Alice Weidel: German Ukraine policy is “complete madness”
May 30, 2025
What is Germany doing in the war in Ukraine? In Patriot Extra, Máté Gerhardt’s guest is Alice Weidel, co-chair of the AfD and leader of the party’s Bundestag faction.
Russian Cybersecurity Gains Traction in Global South and East – Deputy Foreign Minister
Sputnik – 01.06.2025
Russian cybersecurity solutions have become increasingly sought after by countries in the Global South and East amid the growing discreditation of most leading Western IT firms, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin told Sputnik.
“In the field of information and communication technologies, we possess significant capabilities — from legislation and law enforcement practices to extensive experience and developments in ensuring ‘digital sovereignty,’” he said.
According to the senior diplomat, Russian companies are offering cybersecurity solutions that are in high demand among nations in the Global South and East.
“This is largely due to the fact that many leading Western IT corporations have discredited themselves,” Vershinin noted.
He pointed out that there have been recurring revelations about Western companies ignoring the laws of the countries in which they operate, embedding hidden “backdoors” in their products — often for the benefit of intelligence agencies — and carrying out politically motivated directives from Western governments.
“All of this is, of course, being noticed by our partners in developing countries, who are increasingly leaning toward supporting our depoliticized and impartial approaches and initiatives in the ICT sphere on multilateral platforms,” he emphasized.
Europe punching above weight for nothing
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – June 1, 2025
Recent European (UK plus EU) sanctions on Russia amid ongoing US-backed efforts to broker a ceasefire in Ukraine aim to assert Europe’s perceived ability to “correct” the course of events.
However, the continued reliance on sanctions also underscores the limits of what Europe can—and cannot—achieve in ultimately shaping geopolitical outcomes.
Sanctions amid Talks
In geopolitics, timing is often more telling than the event itself. Such is the case with the European Union’s and the UK’s recent decision to impose fresh sanctions on Russia—announced just a day after former President Donald Trump held a two-hour “serious” conversation with Vladimir Putin. This is not the first time European states have sanctioned Russia, nor will it be the last. But this round is different, not in content but in context. The timing sends a clear message: Europe is uneasy, not just about Russia’s actions in Ukraine, but also about the growing strategic vacuum left by an increasingly disengaged United States.
Despite the recent round of dialogue between Ukrainian and Russian officials—and other rounds expected to follow—European leaders remain skeptical of where this path may lead. Their fear? That a negotiated settlement—particularly one brokered without robust Western unity—could leave Russia in a stronger position than before the conflict began.
That anxiety is compounded by waning American commitment to NATO under the Trump administration. In the absence of a coherent transatlantic front, European powers are trying to assert their own leverage. This latest sanctions package, targeting Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” of oil tankers and the financial networks enabling sanctions evasion, is as much a political statement as it is an economic measure.
According to German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, the sanctions are a response to Russia’s refusal to agree to an “immediate ceasefire without preconditions.” But here’s the strategic problem: Europe acted alone. Washington, notably silent, announced no corresponding measures. In fact, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested that threatening sanctions now could derail ongoing talks rather than advance them. “The president … believes that right now, you start threatening sanctions, the Russians will stop talking,” Rubio told lawmakers in the US.
This divergence reveals a deeper strategic disconnect between Europe and the US. Despite intense lobbying from European capitals, the Trump administration remains hesitant to jeopardize fragile diplomatic progress. In the eyes of many analysts, this marks a foreign policy failure for Europe, unable to rally its closest ally at a critical juncture. Still, the broader implication is troubling: these sanctions are unlikely to shift Moscow’s calculus or alter the trajectory of ceasefire negotiations. Instead, they may highlight Europe’s limited influence in the absence of American backing—and underscore a growing realization that, in the new era of great power politics, Europe may have to fend more for itself. If the goal is to contain Russian power and shape the post-war regional order, sanctions without transatlantic unity are unlikely to suffice. Without Washington on board, Europe’s message is loud—but not necessarily strong.
Anatomy of Sanctions
As the conflict in Ukraine drags into its fourth year, Europe finds itself in a strategic bind. While its leaders continue to voice solidarity with Kyiv, the reality beneath the rhetoric is unmistakable: Europe’s message is not strong enough. But the more pressing question is—why is this message so weak?
The answer lies not in a lack of compassion or political will, but in the cold calculus of power, capability, and consequence. After years of bloodshed, destruction, and stalemate, European leaders increasingly grasp the sobering truth: hard military power has its limits. In this war, force has not produced victory and may never do so. But sanctions, Europe’s go-to instrument in lieu of military engagement, have proven even weaker. Despite wave after wave of economic penalties imposed on Russia—freezing assets, targeting oligarchs, cutting trade—Moscow has adapted.
Faced with this double bind—military impotence on one hand, economic ineffectiveness on the other—some European policymakers have flirted with the idea of escalating their involvement. The suggestion of deploying troops or enforcing a no-fly zone in Ukraine has crept into public discourse. Yet such options bring their own dangers, dangers that many in Europe are not prepared to face. The reality is stark: without the United States, neither NATO nor any coalition of European powers has the muscle to militarily confront Russia directly.
Moreover, sending European troops into Ukraine or deploying aircraft over Ukrainian skies risks a direct confrontation with a nuclear-armed state. It is a step that would almost certainly invite retaliation on European soil. The conflict, in other words, would no longer be something happening “over there”—it would be an immediate, domestic reality. And this, more than anything else, is the psychological wall European leaders are reluctant to breach.
This is the heart of Europe’s dilemma: a conflict it cannot win, a peace it cannot broker, and a strategic imperative it cannot fulfill without paying a heavy cost. Until Europe reconciles its ambitions with its capabilities, its message will remain what it is today—resolute in tone, but tragically weak in substance.
Salman Rafi Sheikh is a research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.
Russian Arctic region under drone attack – governor
RT | June 1, 2025
Russia’s Murmansk Region, located mostly north of the Arctic Circle, is being targeted by drones, local governor Andrey Chibis has said.
Air defenses have been intercepting incoming UAVs in the region, Chibis wrote on Telegram on Sunday.
“Enemy drones have attacked the territory of Murmansk Region,” he wrote.
The governor urged the population to remain calm and report all incidents to the authorities.
Also on Sunday, several drones targeted a military installation in Irkutsk Region, central Russia. Local Governor Igor Kobzev said it is the first UAV raid in Siberia.
The attack occurred in the settlement of Sredny, some 150km from Lake Baikal, Kobzev wrote on Telegram. He added that the drones were launched from a tractor-trailer. “The source from where the UAVs came had been blocked,” he said.
Kiev has significantly intensified drone raids into Russia in recent weeks, targeting Moscow and other regions. Russia has responded by launching a series of large-scale missile and UAV strikes against Ukrainian military-related infrastructure.
Russian officials suggest that the drone incursions are an attempt by Ukraine to derail a US-brokered peace process between Moscow and Kiev. The attacks in Murmansk and Irkutsk regions come a day ahead of a scheduled meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian negotiators in Istanbul, during which the sides are expected to discuss each other’s proposals on ways to settle the conflict.
Collapsed bridge in Russia’s Bryansk Region was blown up – governor
RT | June 1, 2025
A bridge that collapsed onto a moving passenger train in Russia’s Bryansk Region was deliberately blown up, local governor Aleksandr Bogomaz has said.
At least seven people were killed and 69 others wounded in the incident late on Saturday, according to Bogomaz.
“A bridge on a highway was blown up as a train with 388 passengers was moving under it,” the governor told the television channel Russia 24 on Sunday morning.
According to Bogomaz, all of the wounded were swiftly hospitalized following the incident. Two of the patients, including one child, remain in critical condition and will be flown to Moscow for further treatment.
A source in Russia’s law enforcement agencies told RT that, according to preliminary data, a section of the bridge collapsed on the tracks in front of the train, with the driver having no time to avoid the crash.
The driver and his assistant likely died immediately as a result of the collision, the source said.
According to RT’s interlocutor, a probe is now being carried out to determine if the incident was a terrorist attack.
Russian Federation Council member Andrey Klishas has blamed Kiev for the derailment, writing on Telegram that the incident confirmed that “Ukraine is being controlled by a terrorist group.”
“Ukraine has long lost the attributes of a state, turning into a terrorist enclave without borders, without legitimate authorities and laws,” he said.
The senator urged the creation of a vast buffer zone inside Ukrainian territory to make sure that “terrorists” are unable to reach Russia in the future.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Behind Closed Doors – The US-Russia Diplomatic Games
Glenn Diesen | May 31, 2025
Fyodor Lukyanov is Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, a Research Professor at the Higher School of Economics, Editor in Chief of the Russia in Global Affairs Journal, and the Research Director at the Valdai Discussion Club. Prof. Lukyanov outlines how the US and Russian frameworks for ending the war are coming together. Ukraine is incrementally dragged into the format, and the Europeans are ignored as they are seen to be unrealistic and unreliable.
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Hundreds Still Missing, 304 Dead After Ukrainian Raid on Russia’s Kursk Region
Sputnik – 31.05.2025
KURSK, Russia – An estimated 576 civilians who went missing during the Ukrainian invasion in the western Russian region of Kursk in August remain unaccounted for 10 months on, the region’s acting governor, Alexander Khinshtein, said on Saturday.
“The number of people whose whereabouts today, unfortunately, are unknown to us, stands at 576 at this moment. Of course, this is a very large number, but at the same time, it is accurate. It was compiled from a number of sources because, when forming our register, we based it on data from all relevant agencies,” Khinshtein told reporters.
Khinshtein held a working group meeting on the aftermath of the Ukrainian invasion and the mass disappearance of civilians, including four children. He estimated that of the 2,287 people reported missing after the invasion 1,290 had been found and the whereabouts of another 421 had been located.
The governor said that 304 civilians were confirmed to have been killed by the Ukrainian armed forces during the incursion.
“Unfortunately, as our settlements continue to be liberated, military personnel and investigators are finding evidence of the barbaric crimes committed by the Ukrainian armed forces. As of today, the death of 304 civilians has been confirmed. Most of them have been identified,” he said.
The evacuation of the bodies from the affected territories is ongoing, Khinshtein said. Volunteers have been assisting in the evacuation and the mapping of potential sites where more slain civilians may have been buried, he added.
What Did President Trump Know When President Putin’s Helicopter Came Under Ukrainian Drone Attack in Kursk?
By John Helmer | Dances With Bears | May 30, 2025
The first report came from RIA-Novosti, the Russian state news agency, on May 25 at 13:24.
“President Vladimir Putin’s helicopter (lead image, top) was in the epicentre of repelling a large-scale attack by Ukrainian Armed Forces drones during a visit to the Kursk region, said Yury Dashkin [Major General in command of the 32nd Air Defence Division , lead image, below) commander of the air defence division in whose area of responsibility the region is located. According to him, during the president’s visit, the Ukrainian military launched an ‘unprecedented attack,’ with 46 drones destroyed by the air defence system. ‘At the same time, we conducted an anti-aircraft battle and ensured the safety of the president’s helicopter flight in the air. [The helicopter was] actually in the epicentre of repelling a massive drone attack,’ Dashkin said.”
The drone attack on Kursk had taken place five days earlier, on May 20. Putin’s visit to the region, his meetings with local officials, the region governor, engineers and scientists at the Kurchatov nuclear power plant, and local medical, rescue and social welfare volunteers was not reported by the Kremlin website until the following morning. The report of the attack on the helicopter was kept secret at the time. The Kremlin has made no comment on the later press reports.
Note Gen Dashkin’s precise wording: he did not claim the President’s helicopter was targeted directly; he did not say Putin was on board at the time (the President also travelled in Kursk by motorcade); he did not reveal whether there was more than one helicopter in the presidential flight to Kursk; he did not say whether the air defence command was spoofing the electronic tracking technology which the US and the Ukrainians have been using for their drone and missile attacks in recent days.
The Kremlin pool reporter for Kommersant, Andrei Kolesnikov, reported on Putin’s movements and meetings after the 24-hour security delay. Kolesnikov noted in passing: “The situation was not cloudless: when the cortege of the president moved around the region, there were drones of the APU in the sky – they cannot be ignored on the video footage, which I saw. However, the region lives in such an environment not for the first year, as you know — so Vladimir Putin should have recognized how the region is working.”
Pick-up of the May 25 report by Newsweek of the US conceded: “This is the first known instance in which the Russian president is reported to have flown through an active drone attack.”
The magazine then adopted the Ukrainian version of what had happened. “Ukrainian officials haven’t comment on the alleged attack on Putin, but Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said that his country has every right to kill Putin if the opportunity arises, if doing so would protect Ukraine and its people. Zelensky told The Sun in Kyiv in November 2023 that he has lost track of the number of times Moscow has attempted to assassinate him since Putin launched a full-scale invasion of his country. ‘That’s war, and Ukraine has all the rights to defend our land,’ the Ukrainian leader said when asked if Kyiv would take a chance to assassinate Putin if such an opportunity arose.”
“Zelensky is no longer in Kiev,” a Moscow source in a position to know commented this week. “He spends much of his time travelling around the world, and then in a command post in Poland. He simulates his presence in country for PR purposes. He only goes to Kiev when foreign government officials visit.” In March 2022 Putin told former Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett that he would not order an assassination strike on Zelensky.
Five years later, has Zelensky made an attempt against Putin? what role are the US electronic warfare forces playing in tracking Putin’s movements and targeting his position? When Trump tweeted on May 27 that Putin is “playing with fire!” had Trump fired first – and missed?
Since the Kursk incident, the public White House log records that Trump had received his weekly intelligence briefing at 11 am on May 22, and then again at the same time on May 29. There is no record yet that Trump has responded to a reporter’s question on the incident.
What Trump knew in advance and after the Kursk incident, and what message the Kremlin is sending by revealing the details now, are discussed with Chris Cook in this Gorilla Radio broadcast from Victoria, BC, on May 28. Listen from Minute 31:55.
Source: https://gradio.substack.com/p/gorilla-radio-with-chris-cook-dave-73c — Min 31:55
Chris Cook has hosted Gorilla Radio, broadcast/webcasting since 1999. Click on the archive here; The Gorilla Radio blog is at https://gorillaradioblog.blogspot.com/ and on Telegram at https://t.me/gorillaradio2024
Trump bracing for a longer Ukraine war
By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | May 30, 2025
One of the mysteries of the Ukraine endgame is that President Donald Trump did not issue an executive order on January 20 withdrawing all support for Ukraine. That would have been the easiest way to end the war.
The conditions were propitious — Candidate Trump didn’t mince words that it was a hopeless war that cost the US dearly in treasure; he thought poorly of President Volodymyr Zelensky as a shameless free rider; he saw the war as impeding his foreign-policy priority of the US’ transition to a multipolar world order; and, he felt no compulsion to inherit ‘Biden’s war’.
But instead, Trump plunged himself with gusto into the Ukraine question, although Washington lacked the means to leverage Russia to compromise on its core interests in what Russian people regarded as an existential war.
Quite possibly, some of Trump’s advisors prevailed upon him to undertake the theatrical diplomatic effort on the basis of a flawed reading of the state of play in the war. Trump believed that western sanctions lethally weakened the Russian economy; that Russia’s casualty figures ran into hundreds of thousands and such a high level of attrition was unsustainable; that Zelensky would sign up on the dotted line; that an improvement in Russian-American relationship would be a ‘win-win’ with massive economic benefits accruing to both sides and so on.
But all these premises turned out to be wrong notions. Putin has steered the economy to a state of permanent western sanctions (which was the Soviet experience, too). Russian entrepreneurs have successfully replaced the fleeing western businesses in the wake of sanctions and will now resist any re-entry by the latter.
Russia’s casualty figures are much lower than the self-serving western estimates put it, as the high level of recruitment to the army suggests. Zelensky is bent on prolonging the war with support from European powers per Biden’s script to ‘Trump-proof’ the war. Europeans not only have a Plan B but have collaborators within the US some of whom may even be in Trump’s team.
Suffice to say, Trump has been on a learning curve, as he began sensing that the Kremlin is determined to realise the objectives it had set for itself (as outlined in Putin’s historic speech last June at the foreign ministry). According to a Reuters report two days ago, “Putin wants a ‘written’ pledge by major Western powers not to enlarge the US-led NATO alliance eastwards — shorthand for formally ruling out membership to not only Ukraine and Georgia and Moldova and other former Soviet republics as well.”
“Russia also wants Ukraine to be neutral, some Western sanctions lifted, a resolution of the issue of frozen Russian sovereign assets in the West, and protection for Russian speakers in Ukraine” — per Reuters.
Europeans will scoff at such demands. Therefore, as things stand, a breakthrough at the Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul on June 2 seems unlikely. Unsurprisingly, Russia is pressing ahead with an offensive campaign in all directions, throwing in all its forces with a culmination planned for summer or early autumn.
The least bad option
Trump has three options under the circumstances. One is to simply refuse to own responsibility for the war and walk away for good. But then, can Trump deny his own part in it in his first term? While the Trump administration identified its approach to foreign policy as ‘principled realism’, late Joseph Nye’s characterisation of Trump as an “idiosyncratic realist” was perhaps closer to the truth.
The official administration policy on Ukraine during Trump’s first term was a continuation of the policy pursued by the Obama administration. It recognised Crimea as part of Ukraine, condemned Russia’s occupation and eventual annexation annexation of the peninsula; it underscored Russia’s primary responsibility for the instigation, continuation and conduct of the conflict in eastern Ukraine; it even identified the Russian interference in Ukraine as part of a wider pattern of aggression towards other states and as proof of Moscow’s challenge to the fundamental principles of international order.
For these reasons, the Trump administration maintained that the US should help Ukraine to defend itself and should penalise Russia both through sanctions and diplomatic isolation (eg., membership of the G7). Curiously, shades of this thought process resurface even today occasionally in Trump’s Truth Social outbursts. Trump seems unaware he’s carrying a can of worms as his Ukraine legacy.
So, the second option today is to convey Trump’s dissatisfaction over Russia’s perceived intransigence in dictating terms for settlement and its alleged lack of interest in peace talks. Trump even hinted at Russia’s hidden agenda to conquer Ukraine. Trump is hinting at punishing Russia both through sanctions and supplying weapons to Ukraine. German chancellor Friedrich Merz’s provocative announcement of giving long-range weapons to Zelensky was probably green lighted by some people in Trump’s team. After all, Merz is no stranger to Wall Street.
However, this is a recipe for an extremely dangerous NATO – Russia confrontation. If long range German missiles hit Russia, Russia will retaliate in a way that could potentially cripple NATO’s operational readiness in a hypothetical war. Belarus State Secretary of Security Council Alexander Volfovich has said that the Oreshnik missile system is “planned to be stationed in Belarus by the end of the year. The locations for its deployment have already been determined. Work is under way.” The spectre of World War III may seem a bit of a stretch, but Trump will have to consider the dangers of climbing the escalation ladder, which could destroy his MAGA presidency.
Washington has no means to intimidate the Kremlin. The bottom line is, Trump is actually left with only a third option, the least bad option — viz., walking away from the Ukraine conflict at this point and return when the war has been lost and won, possibly by the end of the year. This will not damage Trump’s reputation.
Trump may already be displaying his credentials as ‘peacemaker president’ if the US-Iran talks, which seem to be making progress, results in a nuclear deal. Besides, US-Russia normalisation needs more time to gain traction. Senator Lindsey Graham’s hard-hitting sanctions bill against Russia with 81 co-sponsors in the senate signals that Russia is a very toxic subject in the US domestic politics.
Also, Russia-Ukraine talks is only one track. The Russians have sensitised Trump’s team that while Moscow engages with Kiev, the root cause of the war — absence of a European security architecture — still remains to be addressed, which is something that only Russia and the US can work out jointly. The US shouldn’t shirk its responsibility, being both the original instigator of NATO expansion and sponsor of the Ukraine war.
The reaction by the US special envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg has been positive when he told ABC News in an interview that the US understands that it is a matter of national security for Russia that NATO may stop accepting new Eastern European countries into its ranks — ie., not only Ukraine but Moldova and Georgia as well.
Kellogg said he considered the Russian side’s concerns to be justified. He did not rule out the possibility of reaching an agreement during negotiations between the US and Russia. This is a big step forward.
Col. Jacques Baud: Russia Pursues Military Solution as Diplomacy Fails
Glenn Diesen | May 29, 2025
Colonel Jacques Baud is a former military intelligence analyst in the Swiss Army and the author of many books. Colonel Baud argues that American indecisiveness and European irrationality have undermined negotiations, and Russia is now convinced it must pursue a military solution.
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Why Merz’ comments show he is two steps down the escalation ladder from Putin
By Ian Proud | Strategic Culture Foundation | May 29, 2025
Russia has established escalation dominance in Ukraine in November 2024 by raising the bar on the military capabilities that it is willing to use. Merz’s comments on western cruise missile use haven’t changed that calculus and, instead, have illustrated German weakness in Russia’s eyes.
For some time now, western media outlets have pushed the argument hard that Zelensky should be free to use longer-range weapons deep inside Russia. In his bid to offer a tougher line on Ukraine’s war effort during his honeymoon period in office and ahead of Zelensky’s visit to Berlin today, Friedrich Merz announced a lifting of restrictions on the use of western missiles within the territory of Russia. In doing so, he showed a fundamental misunderstanding of Russian strategy.
I have seen at critical points over the past decade that Russia seeks escalation dominance, a Cold War concept holding that a state can best contain conflicts and avoid escalation if it is dominant at each successive rung up the “ladder of escalation,” all the way to the nuclear rung.
Since the onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russia has sought to dominate each step up the escalation ladder. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 were major escalations that NATO didn’t meet head-on. This strategy is also seen in the diplomatic sphere, for example, Russia escalated a dispute with the U.S. in 2017 when it kicked 755 American diplomatic staff out of Russia. When Moscow over-escalates, it makes a gamble that its adversary will not be willing to step another rung higher on the escalation ladder.
There is a hard-wired view in Moscow that Russia will always overmatch a divided and morally weak Western alliance when push comes to shove. Russia has something that the West does not have — the sovereign power and the political will to act unilaterally. Putin had been subject to criticism from hardliners in Russia that he hasn’t responded to the slow ratcheting up of military support to Ukraine from the West.
What was surprising about Merz’s comments were their blindness to recent events. On Nov. 21, 2024, Vladimir Putin presented a huge escalation challenge to the West: are you ready for Russia to strike NATO facilities anywhere in Europe with hypersonic munitions that you don’t possess?
At that time, much as now in Berlin, bombastic British ex-military saber rattlers had been at the forefront of calls that such weapon systems as Scalp, Storm Shadow, U.S. ATACMS missiles could make on the battlefield in Ukraine.
On Nov. 19, the first salvo of ATACMS was lobbed at a military facility in Bryansk — outside the area in which Ukrainian forces were battling in Kursk. The following day, British Storm Shadow missiles were fired into Kursk, with the jubilant approval of Prime Minister Keir Starmer, no less. These strikes elicited widespread attaboy jingoism from the Western media, with hardly a word of caution.
On Nov. 21, Russia over-escalated. Specifically, they deployed a more powerful and destructive hypersonic Oreshnik missile at a well-fortified Ukrainian weapons facility in Dnipropetrovsk. This is the first time an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile has been used in combat. The claimed range of Oreshnik is 16 times greater than ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles. Its deployment put any NATO targets within Europe in the scope of a conventional strike.
This represented a major escalation in destructive capabilities. Russia had been trying unsuccessfully to destroy the Yuzhmash weapons facility since 2022 using the battlefield weapons at its disposal. Built during the Soviet era, Yuzhmash has workshops buried deep underground to protect them from attack. Among other purposes, the facility is thought to be where Rheinmetall had set up a plant to repair German Leopard tanks. It was also used in missile and long-range drone production. The Oreshnik strike levelled it.
The destruction of valuable Western repair facilities at Yuzhmash will have satisfied Kremlin hawks that Oreshnik has taken Russia two steps up the escalation ladder. Putin also sent a clear message to military planners from the U.S. and UK who supported the deployment of the ATACMS, that a more specifically NATO target may be next.
Carefully described by Putin at the time as a “test” the Oreshnik is now a deployed capability far beyond those that Western powers have allowed Ukraine to use, namely ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles. And also beyond the capabilities that Zelensky had requested — namely Tomahawk cruise missiles — that the U.S. has so far refused to sanction. Putin has left the door open for further “tests” of the Oreshnik.
Following Merz’s surprise announcement, speculation quickly mounted that Germany would finally relent on allowing Ukraine to use German Taurus cruise missiles. Even if supplied, Taurus offers nothing Ukraine doesn’t already have, as its range is slightly lower than the British Storm Shadow and its payload only slightly higher. The U.S. ATACMS has more destructive capability.
So, all that Merz did by grand-standing was to put Germany and Ukraine in a position where a more devastating weapon i.e. Oreshnik – may be used against strategic or battlefield targets that would overmatch the theoretical use of Taurus missiles. Taurus is therefore a battle-losing capability. To make matters worse, the new German Chancellor has already backtracked on supplying Taurus, following blowback from members of his coalition government.
Following the first deployment of ATACMS and Storm Shadow at targets in Bryansk and Kursk, western powers deescalated and placed greater restrictions on their tactical use. This made both Joe Biden and Keir Starmer look weak in President Putin’s eyes. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the pro-ATACMS advocates largely fell silent, at least for a little while. Ukraine has gone on to lose further territory in the Donbass since that time.
So, the question for Merz when he meets Zelensky today is, what escalation card is he empowered to play next to overmatch a future Oreshnik strike at a target in Germany? If he hasn’t thought that through, and I suspect that he has not, Merz should reconsider his rhetoric, or risk looking weak and feckless, as Biden and Starmer did in November of last year.
Following the Oreshnik deployment, Prime Minister Starmer conceded in his December Manion House speech that Britain needed to help Ukraine get into the strongest position to secure a negotiated settlement to the war. That sill hasn’t happened. Perhaps Merz might consider a negotiated end to the conflict, rather than more empty sabre-rattling that he cannot deliver upon.

