Aletho News

ΑΛΗΘΩΣ

Europeans oppose Brussels’ Russian energy ban, survey finds

By Thomas Brooke | Remix News | January 30, 2026

A proposed European Union ban on Russian oil and gas faces broad public opposition across the bloc and mounting legal resistance from member states, according to new survey data.

Research published by Hungary’s Századvég Foundation indicates that a relative majority of EU citizens oppose a full embargo on Russian energy imports. Across the European Union, 45 percent of respondents said they were against a complete ban, while support failed to reach a majority in most member states. In two-thirds of EU countries surveyed, at least a relative majority rejected the proposal. Only Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia recorded absolute majority support.

Opposition was strongest in Central and Southern Europe. In Slovenia, 68 percent of respondents opposed the embargo, followed by Greece at 65 percent. In Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Hungary, 62 percent of respondents rejected the measure, according to the survey.

Despite this, the European Commission has moved ahead with a regulation under its REPowerEU framework that would prohibit new contracts for Russian fossil fuels and impose a complete phase-out by 2027. The regulation was advanced using qualified majority voting, overcoming government opposition from Hungary and Slovakia.

Critics argue that the Commission’s approach raises serious legal and constitutional questions. While the policy would have the effect of a sanction, opponents say it has been presented as a trade measure, allowing it to bypass the requirement for unanimous approval by all member states.

Energy policy and decisions on national energy mixes fall under member state competence under EU treaties, a point repeatedly emphasized by Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó, who announced on Monday that Budapest would seek to have the regulation annulled.

“Hungary will take legal action before the Court of Justice of the European Union as soon as the decision on REPowerEU is officially published. We will use every legal means to have it annulled,” he said.

“The REPowerEU plan is based on a legal trick, presenting a sanctions measure as a trade policy decision in order to avoid unanimity,” Szijjártó added. “This goes completely against the EU’s own rules. The Treaties are clear: decisions on the energy mix are a national competence.”

The Hungarian government has also warned of significant economic consequences if Russian supplies are cut off. Analysts cited by officials estimate that household utility costs could rise to three-and-a-half times current levels, while fuel prices could exceed 1,000 forints (€2.62) per liter.

Slovakia has announced it will join Hungary’s legal challenge. Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Blanar said Bratislava could not accept solutions that fail to reflect the “real possibilities and specificities” of individual member states, according to comments cited by TASR.

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico went further in his criticism, describing the Commission’s plan as “energy suicide” and predicting that “when the military conflict ends, everyone will be breaking their legs, rushing to go to Russia to do business.”

January 30, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Russophobia | | Leave a comment

Russia Vows to Protect Its Oil Tankers

teleSUR | January 30, 2026

On Friday, Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova announced that her country will take all necessary measures to protect its oil tankers, several of which have been seized in international waters.

“If the norms of international law are violated in relation to vessels flying our flag, Russia will take all measures at its disposal to defend them. Attacks on freedom of navigation are inadmissible,” she said.

Referring to Western sanctions used to justify the seizure of tankers belonging to the so-called “shadow fleet,” Zakharova said they run counter to international law and, in any case, cannot serve as a basis for exercising jurisdiction on the high seas and seizing vessels.

“Allusions to European Union sanctions, which French leaders arbitrarily describe as international, as grounds for adopting coercive measures against any vessel are absolutely untenable,” she insisted.

Russia adopted a very restrained stance in the case of vessels seized by the U.S. Coast Guard, as occurred earlier this year with the tanker Marinera.

Moscow’s position became much firmer in the case of the vessel Grinch, seized more than a week ago by French authorities between Morocco and Spain.

Western authorities have decided in recent months to intensify their pursuit of the fleet Moscow uses to circumvent sanctions on its oil exports, which have declined significantly since the end of last year.

January 30, 2026 Posted by | Economics, War Crimes | , , | 1 Comment

Iran, China and Russia sign trilateral strategic pact

By Ranjan Solomon | MEMO | January 29, 2026

In a dramatic geopolitical development this afternoon, Iran, China and Russia formally signed a comprehensive strategic pact, marking one of the most consequential shifts in 21st-century international relations. While the full text of the agreement is being released in stages by the three governments, state media in Tehran, Beijing and Moscow have acknowledged the ceremony and described it as a cornerstone for a new multipolar order.

The pact comes against the backdrop of decades of growing cooperation between these three states. Iran and Russia earlier concluded a 20-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty designed to deepen economic, political, and defence ties, and to blunt the impact of Western sanctions — a treaty that was signed in January 2025 and entered into force last year.  Meanwhile, Iran and China have been bound by a 25-year cooperation agreement first signed in 2021, aimed at expanding trade, infrastructure, and energy integration.

What makes today’s signing significantly different, and newsworthy, is that it explicitly combines the three powers in a coordinated framework, aligning them on issues ranging from nuclear sovereignty and economic cooperation to military coordination and diplomatic strategy.

Officials in Tehran described the pact as a joint commitment to “mutual respect, sovereign independence and a rules-based international system that rejects unilateral coercion,” echoing similar statements issued by Beijing and Moscow.

What the pact represents

This agreement does not – at least from the initial public texts – constitute a formal mutual defence treaty akin to NATO’s Article 5, obligating one to defend the others militarily. Past pacts between Iran and Russia always carefully stopped short of a binding defence guarantee.  Instead, the pact appears to link three major powers in a broader geopolitical coalition defined by shared opposition to Western military dominance and economic coercion.

Central to the agreement is a unified stance against reimposition of sanctions on Iran tied to its nuclear programme under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Tehran, Beijing and Moscow have previously issued joint statements rejecting European attempts to trigger “snapback” sanctions, and have declared the UN Security Council’s considerations of the nuclear deal terminated.

This trilateral pact is therefore as much about diplomatic leverage and strategic narrative as it is about concrete defence or economic mechanisms.

Immediate regional and global consequences

The pact’s signing coincides with heightened tensions between the United States and Iran. President Donald Trump has reiterated threats of military action against Iran absent a negotiated settlement on its nuclear activities, even deploying a US carrier strike group to the Middle East theatre.  Against that backdrop, this new strategic pact serves both Tehran and its partners as a buffer against unilateral US military pressure. By presenting a united front, the three governments aim to compel Washington to negotiate from a position of constraint rather than dominance.

For the Middle East, the balance of power is reshaping. Iran, long isolated by Western policies — now claims the protection of two permanent members of the UN Security Council. This will embolden Tehran’s regional posture in theatres such as Iraq, Syria and the Persian Gulf, and complicate conventional deterrence strategies exercised by the United States and its Gulf allies.

For Europe, the pact undercuts Brussels’ ambitions to retain independent influence in Middle Eastern diplomacy. European powers have repeatedly attempted to revive elements of the JCPOA and threaten punitive measures against Tehran, but coordination by Iran, China and Russia has thwarted those efforts, exposing Europe’s diplomatic limitations in a world less anchored to Western consensus.

Economic repercussions

Economically, the deal signals deeper integration among three of the world’s most significant non-Western economies. Russia and China have already worked on investment protection and bilateral trade agreements designed to sidestep Western financial systems, such as SWIFT, which have been used as vectors for sanctions.  A trilateral pact potentially accelerates the creation of alternative financial mechanisms and trade routes that further bleed Western economic leverage.

Iran — sitting on vast energy resources — gains broader access to markets and investment, especially as China continues its Belt and Road initiatives and Russia seeks alternatives to sanctions-laden European markets. In combination, these developments portend increased trade flows and reduced vulnerability to the US dollar-centric financial system.

Military and strategic dynamics

Although not a formal alliance, the pact strengthens military cooperation among the trio. China and Russia have conducted regular joint naval drills in the Indian Ocean and Gulf waters — exercises that Iran has participated in as well, signalling interoperability and shared security interests.

Strategically, the pact will likely lead to more coordinated defence planning and intelligence sharing, even if it stops short of a binding treaty that compels military intervention. For the United States and NATO partners, this raises the stakes in multiple regions: any escalation with Iran now risks broader strategic responses involving Beijing and Moscow, increasing the threshold for conflict and reducing the effectiveness of unilateral threats.

Longer-term global impact

In the long term, the pact accelerates the multipolar restructuring of international relations. For decades, the United States and its allies have dominated the architecture of global governance — from trade regimes to security pacts. A structured alignment of Iran, China and Russia signifies an alternative axis that challenges Western hegemony not through ideological competition but through pragmatic power balances.

Whether this pact evolves into a deeper defence agreement, or stays as a diplomatic and strategic framework, remains to be seen. What is indisputable is that the world’s power centre is shifting — not towards a simple “East vs West” dichotomy, but towards a more contested, multipolar world order where diplomatic leverage, economic resilience and military signalling converge in new and unpredictable ways.

January 29, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , , , | Leave a comment

Riyadh and Hezbollah: A rapprochement forged in fire

As Lebanon becomes an unlikely stage for a slow Saudi pivot toward pragmatism, regional rifts with allies and foes alike compel Riyadh to recalculate its hard lines.

By Tamjid Kobaissy | The Cradle | January 29, 2026

Lebanon, once more, reflects the fault lines tearing through the Arab world. But this time, the ground is moving. The era of blockades and isolation is ceding to a colder, more calculated politics – and at its core lies an unlikely dialogue: between Hezbollah and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

As The Cradle observed last month on ‘Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia’s uneasy détente,’ behind-the-scenes communication between the two has laid groundwork for a quiet thaw. Recent developments have accelerated this shift, compelling the kingdom to reassess both threats and alliances. The signals are no longer limited to backchannels.

They are becoming visible across Lebanon’s political, economic, and media fronts. This suggests that rapprochement is no longer a theoretical discussion but an unfolding process reshaping both the Lebanese and regional scene.

Economic tremors, political signals

Saudi repositioning on Lebanon and Hezbollah has taken shape across multiple fronts. Economic pressures are easing, political language is softening, and discourse on the resistance movement’s disarmament is adapting to new realities. These changes track with the Saudi–Hezbollah talks and reflect broader drivers such as domestic demands in Lebanon, urgent regional recalculations, and Hezbollah’s calibrated outreach.

Sources tell The Cradle the talks have already produced results, with Riyadh stepping away from its previous economic blockade. That shift is becoming tangible across Lebanon.

The economic front offers the clearest evidence. During a visit to Beirut by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, flanked by a senior economic team, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun signaled readiness to deepen Beirut–Tehran ties. In Lebanon, such moves usually require nods from Riyadh or Washington.

Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, known for his Saudi ties, announced the launch of reconstruction in southern Lebanon within two weeks, with plans to accelerate rebuilding efforts. This follows parliamentary approval of a World Bank loan – an indication of intent to harness regional momentum. Salam also flagged upcoming agreements with Riyadh.

Simultaneously, the long-dormant file of Lebanese depositors was revived in cabinet through a proposed financial reorganization and deposit recovery law. This legislation lays the groundwork for closing the financial gap and gradually repaying deposits.

The reopening of this file after years of stagnation reflects not only domestic pressure but also a new political and financial environment shaped by waning external pressure and the rollback of the economic suffocation policy previously imposed on Lebanon.

Changing tones in Beirut 

Political and media rhetoric in Lebanon is also adjusting, particularly among factions with Saudi leanings. The Lebanese Forces (LF) offer a striking example. Lebanon’s Foreign Minister Youssef Raji’s tone during Araghchi’s visit was notably tempered compared to previous Iranian delegations. While his broader stance may still reflect internal party lines, it is important to note that the LF is not entirely Saudi-aligned and intersects with Washington’s foreign policy.

Equally notable is the near absence of the usual Saudi-linked media campaigns. Outlets and figures typically vocal during such visits stayed quiet. That silence reflects a broader repositioning.

Media sources also say Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Waleed Bukhari has privately conveyed Riyadh’s interest in engaging Lebanon’s Shia leaders, moving beyond the image of a sectarian boycott.

The weapons file: A vocabulary shift

A recalibration is also visible in official discourse around Hezbollah’s arms. Where previous rhetoric focused on “disarmament” or exclusive control south of the Litani River, a new phrase has emerged: weapons “containment” north of the Litani. This lexical shift reflects a more tempered and strategic approach.

On one level, it indicates closer coordination – both internally and with external stakeholders – and a move away from maximalist demands. On another, it aligns with a broader political posture from Riyadh to reduce friction and avoid escalation.

During a recent visit to Beirut, Saudi envoy Yazid bin Farhan told Lebanese officials that while Riyadh supports arms being under state authority, the process must proceed with reason and avoid internal disruption. This was widely read as a message tailored to Hezbollah.

His remark that Saudi Arabia has “no problem … with any of the Lebanese components,” mirrored Hezbollah’s framing of a national defense dialogue. More pointedly, his call for calm in the process echoed the group’s insistence that change must come through consensus, not coercion.

Wariness of war, new parliamentary cues

Another clear signal of Saudi recalibration is its growing resistance to military escalation in Lebanon. Once expressed obliquely, this position is now surfacing in both private meetings and public statements from Saudi-aligned figures.

Reports from Israel’s Channel 12, citing unnamed Saudi royals, pointed to Riyadh’s refusal to countenance any military operation against Lebanon. Such red lines bolster Hezbollah’s messaging and complicate Tel Aviv’s threat matrix.

This shift was also evident in the 18 January parliamentary session, where quorum battles pitted Hezbollah and the Amal Movement – referred to in Lebanon as the Shia Duo – against the LF. Samir Geagea, the long-standing LF leader and vocal advocate for Hezbollah’s disarmament, reportedly urged the Saudi envoy to discourage Sunni MPs from attending. The attempt fell flat. Sunni MPs aligned with Riyadh showed up anyway.

In this context, Hezbollah Political Council member Ghaleb Abu Zainab tells The Cradle:

“In principle, we want our relations with Arab states to be positive – built on mutual respect and shared interests in Lebanon and the Arab world. This, of course, includes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which holds significant Arab and Islamic weight in the region.”

Riyadh’s Persian Gulf equation is shifting

The Hezbollah track is one part of a larger Saudi recalibration, driven by new regional pressures. Yemen, Sudan, the Red Sea, and Lebanon are all areas where Riyadh now sees mounting friction with longtime Gulf ally, the UAE.

In Yemen, Saudi Arabia remains uneasy. While it sought to contain Emirati actions in the south, Abu Dhabi’s moves – including a controlled pullback from certain zones – have sparked concern. The fugitive leader of the now-dissolved Southern Transitional Council (STC), Aidarus al-Zubaidi’s remarks from Abu Dhabi about pursuing southern independence, coupled with the assassination attempt on Giants Brigade commander Hamdi Shukri al-Subaihi and subsequent protests, have raised alarms in Riyadh.

In Sudan, Saudi Arabia is backing the official government in Khartoum, preparing for a potential confrontation with the UAE-supported Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Riyadh facilitated a $1.5-billion deal with Pakistan to supply weapons, air defense systems, and drones to the Sudanese army, signaling its intent to push back on Emirati encroachment – part of a broader regional re-ordering described as a response to Abu Dhabi’s growing alignment with Tel Aviv.

Meanwhile, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and reports of a possible military presence there have added another layer of anxiety – a new Israeli footprint near the Red Sea. 

Confronting Emirati ambitions

Lebanon is not exempt. Saudi officials now suspect that Abu Dhabi is maneuvering for influence in Beirut. The LF, with its alignment to the UAE–Israel axis, is part of this concern. The scandal involving “Abu Omar” – a man posing as a Saudi prince who reportedly ran Lebanese political operations – reinforced concerns that the UAE filled the Saudi void during Riyadh’s absence.

Sources note that Qatar has also intensified its presence in Lebanon, funding figures like those in the Free Patriotic Movement. Whether this is in coordination with Riyadh or not, it contributes to a crowded Gulf rivalry playing out in Beirut.

In response, Riyadh is reassessing its Lebanese allies. The “Abu Omar” affair reportedly prompted the kingdom to question the seriousness of some of its former clients – many of whom failed to deliver either politically or in terms of security. This realization has made Riyadh more cautious and less inclined to repeat past mistakes.

The kingdom is now leaning on Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri’s Ain al-Tineh as a channel to Hezbollah – a more direct and realistic track. Hezbollah remains the decisive force in Lebanon, and Riyadh now appears willing to operate within that reality.

Even former Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri’s future is under reconsideration. A political source stresses that a return through the Emirati channel would lead to deep divisions, especially within the Hariri household itself, as the Emirati project does not align with his personality or political legacy. One of the main reasons for his withdrawal from public life was his refusal at the time to follow the Saudi call for a civil war – a demand that reflected the Emirati approach. Therefore, the Saudi option remains the most realistic path for Hariri, capable of reintegrating him into the political scene and ensuring the unity of the Sunni community under Riyadh’s umbrella rather than fragmenting it through external projects.

These developments mark a broader unveiling of the long-simmering Saudi–Emirati rivalry. Riyadh is now moving quickly to neutralize manageable disputes and focus on what it increasingly sees as its main challenge: Abu Dhabi.

In the end, it is clear that the Saudi–Hezbollah rapprochement is not a sudden development but the product of mounting regional pressures and internal constraints that have made pragmatism not a choice – but a necessity.

January 29, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Russian oil major agrees sale of foreign assets to US firm

RT | January 29, 2026

Russian oil major Lukoil has said it has agreed to sell most of its international assets to American private equity giant Carlyle Group. The US has targeted Russia’s second-biggest oil producer with sanctions, forcing it to divest its overseas holdings worth $22 billion.

Washington has imposed broad sanctions on the Russian oil sector since the Ukraine conflict escalated in February 2022. Along with oil majors, including Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegas, and their subsidiaries, the US has banned American firms from deals with Russian oil companies, joined the G7 price cap on Russian energy, and imposed restrictions on more than 180 oil tankers and ships.

Moscow has argued that the sanctions show that the West is scrambling to maintain dominance and is resorting to anti-democratic and anti-market practices to eliminate competition.

Lukoil said on Thursday that the transaction is subject to regulatory approvals, including clearance from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. The company did not disclose the financial terms, but stressed it is continuing talks with other potential buyers. It noted that the deal doesn’t include its assets in Kazakhstan.

Last month, Reuters cited sources as saying that around ten global investors, including Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Carlyle, and Saudi Arabia’s Midad Energy, were interested in buying Lukoil’s assets.

A previous offer from Swiss-based trader Gunvor Group reportedly collapsed in November after the US Treasury accused the firm of having ties with Moscow. Gunvor, headquartered in Geneva, was co-founded in 2000 by Swedish businessman Torbjorn Tornqvist and Russian entrepreneur Gennady Timchenko. Timchenko sold his stake in 2014, when Washington targeted him with personal sanctions.

Founded in Washington in 1987, Carlyle Group currently manages around $474 billion in assets. The company has long-standing business ties to US President Donald Trump. In 2005, the firm took part in a $1.8 billion deal to acquire land and three buildings from Trump in Manhattan. In December, The Atlantic reported that Trump and Carlyle co-founder and billionaire David Rubenstein “regarded each other as friends.”

January 29, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Russophobia | , | Leave a comment

Davos, Mark Carney’s frankness, and the Euro-American rift

By Raphael Machado | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 29, 2026

One of the defining factors of the era beginning from the second half of the 20th century is the partnership between the USA and Europe – initially only Western Europe, eventually most of the old continent. But “partnership” is perhaps an imprecise term. The ideal term would probably be “occupation,” since, as defined by Lord Ismay, NATO was created to “keep the Americans in, the Soviets out, and the Germans down.”

In the meantime, Europeans grew accustomed to an automatic alignment with the USA, quite similar to that of Ibero-American countries during the same period, with the exception of the brief period when Charles de Gaulle distanced his country from NATO. Otherwise, the Atlantic Alliance gradually absorbed European countries.

The confusion is such that when speaking of “Western civilization,” most people think of Europe and the USA together, not only as expressions of the same civilization but as possessing identical fundamental and strategic interests. The Davos Forum or World Economic Forum can be thought of as the “celebration” of this civilizational alliance, an event bringing together political, economic, and societal leaders from around the world to discuss the priorities to be adopted in the coming years.

Historically, the USA and its representatives have always been prominent at the Davos Forum in all discussions, whether on environmental issues, the supposed need to censor the internet, or the social transformations considered necessary to deal with the 2020 pandemic crisis or future health crises. It was a space for consensus and planning among the North Atlantic elites.

However, Trump’s antagonistic stance towards the countries of the European Union inevitably significantly changed the atmosphere of Davos this time.

The pressures and demands for the cession of Greenland, including the threat of using military force, ultimately became the driving force of interactions among the elites. Naturally, at this moment, EU countries would not be capable of mounting significant military resistance to the USA in Greenland. But the increase in European military presence on the Danish-owned island seems to serve simply as the drawing of a red line.

And despite Mark Rutte rushing to try to find some sort of compromise with Trump on the Greenland issue, the reality is that Trump’s mere threat and pressure against his supposed allies was enough to leave scars. In other words, no matter how timid and cowardly current European leadership may be, to the point of yielding time and again, European distrust and ill-will towards the USA is still likely to increase.

Perhaps it is even necessary to look at other sectors besides the political summit. Among intellectuals, think tanks, journalists, and influencers, it seems easier to find tougher and more critical positions regarding the USA, as well as less willingness to reconcile, than among national political leaders.

“Anti-Americanism,” once a central plank for both nationalist and socialist parties in Europe but fallen into disuse after the Cold War, may end up becoming an important discursive topic again in this era of rising diverse populisms.

To a large extent, the speech by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, can be seen as a reasonable summary of the current geopolitical moment.

Throughout his speech in Davos, Carney emphasized that for decades, Canada and most Western countries remained aligned with the so-called “rules-based international order,” even considering it partly fictional; still, it was a useful and pleasant fiction. The other Western countries knew that these rules were not applied equally to all countries, and that stronger countries were practically exempt from most of their regulations. Everything in that order depended on who was the “accused” and who was the “accuser.” Different countries, engaged in the same actions, such as suppressing civilian protesters, for example, would receive different treatment depending on who their leaders and governments were: some would receive no more than a symbolic slap on the wrist, others would be bombed and have their heads of state executed in sham courts.

And these Western countries were satisfied as long as the bombed countries were African or Arab or, occasionally, some Slavic country like Serbia. This was because, for a few countries, that order allowed them to collect benefits in the form of capitalist extractivism.

Now, however, the international order has ended. It does not even survive as a farce – according to Carney himself. Faced with a series of crises, many countries began to perceive global integration more as an Achilles’ heel than as an advantage. Goods might have been cheaper, but what good is the theoretical availability of cheaper products when, in times of crisis, they become inaccessible, as during the health crisis. Or when sanctions simply make trade relations unviable for targeted countries.

For Carney, therefore, some countries have decided to transform themselves into fortresses, primarily concerned with ensuring their own energy, food, and military autonomy. And one of the basic consequences of this change is the decline of multilateral organizations. International courts, the WHO, the WTO, the World Bank, and various other bodies are increasingly ignored and disdained by regional powers – in the case of countries outside the “Atlantic axis,” because they consider the influence of the USA and its allies in these bodies too great; in the case of the USA, because, on the contrary, they consider that these bodies do not sufficiently serve US national interests.

This parallel and crosswise dissatisfaction is natural, to the extent that international institutions only ever served the USA and its hegemony insofar as that hegemony was the best tool for gradually constituting a “world government,” that “New World Order” proclaimed by George H. W. Bush.

The consequence of this process of collapse of globalist multilateralism is that international relations have come to be dominated by force. Most medium-power countries are not prepared to deal with this new and sudden reality. Moreover, it is naive to simply condemn the current situation and hope for a return to the “good old days” of a “rules-based” international order where the rules do not apply equally to everyone.

Carney also makes a suggestion for these medium-power countries to deal with the current international situation: strengthen bilateral relations with countries of similar mindset and orientation, building small coalitions of reasonably limited scope, aiming both to eliminate possible economic weaknesses and to enhance security mechanisms.

Naturally, Carney is specifically referring to strengthening Canada-EU relations, but, to some extent, we can also apply this kind of reflection to those counter-hegemonic or non-aligned countries that are not continental powers like Russia, China, and India. The case of Venezuela demonstrated that it is, in fact, necessary to be prepared to deal with US aggressiveness.

Countries like Brazil, despite its size and the importance given to it in international relations, lack nuclear weapons and sufficiently modern military forces to effectively protect itself against a focused and determined military action. Naturally, Brazil should seek to solve these deficiencies (and, indeed, the debate on “Brazilian nuclear weapons” has already begun in political, military, and social circles), but no significant change will be seen in the short term – which is why Brazil actually needs to develop other ways to guarantee its own security that do not depend on simple servility to the USA.

It would be fully in Brazil’s interests to lobby, within BRICS, for increasing the “security” dimension of the coalition. Still, we doubt that the current Brazilian administration has any interest in this, or even that it understands the need for such a radical transformation. In the absence of this initiative, at the very least, Brazil should seek to update its military, intelligence, and radar technology with the help of Russian-Chinese partnerships. But on a regional level, Brazil needs to strengthen its ties with other South American countries and begin, subtly, to try to attract them and remove them from the US orbit.

In short, the mere fact that we are discussing these needs, instead of naively betting that international forums created on Western initiative will be enough to defend us, already proves that we are already in a new and dangerous world.

January 29, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , , , | Leave a comment

Davos and Abu Dhabi: How the Ukrainian Endgame Exposed Western Decline

By Ricardo Martins – New Eastern Outlook – January 28, 2026

While Russia, the United States, and Ukraine quietly negotiated in Abu Dhabi, Davos revealed Europe’s real position in the emerging world order: excluded from decision-making yet burdened with the costs of war and peace alike.

The 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos will likely be remembered less as a forum for global coordination than as a public autopsy of the Western-led international order.

What emerged in the Alpine setting was not coherence but fragmentation: rhetorical excess, strategic confusion, and an unmistakable sense that the world has already moved beyond the frameworks still defended—often ritualistically—by Euro-Atlantic elites.

Three speeches captured this moment with particular clarity: those of Volodymyr Zelensky, Mark Carney, and, less noticed but arguably most consequential, Chinese Vice-Premier Ding Xuexiang (represented in the Davos debate through He Lifeng’s economic message).

Zelensky and the Public Humiliation of Europe

President Volodymyr Zelensky’s speech was striking not only for its confrontational tone but also for its intended audience. His criticism was not primarily directed at Russia or even the United States, but bluntly at Europe. He accused the European Union of strategic indecision, military weakness, and an inability to guarantee Ukraine’s security, reiterating that Europe “still does not know how to defend itself” and remains structurally dependent on Washington.

Mocking Europe’s symbolic troop deployments to Greenland and its delayed reactions to crises such as Iran reinforced Zelensky’s humiliation of Europe.

This rhetoric can be understood as a final reckoning — an all-or-nothing move in which he burned all bridges and launched a frontal attack without regard for the consequences. By Davos, Kyiv was already aware that negotiations over the territorial concessions of the war were being discussed in Abu Dhabi between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine without European participation.

Zelensky’s speech thus functioned as political coercion aimed at Europe as the remaining actor capable of paying the price of a settlement. By publicly framing Europe as weak and morally indebted, Zelensky attempted to transform guilt into leverage in the final phase of negotiations.

This interpretation is reinforced by reporting in the Financial Times, which revealed that Ukraine’s willingness to consider territorial concessions is conditional upon accelerated EU membership, potentially by 2027. In domestic political terms, this trade-off allows Zelensky to reframe territorial loss as civilisational gain: Ukraine does not lose land; it “joins Europe.”

The bill, however, is addressed to Brussels.

Europe’s Astonishing Response

The European reaction to Zelensky’s speech in Davos bordered on political self-abnegation. Despite being publicly criticised, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen praised Ukraine’s “heroic struggle” and emphasised Europe’s material commitment rather than responding to the substance of Zelensky’s accusations.

This asymmetry—verbal humiliation met with renewed rhetorical loyalty—reveals a deeper structural problem: Europe’s inability to translate financial power into strategic agency.

Dissent has nevertheless emerged at the national level. Italian politicians, including Rossano Sasso and Matteo Salvini, openly criticised Zelensky’s “ungrateful” tone and questioned continued military and financial support.

Such reactions reflect mounting domestic pressures linked to inflation, energy costs, and war fatigue, documented extensively by Politico and the Kiel Institute.

Yet these voices remain fragmented, and Europe as a collective actor continues to display what can only be described as strategic paralysis.

Mark Carney and the End of the Rules-Based Illusion

If Zelensky exposed Europe’s weakness, Mark Carney articulated its anxiety. His Davos speech openly acknowledged what had long been implicit: the so-called “rules-based international order” is no longer operative—and perhaps never was. Carney framed the current moment as a rupture, arguing that “middle powers” such as Canada and European states must now navigate a world no longer structured by predictable norms but by power, leverage, and economic scale.

Carney’s concept of “value-based realism” deserves close scrutiny. On the surface, it appears as an attempt to reconcile normative language with geopolitical adaptation. In substance, however, it represents an effort to preserve Western managerial influence within a system that has already shifted towards multipolarity. Sovereignty, in Carney’s formulation, is diluted into “managed multipolarity,” administered by the same financial and institutional elites that dominated the previous order.

This is precisely why his discourse fails to resonate in the Global South. For emerging powers—particularly within BRICS—the collapse of the Western order is not a tragedy to be managed but a long-awaited correction. Carney’s speech, far from acknowledging this, sought to repackage decline as stewardship.

That it reportedly irritated Donald Trump is unsurprising: Carney implicitly rejected American unilateralism while simultaneously refusing genuine systemic change.

China and the Silent Centre of Gravity

The most consequential intervention in Davos was arguably not Western at all. Chinese Vice-Premier He Lifeng articulated Beijing’s strategic priority with remarkable clarity: China is positioning itself to become the world’s largest consumer market, making access to Chinese demand the central axis of future global trade.

This message, echoed by analysts such as Pepe Escobar, signals a structural shift in the global economy: dependence is moving eastward.

Unlike Carney’s rhetorical manoeuvres, China’s position was grounded in material capacity: industrial scale, domestic demand, and long-term planning. For much of the Global South, this represents opportunity rather than threat. For Europe, however, it underscores marginalisation.

Abu Dhabi Decides, Europe Pays

The trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi marked a geopolitical turning point. While Europe has committed close to €200 billion in support to Ukraine, it was excluded from negotiations shaping the war’s end.

This exclusion is not accidental. Both Washington and Moscow increasingly view Brussels as incapable of strategic compromise, bound instead by ideological rigidity and proceduralism.

Europe thus faces a brutal dilemma: continue financing a war it does not control, or finance a peace settlement that fundamentally alters the EU through accelerated Ukrainian accession. Neither option strengthens European sovereignty.

Granting Ukraine some lite-sort of membership by 2027—without completed accession chapters—would transform the EU’s budgetary, agricultural, and cohesion policies overnight. Yet postponement risks indefinite financial haemorrhage. As the Financial Times and Reuters have noted, peace may ultimately be cheaper than perpetual war, even if politically uncomfortable.

Conclusion: Europe as the Weakest Link

Davos revealed a system speaking past itself. Zelensky spoke from desperation and tactical clarity. Carney spoke from elite anxiety. China spoke from structural confidence. Europe, by contrast, spoke in platitudes.

The irony is stark. Europe funds Ukraine, absorbs the economic shock, and bears the political consequences—yet is excluded from decision-making. In Abu Dhabi, values were absent, and strategy was outsourced. When the deal is announced, Europe may discover it was not a negotiator, but a guarantor of last resort.

The tragedy is not merely Europe’s weakness, but its refusal to acknowledge it.


Ricardo Martins is a Doctor in Sociology with specialisation in geopolitics and international relations.

Follow new articles on our Telegram channel

January 28, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , | Leave a comment

AfD co-leader states the obvious: Pouring money into the Ukraine war is killing the German economy

By Tarik Cyril Amar | RT | January 28, 2026

Alice Weidel, co-leader of the AfD (Alternative for Germany) party, has given a speech to which every observer of Germany should pay close attention. And not simply because of Weidel’s inherent political weight.

She is among the country’s most important politicians and with serious prospects for very high office: if her New-Right party breaks through to leading a Berlin government, Weidel is the most likely chancellor. Next to her co-chairman Tino Chrupalla, she is the only real opposition that matters inside the current German parliament.

What makes this particular Weidel speech, delivered in the city of Heilbronn while campaigning in state elections in the classically ‘West German’ Land of Baden-Württemberg, especially noteworthy is its unprecedently outspoken, bracingly combative, and, stirringly logical and honest take on one specific topic, namely Germany’s masochistic relationship to Ukraine.

Not that there were no other topics. Indeed, Weidel started what was a gleefully pugnacious ‘Rundumschlag’ (German for onslaught) where you would expect, the absolutely dismal state of Germany’s once proud and now relentlessly tanking national economy. She reminded her large audience that Germany’s industrial sector is bleeding jobs and companies; national insolvency statistics are a horror and won’t stop breaking abysmal records; and the traditional parties have nothing to offer but same-old-same-old.

And yet, as most right-wing politicians – whether traditional or insurgent – former business consultant Weidel is not at all original with her own suggestions either. She complains that producing things in Germany is so expensive that the country’s economy as a whole has been losing international competitiveness. True enough.

But things get more debatable when Weidel starts explaining the causes of the national malaise. Costs that are too high include, in her view, taxes in general, payroll taxes, and social security payments. This is a classical conservative position: if anything is wrong with capitalism, it’s that those at the bottom of the income and power pyramid still have it too good. Cut the state down and rely on the market’s miraculous powers – pretty much the essence of Weidel’s extremely tired recipe for the future.

In that respect, Weidel’s talk had nothing to offer that isn’t already generously supplied by the grindingly repetitive rhetoric of the current centrist Berlin government under mainstream conservative and sour-schoolmaster-in-chief Friedrich Merz. In essence, ‘shut up, work harder, ask for less. (At least if you aren’t rich like me and my chums).’

With so little of that sounding like a genuine alternative from the ‘Alternative for Germany,’ can the AfD really succeed in breaking the traditional parties’ stranglehold by winning another – at least – ten or so percent of the national electorate? In a country where even the government admits that 17.6 percent of its citizens must get by without “important goods and social activities due to poverty.” In a society where 2.2 million children are officially categorized as at risk of or in poverty? Where income inequality has been growing ever worse, with Germany’s five wealthiest families now boasting combined fortunes of €250 billion, which is more than the poorer half of Germans – over 40 million people –combined? Where, finally, working hard is not even a halfway reliable way to achieve success? More than half of private fortunes are now inherited or gifted (usually to circumvent inheritance taxes, low as they are) and that share rises to between 75-80% among the rich.

Weidel’s criticism of Berlin’s – and the EU’s – current economic suicide non-strategy is often refreshingly on point, but it’s also the very easy part. Yet cosplaying as yet another ‘iron lady,’ promising more blood, sweat, and tears for those who are already getting plenty of all that, may well get the AfD stuck where it is now at less than 30% in Germany as a whole, weaker in the West and doing better only in the East. Weidel and her solidly neoliberal wing in the AfD would do well not to be too sure of themselves yet.

For, if the party does get stuck electorally instead of continuing its surge, then the AfD will not be able to fracture the traditional parties’ undemocratic and, arguably, effectively unconstitutional ‘firewall’ policy of exclusion. Studiously supported by Germany’s propagandistic and conformist mainstream media, in reality the ‘firewall’ is a scandal, since it massively discriminates against more than a fifth of Germany’s voters (and more in the East) who are, in effect, partially disenfranchised. Yet ending that scandal will take electoral success beyond anything the AfD has yet achieved. That’s simply a cold hard fact. Weidel’s rigid capitalist dogmatism could be a dead-end, making the AfD, despite all its current surging, a might-have-been story. We’ll see.

Yet, to her credit, Weidel added a crucial point to her diagnosis of the German economy’s dramatic downfall. A point that almost no other German top politician – at least outside the New-Left BSW, which has been electorally kneecapped, most likely by foul means – has the guts to be honest about in public: The main cause of Germany’s ongoing crash, according to Weidel, are “exploding energy costs,” and that explosion is “homemade,” a result of catastrophically self-harming policies by the traditional parties.

While many of these policies of self-strangulation have been driven by an ideologically motivated exit from nuclear energy and misguided – as well as ineffective – attempts to mitigate global warming, one factor stands out because it is a matter of life and death in a straightforward manner, namely the Ukraine war. That is, in reality, the barely indirect war between Russia and the West (including Germany) via Ukraine.

It is a direct consequence not of the war but of the position toward it taken by at least two successive governments in Berlin (first under the hapless Olaf “the Grinner” Scholz, now under Friedrich “the Scolder” Merz) that Germany’s energy has become ever more backbreakingly expensive.

Even official German agencies and mainstream media have not been able to conceal this basic fact. According to the government statistics office, as of early 2023, the industry price for natural gas was 50.7% higher than before the escalation of February 2022; for electrical power – 27.3%, and for petroleum derivatives – 12.6%. In February 2025, German households were paying a whopping 31% more for energy than in 2021 (according to the mega-mainstream RND). One month later, the respectable Handelsblatt called the “price leap” since the pre-2022, “immense” and reported that gas prices for private households had increased by almost 80% in a little over one year. Let that sink in. And where private citizens’ budgets are squeezed like that, the whole economy badly suffers as well, of course.

And just now, the EU has confirmed it will cut itself off from even the last remnants of Russian gas supplies by 2027. Good luck!

Weidel addressed both the insanity of German policy toward this war and the single most emblematic symbol of that madness, the destruction of most of the Nord Stream pipelines and Berlin’s perfectly perverse response to it.

Weidel rightly noted that the AfD’s long-standing – and plausible – arguments in favor of pursuing peace with Russia in earnest have long been met with the usual witch-hunting smears. That is, the type of neo-McCarthyite suppression which all such displays of dispassionate reason in search of an end to the “nonsensical dying” (Weidel) have been receiving from the “politico-media complex” in war-besotted NATO-EU Europe. Weidel was merciless, too, in skewering the persistent sabotage of any peace prospects by (at least) two German governments and their co-bellicists in the EU and most of Europe. All pretty obvious? Yes. Among the reasonable. But not in the German mainstream media and elite.

And then there was the passage that really rocked the hall: “This government [in Berlin] doesn’t utter a squeak” when Ukrainians, helped by other special services (which Weidel cautiously refrained from naming), blow up German energy infrastructure “in our face.” Genuinely irate, Weidel asked how a German government could keep quiet in such a situation. For “the lost delivery of inexpensive gas,” she continued, “harms not only Germany but all of Europe, [and] Germany the most.”  Nice one. So much then for the domestic non-credibility of the Scholz and Merz governments, and for Merz’s aspirations to play a leading role in Europe.

And yes, the Nord Stream scandal marks not merely a political and economic catastrophe. It’s worse than that, because it also stands for a shameful display of submissiveness: “How can a government have so little self-respect,” Weidel asked, that it won’t even genuinely seek to solve such a blatant case of, in effect, massive economic sabotage? That indeed is the question. Even a German very far left of Weidel, such as me, can only agree here. It takes a fundamental lack of elementary patriotism and decency not to share her exasperation.

If the ultra-corruptioneers in Kiev were listening, things got even worse: Weidel was explicit that a country attacking Germany in this manner is not a friend. Obvious? Yes, but not in Germany. Not yet. And she declared her party’s intention to make Ukraine – and Zelensky personally – pay if the AfD gets into power in Berlin. Not only for the enormous damage done by Ukraine’s cowardly Nord Stream terror attack, but also for the dozens of billions preceding German governments have pumped into one of the most corrupt regimes in the world. All power to her arm on that one as well.

Intriguingly, that was a moment when the audience reacted with much applause, as usual, but also loud booing. Clearly, not everyone had caught up to reality when it comes to Germany and its perversely self-damaging relationship to Ukraine. But Weidel is right when she also declared that Germany should have stayed neutral instead of joining the Great Western Proxy Crusade against Russia with gusto. Berlin could have served as an ‘honest broker,’ to the benefit of everyone, not only Germans but also millions of ordinary Ukrainians.

Whatever you think about the specific mix of stale market-dogmatic Thatcherism, undue deference to Donald Trump, and refreshing no-bullshit honesty on foreign policy and national interest with regard to Ukraine and the Ukraine war that Weidel had to offer, there can be no doubt that this was a breakthrough moment. It was the first time a major German party with potentially very good electoral prospects has come out and clearly stated the obvious – Germany was attacked by Ukraine (and quite a few other ‘friends’ as well from Warsaw to London and Washington, even if Weidel skirted that part of the issue), not by Russia.

Therefore, for Germany and Germans, Ukraine is anything but a friendly state, and it is absurd – to put it very mildly – that German governments have ruined the relationship with Russia and the German economy as well, while pumping Kiev full of money and arms. This is an immense national scandal, as clearly as 2 plus 2 is 4. And like that simple fact, it’s always true, no matter who has the courage to say it.


Tarik Cyril Amar is a historian from Germany working at Koç University, Istanbul, on Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, the history of World War II, the cultural Cold War, and the politics of memory.

January 28, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Malthusian Ideology, Phony Scarcity, Russophobia | , | Leave a comment

Czech coalition rules out higher defense spending, says 2% of GDP is enough

Coalition party leaders would prioritize the needs of Czech citizens over increased armaments spending

By Thomas Brooke | Remix News | January 27, 2026

The new Czech nationalist governing coalition will not increase defense spending in the state budget, according to Tomio Okamura, speaker of the Chamber of Deputies and leader of the minority-governing SPD.

Speaking to reporters after Monday’s coalition council meeting, Okamura said that spending equivalent to around 2 percent of gross domestic product was enough, despite calls from the United States for European member states to spend more to defend themselves.

“The 2 percent of GDP plus or minus is sufficient,” Okamura said, dismissing earlier plans by the previous government to raise defense outlays further. The former center-right cabinet led by Petr Fiala of the Civic Democratic Party had pledged to gradually increase defense spending to 3 percent of GDP by 2030.

The government of Prime Minister Andrej Babiš was set to approve the draft state budget for this year at its Monday cabinet meeting. Czechia has been operating under a provisional budget since the start of the year. Okamura said the budget would be presented by Finance Minister Alena Schillerová of ANO and stressed that the coalition’s priorities lay elsewhere.

“We prioritized money for Czech citizens, money for Czech citizens, not for armaments,” Okamura said. “We really will not increase money for armaments, or if you like, for defense.”

NATO currently expects its members to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense. Last year, the Czech Republic spent 171.1 billion crowns (€7.1 billion) on defense, equivalent to 2.02 percent of GDP, meeting both domestic legal requirements and the alliance’s existing target. However, NATO members agreed last June to raise overall defense-related spending, with a goal of 3.5 percent of GDP on core defense by 2035 and an additional 1.5 percent of GDP on related non-military investments.

ANO has repeatedly said it does not question meeting the existing NATO benchmark, but Andrej Babiš has previously described the alliance’s newer spending goals as unrealistic.

President Petr Pavel warned over the weekend that abandoning NATO commitments would carry consequences. Speaking on Nova television, he said that Czechia must meet its defense spending obligations if it expects security guarantees from the alliance. If the country chooses not to do so, politicians must clearly explain to citizens how they would otherwise ensure national security, Pavel said.

January 28, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , | Leave a comment

G7 Hands Ukraine $40Bln Generated From Frozen Russian Assets

Sputnik – 28.01.2026

The G7 issued $37.9 billion in loans to Ukraine in 2025 using income from Russian assets, which is more than 70% of foreign financing for the Ukrainian budget, Sputnik’s calculations revealed on Wednesday.

Under a 2024 G7 plan, a $50 billion loan for Ukraine was approved, funded by proceeds from frozen Russian assets. As of December 31, 2025, $38.9 billion of this sum had already been allocated.

At the end of 2024, the United States was the first to transfer $1 billion, but since then, no further payments have been reported. The EU was the largest contributor to the scheme, providing Ukraine with $21.1 billion in loans. The remaining funds came from Canada, the UK, and Japan.

Apart from the G7 loan, Ukraine was handed an additional $12.1 billion from the EU, $454 million from Japan, $912 million from the International Monetary Fund, and $733 million from the World Bank in 2025.

In total, the Ukrainian budget raked in $52.1 billion from foreign creditors last year, 73% of which came from the G7 loan.

With the start of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine in 2022, EU and G7 members froze nearly half of Russia’s foreign currency reserves, totaling approximately 300 billion euros ($360 billion). Around 200 billion euros in frozen Russian assets are held in European accounts, primarily at the Belgium-based securities depository Euroclear. The European Commission has been pressing EU members for the green light to use these frozen Russian assets to bankroll Kiev’s war machine.

The Kremlin has cautioned that any attempts to confiscate Russian assets would amount to theft and be in violation of international law.

Following a summit in Brussels on December 19, 2025, the EU opted to abandon its plans temporarily to seize Russian state assets and instead agreed to extend a 90-billion-euro loan to Ukraine from the EU budget. However, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic refused to shoulder any responsibility for the loan.

January 28, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , | Leave a comment

Ukraine expects to join EU next year – Zelensky

RT | January 27, 2026

Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky is calling for his country’s accession to the EU by next year. The idea has already raised hackles among some member nations.

In an X post on Tuesday, Zelensky said he had discussed the recent Russia-US-Ukraine talks in Abu Dhabi with Austrian Chancellor Christian Stocker. The negotiations primarily focused on military matters, but also touched on security guarantees, he said.

“Ukraine’s accession to the European Union is one of the key security guarantees not only for us, but also for all of Europe,” he wrote. “That is why we are speaking about a concrete date – 2027 – and we count on partners’ support for our position.”

Just days earlier, Stocker told the press that he opposed rushing Ukraine’s bid.

“I’m not a fan of the fast lane. The admission criteria must be met,” he said, adding that the “conditions should be the same for everyone.”

Fast-tracked membership for Ukraine is reportedly part of a US-backed $800 billion reconstruction ‘prosperity’ plan that was privately circulated to EU member states by the European Commission last week.

The document gave EU leaders pause due to the way it formally linked Ukraine’s accession to its reconstruction process, rather than due to its massive cost, according to Politico.

Last week, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban slammed the proposal, which he said calls for the EU to provide Ukraine with €800 billion for the country’s reconstruction and a further €700 billion for military needs over the next ten years.

“Hear me now, loud & clear: Hungary will NOT pay for this,” he wrote on X.

He has also nixed the idea of letting Ukraine join the EU, arguing that no Hungarian parliament would vote for accession “in the next hundred years.”

Orban has long stood against Ukraine’s bid, arguing that accession would put the bloc at risk of direct confrontation with Russia.

Moscow has long said that it is not opposed to Ukraine joining the EU. However, Kiev’s ambition to join NATO is a red line and one of the core causes of the current conflict, according to Russia.

January 28, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , | Leave a comment

France and EU clash over UK missiles for Ukraine – Telegraph

RT | January 27, 2026

France has clashed with several EU nations over a proposal that would allow Ukraine to use an EU-backed loan to buy British Storm Shadow missiles, The Telegraph reported on Monday, citing diplomatic sources. Paris has consistently pushed for preferential treatment for the EU’s military industry on procurements destined for Kiev.

In December, EU leaders approved a €90 billion ($107 billion) loan to cover Kiev’s military needs and budgetary gap, with spending rules that prioritize EU-made weapons before allowing purchases from outside the bloc. According to The Telegraph, a coalition of 11 capitals has now proposed loosening the rule so Ukraine can more easily buy weapons such as Britain’s long-range Storm Shadow cruise missiles, which are in short supply.

France, however, has emerged as an “obvious opponent” to the plan, a diplomatic source told the newspaper. The outlet noted that Paris is the center of the EU’s drive for “strategic autonomy” amid concerns about overreliance on US defense after a rift with Washington over its controversial push to acquire Greenland.

Under the current design of the €90 billion loan, spending on weapons would follow a four-layer procurement cascade that prioritizes Ukrainian producers first, then EU defense firms, followed by partner countries such as the UK, with suppliers outside Europe – including the US – treated as a last resort, according to the article. Ukrainian officials have reportedly estimated that around €24 billion of equipment this year will have to come from suppliers outside the EU.

A diplomatic source told The Telegraph that the aim of Britain and its partners was to keep the system “open enough for the UK” to ensure that reaching the third layer of the cascade “is not so hard.”

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte earlier warned that the EU loan should not be constrained by “buy European” rules, while acknowledging the bloc “cannot fully supply everything Ukraine needs to defend itself today and deter tomorrow.”

Moscow has condemned Western arms supplies as prolonging the conflict, while Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has suggested that the €30 billion portion of the EU loan earmarked for Ukraine’s budget support would be embezzled by local officials.

January 27, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , | Leave a comment