a temporary ceasefire in place, investors are warning that the damage done to global markets and to confidence in US assets may not be easily repaired. The “scar tissue” that Aviva’s Vokins spoke of could take years to heal, if it ever does.

For the United States, a country already burdened by record debt and a president who has alienated traditional allies, the long-term cost of this war may be measured not only in dollars, but in the erosion of the very foundations of its economic power.

April 10, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , | Comments Off on Iran war will leave long-term ‘scar’ on Wall Street, investors warn

How Iran decimated US power projection in West Asia: Military lessons of 40-day war

By Mohammad Molaei | Press TV | April 10, 2026

As the ceasefire comes into effect after 40 days of aggression against the Islamic Republic, with violations continuing on the Lebanese front, military analysts worldwide are just beginning to unpack one of the most unexpected outcomes of modern military confrontation.

They are examining how the Islamic Republic of Iran, against the full American air and naval power backed by the finest allied systems, managed not only to survive but to inflict high costs and ultimately achieve a historic victory despite overwhelming odds.

Iran’s success did not come through matching the United States in crude technological adequacy or superior system quantities. Rather, it resulted from an advanced, multidimensional asymmetric approach integrating mass, accuracy, mobility, electronic warfare, and unremitting innovation.

This strategy turned historically strong American capabilities in air superiority and power projection into liabilities, while exposing the vulnerabilities of costly, high-tech defensive systems facing prolonged, low-cost saturation attacks.

Anti-access/area denial in the Persian Gulf: Holding US carriers at bay

Among the clearest evidence of Iranian military effectiveness was its maritime defense. The backbone of American power projection — US Navy carrier strike groups — was never free to operate without detection in proximity to Iranian waters.

Iranian coastal defense doctrine established a dense network of mobile anti-ship missile batteries, creating an impassable no-go zone.

Iranian anti-ship cruise missiles — such as the Noor (range approximately 120-170 km), the Qader (range approximately 200-300 km), and longer-range systems like the Abu Mahdi (some versions reaching 1,000 km) — forced American surface combatants to standoff range.

US carriers and their escorts never dared to approach within 300 km of the Iranian coast. Iranian forces fired multiple salvos of anti-ship cruise missiles at both short-range (300 km) and long-range (1,000 km) targets, typically accompanied by swarms of loitering munitions and fast-attack boats.

Although these attacks did not necessarily result in sinkings, they forced US forces to expend vast quantities of defensive missiles and divert air assets to protection missions, significantly impairing American offensive momentum.

Combined with sea-skimming profiles, terminal maneuvering, and saturation tactics, this made interception an extremely expensive affair. The US Navy found itself in an archetypal cost-benefit trap: pitting expensive multimillion-dollar interceptors against cheaper cruise missiles in a highly constrained littoral battlespace where response time was minimal.

Ballistic missile excellence and defeat of theater missile defense

Iran’s ballistic missile force proved to be the decisive strategic weapon. Throughout the 40-day war, Iran maintained a very high volume of fire, launching waves of advanced missiles combining liquid and solid fuel systems with increasing accuracy and survivability.

The Kheibar Shekan (and its modernized versions) played a particularly significant role. This medium-range ballistic missile features a maneuverable reentry vehicle capable of making terminal-phase adjustments at high speed, making reliable interception by Patriot PAC-3 systems extremely difficult.

The combination of speed, altitude profile, and evasive maneuvers stretched the kinematic limits of several Western interceptors. The United States and its allies expended thousands of Patriot and THAAD missiles — costing billions of dollars — yet leak rates remained high enough to damage bases and infrastructure multiple times over.

Targeting the eyes of the US missile defense

One of the enablers of Iran’s astounding success was the systematic targeting of the US missile defense system’s “eyes.” At the beginning of the war, Iranian retaliatory attacks — using both ballistic missiles and drones — damaged or destroyed at least four AN/TPY-2 radars associated with THAAD stations in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.

These powerful X-band radars are essential for providing the long-range, high-resolution tracking needed to achieve exo-atmospheric intercepts. As several of these mission-critical sensors were either blinded or impaired, the effectiveness of the layered US-led missile defense architecture plummeted significantly.

The destruction of early-warning and discrimination capability meant that even advanced THAAD interceptors could no longer reliably engage incoming threats — particularly when Iran combined ballistic missiles with decoys and saturation salvos.

Short-range air defense: The stealthy killers of sophisticated aircraft

Although long-range capabilities dominated headlines, it was Iran’s short- and very-short-range air defense systems that inflicted some of the most crushing damage on US airpower. Electro-optically guided, low-signature launchers such as the Majid (AD-08) and the Qaem-118 — with ranges of approximately 10-15 km — proved incredibly successful.

These systems lack radar emitters, making them nearly invisible to conventional radar warning receivers until a missile is already in flight. During the war, Iranian short-range air defenses were reported to have shot down over 160 drones and several manned aircraft, including F-15E Strike Eagles and A-10 Thunderbolt IIs. Most astonishingly, Iran claimed — and provided evidence of having downed or damaged at least one F-35 Lightning II.

This was widely regarded as nearly impossible before the war. The F-35’s AN/AAQ-37 Distributed Aperture System (DAS) provides 360-degree infrared coverage and can detect incoming missiles, cue countermeasures, and even command evasive maneuvers without pilot input.

The jet is also equipped with advanced infrared countermeasures, including cutting-edge flare dispensers and other systems designed to counteract optically guided threats. Nevertheless, Iranian electro-optical systems repeatedly achieved locks and hits — possibly indicating higher sensor sensitivity, superior image processing, or effective tactics that reduced warning time beyond the F-35’s defensive capabilities.

These short-range systems formed a dense, mobile, and highly integrated air defense grid. Iranian crews adapted quickly as the war progressed: they refined engagement envelopes, improved camouflage and relocation strategies, and closed off previously exploitable avenues.

What began as an occasional threat became a tightening noose. According to American pilot reports, they experienced an ever-shrinking operating range, an increasing risk profile during close air support and strike missions, and a continued deterioration of freedom of maneuver.

The result was a slow strangulation of US air superiority — not necessarily through attrition of aircraft numbers, but through a drastic rise in the risk and cost of every sortie.

Delayed adaptation and cost-imbalance strategy

Iran’s overall strategy rested on three pillars: mass (large quantities of cheaply produced drones and missiles), precision and maneuverability (enhanced guidance packages and terminal-phase evasion), and resilience (mobile launchers, underground bases, and rapid repair capabilities).

This dragged the United States and its allies into a war of attrition in which high-cost, limited-quantity munitions were traded against low-cost, mass-produced Iranian weapons.

Patriot and THAAD interceptors cost millions of dollars each and were often fired in two- or three-shot salvos against each incoming threat. The problem was exacerbated by swarms of drones, which forced defenders to choose between expending expensive interceptors or suffering successful attacks. The result was that US and Persian Gulf inventories were depleted, logistics systems were repeatedly overstretched, and political pressure mounted to de-escalate.

Iran also demonstrated remarkable operational learning. Air defense crews continuously adjusted frequencies, emission control protocols, and ambushing strategies. Missile forces rotated between fixed and mobile positions, employed decoys, and maintained launch efficiency despite persistent American and Israeli airstrikes.

Air corridors that had previously been open became highly contested, forcing American planners to either accept greater risk or reduce operational tempos.

A new model of regional deterrence

Neither side was able to win the Ramadan war on its own traditional battlefield. But in strictly military terms, Iran achieved its fundamental objectives: it deterred a full-scale ground invasion, foiled the “regime change” plots hatched by the enemy, and demonstrated that American troops and airspace were no longer safe havens of American hegemonic power.

This war highlighted a dynamic reality of modern warfare: the absence of qualitative technological superiority can be countered by quantity, asymmetry, and multi-domain integration.

Iran’s ability to combine ballistic missiles that defeat or saturate theater defenses, anti-ship attacks that keep capital ships at standoff range, and short-range electro-optical air defenses proven effective against fifth-generation stealth aircraft — all of this demonstrates that Iran has built an effective A2/AD bubble far stronger than pre-war estimates suggested.

As the dust settles and both sides count the lessons, one inescapable fact remains: the mighty US military is no longer able to dictate its terms at an acceptable pace and cost against a resolute, well-armed regional power equipped with modern asymmetric capabilities.

The Iranian military’s performance has rewritten chapters of the military playbook for future confrontations in the West Asia region — and has sent a powerful message that the era of unparalleled US domination in the region is past.

The ceasefire may have prevented the continuation of a devastating war that could spill over beyond the region, but the military lessons of the ‘Ramadan War’ will continue to shape deterrence calculations, force planning, and alliances in the region for years to come.

Mohammad Molaei is a Tehran-based military affairs analyst.

April 10, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , | Comments Off on How Iran decimated US power projection in West Asia: Military lessons of 40-day war

Iran’s report details US-Israeli war crimes in targeting schools, hospitals, livelihoods

Press TV – April 10, 2026

Iran’s Human Rights Headquarters has condemned the US-Israeli attacks that “deliberately” targeted civilian places directly affecting people’s daily lives and livelihoods as a “clear violation” of the most basic humanitarian and legal principles, stressing that they amount to “war crimes”.

In a statement on Friday, the office strongly condemned “the repeated and deliberate attacks by the Zionist regime and the United States against a wide range of civilian targets, including residential homes, hospitals, medical and relief centers, vital infrastructure, economic centers, bridges, schools, as well as vessels and barges used for people’s livelihoods”.

The statement referred to the attack on four fishing boats in the Lengeh port and other civilian vessels set ablaze, saying the attacks have directly violated “fundamental human rights, including the right to life, the right to work and the right to development.”

These acts of aggression “may amount to war crimes”, it said, referring to threats by US President Donald Trump and his war secretary Pete Hegseth to return Iran to the “Stone Age” and attack its vital infrastructure as “a clear evidence of the war crime intent of this aggressor regime.”

The statement noted that the fundamental principle of separation – the principle of distinction between military and civilian – in international humanitarian law obliges all parties to the conflict to avoid targeting civilian persons and property.

“Systematic attacks against ordinary people, the country’s vital arteries and development infrastructure are a gross violation of these principles and constitute a war crime.”

The statement also emphasized that the US and Israeli practice of “collective punishment” of the Iranians breaches the principle of prohibition of the threat and use of force in international law.

“This inhuman approach, which is devoid of the logic of law, morality and human conscience, reveals the true mentality” of those behind these “brutal” attacks, it added.

The statement urged the international community, human rights institutions and the United Nations to take immediate, decisive action against the US and the Israeli regime for committing these crimes and holding them accountable for these crimes.

It warned that any silence or indifference on the part of international institutions constitutes “approval and complicity” in these crimes.

April 10, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, War Crimes, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Iran’s report details US-Israeli war crimes in targeting schools, hospitals, livelihoods

NATO’s Slow Fracture: How Trump’s Iran War Exposed the Instrument of Hegemony

By Adrian Korczyński – New Eastern Outlook – April 10, 2026

The myth was always more durable than the machinery. NATO presented itself as a collective security architecture; in practice, it functioned as a billing arrangement for American imperial overhead, in which European governments paid in treasure, territory, and political will for the privilege of hosting Washington’s forward operating positions. The Iran war has not broken the alliance. It has simply made the arrangement too expensive to maintain the fiction. When Spain closed its airspace to U.S. flights on 31 March 2026, and Italy denied Sigonella to transiting bombers, it was not a minor rift or hesitation. It was the first visible moment in decades in which the instrument of European subordination refused to execute commands. NATO, as a mechanism of American coercion, has encountered limits.

The Myth of the Monolith

Europe’s formal commitments, ceremonial meetings, and Article 5 promises created an impression of unity. Yet 28 February 2026 revealed the monolith for what it was: a thin shell over a transactional system. The United States and Israel struck Iran first, without consultation, without a Security Council mandate, and without Iranian aggression against U.S. territory. The assassination of Supreme Leader Khamenei was the execution of a sitting head of state, an act that violated international law. Iran’s partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz is a defensive response, not an act of aggression. European refusal to participate is not mere obstinacy; it is recognition of the legal asymmetry. Compliance was optional the moment the operation violated the norms Europe had quietly internalized.

Compliance, Refused

The operational picture is unequivocal. Spain barred U.S. aircraft from Rota and Morón. Italy prevented Sigonella landings. France blocked munitions intended for Israel. Poland refused to redeploy its Patriot batteries. These refusals are not symbolic; they are concrete disruptions to U.S. planning. Bases, airspace, and munitions are tools of war; withholding them alters outcomes. NATO’s bureaucratic structure remains, but the logic of obedience—the lifeblood of the instrument—has fractured.

Poland illustrates the alliance’s contradictions most starkly. Warsaw has cultivated the image of the United States’ most reliable European client: hosting expanded troop rotations, spending 4.8% of GDP on defence in 2026, providing Patriot batteries, absorbing the economic costs of Ukraine-related sanctions. Operation Epic Fury arrived without consultation. Washington’s subsequent request to redeploy Polish Patriots to the Persian Gulf met a clear refusal. Defence Minister Kosiniak-Kamysz stated: “Our Patriot batteries are used to protect Polish airspace and NATO’s eastern flank. Nothing is changing in this regard.” The message is stark: loyalty is no longer a currency that guarantees influence. Even the most obedient client confronts limits when the cost of compliance exceeds both legality and national interest. Every denial signals a reassertion of European discretion, previously constrained by financial and political leverage wielded by Washington.

Trump, Rubio, and the Transactional Doctrine

Trump’s public denunciations of NATO—calling it a “paper tiger” and European governments “cowards”—and Rubio’s remarks on Fox News are doctrinal, not emotional. Trump suggested that U.S. membership itself is under reconsideration. Rubio asked why America should maintain NATO when the operational support is denied. What they articulate is a formal redefinition: the transatlantic relationship is no longer a guarantee of security; it is a transaction. European compliance in operations like Hormuz now exchanges political obedience for U.S. defence assurances. The logic is imperial, not allied. Empires do not seek permission; they dictate terms and issue invoices. When clients decline, threats of withdrawal follow. This is not a NATO crisis; it is the moment when the protection racket stops pretending to be a mutual defense treaty.

Historical Echo: From Suez to Iran

The lessons of Suez, 1956, resonate here. Britain and France acted militarily without consulting Washington; Eisenhower threatened financial retaliation, forcing withdrawal. Europe learned that independent military initiative without U.S. consent carries unmanageable cost. Iran 2026 reverses the dynamic. Washington acts unilaterally; Europe refuses operational support. The instruments of coercion—financial leverage, dollar dominance—are no longer sufficient. Europe possesses central bank reserves, fiscal tools, and industrial capacity to resist. Suez taught Europe to follow. Iran may be teaching it to lead.

Yuan in Hormuz

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is now operating a live pilot for post-dollar maritime commerce. Ships wishing to transit the Strait are assessed for U.S. or Israeli connections. Friendly vessels—from China, India, Turkey, or neutral states—pay transit fees in Chinese yuan or cryptocurrency. Rates are significant: oil tankers carrying two million barrels face starting fees of one dollar per barrel. Washington launched a war to defend the rules-based international order; in real time, Iran is constructing an alternative settlement infrastructure that bypasses the dollar entirely. The petrodollar system, once the backbone of American financial hegemony, is not debated in conferences—it is bypassed, barrel by barrel, yuan by yuan, as the U.S. Navy observes from afar. This is not a theoretical shift. It is operational, measurable, and immediate.

Europe Responds and the Quiet Proof

European capitals retreated into legal formalism not out of cowardice but calculation—the calculation that the cost of compliance now exceeds the cost of refusal. Macron called the operation illegal, yet deployed the Charles de Gaulle for French interests. Starmer emphasized national priorities. Steinmeier denounced the operation as dangerous. Spain and Italy blocked airspace and bases. France restricted ammunition transit. Simultaneously, a coalition outside Washington—Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey—began mediating Ormuz transit. States are acting to preserve navigational freedom, financial sovereignty, and operational independence without U.S. supervision.

Economic behavior confirms the operational shifts. EU-Iran trade in 2025 reached €3.72 billion, with Germany exporting €963 million and importing €218 million. Italy exported €447 million, and imported €132 million. The Netherlands served primarily as a logistics hub. These flows constitute two-thirds of total EU-Iran commerce. INSTEX remains operative, facilitating transactions despite secondary sanctions. Machinery, transport equipment, and chemical products move across borders under a deliberately maintained European framework. The numbers require no interpretation. While Warsaw was applauding in Davos, Berlin was exporting machinery to Tehran. Strategic autonomy was always practiced. It simply wasn’t named.

The Architecture of Compliance

Ivo Daalder, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, noted: “Military alliances are, at their core, based on trust. It’s hard to see how any European country will now be able and willing to trust the United States to come to its defense.” The alliance exists in form; obedience does not. European investment in defense, industrial capacity, and energy diversification accelerates independently of U.S. preferences. NATO survives as a bureaucratic structure, but the instrument of American hegemony—the mechanism through which Washington coerced compliance—is no longer operational.

What matters is what emerges where the old order once dominated: a mediation coalition outside U.S. influence, yuan-denominated shipping through Hormuz, European defence funded by its own borrowing, independent industrial capacity, and sustained trade with Iran. These are not marginal adjustments; they are the outlines of a multipolar order actively taking shape. The architecture of compliance is intact. The compliance itself is not. In geopolitics, that distinction is everything.

April 10, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , | Comments Off on NATO’s Slow Fracture: How Trump’s Iran War Exposed the Instrument of Hegemony