Saudi Arabia’s shadowy role in the Ghouta chemical attack
There is now substantial evidence Saudi intelligence conducted false flag chemical attacks in Syria to trigger US military intervention and regime change
By William Van Wagenen | The Cradle | October 6, 2023
On 13 September, acclaimed US investigative journalist Seymour Hersh revealed a crucial five-page memo prepared for the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on 20 June, 2013. This document contained alarming details about the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front’s disturbing plan to manufacture sarin nerve gas with the aim of executing a chemical attack within Syria.
The significance of this memo extends beyond its surface, as it adds to the mounting evidence pointing toward Saudi intelligence’s involvement in orchestrating a false flag chemical attack in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta a month later, on 21 August 2013.
The attack resulted in the tragic deaths of numerous civilians and nearly triggered a western military intervention in support of Islamist militant factions aiming to overthrow the Syrian government.
Nusra’s sarin procurement
The DIA memo, which provides details obtained by US National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance, states that in April and May that year, “several Turkey and Saudi-based chemical facilitators” working for the Nusra Front “were attempting to obtain sarin precursors in bulk, tens of kilograms, likely for the anticipated large-scale production effort in Syria.”
Notably, the memo identifies three Nusra operatives — Abd al-Ghani, Kifah Ibrahim, and Adil Mahmud — who planned to perfect “a process for making sarin, then go to Syria to train others to begin large scale production at an unidentified lab in Syria.” Ibrahim and Mahmud were both captured in Iraq in May 2013, according to the memo.
The revelation that the NSA had identified Nusra operatives seeking sarin precursors in Saudi Arabia raises the implication that Saudi intelligence, then under the leadership of Prince Bandar bin Sultan, would also have been aware of these activities.
This implies that Riyadh might have either actively facilitated Nusra in obtaining sarin precursors or chosen not to interfere, allowing these sinister plans to progress unimpeded.
The memo further states that:
“The Syria-based part of this effort [to produce sarin] may have begun as early as late 2012. Abu Muhammad al-Hamawi, the [Nusra Front] emir for Hamah, was attempting to obtain phosphorous trichloride, a key sarin precursor, in December 2012. We cannot definitively connect this to the sarin cell, but it could very well be linked.”
Saudi’s ‘southern strategy’
According to US-based, regime-change advocate Charles Lister and Swedish journalist Aron Lund, Abu Muhammad al-Hamawi is also known as Sheikh Saleh al-Hamawi, a Syrian from the town of Halfaya in Hama. He was one of six founders of the Nusra Front and a recipient of Saudi support.
The timeframe in December 2012, when Hamawi was purportedly seeking sarin precursors, coincides with the period when Prince Bandar bin Sultan — the well-connected former Saudi ambassador to Washington — oversaw the implementation of Saudi intelligence’s “southern strategy” to shift the focus of the conflict towards Damascus.
Bandar had assumed the position of director of Saudi intelligence in mid-2012 and established an operations center in Jordan to covertly direct efforts against the Syrian government. He came into his role with guns blazing: on July 18, armed elements turned their sights to the capital city, beginning with the Damascus bombing of Syria’s National Security headquarters, which killed key officials in Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s inner circle.
The New York Times reported that in November 2012, a “cataract of weapons” procured by Saudi intelligence began flowing from Jordan into Syria. While the weapons were publicly presented as going to so-called “moderates” in the Free Syrian Army (FSA), US officials acknowledged that many of them ended up in the hands of “hard-line Islamic Jihadists.”
In February 2013, the Washington Post interviewed Hamawi, identifying him as an FSA rather than a Nusra commander (the FSA and Nusra collaborated closely and, in many cases, were indistinguishable).
Hamawi suggested his units had received weapons shipments in previous weeks from Saudi Arabia as part of Bandar’s southern strategy while stating that “Deraa and Damascus are the key fronts on the revolution, and Damascus is where it is going to end.”
According to a leaked NSA document, Prince Bandar’s subordinate, National Security Council deputy chief Prince Salman bin Sultan, provided 120 tons of explosives and other weaponry to opposition forces, giving them direct instructions to “light up Damascus” and “flatten” the airport in March 2013.
Regiment 111
In December 2012, several jihadist groups spearheaded by the Nusra Front captured a Syrian army base in the Aleppo countryside known as Regiment 111. The base contained stocks of mustard gas, chlorine, and sarin, which Nusra seized. Katibat al-Muhajireen, an Islamist armed group of foreign fighters supported by British intelligence, also participated in the capture of Regiment 111.
It is highly probable that US intelligence was aware of Nusra’s acquisition of these chemical weapons. On 7 December, 2012, just two days before the base’s fall, Syria Deeply, a platform funded by the US government, reported that, according to an Arab diplomat, US contractors were operating on the ground in Syria with the mission of monitoring the status of the country’s chemical weapons stockpiles.
The diplomat said there “are 24-hour Skype links connecting the US with rebel brigades to enhance monitoring of chemical weapons sites on the ground.”
Just as jihadists backed by Saudi and western intelligence were about to acquire sarin (or the components to create sarin) from Regiment 111, US officials began floating accusations that the Syrian government was preparing to use chemical weapons. US officials also cited these claims as a justification for possible western military intervention.
Predictably, the Syrian opposition soon asserted that the Syrian government had employed chemical weapons. On 25 December 2012, a Syrian army defector claimed to Al-Jazeera that the Syrian government had used a nerve gas resembling sarin in an attack on Homs. However, the evidence supporting these allegations was so flimsy that even US officials promptly dismissed them.
Nonetheless, Prince Bandar saw an opportunity in this incident. In February 2013, he tried to persuade the White House that Syria’s Assad had crossed US President Barack Obama’s “red line” by employing chemical weapons.
US response and arming opposition
Several months later, evidence began to emerge suggesting that the Nusra Front had managed to obtain or produce some low-grade sarin. On 19 March, 2013, a rocket containing chemical agents was launched at the town of Khan al-Assal in Aleppo province, resulting in the death of 25 individuals.
Notably, among the casualties, 16 were Syrian soldiers, a detail that raised doubts about Assad’s culpability in the attack.
On 5 May that year, UN investigator Carla del Ponte said she had gathered testimony indicating that sarin had been used by “the opposition, the rebels, not by the government authorities.”
Bolstering del Ponte’s claim, Reuters reported on 30 May that Turkish authorities detained 12 Nusra Front militants in possession of 4.5lb of sarin gas, while a Nusra fighter who helped capture the Regiment 111 base later speculated that Nusra had carried out the Khan al-Assal attack with the sarin captured at the base.
When the Syrian army and allied-Hezbollah forces captured the strategic town of Qusair on the Lebanon border in June, officials in Washington began to panic, believing that drastic measures were needed “to stem the tide of Assad victories.”
Amid calls for a no fly zone in Syria from prominent US lawmakers and the media, the Pentagon announced it was sending F-16s and Patriot missile batteries to Jordan. Although Obama refused direct military intervention, his administration issued a special assessment claiming the Syrian government had used chemical weapons and announcing that the US would now arm extremist opposition groups directly.
But for Prince Bandar, this was not enough. Reuters reported that Saudi officials, including the late King Abdullah and Prince Bandar, “want more US involvement … They are really worried about the attitude in Washington.”
Foreign support for Syrian ‘rebels’
On 20 June, the DIA memo revealed by Seymour Hersh was written and distributed, confirming that the Nusra Front was seeking to produce sarin. But this information was ignored, and western officials continued to make new fabricated claims that Damascus had carried out chemical attacks, including in Saraqeb, Sheikh Maqsoud, and Jobar.
It is in this context that Prince Bandar, with the help of his counterparts in US and Israeli intelligence, prepared to launch a massive “rebel” assault on Damascus.
The French newspaper La Figaro reported that according to its sources, the “first Syrian contingents trained in guerrilla warfare by the Americans in Jordan have been in action since mid-August in southern Syria, in the Deraa region. A first group of 300 men, probably supported by Israeli and Jordanian commandos, as well as by men from the CIA, would have crossed the border on August 17. A second would have joined them on the 19th.”
The stage was now set for a US air campaign to aid Bandar’s jihadist groups amassing near Damascus. However, a trigger was still needed to force Obama to authorize it.
The Ghouta attack
On the morning of 21 August 2013, a flurry of videos appeared on social media allegedly showing the aftermath of a mass chemical attack carried out by the Syrian army in Ghouta, killing 1,429 civilians, including 456 children.
The New York Times reported that “Within hours, [Obama] administration officials began signaling that they were preparing for an immediate military strike to punish the Syrian government,” reversing Obama’s previous reluctance.
The following day, 22 August, La Figaro published its report about the jihadist offensive on Damascus, stating “the anti-Assad operation has begun.”
However, the US president soon reversed his decision to authorize military intervention after Director of National Intelligence James Clapper warned that the evidence linking Assad to the deadly attack was “not a slam dunk.”
In the absence of a wide-scale US bombing campaign, the armed offensive on Damascus failed after 15 days of brutal fighting.
In their interim report released in September 2013, UN investigators later confirmed sarin had been used in Ghouta.
The UN team did not have a mandate to attribute responsibility for the Ghouta attack, however, a detailed analysis published in 2021 by Rootclaim showed that the Saudi-backed Liwa al-Islam fired the sarin-filled rockets in Ghouta – not the Syrian army.
Furthermore, the conclusive UN report released in December 2013 corroborated that jihadist groups had indeed used small quantities of sarin in attacks against Syrian soldiers in the Damascus suburb of Jobar on 24 August and in Ashrafiah Sahnaya in the capital’s countryside on 25 August.
Continued false flag attacks
Jordanian journalist Yahya Ababneh visited Ghouta days after the attack and interviewed several opposition fighters, their families, local doctors, and civilians. According to his sources, local armed groups received chemical weapons via Saudi Prince Bandar and were responsible for carrying out the Ghouta attack.
Ababneh reported that fighters he spoke with “reported that their salaries came from the Saudi government” and that “Prince Bandar is referred to as ‘al-Habib’ or ‘the lover’ by al-Qaeda militants fighting in Syria.”
One month later, a senior UN official who dealt directly with Syrian affairs claimed that according to fighters in Ghouta, “Saudi intelligence was behind the attacks, and unfortunately nobody will dare say that.”
Syria Deeply reported in December 2012 that as part of a special task force sent to Jordan, the “US and its allies have hired contractors to train some Syrian rebel brigades in chemical weapons security.”
After Ghouta, jihadist groups supported by the CIA, Saudi intelligence, and Mossad continued to stage false flag chemical attacks blamed on Assad, most notably in Khan Sheikhoun in April 2017, and Douma in April 2018.
Saudi-funded sedition
The Saudi role in such false flags was further illustrated in March 2018 when the Syrian army liberated some Eastern Ghouta farmlands and discovered a well-equipped chemical laboratory run by Saudi-backed Liwa al-Islam (by then known as Jaish al-Islam).
The Cradle columnist Sharmine Narwani visited the lab that year and reported that it was packed with equipment, chemical substances, and munitions. The equipment included a US-manufactured gas compressor for which Saudi Arabia put out tenders in 2015.
In the nine months leading up to the Ghouta false-flag incident, Nusra operatives were actively seeking sarin precursors in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, a Nusra commander in Syria, identified by the DIA as being involved in seeking sarin precursors, had received Saudi military support.
Saudi intelligence was not only arming and financing jihadist groups but was also issuing direct orders for attacks in Damascus. Liwa al-Islam fired the sarin-filled rockets at Ghouta at a critical juncture when a major offensive on Damascus, planned by Saudi intelligence in cooperation with the CIA and Mossad, was about to commence.
The broader pattern of false flag chemical attacks blamed on the Syrian government, such as those in Khan Sheikhoun and Douma, further underscores the potential Saudi role in such operations.
Considering the documented evidence, it becomes increasingly implausible to suggest that Liwa al-Islam acted alone in the Ghouta false-flag attack. The incident resulted in the deaths of numerous Syrian civilians, including women and children, and nearly led to western military intervention, aligning with the objectives of US, Saudi, and allied intelligence agencies seeking to overthrow the Syrian government.
Nagorno-Karabakh and the failure of Armenia’s ‘colour revolution’
By Paul Robinson | Canadian Dimension | September 22, 2023
Thursday was Armenia’s independence day. This year, however, there was very little for Armenians to celebrate. Just one day earlier, the authorities of the region of Nagorno-Karabakh had in effect capitulated to Azerbaijan following a brief offensive by the Azerbaijani armed forces. The future of the region’s predominantly Armenian population remains uncertain, but the province’s complete integration into Azerbaijan is now inevitable and dreams of an Armenian Karabakh seem to be permanently shattered.
Despite its Armenian population, Nagorno-Karabakh became part of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic as a result of a decision by the Soviet government in the early 1920s following the Bolshevik conquest of the Caucasus. Armenians, however, never reconciled themselves to this decision and when the Soviet Union began to unravel in the late 1980s, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh lobbied for their territory to be transferred to the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. After the dissolution of the USSR, newly independent Armenia and Azerbaijan fought what became known as the First Karabakh War, which resulted in an Armenian victory. Nagorno-Karabakh became de facto independent, while Armenia gained control of a swathe of Azerbaijani territory around it.
Subsequent diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan failed. Azerbaijan bided its time, built up its armed forces, and in 2020 launched the Second Karabakh War, recapturing part of Nagorno-Karabakh. Poised to recapture the rest, the Azerbaijanis halted their offensive after the Russian Federation brokered a ceasefire which saw the Armenians hand back the Azerbaijani territory around Nagorno-Karabakh. This kept what remained of the latter out of Azerbaijani control but dependent on a narrow corridor through Azerbaijani territory protected by Russian peacekeepers.
In this way, the Russians saved Nagorno-Karabakh from complete conquest. This did not, however, earn them much gratitude from Armenia’s Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, who had come to power in 2018 as a result of what has been called a “colourless colour revolution.” Since the 2020 war, Pashinyan’s relations with Russia have gone from bad to worse, and following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Pashinyan and his government have sought to reduce their dependence on Moscow, hinting that they would leave the Collective Security Treaty Organization, of which both Armenia and Russia are members, and more recently announcing the holding of joint military exercises with the United States. Last year Pashinyan also caused a stir by seeming to recognize Azeri sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan has now stepped in to exploit the situation, launching an attack on Nagorno-Karabakh that after just one day of fighting forced the Karabakh authorities to agree to completely disarm. The region’s reintegration into Azerbaijan is now bound to follow. Artin DerSimonian of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft comments that Azerbaijan’s actions are a direct consequence of the fact that “the Russian army is pinned down in Ukraine” as well as of “Prime Minister Pashinyan’s unwillingness to directly engage Armenian forces in this fight.” Azerbaijan’s victory seems complete.
Pashinyan and his followers are attempting to blame Russia for this debacle, claiming that Moscow allowed Azerbaijan to recapture Nagorno-Karabakh in order to discredit Pashinyan, remove him from power, and install a pro-Moscow Armenian government. The thesis is an odd one. There is, after all, no good reason why Russia should fight Azerbaijan when the Armenian government itself has proven unwilling to do so. Absurdity has, however, never stopped people believing conspiracy theories, and this one may help Pashinyan deflect blame to some degree. Whether it helps him enough, though, remains to be seen.
For while some Armenians may blame Russia, many others point the finger at Pashinyan himself. Dr Pietro Shakarian, a postdoctoral fellow at the Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg, argues that “Pashinyan’s premiership has been a disaster for the Armenian people.” Until recently, says Shakarian, “Pashinyan was able to cling to power by relying on an array of manipulative populist tactics. However… his recent recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan became widely viewed among Armenians as an unambiguous act of betrayal. … Today he is almost universally disliked in the country.”
Pashinyan came to power on the back of a wave of protests against the corruption of what was called the “Karabakh clan,” a group of Armenian politicians who originated from Nagorno-Karabakh and who had run Armenia for many years. These included Presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. According to Dr. Benyamin Poghosyan, Chairman of the Centre for Political and Economic Strategic Studies in Yerevan, “hatred towards the ‘Karabakh clan’ started to be projected on Karabakh as a whole.” Consequently, many Armenians were reluctant to fight to defend it.
Beyond that, Pashinyan gave the impression of wanting to rid Armenia of the problem of Karabakh, viewing it as an impediment to his desire to turn Armenia politically westwards. Poghosyan notes that Pashinyan’s “primary goal is to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, which will decrease the dependence on Russia and bring Armenia closer to the West. From this perspective, Nagorno-Karabakh was more a liability than an asset.” Pashinyan’s detractors, therefore, accuse him of betraying the people of Karabakh in pursuit of his broader pro-Western and anti-Russian political ambitions.
Dr. Shakarian comments that the loss of Karabakh puts into question “Russia’s whole position in the Caucasus.” “Many Western war hawks understand this,” and will seek to exploit it, he says. By contrast, Dr. Poghosyan is somewhat more ambiguous about the likely geopolitical consequences, arguing that it is harder for Armenia to turn westwards in practice than it is in theory. According to Poghosyan, “The only way for Armenia to move out of the Russian orbit and move towards the West is to accept some protection from Turkey and, in a midterm perspective, replace Russia with Turkey as a primary economic and security partner of Armenia. It will result in at least de facto Turkish and Azerbaijani control over the southern part of Armenia. … Will Pashinyan go for that? No clear answer exists.”
Equally unclear is Pashinyan’s political fate. Both Poghosyan and Shakarian express some doubt that the protestors who have now come out to demand Pashinyan’s resignation will be able to sustain their protests for long. Pashinyan himself, meanwhile, is insisting that he will remain in power. What is clear, though, is that like so many other so-called colour revolutions, the Armenian revolution of 2018 has not ended well.
Paul Robinson is a professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa and a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy. He is the author of numerous works on Russian and Soviet history, including Russian Conservatism, published by Northern Illinois University Press in 2019.
Russia-Turkiye-Qatar Grain Deal: ‘Humanitarian Program’ to Shore Up Poorest Nations
By Oleg Burunov – Sputnik – 08.09.2023
A new grain agreement initiated by Moscow may partly add to resolving the problem of hunger across the globe, Russian analysts have told Sputnik.
The Russian Foreign Ministry has heaped praise on a joint project between Moscow, Ankara and Doha on Russian grain supplies to Turkiye.
The ministry said in a statement that “the project to deliver one million tons of grain from Russia for processing in Turkiye with subsequent free transportation to the poorest countries is of utmost importance.”
The statement came after Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko told reporters that Moscow and Ankara had reached an agreement.
“This is a good initiative, and the right process,” Moscow-based political analyst Alexander Asafov said, describing the deal as an example of international cooperation that “takes into account promoting Turkiye’s interests with the help of Qatar,” which “will act as the agreement’s financial contributor.”
Asafov noted that although the deal would unlikely become a “game-changer” in terms of tackling the problem of hunger globally, it “will, of course, improve the situation in those countries where grain will be delivered to.”
When asked about the prospect of the initiative, the analyst said that the agreement “confirms the logic of a multipolar world, where the parties, without fear of sanctions or other pressure, can conclude two, three or more deals, contrary to the opinion of the side that until recently considered itself global cop,” an apparent nod to the US.
Asafov was echoed by Victor Nadein-Raevskiy, a senior researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences, who underscored that Russia initiated the Moscow-Ankara-Doha initiative after the suspension of the Black Sea Grain Deal. According to him, Moscow offered the accord proceeding from the fact that developing countries, who are “going through really great food problems, should not suffer.”
Actually, “this agreement is no longer a deal, but a humanitarian program to deliver grain – to be more exact, flour – to those countries that are in need of it,” Nadein-Raevskiy stressed. He added that transportation-related expenses would be on Qatar, who “enthusiastically joined the agreement.”
Touching upon the prospects of the initiative, the expert pointed out that first and foremost, it’s necessary to assess the effectiveness of the project as such.
“If we and our partners in Turkiye and Qatar manage to implement our plans, namely, if the deal is successful, then, of course, Russia will use its great opportunities on grain exports market,” he said.
Scheme’s Details to Follow
The issue was on the agenda of talks between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Russia’s Black Sea resort of Sochi on September 4.
“We expect that in the near future we will begin discussions with all parties to work out all the technical aspects of the scheme of such supplies,” Grushko said, adding that the technical details include, among other issues, logistics and finances.
Erdogan, for his part, signaled Ankara’s readiness to prepare its own proposals on the matter and to “find a solution in the near future” that will meet the expectations of all parties to the talks.
Nadein-Raevskiy noted in this vein that Turkiye is “ready” for flour supplies to developing countries “at very low prices or on the free-of-charge basis.”
“One should not think that Turkiye is a country that does everything only for its own benefit. While strengthening Turkish positions in Africa and beyond ahead of the COVID-19 pandemic, Turkiye – as far as I remember – spent up to $3 billion a year on humanitarian programs,” the expert emphasized.
The deal comes after Moscow suspended its participation in the Black Sea grain deal, also known as the Black Sea Grain Initiative, on July 18. The Kremlin has repeatedly emphasized that the Turkiye and UN-mediated grain deal’s component on facilitating Russian grain and fertilizer exports was not fulfilled, specifically with regard to reconnecting Russian banks to SWIFT and unblocking the Tolyatti-Odessa ammonia pipeline.
Moscow also pointed out that just three percent of the grain shipped out of Ukraine under the agreement actually went to countries in need in Africa and Asia, with the vast majority instead ending up in Europe and Turkiye.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov later stressed that the proposals made by the United Nations regarding the resumption of the Black Sea Grain Initiative lack guarantees when it comes to Russia’s concerns.
SDF ‘frustrated’ with US silence over repeated Turkish attacks
The Cradle | August 8, 2023
The US-backed Kurdish militia, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), has become increasingly frustrated with Washington over its failure to condemn continued Turkish attacks against the group, Al-Akhbar daily reported on 8 August.
The Kurdish group has released several statements this month “denouncing the silence” of the US coalition in Syria, and “holding them responsible” for the surge in attacks against their leaders.
According to the newspaper, Kurdish officials held a recent interview in which they, for the first time, explicitly condemned US silence on Ankara’s strikes.
The widening of the gap between Washington and its Kurdish proxy can be attributed to three factors, Kurdish sources told Al-Akhbar.
The first is that some in the SDF continue to see Washington as a permanent partner, while the US wishes to “limit” its relationship with the Kurdish group. The report explains it as Washington’s “keenness not to disturb its relationship with Turkiye.”
The second is the US failure to help the SDF implement its goal of full self-determination and autonomy in northern Syria.
The third factor is viewed by the SDF as the “most dangerous,” and is the US plan to forge new alliances with the Arab tribes of the region – which, according to earlier reports, may include merging SDF forces with Arab tribal troops organized by Washington.
The SDF has long viewed such a plan as a threat to its Kurdish identity.
According to the Al-Akhbar report, a leader in the Deir Ezzor Military Council – a council of Arab tribesmen organized by the US – recently launched a rebellion against the SDF with support from Washington.
The Arab tribal leader, Abu Khawla, “would not have dared to rebel against the SDF had it not been for the implicit support of the US,” the report adds.
On 3 August, a Turkish drone strike resulted in the killing of four SDF members.
The following day, the SDF released a statement urging Washington to take a clear and final stance on Ankara’s continued strikes against its Kurdish ally.
With this distance from the US, some have suggested that the SDF has been torn on who to depend on for its future in the country.
As a result, it has recently held several rounds of talks with Damascus. While failing to reach any agreements regarding its wish to maintain autonomy, the SDF remains on the same page as Bashar al-Assad’s government when it comes to the Turkish occupation of Syria.
In the past, the two sides have coordinated against the Turkish presence in Syria.
SDF chief Mazloum Abdi in April expressed openness to potentially merging his forces with the Syrian army at some point in the future.
Wildfires in Syria used as a weapon of war
By Steven Sahiounie | Mideast Discourse | July 30, 2023
Wildfires broke out on July 25 in Latakia province in northwest Syria and are still burning amid new fires being started. The fires spread quickly by a sudden unusual wind which whipped up. The whole country, and the adjacent Mediterranean region, is in a heat-wave which sets the stage for such a devastating fire burning crops, forests and homes. However, this was not a chance wildfire, but was an act of terrorism.
General Jalal Dawoud, Head of the Fire Department in Latakia, says the fire was man-made. This was determined because the origin of the fire was not in one place, but was started in scattered areas all at the same time in daylight hours.
After the security forces began their investigation, it was found that the fires were started by drones originating from Idlib, under the occupation of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, formerly Jibhat al-Nusra, the Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria.
Turkey is illegally occupying Idlib as they protect the terrorists under the command of Mohammed Jolani, formerly allied with Abu Baker Al Baghdadi, the head of ISIS who was killed in Idlib by President Trump.
The terrorists have been attacking the fire fighters and vehicles. Bassem Bakar, a water tanker driver, was killed when the terrorists targeted his vehicle near Deir Hanna and Rabiah. Two other men with him were injured.
Turkey is well known for the manufacture of drones, and has been selling drones to Ukraine recently.
On July 25, a fire department vehicle drove over a previously planted mine on Zgharo Mountain, near the town of Maskita, but without injuries. This area was occupied by the terrorists now in Idlib during the 2015 period before they were driven east to Idlib.
The Mayor of Latakia, Amer Hallal, said fire depratments from many areas came to fight the fires, and a Russian water tanker airplane came to battle the fires. Civilians were evacuated from homes and farms and taken to a safe area where they were given humanitarian aid.
The fire raged in Rabiah which sits on a road that connects directly to Idlib. Other areas burning are Ghamam, Sarsekiah, Ein Zarkha, Deir Hanna, Jib Alahmar, Sed Bradoon, and Jebal al Zahra.
A young soldier who volunteered to fight the fires, Mounif Sebry Hassoun, died while fighting the fire due to suffocation in Meshkita. He is from village of Wadi Khelah, in the suburb of Jeblah
The Syrian government, Syrian Red Crescent are coordinating efforts to put out the fires and assisting the humanitarian needs of the affected civilians. Local restaurants have been donating meals to the fire fighters. The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and the Syrian Red Crescent are putting out fires in Rabiah, which is the front line against the terrorists in Idlib.
The foreign policy of the US and EU have kept the status quo in Idlib. 3 million civilians there are kept as human shields by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Turkey prevents the SAA and the Russian military from freeing the civilians kept as hostages to an international game of chess played by America.
International aid organizations, such as the UN, Doctors Without Borders, Save the Children and others deliver all the humanitarian aid to the civilians, while Jolani and his terrorists receive all the aid and distribute it to their cronies first, and sell whatever they horde in a huge shopping mall Jolani and partners built.
Idlib is an agricultural province with farmers and terrorists selling olives and olive oil to Turkish businesses.
The US, EU and UN are enablers of Jolani and the terrorists under his command. Recently, Jolani hung people in Idlib that he perceived were enemies. He and his men oppress women by not allowing social programs directed at women’s issues. The terrorists rule under Islamic Law and in the case of a rape, a woman must present the court with three men who are witnesses to the rape in order to get a conviction. In this situation, rapes go unreported as there is no chance for justice.
Drones can be used for humanitarian purposes, for example: delivering medicines to a remote village. However, drones can also deliver a deadly payload in a war, or attack, and now in Syria they are being used to start wildfires in the heat of summer amid dry winds which spread the deadly fires.
The world responded to the massive 7.8 earthquake on February 6 in Syria and Turkey. Humanitarian aid poured in from Arab countries mainly, with the US boycotting all aid to Syria, with the sole exception of Idlib and the occupying terrorists there.
The earthquake aid has long ago stopped, and although many friends of Syria have asked the US and EU to lift the sanctions which prevent all rebuilding and recovery in Syria from years of war and the earthquake, still there has been no move to lift any sanctions.
Recently, a list of the world’s poorest nations was unveiled with Syria tying for the worse place along with Yemen and Afghanistan. 12 years of armed conflict, the COVID-19 pandemic, the 7.8 earthquake of the century, and now wildfires being delivered by terrorists supported by the US and NATO.
Jolani and his US supported terrorists have no red lines they cannot cross. They are heartless criminals holding the northwest of Syria in fear of their next move.
US mulling multi-front offensive in Syria in collaboration with Takfiri terrorists
By Robert Inlakesh | Press TV | July 29, 2023
The US military is readying approximately 2,500 service members for deployment in the West Asian region, as its proxy forces in Syria’s northeast and al-Tanf areas seek potential alliances with Takfiri terrorists in the northwestern Idlib province.
With tensions boiling between the Syrian government-aligned forces and the US occupation troops in the war-ravaged Arab country, it might be a sign of more violence on the way, observers believe.
According to a report published in New York local media in mid-July, some 2,500 10th Mountain Division soldiers were being sent “off to combat” in Iraq and Syria.
It is not exactly clear how many soldiers from the light-infantry division will be dispatched for operations in the two West Asian countries.
However, the number of forces being sent rings true with a report from the Turkish newspaper, Yeni Safak, that claimed Washington was preparing to send 2,500 troops to northeast Syria.
The US currently maintains, at least publicly, that it has around 900 active-duty service members deployed to Syria, a number which is speculated to be much higher.
If the US is indeed sending additional forces to the region, it could indicate that its objectives have slightly changed in the northeast of the country.
At this time, the Americans occupy roughly a third of Syrian territory and do so without any congressional approval, through its occupation – which it uses the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to maintain – it holds hostage the most fertile agricultural lands and roughly 90 percent of Syria’s natural gas from the Damascus government.
Over the past years, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its allies based in the Deir Ezzor province, have grown tired of continued US troop presence inside their territory.
On March 23, the US Department of Defense (DoD) announced “retaliatory strikes” against targets in Deir Ezzor, following a UAV strike against its forces in al-Hasakah.
“Earlier today, a US contractor was killed and five US service members and one additional US contractor were wounded after a one-way unmanned aerial vehicle struck a maintenance facility on a coalition base near Hasakah in northeast Syria at approximately 1:38 p.m. local time,” stated the announcement.
The US coalition airstrikes triggered an unusually extensive response from the SAA and its allies, which fired back and inflicted six traumatic brain injuries, according to the US reports.
At the time, back in March, a Syrian political source told me that the recent move by Syria and its allies was a “direct response” to a wave of Israeli escalation against the country that began last year.
“If you remember in August of 2022, there was a similar stand-off between the Americans and resistance forces in northeastern Syria,” he said, pleading anonymity.
I was also informed by a second source that an order had been given at the time to directly target Americans and not just fire warning shots. However, no further details were divulged.
In mid-July, the US began fortifying its occupation bases surrounding the Conoco and al-Omar oil and gas fields, with forces belonging to their SDF proxies.
According to an Al-Mayadeen source at the time, Washington informed the SDF and its affiliated militias “to prepare for any attack on the region from the Western banks of the Euphrates River” and the US “tasked the Free Syrian Army to mobilize, to face any attack on the 55-kilometer area in Al-Tanf”.
Reports that surfaced on pro-opposition ‘Syria TV’ indicated that the Idlib province-based terrorist group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, had hosted several SDF delegations from northeast Syria over the span of months.
The two parties had allegedly concluded agreements on the transport of fuel from Syria’s north-east to Idlib, which appears to have come after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham began facing mounting pressure from Turkiye in northern Aleppo.
The talks between the dominant Idlib Takfiri terrorist group and the SDF apparently explored the possibility of a joint Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-SDF civilian administration with the SDF reportedly claiming that the US supports the idea of unifying the two militant strongholds.
A source who has intimate knowledge of the current security situation in Syria, and who chose to remain anonymous, told the Press TV website that “these moves are complicating, even if this does not amount to an offensive, the only thing that will change the current scenario is a Turkiye-Syria normalization and a possible anti-SDF operation”.
What is also of interest to these developments is that US-Russia relations inside Syria are also deteriorating, with Washington accusing a Russian fighter jet of damaging a US drone on July 23; allegedly using flares to cause the damage.
The terrorist stronghold of Idlib and the US proxies in both northeastern Syria and al-Tanf are seemingly coming together, at a time when American troops are being deployed to the area amid tensions between their occupying forces and the Syrian government’s military.
A possible way forward, in the event that the US carries out a new offensive strategy against the SAA and its allies in Syria, is through the possible normalization of ties between Ankara and Damascus, according to observers.
Despite there being no breakthrough between Turkiye and Syria, the two states are engaged in a dialogue that is aimed at a restoration of ties between them.
Experts say the reason why this is so crucial to combating any potential American plots against the Syrian government and its allies is that Ankara’s cooperation with Damascus could bring an end to many of the various territorial issues in the country.
Turkiye currently occupies two small pockets in the north of Syria, while it actively threatens an offensive against the Kurdish SDF, which it accuses of being run by the YPG and hence a terrorist threat on its border.
If Turkiye forces an incursion into northeastern Syria, dealing another significant blow to the Kurdish armed groups there, it will also force the US to again abandon its SDF proxies, as happened in 2018 and 2019.
If the US withdraws temporarily, this would provide the perfect opportunity for the SAA and its allies to cross the Euphrates River and liberate their oil fields, which the SDF would not likely be capable of holding by themselves.
This is why, in the event that Washington is implementing a new strategy to further punish Syria and its people, a Turkish military offensive may be the simplest way to quickly put an end to it.
What is behind the current tension in Turkish-Iranian relations?
By Alexandr Svaranc – New Eastern Outlook – 16.07.2023
Turkey and Iran continue to be important Middle Eastern nations. Due to their geographical proximity, imperial past, violent rivalry, theological tensions (between Sunnism and Shiism), and, of course, the continuous divergence of geopolitical interests, both nations have a rich history of relations.
There were multiple Turkish-Persian clashes and wars, with various interruptions and varying degrees of success, during the Ottoman and Persian empires. Regarding the significance of the harem in the Ottoman Empire, historians have observed that, unlike the Turkish-Persian conflicts, which occasionally came to an end during periods of truce, the harem wars continued unabatedly. The reasons for these wars were varied, with religion often becoming a justification for the ambitions of Istanbul or Tehran. As a rule, it was a struggle for the right to own border territories from the Caucasus to Asia Minor, for the right to control strategic trade and military communications (for example, the area between Tigris and Euphrates, Eastern or Western Armenia and Syria).
In fact, such a confrontation lasted from the Middle Ages until World War I. The long military and political conflict between the Persians and Turks in such important regions, where the interests of the leading powers of Europe and Russia were represented, led to the establishment of a special international border commission with the participation of Britain and Russia at the turn of the twentieth century to facilitate the delimitation of Persia and the Ottoman Empire. But because London and St. Petersburg had their own distinct interests in the Near and Middle East, this commission never accomplished its mission.
There were also more stable times between Iran and Turkey in the new era. After World War II, from 1955 to 1979, Tehran and Ankara became even politico-military allies in the CENTO (Central Treaty Organization or Baghdad Pact) regional bloc, which emerged thanks to the Middle East diplomacy of Britain and the United States. While the Shah’s regime in Iran remained an ally of the West and Iranian oil and gas were exploited in the interests of London and Washington, Tehran was a regional partner of NATO member Turkey.
The situation changed after the February 1979 revolution in Iran, as the overthrow of the pro-American Shah’s regime and the ascension to power of the Shiite mullocracy brought about a major change in the disposition of forces in the Middle East. Since then, there have been renewed notes of mistrust and tension in Iranian-Turkish relations across the Middle East and global agenda, some of which remain relevant to this day.
It cannot be said that pragmatism in the approaches of Turkey and Iran has lost importance after the overthrow of Shah Reza Pahlavi. Despite harsh anti-Iranian sanctions, Ankara was forced to retain trading with Iran and keeps shipping gas in varying volumes due to its limited own energy supplies.
With the change of political regime in Iran after the 1979 revolution in Kemalist Turkey, where the secular regime suppressed the sprouts of Islamic revival, the politicization of Islam (albeit of Shiite origin) in the 1980s and 1990s still influenced the public consciousness of the Turkish masses in favor of the growing role of religion in the state.
The Kurdish issue remains a common concern between Turkey and Iran. Ankara and Tehran oppose all forms of Kurdish statehood and threats of ethnic separatism. However, in the situation of the Kurds after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran there have been some changes. Some experts believe, not unreasonably, that the phenomenon of the Shiite revolution in February 1979 has both external and internal justifications.
The external reason was to prevent the leading Anglo-Saxon countries (the US and Britain) from monopolizing and plundering Iran’s strategic resources (oil and gas), as well as to prevent the corrosive influence of Western pop culture on the minds of Iranian youth and the general population. The internal reason, however, was related to the idea of preventing the weakening and collapse of Persian statehood under the threat of ethnic separatism with different colors (Kurds, Azeris, Baluchis). At the same time, Islam, namely political Shiism, assumed the religious consolidation of Iranian society regardless of ethnic origin.
Following the revolution’s victory, Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini summoned Mustafa Barzani, the leader of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, then in exile, to Tehran for a final settlement of the Kurdish crisis on an Islamic basis. According to some reports, such an agreement was accepted by a Kurdish politician, but he never made it to Tehran. CIA handlers then announced an emergency surgery on Mustafa Barzani, but the surgery ended in his death.
The main contradictions between Tehran and Ankara include Turkey’s continued membership in NATO and Shiite-Sunni religious differences between different madhhabs. At the same time, as key countries in the Middle East region, it is natural that Turkey and Iran have different approaches on a number of regional topics (including the Syrian crisis, the situation in Libya and Iraq, and the relationship with Pakistan). The adjacent territories of the South Caucasus and Central Asia occupy a distinctive place in this package of contradictions following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the parade of sovereignties of post-Soviet states.
First, Iran is concerned about the renaissance of Turkey’s pan-Turkic and pan-Turanist ambitions toward the Turkic countries of the CIS, which could seriously weaken Iran’s position if the Turan project succeeds.
Second, Tehran watches with great caution the geo-economic projects in the Caspian energy region, which with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the weakening of Russia got a start and developed thanks to the joint initiatives of Turkey and its NATO allies (primarily, the UK and the US). At the same time, this concern of the Persian state is determined not only, or rather, not so much by the considerations of the new direction of oil and gas exports to Turkey as by Ankara’s plans to create alternative energy transit routes bypassing Russia and Iran to bring exporters from Turkic countries to world markets (especially to Europe) and turn the Turkish territory into a major hub. In other words, Iran, as an oil and gas-rich country, is concerned about the geopolitical consequences of transformations in the South Caucasus and Central Asia in favor of the strengthening of Turkey, the United States and Britain.
Third, taking into account the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem that has formed on Iran’s northern borders, Tehran is anxiously observing the trend of Israel showing up along the Iranian-Azerbaijani border line on the Arax River, the increased intelligence presence of the Mossad and Aman in the same Azerbaijan with the approval of NATO member Turkey.
Fourth, there is now a certain geopolitical rivalry between Turkey and Iran, with a religious connotation in as yet predominantly Shiite Azerbaijan. Given that the Azerbaijani authorities have based their relations with Turkey on the pan-Turkic slogan and the principle of “one nation, two states,” Iran notes the active political persecution of Azerbaijani Shiites (including often with accusations of spying for IRI) by Baku. Moreover, IRGC sources in Azerbaijan note an increasing number of cases of religious interference by Turkey in the Sunnization of Azerbaijani Shiites. Tehran sees all these actions as an attempt by Ankara to weaken the influence of Shiite Iran in this Transcaucasian republic.
After Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s victory in the elections and his visit to Baku, assessing the situation with the Zangezur corridor in Armenia, the Turkish leader, not by chance, stressed that the main reason for blocking this corridor was not Yerevan, but Tehran. Iran indeed publicly through the mouths of Ayatollah Ali Khomenei, President Ibrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian has repeatedly noted that for it the Zangezur corridor remains a “red line,” it is unacceptable to change the borders of neighboring republics of the South Caucasus (in particular, Armenia) and it is important to maintain the direct multi-millenial border of Iran with Armenia.
Tehran does not want NATO to strengthen in the region on the shoulders of its member Turkey, nor does it want to see the Turan project implemented with pan-Turkic content. Otherwise, Iran will be blocked by unfriendly forces on its northern borders, including the emergence of a bridgehead of Zionist Israel on the banks of the Arax River.
With his statement, Erdoğan not only expresses his dissatisfaction with the regional policy of Iran that three Muslim states (Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iran) through the fault of Persians can’t solve the road question peacefully and get economic dividends but actually says that Iran is not allowing the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem to start a war with Armenia again and take by force the Meghri segment of the Zangezur corridor (if not all of Zangezur – Syunik Province) from the latter.
Given that Russia is now forced to engage in the western flank of the geopolitical confrontation with the West in Ukraine and is therefore interested in maintaining a partnership with Turkey for the same transit and out into the world, it cannot strain relations with Ankara in Armenia (Transcaucasus). Iran becomes the main opponent of Turkey in this theater.
In the second half of June 2023, Turkey and Azerbaijan announced the formation of a unified system of control and management of airspace from the Aegean Sea to the Caspian Sea according to NATO standards (the Turkish HAKİM Air Command Control System). The latter is practically capable of establishing airspace control in the South Caucasus region and threatening not only Armenia but also Iran. Given the existence of a common air defense system between Armenia and Russia within the CSTO, such a move by the tandem of Ankara and Baku is in some ways a challenge for Russia’s regional interests as well.
Since the beginning of 2023, trade turnover between Iran and Turkey has decreased by 20%, where the main export commodity for the Turkish side remains gas. Apparently, such a decline in economic relations between these countries was the result of a number of objective and subjective reasons (such as the crisis in the energy market due to anti-Russian sanctions and rising prices, the earthquake and rising inflation in Turkey, the devaluation of the Turkish lira, and Ankara’s pressure on the issue of the Zangezur corridor). In response to Moscow’s proposal to create a gas hub in Turkey, Iran came up with an equally ambitious similar project in the Persian Gulf. All these processes testify to the growing Iranian-Turkish contradictions.
Moreover, the information about the ongoing closed-door talks between Iran and the USA on the subject of the deblocking of Iranian assets in exchange for American prisoners and, most importantly, about the end of the “tanker war” between Tehran and Washington in the waters of the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman and the export of Iranian oil to world markets (as we know, in the USA itself there is a rise in gasoline prices and an increasing need for oil) creates additional tension in Turkish politics as well.
The US is not yet interested in the implementation of alternative communications from China to Europe through the territory of Turkey (under the One Belt, One Road Initiative). Perhaps Washington is proposing an Indian project through Iran to Europe as an alternative to Chinese transit. And in this geographic preference of the states, a new confrontation between Iran and Turkey is created.
Accordingly, if Iran develops strategic partnerships with countries such as China and India, and can establish certain relationships with the US administration on the nuclear program and oil exports, Turkey will find it difficult to count on success in a battle with Tehran. Moreover, today’s Iranian authorities are interested in strengthening President Erdoğan’s policy independent of the United States, which makes it possible to weaken Washington’s pressure on the region. These are the complicated patterns of the contemporary geopolitical mosaic in the Greater Middle East.
Aleksandr SVARANTS, PhD in political science, professor.
Sweden’s NATO membership not a done deal – Erdogan aide
RT | July 14, 2023
Türkiye has opened the door to the process of Sweden joining NATO but has not yet given its approval, Omer Celik, spokesman for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ruling AK Party, said on Friday.
In a live broadcast on Haberturk TV, Celik said there was a tripartite memorandum between Türkiye, Sweden and NATO about the preconditions for membership, in which Stockholm pledged to undertake certain steps.
If the Turkish parliament is told that Sweden has produced “a strong satisfactory result” by complying with its obligations, AKP deputies will vote to ratify its membership of the US-led military bloc, Celik told Haberturk.
Asked when this might happen, Celik said “at the next session” of the parliament, meaning not before October or November.
Earlier this week, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said Türkiye had agreed to support Sweden’s application after a months-long delay.
Erdogan had reportedly attempted to tie his approval of Sweden’s membership bid to Türkiye being admitted to the European Union. In return, the US has signaled willingness to unblock a sale of F-16 fighters to Ankara.
Commenting on Türkiye’s relations with the US, Celik said the meeting between Erdogan and US President Joe Biden promised “a new page,” but that remained to be seen. Relations could improve much faster if the US would change its mind about supporting Kurdish-led militants in Syria, Celik noted.
NATO had hoped to admit Sweden and Finland together before the bloc’s summit in Vilnius, Lithuania this week. Finland eventually joined on its own, after Türkiye held up Sweden’s application over concerns that Stockholm was protecting Kurdish organizations that Ankara has labeled as terrorists. The US-dominated bloc technically requires the consensus of all 31 members before admitting new ones.
Erdogan still firmly in NATO bloc despite blackmailing EU
By Ahmed Adel | July 11, 2023
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan urged the European Union on July 9 to open the doors for his country to join the bloc if they want to secure support for Sweden’s accession to NATO. His blackmailing of the EU, which ultimately produced results, comes only days after he controversially broke an agreement with Moscow by releasing neo-Nazi Azov Battalion members under Turkey’s custody to Ukraine.
“Turkey has been waiting at the door of the European Union for over 50 years now, and almost all of the NATO member countries are now members of the European Union. I am making this call to these countries that have kept Turkey waiting at the gates of the European Union for more than 50 years,” Erdogan said. “First, open the way to Turkey’s membership of the European Union, and then we will open it for Sweden, just as we had opened it for Finland.”
Turkey has been an EU member candidate since 1999. Since 2016, negotiations on a visa-free regime between Turkey and the EU have been on hold. The country’s bid for EU membership has been stalled due to democratic backsliding and an unrelenting occupation of the northern portion of EU-member Cyprus since 1974.
Ultimately, Erdogan backflipped just mere hours after issuing his blackmail.
“I’m glad to announce … that President Erdogan has agreed to forward the accession protocol for Sweden to the grand national assembly as soon as possible, and work closely with the assembly to ensure ratification,” said NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg on the eve of the alliance summit in Vilnius, which will be held on July 11-12.
Finland and Sweden applied to join the bloc in May 2022. Finland gained its membership on April 4, 2023, while the Swedes await approval from Hungary and Turkey. As Turkey will never surrender its occupation of northern Cyprus, its EU membership will be forever stalled, making Erdogan’s ultimatum either a desperate action or a calculated manoeuvre to advance other interests.
Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billström told public broadcaster SVT that he expects Turkey will eventually signal that it will let Sweden join the alliance, though he could not say whether that would happen at the NATO summit in the Lithuanian capital. Sweden’s top diplomat said he expects Hungary, which also has not ratified Sweden’s accession, to do so before Turkey.
Turkey and Hungary remain the only NATO members still standing in the way of Sweden becoming the 32nd member of the US-led bloc, with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban strongly signalling he will follow Erdogan’s lead and approve Sweden’s membership only if Turkey does the same.
Now that Erdogan has reportedly unblocked Sweden’s path, the question is what was offered to appease the Turkish leader. Presumably, Erdogan would have only unblocked the accession process with the promise of receiving F-16 fighter jets, advancing EU membership talks without altering domestic oppression and ethnic cleansing abroad, or securing Western funding as the Turkish economy continues to tank with Gulf money all dried up.
The NATO summit will be dominated by how the alliance will see its future relationship with Kiev amid endless efforts by President Volodymyr Zelensky for Ukraine to become a member and a signatory to the mutual defence pact. Evidently, though, Sweden’s situation will also be discussed since Turkey is the main hindrance to their accession.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, for his part, joined a chorus of other European leaders and officials who said Sweden’s NATO membership should not be tied to Ankara’s stalled EU membership bid.
“Sweden meets all the requirements for NATO membership. The other question is one that is not connected with it. And that is why I do not think it should be seen as a connected issue,” the German chancellor said.
Stoltenberg also expressed before announcing Erdogan’s unblocking that the two issues have nothing to do with one another, reminding that while he supports Ankara’s bid for EU membership, it was not one of the conditions in the agreement signed by Turkey, Sweden, and Finland in 2022 at the NATO summit in Madrid.
Despite Erdogan initially adding another condition to Sweden’s accession, it is not a sign that Turkey has gone rogue within NATO, but rather it is the Turkish president blackmailing the alliance and EU to gain advantages for his country – what they are specifically since EU membership is not realistic, remains to be seen.
Erdogan broke a deal he had with Moscow by releasing on July 8, only days before the NATO summit, five Ukrainian Azov Battalion officers, who returned to Ukraine on a presidential plane. The Azov Battalion militants had been prisoners since the battle of Azovstal following the Russian liberation of the port city of Mariupol. Erdogan had no obvious reason for breaking the deal, meaning that he will now want something at the NATO summit for doing this.
Although it may appear that Erdogan has gone rogue by attaching an impossible condition for Sweden to become a NATO member, he is just leveraging to gain some advantage for Turkey. The release of the Azov Battalion members for seemingly no good reason demonstrates that Turkey is still firmly within the NATO bloc.
Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.
US, Turkish-backed militias in Syria boost number of child soldiers in their ranks: UN
The Cradle | June 30, 2023
According to a UN report released on 28 June, the US and Turkish-backed armed groups in Syria have been increasingly recruiting minors into their ranks.
The report claims that the number of children recruited by militant groups in the country has risen from around 800 to over 1,200 since 2020.
It adds that among those recruiting children are the US-backed Kurdish militia, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which oversee control of Syrian oilfields in collaboration with Washington’s occupation forces.
The UN claims that more than 600 of child recruitment cases in Syria are attributed to the SDF and associated Kurdish groups in the country. This is despite the fact that the SDF signed an agreement with the UN in 2019 to end minors’ enlistment.
Over 600 child recruitment cases have also been attributed to the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) coalition of militant groups, which has incorporated fighters from several extremist groups, including ISIS, over the years.
Additionally, the UN says that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly known as the Al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front, has recruited over 380 minors into their ranks.
Twenty-five cases among Syrian government forces and allied militias have allegedly been recorded as well.
Bassam al-Ahmad, executive director of Syrians for Truth and Justice, said that in some cases, children are forcibly conscripted into the ranks of armed groups. He added that some join for religious or ideological beliefs, while others join for the salaries much needed by them or their families.
Ahmad claimed that some children are even sent out of the country to participate as mercenaries in foreign wars.
The enlistment of child soldiers has been an issue for much of the Syrian conflict.
During the recruitment efforts of the Nusra Front between 2013 and 2016, led mainly by Saudi cleric Abdullah al-Muhaysni, scores of teenagers were among the thousands enlisted to fight against the Syrian army. Many of these teenagers were sent on suicide missions.
In 2016, members of a US-backed armed group, the Nour al-Din al-Zinki Movement, were filmed beheading a 12-year-old boy named Abdullah Issa, who they claimed was a fighter in the pro-government Liwa al-Quds militia.
Liwa al-Quds released a statement at the time categorically denying that the boy was a fighter, claiming that he had been residing in an area of Aleppo under the control of armed groups.
In 2019, the Nour al-Din al-Zinki Movement was absorbed by the SNA after being defeated by HTS.
DC Scholars: Ukraine Conflict Shows World Has Grown Weary of US Hegemony
By Ekaterina Blinova – Sputnik – 24.06.2023
Despite having the largest military budget in the world and being the largest operator of military bases abroad, the US is far from being a global hegemon, argues a DC-based think tank Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
Over the past decades Washington has demonstrated a capacity for mass destruction – in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere – but “it has won no more than Pyrrhic victories” which led to the erosion of trust in Pax Americana both at home and abroad, according to Responsible Statecraft scholars.
The US military spending reached $876.9 billion in 2022, while the nation also operates a whopping 750 foreign military bases. Still, Washington is incapable of persuading the Global South to join anti-Russia sanctions over the latter’s special military operation in Ukraine, the think tank remarks. “If hegemony means the capacity to get other countries to comply with one’s demands, the United States is far from being a global hegemon,” the report notes.
Judging from the so-called Pentagon leak, even some US allies and partners demonstrated hesitance and unwillingness to provide the Kiev regime with shells, jets and armored vehicles. Meanwhile, most nations of the Global South shrugged off the US calls for slapping sanctions on Moscow as contradicting their national interests.
US political observers emphasize that six nations in the Global South – namely, India, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa – are set to decide the future of geopolitics and insist that the Biden administration needs to win their hearts and minds. At the same time, European commentators argue that developing nations have the right to remain neutral and non-aligned.
For instance, in June 2022, India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar shredded the West’s claim that New Delhi was “sitting on the fence.” According to the minister, India is entitled to its opinion when it comes to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.
Likewise, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has chosen to collaborate with both the US and China, instead of taking sides. Moreover, ASEAN nations are active participants of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) regardless of Washington’s attempts to maintain its dominance in the region and curb China’s influence in the Asia Pacific.
Per DC scholars, the emerging trend was articulated by Brookings Institution fellow Fiona Hill, former Deputy Assistant to the President of the United States, in May 2023:
“The war in Ukraine is perhaps the event that makes the passing of Pax Americana apparent to everyone. … [Other countries] want to decide, not be told what’s in their interest. In short, in 2023, we hear a resounding no to US domination and see a marked appetite for a world without a hegemon,” she said at a conference in Tallinn, Estonia
According to Hill, the Global South’s resistance to the US and the EU’s demands to slap sanctions on Moscow is nothing short of “an open rebellion.” She noted that “this is a mutiny against what they see as the collective West dominating the international discourse and foisting its problems on everyone else, while brushing aside their priorities on climate change compensation, economic development, and debt relief.”
Western observers also acknowledge that the world’s center of gravity is steadily shifting east, adding that the Biden administration has so far sought to avert this trend by trying to establish “a lasting technological lead over China” and beefing up the US military in Western Pacific.
However, “most developing countries, including emerging powers in the Global South, are no longer willing to make zero-sum choices” between Washington and its geopolitical rivals, DC scholars underscore, urging American policymakers to accept the reality that the US is no longer “the indispensable nation.”
Extremists who left Syria to fight in Ukraine realize journey ‘futile’: Expert
The Cradle | June 21, 2023
Egyptian researcher and political analyst Ahmad Sultan was quoted as saying on 21 June that many of the extremist militants who left Syria for the Ukrainian battlefield last year have realized that the fight against Russia is futile.
“The jihadists have realized that the situation in Ukraine is difficult for them, and that the arena there is not suitable for them, and that their fight against Russia is a lost battle,” Sultan said.
“Among the jihadists who returned [to Syria] recently is the leader Abdel Hakim al-Shishani … he is one of the most prominent leaders who left with their fighters from Idlib to Ukraine,” he added.
“Dozens of foreign jihadists, especially Chechens, led by Abdel Hakim al-Shishani, the leader of the Soldiers of the Caucasus group, left Idlib in northern Syria and relocated to the fronts against Russian forces in Ukraine,” Sultan went on to explain, adding that Shishani made his way back to Syria “recently.”
Shishani is a Chechen militant leader who was in charge of the Idlib-based group of foreign fighters, Soldiers of the Caucasus.
At the start of the year, Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar reported that after several months of disappearance, the well-known Chechen extremist appeared in Ukraine as part of Kiev’s ‘international legion.’ The Chechen commander appeared in a video posted by the official Twitter account of Ukraine’s defense intelligence.
According to Sultan, Shishani and his Soldiers of the Caucasus were stationed on the fronts near Bakhmut, the eastern Ukrainian city which just last month fell to Russian forces.
“The available data confirms that there are countries that facilitated the process of these fighters’ exit from Syria to Ukraine and that the process of transferring foreign fighters was planned by intelligence services affiliated with countries involved in the conflict inside Ukraine,” the Egyptian researcher continued.
According to Al-Akhbar’s January report, Turkish intelligence played a leading role in facilitating the transfer of militants from Syria to Ukraine.
Sultan adds that these cross-country transfers of militants were ignored by the US coalition operating in Syria, which he said “raises questions.”
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, hundreds of Syria-based militants belonging to ISIS, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and other groups, have made their way to the eastern European country.
“The transfer of foreign fighters suggests that there is an attempt to recreate the scenario of the Afghan-Soviet war in Ukraine. There are fundamental differences between the two cases, but this did not prevent some countries from using the same tactics,” he concluded.
During the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, foreign militants joined the Afghan side under heavy backing from the US and Saudi Arabia.
US-backing for the ‘Mujahideen’ in Afghanistan throughout the 1980s resulted in the formation of what is today known as Al-Qaeda. This was admitted by Hilary Clinton in 2009.
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From the Archives
The US: The Century of Lost Wars
By James Petras | Global Research | September 12, 2018
Introduction
Despite having the biggest military budget in the world, five times larger than the next six countries, the largest number of military bases – over 180 – in the world and the most expensive military industrial complex, the US has failed to win a single war in the 21st century.
In this paper we will enumerate the wars and proceed to analyze why, despite the powerful material basis for wars, it has led to failures. … continue
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