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Senior Israel delegation visits Azerbaijan 2 days before clashes in Karabakh

MEMO | September 21, 2023

Director General of Israeli Defence Ministry, Eyal Zamir, visited Azerbaijan two days before clashes erupted with Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, Israeli media reported on Wednesday.

Members of the Israeli delegation met with their Azeri counterparts, including Defence Minister, Zakir Hasanov, The Times of Israel said, pointing out that the visit came amid stepped-up Israeli arms supplies to Azerbaijan.

At least 32 people had been killed in the region before the clashes stopped. Azerbaijan described its attacks as an “anti-terrorist operation”.

It said it would continue until the separatist government of Nagorno-Karabakh dismantles itself and “illegal Armenian military formations” surrender.

On Wednesday, the two sides announced a ceasefire.

Israel is expanding bilateral ties with Azerbaijan. In March, Azeri Foreign Minister, Jeyhun Bayramov, opened Baku’s first-ever embassy in Israel.

Israel is one of Azerbaijan’s leading arms suppliers. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Israel provided 69 per cent of Baku’s major arms imports in 2016-2020, accounting for 17 per cent of Israel’s arms exports over that period.

During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Israel stepped up its weapons shipments to Azerbaijan, which emerged victorious in that war with Armenia.

Israel gets benefits from its relations with Azerbaijan through its location on Iran’s northern border and the fact that Israel buys over 30 per cent of its oil from Baku.

September 22, 2023 Posted by | Militarism | , , , | Leave a comment

Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh Agree on Ceasefire Through Coordination of Russian Peacekeepers – MoD

Sputnik – 20.09.2023

Azerbaijan and representatives of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh have agreed on a complete cessation of hostilities through the mediation of Russian peacekeepers, the Russian Defense Ministry said on Wednesday.

“Through the mediation of the command of the Russian peacekeeping contingent, an agreement was reached between the Azerbaijani side and representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh on a complete cessation of hostilities. The implementation of these agreements will be carried out in coordination with the command of the Russian peacekeeping contingent,” the ministry said in a statement.

The Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh is in contact with both Yerevan and Baku, discussing the prevention of bloodshed in the region, the Russian Defense Ministry said on Wednesday.

“The command of the Russian peacekeeping contingent is in close contact at the appropriate level with the Azerbaijani and Armenian sides, representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh. The prevention of bloodshed, compliance with the norms of humanitarian law in relation to the civilian population, as well as ensuring the safety of the Russian peacekeeping contingent are discussed,” the ministry said in a statement.

Russian peacekeepers continue to perform their duties in Nagorno-Karabakh in aggravated conditions, the ministry said, adding that 2,261 civilians, including 1,049 children, are currently located in a base camp of peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh.

On Tuesday, Baku announced the launch of “local-level anti-terrorist activities” in Nagorno-Karabakh aimed at “restoring the constitutional order.” It also said Azerbaijani forces only targeted military objects in Nagorno-Karabakh, while Armenian state media reported multiple casualties among civilians as a result of Azerbaijani strikes. Yerevan described the operation as aggression and reiterated that it had no military presence in the disputed region.

In 1923, the region was granted the status of an autonomous area called the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.

In 1988, a movement for reunification with Armenia began in Nagorno-Karabakh. On September 2, 1991, it declared independence from Azerbaijan and changed its name to the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. From 1992 to 1994, Azerbaijan attempted to regain control over the self-declared republic, resulting in full-scale military hostilities in which up to 30,000 people lost their lives.

In 1994, the parties agreed to a ceasefire, but the status of the republic remained undetermined. In late September 2020, hostilities resumed in Nagorno-Karabakh. On the night of November 10, Azerbaijan and Armenia, with Moscow’s support, reached a comprehensive ceasefire agreement, maintaining their respective positions and exchanging prisoners of war and the bodies of the deceased. Russian peacekeepers were deployed in the region, including the Lachin Corridor.

In 2022 with the mediation of Russia, the United States, and the European Union, Yerevan and Baku began discussing the terms of a future peace agreement. In late May of this year, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan declared that Yerevan was ready to recognize Azerbaijan’s sovereignty within its Soviet-era borders, including Karabakh.

In September 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that the Armenian leadership had essentially recognized Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev said that Azerbaijan and Armenia could sign a peace agreement by the end of the year if Yerevan did not change its stance.

September 20, 2023 Posted by | Militarism | , , | Leave a comment

Washington Trying to Blackmail Armenians in Karabakh Into US-Brokered Talks: Here’s Why

By Ilya Tsukanov – Sputnik – 14.06.2023

The dispute between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over the landlocked mountainous region of Nagorno-Karabakh has been a source of severe tensions between the Caucasus nations, with several conflicts fought over the territory over the past 35 years. Moscow has worked tirelessly to mediate the crisis.

Washington is reportedly making a concerted, behind-the-scenes push to interfere directly in negotiations between Azerbaijan and the ethnic Armenian-led unrecognized Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, including by blackmailing the Armenian side with the threat of a fresh round of violence in the region.

Informed sources cited by Russian media indicated that US officials – which until recently had limited their “mediation” efforts to talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia proper, are now trying to force their way into the sensitive negotiations between Baku and Stepanakert (Nagorno-Karabakh’s self-proclaimed capital).

“In the form of an ultimatum, Washington is forcing Nagorno-Karabakh representatives to agree to a meeting with the Azeri side in the near future in a third country under the supervision of American curators. Moreover, the Karabakh leadership has been told that if they refuse, they will be threatened with something close to an Azerbaijani ‘counter-terrorist operation’ in the region,’” the sources indicated.

The “ultimatum” has reportedly been received negatively in Stepanakert overall, but got support from Sergey Ghazaryan, the self-proclaimed republic’s foreign minister.

The past few weeks have seen a flurry of US and EU diplomatic activity in the Southern Caucasus, with Armenia and Azerbaijan’s foreign ministers meeting in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken in early May, and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev holding talks in Brussels mediated by European Council chief Charles Michel the same month. In late May, Pashinyan, Aliyev, and Russian President Vladimir Putin held trilateral talks in Moscow. Pashinyan and Aliyev got into an argument much reported on in Western media about transport corridors during the Eurasian Economic Union Summit, with Putin intervening to quell the dispute.

US and EU mediators spoke of “significant progress” in the Armenian-Azeri talks, but few details were made public. However, on May 22, Pashinyan made the bombshell announcement that Yerevan would be ready to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan if the security of its ethnic Armenian population was guaranteed. This move was sharply criticized by some observers as a de-facto concession by Yerevan to leave the Karabakh issue “practically to the mercy of Western sponsors,” with autonomy guarantees for the region left off the table.

Moscow deployed a 2,000 troop-strong peacekeeping contingent to Nagorno-Karabakh three years ago after the September-November 2020 war, with these forces patrolling the Lachin corridor connecting Armenia proper to Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia’s strategy has revolved around seeking to maintain the status quo, ensuring the safety and security of the local civilian population, and preventing any further hostilities from breaking out.

Concerted Push to Eject Russia From Region

Retired Russian Foreign Ministry senior advisor Alexander Ananiev fears US and its allies and sympathetic actors in Yerevan and Baku have decided to try to remove Russia from its mediation role, and to eliminate Russia’s presence in the Southern Caucasus generally (including through the removal of the Russian military base in Armenia proper, and Yerevan’s withdrawal from Russian-led integration processes and defense agreements).

“Yerevan, with a geopolitical turn away from Russia, wants to receive the support of the West, but, in accordance with the ‘post-Soviet traditions’, not to lose anything from Russia in economics terms. For Baku, it’s important to distance itself from Moscow due to sanctions and the desire to gain a foothold as an important energy supplier to the European Union,” Ananiev wrote in a recent article in a major Russian international affairs journal.

‘Perfect’ Timing

Stanislav Tarasov, a veteran Russian political scientist specializing in Caucasus affairs, points out that the timing of the reported US “mediation effort” in Nagorno-Karabakh lines up perfectly with the signing of a major railway construction agreement by Russian and Iranian officials last month to bring the ambitious North South Transport Corridor one step closer to reality.

“The West offers nothing, have no solution of their own. They play on contradictions between Yerevan and Baku which Moscow is trying to neutralize or eliminate,” Tarasov told Sputnik.

“America’s interests are very simple. First, they would potentially like to use the South Caucasus as a springboard for ‘containing Iran.’ So far, this has not been achieved, although they did manage to carry out an operation to complicate ties between Azerbaijan and Iran. Second, they have managed to preserve a hotbed of regional tension via the Karabakh conflict. Third, the implementation of the North-South Corridor’s transit routes requires huge investments –investments which do not flow to an area facing the potential threat of war. This means Russia will seek to resolve this situation… while the West will try to destabilize it, so that Russia can’t break through the Southern Caucasus and unblock its communications,” the observer explained.

North South Transport Corridor (NSTC)

For Russia, the opening of new trade and transit routes is particularly vital today, Tarasov said, owing to the breakdown in economic relations with the West after the escalation of the Ukraine crisis, which deprived Moscow of key routes for global trade.

Consequently, “in order to block Russia in this region, the West began to put spokes in the wheels, including relating to the peace processes formed which emerged after the Second Karabakh War, but which, unfortunately, could not be fully resolved at the time,” he said.

June 14, 2023 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Devil’s In The Details When It Comes To Pashinyan’s Karabakh Peace Proposal

BY ANDREW KORYBKO | MAY 23, 2023

Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan proposed recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity in full in exchange for it doing the same to his country, though the caveat is that he’ll only do so if the security of local Armenians there is guaranteed. This naturally raises the question of how to satisfy his requirement in a way that’s also acceptable to Azerbaijan, with one possibility being to prolong the deployment of Russia’s peacekeepers there.

It can’t be taken for granted that Azerbaijan would approve of this for the extended period of time that Pashinyan appears to be implying is required to guarantee their safety, however, since it appears to be growing frustrated with the status quo. Azerbaijan only agreed to the presence of these forces in November 2020 because it expected that they’d expedite the removal of Armenian forces in parallel with facilitating the reasserting of the state’s sovereignty over the rest of its territory.

That outcome hasn’t yet materialized, and instead, these South Caucasus rivals have even clashed several times along their internationally recognized border. Armenia also accuses Azerbaijan of violating the same Moscow-mediated ceasefire that it agreed to after self-described “activists” blocked the Lachin Corridor, while Azerbaijan accuses Armenia of doing the same by still launching attacks from Karabakh. These factors have combined to make many worry about whether another war might soon erupt.

As a self-respecting state, Azerbaijan regards it as offensive for Armenia to hint that it can’t guarantee the security of its citizens, which includes those Armenians who’ve been in Karabakh since Soviet times but not those who moved to the region as colonists after its occupation by neighboring Armenia. Its rising confidence and regional prestige as a result of its victory two and a half years ago reduces the chances that Azerbaijan would agree to prolong the deployment of Russia’s peacekeepers.

Those calculations indirectly pose a problem for Russian-Armenian relations since Moscow must prove its military-security worth to Yerevan in order to prevent its “defection” from the CSTO, with the scenario of it prolonging the deployment of its peacekeepers in Azerbaijan being the best way to do so. Armenia surprised Russia by participating in joint NATO drills last month, which was followed by its Deputy Foreign Minister revealing this month that it contemplated leaving the CSTO last September.

Pashinyan added earlier this week that Armenia’s withdrawal might indeed still happen if it concludes that the CSTO has “become a non-functional organization”, which prompted Kremlin spokesman Peskov to promise that Russia will retain relevant dialogue with its partner in an effort to prevent this. The unstated threat that was just conveyed by Yerevan is that it’ll ditch the CSTO and thus deal a major blow to Moscow if Russia can’t convince Azerbaijan to guarantee the security of Armenians there.

In the event that Armenia “defects” from this Russian-led military-security bloc, then it would immediately raise questions about Moscow’s reliability to its other partners such as those in Central Asia, thus possibly emboldening those countries to distance themselves from it too like the West wants. With Armenia out of the CSTO, it might then apply for expedited entry into NATO, which could possibly lead to it and Georgia joining together like was supposed to be the case with Finland and Sweden.

Russia must therefore do its utmost to avert this dark scenario from unfolding, to which end it’s pressed to politically resolve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict once and for all as soon as possible before Yerevan’s patience runs out. That said, it wouldn’t be in Armenia’s best interests to ditch the CSTO until it gets what it wants since otherwise it’ll be without Russia’s protection if Azerbaijan and/or Turkiye decide to invade its internationally recognized territory in order to resolve this conflict on their own terms.

Nevertheless, it might end up being the case that Armenia could secretly reach an agreement with the US for the latter to extend security assurances to it prior to that country’s membership in NATO upon it formally announcing its withdrawal from the CSTO and intention to join that enemy bloc. The precedent for doing so was already established last May after the US gave exactly these sort of assurances to Finland and Sweden until they joined NATO, which is still relevant to the latter since it hasn’t yet done so.

Russia’s challenge is therefore threefold since it must: 1) broker a sustainable peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan as soon as possible to preempt Yerevan’s “defection” from the CSTO on the pretext that this group is “non-functional”; 2) to which end Moscow must likely get Baku to agree to at least prolong the presence of Russian peacekeepers for the next few years; and 3) then ensure that Armenia still doesn’t “defect” from that bloc after it already gets what it wants from Russia.

Each of these tasks presents a formidable challenge in and of themselves, let alone having to be tackled all at once due to Armenia hinting that it’ll dump the CSTO if it doesn’t get what it wants sometime soon, and not to mention that this is happening amidst Russia’s ongoing special operation. Even so, if there’s any country whose diplomats are capable of rising to the occasion, it’s Russia’s. This doesn’t mean that they’ll succeed, but just that nobody should doubt that they’ll give this their best shot.

May 24, 2023 Posted by | Aletho News | , , , | Leave a comment

Kiev’s terrorist regime possibly involved in assassination attempt in Transnistria

By Lucas Leiroz | March 10, 2023

According to information recently published by local authorities in Transnistria, a terrorist attack was planned by Ukrainian saboteurs in Tiraspol, the aim of which was to kill the current president of the autonomous republic, Vadim Krasnoselsky. The case reveals that in fact Kiev maintains regular terrorist activities abroad, using sabotage tactics to eliminate civilians considered “enemies” of the Ukrainian neo-Nazi regime.

The plan was discovered by the intelligence services of the secessionist republic. According to Tiraspol’s officials, the Ukrainian scheme was discovered in time to avoid the tragedy. It is believed that not only President Krasnoselsky would be targeted by the saboteurs, but also some other top Transnistrian officials would be assassinated. The agents behind the maneuver were linked to the Ukrainian Secret Service.

In a statement published on March 9, the Ministry of State Security says that “criminal cases have been opened and are being investigated with regard to the crimes”, despite the threats having already been neutralized. With this, it is possible to say that there is evidence of other plots within the republic aiming at damaging the local political system. Certainly, more information about these criminal cases will be revealed in the course of the next few days.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Transnistria Vitaly Ignatiev also commented on the case. He stated that the situation is under control and that the president is working normally in his office, with assured security. Ignatiev also said that the republic will formally ask Ukraine to cooperate in the investigation of the sabotage attempt, providing all the necessary information to identify and capture those responsible for the failed attempt at terrorist attack.

Tiraspol’s authorities believe that Ukraine’s possible willingness to cooperate in punishing the saboteurs is the only way to prevent tensions from escalating. If Kiev refuses to cooperate, it will be making clear that in fact there was a deliberate operation by the regime to destabilize Transnistria, and not a unilateral action by some Ukrainian spies. More than that: by denying cooperation Kiev will also be saying that it does not regret having planned the attack and suggesting that it will continue to plot against Transnistria, thus becoming an existential threat to the Republic.

In this sense, Foreign Minister Ignatiev also stated that if nothing is done by Kiev to help with the investigations, the Transnistrian government will request that the issue be discussed at the UN Security Council – a measure that would certainly be supported by the Russian Federation, which has taken the greatest responsibility for peace in the republic, keeping troops in the region to prevent illegal advances by the Moldovan government or foreign invasions.

Ukraine is unlikely to cooperate as Kiev has long practiced a policy of open terrorism against its opponents, carrying out illegal operations abroad. The assassination of Daria Dugina, the Bryansk attack, repeated drone incursions into undisputed Russian territory, and the recent assassination attempt on businessman Konstantin Malofeev make Ukrainian terrorism evident. However, to better understand the motives for sabotaging Transnistria, it is necessary to go beyond Ukraine and investigate the interests of the sponsors of the neo-Nazi regime: the Western governments.

It is necessary to take into account that the West has recently implemented a strategy of multiplying fronts. Faced with NATO’s imminent defeat in its war against Russia using Ukraine as a proxy, the objective now is to generate as many combat fronts as possible to distract Russian forces, forcing Moscow to keep soldiers in several conflict zones simultaneously.

This explains the Western pressure for Georgia to invade Abkhazia and South Ossetia – as well as the ongoing color revolution against the pro-peace government. It is also possible to understand the Azerbaijani sabotage against Artsakh and Armenia. And even the recent tensions between Kosovar terrorists and Serbian authorities can be analyzed from this perspective. All these are conflicts in which Russia would intervene supporting one of the sides, so it is in the West’s interest to intensify tensions so that Moscow maintains several combat fronts and increases its losses.

As it is possible to see, NATO tries to open these new combat fronts only in countries that are not part of the alliance, thus guaranteeing that new confrontations are fought without the need to involve the regular troops of the western countries – which are preserved for an eventual situation of direct war against Russia or China.

Indeed, Moscow has been actively working with local Transnistrian authorities to ensure that law and order is respected in the autonomous republic. The Western attempt to open new combat fronts has already been understood by Russian strategists, who work precisely trying to prevent tensions from escalating to open confrontation. It is possible that new eruptions of military frictions will arise in the coming months, but first the Russian government will do everything possible for these cases to be resolved through intelligence and diplomacy.

Lucas Leiroz is a researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies; geopolitical consultant.

You can follow Lucas on Twitter and Telegram.

March 10, 2023 Posted by | Deception, War Crimes | , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Isfahan incident may have been foreign provocation

By Lucas Leiroz | January 31, 2023

The Islamic Republic of Iran was the target of air strikes with drones in the early hours of January 29th. Many unconfirmed rumors about the attacks have been spread on the internet, but the most probable possibility is that the action was planned by Israelis and Azeris in order to dissuade Iran to take a less active stance in current key conflicts, considering that many factories of Shahed military drones, one of Iran’s most important weapons, were hit during the bombings.

Iran’s Ministry of Defense confirmed that some attacks occurred in the Isfahan region. Military drone factories were the main targets, which indicates that it was an assault aimed at destroying the Iranian war industry. Other regions also reported incidents, mainly Khoy, on the border with Azerbaijan, but without official confirmation from the Iranian government.

According to some anonymous sources, the drones used in the attacks probably came from an Israeli military base in Azerbaijan. During the strikes, some media outlets even published news stating that Tel Aviv had formally started a military operation inside the Iranian territory which has been described as “disinformation and “psychological warfare” by the Iranian authorities. Investigations are still being conducted and apparently there are Iranian officials both confirming and denying the Israeli involvement.

On the 30th, Iranian officials anonymously informed some Middle Eastern media outlets that data so far indicate that Tel Aviv is the side responsible for the attack. However, some other Iranian representatives on the same day have expressed skepticism about this possibility, claiming that, in such a circumstance, Tel Aviv would certainly be willing to admit its responsibility.

For example, Abbas Moghtadaei, deputy chairman of the Iranian Parliament’s Foreign Policy and National Security Commission, said during an interview to Russian press: “If Israel had done this, it would proudly show evidence of its operation to the whole world”.

However, many reasons indicate that in fact the country most interested in carrying out this assault on Iran would really be Israel. In addition to historic regional rivalries between Iran and Israel, Iran’s pro-Armenian stance on the Artsakh conflict and Tehran-Moscow cooperation regarding military drones have been seen recently as a “threat” by the Israeli government and its Western allies. Furthermore, interestingly, Israeli attacks against Iranian military and humanitarian convoys in Iraq and Syria have also occurred recently, which further points to the possibility of an Israeli wave of aggressions on Iran.

Some reasons could explain why Israel did not “confess” the attack publicly. First, it is necessary to understand that apparently the strikes had a lower effect than what was being planned by the aggressor forces. The damage caused to the drone industry was insignificant, visibly not enough to harm the Iranian-Russian or Iranian-Armenian military partnership. Pro-Israel media outlets even spread fake news trying to make the attacks seem bigger than they really were, but they failed due to concrete data, as normal life in Iran continued during the strikes, including air traffic. So, faced with an unsuccessful assault, perhaps Israel chose not to declare its involvement in the incursion.

Azerbaijani participation should also be considered. Although there was no official confirmation, there are reliable sources indicating that the drones used in the provocations were sent from an Israeli military base in Azerbaijan. Another interesting factor is that the Azerbaijani diplomats in Iran left the country after the incident, with the Azerbaijani Embassy in Tehran currently inactive. In fact, as rivalries in the region increase, Israel and Iran tend to have more and more friction – and obviously the Azeris would be interested in annihilating Iranian weapons such as the Shahed drones before it comes to an open war scenario.

What is really known is that, regardless of which country operated them, the attacks indeed happened and were certainly a response to the Iranian position in current conflicts. Shahed drones, used by Russian forces against military positions of the Ukraine’s neo-Nazi regime, are the focus of Western leaders’ concerns regarding Iran. Certainly, if a pro-Western country wanted to attack Iran, choosing drone factories as the main target would be a decision of high strategic value.

It remains to be seen how the Iranian government will react to the provocations it suffered. Tehran has historically been marked by its extreme caution in conducting military actions, responding slowly and asymmetrically to foreign affronts – and it is likely that it will also be the case this time. Of course, any measure against Israel needs to be very well planned, since Tel Aviv has nuclear weapons, but an expected scenario is increased Iranian activities on the Artsakh issue, as neutralizing Azerbaijan seems to be becoming a real necessity for the Persian country’s security.

Lucas Leiroz is a researcher in Social Sciences at the Rural Federal University of Rio de Janeiro; geopolitical consultant.

You can follow Lucas on Twitter and Telegram.

January 31, 2023 Posted by | War Crimes | , | 4 Comments

South Caucasus: A battle of wills and corridors

By Yeghia Tashjian | The Cradle | December 30, 2022

On 12 December, under the pretext of environmentalism, dozens of state-backed “eco-activists” from Azerbaijan blocked the only land corridor connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh.

The blockade created a humanitarian crisis for the 120,000 Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh, cutting them off from the outside world. This is not the first time Baku has taken such a provocative action. Azerbaijan has long been pushing for the creation of the “Zangezur corridor” to connect itself to close ally Turkiye through southern Armenia, thereby cutting off the strategic Armenia-Iran border.

Tehran has opposed this project and has engaged in military exercises on its border with Azerbaijan. In October, the Iranians opened a consulate in the city of Kapan in southern Armenia as a warning to Baku and its regional allies.

Blocking the Lachin corridor

Despite this, Azerbaijan, with the support of Turkiye, has continued to pursue its goal, which has included blocking the road where Russian peacekeepers are stationed in the Lachin corridor connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh.

Map of Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict zones (Photo Credit: The Cradle)

In July 2022, Baku amended a contract with British company Anglo Asian Mining PLC, transferring three new mining sites inside Azerbaijan to the firm. One of these areas is located in the eastern part of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Martakert region, an area rich in gold, copper, and silver mines.

Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population refused Azerbaijan’s efforts to send in monitoring groups, believing the move would give Baku control over the region’s economy and eventually lead to its annexation. In retaliation, Baku sent “environmentalists” to block the only corridor connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh.

Social media users have identified Azerbaijani state employees amid some of these “environmentalists” who periodically try to provoke Russian peacekeepers. The blockade has caused a humanitarian disaster in the region, with thousands of civilians unable to access basic necessities like medication and food via the only road connecting them to the outside world.

To compound tensions, Anglo-Asian Mining sent a letter to leading international organizations and states demanding that the “illegal exploitation” of the mines in Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenians be stopped. And yet Moscow continues to take a passive position, despite being a targeted party in the melee.

The Battle of Corridors

The blockade of the Lachin corridor did not come as a surprise, having been openly discussed in Azerbaijani media.

The only surprise was Russia’s inability to resolve the crisis. Earlier this month, Turkiye’s defense minister Hulusi Akar called on Armenia to “grasp the opportunity and respond positively to Turkiye’s and Azerbaijan’s peace calls” during joint military drills with Azerbaijan near the Iranian border.

He also commented on the “Zangezur corridor,” claiming that it was Baku’s “sincerest wish” to re-establish connections in the region and ensure “a comprehensive normalization throughout the region, including the relations between Azerbaijan-Armenia and Turkiye-Armenia.” Akar also vowed that Turkiye would continue to support Azerbaijan’s “righteous cause” against Armenia.

But on the second day of the protests organized by Azerbaijanis and the blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijani media outlets made their intentions clear.

They called for the replacement of the commander of the Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh, Andrey Volkov, and for the control of the Lachin corridor to be transferred to Azerbaijan, along with the “full restoration of Azerbaijani sovereignty in the territories under the control of the peacekeepers.”

Some Azerbaijani activists also called for the removal of Russian forces and their replacement with UN-mandated forces.

Removal of Russian peacekeepers

It is unclear if Baku itself is willing to employ this language and demand the removal and replacement of Russian peacekeeping forces. According to some Azerbaijani experts, Baku is currently against the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers by force, as this could lead to the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh and the ethnic cleansing of Armenian Christians, which could tarnish President Ilham Aliyev’s image in the west and potentially result in US-EU economic sanctions.

Instead, Baku prefers to have the Russians stay, but in a restrictive capacity. It is easier for Azerbaijan to deal with a weak Russia, rather than with the Europeans, as they are familiar with the “Russian mentality,” says one expert. This suggests that Azerbaijan may prefer to continue using the Lachin corridor as a tool for negotiating with Moscow, rather than risking the removal of Russian forces.

Another Azerbaijani expert agreed that the current crisis is essentially between Azerbaijan and Russia – that the latter is unable to fulfill its “peacekeeping mission” and prevent the “Armenians of Karabakh from exploiting the natural resources in the region.”

But he also argues that the crisis is less about the mining and exploitation of resources, and more about pressuring the Russians to open the “Zangezur corridor,” which connects Azerbaijan proper to its Nakhichevan exclave, and lies on Iran’s strategic border with Armenia.

According to the expert, “Azerbaijan wants additional guarantees that it will have a safe connection with Turkiye, in exchange for Karabakh’s safe connection to Armenia.”

The story gets more complicated. In December, Azerbaijani media accused Armenians of inviting Iranian military experts to train Nagorno-Karabakh’s self-defense forces. The reports claim Iranians crossed the Lachin corridor and entered the territories controlled by Russian peacekeepers.

Despite Baku’s continuous barbs and provocations, it appears that Azerbaijan’s goal is not to fully remove or replace Russian peacekeepers, but rather to control their mission, monitor transit in the Lachin corridor, and use the corridor as a pressure card on Yerevan to open a “corridor” in Syunik linking Azerbaijan to Turkiye.

Therefore, from Azerbaijan’s perspective, the future of the Lachin corridor is now tied to the fate of the “Zangezur corridor.”

The view from Tehran

According to Dr. Ehsan Movahedian, researcher and instructor at the Allameh Tabataba’i University of Tehran, “the Republic of Azerbaijan is seeking a new adventure in the Caucasus region, and this issue requires diplomatic steps from the Islamic Republic of Iran and should be warning for the military authorities (in Tehran).”

One Iranian media outlet argues that if Stepanagert (the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh) falls:

“Unpleasant scenarios can be imagined for the South Caucasus region and its surrounding areas, including Iran. Removing an obstacle such as Nagorno-Karabakh paves the way for occupying Armenian territory and changing the map of the region, and in the long term for security attacks on the northwestern regions of Iran.”

The analyst, Mohammad Hossein Masumzadeh, says the only solution to halt Azerbaijan’s aggression “is offensive measures instead of the defensive approach governing the country’s regional policy in order to avoid irreparable risks.”

Some Iranian experts and former diplomats believe that the developments in the South Caucasus are related to domestic developments in Iran, where many ethnic Azeris, backed by Ankara and Baku, have called for separatist aspirations to dismantle the state from within.

Iran is concerned that the spread of Turkish influence on its northern border could impact its domestic politics in the future, as Azerbaijan has openly called for the “unification of Southern Azerbaijan (northern Iran) to the Republic of Azerbaijan.”

These do not appear to be empty threats. On 29 November, the “Organization for the Protection of the Rights of South Azerbaijanis” was established in Switzerland, announcing that it will submit documents and information to international organizations, including the UN, regarding the “rights of people in the Azerbaijani Province of Iran”.

On 2 December, the representative of “South Azerbaijan” at the UN, Araz Yurdseven, defended the idea of the independence of “South Azerbaijan” and accused Iran of committing “murders against the Iranian Azeris.”

Is the region heading for a new escalation?

Interestingly, many European and Azerbaijani experts viewed Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s refusal to sign the final document of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO ) as a sign of Russian weakness, calling it “an unprecedented event that had never happened before.”

The CSTO is a Eurasian military alliance consisting of six post-Soviet states, which include Armenia, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

There are concerns that the region could be headed towards a new escalation. Azerbaijan has recently invited Turkish F-16 fighter jets to the region, which is being viewed as a preparation for conflict. The last time Baku invited the Turkish jets was in 2020, weeks before its war with Armenia.

Azerbaijan is also pressuring Russia to renegotiate the terms of their 10 November 2020 trilateral statement, which states that only Russian peacekeepers are responsible for controlling the Lachin corridor.

Azerbaijan is linking the blockade of the Lachin corridor to the opening of the Zangezur one. If Russia agrees to these concessions, it could lead to the isolation of Armenia, threaten its territorial integrity, and block an Iranian strategic border.

This would also shift the regional balance of power towards Turkiye, as Iran risks acting alone against Turkish-Azerbaijani pan-Turkic aspirations, which could eventually threaten Iran’s national security interests both regionally and domestically.

December 30, 2022 Posted by | Aletho News | , , , , | Leave a comment

Resuming of Azeri-Armenian conflict would be quite suitable for the political West

Baku is trying to use the current geopolitical situation to fulfill its long-term goals

By Drago Bosnic | September 13, 2022

Over the last 24 hours, fighting broke out in multiple areas along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. The conflict has escalated enough for Yerevan to ask its CSTO allies, in particular Russia, to intervene. This has been revealed just hours after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan held a late-night telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Armenian government has since confirmed it has requested Russian military assistance to repel Azeri aggression and shelling, according to an official statement:

“During the meeting, further steps were discussed to counter the aggressive actions of Azerbaijan against the sovereign territory of Armenia that began at midnight. In connection with the aggression against the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia, it was decided to officially appeal to the Russian Federation in order to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, as well as to the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the UN Security Council.”

Armenia is basing its official request on the Collective Security Treaty Organization military pact it has with Russia and four other former Soviet republics (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). Within the framework of its military cooperation with Yerevan, Russia previously sent a 2000-strong peacekeeping force to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh (known as Artsakh to the indigenous Armenians) after the late 2020 war which saw much of the contested region taken by Azeri forces.

This escalation comes approximately a month and a half since the late July/early August clashes in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic when Azeri forces attacked the remaining Artsakh defenders. After months of tensions, Azerbaijan accused Armenia of allegedly attacking its military units in the disputed region. Azeri Ministry of Defense claimed that Armenian soldiers supposedly opened fire at Azeri troops in Gadabay, Kalbajar and Khojavend. Initially, no casualties or material losses were reported as a result of the alleged attack, although the Azeri MoD later claimed at least one of their soldiers was killed. Azerbaijan then took what it called “retaliatory measures”. The Armenian side denied the accusations and stated that the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is stable. Since 2020, nearly 2000 Russian peacekeepers have been deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh to enforce a ceasefire agreement signed after the large-scale Azerbaijani attack on Armenian forces late that year.

However, the latest escalation is the first large-scale incident when Azeri forces attacked Armenia proper. This is just one of many instances in which the Azeri side is claiming it’s “only defending” and is accusing Armenia of attacking its troops. Given the rather difficult position of both Armenia proper and the Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, it would be strategically unwise to even contemplate escalation against Baku, especially when taking into account the clear superiority of Azeri forces in the last several years. In recent times, the oil and gas-rich Azerbaijan has been acquiring large quantities of advanced weapons from various countries, especially Turkey and Israel. At the same time, Armenia, a small landlocked country with scant resources, has been under a virtual blockade by both Turkey and Azerbaijan for over three decades and it cannot match the economic and military power of Azerbaijan alone, to say nothing of the virtually guaranteed support Baku gets from regional powers such as Turkey.

The Azeri side is most likely resuming its offensive in the region since Russia is preoccupied with its counteroffensive against NATO aggression in Europe. Baku is trying to use the current geopolitical situation to fulfill its long-term goals and it may very well be attacking Armenia directly to divert Yerevan’s attention and create an opportunity to capture the entire territory of the already surrounded Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. 

However, this would require Azerbaijan to effectively go against Russia’s interests in the Southern Caucasus region. Moscow has repeatedly warned Azerbaijan against escalating the conflict with Armenia any further. Despite the successful geopolitical game Azeri leadership has been playing for years, balancing between Russia, Turkey and the political West, Moscow is unlikely to allow further attacks. Back in March, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu warned Baku that the Russian military is capable of conducting large-scale operations in multiple theaters, clearly implying that no unilateral Azeri action will be tolerated.

However, Baku seems to have the quiet backing of the EU. According to Radio Free Europe, the same day when the conflict escalated Azerbaijan announced it will increase natural gas exports to Europe this year by 30%. As Brussels is trying to reduce its dependence on Russian energy, the EU is neither willing nor in a position to condemn an Azeri attack on Armenia. 

What’s more, the conflict would be quite suitable for the political West, particularly the US. First, it could further undermine relations between Russia and Turkey, which could also spill over to other regions, such as Syria. Second, it would require Russia to send additional troops to Armenia and possibly even Nagorno-Karabakh, which would divert Moscow’s attention and resources from its military operation against the NATO-backed Kiev regime. Either way, Russia is faced with a carefully coordinated destabilization on its entire western and southwestern flank and it will require nothing short of masterful strategic planning to tackle these issues without creating even more problems.

Drago Bosnic is an independent geopolitical and military analyst.

September 13, 2022 Posted by | Militarism | , | Leave a comment

Rising tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran spark fears of an Israeli-US proxy war against Tehran

By Robert Inlakesh | RT | October 6, 2021

Tensions are running high as Iran holds war games along its northern border, warning it won’t tolerate its neighbour providing a safe haven for the “anti-security activities of the fake Zionist regime.”

Iranian war games held along its northern border with Azerbaijan, leading to Baku threatening military deployment in retaliation, has sparked fear of war between the two countries.

But any such war would not end up being won by Tehran or Baku, but rather the United States and Israel, who would likely seize such an opportunity to fuel a Syria-style proxy war against the Islamic Republic.

The tensions that have arisen between Azerbaijan and Iran, as of late September, have seemingly popped up out of nowhere, but such an escalation was only a matter of time. The recent political quarrel has come about as a product of last year’s war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, over the Nagorno-Karabakh area, which resulted in a victory for Baku and allowed it to take over Karabakh from Armenia.

Iran had previously used its access through Armenian-controlled Karabakh to reach West Asia and Russia, sending its trucks and other means of transportation through the area, often free of customs.

Since Azerbaijan established its sovereignty over Karabakh, it has cracked down harshly on Iranian trucking and sought to establish itself as the leader of the Caucasus, intending to make itself the primary connection hub between Europe and Asia.

In order to undermine Baku, Iran has now announced that it will help Armenia establish a new bypass road that will cut out Azerbaijan. Although Tehran denies it initiated the recent war games along the Iran-Azerbaijan border with the intent of escalation, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev criticised the military drills, asking, “Why now, and why on our border?”

The commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Force offered one answer when he said last week that Iran would not tolerate its neighbors becoming “a safe haven and a base for the presence and anti-security activities of the fake Zionist regime.”

In the event that a clash does occur between Iran and Azerbaijan, it is likely that the Islamic Republic has the upper hand, being a regional military powerhouse. Yet Azerbaijan has more potential for causing Iran trouble through its allies and potential proxies than it does through its military might. Iran’s military drills, named Fatehan-e Khaybar (Conquerors of Khaybar), are also clearly not just aimed at sending a message to Baku, but also to Israel.

Israel armed Azerbaijan with roughly $825 million in armaments between 2006-2019. Although it would seem strange to some that Iran claims an Israeli presence on its northwestern border, as Israel is not even close geographically and its relationship with Azerbaijan looks on the surface to be mainly business based, it does have a point when it claims this, as the relationship runs far deeper than weapons trade.

A WikiLeaks-released cable sent by Donald Lu, the deputy chief of mission for the US embassy in Baku, to the US State Department revealed the nature of Azerbaijan-Israel ties, stating: “The relationship also affects U.S. policy insofar as Azerbaijan tries, often successfully, to convince the U.S. pro-Israel lobby to advocate on its behalf,” indicating a much closer connection than publicly admitted between the two sides. The document also revealed that, “with some humor, the Israeli DCM told us that Israeli businessmen expressed to her that they prefer corruption in Kazakhstan to that of Azerbaijan because in Kazakhstan one can expect to pay exorbitant fees to do business but those are generally collected at once, up front, whereas in Azerbaijan the demands for bribes never cease.”

Foreign Policy Magazine published a piece in 2012 in which they claimed that a senior US official confirmed that Israel had secured an airfield in Azerbaijan and that Israel could be using the country for a staging ground against Iran, a charge that Baku denies. Beyond this, Tehran has accused Azerbaijan of encouraging separatists groups inside of Iran, many of which staged demonstrations last year during the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, calling for the re-establishment of what they call “Southern Azerbaijan.”

If any war was to be initiated between Baku and Tehran, this would be the greatest opportunity for Israel and the US to back ethnic Azeri separatists in a similar way to how the Obama administration funded and trained Syrian militants to overthrow the government of Bashar Assad. Out of Iran’s 83 million citizens, between 10-15 million of them are believed to be ethnic Azeris, meaning that just a small portion of them are needed to form an extremely problematic military force that could fight in urban warfare settings.

The United States and Israel have for long been hesitant to launch direct strikes against Iran, likely for fear of the regional war which it could spark, along with Iranian retaliation, yet a proxy war would be much less costly. During any such war, they could also launch strikes against Iran, especially Israel, which constantly threatens Tehran.

Turkey has already pledged its support to Azerbaijan, and during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, even sent ex-Syrian Jihadist mercenaries to aid Baku’s forces; some of these ex-Syrian militants are reportedly present along the Iranian border now.

Iran may be able to handle such a proxy war, but it would certainly be a tough challenge, while Azerbaijan would likely suffer badly. The war would benefit no one but regional players and super powers seeking regime change in Tehran, which is unlikely to succeed, as was the case in Syria. Such a war would result in perhaps hundreds of thousands of deaths and cause any number of unforeseen consequences. Iran knows the strategy which the likes of Israel is attempting to employ against it, meaning that such a war could lead to retaliatory action committed against Tel Aviv.

Robert Inlakesh is a political analyst, journalist and documentary filmmaker currently based in London, UK. He has reported from and lived in the occupied Palestinian territories and currently works with Quds News and Press TV.

October 6, 2021 Posted by | Aletho News | , , , , , | 1 Comment

Azerbaijan won the war in Nagorno-Karabakh but reduced its sovereignty

By Paul Antonopoulos | February 1, 2021

Although Azerbaijan won the war against Armenia, both countries have in fact lost part of their sovereignty.

Azerbaijan won the war and expanded territorially after it captured or received the districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh proper that Armenian forces captured in the first war (1988-1994). The status of Nagorno-Karabakh proper remains undetermined but is protected by Russian peacekeepers and is still governed by Armenians.

Despite this territorial expansion, Azerbaijan has in fact partly lost its sovereignty. During the war, reports began emerging that Azerbaijani military leaders were becoming increasingly frustrated with the level of control that Turkey had over their fighting forces. These reports were quickly dismissed and denied by Azerbaijan as Armenian attempts to create division through misinformation. But if this was just misinformation, then there would be no risk of division to begin with, meaning it would not be worth giving attention to, suggesting there was certainly an element of truth to it.

Azerbaijan’s military success lays with two key factors: the Armenian political and military incompetency and lack of will, and Turkey’s contribution with drones, special forces, intelligence and transfer of Syrian jihadists.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan never truly committed to the war effort as Armenian forces were never fully mobilized, powerful Iskander missiles infrequently used, the Armenian Air Force mostly grounded, Armenian diaspora and foreign volunteers rejected from fighting, and local Armenian militias not equipped with enough ammunition, maps and communication devices, nor were the militias assigned commanders – yet this was supposedly a “war for survival,” as Pashinyan termed it.

None-the-less, despite the incompetency of the Armenian leadership, Azerbaijan’s rapid success in Nagorno-Karabakh would not have been possible without significant Turkish support. Even Azerbaijan’s success is limited as it did not achieve its main war aim – the capture of Nagorno-Karabakh.

More importantly, Ankara’s footprint in the country massively expanded through the deployment of more Turkish troops to Azerbaijan, control of more military bases, and the establishment of a joint observation center with Russia in the Agdam region.

As said, reports circulated during the war that divisions in the Azerbaijani military and political circles were emerging between a pro-Turkish faction and another faction in opposition to Turkey’s dominant role in the war effort. These reports have only intensified in recent days as Turkish troops are now deployed in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani politicians and military leaders are beginning to worry about Ankara’s strong influence in the country, with critics commenting that Azerbaijan has become the 82nd province of Turkey. Although Azerbaijan now controls most of the formerly Armenian-held territory, it cannot exercise control over it without Turkish and Russian oversight.

In fact, even Iran has greater opportunities to influence Azerbaijan that it was not able to do before the war. Azerbaijan’s capture of the districts to the south of Nagorno-Karabakh proper means that it shares external borders with only Armenia and Iran. Effectively Iran has great opportunities to be one of the leading foreign investors in the region as Armenia and Azerbaijan have not normalized their relations. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif visited the Nakhichevan exclave of Azerbaijan, the region wedged between Armenia, Turkey and Iran, to boost regional cooperation through new railroad and transportation routes.

In turn, it will be inevitable that Iran will attempt to gain influence through pan-Shi’ism, but this may prove difficult to gain a foothold as pan-Turkism has become the dominant ideology of Azerbaijan because of Turkey’s own soft power manoeuvers. Russia will utilize its influence through its peacekeepers in the region, and also soft power through economic exchanges.

Although Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev will relish his country’s long-awaited victory after his father Heydar Aliyev signed a humiliating ceasefire in May 1994 to conclude the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, the long-term repercussion means that Turkey dominates the Azerbaijani military and wields great political influence over Baku. Also, there is limited Azerbaijani governance in the territories it controls because of Russia’s watchful eye through the deployment of peacekeepers. And finally, we can see much stronger Iranian influence as it aims to penetrate the region through economic and religious means.

Azerbaijani flags may be flying over the captured territories, but it certainly has come at the price of reduced sovereignty – militarily, economically, politically, and perhaps even religiously and culturally.

Paul Antonopoulos is an independent geopolitical analyst.

February 1, 2021 Posted by | Aletho News | , , , , | Leave a comment

Turkey has perfected a new, deadly way to wage war, using militarized ‘drone swarms’

By Scott Ritter | RT | November 29, 2020

From Syria to Libya to Nagorno-Karabakh, this new method of military offense has been brutally effective. We are witnessing a revolution in the history of warfare, one that is causing panic, particularly in Europe.

In an analysis written for the European Council on Foreign Relations, Gustav Gressel, a senior policy fellow, argues that the extensive (and successful) use of military drones by Azerbaijan in its recent conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh holds “distinct lessons for how well Europe can defend itself.”

Gressel warns that Europe would be doing itself a disservice if it simply dismissed the Nagorno-Karabakh fighting as “a minor war between poor countries.” In this, Gressel is correct – the military defeat inflicted on Armenia by Azerbaijan was not a fluke, but rather a manifestation of the perfection of the art of drone warfare by Baku’s major ally in the fighting, Turkey. Gressel’s conclusion – that “most of the [European Union’s] armies… would do as miserably as the Armenian Army” when faced by such a threat – is spot on.

What happened to the Armenian Army in its short but brutal 44-day war with Azerbaijan goes beyond simply losing a war. It was more about the way Armenia lost and, more specifically, how it lost. What happened over the skies of Nagorno-Karabakh – where Azerbaijan employed a host of Turkish- and Israeli-made drones not only to surveil and target Armenian positions, but shape and dominate the battlefield throughout – can be likened to a revolution in military affairs. One akin to the arrival of tanks, mechanised armoured vehicles, and aircraft in the early 20th century, that eventually led to the demise of horse-mounted cavalry.

It’s not that the Armenian soldiers were not brave, or well-trained and equipped – they were. It was that they were fighting a kind of war which had been overtaken by technology, where no matter how resolute and courageous they were in the face of the enemy, the outcome was preordained – their inevitable death, and the destruction of their equipment; some 2,425 Armenian soldiers lost their lives in the fighting, and 185 T-72 tanks, 90 armored fighting vehicles, 182 artillery pieces, 73 multiple rocket launchers, and 26 surface-to-air missile systems were destroyed.

A new kind of warfare

What happened to Armenia was not an isolated moment in military history, but rather the culmination of a new kind of warfare, centered on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones). Azerbaijan’s major ally in the war against Armenia – Turkey – has been perfecting the art of drone warfare for years, with extensive experience in full-scale modern conflict gained in recent fighting in Syria (February-March 2020) and Libya (May-June 2020.)

Over the course of the past decade, Turkey has taken advantage of arms embargoes imposed by America and others which restricted Ankara’s access to the kind of front-line drones used by the US around the world, to instead build from scratch an indigenous drone-manufacturing base. While Turkey has developed several drones in various configurations, two have stood out in particular – the Anka-S and Bayraktar.

While the popular term for the kind of drone-centric combat carried out by Turkey is “drone swarm,” the reality is that modern drone warfare, when conducted on a large scale, is a deliberate, highly coordinated process which integrates electronic warfare, reconnaissance and surveillance, and weapons delivery. Turkey’s drone war over Syria was managed from the Turkish Second Army Command Tactical Command Center, located some 400km away from the fighting in the city of Malatya in Turkey’s Hatay Province.

It was here that the Turkish drone operators sat, and where they oversaw the operation of an integrated electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) warfare capability designed to jam Syrian and Russia air-defense radars and collect signals of military value (such as cell phone conversations) which were used to target specific locations.

For every $1 in losses suffered by Turkey, Syria lost approximately $5

The major systems used by Turkey in this role are the KORAL jamming system and a specially configured Anka-S drone operating as an airborne intelligence collection platform. The Anka-S also operated as an airborne command and control system, relaying targeting intelligence to orbiting Bayraktar UAVs, which would then acquire the target visually before firing highly precise onboard air-to-surface rockets, destroying the target. When conducted in isolation, an integrated drone strike such as those carried out by Turkey can be deadly effective; when conducted simultaneously with four or more systems in action, each of which is capable of targeting multiple locations, the results are devastating and, from the perspective of those on the receiving end, might be likened to a deadly “swarm.”

The fighting in Syria illustrated another important factor regarding drone warfare – the disparity of costs between the drone and the military assets it can destroy. Turkish Bayraktar and Anka-S UAV’s cost approximately $2.5 million each. Over the course of fighting in Syria’s Idlib province, Turkey lost between six and eight UAVs, for a total replacement cost of around $20 million.

In the first night of fighting in Syria, Turkey claims (and Russia does not dispute) that it destroyed large numbers of heavy equipment belonging to the Syrian Army, including 23 tanks and 23 artillery pieces. Overall, Turkish drones are credited with killing 34 Syrian tanks and 36 artillery systems, along with a significant amount of other combat equipment. If one uses the average cost of a Russian-made tank at around $1.2 million, and an artillery system at around $500,000, the total damage done by Turkey’s drones amounts to some $57.3 million (and this number does not include the other considerable material losses suffered by the Syrian military, which in total could easily match or exceed that number.) From a cost perspective alone, for every $1 in losses suffered by Turkey, the Syrians lost approximately $5.

Turkey was able to take the lessons learned from the fighting in Idlib province and apply them to a different theater of war, in Libya, in May 2020. There, Turkey had sided with the beleaguered forces of the Government of National Accord (GNA), which was mounting what amounted to a last stand around the Libyan capital of Tripoli. The GNA was facing off against the forces of the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA), based out of Benghazi, which had launched a major offensive designed to capture the capital, eliminate the GNA, and take control of all of Libya.

How to capture half a country

The LNA was supported by the several foreign powers, including Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia (via Wagner Group, a private military contractor.) Turkey’s intervention placed a heavy emphasis on the integrated drone warfare it had perfected in Syria. In Libya, the results were even more lop-sided, with the Turkish-backed GNA able to drive the LNA forces back, capturing nearly half of Libya in the process.

Both the LNA and Turkish-backed GNA made extensive use of combat drones, but only Turkey brought with it an integrated approach to drone warfare. Observers have grown accustomed to the concept of individual US drones operating freely over places such as Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan, delivering precision strikes against terrorist targets. However, as Iran demonstrated this past May, drones are vulnerable to modern air-defense systems, and US drone tactics would not work over contested airspace.

Likewise, the LNA, which made extensive use of Chinese-made combat drones flown by UAE pilots, enjoyed great success until Turkey intervened. Its electronic warfare and integrated air-defense capabilities then made LNA drone operations impossible to conduct, and the inability of the LNA to field an effective defense against the Turkish drone operations resulted in the tide of battle rapidly shifting on the ground. If anything, the cost differential between the Turkish-backed GNA and the LNA was greater than the $1-to-$5 advantage enjoyed by Turkey in Syria.

The big players – the US, Russia & China – are playing catch-up

By the time Turkey began cooperating with Azerbaijan against Armenia in September 2020, Turkish drone warfare had reached its zenith, and the outcome in Nagorno-Karabakh was all but assured. One of the main lessons drawn from the Turkish drone experiences in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh is that these conflicts were not fought against so-called “poor countries.”

Rather, the Turks were facing off against well-equipped and well-trained forces operating equipment which closely parallels that found in most small- and medium-sized European countries. Indeed, in all three conflicts, Turkey was facing off against some of the best anti-aircraft missile defenses produced by Russia. The reality is that most nations, if confronted by a Turkish “drone swarm,” would not fare well.

And the multiple deployment of drones is only going to expand. The US Army is currently working on what it calls the “Armed, Fully-Autonomous Drone Swarm,” or AFADS. When employed, AFADS will – autonomously, without human intervention – locate, identify, and attack targets using what is known as a “Cluster Unmanned Airborne System Smart Munition,” which will dispense a swarm of small drones that fan out over the battlefield to locate and destroy targets.

China has likewise tested a system that deploys up to 200 “suicide drones” designed to saturate a battlespace and destroy targets by flying into them. And this past September, the Russian military integrated “drone-swarm” capabilities for the first time in a large-scale military exercise.

The face of modern warfare has been forever altered, and those nations that are not prepared or equipped to fight in a battlefield where drone technology is fully incorporated in every aspect of the fight can expect outcomes similar to that of Armenia: severe losses of men and equipment, defeat, humiliation and the likely loss of their territory. This is the reality of modern warfare which, as Gustav Gressel notes, should make any nation not fully vested in drone technology “think – and worry.”

Scott Ritter is a former US Marine Corps intelligence officer and author of ‘SCORPION KING: America’s Suicidal Embrace of Nuclear Weapons from FDR to Trump.’ He served in the Soviet Union as an inspector implementing the INF Treaty, in General Schwarzkopf’s staff during the Gulf War, and from 1991-1998 as a UN weapons inspector. Follow him on Twitter @RealScottRitter

November 29, 2020 Posted by | Militarism | , , , | Leave a comment

Why Conflict in Caucasus Is Erdogan’s Revenge for Syria

By Finian Cunningham | Strategic Culture Foundation | October 17, 2020

Turkey’s outsize role in fueling the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is becoming more apparent. That’s why a peace deal will be hard to cut and indeed the conflict may blow up further into a protracted regional war. A war that could drag Russia into battling in the Caucasus on its southern periphery against NATO proxies.

In a phone call this week with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan reportedly backed Moscow’s efforts at mediating a ceasefire in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Notwithstanding, Erdogan appeared to deliver an ultimatum to his Russian counterpart. He said that there must be a “permanent solution” to the decades-long territorial dispute.

Erdogan and his Azerbaijan ally have already made it clear that the only solution acceptable to them is for Armenian separatists to relinquish their claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey and Azerbaijan – bound by common Turkic culture – have long-called the Armenian-held enclave an illegal occupation of Azerbaijani territory since a border war ended in 1994.

When hostilities flared again last month on September 27 initial reports suggested the clashes were of a haphazard nature with both sides trading blame for starting the violence. However, it has since become clear that the actions taken on the Azeri side seem to have been a planned aggression with Turkey’s full support.

Following a previous deadly clash on July 12-13 involving about a dozen casualties among Armenian and Azerbaijani forces, there then proceeded massive military exercises in Azerbaijan involving 11,000 Turkish troops beginning on July 29. For nearly two weeks into August, the maneuvers deployed artillery, warplanes and air-defense units in what was evidently a major drive by Ankara and Baku to coordinate the armies from both countries to fulfill joint operations. Furthermore, reports indicated that Turkish forces, including F-16 fighter jets, remained in Azerbaijan following the unprecedented military drills.

Alongside the drills, there was also a dramatic increase in military arms sales from Turkey to Azerbaijan. According to Turkish export figures, there was a six-fold increase in weapons deals compared with the previous year, with most of the supply being delivered in the third quarter of 2020 between July and September. The armaments included drones and rocket launchers which have featured with such devastating impact since hostilities erupted on September 27.

A third factor suggesting planned aggression was the reported transport of mercenary fighters from Syria and Libya by Turkey to fight on the Azerbaijani side. Thousands of such militants belonging to jihadist brigades under the control of Turkey had arrived in the Azeri capital Baku before hostilities broke out on September 27. The logistics involved in organizing such a large-scale deployment can only mean long-term planning.

Armenian sources also claim that Azeri authorities had begun impounding civilian vehicles weeks before the shooting war opened. They also claim that when the fire-fights erupted on September 27, Turkish media were present on the ground to give live coverage of events.

It seems indisputable therefore that Turkey and Azerbaijan had made a strategic decision to implement a “final solution” to the protracted dispute with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.

That’s what makes Russian efforts at mediating a cessation to hostilities all the more fraught. After marathon talks mediated by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov a ceasefire was introduced on October 10. However, within hours the truce unravelled with reports of resumed exchange of fire and shelling of cities on both sides. The main violations have been committed by the Azerbaijani side using advanced Turkish [as well as Israeli] weaponry. Armenian leaders have complained that the Azeri side does not seem interested in pursuing peace talks.

More perplexing is the widening of the conflict. Azerbaijan air strikes since the weekend ceasefire broke down have hit sites within Armenia, extending the conflict beyond the contested enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan has also claimed that Armenian missiles have hit cities within its territory. Armenia flatly denies carrying out such strikes, which begs the question: is a third party covertly staging provocations and fomenting escalation of conflict?

What is challenging for Russia is that it has a legal obligation to defend Armenia as part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (1992). With Armenia coming under fire, the pressure will be on Moscow to intervene militarily.

This would see Russia being embroiled in another proxy war with NATO-member Turkey. But this is not in Syria. It is the Caucasus region on Russia’s southern border. There are concerns among senior Russian military figures that such a scenario is exactly what Turkey’s Recep Erdogan is aiming for. Turkey was outplayed by Russia in the proxy war in Syria. Erdogan and NATO’s plans for regime change in Damascus were dealt a bloody nose by Russia. It seems though that conflict in the Caucasus may now be Erdogan’s revenge.

Moscow may need to seriously revise its relations with Ankara, and let Erdogan know he is treading on red lines.

October 18, 2020 Posted by | Aletho News | , , , | Leave a comment

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