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Riyadh and Hezbollah: A rapprochement forged in fire

As Lebanon becomes an unlikely stage for a slow Saudi pivot toward pragmatism, regional rifts with allies and foes alike compel Riyadh to recalculate its hard lines.

By Tamjid Kobaissy | The Cradle | January 29, 2026

Lebanon, once more, reflects the fault lines tearing through the Arab world. But this time, the ground is moving. The era of blockades and isolation is ceding to a colder, more calculated politics – and at its core lies an unlikely dialogue: between Hezbollah and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

As The Cradle observed last month on ‘Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia’s uneasy détente,’ behind-the-scenes communication between the two has laid groundwork for a quiet thaw. Recent developments have accelerated this shift, compelling the kingdom to reassess both threats and alliances. The signals are no longer limited to backchannels.

They are becoming visible across Lebanon’s political, economic, and media fronts. This suggests that rapprochement is no longer a theoretical discussion but an unfolding process reshaping both the Lebanese and regional scene.

Economic tremors, political signals

Saudi repositioning on Lebanon and Hezbollah has taken shape across multiple fronts. Economic pressures are easing, political language is softening, and discourse on the resistance movement’s disarmament is adapting to new realities. These changes track with the Saudi–Hezbollah talks and reflect broader drivers such as domestic demands in Lebanon, urgent regional recalculations, and Hezbollah’s calibrated outreach.

Sources tell The Cradle the talks have already produced results, with Riyadh stepping away from its previous economic blockade. That shift is becoming tangible across Lebanon.

The economic front offers the clearest evidence. During a visit to Beirut by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, flanked by a senior economic team, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun signaled readiness to deepen Beirut–Tehran ties. In Lebanon, such moves usually require nods from Riyadh or Washington.

Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, known for his Saudi ties, announced the launch of reconstruction in southern Lebanon within two weeks, with plans to accelerate rebuilding efforts. This follows parliamentary approval of a World Bank loan – an indication of intent to harness regional momentum. Salam also flagged upcoming agreements with Riyadh.

Simultaneously, the long-dormant file of Lebanese depositors was revived in cabinet through a proposed financial reorganization and deposit recovery law. This legislation lays the groundwork for closing the financial gap and gradually repaying deposits.

The reopening of this file after years of stagnation reflects not only domestic pressure but also a new political and financial environment shaped by waning external pressure and the rollback of the economic suffocation policy previously imposed on Lebanon.

Changing tones in Beirut 

Political and media rhetoric in Lebanon is also adjusting, particularly among factions with Saudi leanings. The Lebanese Forces (LF) offer a striking example. Lebanon’s Foreign Minister Youssef Raji’s tone during Araghchi’s visit was notably tempered compared to previous Iranian delegations. While his broader stance may still reflect internal party lines, it is important to note that the LF is not entirely Saudi-aligned and intersects with Washington’s foreign policy.

Equally notable is the near absence of the usual Saudi-linked media campaigns. Outlets and figures typically vocal during such visits stayed quiet. That silence reflects a broader repositioning.

Media sources also say Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Waleed Bukhari has privately conveyed Riyadh’s interest in engaging Lebanon’s Shia leaders, moving beyond the image of a sectarian boycott.

The weapons file: A vocabulary shift

A recalibration is also visible in official discourse around Hezbollah’s arms. Where previous rhetoric focused on “disarmament” or exclusive control south of the Litani River, a new phrase has emerged: weapons “containment” north of the Litani. This lexical shift reflects a more tempered and strategic approach.

On one level, it indicates closer coordination – both internally and with external stakeholders – and a move away from maximalist demands. On another, it aligns with a broader political posture from Riyadh to reduce friction and avoid escalation.

During a recent visit to Beirut, Saudi envoy Yazid bin Farhan told Lebanese officials that while Riyadh supports arms being under state authority, the process must proceed with reason and avoid internal disruption. This was widely read as a message tailored to Hezbollah.

His remark that Saudi Arabia has “no problem … with any of the Lebanese components,” mirrored Hezbollah’s framing of a national defense dialogue. More pointedly, his call for calm in the process echoed the group’s insistence that change must come through consensus, not coercion.

Wariness of war, new parliamentary cues

Another clear signal of Saudi recalibration is its growing resistance to military escalation in Lebanon. Once expressed obliquely, this position is now surfacing in both private meetings and public statements from Saudi-aligned figures.

Reports from Israel’s Channel 12, citing unnamed Saudi royals, pointed to Riyadh’s refusal to countenance any military operation against Lebanon. Such red lines bolster Hezbollah’s messaging and complicate Tel Aviv’s threat matrix.

This shift was also evident in the 18 January parliamentary session, where quorum battles pitted Hezbollah and the Amal Movement – referred to in Lebanon as the Shia Duo – against the LF. Samir Geagea, the long-standing LF leader and vocal advocate for Hezbollah’s disarmament, reportedly urged the Saudi envoy to discourage Sunni MPs from attending. The attempt fell flat. Sunni MPs aligned with Riyadh showed up anyway.

In this context, Hezbollah Political Council member Ghaleb Abu Zainab tells The Cradle:

“In principle, we want our relations with Arab states to be positive – built on mutual respect and shared interests in Lebanon and the Arab world. This, of course, includes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which holds significant Arab and Islamic weight in the region.”

Riyadh’s Persian Gulf equation is shifting

The Hezbollah track is one part of a larger Saudi recalibration, driven by new regional pressures. Yemen, Sudan, the Red Sea, and Lebanon are all areas where Riyadh now sees mounting friction with longtime Gulf ally, the UAE.

In Yemen, Saudi Arabia remains uneasy. While it sought to contain Emirati actions in the south, Abu Dhabi’s moves – including a controlled pullback from certain zones – have sparked concern. The fugitive leader of the now-dissolved Southern Transitional Council (STC), Aidarus al-Zubaidi’s remarks from Abu Dhabi about pursuing southern independence, coupled with the assassination attempt on Giants Brigade commander Hamdi Shukri al-Subaihi and subsequent protests, have raised alarms in Riyadh.

In Sudan, Saudi Arabia is backing the official government in Khartoum, preparing for a potential confrontation with the UAE-supported Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Riyadh facilitated a $1.5-billion deal with Pakistan to supply weapons, air defense systems, and drones to the Sudanese army, signaling its intent to push back on Emirati encroachment – part of a broader regional re-ordering described as a response to Abu Dhabi’s growing alignment with Tel Aviv.

Meanwhile, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and reports of a possible military presence there have added another layer of anxiety – a new Israeli footprint near the Red Sea. 

Confronting Emirati ambitions

Lebanon is not exempt. Saudi officials now suspect that Abu Dhabi is maneuvering for influence in Beirut. The LF, with its alignment to the UAE–Israel axis, is part of this concern. The scandal involving “Abu Omar” – a man posing as a Saudi prince who reportedly ran Lebanese political operations – reinforced concerns that the UAE filled the Saudi void during Riyadh’s absence.

Sources note that Qatar has also intensified its presence in Lebanon, funding figures like those in the Free Patriotic Movement. Whether this is in coordination with Riyadh or not, it contributes to a crowded Gulf rivalry playing out in Beirut.

In response, Riyadh is reassessing its Lebanese allies. The “Abu Omar” affair reportedly prompted the kingdom to question the seriousness of some of its former clients – many of whom failed to deliver either politically or in terms of security. This realization has made Riyadh more cautious and less inclined to repeat past mistakes.

The kingdom is now leaning on Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri’s Ain al-Tineh as a channel to Hezbollah – a more direct and realistic track. Hezbollah remains the decisive force in Lebanon, and Riyadh now appears willing to operate within that reality.

Even former Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri’s future is under reconsideration. A political source stresses that a return through the Emirati channel would lead to deep divisions, especially within the Hariri household itself, as the Emirati project does not align with his personality or political legacy. One of the main reasons for his withdrawal from public life was his refusal at the time to follow the Saudi call for a civil war – a demand that reflected the Emirati approach. Therefore, the Saudi option remains the most realistic path for Hariri, capable of reintegrating him into the political scene and ensuring the unity of the Sunni community under Riyadh’s umbrella rather than fragmenting it through external projects.

These developments mark a broader unveiling of the long-simmering Saudi–Emirati rivalry. Riyadh is now moving quickly to neutralize manageable disputes and focus on what it increasingly sees as its main challenge: Abu Dhabi.

In the end, it is clear that the Saudi–Hezbollah rapprochement is not a sudden development but the product of mounting regional pressures and internal constraints that have made pragmatism not a choice – but a necessity.

January 29, 2026 - Posted by aletho | Economics | Hezbollah, Iran, Lebanon, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen