The Pentagon wants to build millions of drones without Chinese parts. It’s off to a bad start.
Inside China Business | July 15, 2025
Chinese companies produce over 90% of the commercial drones in use today. China also enjoys near-monopolies on the production of components, and deep supply chains. The White House and Pentagon have announced multi-billion dollar initiatives to create a drone manufacturing industry in the United States, particularly for warfighters. At the same time, Chinese officials have banned the exports of key drone materials and components to any company with a dual-use intent. Only a handful of American companies are being considered for the Pentagon effort, and testing is underway. However, major problems are already evident. Closing scene, Phoenix (Fenghuang) Ancient Town, Hunan
Resources and links:
YouTube, Pete Hegseth Unleashes PLAN to Modernize US Military’s War Fighting Effort
• Pete Hegseth Unleashes PLAN to Modernize U…
The Best Drone Manufacturing Companies in 2022 https://droneii.com/best-drone-manufa…
UNLEASHING AMERICAN DRONE DOMINANCE https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidenti…
Drones Are Key to Winning Wars Now. The U.S. Makes Hardly Any. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/13/bu…
Silicon Valley’s Military Drone Companies Have A Serious ‘Made In China’ Problem https://www.defensemirror.com/news/39…
Forbes, Silicon Valley’s Military Drone Companies Have A Serious ‘Made In China’ Problem https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidjea…
X, Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance https://x.com/SecDef/status/194374887…
DJI market share: here’s exactly how rapidly it has grown in just a few years https://www.thedronegirl.com/2018/09/…
Why America fell behind in drones, and how to catch up again https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/why-ame…
NAVIGATING THE SKIES OF REGULATION AND INNOVATION: THE CASE OF CIVIL DRONES https://competitionlab.gwu.edu/sites/…
France predicts ‘major war in Europe’ by 2030
RT | July 15, 2025
France expects a “major war” in Europe by 2030, according to the new Strategic National Review released on Monday by the General Secretariat for Defense and National Security.
Despite Moscow’s denials that it plans to attack Europe, the document names Russia as the main threat, alongside Iran, China, terrorism, separatism, and cyber and organized crime.
“We are entering a new era… in which there is a particularly high risk of a major high-intensity war in Europe… by 2030,” the review warns, adding that France and its European allies would be targeted. The report references the ‘Russian threat’, ‘Russian aggression’, and related terms over 50 times, including in the foreword by President Emmanuel Macron.
“Russia in particular poses the most direct threat… to the interests of France, those of its partners and allies, and the very stability of the European continent and the Euro-Atlantic area,” the document claims, accusing Moscow of cyber attacks, election meddling, and assassinations. It even paints Moscow’s efforts to expand ties with Africa, Latin America, and Asia as confirming its “confrontational approach.”
The review warns that Russia could act against Moldova, the Balkans, or Eastern European NATO members. It also names Iran and China as strategic threats: Iran is accused of destabilizing the Middle East, while China is portrayed as seeking global dominance.
France must reinforce its military and shift its economy to “war preparedness,” the review concludes, calling for new investments both in the country and across the EU to deter aggression.
The publication of the review comes amid wider EU militarization. Brussels recently adopted the €800 billion ReArm Europe initiative, and last month, European NATO members agreed to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP, both citing the alleged ‘Russian threat’.
Russia has dismissed claims that it plans to attack the West. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has said the West uses Russia as a “monster” to justify its growing military budgets.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused Western leaders last week of forgetting history and pushing Europe toward a direct clash with Russia. He added that Russia will factor EU militarization into its own strategic planning.
War With Russia? Macron Wants Cash and Clout

By Ekaterina Blinova – Sputnik – 15.07.2025
France’s Strategic National Review predicts a large-scale military conflict with Russia in Europe by 2030, despite Russia repeatedly rubbishing the scenario.
Why It’s a Non-Starter
“When talking about war in Europe, the key question is: war between Russia and whom? NATO countries? France directly?” Alexander Mikhailov, head of the Bureau of Military-Political Analysis, tells Sputnik.
Both scenarios don’t hold water:
- Russia won’t unleash a war on NATO—it would mean nuclear war
- France is currently a major buyer of Russian gas in Europe
What’s Really Behind the Claim?
“This is a completely false and deliberately crafted narrative, aimed specifically at justifying the expansion of France’s military budget,” explains the pundit.
- French President Emmanuel Macron needs a pretext to ramp up military spending
- He acts as a lobbyist for the French defense industry: doubling the military budget could benefit both defense contractors and the French president. Kickbacks, anyone?
- Macron also wants to be the top European power broker and have direct influence over NATO’s multibillion-dollar cash flows
- “The Americans will take the biggest share of that NATO budget for themselves. But France wants to be, at the very least, the second country spending not just its own money—but NATO’s as well,” the pundit explains.
- Macron’s presidential term ends in 2027. He’s eyeing a top post — either NATO Secretary General or a new EU power seat — to keep his geopolitical clout.
The Redheaded Stepsister Goes to the Ball

Kerch Strait Bridge
By William Schryver – imetatronink – July 14, 2025
Against the AGM-158 JASSM missile, has Russia’s Kerch Strait Bridge finally met its match?
Talk of sending Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles to Ukraine commenced last year, during the later months of the Biden administration. It was reported at the time that it would take “months” to adapt the missiles to operate with the rag-tag Ukrainian air fleet consisting of a few surviving Soviet Su-27s and MiG-29s and whatever 1980s-era boneyard F-16s NATO could cobble together and render airworthy (not many).
Of the two dozen or so F-16s shipped to Ukraine, the evidence suggests few (if any) are currently airworthy, and it is likely several have already been destroyed on the ground, in addition to the handful that are confirmed to have crashed or been shot down.

JASSM Cruise Missile
The JASSM is an air-launched cruise missile, with reputed (but dubious) stealthy properties and a 450 kg warhead. The majority of production consists of the relatively short-ranged (~350 km) AGM-158A.
The later-model AGM-158B (JASSM-ER) claims a range of 1000 km, but that has never been demonstrated in a live scenario. Although at least several dozen JASSM strikes were made against Syria and Yemen during Trump’s first term, none were of the extended range variety.
The JASSM was actually considered a bust during its many years of development (1998-2009). On multiple occasions, it appeared the entire program was going to be canceled.
What was the problem? It was notoriously inaccurate!
But eventually Lockheed was able to formulate a testing regimen more likely to indicate success, and the missile finally went into production.
The US Air Force contracted to buy ~5000 units.
The US Navy declined to buy any of them.
Foreign sales have been unimpressive.
It is almost certain that the Pentagon will not throw away many (if any) of the long-range AGM-158Bs on the irreversibly lost Ukraine War. That means all that can be hoped for is a few hundred AGM-158As, with their ~350 km range.
And, in my considered opinion, the only way “Ukraine” will be able to deploy these short-range air-launched cruise missiles is if “volunteer” NATO pilots fly front-line NATO planes to deliver them.
NATO F-16s and F-15s can carry two JASSM missiles, one under each wing.
In a mission (for example) to strike the Kerch Strait Bridge, NATO aircraft (likely flying from Romania) would have to penetrate deeply into Russian air defense coverage areas extending around Crimea.
It would almost certainly require at least a dozen JASSM 450 kg warheads to make a meaningful dent in the Kerch Strait Bridge. That translates into half a dozen strike aircraft.
And, unless the NATO generals are just utterly clueless and indifferent (which they probably are), it would be a dereliction of duty to not provide a half-dozen fighters for combat air patrol.
So a dozen NATO aircraft in total — not counting any refueling tankers and ISR platforms that would be required.
I assess as VERY LOW the likelihood of success for a JASSM attack against the Kerch Strait Bridge.
I assess the risks for the attacking force to be VERY HIGH.
But I reckon they’re stupid enough to give it a try all the same.
Patriot Systems Delivery to Ukraine Will Take Months – German Defense Ministry
Sputnik – 15.07.2025
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated that the delivery of Patriot systems to Ukraine, following an agreement with the United States on their purchase in the coming days or weeks, will take months. This came after his meeting with Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth.
“It is clear that Ukraine really needs them [Patriot systems], and we have seen this. But do not have any illusions — the Patriot system, which we are talking about today that it should be sent to Ukraine, will take months to deliver. And it will take more days or weeks until a decision is made. But after that, everything will go quickly,” Pistorius told reporters.
The minister noted that the parties had decided not to report the number of systems being supplied, as discussions were ongoing on what exactly would be included in one unit of the system in terms of technical characteristics and the number of missiles. He estimated the cost of one battery at approximately $1 billion.
Earlier, Pistorius said that the issue of a roadmap for ensuring the security of Europe by the United States would be discussed during the meeting. According to Pistorius, the ministers would also discuss the sale of two Patriot systems by the United States to Germany, intended for Ukraine.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that any cargo containing weapons for Ukraine would be a legitimate target for Russia. The Kremlin emphasized that pumping Kiev with weapons by the West would not contribute to the success of Russian-Ukrainian negotiations and would have a negative effect.
Boris Pistorius said that he had discussed with his US counterpart, Pete Hegseth, the need to coordinate the possible reduction of US troops in Europe.
“We have discussed what to do if this happens … We are speaking about how we step by step can coordinate the implementation of such decisions if they are made – but they have not been made yet – so that we together guarantee that there will be no dangerous gaps in the European security. So that we can avoid the situation when the United States withdraws something which we cannot replace in time,” Pistorius told reporters after the meeting with Hegseth.
On June 5, Hegseth said that the United States intended to review the deployment of its troops around the world and restore deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region.
‘Russia doesn’t respond to pressure’: How Moscow sees Trump’s ultimatum
From skepticism to strategic recalculations, Russian analysts interpret Washington’s new pressure campaign – and its limits
By Georgiy Berezovsky | RT | July 15, 2025
On Monday, July 14, US President Donald Trump issued a stark ultimatum: Russia has 50 days to reach a peace agreement, or face “very severe” tariffs on its exports – potentially as high as 100%. The move signals a shift from rhetorical posturing to a time-bound strategy aimed at forcing negotiations.
While Trump’s statement made waves in Washington and Europe, it is the reaction from Moscow that may prove most consequential. In this roundup, RT presents a cross-section of views from Russian political analysts, foreign policy scholars, and institutional insiders – voices that provide a window into how the American ultimatum is being interpreted in Russia.
Dmitry Suslov, deputy director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at HSE University:
Trump’s remarks are a major setback for any meaningful progress on Ukraine and will likely freeze US-Russia normalization for the foreseeable future. Zelensky now has no incentive to engage in serious negotiations with Moscow or consider the terms outlined in the Russian ceasefire memorandum.
Meanwhile, the European ‘party of war’ will seize on Trump’s statements as cover to promise Ukraine an endless stream of military aid – further escalating the conflict. The result? No truce, no talks, just a deepening of hostilities. Kiev may even walk away from the Istanbul peace process in the coming months – unless the battlefield situation shifts dramatically in Ukraine’s favor.
As for US-Russia relations, they were already at a standstill. Washington had effectively put dialogue on hold. Now, that pause could drag on indefinitely. When Trump issues ultimatums, sets arbitrary deadlines, and threatens Russia’s key trading partners with 100% tariffs, it’s clear there’s no space for normalization – or cooperation.
That said, unlike the Biden administration, Trump’s team appears committed to keeping diplomatic channels open with Moscow, regardless of whether there’s progress on Ukraine. But this isn’t an opening for a settlement on Russia’s terms. Trump’s goal is to pressure Moscow into compromise – something that simply isn’t going to happen.
His statement also signals that he has no intention of letting Congress dictate US foreign policy. He wants full control over tariffs – their size, timing, and structure. That’s why it’s entirely possible he’ll tweak or delay his self-imposed deadline.
Ivan Timofeev, program director of the Valdai Club:
1. Trump is frustrated with Moscow’s position on Ukraine.
Russia has refused to freeze the conflict on terms favorable to the US and Kiev – a signal that Trump sees dialogue as having hit a dead end.
2. The Lindsey Graham sanctions bill is now much more likely to pass.
Among other things, it would authorize secondary tariffs of up to 500% on countries that import Russian oil and other raw materials. While the US president already has the power to impose these measures unilaterally under IEEPA, the bill would bring Congress into alignment and add yet another layer to the already sprawling legal web of sanctions on Russia.
3. Trump would have full discretion over these secondary tariffs.
That could mean 100%, 500%, or anything in between – and he could calibrate them differently depending on bilateral relations. For example, India might face lower tariffs, China higher ones – or he might apply them uniformly. The Iran sanctions precedent shows that countries which reduced oil purchases were granted exemptions as a reward for ‘good behavior’.
4. A coordinated pushback from the Global South is unlikely.
Trump has already been pressuring both allies and neutral countries with new tariffs since April – and most are caving. Even China is treading carefully. So in the short term, we may see reduced purchases of Russian commodities simply out of a desire to avoid Trump’s wrath. Alternatively, countries may demand a higher risk premium. While there’s a lot of rhetorical support for Russia in the Global South, few are willing to stick their necks out when it comes to action.
5. Trump’s 50-day deadline amounts to an ultimatum.
Moscow will almost certainly ignore it, making the imposition of secondary tariffs a highly probable – perhaps even default – scenario. That said, Russia isn’t without leverage, limited though it may be. And it’s clearly preparing for a hardline path. Tight global commodity markets and well-established export channels work in Russia’s favor.
6. This may mark the end of backchannel diplomacy on Ukraine.
Sanctions will be ramped up, and arms deliveries to Kiev are likely to intensify. Russia, for its part, will maintain military pressure. We’re back to a familiar standoff: The West betting on economic collapse in Russia, while Moscow counts on Ukraine’s military defeat and the West’s internal turmoil. But after three years, it’s clear neither side’s assumptions have panned out. Sanctions haven’t broken Russia’s resolve, and the war effort is now on a new long-term footing.
7. The optimism in Russian markets is puzzling.
Yes, sanctions haven’t been imposed just yet – which some investors may have hoped for – but the risk landscape has only worsened. The current rally looks short-lived. Those banking on a quick end to sanctions may be in for a long wait.
Timofey Bordachev, professor at the Higher School of Economics:
In theater or film, ‘playing a scene’ means performing a role convincingly – conveying emotions, building a character, advancing the plot. Donald Trump does that rather well. He seems to grasp a fundamental truth: Bold moves between nuclear superpowers are dangerous precisely because they are impossible. They risk the irreversible – and Trump clearly wants no part of that. On some level, he understands that the diplomatic chess match will drag on indefinitely, and that there are no clean resolutions. Still, the show must go on – and the audience must be entertained.
That’s why Trump substitutes real strategy with theatrics: Shifting arms deliveries to NATO, proposing a new financing scheme for Kiev, tossing around tariff threats against Russia and its trading partners. It’s about constantly filling the political space with action – or at least the illusion of it – to avoid the impression of paralysis or failure. If no progress is made on Ukraine within 50 days, he’ll unveil a new plan that overwrites the old one.
None of these announcements should be treated as final or irreversible – and in that, Trump is perfectly in tune with the nature of today’s international politics. His behavior isn’t a deviation – it’s a reflection of the system.
Maxim Suchkov, director of the Institute for International Studies at MGIMO University:
Trump’s statement brings both good and bad news for Moscow. The good news is that the final decision was largely predictable – no surprises, no sudden turns. As is often the case with Trump, the ‘teaser’ for his policy was more dramatic than the main act. Europe wants to continue the war – and Trump is happy to let it pay the price. For now, he’s held back from embracing the more radical measures proposed by the hawks in his circle, which means dialogue with Washington is still on the table.
The bad news: After six months in office, Trump still hasn’t grasped Russia’s position or understood President Putin’s logic. It’s as if the repeated visits to Moscow by Steve Witkoff never even registered with him. More broadly, Trump seems to have learned very little about this conflict. And that’s a problem – because without some form of resolution and a working relationship with Moscow, key elements of Trump’s domestic agenda simply aren’t achievable.
Either he genuinely believes the Ukraine conflict can be settled by setting a deadline and hoping for the best – or he just doesn’t care. Maybe this is just his way of playing global peacemaker: Making noise, tossing out promises to fix everything, knowing full well there will be no political consequences if he fails. American voters won’t judge him on Ukraine.
Which scenario is worse is anyone’s guess. But one thing is clear: If anyone still had hopes for this administration to play a serious role in ending the conflict, those hopes look misplaced. Whether they were premature – or already outdated – we’ll find out in 50 days.
Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs:
If you strip Trump’s latest White House remarks down to their essence, one thing stands out: He still desperately wants to avoid becoming a full party to the conflict – in other words, he doesn’t want a head-on confrontation with Russia. That’s why he keeps repeating that this is “Biden’s war,” not his. From Trump’s perspective, what he announced is a cautious, compromise-driven approach.
First, the tariffs he’s threatening on Russian commodities – and let’s be clear, these aren’t ‘sanctions’ in his lexicon – have been postponed until the fall. Just like in other cases, the offer of negotiations remains open.
Second, the US won’t be sending weapons to Ukraine directly. Deliveries will go through Europe, and only on a full-cost basis – meaning the Europeans will foot the bill. To Trump, that’s not direct confrontation with Moscow – it’s a way to nudge the parties toward talks.
We can set aside the usual flood of self-congratulation and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte’s over-the-top flattery – that’s all part of the ritual now.
Russia is unlikely to see this as a genuine invitation to dialogue. It’s pressure – and the Russian leadership doesn’t respond to pressure. It’s also a worsening, though perhaps not a dramatic one, of the military situation for Russian forces, which naturally elicits a response. But Moscow won’t engage in verbal sparring. There’s no point. The conversation is now happening on the battlefield.
Most likely, we’ve reached the end of the first phase of US-Russia relations under Trump – a six-month stretch now drawing to a close. When the next phase begins, and what it looks like, remains anyone’s guess.
Dmitry Novikov, associate professor at the Higher School of Economics:
Trump’s bombastic statement – supplemented by his Q&A with reporters – boils down to three core messages.
First, the objective hasn’t changed: Washington still wants a deal on Ukraine, but only on terms acceptable to the US.
Second, the carrot for Moscow remains the same: Promises of good political relations (‘talking to Putin is always pleasant’) and vague suggestions of future economic cooperation (‘Russia has enormous potential’).
Third, the stick – for now – isn’t particularly impressive. The announcement of Patriot systems for Ukraine is just the latest iteration of something Trump and his team have floated before: Boosting Kiev’s air defenses to protect against Russian strikes. And that, it seems, bothers Trump more than the frontline situation itself. He’s criticized Russia before for deep strikes into Ukrainian territory, and he did it again this time – presumably after being shown some grim images.
As for other weapons, there were no specifics – just the familiar ‘billions of dollars in military aid’ line.
The introduction of 100% secondary tariffs, delayed by 50 days, appears to be Trump’s main instrument of coercion. As an economic determinist, he likely believes this is his most powerful and effective threat. But whether it will actually be implemented is unclear. Previous efforts to squeeze Russian energy exports – price caps, import bans – didn’t exactly shut the flow. Russia adapted.
In essence, the message is more psychological than strategic: You’ve got 50 days. After that, I’ll ‘get serious’.
But Trump left one key question unanswered: How far is the US actually willing to go if there’s no progress after 50 days? If tariffs are the endgame, and Washington backs off after that, that’s one scenario. But if those tariffs are just the prelude to broader military or political escalation, that’s something else entirely.
Trump deliberately keeps things murky, leaning on the old idea that ‘a threat is more powerful than an attack’. He seems to be counting on Moscow to imagine the worst.
Nikolai Topornin, director of the Center for European Information:
With his latest statement, Trump didn’t just leave a crack open for Russia – he threw the window wide. He made clear he expects a practical response from Moscow within the next 50 days. As things stand, nothing prevents Russia from acting on the terms previously discussed with Trump: Initiating a 30-day ceasefire and entering talks with Kiev to start hashing out a concrete peace agreement.
Of course, the problem remains that many of Russia’s proposals are fundamentally at odds with Ukraine’s position. Still, from a diplomatic standpoint, the ball is now in Moscow’s court. And Kiev, in the meantime, comes out as the clear short-term beneficiary of Trump’s announcement.
We can expect the usual statements from Moscow rejecting the pressure – that sanctions don’t scare Russia. And it’s true that US-Russia trade is already near zero. There are no billion-dollar contracts left to speak of. Most economic ties were severed back in the Biden era. Washington has already imposed sweeping sanctions on Russian businesses and the financial sector.
So if nothing changes over the next 50 days, the US will likely continue expanding military aid to Ukraine – but on a pragmatic basis. In doing so, Washington can channel European funding to keep its own defense industry running at full speed.
Sergey Oznobishchev, head of the Military-Political Analysis and Research Projects Section at IMEMO RAS:
Trump needs to save face. He once vowed to end the conflict in a single day – but that hasn’t happened. Russia isn’t backing down, isn’t agreeing to a ceasefire with Ukraine, and isn’t halting its offensive. There’s nothing Trump can point to and sell as even a partial fulfillment of that campaign promise. So now he’s under pressure to act.
He’s signaling to Moscow that he expects some kind of reciprocal move – and he’s trying to extract it through a mix of diplomatic pressure and economic threats.
What exactly Trump discussed with the Russian president remains unclear. But it’s likely that Russia’s core position was laid out: Full control over the territories now enshrined in its constitution. Russia simply cannot walk away from those claims. It’s even possible that Trump’s 50-day deadline is meant as a tacit acknowledgment of that reality – a window for Russia to consolidate its hold before talks resume. That would be his version of compromise.
Trump often opens negotiations with bold, hardline offers – the kind you ‘can’t refuse’, as American political lore puts it – only to walk them back later and land somewhere in the middle. That’s his style, drawn straight from the world of business deals: Apply pressure first, then strike a bargain.
Of course, these latest announcements – especially the pledge to send weapons – will only increase criticism of Trump within Russia. Still, this isn’t the harshest stance he could have taken. It’s a tough message, but one that still leaves room for maneuver.
Nikolai Silayev, senior research fellow at the Institute for International Studies, MGIMO University:
I wouldn’t say we’re standing at the brink of a new escalation. Trump hasn’t endorsed the sanctions bill currently under discussion in Congress. Instead, he’s talking about imposing 100% tariffs by executive order – just as he’s done in the past. In doing so, he’s clearly distancing himself from that legislation.
There are no immediate sanctions coming. The 50-day timeline he mentioned is just the latest in a series of deadlines he’s floated before.
On the one hand, Trump wants to avoid sliding back into the kind of confrontation with Russia that defined the Biden era. On the other, he doesn’t want to see Ukraine defeated – nor is he willing to accept a Russian ceasefire on Moscow’s terms, since that could be spun as a US loss, and by extension, a personal failure. He keeps repeating that this is “Biden’s war” – but the longer it drags on, the more it becomes his own.
As for the Patriots, it’s Europe that will be footing the bill. Trump didn’t promise any new funding from the US budget. What remains to be seen is how many systems and missiles the US defense industry can actually produce – and how many European countries are willing to buy.
From Moscow’s perspective, this is still the US arming Ukraine. Washington is also continuing to share intelligence and support logistics. No one in the Kremlin is going to say, ‘Thank you, Grandpa Trump – now you’re just a vendor’. That’s not how this will be seen.
Sergey Poletaev, political commentator:
The scale of this conflict is such that no single move – not by the US, not by Russia, not by anyone – can produce a sudden breakthrough. The only person who could do that is Vladimir Zelensky – by surrendering. There’s no weapon system that could fundamentally change the course of this war, short of nuclear arms. And the only other game-changer would be direct involvement by the US or NATO – but if they’d wanted that, they would’ve intervened long ago.
As for Trump’s tariff threats against Russia and its trading partners – that’s really just kicking the can down the road for another 50 days. Classic Trump.
From Russia’s standpoint, we’re not shipping anything to the US anyway. As for our trading partners – yes, we’re talking about China and India. But this move would only add to the contradictions in Trump’s chaotic tariff diplomacy, where every issue is approached through economic threats. I don’t think it’s going to work.
I don’t see how Trump thinks he can pressure India. China – maybe. But Beijing is already staring down a whole slew of tariff threats. One more won’t make things easier – just worse. If anything, it will reinforce the idea that the US sees China as vulnerable to pressure. And that’s not a message China will take lightly.
Konstantin Kosachev, Russian senator and foreign affairs specialist:
If this is all Trump had to say about Ukraine today, then the hype was definitely overblown. Most of Lindsey Graham’s alarmist fantasies remain just that – fantasies. A 500% sanctions package makes little practical sense.
As for Europe, it looks like they’ll keep picking up the tab – again and again. What they thought was free cheese turned out to be a trap. The only true beneficiary here is the US defense industry.
Ukraine, meanwhile, is left to fight until the last Ukrainian – a fate they seem to have chosen for themselves.
But 50 days is a long time. A lot can change – on the battlefield, in Washington, and in NATO capitals. What matters most, though, is that none of this has any real impact on our own determination. At least, that’s how I see it.
Alexander Dugin, political philosopher and commentator:
Trump has given Russia 50 days to complete the job: To fully liberate our four regions, take Kharkov, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk – and ideally, Kiev. After that, he’s promised to get truly angry and hit back with 100% tariffs on our key oil buyers – India and China. That’s a serious threat.
So now we have 50 days to finish what we’ve left unfinished over the past 25 years.
This is precisely the kind of moment captured in the old Russian saying: ‘We take a long time to harness the horses, but we ride fast’. Given the circumstances, I believe any weapons can be used, against any targets. We have 50 days to win.
Bornholm Island: NATO’s Baltic Bridgehead for Aggression Against Russia
By Ilya Tsukanov – Sputnik – 14.07.2025
Copenhagen is using the old ‘Russian threat’ excuse to justify the militarization of its easternmost island, but NATO operational planning and drills reveal otherwise.
Where is Bornholm?
Situated about 140 km southeast of Copenhagen in waters between Sweden, Poland and Germany, the 588 km2 island has been a strategic stronghold since medieval times, used by Vikings, Scandinavian kings, Napoleon and the Nazis for both defensive and offensive operations.
In 2022, NATO announced plans to turn the Baltic Sea into a ‘NATO lake’. Bornholm would play a key role in this calculus.
Breaking Old Agreements
Freed from the Nazis by the Red Army in WWII, Bornholm was returned to Denmark by Moscow on the understanding that foreign troops would never again be stationed there. Denmark reneged in 2022, okaying large-scale NATO drills on and around the island.
Drills have included deployments of US HIMARS MLRS (300 km max range) and Typhon missile system components (2,500 km range). The Typhon TEL can fire SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles, whose payload, notably, can include nuclear warheads.
Military Infrastructure Buildup
- construction of a 85m spy tower in Ostermarie (2017)
- inclusion in NATO’s Baltic “island chain” strategy alongside Gotland and Aland (2023)
- plans to add 5k troops to the local garrison (2025)
Air and Naval Power Projection
Bornholm’s Ronne Airport has a military apron, and has been used in drills by Finnish F-18 jets (2024). Moscow has accused USAF strategic bombers flying toward Russian cities including Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg of hiding in the island’s airspace to avoid interception by Russian jets.
Ronne’s seaport has undergone expansions (2023) to accommodate large ships, including military and support vessels.
Fictitious Justifications
“Bornholm’s militarization is taking place under the false pretext of the need to protect the island from the ‘Russian threat,’” even though Russia “has never had aggressive intentions toward Denmark,” Ambassador Vladimir Barbin has said.
NATO Preparing Moldova for “Porobable Armed Conflict” with Russia – SVR
Sputnik – 14.07.2025
NATO is actively preparing to involve Moldova in a potential armed conflict with Russia, and a decision has been made in Brussels to accelerate the country’s transformation into the alliance’s “forward outpost” on the eastern flank, the press office of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) stated.
“The press office of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service reports that, according to information received by the SVR, NATO is actively preparing to engage Moldova in a probable armed conflict with Russia. A decision has been made in Brussels to speed up the transformation of the country into the ‘forward outpost of the alliance on the eastern flank, taking into account the advancement of Russian forces in Ukraine,'” the statement reads.
NATO is working to make Moldova’s territory suitable for the rapid deployment of the alliance’s troops to Russian borders, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service reported.
“NATO forces are intensively turning what was once a peaceful agricultural republic into a military testing ground. Moldova’s territory is being made suitable for the operational redeployment of NATO troops to Russia’s borders. Projects are underway to switch to European railway standards and increase the capacity of bridges. Logistic hubs, large warehouses, and areas for concentrating military equipment are being built. The Marculesti and Balti airfields, located near Ukraine, are being modernized with a focus on enabling the reception of a significant number of combat and military transport aircraft,” the statement said.
The Western military bloc expects that Moldovans will become “cannon fodder” in the event of armed actions against Russia, said the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.
Moldova is heavily relying on NATO support for the pro-presidential “Action and Solidarity” party in the upcoming parliamentary elections, the press office reported.
Who profits when nations bleed: Pentagon, Trump or the arms lobby?
By Nazmelis Zengin | Daily Sabah | July 3, 2025
In recent months, the drums of war have started beating once again in Washington. This time, however, the noise comes not from the front lines, but from boardrooms, lobbying corridors and the heart of an invisible yet relentless power struggle.
A critical conflict is unfolding not between the U.S. and Iran, but between two rival power blocs within the U.S. itself. On one side stands the Pentagon, advocating strategic caution and increasingly aligning with President Donald Trump. On the other side is a powerful alliance of defense industry lobbies, pro-Israel actors and rising private sector forces.
The arms lobby and private capital feed not only on increased defense spending but also on the economic opportunities that war presents. Senator Lindsey Graham has long been one of the most loyal champions of this lobby. Since the Iraq War, he has served as a political emissary for defense giants like Raytheon and Lockheed Martin. His rhetoric today mirrors the past: “U.S. deterrence is only possible through resolve.” But behind this call for resolve lies a multi-billion-dollar procurement pipeline.
Following the U.S. airstrikes on Iran’s Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan facilities on June 22, 2025, the Pentagon attempted to frame the narrative. Department of Defense spokesperson Pete Hegseth stated, “This mission is not about regime change … It was a precision strike aimed at the nuclear program.” Gen. Dan Caine, chair of the Joint Chiefs, added, “Our B2 mission inflicted severe damage, but it is too early to fully assess the impact.” These statements reflect the Pentagon’s cautious public posture, even as more aggressive steps unfold behind the scenes. The repeated emphasis on “retaliation risk” signals that the military is reluctant to be drawn into full-scale war.
Trump, in contrast, portrayed the strike as a victory: “Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has been destroyed.” He soon posted on social media: “If the current Iranian regime can’t ‘Make Iran Great Again,’ why not consider regime change?” This starkly contradicted Pentagon messaging and suggested Trump was leveraging the war narrative for domestic political gain ahead of the elections. Early June 2025 polls showed Trump’s approval among Republican voters rose slightly post-strike, while independents remained skeptical.
Iran responded swiftly with missile strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq and cyber operations targeting American infrastructure, signaling it would not remain passive. The United Nations Security Council convened an emergency session, where European and Chinese representatives warned that escalation could destabilize the entire region. Meanwhile, oil prices surged 18% in the week following the strikes, adding global economic pressure.
Trump’s decision won enthusiastic support from Senator Graham and Tom Cotton. However, Democrats responded sharply. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez declared, “This strike was carried out without Congressional approval and is unconstitutional,” reviving impeachment discussions. Within the Republican Party, Vice President JD Vance and commentator Tucker Carlson distanced themselves from Trump’s hawkish faction, while the arms lobby viewed the intervention as a strategic opportunity. Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Technologies shares rose by 11% and 9% respectively in the week after the strikes.
Washington Post columnist Jason Willick warned, “Trump’s actions risk repeating the mistakes made in Iraq, this time in Iran.” The Guardian’s Stephen Wertheim echoed this concern: “The U.S. is on the verge of repeating its Iraq error in Iran.” A RAND Corporation report noted that regime change efforts typically produce protracted conflicts with unforeseen consequences.
Private sector actors in the U.S. no longer settle for market share; they now seek to shape strategic direction. Companies like Starlink and SpaceX are embedded within the Pentagon, gaining technological footholds and influence over decision-making. SpaceX’s new 2.1 billion contract for missile tracking satellites exemplifies how tech giants are reshaping national security priorities. The alliance between defense contractors and tech giants is redefining the very notion of national interest.
This evolution weakens traditional state institutions and circumvents democratic oversight, not just a shift in strategy, but what could be described as a modern civilian cloaked coup. This recalls political scientist C. Wright Mills’ 1956 concept of the “power elite.” Mills warned that when state, military, and economic actors form a mutually reinforcing triangle, democratic accountability gives way to elite consensus. Similarly, Benjamin Page and Martin Gilens’ Democracy in America? demonstrated that economic elites and large corporations exert more influence on U.S. policy than average voters. RAND and Stockholm International Peace Research Institution (SIPRI) data confirm that this nexus intensifies during military interventions. For example, RAND’s 2024 report found that military spending increased by up to 30% directly due to private sector lobbying, while SIPRI’s 2023 data showed that 65% of major defense contracts during crises were awarded without competitive bidding. These findings illustrate how ties between lobbyist capital and the state tighten during war and crisis periods.
In this context, the boundaries of free market intervention in public policy are no longer theoretical; they are existential. Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has emphasized, “Market failures produce not only economic consequences but political ones as well.” When inequality concentrates not just wealth but decision-making power, democracy begins to erode. Public authority must retain its regulatory and directional role for markets to function properly.
Moreover, economist Mariana Mazzucato’s theory of the “entrepreneurial state” offers a necessary counterpoint. She argues that the public sector should not merely correct market failures but also take on a proactive investment role. Yet today we witness the opposite: public policy is shaped by private sector logic, endangering the state’s protective and innovative capacities. The transformation of the state from a guiding force into one that is guided reflects a sacrifice of long-term public good for short-term private profit.
Protests have erupted across major U.S. cities, with demonstrators denouncing the war as “a war for corporate gain.” Brookings public opinion research shows a sharp rise in distrust of the government’s motives behind foreign interventions.
Today, private actors born under the guise of the free market no longer settle for profit alone; they seek to steer foreign policy. As the U.S. returns to the Middle East after two decades, it does so not out of moral necessity or strategic urgency but under the pressure of corporatist interests eager for enrichment.
The real question is: Who inside the United States wants this war most, and perhaps more crucially, who has the power to stop it?
Zelensky threatens ‘long-range strikes’ in Russia
RT | July 14, 2025
Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky has threatened new strikes deep inside Russia, days after the US pledged to resume military aid to Kiev.
Zelensky made the remarks after a meeting with Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Aleksandr Syrsky, and Chief of the General Staff Andrey Gnatov on Sunday.
“Our units will continue to destroy the occupiers and do everything possible to bring the war onto Russian territory. We are preparing our new long-range strikes,” Zelensky wrote on X.
He added that Ukraine is preparing for a visit by US presidential envoy Keith Kellogg and will “work with partners on arms deliveries and scaling up joint production of essential defense assets.”
Among its recent attacks far from the front line, Ukraine targeted military airfields housing strategic bombers in several Russian regions last month. Ukrainian drones and missiles also repeatedly struck apartment blocks and other civilian infrastructure. According to Moscow, Ukraine was responsible for the passenger train derailment on March 31, which left seven people dead.
The EU has allocated hundreds of billions of euros in recent months to expand its military-industrial complex and support Ukraine’s domestic armament production.
Berlin will provide Ukraine its first batch of long-range missiles financed by Germany in the coming weeks, Major General Christian Freuding, who oversees the coordination of the country’s military support for Kiev, has said.
US President Donald Trump said earlier this week that the Pentagon will resume deliveries to Kiev, following weeks of suspension, and reportedly considers approving a first new aid package since returning to office.
Russia has said that it views the use of foreign-supplied missiles as direct participation by Western states in the conflict and claimed that Ukrainian troops cannot operate sophisticated weapons systems on their own.
Lasha Kasradze: Azerbaijan as the Next Frontline Against Russia & Iran?
Glenn Diesen | July 13, 2025
As Azerbaijan takes an increasingly hostile approach to both Russia and Iran, it risks becoming a proxy in a wider regional war. Azerbaijan’s Zangezur corridor connects Azerbaijan closer to Turkey, and thus NATO. Many uncertainties emerge in terms of what happens to Armenia, to what extent Turkey and NATO can project power that deep into the South Caucasus, and how Russia and Iran will react. Lasha Kasradze is an international affairs analyst from Georgia, and an expert on the wider region.
Israeli Firm Tests Drone on Unarmed Palestinian in Gaza, Shares Footage on Twitter for Marketing
Quds News | July 13, 2025
Israeli weapons manufacturer Rafael Advanced Defense Systems used footage showing the killing of an unarmed Palestinian man in Gaza to market one of its combat drones.
The video, posted on Twitter, shows the moment an Israeli Spike Firefly drone strikes and kills an unarmed Palestinian man walking alone in northern Gaza. Rafael shared the footage with the caption:
“SPIKE FIREFLY: Proven Precision, Redefining the Tactical Edge.”
The post celebrated two years since the Firefly drone’s first use. It praised the loitering munition’s precision and performance in “difficult environments.” “Tested. Trusted. Tactical.” Rafael declared.
The video highlighted how Israel’s military-industrial complex profits from crimes against Palestinians, often documented and repackaged into advertising for global arms deals.
The Spike Firefly is a loitering munition, a drone that searches, identifies, and attacks targets with explosive payloads. It is part of the larger SPIKE missile family, which Rafael exports to dozens of countries.
Rafael, which is state-owned, has sold billions in weapons across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Some of its largest customers include:
- Greece: Signed a €370 million deal.
- Finland: Purchased a system for €316 million.
- Poland: Signed a $152 million deal, with partial local production.
- Slovakia: Made multiple purchases totaling in the hundreds of millions.
- Romania: Signed a $2.2 billion contract, along with a separate multimillion-dollar deal.
- Czech Republic: Signed arms contracts and has ongoing plans for additional deals.
- UAE: In negotiations for multi-system defense purchases.
- Philippines: In talks to acquire air-defense technology.
- Thailand: Partnered for local production of Israeli systems.
- Azerbaijan: Acquired Israeli-made weapons and surveillance technology.
- Singapore, Vietnam, Morocco: Use Israeli weapons in their arsenals.
Since October 2023, Israel’s ongoing genocide in Gaza has killed over 57,000 Palestinians, most of them women and children.
Israel and Rafael continue to promote their weapons as “battle-proven” based on their use against civilians in Gaza, a region under siege, starved, and cut off from the world.
