Israel’s Iran War: Myth and Reality
Israel’s press paints a very different picture than that circulated by its flunkies and apologists
By Mouin Rabbani | April 11, 2026
According to the Hasbara Symphony Orchestra, Israel’s latest war against Iran was an astounding triumph and the country remains dizzy with success.
More precisely, we should speak of Israel’s invaluable contribution to an enormous US strategic victory, because the suggestion that the war primarily served Israeli rather than US interests, or that Israel played a central role in Washington’s decision to launch this war is an anti-Semitic blood libel.
Yet the Israeli press tells a very different story. Its views are of course not uniform, but across the political spectrum a fairly consistent assessment emerges:
1. Israel’s greatest success was Netanyahu’s ability to persuade Trump to launch this war. In Trump, Netanyahu finally found his mark.
2. This achievement is also a very sharp double-edged sword. It was from the outset an unpopular war in the US, dividing even the MAGA right. If responsibility for this war is placed at the feet of Israel, and particularly if it is seen in the US as a failed adventure that weakens the US position regionally and globally, the negative ramifications for Israel could have strategic consequences. Not so much because of reduced US power, but rather on account of the fallout this could have on the US-Israeli relationship.
3. Israel scored many tactical successes but failed to achieve its war objectives. If the war ends, and the Islamic Republic is not overthrown, it will have been a costly failure. Debate continues over whether Israel’s objectives were realistic and attainable, and whether Israel’s leadership raised false expectations among the Israeli public.
4. Despite the damage inflicted on Iran it has thus far emerged strengthened from this war. The Islamic Republic did not collapse, it demonstrated an ability to retaliate and inflict damage of its own throughout the war, and most importantly was able to establish its control over the Strait of Hormuz with all this entails for the global economy. In other words, Israel’s war objectives will not be extracted from Iran by the US around the negotiating table, because Tehran has no reason to capitulate.
5. If Israel is compelled to end its war against Lebanon before defeating Hizballah, this will be a political catastrophe.
6. The main losers of this war are the Arab states, particularly those of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The good news for Israel is the sharp deterioration in their relations with Iran. But Arab governments are unlikely to respond by strengthening relations with Israel, and perhaps also not with the US, because they see Washington and particularly Israel as responsible for their misfortune. And when push came to shove they proved to be exorbitantly expensive yet unreliable allies. (On this point commentary is more divided, and some anticipate closer relations).
As far as Israeli media is concerned this is not a final verdict, because the war is not necessarily over and even when it is it will take time for its full impact to be revealed. But thus far, at least, it is painting a very different picture than that served up by its flunkies and apologists abroad.
Between the lines, the conclusion is clear: in Iran, Israel’s new national security doctrine of eliminating any challenge to its regional hegemony, and of ensuring that any threat is nipped in the bud before it emerges, has been overtaken by reality.
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