Aletho News

ΑΛΗΘΩΣ

Under fire, Moscow and Tehran close ranks

US–Israeli escalation is accelerating, rather than weakening, the Russia–Iran axis, reshaping the Caspian into a contested strategic corridor.

By Hazal Yalin | The Cradle | April 6, 2026

Hours after the US and Israel – increasingly referred to in some circles as the “Epstein coalition” – attacked Iran on 28 February, Russia’s Foreign Ministry issued a sharply worded response, describing the assault as “a deliberate, premeditated, and unprovoked act of armed aggression against a sovereign and independent UN member state, in direct violation of the fundamental principles and norms of international law.”

When interpreting diplomatic texts in general – and Russia’s statements in particular, given its near-obsessive adherence to traditional diplomacy – the importance of terminology is often overlooked. The concept of “aggression” is not an ordinary one; it signifies a violation of the very spirit of the UN Charter, especially Article 2(4).

A firm response to aggression

Just as significant as its use is its absence elsewhere. Aside from Russia, North Korea, and Cuba, no other state initially used the term “aggression” in condemning the attack—not even China, which only adopted the wording after 2 March.

This framing has been consistent across Russian statements and in President Vladimir Putin’s diplomatic readouts. At the same time, Moscow has walked a careful line in its engagement with Persian Gulf monarchies.

While avoiding endorsement of Iranian strikes on US and Israeli-linked targets in the Gulf, Russian officials have repeatedly stressed that the central issue remains US–Israeli aggression—and that criticism of Iran cannot be allowed to obscure this.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov captured this balance on 5 March during the Ambassadorial Roundtable on the Ukraine crisis. While opposing Iranian strikes on Gulf states and questioning their military utility, he warned that “Simply saying that Iran has no right to do anything effectively means openly encouraging the United States and Israel to continue what they are doing.”

In line with this approach, Russia (and China) did not veto the UN Security Council resolution on 11 March condemning Iran. However, Russia’s permanent representative to the UN, Vasiliy Nebenzya, stated that the resolution was one-sided and “confused cause and effect.”

This stance is largely linked to the UAE’s critical role in facilitating capital movement for Russia under western sanctions.

Israeli irritation and escalation

Such an uncompromising definition of aggression – and the Kremlin’s apparent decision to avoid even routine contact with the Israeli government – was never likely to pass unnoticed in Tel Aviv.

The first notable rupture came via an interview with Israeli army spokesperson Anna Ukolova on Radio RBK. Referencing reports that Israel had hacked Tehran’s traffic cameras to track Iranian officials, she was asked whether similar access existed in Moscow. Her response was striking:

“The elimination of key figures – the leadership of all these proxy groups, including Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei – already demonstrates that we possess quite formidable capabilities, and that no one who seeks to do us harm will go unscathed.”

“Then again, the question is: Who would want to do us harm? I hope that, at this moment, Moscow does not wish Israel ill. I want to believe that.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s extremist government has traditionally adopted a cautious and diplomatic stance in relations with Russia. Even if it had decided to shift toward open hostility, one would expect it to do so through diplomatic, economic, or even, at most, fifth-column activities within Russia. Ukolova’s direct threat – drawing a parallel of “elimination” against the Russian leadership – was unprecedented.

Attack on Bandar Anzali

The remark itself might have been dismissed as bluster were it not followed by something far more consequential: Israel’s reported strike on Iran’s Bandar Anzali Port on the Caspian coast.

The attack was first reported on 18 March by Israel’s Channel 12 as an “unusual attack” carried out 1,300 kilometers from Israeli territory.

Curiously, western media remained silent on the matter for some time. In Russia, Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov initially stated on 20 March that he had no information about it. When asked how Moscow would view a situation where the conflict escalated to engulf the Caspian Sea region, he said: “Russia would view it extremely negatively.”

Later that same day, Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova confirmed the strike, warning that the Caspian Sea basin has always been regarded “as a safe zone of peace and cooperation. The aggressors’ reckless and irresponsible actions pose a threat of dragging Caspian states into an armed conflict.”

She also stressed that Bandar Anzali is “an important trade and logistics hub that is actively used in Russian–Iranian trade, including for food deliveries. The strike has affected the economic interests of Russia and the other Caspian states that maintain transport communications with Iran via that port.” Two days later, Peskov noted that the conflict was “showing a tendency to expand its boundaries.”

Because there is a general tendency to follow events through the lens of London or Washington, The story only gained wider traction on 24 March, when the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) ran it as a headline: “Israel Hits Russian–Iranian Weapons Smuggling Route in the Caspian Sea.”

Casting a sovereign logistics corridor as “smuggling” recodes the strike as pre-emptive policing rather than escalation. The same report noted that the attack threatened Iran’s food supply and signaled Israel’s capacity to inflict broader civilian hardship – language that treats civilian suffering as a strategic message.

Russia’s public response was strong – and predictably so – for two reasons.

The Caspian legal order

First, the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Unlike other bodies of water, the Caspian falls outside the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Its governance is defined instead by the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, agreed upon by its five littoral states.

Under this framework, all decisions concerning the Caspian must be made jointly by the five littoral states – Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Non-littoral states are prohibited from maintaining a military presence (Article 3/6), and littoral states cannot allow their territory to be used for aggression against one another (3/7). Navigation security is a shared responsibility (3/9).

An attack carried out by a non-littoral actor via the Caspian undermines not only these provisions but the broader stability they are meant to guarantee.

While no explicit breach of Articles 3/6 or 3/7 has been formally identified, the presence of Israeli, US, and British military and intelligence networks – particularly in Azerbaijan – is widely acknowledged. This latent infrastructure adds a further layer of tension.

The strike on Bandar Anzali directly engages Article 3/9. It represents a breach of navigational security by an external actor, placing responsibility on all littoral states. Yet, aside from Russia and Iran, none have responded – an omission that speaks as loudly as any formal position. 

Trade routes and strategic depth 

The second factor is more straightforward: geography. The Caspian is the primary trade corridor between Russia and Iran, and Bandar Anzali is one of its key nodes.

This trade is not limited to civilian goods. Since the signing of the “comprehensive strategic partnership agreement” on 17 January 2025, it is widely understood that military logistics also transit this route.

The agreement was signed in Moscow on 17 January 2025 by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. It was approved by the Russian State Duma on 8 April 2025, signed by Putin on 21 April 2025, approved by the Iranian parliament on 21 May 2025, endorsed by the Guardian Council on 11 June 2025, and entered into force on 2 October 2025.

As previously noted by The Cradle, the agreement is not a binding mutual defense pact but a statement of strategic intent. Russia’s threshold for military support hinges on legal framing – specifically, whether an action qualifies as “aggression” in terms Moscow recognizes. Iran, for its part, has resisted any arrangement that would allow foreign military use of its territory.

Still, the agreement is far from symbolic. It outlines extensive cooperation in defense, security, and intelligence, and explicitly commits both sides to countering third-party interference across the Caspian, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and West Asia.

Articles 4, 5, and 6 set out broad military and security cooperation frameworks, while Articles 4/1 and 4/2 specifically formalize intelligence exchange, experience-sharing, and operational coordination between the two countries’ security and intelligence services.

April 6, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Under fire, Moscow and Tehran close ranks