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Iran Weathering The Storm, But Saudi Arabia Is Sinking

By Brian McGlinchey | Stark Realities | November 2, 2026

While the disastrous US-Israeli attempt to impose regime change on Iran has commanded the world’s attention, most people are oblivious to the rising probability that regime change is instead coming to a major US and Israeli partner: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Owing to financial strains, demographics, military failures, and simmering domestic discontent, it may only be a question of magnitude. That is, will Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) be removed by fellow members of the House of Saud, or will the 94-year-old kingdom collapse altogether? Most likely, we’ll see both things happen in fairly rapid succession.

To understand why Saudi Arabia is in danger of falling apart, it’s important to first understand what’s been holding it together since Ibn Saud united a land of many tribes into a huge new state in 1932:

  • Power-sharing across the branches of the Saudi royal family. Traditionally, authorities were shared among many senior princes, with their ministries providing each with a base of power and a well of patronage to tap. Major decisions were made by consensus, consistent with the Islamic principle of shura, which is expressly encouraged by the Quran.
  • The integration of the Wahhabi religious establishment into Saudi government. Wahhabism is an austere and puritanical variant of Sunni Islam that arose in central Arabia in the 18th century and came to dominate it. In exchange for the Wahhabists’ bestowing of religious legitimacy on the monarchy, the Wahhabi religious authorities — or ulema — were given authority to guide schools, run charitable entities and enforce social norms.
  • Tribal loyalty given in exchange for patronage and influence. The Arabian peninsula is home to dozens of tribes, with histories stretching back several hundred years or more. Their acquiescence to rule by the House of Saud has been secured via ongoing consultations and by government jobs, subsidies and contracts. Tribes have helped maintain internal peace by recognizing the monarchy’s authority, and by acting as mediators of disputes, and negotiators of access to tribal land and resources.

Everything changed when MBS became crown prince in 2017, as he radically concentrated power and decision-making in his own hands and those of a tight circle of trusted allies, to the detriment of the tribes and other members of the royal family. More than just a political maneuver, this was a bona fide revolution against the arrangement that had hitherto ensured the House of Saud’s survival.

In one of his first moves, MBS rounded up hundreds of Saudi royals and top business leaders and imprisoned them in the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton hotel. Most of them were reportedly abused, both psychologically and physically. Seventeen were hospitalized, and a major general died in custody. Faced with corruption accusations, detainees secured their freedom by forking over $107 billion, according to the claims of Saudi officials.

MBS also provoked the Wahhabi ulema, as he undertook an agenda of liberalization and Westernization aimed at improving Saudi Arabia’s image and keeping the country’s youth content. These moves included allowing women to drive cars, ending the requirement for traveling women to have male guardians, relaxing women’s dress codes, re-opening cinemas after a decades-long ban, and allowing rock concerts and art festivals. He also stripped the Saudi religious police of their investigation and arrest powers, shifting the overseers to an advisory role.

“He has offended virtually every constituency of the royal family,” Chas Freeman, former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, said on Judging Freedom. “He’s also offended the reactionary religious establishment, so he’s made a hell of a lot of enemies.”

MBS’s concentration of power isn’t entirely self-serving. His power grab was driven in part by a sense of urgency as Saudi Arabia stares down a looming financial disaster, which is rooted in the nature of the Saudi state, and exacerbated by its demographics.

Like many other states in the region, Saudi Arabia is an example of a rentier state — a state that derives the great majority of its revenue from sale of resources to other countries, rather than from the taxation of domestic economic and entrepreneurial activity.

In rentier states, the relationship of the people and the government is far different from the norm. Instead of relying on the citizenry as a source of funding, rentier states use their resources to distribute money to the citizenry. “The state doesn’t need its citizens to work hard and pay taxes. It needs them to stay content,” explained The Marrow in a video report on Saudi Arabia’s challenges.

Rentier states are put in danger when revenue becomes insufficient to sustain the flow of money to the people. For Saudi Arabia, two variables have been moving in dangerous directions: the population has grown by leaps and bounds since the 1970s, and oil revenues haven’t kept up.

Saudi Arabia now has an extraordinarily young population: Nearly two-thirds of Saudi citizens are under age 30. In a typical state fueled by economic activity, a large, youthful population can be a great asset. In a rentier state, it’s a liability — one that strains the government’s ability to keep them financially secure, with the failure to do so carrying the risk of dangerous discontent.

A primary means by which the Saudi government has distributed wealth — and prevented idleness that facilitates mischief — is government employment. As of 2016, an extraordinary two-thirds of employed Saudis held government jobs, and their salaries consumed 40% of the kingdom’s budget.

Government jobs’ domination of a market becomes a self-sustaining phenomenon. Private industry struggles to hire workers who’d prefer the lower demands, higher pay and greater job security of a government job. That, in turn, inhibits the growth of a private sector that could reduce the need for a large and costly public sector.

Recognizing the need to completely re-engineer the Saudi economy and relieve its reliance on oil money, MBS in 2016 unveiled “Vision 2030,” with a goal of spurring private-sector investment and employment, and improving the quality of life for Saudi citizens.

Many of MBS’s visions were the stuff of science fiction. A huge ski resort in the desert. A gigantic cube-shaped skyscraper in Riyadh as voluminous as 20 Empire State Buildings. A city for nine million people called “The Line,” comprising two parallel buildings 1,640 feet tall, 660 feet wide and stretching a staggering 110 miles.

One by one, Vision 2030 projects meant to dazzle the world have gone dim as the 2030 due date grows closer. The ski resort, which was supposed to host the 2028 Asian Winter games, has been put on ice. The Line has been suspended, leaving only a few kilometers of construction and a 70-mile-long trench. The colossal cubic skyscraper has been halted after initial excavation and installation of foundation pilings.

The curtailing of those ambitions reflects an irony embedded in the kingdom’s predicament: Its quest to end its dependence on oil revenue itself depends on oil revenue. Since the announcement of Vision 2030, oil prices haven’t cooperated.

As MBS’s grand visions evaporate, they’re increasingly regarded as wasteful vanity projects that have only worsened Saudi Arabia’s situation. Questions about his judgment aren’t confined to economic matters — his military decisions have been even worse.

After his appointment as Saudi defense minister in 2015, MBS immediately sought to establish his military credentials by intervening in Yemen’s civil war, which had seen that country’s Saudi-allied government ousted from the capital by Ansar Allah, a Zaidi Shia group widely referred to as “the Houthis.”

It was an enormous failure. Even with refueling, arms and other assistance provided by the United States, the Saudi intervention failed to defeat Ansar Allah. It also inflicted enormous damage on Saudi Arabia’s reputation, as bombings routinely caused mass casualties among Yemeni civilians, and a Saudi blockade created one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters.

Saudi Arabia finally joined a truce in 2022. Despite his earlier humiliation, MBS stirred things back up again in July of this year, violating the truce by bombing an airport in Yemen’s capital to prevent a Yemeni delegation from landing in an Iranian jet, after attending the funeral of Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei.

What followed has been devastating to Saudi Arabia. Ansar Allah retaliated, declaring the imposition of a blockade on Saudi Arabia to counter the Saudi blockade on Yemen. Furthering their ability to make good on that promise, Ansar Allah unleashed an offensive in which they rapidly seized the remainder of Yemen’s west coast, positioning their forces to easily threaten Saudi shipping entering the Red Sea via the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Worse, Ansar Allah has taken the battle into Saudi territory, repeatedly inflicting damage on oil and gas facilities. Iraqi Shia militias joined them in that endeavor, shutting down the east-west pipeline that Saudi Arabia had been using as an alternative to the Iranian-blockaded Strait of Hormuz. Ansar Allah has also struck Saudi airports. In the worst such attack, a Yemeni cruise missile hit a passenger terminal at Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport, killing 13 people, wounding more than 300, and causing a weeks-long closure. President Trump has compounded MBS’s ongoing military humiliation by refusing his repeated pleas for US forces to rejoin the war on Ansar Allah.

The destruction resulting from MBS’s renewal of the war in Yemen comes on top of damage caused by Iran, which has deemed any country that hosts US forces as fair targets for retaliation. Some analysts predict it will take seven to 10 years to replace all the specialized oil and gas equipment and fully restore production.

The physical damage from missiles and drones will be hard enough to repair, but the most enduring damage may have been inflicted on Saudi Arabia’s reputation as a safe place to visit and to open businesses — directly undercutting the kingdom’s quest to attract foreign investment and remake its economy.

In a vivid illustration of such damage, Ansar Allah’s attacks recently forced the postponement of Saudi Arabia’s annual Future Investment Initiative, which is hosted by the kingdom’s Public Investment Fund. First held in 2017 and nicknamed “Davos in the Desert,” the highly-anticipated October event was poised to bring major-corporation CEOs — including the leaders of JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Blackrock — to Riyadh. Major sports events, such as F1 races, have also been cancelled or postponed, and the E-Sports World Cup was moved from Riyadh to Paris.

“MBS has staked everything on Vision 2030, the promise that Saudi Arabia will become a global hub for business, tourism, sport and investment,” writes former CIA intelligence analyst Larry Johnson. “Every one of those businesses depends on one thing: the perception that the kingdom is safe. The Houthis are attacking that perception directly.”

As bad as the military situation is for Saudi Arabia and MBS, it may get far worse. As Ansar Allah continues to expand its control of Yemen — where the group already has the capital and territory in which 70 to 80% of Yemenis live — there’s growing wariness the group could retake three provinces from southwest Saudi Arabia that were historically part of Yemen, but were annexed by Saudi Arabia in 1934.

With Saudi Arabia facing increasingly dire circumstances, MBS could be targeted for removal by those who see him as incapable of steering the kingdom out of peril. There are Saudi precedents for that. Faulted for extravagant personal spending and poor management of the kingdom’s finances, King Saud al Saud saw his powers reduced in the late 1950s. Then, in 1964, he was dethroned in a bloodless coup organized by his younger brother, Crown Prince Faisal, who became king.

Eleven years later, King Faisal was himself removed from power — in bloody fashion. In 1975, after returning from a trip to the United States, he was shot to death by his nephew Prince Faisal bin Musaid, who was apparently outraged by the king’s drive to Westernize and liberalize Saudi Arabia. Revenge was also thought to be a factor, as the prince’s brother was killed in 1966 amid a violent protest of the introduction of television to the kingdom.

In October, there were reports that MBS was moving from bomb shelter to bomb shelter beneath heavily-guarded palaces. “[Supposedly] for fear of a Houthi assassination,” Alistair Crooke told Judge Napolitano. “Actually, what he’s frightened of is an assassination by one of his own family or a military officer.”

“There’s a long history in the Arab world of the overthrow of monarchy,” Freeman noted. “It’s facilitated because Islam, in the Holy Quran, is actually very much against monarchy.”

As Saudi Arabia’s condition weakens, its political and economic landscape has become fertile ground for countless seeds of discontent:

  • Vision 2030 construction projects have forced thousands from their homes and granted compensation that many say is far too little.
  • Government jobs have lost some of their luster; pay raises are harder to come by, and limits on overtime and annual leave have been imposed.
  • Citizens who were accustomed to a largely tax-free existence are getting a taste of non-rentier-state life: In 2018, Saudi Arabia adopted a 5% Value Added Tax and later tripled it to 15%.
  • Saudi royals — which number between 15,000 and 25,000 — have seen their perks and stipends reduced, forcing many of them to sell homes, yachts and art to raise cash. Princes who were subjected to abuse at the Ritz-Carlton and the confiscation of their assets are likely yearning for revenge.
  • Resentments are growing over uneven financial treatment. Crooke offers an illustrative example of two military officers working side by side: one, a highly-placed tribal member who isn’t well-paid, the other a royal of the same rank whose income is padded by a stipend.
  • Military cohesion and operational efficiency has been impaired by the silo-ization of the various service branches — which is meant to reduce the ease with which a coup could be mounted. “[MBS] has divided the military, set them against one another, [and] used the National Guard to keep an eye out for any disaffection within the army,” explained Crooke.
  • Though often characterized as a Sunni country, Saudi Arabia has a significant Shiite minority, accounting for about 12% of the population. Critically, they’re concentrated in two important areas: Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Region, which is the center of the kingdom’s oil production, and Saudi Arabia’s southwest corner, adjacent to the Shiite population in northwest Yemen, where Ansar Allah rules.
  • The kingdom faces reputational damage and a major financial hit that’s likely to arise in a US civil suit in which victims of the 9/11 attacks are building an overwhelming case that Saudi government officials aided the Al Qaeda plotters.
  • MBS’s marginalization of the Wahhabi religious establishment holds great peril. Clerics may no longer tell their followers to ignore the lavish royal lifestyles that violate the core tenets of Wahhabism, setting the stage for a radical Islamic insurrection.

Saudi Arabia isn’t alone among Middle East countries in facing the likelihood of major upheaval. Other Gulf rentier states are similarly exposed, and Kuwait could vanish via conquest by Iraqi Shiite militias. As Crooke recently said on Daniel Davis Deep Dive, “People just do not see the huge geopolitical shifts that are taking place today. The Middle East is going to change. You will not recognize it in two years’ time.”

November 3, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , | Comments Off on Iran Weathering The Storm, But Saudi Arabia Is Sinking

Sunk Ships Don’t Sail Home: Why Peace Won’t Save the Oil Market and War Will Wreck It

By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | November 3, 2026 

Yesterday, at the opening of ADIPEC in Abu Dhabi, ADNOC’s CEO Sultan Al Jaber told the world that energy security now comes down to getting the oil to the customer, not just producing it. He wants storage, redundancy and diversified routes to market. He noted that shipping and logistics have climbed from less than 5 percent of the cost of a barrel to more than 30 percent. All true. But he skipped one small detail about routes to market. They require ships.

Karl Miller, who has been annoyingly right about the Gulf all year, supplied that detail in a November 1 assessment of the Persian Gulf tanker fleet. If Al Jaber’s speech was the diagnosis, Miller’s report is the X-ray. It shows why a barrel now costs a third of its value just to move.

The butcher’s bill, maritime edition

Miller counts 79 named tankers in the Gulf damage and casualty record. Thirty-five of them are VLCCs, the 2-million-barrel workhorses of the crude trade. That works out to 70 million barrels of carrying space caught up in the damage, for each loading. Together the 79 ships represent more than 14 million tonnes of rated deadweight. His assessment rates the physical damage and replacement burden as “catastrophic,” which is the sort of word that is hard to soften in a press release.

The worst cases make the point:

  • Sunk: the Suezmax KYLO on September 5 and the Aframax RIESCO on September 8, about 267,000 tonnes of deadweight lying on the bottom.
  • Permanently disabled: DOWNY and STARK I, one VLCC and one Suezmax, reported by the military on September 5.
  • Destroyed or rendered inoperable: DERYA, KAVIZ and CHARMINAR, reported by the military on September 8.
  • ADNOC’s own ships: the VLCCs AL BAHYAH and MOMBASA B took significant damage in July. MOMBASA B later went back to shuttle work.
  • Jet fuel adrift: METRO VENETIAN suffered an engine-room casualty on August 24 with 704,000 barrels of jet fuel aboard. It later limped into Fujairah.
  • Confiscated: KAVOMALEAS caught fire in July, was abandoned and ended up in Iranian custody. It was last seen near Qeshm on October 29.

Then there are the October cases: EVER VICT losing command, PETRO DOLPHIN evacuated and drifting, and GEM NO 2 leaking oil into the Gulf. Nothing says “diversified routes to market” quite like a tanker drifting with nobody aboard.

Arithmetic, the enemy of optimism

A tanker is not a barrel. It is a delivery service that loads, sails, discharges, sails home and does it again. Lose the ship and you lose every cargo it would have carried for the rest of its working life.

Miller cites an October 30 assessment that 18 non-Iranian VLCCs are likely out of operation. That is 36 million barrels of loading space. How much daily delivery that represents depends on how long the full round trip takes:

Full voyage cycle Lost gross service

30 days – 1,200,000 barrels/day

45 days – 800,000 barrels/day

60 days – 600,000 barrels/day

That is for the VLCCs alone. It leaves out the Iranian fleet, the two sunk medium tankers and the product carriers.

Now for diesel and jet fuel, the products that actually keep trucks and airliners moving. Before the war, about 750,000 barrels a day of diesel and gasoil and 400,000 barrels a day of jet and kerosene came through Hormuz. In one of Miller’s sensitivity cases, 10 percent of the ships are lost and the round trip stretches from 30 days to 40. Only 67.5 percent of the old service survives. That is 373,750 barrels a day of diesel and jet fuel that never arrives. Al Jaber said yesterday that diesel stocks in some markets are at their lowest seasonal level in 35 years. Now you know part of the reason.

The ships that survive have problems too. A hull that sits idle in warm Gulf water for six months grows things. On a 45-day cycle, fouling that cuts speed by 10 percent reduces daily service by about 9 percent, and a 20 percent speed cut costs about 18 percent. The barnacles, at least, have had a very good war.

Supertankers are not sold at the mall

Somewhere in Washington, someone is surely saying that the market will simply build more ships. It will. Eventually. A VLCC is an industrial project: hull, propulsion, cargo systems, commissioning, sea trials and classification approval, all before it carries a single barrel. The owners’ contracts show how long that takes:

  • Worldwide, 20 VLCCs are scheduled for delivery in Q4 2026 and Q1 2027 combined.
  • Scorpio’s newly ordered VLCCs arrive in September and October 2028.
  • Bahri’s three newly contracted VLCCs arrive in 2029–2030.
  • Product tanker orders from Scorpio and TORM deliver in 2029, with options running into 2030.
  • Another 138 VLCCs on the orderbook are scheduled for 2029 and later.

Those 20 near-term ships are not an emergency reserve waiting in a parking lot for the Gulf’s insurance claims. They already have owners and charters. Chartering an existing tanker only moves the problem to someone else’s trade. And a ship that has been hauling crude cannot load jet fuel next week. Its tanks need cleaning, inspection, technical approval, crew, insurance and a route that nobody is shooting at. If you lost a ship in September 2026, expect its replacement sometime during the next presidential term.

I am not going to claim the Gulf has stopped exporting. It hasn’t. Late in October, non-Iranian Middle East crude exports exceeded their historical average of about 16 million barrels a day. The bottleneck was how fast ships could be loaded. Some damaged ships do come back. A traceable subset of attacked tankers averaged about two months to their next cargo. On October 28, Bahri reported two affected ships back in commercial service and two still under repair.

Miller is also careful about his counting. The 79 ships include vessels that have since been repaired. The roughly 20-ship current outage estimate (18 VLCCs plus the two sinkings) is a separate measure, and you cannot add it to the 79. Ships running with their transponders off do not mean a hidden graveyard either. There is no honest multiplier for unreported losses, and Miller declines to invent one. Iran’s roughly 43 million barrels of crude and condensate sitting loaded but trapped inside the blockade area on October 22 is cargo waiting to leave. It is not 43 million barrels lost.

That restraint is what makes the conclusion hard to dismiss. Exports are flowing because the surviving fleet is being worked hard, and because buffers are being drawn down. Al Jaber put that drawdown at nearly a billion barrels worldwide.

Peace will not refill the tanks

Suppose the war ends tomorrow. Trump lifts the blockade, hands back Iran’s frozen assets and declares victory on Truth Social. The ships sunk in September stay sunk. The VLCCs out of service still need repair yards or newbuilds that will not arrive before 2028. And the owners and insurers who have spent eight months watching tankers burn will not rush back into the strait because of a press conference.

Aramco’s CEO, Amin Nasser, has already said as much. Speaking in London on October 5, he put lost supply since the war began at almost 3 billion barrels, with about 1 billion barrels pulled from stocks to cover the gap. Even after Hormuz fully reopens, he warned, “replenishing inventories while meeting demand could take up to two years.” Refilling those stocks would add roughly 2 million barrels a day of demand for 18 months. That demand lands on top of normal consumption and has to be carried by a fleet that is short of ships. Nasser also noted that most of the oil still in storage is not really available, because it is sitting in pipelines or needed as minimum tank volume.

So two years is the optimistic case. It assumes the peace holds, the strait stays open and the shipping capacity Miller documents comes back faster than the shipyard calendars allow. I would not bet the farm on any of those.

Or Trump could make it catastrophic

And if Trump decides instead to launch a new attack on Iran? Miller’s 79-ship damage record shows how easily tankers in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman can be hit. Today’s exports depend on the ships that survived, run flat out, and on inventories that have been drained. A new round of strikes would put those survivors back in the line of fire just as the cushion runs out. Last time, the world had a billion barrels in storage to burn through. Next time it will not. That is how a serious energy crisis becomes a catastrophic one.

Count the cargoes, not the communiqués

So here we are. The Gulf’s producers can pump. Their CEOs can give speeches about resilience. Their communications chiefs can send emails demanding corrections without naming a single error. None of that floats a hull. A fleet that lost two ships to the seabed, had five more reported disabled or destroyed and has about 18 VLCCs sitting out of operation is not rebuilt by press release. It is rebuilt in shipyards in Korea, China and Japan, on a schedule that runs to 2030.

Miller ends his report with a test I would recommend to every energy minister now taking a victory lap. Measure recovery by ships cleared to load, carrying space restored and complete cargo cycles delivered. Everything else is just talk about routes to market.

The only thing moving smoothly through the Gulf right now is the rhetoric.

November 3, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , | Comments Off on Sunk Ships Don’t Sail Home: Why Peace Won’t Save the Oil Market and War Will Wreck It

No Cossacks at the gates, fix Italy instead – opposition leader to Meloni

RT | November 3, 2026

Italy should spend money tackling real domestic problems rather than driving itself deeper into debt to defend against fictional threats like the “Cossacks from the Russian steppes,” right-wing leader and MEP Roberto Vannacci said on Monday.

Vannacci, who leads the right-wing Futuro Nazionale party, made the remarks at a press conference in Milan alongside his party’s mayoral candidate, Carmelo Burgio.

“Any defense system must be commensurate with a real threat… If we were to ask the people of Milan what the real threat is, they certainly wouldn’t point to Cossacks coming from the Russian steppes,” he told the press. “They would likely point to harassers, vandals who smash shop windows, or ‘youth gangs’ roaming the streets with knives.”

The right-wing politician criticized the EU’s €800 billion ReArm plan for its “excessive spending on weapons systems,” arguing that there was no “concrete threat” to justify such spending and borrowing.

Vannacci has previously argued that the EU’s €150 billion rearmament loan instrument under ReArm would drive Italy deeper into debt without addressing its domestic issues.

Italy’s public debt stood at nearly 140% of GDP in mid-2026, the second-highest ratio in the European Union, according to Eurostat.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni came to power in 2022 on a platform promising tax cuts, stronger border controls, support for Italian families, and responsible management of public finances. Her government has nevertheless continued to commit billions of euros to military assistance for Ukraine, while also backing increased defense spending.

Moscow has long accused European nations of using the pretext of an alleged threat from Russia to justify their accelerating militarization. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly dismissed claims that Moscow intends to attack NATO as “nonsense.”

The Russian president has also blamed European governments’ economic and financial policies, including high public debt, for the riots and unrest sweeping EU countries since September. The reasons lie in “their own mistakes… in economics and finance,” he told Vesti last month, stressing that some EU countries have public debt exceeding 100% of GDP.

November 3, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism, Russophobia | , | Comments Off on No Cossacks at the gates, fix Italy instead – opposition leader to Meloni

Russia shows Europe that prolonging the Ukraine war is pointless

By Ahmed Adel | November 2, 2026

Moscow has shown the European Union that continuing the conflict in Ukraine makes little sense, as Norway and Finland suggest the need for a new approach to building relations with Russia, according to Responsible Statecraft. This became clear after the Oslo conference on Ukraine, when the positions of some European leaders visibly softened.

“Finland and Norway’s more moderate language is a crucial first step toward a shared European understanding that continuing the war in its current form is self-defeating,” Responsible Statecraft reported.

The article noted that European efforts to pressure Moscow have failed. Neither Kiev nor its Western allies achieved the desired results, even after attempting to escalate the conflict, the author added.

“Without US intelligence and weapons supplies, Europe lacks the military leverage to continue this effort on its own. There is no viable European war plan, only reactive crisis management and ad hoc solutions about Ukraine, coupled with repeated hyping of Russia’s ‘hybrid war’ threat,” he wrote.

According to the publication, Europe can resolve the situation in Ukraine through diplomacy, but first European leaders must decide whether to support or sabotage US efforts to achieve a diplomatic resolution.

“But first, Europe must decide: will it support or sabotage the US effort to build a diplomatic off-ramp?” Responsible Statecraft added.

On October 20, multilateral negotiations on the Ukrainian agreement were held in Oslo, attended by Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, and US President Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff. The next day, Vladimir Putin and Witkoff met in St. Petersburg. Putin told Witkoff that Moscow was ready to resume trilateral negotiations on Ukraine on November 10. Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov said that a new round of trilateral negotiations on the Ukrainian settlement may take place in Abu Dhabi.

During his recent visit to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Stubb reiterated his case for a “value-based realism.” He said European states should uphold their values without settling the conflict by rigidly claiming the moral high ground, and urged the audience to keep “cooler heads,” warning that fostering a “war mentality” would make imagining peace nearly impossible.

Without a geopolitical agreement with Russia, Ukraine faces destruction, a deeper demographic crisis, and an inability to recover economically—creating a serious problem for Europe. Battlefield conditions remain unfavorable for Ukraine as Russian forces continue to advance and Kiev struggles with air-defense shortages.

Russian troops are maintaining pressure along the front and gradually eroding Ukrainian positions, while Ukraine’s manpower shortages have prompted intensified mobilization and further strained society. Inadequate defenses against Russian missiles, glide bombs, and jet-powered drone attacks are already creating a crisis. As winter approaches, cities, infrastructure, and energy facilities are becoming increasingly vulnerable to attack.

Ukraine is expected to face an extremely difficult winter, with shortages of electricity, energy, heat, and water that could trigger a humanitarian emergency. Repeated Russian strikes on the power grid have left large parts of the country exposed to prolonged blackouts, while electricity-dependent heating and water systems risk failing in freezing temperatures. These difficult winter conditions threaten to deepen civilian hardship, accelerate population displacement, and further weaken Ukraine’s capacity to sustain its war effort, but this reality has meant very little to Europe’s insistence on supporting Ukraine “to the very end” and “for as long as it takes.”

Despite mounting domestic problems, much of Europe still backs the futile war effort. Many capitals favor maximalist rhetoric rather than the more pragmatic diplomatic openings Norway and Finland have begun to explore. This stubbornness persists even as European states face economic decline and deindustrialization, lack independent military leverage without US support, and fail to turn sanctions, arms deliveries, and escalation into battlefield gains.

European leaders still frame the conflict in absolute moral terms, while their economies face rising energy costs and mounting debt pressures. Without moving toward the diplomacy opened in Oslo, Europe remains trapped in a cycle that does not shift the battlefield situation in Ukraine’s favor nor enhance European security. The alternative—backing a negotiated settlement that preserves a viable Ukraine while addressing core security concerns—remains open, as Responsible Statecraft stresses, but it requires political will that much of the continent has so far been unwilling to show.

Ukraine still has a chance to avoid the worst outcome by pursuing a peaceful settlement with Russia. Accepting terms would mean ceding part of its territory, but Ukraine would remain a viable state with a real opportunity for economic and political development. The longer the rest of the continent ignores the opening that Norway and Finland have made, the more territory and state capacity Ukraine will lose.

Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.

November 2, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , | Comments Off on Russia shows Europe that prolonging the Ukraine war is pointless

There is cautious optimism about ending the Ukraine War – Part 2

Peace comes in driblets in Ukraine

By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | November 2, 2026

The famous line of Irish poet WB Yeats from the poem The Lake Isle of Innisfree comes to mind: ‘And I shall have some peace there, for peace comes dropping slow…” Yeats was expressing his longing for the peace and tranquility of Innisfree, an uninhabited island in Ireland near which he spent his summers as a child while residing in an urban setting. And that is how Ukraine’s search for peace is meandering – not in a sudden, overwhelming wave; rather, in tiny, quiet increments, much like a gentle rain or a slow leak.

The ‘leak’ by Russia’s presidential aide for foreign policy Yuri Ushakov is no doubt an increment of potentially immense consequence when he told Kremlin’s preferred reporter Pavel Zarubin on Sunday that President Vladimir Putin never refused to speak with Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky. Replying to a pointed question whether Putin would answer a call from Zelensky, Ushakov foretold, “I think he would answer, of course. Putin has never refused to talk. He [Zelensky] is sending signals through various sources. If he really wants to negotiate, he is free to come [to Moscow].”

The remark comes within a week of the joint phone call on October 27 by Finland’s President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre to Putin during which, per a subsequent disclosure by Ushakov, the Nordic leaders discreetly broached the subject of direct contact between Putin and Zelensky. Zelensky later appreciated their debriefing. This is the first thing. Apparently, Putin repeated the refrain that Zelensky can always visit Moscow and that the Kremlin would ensure his personal safety and security. Now, an addendum, as it were, has appeared for the first time to Putin’s standing offer. Presumably, it was an orchestrated Q&A. This is the first thing.

Secondly, the Kremlin closely studied the commotion in Europe that the two Nordic leaders’ impudent behavior triggered — as if the wolf entered the hay pen. The two Nordic leaders broke ranks. Denmark and Sweden protested they were not consulted. However, the two EU heavyweights — France, Germany – simply looked away, and the super hawkish European Commission (EC) leadership under Ursula von der Leyen and her fiery foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, were uncharacteristically subdued.

How to explain it? As Guardian newspaper (no friend of Russia or Putin) noted, “The confusion reflects a wider disagreement across Europe over how to approach Putin, even as governments remain broadly united in their support for Ukraine… France has long advocated keeping a channel to Putin open, while Germany and Britain have been more cautious. The Baltic states and Kaja Kallas fear that renewed high-level engagement could ease pressure on Moscow without securing concessions.”

Thirdly, the dissonance is at its loudest when it came to the question of who should lead any European outreach. Von der Leyen insists on nominating someone who will faithfully execute her policy line – in sum, put her in the driving seat. It is excruciatingly painful for Von der Leyen to dismount the high horse she has been riding to demonize Putin and insist Russia can be defeated in the war.

This is the crux of the matter: the EU, with its narrative on the war collapsing, is not able to come up with any peace proposals. Its one-point demand is to have a physical presence at the high table of negotiations. Moscow has said it does not make sense unless the EU has something to bring to the peace table. Trump agrees.

In fact, across the Atlantic no one is paying attention to the acrimony in Europe regarding the seating arrangement at the peace table. The American elites are busy with domestic politics and if at all on the US’ war with Iran. Generally speaking, the Ukraine war has ceased to be a hot button foreign-policy issue among the elites. The ease with which Trump could mothball the Graham Act sanctions on Russia is telling. Zelensky’s support base in the US is also steadily shrinking. In practical terms, it turns out to be the CIA’s war.

Clearly, the trilateral meeting in Abu Dhabi will go ahead without any European participation. Meanwhile, Slovakia says Bratislava will represent itself. The house that Von der Leyen built to centralize all decision-making seems far too fragile as multipolarity gains ground in Europe. This trend can only gather pace as incumbent governments may be replaced in four of the EU’s biggest member states in national elections during 2027 – France, Italy, Poland and Spain. A recent Carnegie paper in mid-September assessed that radical-right parties with Eurosceptic orientation and which are Russia friendly are expected to do well.

The Carnegie paper titled How Europe’s 2027 Elections could Test EU Governance reluctantly admitted that the war in Ukraine “is likely to remain the EU’s most urgent security challenge. Radical-right parties are sharply divided on this issue, but as the cost of the EU’s support for Ukraine rises, resistance in several countries will increase. Locking in the union’s backing for Kyiv through multiannual programs would reduce the risk of a new constellation of political forces putting the union’s commitment to Ukraine in doubt.”

Overall, therefore, the Kremlin’s overture to engage Zelensky in a phone conversation comes not a day too soon. The catch is, Zelensky is a protégé of Britain’s MI6’s but here too, Britain’s ability to sustain the present momentum of the war is increasingly debatable. A BBC report gave a stark warning of “painful and depressing few years ahead” for the British people “after forecasts showed growth in living standards grinding almost to a halt.”

Ushakov’s remark testifies to the suppleness of the Kremlin’s strategy of not being an impediment to peaceful settlement in Ukraine but with no let-up in the frontline. Large scale Russian troop movements, the destruction of bridges over the Dnieper, the focus on Odessa and Kharkov, etc message that in the Kremlin’s estimation, there might be no alternative but to seek a military victory.

In a Substack piece, Gordon Hahn, the US security expert and specialist on Russia, visualised that Moscow may “add to its original demands” by pushing the ante on territorial issues, including the seizure of Kiev (“the mother of all Russian cities”) and Odessa (which Putin calls a Russian city’) – ie., gain control of the territory east of Dnieper (what Russians call the ‘Left Bank’) letting western Ukraine collapse into warlordism.

November 2, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , | Comments Off on There is cautious optimism about ending the Ukraine War – Part 2

Europe facing gas price shock – Gazprom chief

RT | October 30, 2026

European gas prices could more than double as depleted reserves threaten winter supplies, Gazprom CEO Aleksey Miller has warned.

Wholesale prices have already reached their highest level in nearly four years, briefly exceeding €97 ($108) per megawatt-hour on Monday. December gas futures climbed another 3.1% on Friday to around $1,164 per thousand cubic meters, according to London’s Intercontinental Exchange.

Miller pointed to unusually low gas reserves across the EU, noting that Germany, the bloc’s largest consumer, has filled just 61.6% of its underground storage capacity.

”Given the series of historic record lows Europeans have set in filling underground gas storage facilities […] we can expect gas prices in Europe to peak at $2,500 per thousand cubic meters in the event of a cold winter,” he said.

Norwegian energy giant Equinor has echoed concerns over another price shock. CEO Anders Opedal said on Wednesday that European gas reserves were at their lowest seasonal level since 2011, leaving the bloc exposed to further price spikes as it competes with Asian buyers for liquefied natural gas (LNG).

The US-Israeli war on Iran has further strained supplies, disrupting shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, which previously handled around a fifth of global LNG trade. Deliveries remain roughly 80% below pre-conflict levels.

EU gas storage facilities were 74.62% full as of October 25, well below seasonal averages, with some member states already drawing on reserves as temperatures fall.

Germany has been particularly hard hit. Gas tariffs for new household customers have jumped 55% this year, according to comparison website Verivox. High energy costs have forced some European fertilizer, chemical, and steel producers to cut output, Reuters reported.

In September, EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jorgensen warned that the bloc faced its worst energy crisis since 2022, when wholesale gas prices exceeded €300 per megawatt-hour.

Despite mounting supply concerns, Brussels is pressing ahead with plans to eliminate Russian gas imports. Long-term LNG deliveries are set to be banned from January 2027, with remaining pipeline supplies scheduled to end later that year.

Moscow has repeatedly condemned the EU’s energy policy as “suicidal.” Russian presidential investment envoy Kirill Dmitriev argued last week that restoring economic cooperation with Russia “will be inevitable.”

October 30, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Malthusian Ideology, Phony Scarcity, Russophobia | , | Comments Off on Europe facing gas price shock – Gazprom chief

Three tankers hit mines on unauthorized Hormuz route: IRGC Navy

Al Mayadeen | October 29, 2026

Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy announced on Thursday that three oil tankers exploded and caught fire after striking naval mines while attempting to cross an unauthorized southern route through the Strait of Hormuz.

The vessels disregarded warnings from Iranian naval forces and switched off their radar and navigation systems before entering the mined passage, according to the statement.

“Over the past 24 hours, three violating oil tankers exploded and caught fire after striking mines while attempting to pass through the unauthorised southern route of the Strait of Hormuz,” the IRGC said.

The navy reported that the tankers were left along the southern shores of the strait following the explosions. Their identities and flags were not immediately available, and no information was provided about casualties.

IRGC warns crews against relying on CENTCOM assurances

The IRGC Navy reiterated that the southern route remains mined, warning shipowners and crews against attempting passage in disregard of its instructions or relying on statements issued by US Central Command (CENTCOM).

“The IRGC Navy states that the unauthorised route through the Strait of Hormuz is mined, and that vessel owners and crews are responsible for transiting these routes and should not pay attention to CENTCOM’s delusions on social media,” the statement said.

It further warned that any provocative action backed by the US military that disregards Iran’s rules governing passage through the strait would be met firmly.

Iranian forces have repeatedly accused CENTCOM of encouraging commercial vessels to use the southern corridor near the Omani coast despite Iranian warnings.

In a statement issued on Wednesday, CENTCOM rejected earlier Iranian reports of commercial vessels striking mines and maintained that US forces had cleared all internationally recognized primary transit routes. It also said thousands of commercial vessels had used those lanes safely. The statement preceded Thursday’s IRGC announcement.

UKMTO receives report of vessel burning near Oman

Separately, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) said on Thursday that a shipmaster had reported seeing another vessel on fire nine nautical miles north of Khasab, Oman.

The agency did not identify the vessel or establish the cause of the blaze. Its connection to the three tankers reported by the IRGC remained unclear.

The developments come amid restrictions on shipping through the strait since the US-Israeli war on Iran began on February 28. Tehran maintains that vessels must coordinate their passage with Iranian authorities, while Washington has imposed a blockade on Iranian ports.

IRGC announces capture of US reconnaissance drone

In a separate statement, the IRGC Navy announced that its electronic warfare unit had captured a US drone in the western Strait of Hormuz and brought it down intact.

The navy identified the aircraft as an MQM-170 reconnaissance and decoy drone, saying it had been tasked with detecting Iranian air-defense systems along the Gulf coastline and the strait.

“The IRGC Navy announced that its electronic warfare unit had successfully captured a US MQM-170 drone during an offensive operation in the western Strait of Hormuz,” the statement said.

October 29, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , | Comments Off on Three tankers hit mines on unauthorized Hormuz route: IRGC Navy

Iran is (probably) collecting tolls, and why Asia stopped buying oil from the US

Inside China Business | October 29, 2026

The War on Iran, and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, forced energy buyers to source crude oil and refined products from the United States. But US exports of crude to Asia have since collapsed, and are plumbing multiyear lows. Oil transport costs have skyrocketed, making American oil shipments to Asia non-competitive. Industry insiders strongly suspect that the increased oil flows through the Persian Gulf are a result of oil suppliers quietly paying Iran for safe passage through the Hormuz. Middle East suppliers are also selling oil on a “delivered basis” to buyers in China and India, thereby assuming all the transport costs and insurance risks. 

Resources and links:

U.S. exports of crude oil and petroleum products reached record in April https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/det…

$80 Million Tanker Bills Are Crushing US Oil Exports to Asia https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articl…

Asian refiners use smaller tankers, buy delivered crude as freight rates soar https://www.reuters.com/business/ener…

Kpler Suspects Gulf Producers Are Paying Iran for Safe Passage https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil…

Is Iran charging a toll to allow oil traffic through Hormuz? https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1…

The Strait of Hormuz transit fee. https://straits.live/strait-of-hormuz…

Oil Tankers Earn $1 Million a Day as War Leaves Ship Shortage https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articl…

Supertanker chartered from Gulf Coast to China for $76 million, 10 times higher than pre-war level https://www.cnbc.com/2026/10/07/super…

Operation Economic Outcast Disrupts Digital Asset Exchange Enabling the Iranian Regime https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-…

Over a thousand “dark fleet” tankers sell sanctioned oil. And nobody really wants them to stop.    • Over a thousand “dark fleet” tankers sell …  

Shipping companies offering captains $US100k a month to transit Strait of Hormuz https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-10-1…

Ship captains and crews transiting the Strait of Hormuz make so much danger pay that they’re ‘almost being viewed as mercenaries’ https://fortune.com/2026/10/10/ship-c…

Kotak raises FY27 crude oil price forecast to $100 amid 8-month supply disruption https://timesofoman.com/article/17852…

China Refiners Tap African, Brazilian Oil as Freight Rates Fall https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articl…

October 29, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Video | , , | Comments Off on Iran is (probably) collecting tolls, and why Asia stopped buying oil from the US

The accession of Ukraine could signal the collapse of the EU

By Sonja van den Ende | Strategic Culture Foundation | October 28, 2026

EU enlargement has become a trap in which political intentions collide with economic reality; Eastern and Southern Europe will bear the brunt of the impact if Ukraine joins the European Union. Ukraine is a war‑torn country, and EU citizens are already footing the bill for its reconstruction and the support of its refugees. The EU’s cohesion policy would collapse: Ukraine would become the largest and poorest member state, absorbing virtually all available development funds. Current beneficiaries – such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Spain, and Greece – would lose 80% to 100% of their cohesion funding and, overnight, become net contributors.

Compared to Western European countries, nations such as Greece, Spain, and Hungary are “poor countries.” To illustrate: the minimum monthly wage for an employee in Greece is around €900, whereas in the Netherlands it is approximately €2,300 for a 40‑hour workweek.

In the planning for the next seven‑year EU budget, starting in 2028, the potential accession of Ukraine must be taken into account – at least according to the rhetoric of key EU figures, such as Ursula von der Leyen and her political elites.

Such an accession, however, would amount to financial suicide for the former Warsaw Pact countries – Eastern European nations such as Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary – as well as for Southern European countries, particularly Greece and Spain. Furthermore, it would spell disaster for France, a Western European nation currently grappling with large‑scale demonstrations fueled by the state’s insolvency. Some economic experts are already warning that France could become a second Greece – a country that, in 2015, faced extremely harsh austerity measures, endured the eurozone crisis, and remains a financial burden to this day, especially for its own citizens. We are currently witnessing a clash between the political ambitions of Western European figures – such as Ursula von der Leyen and her entourage, as well as NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte – and economic reality. It is Eastern and Southern Europe that stand to bear the brunt of the consequences.

The problem with Ukraine is not just the issue of reconstruction and the funding required for the many refugees – who, in theory, could return home, though in practice this rarely happens (consider the case of Syria, where tens of thousands remain in the EU, either unwilling or unable to return). There is also the matter of the devastation of the agricultural sector: Ukraine’s vast, fertile farmlands and massive agribusinesses would consume roughly one‑third of the EU’s entire agricultural budget.

To prevent a collapse, Brussels would either have to increase contributions from member states – a move likely to be blocked by Western nations – or drastically cut per‑hectare subsidies for farmers in countries like France, Germany, Poland, and Hungary. Such a move would risk an agricultural breakdown, potentially leading to tractor blockades across Europe.

In reality, an agricultural collapse is already underway within the EU – not because of Ukraine, but due to the EU’s utopian policies. The Netherlands, in particular, has implemented strict EU nitrogen‑reduction directives in an extreme manner, leading to the buyout of hundreds of farms and the departure of many farmers to countries outside the EU (notably Canada). Agricultural enterprises that have existed for centuries – and which once formed the backbone of the economy in the Netherlands – are now disappearing to make way for defense interests; after all, the military requires ammunition depots and training grounds for an imagined war against Russia. Under the guise of nitrogen reduction and climate change, the state is effectively securing farmers’ land for military use, and the accession of Ukraine will only exacerbate the situation.

Since 2022 (the year of what the EU refers to as the Russian invasion), the European Union has largely suspended import tariffs on Ukrainian agricultural products to provide economic support to the country. As a result, imports of inexpensive Ukrainian poultry and eggs into the EU have risen exponentially. In 2025, the Dutch poultry sector, which was the largest in Europe, expressed concern regarding the renewed trade deal between Europe and Ukraine. Under this new agreement, the quotas – within which Ukraine is permitted to export to Europe duty‑free – have been significantly increased for a number of agricultural products. For instance, the quota for chicken meat entering Europe has been raised from 90,000 tonnes to 120,000 tonnes, and for eggs from 6,000 tonnes to 18,000 tonnes.

This points toward the “death” of the poultry industry in Western Europe (the Netherlands) and an increase in the emigration of Western European businesses. Some refer to this as “depopulation” – a sensitive term in Europe – but I would describe it more accurately as “depopulation of businesses” coupled with the “expropriation of farmers and businesses.”

However, the Brussels elites face another major problem: they have promised Ukraine a swift accession to the European Union. These elites make almost monthly “unexpected” visits to Kiev to assure their “hero,” Zelensky, of their support – in the form of money (from EU taxpayers), weapons, and the prospect of EU membership. Yet a rapid accession would be suicidal for the European Union (and for the elites themselves).

The most likely solution is that Ukraine will not be granted full membership in terms of the distribution of funds. A transitional period of 10–15 years could be introduced – much like the way Albania, Turkey, and North Macedonia have been kept on a string for years – during which Kiev would have only minimal access to funds, and its participation in the agricultural market would also be restricted. Yet this would expose the European political elites (such as former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte) as liars – though, in fairness, that is nothing new.

Almost every year, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, visits Albania, North Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro to assure them of her support (and that of the EU) – a practice that has continued for more than 15 years. Meanwhile, the citizens of these countries have largely grown completely fed up with the empty promises. We are now also seeing unrest emerge in Albania, where Prime Minister Edi Rama – a good friend of Mark Rutte, who also visits the country regularly – has been in power for years but is currently facing significant resistance from his own population; an opposition that has reached an unprecedented level, fueled in part by the so‑called “Flamingo Revolution.”

Take Turkey, for example, which has been waiting 39 years to join the European Union. It first submitted an application for membership in 1987 – to what was then called the European Economic Community – and it has been 27 years since it was officially recognized as an EU candidate country in 1999. This has only served to distance Turkey further from Europe, especially when contrasted with the almost obsessive rhetoric from the EU regarding its unwavering, unconditional support for Ukraine in its war against Russia – or, as they term it, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Other countries in and around Europe – such as Montenegro – are also involved in the so‑called accession process, with active negotiations and a projected timeline pointing toward potential membership around 2028. As with Ukraine, however, it is unlikely that they will meet the requirements regarding corruption. Serbia finds itself in a similar position, and Georgia is also a potential candidate – a fact that causes displeasure in Russia. After all, the majority of Georgian territory lies just south of the Greater Caucasus, which is traditionally considered the boundary between Europe and Asia; a situation comparable to that of Turkey. Armenia (in Western Asia) intends to submit a formal application for EU membership in the near future, though it has not yet done so. Armenia is not a European country; the EU views such nations primarily as geopolitical, strategic tools to help encircle Russia, even though, in reality, these countries remain far removed from Europe.

For Ukraine, and for Zelensky in particular, this would be a slap in the face if they could not join in 2028, as they are not fighting for second‑class membership or to be kept waiting like the above‑mentioned countries, and in particular Turkey. Consequently, EU enlargement has turned into a trap for the European Union, whereas said political will collides with harsh economic reality.

In 2016, a referendum was held in the Netherlands regarding Ukraine’s accession and its association agreement with the EU – the first and, to date, only referendum to take place in the Netherlands, a country that considers itself a democracy! The outcome was unwelcome to Dutch politicians and the EU (it should be noted that the Netherlands is one of the EU’s founding member states); consequently, no further referendums have been held in the Netherlands, and the mechanism itself has even been abolished. The Dutch public voted “NO” to Ukraine’s accession; the primary reason for this “NO” vote was the widespread corruption in Ukraine.

Moreover, many (Dutch) citizens feared even then that this would lead to problems with Russia and that Europe might ultimately have to fight on behalf of Ukraine – pointing to the European Union’s mutual assistance clause (Article 42, paragraph 7). This clause stipulates that if an EU country becomes the victim of armed aggression on its own territory, the other EU member states are obligated to provide all the aid and assistance within their power. It now appears that this obligation is effectively being acted upon, even though Ukraine is not an EU member state; the public and EU citizens have, in effect, been misled by their own politicians and are now paying a high price in the form of arms shipments, the loss of gas supplies, and the deployment of weaponry.

October 28, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , | Comments Off on The accession of Ukraine could signal the collapse of the EU

Iran FM Araghchi: “Hormuz Will No Longer Be the Same”

Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – October 26, 2026

October 26, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism, Russophobia | , , , | Comments Off on Iran FM Araghchi: “Hormuz Will No Longer Be the Same”

EU facing trillion-euro debt hole while seeking more cash for Kiev

RT | October 26, 2026

The EU faces a growing budget squeeze after borrowing hundreds of billions for pandemic recovery and Ukraine. Rising repayment costs threaten future spending and rushed payouts raise fraud risks, its chief auditor has warned. Brussels is nevertheless seeking billions more for Kiev.

Speaking to Rapporteur, Tony Murphy, president of the European Court of Auditors, described the budget situation as a “pressure cooker,” with EU debt potentially reaching €1 trillion (1.12 trillion) by the end of 2027. The bloc’s debt stood at €739 billion (825 billion) in 2025, up from €601 billion ($671 billion) a year earlier.

“You have to pay it back at some time. It’s not free money,” Murphy said. He emphasized that “it’s real money that has to be paid back.”

However, concerns have repeatedly been raised about the EU getting back any of the billions it has spent on Ukraine, including its recent €90 billion ($100 billion) loan, which Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico recently slammed as “gifts” that Ukraine will “never pay back.”

Kiev is required to repay the loan only after receiving Russian reparations – something Moscow has vehemently ruled out. Ukraine’s own former Prime Minister Nikolay Azarov has also acknowledged that such scenarios are “just fairy tales” and that Brussels will never get its money back, which is being actively embezzled by Kiev.

The EU, however, must still repay the money it borrowed. According to Murphy, servicing pandemic debt alone would consume 8% of the bloc’s proposed 2028–2034 budget and governments have yet to agree on new revenue to cover the repayments, leaving Brussels with less money for other priorities.

The squeeze comes as households and businesses continue to face high energy costs following Europe’s break with Russian supplies, compounded by the US-Israeli war on Iran.

Murphy also warned about how quickly money is being spent. He called the requirement to process €90 billion in remaining pandemic recovery payments by December “crazy,” describing the impending payouts as a “tsunami.”

Pressure to meet deadlines could also encourage weaker checks and more abuse, he said, as European prosecutors are already investigating hundreds of suspected fraud cases involving recovery funds.

Despite the crisis, Brussels is again looking for more money for Kiev after Vladimir Zelensky requested another €70 billion ($78 billion) for 2027, beyond existing commitments. European Council President Antonio Costa said Friday that the EU expects to cover roughly two-thirds, with a decision potentially coming in November.

October 26, 2026 Posted by | Corruption, Economics, Militarism, Wars for Israel | , | Comments Off on EU facing trillion-euro debt hole while seeking more cash for Kiev

Pakistan reopens Iran border after boosting security: Report

Press TV – October 25, 2025

Pakistan has reopened a major border crossing with Iran that handles key energy and commodity supplies between the two countries amid improved security in the region.

Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper reported on Sunday that the Gabd-Rimdan border crossing, also known as Gate 250, in the country’s Gwadar region, had reopened a day earlier following a weeklong suspension that began on October 17.

The report quoted Mir Naveed Jan Kalmati, president of the Gwadar Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as saying that import and export operations between Pakistan and Iran had resumed.

It said the decision came amid dwindling LPG supplies in Pakistan ahead of the winter season.

The closure of the border crossing on October 17 left hundreds of trucks stranded on both sides of the border.

An attack was also reported in the region earlier this week, when unidentified gunmen targeted parked trucks, setting dozens ablaze and damaging several others.

Dawn said local administrators had deployed additional forces to protect trade convoys before reopening the border crossing.

Meanwhile, Iran’s ambassador to Pakistan, Reza Amiri Moghadam, said in a post on his X account on Sunday that the disruption to cross-border trade between the two countries was mainly due to changes in Islamabad’s import rules.

He denied that Iran had made any decision to reduce LPG exports to Pakistan.

“… Changes in the implementation of Pakistan’s E-Form procedure for imports from Iran have created a situation in which traders are effectively and literally unable to dispatch cargo from Iran to Pakistan,” Amiri Moghadam said.

He said cross-border trade between Iran and Pakistan “serves the mutual interests of both countries and their people,” adding that Iran had made every possible effort to facilitate and promote trade with its “brotherly” neighbor.

October 25, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , | Comments Off on Pakistan reopens Iran border after boosting security: Report

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