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How CIA secretly triggered Sino-Indian war

By Kit Klarenberg | Al Mayadeen | November 26, 2025

From October 20 – November 21, 1962, a little-remembered conflict raged between China and India. The skirmish damaged India’s Non-Aligned Movement affiliation, firmly placing the country in the West’s orbit, while fomenting decades of hostility between the neighbouring countries. Only now are Beijing and New Delhi forging constructive relations, based on shared economic and political interests. A detailed academic investigation, ignored by the mainstream media, exposes how the war was a deliberate product of clandestine CIA meddling, specifically intended to further Anglo-American interests regionally.

In the years preceding the Sino-Indian War, tensions steadily brewed between China and India, in large part due to CIA machinations supporting Tibetan separatist forces. For example, in 1957, Tibetan rebels secretly trained on US soil were parachuted into the territory and inflicted major losses on Beijing’s People’s Liberation Army forces. The next year, these cloak-and-dagger efforts ratcheted significantly, with the agency airdropping weapons and supplies in Tibet to foment violent insurrection. By some estimates, up to 80,000 PLA soldiers were killed.

Mao Zedong was convinced that Tibetan revolutionaries, while ultimately US-sponsored, enjoyed a significant degree of support from India and used the country’s territory as a base of operations. These suspicions were significantly heightened by Tibet’s March 1959 uprising, which saw a vast outflow of refugees from the region to India, and the granting of asylum to the Dalai Lama, their CIA-supported leader, by New Delhi. Weeks later, at a Chinese Communist Party politburo meeting, Mao declared a “counteroffensive against India’s anti-China activities.”

He called for official CPC communications to “sharply criticise” India’s premier Jawaharlal Nehru, stating Beijing “should not be afraid of making him feel agitated or of provoking a break with him,” and “we should carry the struggle through to the end.” For example, it was suggested that “Indian expansionists” be formally accused of acting “in collusion” with “British imperialists” to “intervene openly in China’s internal affairs, in the hope of taking over Tibet.” Mao implored, “we… should not avoid or circumvent this issue.”

Ironically, Nehru was then viewed with intense suspicion by the West due to his Non-Aligned commitment and broadly socialist economic policies. Thus, he could not be trusted to support covert Anglo-American initiatives targeting China. Meanwhile, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev considered Nehru an important prospective ally and was keen to maintain positive relations. Simultaneously, the Sino-Soviet Split, which commenced in February 1956 with Khrushchev’s notorious secret speech denouncing the rule of Joseph Stalin, was ever-deepening. Disagreements over India and Tibet only hastened the pair’s acrimonious divorce.

‘A weapon’

After months of official denunciations of Nehru’s policies toward Tibet, Beijing’s information war against India became physical in August 1959, with a series of violent clashes along the countries’ borders. Nehru immediately reached out to Moscow, pleading that they rein in their closest ally. This prompted a tense meeting in October 1959 between Khrushchev, his chief aides, and the CPC’s top leadership, at Mao’s official residence. Khrushchev belligerently asserted to his Chinese counterparts that their confrontations with New Delhi and unrest in Tibet were “your fault”.

The Soviet leader went on to caution about the importance of “preserving good relations” with Nehru and “[helping] him stay in power,” for if he was replaced, “who would be better than him?” Mao countered that India had “acted in Tibet as if it belonged to them,” and while Beijing also supported Nehru, “in the question of Tibet, we should crush him.” Assorted CPC officials then, one by one, forcefully asserted the recent border clashes were initiated by New Delhi. However, Khrushchev was highly dismissive.

“Yes, they began to shoot and they themselves fell dead,” he derisively retorted. A Soviet declaration of neutrality in the Sino-Indian dispute a month prior also provoked anger among the CPC contingent. Mao complained, “[the] announcement made all imperialists happy,” by publicly exposing rifts between Communist countries. Khrushchev et al were again unmoved by the suggestion. Yet, unbeknownst to attendees, they had all unwittingly stepped into a trap laid by the CIA, many years earlier.

In September 1951, a State Department memo declared, “The US should endeavor to use Tibet as a weapon for alerting” India “to the danger of attempting to appease any Communist government and, specially, for maneuvering [India] into a position where it will voluntarily adopt a policy of firmly resisting Chinese Communist pressure in south and east Asia.” In other words, it was believed that supporting Tibetan independence could force a Sino-Indian split. In turn, the Soviets might be compelled to take sides, deepening ruptures with Beijing.

This strategy informed CIA covert action in Tibet over the subsequent decade, which grew turbocharged when Allen Dulles became CIA chief in 1953. A dedicated, top-secret base was constructed for the separatists at Camp Hale, the US military’s World War II-era training facility in the Rocky Mountains. Local terrain – vertiginous, replete with dense forests – was reminiscent of Tibet, providing ample opportunity for insurgency practice. Untold numbers of militants were tutored there over many years.

At any given time, the CIA maintained a secret army of up to 14,000 Tibetan separatists in China. While the guerrillas believed Washington sincerely supported their secessionist crusade, in reality, the agency was solely concerned with creating security problems for Beijing, and resultantly inflicting economic and military costs on their adversary. As the Dalai Lama later lamented, the agency’s assistance was purely “a reflection of their anti-Communist policies rather than genuine support for the restoration of Tibetan independence.”

‘More susceptible’

Come October 1962, the CIA’s Tibetan operations had become such an irritant to China that PLA forces invaded India. Washington was well aware in advance that military action was imminent. A telegram dispatched to Secretary of State Dean Rusk five days prior to the war’s eruption forecast a “serious conflict” and laid out a detailed “line” to take for when the time came. First and foremost, the US would publicly make clear its “sympathy for the Indians and the problems posed by the Chinese intervention.”

However, it was considered vital to “be restrained in our expressions in the matter so as to give the Chinese no pretext for alleging any American involvement.” While New Delhi was already secretly receiving “certain limited purchases” of US military equipment, Washington would not actively “offer assistance” when war broke out. “It is the business of the Indians to ask,” the telegram noted. If such requests were forthcoming, “we will listen sympathetically to requests… [and] move with all promptness and efficiency to supply the items”:

“The US is giving assistance… designed to ease Indian military transport and communications problems. Additionally, the Departments of State and Defense are studying the availability on short notice and on terms acceptable to India of transport, communications and other military equipment in order to be prepared should the government of India request such US equipment.”

As predicted, the Sino-Indian conflict prompted Nehru to urgently reach out to Washington for military aid, a significant policy shift. Much of New Delhi’s political class duly adopted a pro-Western line, with calls for a review of the country’s Non-Aligned stance reverberating widely throughout parliament. Even Communist and Socialist parties that hitherto rejected any alliance with the US eagerly accepted the assistance. The CIA’s Tibetan operations had triumphed.

As a May 1960 Agency National Intelligence Estimate noted, “Chinese aggressiveness” toward New Delhi over Tibet had fostered “a more sympathetic view of US opposition to Communist China” among India’s leaders. This included “greater appreciation of the value of a strong Western – particularly US – position in Asia to counterbalance” Beijing’s influence regionally. However, the CIA noted how, as of writing, “Nehru has no intention of altering India’s basic policy of nonalignment, and the bulk of Indian opinion apparently still shares his attachment to this policy.”

The Sino-Indian War changed all that. A December 1962 Agency analysis of the conflict’s “outlook and implications” hailed New Delhi’s “metamorphosis”, which the CIA forecast would “almost certainly continue to open up new opportunities for the West.” The country was judged “more susceptible than ever before to influence by the US and the UK, particularly in the military field.” Conversely, the War had “seriously complicated the Soviet Union’s relations with India and aggravated its difficulties with China”:

“The USSR will place a high value on a continued close relationship with India. While its opportunity to build up lasting influence in the Indian military has virtually disappeared, it will probably continue to supply some military equipment and to maintain its economic ties with India.”

Subsequently, New Delhi began assisting Anglo-American intelligence gathering on China and became actively involved in CIA wrecking activities in Tibet. The Sino-Indian War’s spectre hung over relations between the two nations for many years thereafter, and border clashes occurred intermittently throughout. Now, though, as Donald Trump bemoaned in September, India appears enduringly “lost” to Beijing and its close partner Russia. Decades of determined US efforts to foment antagonism between the vast neighbours have come spectacularly undone, due to the sheer weight of geopolitical reality.

November 26, 2025 Posted by | Deception, Timeless or most popular | , , , , , , | Leave a comment

On the beginning of détente in Chinese-Indian relations

By Vladimir Terehov – New Eastern Outlook – November 7, 2024

The meeting of the leaders of India and China, which took place on October 23 on the side-lines of the latest BRICS summit, became one of the most significant events of the Kazan summit, in which 30 countries participated.

In a commentary on the Chinese Global Times, the term ‘détente’ was used to characterise the state of relations between them, two of the multiple participants in the ‘Big Global Game’ at its current stage, which began to form both as a result of the aforementioned meeting and as a result of certain previous events. This article is a reaction to the words of Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar that it is premature to talk about the normalisation of relations between the two countries and that “restoring trust and readiness to work together will, naturally, take time”.

Half a century ago, the term ‘détente’ was used at one point of the Cold War by very responsible (both to their own peoples and to the world as a whole) leaders of opposing military and political groups. One of the main tasks was to prevent the use of ‘doomsday devices’, which are today absent-mindedly juggled by self-asserted political connoisseurs due to schizoid propaganda.

However, it did not, of course, reduce the multitude of fundamental problems at the heart of the Cold War itself, which were not eliminated by détente. Today, the ‘détente’ that has seemingly begun does not eliminate the serious issues in relations between the two Asian giants. This is likely what was meant by the head of the Indian Foreign Ministry and his commentators from the leading Chinese newspaper, warning against premature euphoria about the results of the meeting of the Chinese and Indian leaders in Kazan.

Issues in relations between India and China

This meeting was preceded by the resolution of a private problem that arose after the famous events of the summer of 2020 in Ladakh, a disputed area in the Himalayas. That which was agreed upon on the eve of the meeting between Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi boils down to the fact that the border guards based there will not face each other looking through a scope, but will rather engage in joint patrolling of certain paths passing through the territory that remains disputed.

There are several such disputed areas (with a total area of about 130,000km2). In the 50s and 60s, attempts were made to solve the territorial issue according to the principle of mutual and approximately equal concessions.

But something went wrong; what exactly went wrong is hard to pinpoint. This is the mystery of the whole issue of Chinese-Indian relations, the scale of which goes beyond the disputed territories. In order to define this ‘something’, international conferences are held with the participation of reputable Indologists and Sinologists who offer plausible hypotheses about this ‘something’.

10-15 years ago, it was defined by the word ‘Tibet’. More precisely, the state of bilateral relations after the liquidation of the virtually independent status of Tibet at the end of 1950. This status, in turn, turned out to be a consequence of the turmoil in China as a result of the Xinhai Revolution of 1911-1912. Since 1952, Tibet has ceased to be a sort of buffer zone between India and China and the military units of both countries are now separated by a 4,000,000 km line of actual control, which is not an internationally recognised border and will not become such until the parties resolve the issue of control over several of the above-mentioned disputed territories.

As a result of this and a number of subsequent events (this is first of all the 1959 rebellion in Tibet), the head of Buddhism in the world and about 100,000 Tibetan refugees found themselves in India, creating ‘authorities in exile’ there. This aids in keeping the ‘Tibetan issue’ – and suspicion in relations between India and China in general – in a tense state.

Over the past 10-15 years, radical changes have taken place in the status of these countries in the format of the ‘Big Global Game’. At the same time, the interests of both India and China extend far beyond national borders, intersecting on the territories of ‘external’ countries, which include all the countries of the Indian Ocean area and that are adjacent to India and China on the Asian mainland.

The situation developing within and outside Bangladesh requires special attention; a de facto coup took place in early September of this year and the country’s permanent (since 2009) Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, fled to India. Today, this serves as an additional reason for her to be accused of maintaining a ‘pro-Indian’ political vector, although she has actually been skilfully balancing the force fields created by two great neighbours of Bangladesh.

Relations between India and the current ‘transitional government’ of Bangladesh (which demanded the extradition of S. Hasina for her trial) have deteriorated markedly. This is especially notable against the background of a number of recent friendly gestures in Dhaka’s relations with Beijing (e.g. two Chinese navy ships visiting one of the ports of Bangladesh in the first half of October).

One may also recall India’s membership (along with the United States, Japan and Australia) in the Quad configuration, the latest summit of which was held in September in the US. Three weeks later, 10-day joint naval exercises between Quad countries took place in the Bay of Bengal. It is possible that, among other things, this was a warning signal to Bangladesh and China.

What to expect from future developments of Chinese-Indian relations? 

It is difficult to make forecasts at the current stage of the radical reformatting of the world order. Therefore, assessments regarding the nature of further development of bilateral relations – both in China and in India – are reserved. The illustration in the Global Times article mentioned at the very beginning accurately reflects reality.

Nevertheless, a remark in another commentary from the same newspaper about the need to “reduce future fluctuations in Chinese-Indian relations so as to minimise geopolitical disruptions from third parties guided by hidden malicious intent” seems noteworthy. Everything is significant in this phrase, especially the term ‘fluctuations’, a word which could describe the entire period of bilateral relations between independent India and China.

The previous stage of bettering bilateral relations started during a meeting of the two countries’ leaders held in April 2018 in Wuhan, China. A year and a half later, this trend was confirmed during Xi Jinping’s return trip to India and his meeting with N. Modi. The ‘incident in Ladakh’ followed and bilateral relations again fell to one of their lowest levels.

As for the ‘third parties with malicious intent’, it is clear who is meant by this. Note that Russia is also a ‘third party’, but with the complete opposite ‘intent’. There can be little doubt that it was Russian assistance that facilitated the meeting of the Indian and Chinese leaders on the side-lines of the latest BRICS summit. Russian diplomacy should be acknowledged on this occasion.

Fully aware of the fact that various difficulties remain in Chinese-Indian relations, let us hope that this meeting will become the starting point of their long-term positive development.

Vladimir Terekhov is an expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region.

November 7, 2024 Posted by | Aletho News | , , , , , | Leave a comment

India’s ‘Tibet card’ is a bitter legacy

By M K Bhadrakumar | Indian Punchline | August 9, 2018

A sensational report on Tuesday by the Japanese publication Nikkei that Prime Minister Narendra Modi discussed a Faustian deal on Tibet with Chinese President Xi Jinping stretches credulity. The report citing Indian sources claimed that Modi government is dumping the Tibetan issue in anticipation of the death of the Dalai Lama as quid pro quo by Beijing on a partial border settlement.

It is a curious report, to say the least. First, one would like to think that Modi being a staunch Hindu, will not negotiate over the death of someone who is still alive. Period. Second, Xi has a stated position, repeated ad nauseum, that China will never make concessions on its territories, and there is no reason to doubt the Chinese leader’s resolve. Third, even if such a diabolical exchange had taken place at Wuhan on an explosive topic (which had contributed to the 1962 conflict), it cannot possibly become bazaar gossip. India is not a banana republic.

So, why has such an attempt been made to scandalize Modi as someone raring to dump the ‘Tibetan cause’? One reason could be that the Japanese publication, which has a record of Sinophobia, simply vandalized the Wuhan summit in a continuing attempt to stall any improvement in India-China relations. Quite possibly, motivated Indians put the publication onto it.

For, it is no secret that Modi’s initiative to improve relations with China lacks acceptability within sections of our so-called ‘strategic community’ –  think tankers, media persons, ‘China experts’ and so on – who for reasons of their own appear to have convinced themselves that Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry must inexorably run its course until such time as Delhi can negotiate with Beijing from a position of strength.

Having said that, the fact remains that there has been a flurry of media reports lately on Tibet. They have focused attention on the tumultuous life and times of the Karmapa Lama. In particular, following his recent remarks about returning to India after a yearlong sojourn in the United States, there is an animated discussion going on over this topic.

It appears that the Indian security establishment, which viewed him as a ‘Chinese spy’ and had kept him under close surveillance for almost two decades in a remote monastery in Dharamsala, has had a profound rethink in the most recent weeks and is now beseeching him to come back to India. It seems that the Indian agencies have made a seductive offer of prime land (5-acre sprawling estate) in Delhi to set up the Karmapa’s Hqs on a grand scale.

Many of these reports are so obviously based on ‘spin’ by intelligence operatives themselves. Now, spooks are creators perfectly capable of constructing a world that works on the same emotional basis as successful soap operas. So, what is the soap opera here about?

Put differently: How come the government has had a change of heart with regard to 32-year old Karmapa in the downstream of the Wuhan summit in end-April?

More to the point, Karmapa has been living in America for over a year and it is inconceivable that the CIA never got to know about his presence on a lavish 150-acre estate in the Wharton State Forest Area in New Jersey that has been ‘gifted’ to him — purportedly by a Taiwanese couple. In fact, his remarks about his intention to return to India were transmitted via Radio Free Asia, which is known to be a US intelligence outfit.

To be sure, the whole sordid soap opera stinks to the heavens. As the Nikkei report on Tuesday hints, there are all sorts of interest groups (within and outside India), who want the Trans-Himalayan gravy train to Lhasa to keep running. But isn’t it in India’s long-term interests that Tibet-related issues do not remain a point of discord in the Sino-Indian relationship?

It is Modi’s call, finally. After all, this is a bitter legacy which is not his creation and, therefore, he is best placed than any of his predecessors to put a full stop to the delusional belief that we are holding a ‘Tibet card’ with a unique potential to leverage Chinese policies toward India. Read the essay by Ambassador Stobdan, one of our best experts on the politics of Tibetan Buddhism – The Flight of the Karmapa is Further Proof That India Has No Tibet Card, here.

August 9, 2018 Posted by | Mainstream Media, Warmongering, Militarism, Timeless or most popular | , , , | Leave a comment