Barak blasts Netanyahu: ‘Stop lying – you can’t destroy Iran’s nuclear, missile capabilities’
Press TV – March 23, 2026
Former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak on Monday launched a blistering attack at the regime’s incumbent political and military leadership, slamming them for peddling “blatant” lies over the war against Iran and noting that the regime has no strategy to end the war.
In an interview with Channel 13, Barak, who also previously acted as the regime’s military chief and military affairs minister, delivered a stark assessment of the Israeli wars on Gaza, Lebanon and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
“We cannot open the Strait of Hormuz, nor destroy Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities, so don’t lie to us too much,” Barak said, directly challenging the regime’s claims regarding its capacity to confront the Islamic Republic.
His remarks came as the Israeli-American war against Iran entered its 24th day with no end in sight. The war, which started with the assassination of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, and some top-ranking officials and military commanders, has failed to achieve the “regime change” agenda or to decapitate the Iranian government.
On the contrary, as experts acknowledge, Iranian armed forces have decimated Israeli military and intelligence infrastructure across the occupied territories as well as US military bases in some Persian Gulf countries as part of Operation True Promise 4.
So far, 74 waves of missile and drone operations have been successfully carried out against enemy targets, which have effectively destroyed the air defense systems.
Barak, who acted as the regime’s premier from 1999 to 2001, launched a stinging attack at the regime’s war cabinet, stressing that the political echelon lacks both the knowledge and the will to end the fighting that has failed to achieve any objectives.
“Israel at the political level doesn’t know – doesn’t know or doesn’t want – to bring the war to an end,” he said. “They don’t know how to end wars.”
He also pointed to unfulfilled promises made repeatedly by the Benjamin Netanyahu regime vis-à-vis the genocidal wars against Gaza and Lebanon.
“We are two and a half years in; Hamas is still there after they promised us six times that we were a step away from ‘total victory.’ Hezbollah is still there after they told us we threw them back decades,” he stated.
Barak also took aim at Netanyahu’s long-standing emphasis on the so-called “Iranian threat,” noting that the regime’s claims of neutralizing the danger do not align with reality.
“Iranian nuclear program and missiles are still there after they clarified to us that he [Netanyahu] removed the existential threat,” he said, shaken by the direct Iranian missile impacts across the occupied territories in the ongoing war.
The former prime minister described a systemic breakdown in trust between the regime and settlers, exacerbated by what he called deliberate withholding of information.
“Now, what is the problem? When there is no truth and no trust. We also don’t know all the details, including those of us who were deep inside these matters,” Barak said. “We don’t know what the truth is. But they shouldn’t tell us ‘the truth’ – they just shouldn’t lie to our faces in such a blatant way so that we can participate in the discussion more seriously.”
CIA Assessment: The Resistance Cannot Be Crushed
By Kit Klarenberg | Global Delinquents | March 15, 2026
The Judaeo-American war on Iran was intended to be a lightning strike routing, fought exclusively from the air, lasting only a few days. Instead, Washington and its Zionist proxy have blundered into a major multi-front conflict, which could well threaten the Empire’s very existence. The initial US aerial bombardment’s centrepiece was Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s February 28th murder. Initially hailed by Western media as “the assassination of the century,” the vile act has resulted in catastrophe for the perpetrators.
The Islamic Republic’s relentless battering of Zionist entity civilian centres and military and intelligence infrastructure, and US bases throughout West Asia, hasn’t been deterred one iota. Vast crowds took to the streets of Tehran in vengeful mourning. Their righteous anger has pullulated throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Ever since, incensed Shiites have violently clashed with security forces in multiple major Pakistani cities. Meanwhile, Bahrain teeters on the brink of all-out revolution. Now, Mojtaba Khamenei, the slain Supreme Leader’s son, has taken his place.
Iranian citizens of every ethnic and religious extraction braved US-Israeli airstrikes to celebrate his ascension. Commonly perceived as a hardliner with strong ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, the expectation that the new Supreme Leader will adopt a considerably less conciliatory, patient approach than his father is widespread. Western sources forecast Mojtaba may decide the Islamic Republic “must move quickly to obtain nuclear weapons in order to forestall future US and Israeli attacks,” overturning Ali Khamenei’s longstanding fatwa against their development by Tehran.
US President Donald Trump has declared he is “not happy” with Mojtaba taking power, and Israeli apparatchiks are likewise perturbed by the development. Nonetheless, this was an inevitable upshot of assassinating the former Supreme Leader. There was also no reason to believe doing so would precipitate the Islamic Republic’s collapse, or lead to Tehran’s military submission. It begs the obvious question of why Washington and Tel Aviv electively helped install a ruler more committed than ever to expelling the Empire from West Asia.
Similarly, Hezbollah’s extraordinary broadsides of the Zionist entity since Khameinei’s assassination should dispel any notion – as perpetuated by Israeli political and military chiefs – the group was obliterated by Tel Aviv’s criminal October 2024 invasion of Lebanon. That incursion was prefaced by an operation in which thousands of pagers used by senior Hezbollah operatives were detonated simultaneously, having been wired with explosives by Mossad pre-purchase, killing and injuring many. A week-and-a-half later, the group’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was lethally targeted in a Zionist entity airstrike.
Evidently, the Resistance cannot be crushed via high-level assassinations. In fact, such actions actively strengthen its members. This inconvenient reality has been well-known to the CIA since at least 2009. In July that year, the Agency produced a top secret assessment laying out the pros and cons of liquidating “high value targets” (HVTs). It was prepared in advance of Barack Obama’s CIA chief Leon Panetta shifting US “counter-terror” operations from capturing and torturing high-level suspects, to outright executing them.
The assessment concluded HVT operations “can play a useful role when they are part of a broader counterinsurgency strategy,” and sought to “assist policymakers and military officers involved in authorizing or planning” such strikes. However, it listed many “potential negative effects” of “high value” assassinations. Israel’s past killing of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders were specifically cited as examples of how the strategy can spectacularly backfire. We have witnessed the CIA’s unheeded cautions play out in real-time since February 28th.
Foremost among prospective blowback from HVT operations is that the risk high-level assassinations can increase an “insurgent” group’s support. This occurs when killing a target “[strengthens] an armed group’s bond with the population, radicalizing an insurgent group’s remaining leaders, creating a vacuum into which more radical groups can enter, and escalating or deescalating a conflict in ways that favor the insurgents.” Such actions can also “[erode] the ‘rules of the game’ between the government and insurgents,” thus exacerbating “the level of violence in a conflict”:
“HVT strikes, however, may increase support for the insurgents, particularly if these strikes enhance insurgent leaders’ lore, if noncombatants are killed in the attacks, if legitimate or semi-legitimate politicians aligned with the insurgents are targeted… An insurgent group’s unifying cause, deep ties to its constituency, or a broad support base can lessen the impact of leadership losses by ensuring a steady flow of replacement recruits.”
The CIA assessment noted several historical instances of supposed HVT successes. When high-level targets have “prominent public profiles”, assassinations can in specific instances shatter a target group. However, this was not the case with Hamas or Hezbollah. The pair “carry out state-like functions, such as providing healthcare services,” so group leaders are well-known to citizens of Gaza and Lebanon. Yet, their “highly disciplined nature, social service network, and reserve of respected leaders” mean they can easily “reorganize” in the wake of assassinations.
The Zionist entity had by this point been engaged in “targeted-killings” against Hamas, Hezbollah, and other Resistance groups since the mid-1990s. However, their “decentralized command structures, compartmented leadership, strong succession planning, and deep ties to their communities” made them “highly resilient to leadership losses.” Undeterred, Tel Aviv’s high-level assassinations continued apace. In the early 2000s, Hamas founder Sheikh Yassin and the group’s leader in Gaza Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi were murdered. However, the killings “strengthened solidarity” between Resistance factions, while “[bolstering] support for hardline militant leaders.”
The obvious lessons of this wanton bloodletting remained unlearned by the Zionist entity, once the Gaza Holocaust erupted. In June 2024, elite imperial journal Foreign Affairs published a report unequivocally headlined Hamas Is Winning. It boldly concluded “Israel’s failing strategy makes its enemy stronger.” The outlet also recorded how “according to the measures that matter,” Hamas was considerably bigger and more powerful than on October 7th 2023. Israel had thus stumbled into a deeply ruinous attritional war, with a “tenacious and deadly guerrilla force.”
Hamas’ surging popularity with Palestinians throughout the Gaza genocide was found to have significantly enhanced the group’s “ability to recruit… [and] attract new generations of fighters and operatives.” This granted Hamas the ability to launch “lethal operations” in areas previously “cleared” by the IOF “easily”. Foreign Affairs charged the Zionist entity, to its “great detriment”, failed to comprehend how “the carnage and devastation it has unleashed in Gaza has only made its enemy stronger.”
It is not merely Hamas that has been galvanised by the Gaza genocide. Israel’s “carnage and devastation” has greatly expanded the ranks and resolve of the entire Resistance, while its constituent members have won hearts and minds globally in ever-mounting numbers. Tel Aviv and its Anglo-American puppet[master]s have no good choices left to make, in a criminal war of choice waged against an indefatigable adversary committed to total victory, the likes of which they have never faced off against before.
The calamitous outcomes of Judaeo-American conflict with Iran were amply spelled out in a June 2025 report by the Israel-based Institute for National Security Studies. Among other things, it cautioned against assassinating Ali Khamenei, as the Islamic Republic “would likely have little difficulty selecting a successor, who could prove to be more extreme or more capable,” while uniting the Iranian public and government more than ever behind all-out victory. The consequences of disregarding this prophetic curse will reverberate throughout West Asia for centuries.
Hezbollah Returns: It Didn’t Start a War, It Is Ending One
By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle | March 12, 2026
Hezbollah’s intervention in the war with Israel followed months of Israeli ceasefire violations in Lebanon, challenging Western media narratives about responsibility.
Key Takeaways
- UNIFIL recorded more than 15,400 Israeli ceasefire violations in Lebanon between November 2024 and February 2026.
- Hundreds were killed inside Lebanon during the ceasefire period, including around 150 civilians, while Israeli strikes repeatedly hit Beirut.
- Hezbollah largely maintained the ceasefire for 15 months, cooperating with the Lebanese Armed Forces despite continued Israeli attacks.
- Western media narratives claiming Hezbollah “dragged Lebanon into war” overlook the ongoing Israeli military actions and territorial violations.
- Hezbollah’s battlefield performance suggests the group retained significant military capacity, contradicting claims that it had been decisively weakened.
Media Narrative vs. Reality
When Lebanese Hezbollah chose to fire on Israel, effectively transforming the US-Israeli assault on Iran into a regional war, it did so in retaliation for aggression against Lebanon. Contrary to what Western corporate media has reported, the group is not responsible for initiating the war, and its role in it is crucial to the region’s future.
At the beginning of this month, the BBC ran a story entitled “Battered and isolated, Hezbollah drags Lebanon into another war”. Written by the British State-funded media’s correspondent in Tel Aviv, the piece not only presents a biased and false depiction of events, cheap propaganda that you would expect from the Sun or other tabloids, but fails to even mention Israel in its title.
CNN and others throughout the Western corporate media landscape also published pieces with similarly worded headlines. Therefore, the first point of entry into this topic is to establish the facts, which reveal just how atrocious the BBC and others have been in their framing of the Lebanon-Israel war.
On February 25, 2026, UNIFIL, the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, had recorded over 15,400 Israeli violations of the ceasefire agreement that technically went into effect at the end of November 2024. This included the killing of hundreds of people inside Lebanon, mostly Lebanese, but also Syrians and Palestinians, including around 150 civilians in total.
Thousands of civilians, over the 15-month ceasefire period, were forced to flee their homes due to bombings, while Israel attacked the capital, Beirut, a number of times. Additionally, Israel was caught spraying cancer-causing chemical substances across southern Lebanon, also illegally occupying seven points there and refusing to leave the nation’s territory.
That entire time, Hezbollah held its fire and cooperated with the Lebanese Armed Forces, even when Lebanon’s pro-US Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam, pursued a campaign against the group. He aggressively pursued Israeli-US demands, forcing the Lebanese army to disarm Hezbollah, while announcing his intentions to eventually normalize ties with Tel Aviv, a blatant stab in the back to his own people, who were experiencing daily bombing raids by Israel.
Israel committed more ceasefire violations of the Lebanon truce than any military has ever committed against any ceasefire in human history.
In other words, the idea that Hezbollah dragged Lebanon into a war is categorically false. Israel never implemented its side of the deal, and for the residents of southern Lebanon, the war was ongoing throughout those 15 months. The only reason we continued to call it a ceasefire is that Hezbollah chose to uphold it.
The Myth of Hezbollah’s Weakness
Following the cessation of hostilities — at least from the Lebanese side — in November of 2024, US and Israeli officials publicly bragged that they had defeated Hezbollah. In February of 2024, then US envoy to Lebanon, Morgan Ortagus, asserted publicly that Hezbollah had been “defeated” and that its “reign of terror” was over.
This theory of Hezbollah’s apparent weakness was widely accepted among Western leaderships. Evidently, the Lebanese leadership under Nawaf Salam had also gotten this impression. They believed Israel’s unsubstantiated statistics about how it had taken out the majority of the group’s weapons, believing that the terrorist pager attacks and assassinations of key leaders had, in effect, destroyed the organization. At the very least, Hezbollah was believed to have been badly degraded and hanging on by a thread.
Here for the Palestine Chronicle, I have been writing over the past 15 months against this notion, arguing that the merits of this argument do not hold up to scrutiny. The reasons for this are rather simple: the group has a ground force of around 100,000 fighters — larger than the Lebanese Army — as it also demonstrated all the way up until the last days of the 2024 war that it still possessed strategic weapons.
Hezbollah was so confident in its stockpile of drones, for example, that there were accounts of them using dozens of them in singular operations against invading Israeli soldiers toward the end of November 2024. In addition to this, at the end of the conflict, is when the group began to reveal its most deadly capabilities, which clearly still existed after the ceasefire was declared.
The fall of former Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad was initially interpreted as being a major impediment to the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, yet this eventually turned out to be only partially true. There were even some sources that argued that larger quantities of weapons were being transferred than in the last years of Assad’s reign in power. Other sources alleged that weapons belonging to the former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) may have fallen into Hezbollah’s hands during the collapse of the state.
A key reason why the weapons continued to flow into Lebanon was that the new Syrian state had no real security apparatus. It is, in essence, a collection of armed groups that operate in an environment inside the country where gangsters, local militias, and groups all maintain their own arms.
As has been on display since Ahmed al-Shara’a came to power, he is unable to control many of the militias inside the country, despite his best efforts alongside his US allies to do so. The conflict in Sweida and the coastal massacres were great examples of this.
Therefore, when Hezbollah chose to retaliate against Israel after 15 months of non-stop fire against Lebanon, they did so not from a position of weakness, but with the understanding that it was waging a war effort with the most favorable circumstances for achieving victory.
A War Israel Provoked
Although there are many within the Lebanese Army that seek to resist and protect Lebanon, including its current commander — after all, it is the nation’s official armed forces — it is held back by the government and under constant pressure from the United States. The US does not allow it to possess strategic weapons and won’t allow Hezbollah to integrate into it.
This means that Hezbollah is the only force capable of defending the country against Israeli aggression. That being said, if the pro-US regime in Syria — which has already reached a security understanding with the Israelis — attempts to attack Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces will likely prove capable of defending their borders.
Although the Lebanese Army is not capable of fighting Israel, the Syrian militia forces that constitute its army are clearly less well prepared. Hezbollah will also likely assist the Lebanese Army in such a defense, as it did against Daesh and Al-Qaeda militants during the Syrian War.
Hezbollah, since entering the conflict against the Israeli occupiers, has managed to inflict countless deadly ambushes, thwarted two landing attempts in the Bekaa Valley, and taken out dozens of Israeli military vehicles with guided anti-tank weapons along the border area. In addition to this, it has fired precision missiles at strategic locations south of Tel Aviv and around Haifa, accurately striking their targets with pinpoint precision.
The strength of Hezbollah this time around has shocked Israeli analysts, who are scrambling to explain the sudden revival of the group that they believed to have been weakened south of the Litani River (southern Lebanon).
It is likely that Hezbollah are seeking to drag the Israeli army as deep into Lebanese territory as possible, making them commit to a costly invasion, one in which they can then engage in all-out ground warfare. While Israel has air superiority and more advanced weapons, Hezbollah is a much more formidable ground force than the Israeli army.
In order to force the Israelis into committing to such a large-scale invasion, where their troops will be led into countless ambushes — especially if they try to invade the Bekaa Valley through Syria — we may even see some cross-border operations in the future.
All of this could have been avoided by the Israelis and their arrogant backers in the White House, yet they chose to illegally occupy Lebanese lands and to violate the ceasefire at least 15,400 times. Just as is the case in Gaza, where Israel has committed around 2,000 ceasefire violations so far, it is they who are at fault.
Despite the fact that Hezbollah’s true strength is on full display and that Israel clearly started this conflict, the corporate media will continue to lie about the situation in Lebanon. This should come as no surprise, considering their atrocious and racist reporting throughout the Gaza genocide.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine. He contributed this article to The Palestine Chronicle.
Ukrainian Embassy in Beirut sheltering top Mossad agent
The Cradle – March 13, 2026
The Ukrainian Embassy in Beirut is currently harboring a high-profile Israeli intelligence asset wanted by Lebanese authorities, journalist and The Cradle contributor Radwan Mortada has revealed.
Khaled al-Aida, a Palestinian-Syrian with Ukrainian citizenship, has been implicated in bombings and assassinations across Lebanon between 2024 and 2025.
Security investigations have proved his involvement in an assassination attempt at Beirut’s Rafiq Hariri International Airport, as well as the capital’s southern suburb.
Aida was also on the ground during the assassination of former Hezbollah secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, according to Mortada, who also reported that Aida had helped Lebanese intelligence dismantle a Mossad cell.
He was eventually caught with an explosive device hidden on a motorcycle intended for later use in southern Beirut.
“Aida managed to escape after the Israeli bombing of the building where he was being held in Beirut’s southern suburbs. The bombing provided him with an opportunity to flee, and he eventually sought refuge in the Ukrainian Embassy, which is now attempting to smuggle him out with the help of the US Embassy,” according to the information obtained by Mortada.
The embassy is reportedly seeking to secure Aida’s exit, requesting a laissez-passer from Lebanese security, while US operatives, including CIA station chief Sherry Baker, are pressuring for his evacuation.
“We will not accept being told that he left in a diplomatic vehicle, or through an illegal crossing, or under the protection of the American Embassy in Lebanon,” Mortada went on to write.
In recent history, Lebanese authorities have repeatedly been coerced by Washington to release agents who have been detained.
“Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and the General Security Directorate, specifically Major General Hassan Shqeir, are all accountable to the Lebanese people. If they are truly concerned about the interests of Lebanon and the Lebanese, they must arrest Khaled al-Aida and hand him over to the judiciary. This wanted man is a valuable asset for Lebanon, one that should be negotiated for, not given away for free,” Mortada said.
Around two dozen Lebanese prisoners are currently being held in Israeli prisons, some of whom were abducted during the ceasefire.
Mortada’s report comes as Lebanon is under heavy Israeli bombardment. Around 700 have been killed by Israel since 2 March, when Hezbollah responded to over a year of Israeli ceasefire violations.
Israel has stepped up attacks on Beirut’s suburbs as well as the heart of the city, while continuing brutal and deadly attacks across southern and eastern Lebanon.
Israeli planes dropped leaflets over the capital on Friday, threatening that Hezbollah must be disarmed for “everybody’s interest.”
The Lebanese army warned citizens not to open the QR Code on the leaflets, which “link to a WhatsApp contact and another to a Facebook page to communicate with Unit 504 of the Israeli army, which is responsible for recruiting agents.”
Syrian president vows ‘absolute support’ to disarm Hezbollah
The Cradle | March 11, 2026
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun received a phone call on 10 March from his Syrian counterpart, ex-Al-Qaeda chief Ahmad al-Sharaa, who expressed his support for Beirut’s efforts in disarming Hezbollah.
The Lebanese Presidency said Aoun and Sharaa discussed regional developments and stressed that “the current delicate situation requires activating coordination and consultation between the two countries, especially with regard to the need to control the borders and prevent any security breaches from any side.”
The Syrian Presidency also released its own statement on the call with Aoun. “President Sharaa expressed his explicit and absolute support for the efforts led by President Joseph Aoun to disarm ‘Hezbollah.’ He affirmed that this step is essential for solidifying Lebanese state sovereignty and shielding the region from the repercussions of ongoing regional armed conflicts,” the statement said.
It also called for “joint action” between Lebanon and Syria, “to ensure the safety of the Syrian and Lebanese peoples and to protect the gains of stability achieved recently.”
The phone call comes hours after Damascus claimed that it came under attack by Hezbollah on the Syrian–Lebanese border.
The Syrian army said “Hezbollah militias” fired shells toward its positions near Serghaya, adding that reinforcements from the Lebanese resistance group had been observed arriving along the Syrian–Lebanese border.
Syrian officials said they were monitoring the situation, coordinating with the Lebanese army, and studying possible responses, warning that the Syrian army “will not tolerate any attack targeting Syria.”
Hezbollah, which is busy fighting an Israeli invasion in the south, has not released any statements commenting on the matter.
The Lebanese resistance fought in Syria for years alongside the former government, and took part in the recapture of several parts of the country from groups including Al-Qaeda’s Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham, and other extremist organizations who were at the time considered the Syrian opposition.
The Nusra Front was later rebranded into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group that toppled former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s government in 2024 and now dominates Syria’s Defense Ministry.
Nusra occupied large swathes of the northern and eastern Lebanese border region for years at the start of the Syrian war, and was eventually expelled by Hezbollah and the Lebanese army.
Clashes broke out between the Lebanese army and Syrian troops earlier this year, after Damascus’s forces advanced against the border under the pretext of dealing with smuggling.
Heavy clashes also erupted between the Syrian army and Lebanese tribes on the border in 2025. Damascus falsely claimed at the time that it was fighting Hezbollah.
Since the start of the war in Iran and the entry of Hezbollah into the conflict, the Syrian military has been building up its presence along the Lebanese border, claiming the measures are aimed at “combating smuggling.”
The new authorities in Damascus have allied themselves with Washington. Damascus has been working, at the request of the US, to prevent any Hezbollah-bound weapons from entering Lebanon.
It has also been cracking down on Palestinian resistance factions.
US envoy Tom Barrack threatened Lebanon last year with a Syrian incursion, and said Damascus would “actively assist us in confronting and dismantling the remnants of ISIS, the IRGC [Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps], Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist networks.”
Calls for the reconfiguration of military arrangements in the Gulf region
By Thembisa Fakude | MEMO | March 8, 2026
The former Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani called for the formation of a strategic defence alliance bringing together Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan. Al Thani has described it as an “urgent need” in light of developments and changing regional and international dynamics. He made this call weeks before the attack on Iran by Israel and the US on 28th February 2026. It is not the first time Israel attacked Iran whilst in negotiations.
In June 2025 Israel attacked Iran whilst it was it was negotiating its nuclear program with the US. Iran retaliated with hundreds of missiles and drones targeting Israeli cities and the US military base in Al Udeid in Doha, Qatar. Al Udeid is the largest US military base in the Gulf region. In September 2025 Hamas leadership was attacked in Qatar by Israel whilst meeting to consider a ceasefire proposal from the US on the war on Gaza.
Qatar has spent billions of US dollars on US’s weapons and military hardware including a huge investment at the Al Udeid military base. It is estimated that Qatar has spent over 19 billion USD over time in Al Udeid. Notwithstanding, Qatar has remained vulnerable from external military attacks and its sovereignty has been compromised over the past months.
On 28 February 2026, the US and Israel started launching unprovoked attacks on Iran. They killed the Supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei and over 180 school girls at the Tayyebeh girls’ elementary school in the city of Minab in the early stages of the attack. Iran retaliated to the attacks by firing hundreds of drones to Israeli cities and US military installations in the Gulf.
The US and Israel have called for a regime change in Iran. Speaking to the media on 5th March 2026, Donald Trump said “he wants to be involved in picking up the next leadership in Iran”. Iran has vowed not to allow foreign interference in their politics including how its leadership is elected. Such rhetoric from the president of the US presents a threat to the political process in Iran. Moreover, Trump’s hope and ambition that the US can come into Iran, impose its political will and preference and still have a stable Iran is farfetched and dangerous. It could lead to political instability in Iran and indeed the region. Iran has suffered tremendous infrastructural and leadership devastation already in this conflict. However, its government has vowed to continue fighting and judging by how it has resisted over the past couple of days since the start of this war, it is unlikely to collapse.
Secondly, the Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu has said repeatedly that he wants to eliminate all threats to Israel in the region including obliterating Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hamas and Hezbollah have refused to disarm and are both showing signs of recovering from the devastating war on Gaza. The recent attacks of Israel by Hezbollah in retaliation to the killing of Ayatollah Khamenei, caught Israel and many in the world by surprise. After heavy bombardment and killing of its leadership by Israel over the past 24 months, they are still capable of sending missiles and drones hitting their targets in Israel. Likewise, Hamas – who got praised by Trump – for their great work in helping to allocate the dead bodies of the Israeli captives in Gaza – are still governing Gaza.
Notwithstanding the devastation of Iran and the killing of its leadership, its political infrastructure is likely to endure. However, as long as the government of Iran continues to function, with all its current political infrastructural framework, it will continue to be targeted by Israel. Moreover, Hamas, Hezbollah have not disarmed. The Houthis in Yemen continue to attack US and Israeli interests in the Red Sea. Basically, notwithstanding the military attacks on these organisations and Iran, they are still standing albeit weaker. This means the “threats” to Israel remain, it also means that future conflicts between Israel and the US on one hand and Iran will continue as long as both Israel and the US refuse to accept the status quo. This reality brings us back to what the former prime minister of Qatar raised i.e., the strategic defence alliance in the region. Second, a need for the reconfiguration of the military arrangement in the region. The recent unprovoked attacks on Iran and its subsequent retaliation have added a momentum to these discussions. The attacks have also raised questions about the significance of the presence of US’s military bases in the region. Particularly, whether countries in the region should continue having strategic military partnerships with the US? Iran has insisted that US military bases in the region are legitimate targets and it will continue targeting them in retaliation and in defense of their people and sovereignty.
The conclusion therefore is that unless there is a reconfiguration of the security arrangements in the region, the US and Israel are likely to attack Iran again. Iran is likely to retaliate in the manner it is currently doing, targeting both Israel and US’s bases and infrastructure in the region. Iran has repeatedly said “it is not targeting its friendly neighbors rather the interests and assets of the US and Israel in the region”. Consequently, Gulf countries hosting these bases will continue to be targeted by Iran.
Hezbollah Foils Israeli Landing in Lebanon’s Bekaa

Al-Manar | March 7, 2026
Hezbollah foiled an Israeli landing in the town of Nabi Sheet in the eastern Lebanese region of Bekaa before dawn overnight on Friday-Saturday.
Hezbollah’s Military Media said Islamic Resistance fighters observed four Israeli enemy helicopters infiltrating from the Syrian direction and landing an Israeli infantry force at the mountainous triangle linking the towns of Yahfoufa, Khraibeh, and Maaraboun.
“The enemy unit then advanced toward the eastern neighborhood of Nabi Sheet, (Al-Shukr). At 11:30 AM, upon reaching the cemetery area, the Israeli force was engaged by a group of resistance fighters using light and medium weapons, triggering a fierce clash after the infiltrating force was exposed,” the Military Media’s first statement for Saturday read.
As the confrontation intensified, the Israeli enemy unleashed heavy firepower, launching around forty airstrikes by warplanes and helicopters, to cover the withdrawal of its troops from the engagement zone, according to the statement.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah resistance artillery delivered concentrated fire with appropriate weapons on the perimeter of the battlefield and along the enemy’s withdrawal route, while residents of nearby villages joined in providing supporting fire, the first statement added.
The video shows exchange of fire between resistance fighters and Israeli enemy forces in Nabi Sheet.
In another statement, the third one on Saturday, Hezbollah’s Military Media said: “In response to the enemy’s landing in the Bekaa region, the Islamic Resistance fighters targeted the evacuation area in the outskirts of Nabi Sheet with rocket barrages at 04:15 on Saturday.”
Hebrew media reported that Israeli forces attempted to withdraw after resistance forces revealed the military activity in eastern Lebanon, and that Israeli warplanes and helicopters eventually retreated from the area after the failed airborne landing attempt.
Another video shows heavy destruction in the town of Nabi Sheet after the Israeli landing.
Lebanese Heaslth Ministry announced that the Israeli assault on Nabi Sheet led to martyrdom of 16 people and the injury of 53 others.
Lebanon: Between sovereignty and the mirage of normalization
By Ali Abou Jbara | The Cradle | February 26, 2026
The smoke had barely lifted from the latest Israeli bombardment of south Lebanon when another conversation began circulating in Beirut. While border villages buried their dead and families searched through rubble, a parallel discourse surfaced in studios and on digital platforms: normalization with Israel presented as a viable political path.
The ongoing war on Lebanon, marked by unprecedented Israeli escalation, daily raids, and widespread destruction, exposed more than military vulnerability. It revealed that certain voices inside the country no longer conceal their position toward Tel Aviv.
They now speak openly of public normalization as the cure for Lebanon’s crises – even as Israeli warplanes violate Lebanese skies, despite the so-called ceasefire. What is marketed as pragmatism begins to resemble political surrender.
Prominent personalities have amplified this shift. Journalist Marcel Ghanem declared live on his program “Sar al-Waqt” on MTV that he was considering speaking directly with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and suggested repealing Lebanese laws that criminalize dealings with Israel.
Digital platforms followed the same trajectory. “Hona Beirut” circulated videos of Israelis sending populist messages to Lebanese audiences – “We want peace with Lebanon. We want to visit Beirut and enjoy fattoush and shawarma” – carefully packaged to soften the image of a state whose aircraft continue to strike Lebanese territory.
Political figures moved even further. MP Paula Yacoubian stated publicly: “If salvation comes through Israel, let it come but save us.” Charles Jabbour, head of the Lebanese Forces (LF) party media apparatus, argued that Israel does not occupy Lebanon and does not attack the Lebanese, claiming instead that it monitors Hezbollah to ensure implementation of past agreements. He concluded: “If Hezbollah wins, Lebanon loses. If Israel wins, Lebanon wins.”
Such statements are deliberate. They substitute national consensus with partisan calculus and recast normalization as responsible governance.
Expansion as governing doctrine
Advocates of a “quick peace” treat Israel as a state seeking stability. The political current in Tel Aviv suggests something else entirely.
Under Netanyahu and his alliance with ultra-religious and nationalist forces, the “Greater Israel” vision operates as a strategic direction.
On 22 September 2023, Netanyahu stood before the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and presented a map that includes Gaza and the occupied West Bank as part of Israel, using the biblical name “Judea and Samaria” instead of the West Bank – in a symbolic dedication to the annexation project.
His coalition partner, Finance Minister and leader of “Religious Zionism” Bezalel Smotrich, had stated in 2016 that Israel’s borders “must extend to Damascus,” and appeared in Paris in March 2023 in front of a map that considers Jordan part of the “Land of Israel.”
Since Menachem Begin and the Likud party came to power in 1977, the concept of “Greater Israel” has morphed into a political program based on settlement expansion and changing demographic realities. This current is based on interpretations from the Book of Genesis that consider the “Promised Land” to extend from the Nile to the Euphrates. Even Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, wrote in the 1930s that establishing a state on part of the land would serve as a first stage, not an endpoint.
Following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, expansionist language hardened. Military operations broadened in Gaza and the occupied West Bank while strikes intensified in Syria and Lebanon. “Security depth” expanded to encompass regional theaters.
On 21 February 2026, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee said in an interview with Tucker Carlson that, under a biblical interpretation of land promised in Genesis, it “would be fine if [Israel] took it all,” implicitly extending Israel’s reach across much of West Asia – remarks that sparked sharp regional condemnation.
Maps circulated by proponents of this project extend beyond historic Palestine. They incorporate Lebanon, Jordan, most of Syria, half of Iraq, and territories in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and even Kuwait.
Against that strategic horizon, Lebanese normalization rhetoric begins to feel profoundly detached from the lived reality of the country. Border villages remain scarred, Lebanese airspace is violated without consequence, and sovereignty is subjected to daily erosion, yet normalization is presented as transactional diplomacy, detached from geography and history.
It is precisely here that the Lebanese debate turns unsettling. What does it mean to pursue “peace” with a project whose declared maps stretch beyond its recognized borders? How does a state whose skies, waters, and land are routinely breached convince itself to trust assurances from a government that treats expansion as a generational mission?
The occupied West Bank as precedent
The occupied West Bank offers a concrete case study. Since the 1993 Oslo Accords, the settler population has grown from roughly 250,000 to more than 700,000. Hundreds of settlements and outposts now fragment the territory. Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen has described this as imposing “de facto sovereignty” – gradual annexation without formal declaration.
Land confiscations, bypass roads, settlement blocs, and armed settler protection have eroded the territorial basis for Palestinian statehood. Smotrich openly advocates annexation and rejects Palestinian sovereignty. Netanyahu presides over what observers describe as the most right-wing government in Israel’s history, with settlement expansion central to its agenda.
Three decades of negotiations unfolded alongside continuous territorial transformation. Diplomatic processes advanced in parallel with irreversible changes on the ground. This is how “peace” is managed when it is a tool to strengthen control, not to end it.
Despite this record, similar assumptions appear in Lebanese discourse. MP Camille Chamoun of the Free Patriots Party says he does not believe Israel has an interest in violating international agreements and Lebanese borders.
MP Sami Gemayel, head of the Kataeb Party, suggests that relations with Israel and western countries may protect Lebanon. Even Lebanese actress and writer Carine Rizkallah said on the TV program Al-Masar that she hoped there would be no new war with Israel and that “it’s time to end these problems between the two countries.”
The irony is that Lebanese rhetoric promoting normalization leans on an assumption of good faith from the other side, even though the occupied West Bank continues to show how such assumptions unfold in practice. There, decades of agreements, conferences, and international sponsorship did not halt expansion; they unfolded alongside it, as settlements multiplied, land was fragmented, and entire areas were quietly absorbed into a new reality.
If this is where the occupied West Bank has arrived after years of accords and external guarantees, on what basis is Lebanon encouraged to trust similar assurances? The experience is not abstract or distant. It is ongoing, visible, and instructive for anyone willing to look.
Regional patterns of influence
The broader region reinforces this reading. After the fall of the previous Syrian government on 8 December 2024, Israeli influence expanded in southern and central Syria, capitalizing on security vacuums and fragmentation. Strategic corridors between northern Syria and Israeli ports strengthened. Control over the occupied Golan Heights and adjacent water resources deepened.
Turkiye adopted a confrontational stance toward Israeli expansion, warning that the absence of clear red lines destabilizes Syria and opens space for broader intervention. Ankara expanded its diplomatic engagement on Palestine, strengthened regional alliances, and emphasized deterrence, demonstrating that even governments with formal ties to Israel are wary of unchecked expansion.
Across neighboring states, internal divisions have created entry points for influence. Settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank, strikes in Syria, and sustained violations in Lebanon reflect an interconnected strategy.
Normalization premised on unilateral concession narrows strategic space. In regional practice, asymmetrical engagement tends to consolidate the stronger party’s position.
Lebanon operates within that same environment. Any official normalization would unfold against Israel’s strategic framework and military advantage. Expectations of reciprocal restraint lack precedent in current regional dynamics.
Lebanon’s historical record
Lebanon’s experience with Israeli aggression remains documented. In April 1996, Israeli forces bombed a UN base in Qana, killing more than 100 civilians who had sought shelter. In September 1982, the Sabra and Shatila massacre occurred under the watch of the Israeli army. The 1982 Israeli invasion reached Beirut, and south Lebanon remained under occupation until 2000, liberated only through sustained resistance.
The July 2006 war resulted in more than 1,200 Lebanese deaths, extensive infrastructure destruction, and the displacement of nearly one million people. Airspace violations continued long after hostilities subsided.
Following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and Hezbollah’s decision to open a northern support front, strikes on southern villages resumed, placing Lebanon within a wider expansionist frame.
In this context, normalization proposals detach policy from cumulative experience. They assume recalibration without structural change. Historical precedent suggests otherwise.
Legal foundations
Lebanon’s stance toward Israel is codified in law. Since 1955, the Boycott of Israel Law has prohibited commercial, cultural, and political dealings with the Israeli enemy. The law remains in force and constitutes a foundational element of Lebanese state policy.
The penal code criminalizes espionage and communication with the enemy, including cooperation that provides political, media, or moral benefit. In contemporary circumstances, public statements or digital content that promote normalization may fall within this framework if deemed to confer advantage. Penalties can include imprisonment and fines.
Given ongoing Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty, normalization carries national security implications under existing legislation. Judicial and security institutions retain authority to investigate potential breaches.
This legal architecture reflects accumulated historical experience rather than abstract doctrine.
Sovereignty under pressure
The present debate concerns strategic direction under sustained pressure. An expansionist project operates openly in the region. Lebanon’s historical memory remains recent.
Calls for normalization at a moment of ongoing aggression raise structural questions about sovereignty, deterrence, and long-term stability. Strategic environments shaped by military asymmetry rarely reward unilateral accommodation.
Lebanon faces a clear dilemma. Defending sovereignty requires political coherence and deterrent capacity. Pursuing normalization without reciprocal structural change invites further testing of borders and institutions.
The chosen trajectory will shape more than just diplomatic posture. It will define how the state positions itself within a region undergoing forced transformation.
Why Israel Is Escalating Its War Crimes Against Lebanon
By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle | February 23, 2026
Key Analytical Points
- Israel’s pattern of ceasefire violations suggests a deliberate attempt to reshape deterrence rules in Lebanon rather than isolated tactical operations.
- Provocations aimed at Hezbollah appear designed to trigger a response that would justify a broader Israeli escalation under new “rules of engagement.”
- Hezbollah’s restraint signals long-term strategic patience rather than weakness, indicating preparation for a larger confrontation tied to regional dynamics.
- The northern front is increasingly linked to US–Iran tensions, raising the likelihood that Lebanon could become either a preemptive battlefield or a secondary theater in a wider war.
- The balance of power on the ground—particularly Hezbollah’s missile capabilities and ground forces—creates significant deterrent risk for Israel, limiting its escalation options despite mounting pressure.
Escalation under the Cover of Ceasefire
Since the beginning of Ramadan, Israel has notably ramped up its campaign of aggression against Lebanon. Although airstrikes committed throughout Lebanese territory have been routine since the implementation of the November 27, 2024, ceasefire agreement, what we are seeing now is a sign of panic amid rising tensions between Tel Aviv and Tehran.
Israel has committed the most violations of any ceasefire in recorded human history in Lebanon. At the tail end of November of 2025, UNIFIL – the United Nations peacekeeping forces – confirmed that Israel had committed upwards of 10,000 violations of the ceasefire agreement. This is no accident and confirms that the Zionist regime never had any intention of adhering to a cessation of hostilities with Hezbollah.
Instead, the Israelis sought to impose new equations on the ground, enabling total freedom of action, while also using their US allies to pressure the Lebanese state and its army to pursue a policy of undermining the group within the country.
It was never a realistic prospect that the Lebanese army was going to disarm Hezbollah; therefore, the only possible outcomes were going to be civil war or a campaign of pressure. Both favor Tel Aviv, with a civil war conflict being their preferred outcome.
Several times, the Israelis have attempted to provoke a reaction from Hezbollah, which has adhered to the ceasefire and not fired a single munition at their occupiers, who have now illegally established a military presence, intended to be permanent, in southern Lebanon.
These major provocations have included acts such as the assassination of Haytham Ali Tabatabai in southern Beirut. Tabatabai had taken over the role of Hezbollah’s top military chief following the assassination of Fouad Shukr the year prior. The Israelis have attacked the southern suburbs of the Lebanese capital, Dahiyeh, on a number of occasions, also committing civilian massacres in the south of the country up to the northern Bekaa Valley’s Baalbek.
Each of these waves of aggression was clearly designed to draw responses but failed to make Hezbollah bite. The idea was to set new rules of engagement, red lines, and establish a precedent for what constitutes aggression against Israel that would provoke a major bombardment of Lebanon.
Strategic Patience and Military Recalibration
On Hezbollah’s part, it appears that they understood what Israel was attempting to lure them into and instead refrained from responding, waiting for the opportune time to initiate a major war that would enable them to reclaim their territory and inflict what they see as sufficient acts of revenge on the Israeli enemy.
So, while Israel has been provoking Hezbollah and committing its daily acts of aggression against the civilian population in southern Lebanon in particular, Hezbollah has been working to rebuild and establish new battle plans. It has also become clear that the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria did not end the weapons transfers between Syria and Lebanon, something that both Israeli and US think tanks have themselves admitted.
Since the beginning of Ramadan, this campaign of incitement has only increased. On Friday, Israel launched an assassination strike, using three missiles, on the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain al-Hilweh, killing two members of Hamas and injuring a number of civilians. Then, later that same day, Israel bombed three populated buildings in the Bekaa Valley, killing 10, eight of whom were members of Hezbollah, and injuring 50 people.
The Northern Front
Israel and its Trump administration are now poised to enter a new conflict with Iran, as the largest US military buildup in the region since the illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003 continues. It has become clear that in the event a regime-change war is waged against the Islamic Republic, Hezbollah will very likely engage in a battle with the Israelis.
Nobody truly understands just how powerful Hezbollah currently is, yet it is clear from the final week of the 2024 Lebanon-Israel war that they possess ballistic missiles capable of successfully striking high-rise buildings in Tel Aviv, along with a large attack drone arsenal. However, their missile and drone power aside, Hezbollah’s biggest asset has proven to be their ground forces, which inflicted the largest number of military casualties during the war.
In other words, Hezbollah will act as Iran’s ground force in any regional war. If they can manage to breach the border into northern occupied Palestine, it will represent a major blow to the Israeli state, yet a battle in the heart of the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon could prove even more costly to the Israeli occupying forces.
It is because of this inevitable escalation in the north that the Israelis are displaying signs of panic and continue to target both Hezbollah members and civilians alike. There has even been a campaign of spraying cancer-causing chemical substances in the south, alongside a campaign of intimidation using their drone power, a similar strategy to what we saw in Gaza for decades.
If anything, the Israelis may even urge the United States to help them go after Hezbollah in Lebanon. There is a chance this could lead to a scenario where Lebanon is attacked prior to Iran, yet the inherent risks to this strategy could be that they then lose any element of surprise in their planned assault on Iran, especially in the event that Tehran comes to the aid of Hezbollah.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.
Israel ready to strike Iran-backed armed groups – media
RT | February 20, 2026
Israel’s military is preparing to launch large-scale pre-emptive strikes on Iran-backed armed groups across the Middle East in order to prevent them from lending support to Tehran in any potential regional conflict, the Saudi daily Asharq Al-Awsat reported on Friday.
Israeli military sources told the newspaper that West Jerusalem has engaged mediators to warn Lebanon’s Hezbollah militant group, Yemen’s Houthi rebels, and armed factions in Iraq that any attack against Israel would be met with a “massive and unprecedented response.”
The sources said that Israeli defense officials believe Tehran is pushing its regional allies to take part in any potential escalation after concluding that their limited involvement in the 12-day Israel-Iran war was a strategic mistake.
Iran has allocated substantial resources, including an estimated $1 billion in 2025, to bolster its allies’ ability to strike targets in Israel and the region, the sources claimed.
Israeli assessments cited by the paper suggest that Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq is reluctant to take part in a confrontation, while Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis are more likely to participate.
The IDF said on Thursday it had carried out airstrikes on alleged Hezbollah sites in southern Lebanon. Despite a fragile US-brokered ceasefire, Israel has routinely attacked its northern neighbor, accusing it of violating its side of their agreement.
The Houthis, who control much of Yemen, have halted missile and drone attacks on Israel and its commercial shipping in the Red Sea since the truce with Gaza was signed in October, after repeatedly targeting vessels in what they said was solidarity with Palestinians.
On Thursday, US President Donald Trump set a ten-day deadline for Iran to reach a nuclear deal with Washington, saying that failure to comply could trigger decisive measures. The warning followed Omani-mediated talks in Geneva on Tuesday, which both sides described as a positive step, although no breakthrough was made. At the same time, the US accelerated its troop buildup in the region.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also warned about preparations for possible missile strikes on Iran. “We are prepared for any scenario,” he said, adding “they will experience a response they cannot even imagine.”
The US struck Iran’s nuclear sites during the 12-day Israel-Iran air war in June 2025. Tehran has maintained that its nuclear program is peaceful and has vowed it will not be deterred. Tehran’s UN envoy Amir Saeid Iravani reiterated on Thursday that Iran “will not initiate any war,” but will respond resolutely to being attacked.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has accused the US of “playing with fire” and warned that strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites could lead to disaster.
In an interview with Al Arabiya aired on Wednesday, Lavrov said Moscow backs Tehran’s right to peaceful enrichment, adding that the current tensions stem from the US tearing up the 2015 Iran nuclear deal during Trump’s first term.
Iran Adamantly Rejects US Attempt to Control Upcoming Negotiations Over Iran’s Nuclear Program
By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR | February 5, 2026
What a day!! Lots of negotiation and non-negotiation action on the Iranian front. In the span of two hours, starting at 1 pm and ending around 3 pm eastern time, the world was whipped sawed with news that the bilateral negotiations between Iran and the US was cancelled — that was the 1 pm news — and then, at 3 pm, the talks were back on. The initial reports that the meeting in Oman would not take place cited Iran’s reaction to a US demand that Iranian ballistic missiles and Iran’s support for groups like Hamas and Hezbollah must be on the agenda or there would be no negotiations. Without a moments hesitation, Iran barked back and said, “Ok, no meeting.”
Axios reported that US officials were surprised by Iran’s reaction and scrambled to come up with a response to Iran. Within two hours, the US retreated and accepted Iran’s position that the Friday meeting in Oman would only address nuclear bombs and uranium enrichment. Iran won this first round.
While all of this was taking place, Pentagon officials announced that the US carrier strike force had shot down an Iranian drone that was flying towards the USS Abraham Lincoln again… No word about the make and model. Three days ago, Iran successfully overflew the USS Abraham Lincoln and showed the video footage on Iran’s Press TV. I think Pete Hegseth and his team of sycophants were embarrassed by that episode and decided to retaliate with force.
And if that was not enough, Iran dispatched a bevy of small boats to harass what the press described as a US tanker navigating the Strait of Hormuz. I think Iran was simply trying to remind the US that it is serious about taking action against the US military and economic presence in the Persian Gulf if the US acts on its threat to attack Iran.
Danny Davis, Doug MacGregor, and I have heard active duty military officers in recent days insist that any Iranian attacks would be easily repulsed by US forces in the region. We all think that those officers do not understand the full capabilities of the Iranian navy and air force to overwhelm US defenses with a combination of drone and missile swarms if the US carries out an attack on targets inside Iran. King Solomon, writing in Proverbs, accurately described this attitude… Pride goes before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall.
If the US is going to attack Iran it will want to launch in the next two weeks because Russian and Chinese warships are headed to the area to participate in the annual Iran-Russia-China joint-naval military exercise. Iran, Russia, and China are scheduled to hold their joint naval military exercise, known as Maritime Security Belt 2026 (the eighth edition of the series), in the northern Indian Ocean (including areas near the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea) in late February 2026. Iranian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani announced on January 31, 2026, that the exercise will involve units from Iran’s regular navy (Nedaja), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy, and naval forces from China and Russia.
Riyadh and Hezbollah: A rapprochement forged in fire
As Lebanon becomes an unlikely stage for a slow Saudi pivot toward pragmatism, regional rifts with allies and foes alike compel Riyadh to recalculate its hard lines.
By Tamjid Kobaissy | The Cradle | January 29, 2026
Lebanon, once more, reflects the fault lines tearing through the Arab world. But this time, the ground is moving. The era of blockades and isolation is ceding to a colder, more calculated politics – and at its core lies an unlikely dialogue: between Hezbollah and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
As The Cradle observed last month on ‘Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia’s uneasy détente,’ behind-the-scenes communication between the two has laid groundwork for a quiet thaw. Recent developments have accelerated this shift, compelling the kingdom to reassess both threats and alliances. The signals are no longer limited to backchannels.
They are becoming visible across Lebanon’s political, economic, and media fronts. This suggests that rapprochement is no longer a theoretical discussion but an unfolding process reshaping both the Lebanese and regional scene.
Economic tremors, political signals
Saudi repositioning on Lebanon and Hezbollah has taken shape across multiple fronts. Economic pressures are easing, political language is softening, and discourse on the resistance movement’s disarmament is adapting to new realities. These changes track with the Saudi–Hezbollah talks and reflect broader drivers such as domestic demands in Lebanon, urgent regional recalculations, and Hezbollah’s calibrated outreach.
Sources tell The Cradle the talks have already produced results, with Riyadh stepping away from its previous economic blockade. That shift is becoming tangible across Lebanon.
The economic front offers the clearest evidence. During a visit to Beirut by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, flanked by a senior economic team, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun signaled readiness to deepen Beirut–Tehran ties. In Lebanon, such moves usually require nods from Riyadh or Washington.
Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, known for his Saudi ties, announced the launch of reconstruction in southern Lebanon within two weeks, with plans to accelerate rebuilding efforts. This follows parliamentary approval of a World Bank loan – an indication of intent to harness regional momentum. Salam also flagged upcoming agreements with Riyadh.
Simultaneously, the long-dormant file of Lebanese depositors was revived in cabinet through a proposed financial reorganization and deposit recovery law. This legislation lays the groundwork for closing the financial gap and gradually repaying deposits.
The reopening of this file after years of stagnation reflects not only domestic pressure but also a new political and financial environment shaped by waning external pressure and the rollback of the economic suffocation policy previously imposed on Lebanon.
Changing tones in Beirut
Political and media rhetoric in Lebanon is also adjusting, particularly among factions with Saudi leanings. The Lebanese Forces (LF) offer a striking example. Lebanon’s Foreign Minister Youssef Raji’s tone during Araghchi’s visit was notably tempered compared to previous Iranian delegations. While his broader stance may still reflect internal party lines, it is important to note that the LF is not entirely Saudi-aligned and intersects with Washington’s foreign policy.
Equally notable is the near absence of the usual Saudi-linked media campaigns. Outlets and figures typically vocal during such visits stayed quiet. That silence reflects a broader repositioning.
Media sources also say Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Waleed Bukhari has privately conveyed Riyadh’s interest in engaging Lebanon’s Shia leaders, moving beyond the image of a sectarian boycott.
The weapons file: A vocabulary shift
A recalibration is also visible in official discourse around Hezbollah’s arms. Where previous rhetoric focused on “disarmament” or exclusive control south of the Litani River, a new phrase has emerged: weapons “containment” north of the Litani. This lexical shift reflects a more tempered and strategic approach.
On one level, it indicates closer coordination – both internally and with external stakeholders – and a move away from maximalist demands. On another, it aligns with a broader political posture from Riyadh to reduce friction and avoid escalation.
During a recent visit to Beirut, Saudi envoy Yazid bin Farhan told Lebanese officials that while Riyadh supports arms being under state authority, the process must proceed with reason and avoid internal disruption. This was widely read as a message tailored to Hezbollah.
His remark that Saudi Arabia has “no problem … with any of the Lebanese components,” mirrored Hezbollah’s framing of a national defense dialogue. More pointedly, his call for calm in the process echoed the group’s insistence that change must come through consensus, not coercion.
Wariness of war, new parliamentary cues
Another clear signal of Saudi recalibration is its growing resistance to military escalation in Lebanon. Once expressed obliquely, this position is now surfacing in both private meetings and public statements from Saudi-aligned figures.
Reports from Israel’s Channel 12, citing unnamed Saudi royals, pointed to Riyadh’s refusal to countenance any military operation against Lebanon. Such red lines bolster Hezbollah’s messaging and complicate Tel Aviv’s threat matrix.
This shift was also evident in the 18 January parliamentary session, where quorum battles pitted Hezbollah and the Amal Movement – referred to in Lebanon as the Shia Duo – against the LF. Samir Geagea, the long-standing LF leader and vocal advocate for Hezbollah’s disarmament, reportedly urged the Saudi envoy to discourage Sunni MPs from attending. The attempt fell flat. Sunni MPs aligned with Riyadh showed up anyway.
In this context, Hezbollah Political Council member Ghaleb Abu Zainab tells The Cradle:
“In principle, we want our relations with Arab states to be positive – built on mutual respect and shared interests in Lebanon and the Arab world. This, of course, includes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which holds significant Arab and Islamic weight in the region.”
Riyadh’s Persian Gulf equation is shifting
The Hezbollah track is one part of a larger Saudi recalibration, driven by new regional pressures. Yemen, Sudan, the Red Sea, and Lebanon are all areas where Riyadh now sees mounting friction with longtime Gulf ally, the UAE.
In Yemen, Saudi Arabia remains uneasy. While it sought to contain Emirati actions in the south, Abu Dhabi’s moves – including a controlled pullback from certain zones – have sparked concern. The fugitive leader of the now-dissolved Southern Transitional Council (STC), Aidarus al-Zubaidi’s remarks from Abu Dhabi about pursuing southern independence, coupled with the assassination attempt on Giants Brigade commander Hamdi Shukri al-Subaihi and subsequent protests, have raised alarms in Riyadh.
In Sudan, Saudi Arabia is backing the official government in Khartoum, preparing for a potential confrontation with the UAE-supported Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Riyadh facilitated a $1.5-billion deal with Pakistan to supply weapons, air defense systems, and drones to the Sudanese army, signaling its intent to push back on Emirati encroachment – part of a broader regional re-ordering described as a response to Abu Dhabi’s growing alignment with Tel Aviv.
Meanwhile, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and reports of a possible military presence there have added another layer of anxiety – a new Israeli footprint near the Red Sea.
Confronting Emirati ambitions
Lebanon is not exempt. Saudi officials now suspect that Abu Dhabi is maneuvering for influence in Beirut. The LF, with its alignment to the UAE–Israel axis, is part of this concern. The scandal involving “Abu Omar” – a man posing as a Saudi prince who reportedly ran Lebanese political operations – reinforced concerns that the UAE filled the Saudi void during Riyadh’s absence.
Sources note that Qatar has also intensified its presence in Lebanon, funding figures like those in the Free Patriotic Movement. Whether this is in coordination with Riyadh or not, it contributes to a crowded Gulf rivalry playing out in Beirut.
In response, Riyadh is reassessing its Lebanese allies. The “Abu Omar” affair reportedly prompted the kingdom to question the seriousness of some of its former clients – many of whom failed to deliver either politically or in terms of security. This realization has made Riyadh more cautious and less inclined to repeat past mistakes.
The kingdom is now leaning on Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri’s Ain al-Tineh as a channel to Hezbollah – a more direct and realistic track. Hezbollah remains the decisive force in Lebanon, and Riyadh now appears willing to operate within that reality.
Even former Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri’s future is under reconsideration. A political source stresses that a return through the Emirati channel would lead to deep divisions, especially within the Hariri household itself, as the Emirati project does not align with his personality or political legacy. One of the main reasons for his withdrawal from public life was his refusal at the time to follow the Saudi call for a civil war – a demand that reflected the Emirati approach. Therefore, the Saudi option remains the most realistic path for Hariri, capable of reintegrating him into the political scene and ensuring the unity of the Sunni community under Riyadh’s umbrella rather than fragmenting it through external projects.
These developments mark a broader unveiling of the long-simmering Saudi–Emirati rivalry. Riyadh is now moving quickly to neutralize manageable disputes and focus on what it increasingly sees as its main challenge: Abu Dhabi.
In the end, it is clear that the Saudi–Hezbollah rapprochement is not a sudden development but the product of mounting regional pressures and internal constraints that have made pragmatism not a choice – but a necessity.
