A ‘Trump deal’? Juggling war, ‘easy war’ and negotiation
By Alastair Crooke | Strategic Culture Foundation | April 24, 2025
Trump clearly is in the midst of an existential conflict. He has a landslide mandate. But is ringed by a resolute domestic enemy front in the form of an ‘industrial concern’ infused with Deep State ideology, centred primarily on preserving U.S. global power (rather than on mending of the economy).
The key MAGA issue however is not foreign policy, but how to structurally re-balance an economic paradigm in danger of an extinction event. Trump has always been clear that this forms his primordial goal. His coalition of supporters are fixed on the need to revive America’s industrial base, so as to provide reasonably well-paid jobs to the MAGA corps.
Trump may for now have a mandate, but extreme danger lurks – not just the Deep State and the Israeli lobby. The Yellen debt bomb is the more existential threat. It threatens Trump’s support in Congress, because the bomb is set to explode shortly before the 2026 midterms. New tariff revenues, DOGE savings, and even the upcoming Gulf shake-down are all centred on getting some sort of fiscal order in place, so that $9 trillion plus of short-term debt – maturing imminently – can be rolled over to the longer term without resort to eye-watering interest rates. It is Yellen-Democrat’s little trip wire for the Trump agenda.
So far, the general context seems plain enough. Yet, on the minutiae of how exactly to re-balance the economy; how to manage the ‘debt bomb’; and how far DOGE should go with its cuts, divisions in Trump’s team are present. In fact, the tariff war and the China tussle bring into contention a fresh phalanx of opposition: i.e. those (some on Wall Street, oligarchs, etc.) who have prospered mightily from the golden era of free-flowing, seemingly limitless, money-creation; those who were enriched, precisely by the policies that have made America subservient to the looming American ‘debt knell’.
Yet to make matters more complex, two of the key components to Trump’s mooted ‘re-balancing’ and debt ‘solution’ cannot be whispered, let alone said aloud: One reason is that it involves deliberately devaluing ‘the dollar in your pocket’. And secondly, many more Americans are going to lose their jobs.
That is not exactly a popular ‘sell’. Which is probably why the ‘re-balance’ has not been well explained to the public.
Trump launched the Liberation ‘Tariff Shock’ seemingly minded to crash-start a restructuring of international trade relations – as the first step towards a general re-alignment of major currency values.
China however, wasn’t buying into the tariff and trade restrictions ‘stuff’, and matters quickly escalated. It looked for a moment as if the Trump ‘Coalition’ might fracture under the pressure of the concomitant crisis in the U.S. bond market to the tariff fracas that shook confidence.
The Coalition, in fact, held; markets subsided, but then the Coalition fractured over a foreign policy issue – Trump’s hope to normalise relations with Russia, towards a Great Global Reset.
A major strand within the Trump Coalition (apart from MAGA populists) are the neocons and Israeli Firsters. Some sort of Faustian bargain supposedly was struck by Trump at the outset through a deal that had his team heavily peopled by zealous Israeli-Firsters.
Simply put, the breadth of coalition that Trump thought he needed to win the election and deliver an economic re-balance also included two foreign policy pillars: Firstly, the reset with Moscow – the pillar by which to end the ‘forever wars’, which his Populist base despised. And the second pillar being the neutering of Iran as a military power and source of resistance, on which both Israeli Firsters – and Israel – insist (and with which Trump seems wholly comfortable). Hence the Faustian pact.
Trump’s ‘peacemaker’ aspirations no doubt added to his electoral appeal, but they were not the real driver to his landslide. What has become evident is that these diverse agendas – foreign and domestic – are interlinked: A set-back in one or the other acts as a domino either impelling or retarding the other agendas. Put simply: Trump is dependent on ‘wins’ – early ‘wins’ – even if this means rushing towards a prospective ‘easy win’ without thinking through whether he possesses a sound strategy (and ability) to achieve it.
All of Trump’s three agenda objectives, it turns out, are more complicated and divisive than he perhaps expected. He and his team seem captivated by western-embedded assumptions such as first, that war generally happens ‘Over There’; that war in the post Cold War era is not actually ‘war’ in any traditional sense of full, all-out war, but is rather a limited application of overwhelming western force against an enemy incapable of threatening ‘us’ in a similar manner; and thirdly, that a war’s scope and duration is decided in Washington and its Deep State ‘twin’ in London.
So those who talk about ending the Ukraine war through an imposed unilateral ceasefire (ie, the faction of Walz, Rubio and Hegseth, led by Kellogg) seem to assume blithely that the terms and timing for ending the war also can be decided in Washington, and imposed on Moscow through the limited application of asymmetric pressures and threats.
Just as China isn’t buying into the tariff and trade restriction ‘stuff’, neither is Putin buying into the ultimatum ‘stuff’: (‘Moscow has weeks, not months, to agree a ceasefire’). Putin has patiently tried to explain to Witkoff, Trump’s Envoy, that the American presumption that the scope and duration of any war is very much up to the West to decide simply doesn’t gel with today’s reality.
And, in companion mode, those who talk about bombing Iran (which includes Trump) seem also to assume that they can dictate the war’s essential course and content too; the U.S. (and Israel perhaps), can simply determine to bomb Iran with big bunker-buster bombs. That’s it! End of story. This is assumed to be a self-justifying and easy war – and that Iran must learn to accept that they brought this upon themselves by supporting the Palestinians and others who refuse Israeli normalisation.
Aurelien observes:
“So we are dealing with limited horizons; limited imagination and limited experience. But there’s one other determining factor: The U.S. system is recognised to be sprawling, conflictual – and, as a result, largely impervious to outside influence – and even to reality. Bureaucratic energy is devoted almost entirely to internal struggles, which are carried out by shifting coalitions in the administration; in Congress; in Punditland and in the media. But these struggles are, in general, about [domestic] power and influence – and not about the inherent merits of an issue, and [thus] require no actual expertise or knowledge”.
“The system is large and complex enough that you can make a career as an ‘Iran expert’, say, inside and outside government, without ever having visited the country or speaking the language – by simply recycling standard wisdom in a way that will attract patronage. You will be fighting battles with other supposed ‘experts’, within a very confined intellectual perimeter, where only certain conclusions are acceptable”.
What becomes evident is that this cultural approach (the Think-Tank Industrial Complex) induces a laziness and the prevalence of hubris into western thinking. It is assumed reportedly, that Trump assumed that Xi Jinping would rush to meet with him, following the imposition of tariffs – to plead for a trade deal – because China is suffering some economic headwinds.
It is blandly assumed by the Kellogg contingent too that pressure is both the necessary and sufficient condition to compel Putin to agree to an unilateral ceasefire – a ceasefire that Putin repeatedly has stated he would not accept until a political framework was first agreed. When Witkoff relays Putin’s point within the Trump team discussion, he stands as a contrarian outside the ‘licensed discourse’ which insists that Russia only takes détente with an adversary seriously after it has been forced to do so by a defeat or serious setback.
Iran too repeatedly has said that it will not be stripped naked of its conventional defences; its allies and its nuclear programme. Iran likely has the capabilities to inflict huge damage both on U.S. forces in the region and on Israel.
The Trump Team is divided on strategy here too – crudely put: to Negotiate or to Bomb.
It seems that the pendulum has swung under intense pressure from Netanyahu and the Jewish institutional leadership within the U.S.
A few words can change everything. In an about face, Witkoff shifted from saying a day earlier that Washington would be satisfied with a cap on Iranian nuclear enrichment and would not require the dismantling of its nuclear facilities, to posting on his official X account that any deal would require Iran to “stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment and weaponization program … A deal with Iran will only be completed if it is a Trump deal”. Without a clear reversal on this from Trump, we are on a path to war.
It is plain that Team Trump has not thought through the risks inherent to their agendas. Their initial ‘ceasefire meeting’ with Russia in Riyadh, for example, was a theatre of the facile. The meeting was held on the easy assumption that since Washington had determined to have an early ceasefire then ‘it must be’.
“Famously”, Aurelien wearily notes, “the Clinton administration’s Bosnia policy was the product of furious power struggles between rival American NGO and Human Rights’ alumni – none of whom knew anything about the region, or had ever been there”.
It is not just that the team is insouciant towards the possible consequences of war in the Middle East. They are captive to manipulated assumptions that it will be an easy war.
Ukraine debt talks fail
RT | April 24, 2025
Ukraine’s government announced on Thursday that it has failed to reach an agreement to restructure some $2.6 billion of its debt. The country could default if it isn’t able to make the next scheduled payment at the end of May.
A group of GDP warrant holders held discussions last week and continued face-to-face talks during this week’s International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings in Washington, a source familiar with the matter told Bloomberg. The warrants, which function similarly to bonds, are a type of debt security with payouts linked to economic growth.
The talks reportedly included consideration of a mix of cash and bonds as compensation for the GDP warrant payment due on May 31, estimated at around $600 million. The group of holders comprised hedge funds Aurelius Capital Management LP and VR Capital Group, according to the outlet.
“Ukraine indicated that it could not accept the Restricted Holders’ Proposal and declined to make any further proposal to the Restricted Holders before the end of the Restricted Period,” the Ukrainian government said in a statement following the talks.
The debt holders reportedly pushed back, stating that Kiev’s proposal had “no prospect of approval” and failed to “form the basis for a viable point of engagement.”
Ukraine’s Finance Ministry said that it would “consider all available options” for restructuring the debt, a requirement under its agreement with the IMF.
Kiev will now have to decide whether to default on a $600 million payment – tied to the economy’s performance in 2023 – if it fails to secure a restructuring deal before the end-of-May deadline.
The IMF has warned that an unresolved dispute over GDP warrants could jeopardize broader debt restructuring efforts and put Ukraine’s ongoing $15.6 billion aid program at risk.
Ukraine’s budget depends almost entirely on aid from its foreign backers. Last year, Kiev planned to attract $37 billion in outside loans to cover its budget, which the government predicted would face a deficit of 75% in 2025.
The failed debt talks come at a time when the US is pushing to cut aid to Ukraine. Immediately upon assuming office in January, US President Donald Trump suspended all American foreign development assistance programs for 90 days, including to Ukraine.
The Taliban’s approach to the TAPI pipeline: challenges, and obstacles
By Farzad Bonesh – New Eastern Outlook – April 24, 2025
Although TAPI has now taken on more of a bilateral partnership between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, its earlier implementation will certainly have greater domestic consequences for Afghanistan.
The Taliban’s approach to the TAPI pipeline: challenges, and obstacles
The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, a combination of the first letters of the Latin names of the countries participating in the regional project, runs from Turkmenistan to India. The length of the 1,814-kilometer line is 214 kilometers in Turkmenistan and 816 kilometers in Afghanistan.
The TAPI project is intended to transport 33 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually from Turkmenistan’s The Galkynysh gas field to India.
In 2015, the leaders of the four TAPI participating countries celebrated the groundbreaking ceremony for the gas pipeline in the city of Merv. But apart from the laying of the Turkmen section, virtually no major activity took place.
After the Taliban returned to power, international financial institutions either refused to directly support the project due to legal and political considerations or showed no interest in investing.
The Afghan Taliban is not officially recognized, and international sanctions against the Taliban, political differences between India and Pakistan, and tense relations between Kabul and Islamabad have slowed down the implementation of the project.
However, in September 2024, former President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov and Taliban Prime Minister Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund jointly launched the TAPI project in 2024 at a ceremony on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border.
Recently, Hedayatullah Badri, Minister of Mines and Petroleum, and a high-ranking delegation from Turkmenistan, visited the progress of the TAPI gas transmission project in Herat province and emphasized the acceleration of the work process.
Although Pakistan and India have not been involved much in the recent developments of the TAPI gas pipeline, the Taliban, adopting a pragmatic approach, have decided to take this energy transmission project step by step with the cooperation of Turkmenistan.
Political and geopolitical goals and interests of the Afghan Taliban:
From the perspective of TAPI, it is an opportunity to solve the security problem within the country, and Kabul hopes that the opposition will also agree to the construction of this pipeline, considering national interests. During the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan , the Taliban, in a statement, while supporting the TAPI project, saw TAPI as an important economic project and an important element in the country’s economic infrastructure.
Gaining greater regional and global support for this pipeline will further link Afghanistan’s security with regional and global partners. The passage of the TAPI gas pipeline through Afghanistan will link the tangible and real interests of several regional and global countries, and the neighboring countries will also ensure Afghanistan’s security.
The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project has helped increase Afghanistan’s geopolitical position and strengthen relations and mutual interests among partner countries. Taliban leaders seem to believe that TAPI has the potential to expand relations between member countries and strengthen common interests. Also, from the perspective of many in Kabul, the pipeline’s passage through Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India will reduce Pakistan’s incentive to play a negative role in Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, Kabul expects the TAPI project to encourage countries’ interests to move away from confrontation with each other in Afghanistan to a policy of tolerance.
In this approach, accurate and efficient management of the TAPI can have important effects on the public opinion of the people, show government efficiency, deal with the opposition, and satisfy nationalist feelings.
Economic goals and benefits:
Of course, this plan cannot pave the way for an economic revolution in Afghanistan, but it can be very useful for other major construction projects, reconstruction, economic development and production, trade, and transit in Afghanistan.
It will also employ about ten thousand people for the next few decades, creating thousands of direct and indirect jobs and reducing some of the unemployment problem.
Over the past few years, the Taliban have focused on several projects such as the TAP-500 energy system, the revival of important energy transmission and transit projects, including CASA-1000.
In addition, the Taliban have planned and inaugurated some infrastructure and economic projects, such as solar power generation over the past two years. The Taliban consider energy projects important in the development and self-sufficiency of the country, saving Afghanistan from poverty and dependence on expanding energy production, and managing water resources.
The implementation of TAPI can help transform Afghanistan’s energy consumption infrastructure from oil and coal to natural gas, and help increase the country’s production and economic growth.
For the first time, Afghanistan can achieve reliable natural gas for domestic and industrial use. For example, the TAPI pipeline passing through Herat province (the economic hub of Afghanistan) could be a driving force for other local industries.
Afghanistan could be an actor in a major transit route for Central Asia and a bridge between Central Asian energy-consuming and exporting countries. South Asian countries are in great need of energy, and Central Asian countries have abundant gas and electricity resources. Afghanistan has the potential to connect the two sides.
Success in this project could accelerate the construction of power transmission lines, railways, fiber optics, etc., in the field of regional cooperation. If TAPI is completed at a cost of more than $7-10 billion, it could also help attract foreign investment to the country. In addition to meeting the gas needs of its growing economy, Afghanistan could also receive $1 billion in gas transit rights annually. This amount could be a major contribution to the economy.
TAPI could be an important step towards strengthening the economic diplomacy of the Kabul government. Apart from the main role of Turkmen Gas Company, with an 85% stake, in July 2024, Pakistan and Turkmenistan agreed to accelerate the progress of the TAPI gas pipeline project.
Kazakhstan also seems to be willing to join the project. Russian companies may participate in the TAPI project, “as soon as the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes”.
Challenges and Outlook
TAPI suffers from major challenges, from insecurity to political complications, regional instability, the international isolation of the Taliban, and doubts about the investment capacity.
The TAPI project in the Turkmen section has been completed. The Taliban also plan four phases for construction from the Turkmenistan border to the city of Herat; Herat to Helmand; Helmand to Kandahar; and Kandahar to the Pakistani border. But as of April 2025, just 11 kilometers of pipeline have been laid in Afghanistan.
Large investments require security and stability, and major extremist groups such as ISIS can be a significant threat in Afghanistan.
The Afghan section of TAPI (in Herat, Farah, Nimroz, Helmand, and Kandahar provinces) passes through some of the most unstable parts of the country. The Taliban is not yet a legitimate government, with legal standing as an economic contracting party and a reliable partner. Critics have warned that the Taliban government does not have national legitimacy and international and legal recognition.
Pakistan and India appear to be cautiously refraining from immediately participating in the TAPI gas pipeline, waiting for conditions in Afghanistan to change.
While the Taliban has not been recognized yet, it is also not possible to secure financial assistance or loans from international institutions.
In addition, the full and successful construction and operation of the pipeline requires the political will of the leaders of the four countries and serious bilateral and multilateral discussions with all partners.
However, although TAPI has now taken on more of a bilateral partnership between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, its earlier implementation will certainly have greater domestic consequences for Afghanistan.
How Might The US’ Relations With Ukraine & Russia Change If It Abandons Its Peace Efforts?
By Andrew Korybko | April 18, 2025
Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on Friday that the US might stop mediating an end to the Ukrainian Conflict if it concludes within “a matter of days” that no peace deal is doable. That coincided with the Wall Street Journal reporting that Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff told them that “Putin had been fixated on Ukrainian land in their discussions. He said that Russia might get some of the regions, but not all.” This analysis here explained why it’s so important for Russia to obtain full control over the disputed lands.
If no breakthrough is achieved, such as the US coercing Ukraine into withdrawing from those regions or Russia agreeing to freeze this dimension of the conflict, then the US might indeed abandon its peace efforts. The question therefore arises of how that could change its relations with Ukraine and Russia. Beginning with the first, Trump and his team’s explicitly expressed exhaustion with this conflict bodes ill for the scenario of the US continuing military support for Ukraine, which would please Russia.
The Europeans would try to replace some of this lost aid in order to keep the conflict going in alignment with Zelensky’s vision, but they’d be unable to replace all of it and he might ultimately be forced into agreeing to worse terms than the US’ if Russia successfully expands its ground offensive. At the same time, however, the US might also suspend its talks with Russia on the strategic resource deals that were supposed to serve as the centerpiece of their planned “New Détente” as long as the conflict continues.
This balanced approach would be predicated on pressuring Ukraine and Russia into committing to compromises aimed at restoring the US-led peace talks since the first doesn’t want to lose territory in other regions while the second is interested in shaping the post-conflict era in partnership with the US. These evidently aren’t their top priorities, however, otherwise the land issue would have already been resolved one way or another and there wouldn’t be any talk of the US abandoning its peace efforts.
Other than the unlikely scenario of the US “escalating to de-escalate” on better terms for Ukraine, another comparatively more probable one exists but which is still less likely than the aforesaid, and that’s the US discontinuing military support for Ukraine but continuing resource talks with Russia. These negotiations are connected to Ukraine since the US is seeking privileged terms from Russia in exchange for coercing Kiev into Moscow’s demanded concessions but can still proceed even if that doesn’t occur.
The reason why this scenario is considered less likely than the balanced one described above is because some of the US’ sanctions that impede the clinching of resource deals with Russia can’t easily be lifted without first bringing about an end to the Ukrainian Conflict. Moreover, sanctions relief and the prospect of jointly shaping the post-conflict era are the only carrots that the US can dangle for incentivizing Russia to compromise on ending the conflict, which Trump wants it to do for solidifying his global legacy.
He’s therefore expected to at least temporarily suspend such talks with Russia for that reason in that scenario but might resume them if the conflict remains protracted with no clear diplomatic or military solution. That would make the most sense since he wouldn’t prematurely give up the only means that the US has for incentivizing Russia to compromise for peace but he also wouldn’t lose the objective economic and strategic benefits that a resource deal would bring.
Ties with Russia, China key to global peace – Iranian foreign minister
RT | April 19, 2025
Iran, Russia, and China intend to deepen their cooperation in order to promote global peace and security, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has said in an exclusive interview with RT.
Tehran has been strengthening its ties with Moscow and Beijing in recent years, joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2023 and the BRICS group in 2024. Military cooperation has also expanded, most recently through joint naval drills conducted by the three countries off Iran’s coast in March.
Given the current international climate, working closely with Moscow and Beijing is “a necessity” for Tehran, Araghchi told the broadcaster on Saturday.
“We have started trilateral talks between Iran, Russia and China on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program for some time now,” he said, adding that two such meetings have already taken place. “We are ready to continue these talks and expand them to other issues,” the minister added.
Araghchi expressed confidence that “Iran, China and Russia – in a coordinated move – can take effective steps towards international peace.” The three partners “are serious about this,” he insisted.
Tehran’s top diplomat also said that bilateral “relations between Iran and Russia have never been so close and so strong” than at the current moment.
“We now have a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement that raises the level of our relations to a strategic level. Major economic projects are underway between us. The volume of trade between us has increased tremendously,” he said.
Despite harsh Western restrictions slapped on both Iran and Russia, the two countries “are not waiting for the sanctions to be lifted, but we are expanding our relations in this situation,” Araghchi noted.
“We have the same and close positions on many international issues. I do not want to say that there are no disagreements between us. Sometimes there are also differences of opinion, but in most cases we have close positions with each other and, most importantly, we are in constant exchange of views,” he said.
Earlier this week, Russia’s Federation Council, the upper house of the country’s parliament, unanimously ratified the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Russia and Iran, which was signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Iranian counterpart Masoud Peseshkian in January. The pact stipulates that the two nations will develop equal and mutually beneficial cooperation in the fields of politics, defense, economy, security, trade, investment, energy, infrastructure and other areas.
Belgium eyes welfare cuts to meet NATO target – minister
RT | April 16, 2025
Belgium is preparing to raise debt and cut welfare to meet NATO’s minimum military spending target, the EU country’s budget minister has said.
Vincent Van Peteghem told the Financial Times on Wednesday that Brussels recently agreed to lift its 2025 military budget to 2% of GDP through a mix of temporary cash injections, creative accounting, and structural reforms.
The planned hike in military spending could exacerbate the budget crisis as debt mounts. Recent government plans to cut social services have sparked protests, with over 100,000 people rallying in Brussels in February.
Belgium had previously planned to meet the 2% target only by 2029. Military spending currently stands at around 1.31% of GDP, or roughly €8 billion ($8.5 billion), according to Defense Minister Theo Francken.
The shift comes amid pressure from Washington and ahead of a NATO summit in June, where members are expected to consider raising the spending target to above 3% of GDP. US President Donald Trump has urged the bloc members to increase military spending to 5%, warning that countries that fail to do so may no longer be guaranteed American protection.
Higher spending on military budgets would take a toll on the EU’s welfare programs, Van Peteghem warned.
Last month, the European Commission proposed exempting military budgets from fiscal rules and offering €150 billion in loans as part of its ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, which aims to mobilize up to €800 billion through debt and tax incentives for the bloc’s military-industrial complex.
Van Peteghem said Belgium would tap both options to fund additional military spending this year.
To maintain the 2% level, the government plans to raise more debt and may privatize state-owned assets, the minister said. The remaining gap would be filled through spending cuts, including curbs on unemployment benefits, pension reforms, and tax changes.
“But of course, we will need to do more,” Van Peteghem, who also serves as deputy prime minister, said.
France has also announced plans to cut €5 billion from its budget, with some of the savings potentially redirected to military spending.
Moscow has condemned the EU’s military buildup. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called it “a matter of deep concern,” noting that it was aimed at Russia.
Slovak PM Fico urges support for Ukrainian gas transit during visit to Croatia
By Thomas Brooke | Remix News | April 16, 2025
Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico called on Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković to support the resumption of natural gas transit through Ukraine during an official visit to Zagreb on Wednesday.
Fico noted that while Slovakia’s domestic gas needs are currently being met, the country is losing out on key transit revenues due to the halted pipeline flow.
“The resumption of gas flow through Ukraine should be in the interest of the entire European Union, including Slovakia, of course,” Fico said during a joint press conference, as cited by TASR news agency. He acknowledged Croatia’s support in providing access to liquefied natural gas (LNG) via terminals on the island of Krk, but noted that the LNG option remains more expensive for Slovakia.
In January, Fico invited Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to negotiations over the halted transit of natural gas through Ukraine. This was after Kyiv ceased the gas flow at the start of 2025 following the expiration of a contract with Russia, leaving Slovakia and other European nations scrambling to secure energy supplies.
The Slovak prime minister later accused Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky of “begging and blackmailing” European nations for financial aid after turning off the taps.
The meeting in Zagreb highlighted what Fico described as “excellent relations” between Slovakia and Croatia. He expressed gratitude for the hospitality extended to the Slovak delegation and for the warm welcome Slovak tourists receive each year in Croatia. He also acknowledged the continued support of the Slovak minority living in Croatia.
During the bilateral talks, the two leaders agreed on the need to strengthen trade ties, collaborate on illegal migration management, and jointly advocate for cohesion and agricultural policies within the EU budget.
Prime Minister Plenković noted that trade between the two countries now exceeds €1.5 billion, reflecting growing cooperation.
Fico also highlighted Croatia’s role in protecting the EU’s Schengen border, particularly its border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. He offered technical and material support to assist Croatia in this area.
While acknowledging some differences in their perspectives, both leaders reaffirmed their shared desire for an end to the war in Ukraine and a return to peace. They also discussed enhanced cooperation in the arms industry and plans for deeper cultural collaboration. Plenković announced that a bilateral cultural cooperation program for 2025-2029 would soon be signed between the countries’ respective ministries of culture.
Prime Minister Fico’s visit continues with meetings scheduled with Croatian President Zoran Milanović and the Speaker of Parliament Gordan Jandroković. He is accompanied by Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár.
Iran signs contract to convert Iraq’s flare gas into petchem feedstock
Press TV – April 14, 2025
Iran has secured a contract to convert flare gas from Iraqi oilfields into feedstock for petrochemical plants located near its border with the Arab country.
Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs Hayyan Abdul Ghani supervised the signing of the contract on Monday in Baghdad, according to a report by the Iranian Oil Ministry’s news service Shana.
The report said that Iran’s state-run and private companies will contribute to the flare gas recovery project in the Iraqi oilfields that are located near the Iranian border.
The report quoted Paknejad as saying that Iraq is currently burning a part of the flare gas that is extracted with oil, adding that Iran will capture the gases and transport them to its Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) plants across the border to convert them to feedstock for its petrochemical plants.
He said that the contract will alleviate a shortage of NGL feedstock in western Iran where the country is racing against time to end gas flaring in its own oilfields.
Shana said Paknejad and his delegation, who arrived in Iraq earlier in the day as part of an official visit, signed other contracts with the Iraqi side led by Abdul Ghani to facilitate petroleum sector cooperation between the world’s two major oil-producing nations.
Abdul Ghani, who is also Iraq’s oil minister, said after meeting his Iranian counterpart that the Arab country needs Iran’s technical and investment support to reach self-sufficiency in petroleum products.
The contracts include the exchange of experts between Iran and Iraq and launching joint investment projects, Shana said.
During his two-day visit to Iraq, Paknejad will also meet Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani and the country’s Minister of Electricity Ziad Ali Fadel.
What does the restoration of U.S.-Russia relations really mean?
By Lucas Leiroz | Strategic Culture Foundation | April 15, 2025
Recently, The National Interest published a call for a reconfiguration of U.S.-Russia relations, and the proposal to establish an economic partnership signals a subtle but significant shift in Washington’s strategy. After years of hybrid warfare, sanctions, and failed attempts to isolate Moscow, some sectors of the American establishment seem to finally acknowledge the obvious: the U.S. tends to gain much more from reconciliation than Russia does. And most importantly — unlike in the 1990s, Moscow is in no hurry.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S.-Russia relations have been marked by a clear asymmetry. The 1990s and 2000s were defined by a weakened Russia attempting to integrate into the international system on Western terms. The result was a series of strategic humiliations, broken promises—such as NATO expansion—and ongoing efforts at containment. Today, that scenario is completely reversed. Moscow negotiates from a strengthened position, guided by long-term strategic interests and a clear vision of a multipolar world.
The American think tank calls for economic rapprochement do not occur in a vacuum. On the contrary, they reflect the ineffectiveness of sanctions as a tool for political change. Over the past decade, the U.S. has used sanctions as a primary foreign policy method, refining their use to target specific individuals, companies, and strategic sectors while attempting to minimize collateral damage. However, even this “surgical” approach has failed.
In Russia’s case, sanctions not only failed to alter Moscow’s stance but also reinforced its internal resilience and political cohesion. The Russian economy adapted, built alternative logistical, industrial, and financial systems, and deepened ties with powers such as China, India, and Iran. More than that, the sanctions regime stimulated the development of an independent foreign policy, consolidating Russia’s role as a pivotal power in the transition toward a multipolar order.
It is in this context that the U.S. now seeks to replace war and sanctions with other methods of deterrence and engagement—primarily economic in nature. The bet is simple: an economically integrated, cooperative, and stable Russia would better serve Washington’s strategic interests than a confrontational and self-sufficient power. On paper, Moscow could serve as a useful counterweight to China, help relieve economic and migratory pressures in Europe, and potentially shift its focus toward internal economic development instead of geopolitical challenges.
However, this vision ignores a fundamental element: Russia does not simply want to return to being part of a “rules-based international order”—a phrase now synonymous with American hegemony. Moscow wants to end that paradigm. Russia’s strategic interest lies in replacing this unilateral order with a new international structure governed by treaties, pragmatism, and mutual respect between sovereign powers. This is not about returning to the “reset” of the Obama era, but about negotiating new terms for global coexistence—terms that Russia now has the power to impose.
In this scenario, rapprochement with the U.S. only interests Russia if it is based on a realistic, long-term cooperation agenda. Moscow will not accept unilateral conditions or asymmetric concessions. Its goal is clear: to consolidate multipolarity, weaken unilateral structures of domination, and establish relations based on mutual benefits. The geopolitics of force gives way to the diplomacy of interest.
If Washington truly wants a “reset,” it must accept it on the terms of a new world—not as an uncontested leader, but as one among several poles of power. Russia is willing to engage in dialogue, but not in submission. And this time, it’s not Moscow that needs the conversation most—it’s Washington.
AfD leader slams latest German military aid to Kiev as ‘catastrophic’
Al Mayadeen | April 11, 2025
Germany’s plan to ramp up military support for Ukraine has drawn sharp criticism from Alice Weidel, co-leader of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. Speaking on Friday, Weidel condemned Defense Minister Boris Pistorius’ announcement of further arms deliveries, warning that the move fuels conflict rather than advancing peace.
According to a report by RedaktionsNetzwerk Deutschland (RND), Pistorius revealed that Berlin will allocate an additional 8 billion euros ($9 billion) in military assistance to Ukraine by 2029. This comes on top of roughly 7 billion euros worth of equipment pledged for delivery in 2025. Germany has already committed nearly €44 billion in aid to Ukraine since the war began in 2022, including military, financial, and humanitarian support, making it one of Kiev’s largest backers in Europe.
Responding to the announcement on social media platform X, Weidel said: “Pistorius announces new arms deliveries to Ukraine. This makes it clear: the small coalition continues the catastrophic course of escalation carried out by the ‘traffic light’ coalition. This is explosive. We must support the US efforts to achieve a ceasefire.”
Weidel and the AfD have long opposed German military aid to Ukraine, arguing that continued arms shipments escalate tensions and jeopardize German national interests. She has also criticized sanctions on Russia, warning they disproportionately harm Germany’s economy. In her public statements, Weidel has urged Berlin to adopt a neutral foreign policy stance and support diplomatic initiatives, particularly those backed by US President Donald Trump.
Russian officials have frequently argued that Western weapon supplies prolong the war and position NATO countries as active participants in the conflict. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated that any shipment containing arms intended for Ukraine is considered a valid military target under Russian policy.
Why Does Trump Want to Own Major Ukrainian Gas Pipeline?
Sputnik – 12.04.2025
Trump now wants to claim the pipeline used to transport Russian gas to Europe through Ukraine, according to a Reuters report on the April 11 US-Ukraine talks.
How could the US profit from owning the pipeline?
It’s all about the fact that the Ukrainian pipeline can be used to ship gas in reverse, says Dr. George Szamuely, a senior research fellow at The Global Policy Institute.
- Rather than being used to pump Russian gas to European consumers, the pipe can serve to deliver American LNG to Ukrainian consumers.
- By controlling the pipeline, the US can monopolize the Ukrainian gas market, further solidifying Washington’s hold on the country, which would become dependent on American LNG.
- The pipeline could also be used by the US to deliver American LNG to EU countries, making them dependent on US energy resources as well.
Europe and Ukraine “brought this on themselves” by cutting off cheap Russian energy and relying on more expensive American imports, Dr. Szamuely says.
Here we go again – $1 trillion for US ‘defense’
By Drago Bosnic | April 12, 2025
Remember when President Donald Trump promised to make the US military “far more powerful, but for much less money”? Remember when he pledged to end the NATO-orchestrated Ukrainian conflict in 24 hours? Well, me neither. In all seriousness, we can always say that Trump is a politician and that truth or consistency are not exactly the defining qualities of any politician.
On the other hand, the Messianic Complex among many Trumpists is certainly concerning, as there’s little questioning of Trump’s policies. He’s most definitely a very polarizing figure. The vast majority of people are either his staunch supporters or have TDS (Trump derangement syndrome). This prevents a more objective view of his performance, both at home and abroad.
Namely, Trump is exposed to numerous interest groups, many of which have very diverging views on how America should be. The old Deep State sees him as the greatest threat to “Pax Americana” and wants him out at all costs (including through physical removal), while other interest groups think extreme measures are unnecessary and that simply influencing Trump’s decision-making is more than enough.
The latter seem to be leading the charge, while the remnants of the previous administration are engaged in largely pointless protests. However, despite superficial enmity between them, there’s a quite solid continuity in many policies of the two administrations. This is particularly true when it comes to foreign policy and financing the US military.
In the case of the former, the Biden administration’s crawling economic warfare against the European Union (primarily through the destruction of its trade with Russia while the US continued to buy critical commodities from Moscow and even resell them to Europe) has been augmented by Trump’s trade wars.
In the case of the latter, there’s a robust continuity with virtually every US administration in the last 35 years (at the very least). Namely, the consistent increase in American military spending is a clear indicator that the same people are making the final decision on this issue, regardless of who’s in power. The Trump administration’s latest announcement regarding the US “defense” budget effectively proves this is precisely the case.
Namely, on April 7, President Trump and his Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth revealed that the Pentagon will get its first $1 trillion. Interestingly, what should’ve been breaking news was sidelined by global panic regarding the impact of new tariffs. In his usual manner of using superlatives, Trump said that “nobody’s seen anything like it”, adding that “we have to build our military, and we’re very cost-conscious, but the military is something we have to build, and we have to be strong”. It’s certainly commendable to see a government exercise “cost-consciousness”, with Trump employing Musk’s DOGE to be “the ultimate auditing organization”. However, giving a trillion dollars to the unaudited US military sounds like anything but frugality.
On paper, the administration has been adamant about cutting excess government spending, so this move doesn’t make much sense (unless all the auditing was designed to help find the money for the Pentagon). The logical conclusion is that Trump is exposed to the influence of the Military Industrial Complex (MIC) just as much as any other president.
Hegseth was certainly happy with the arrangement, as evidenced by his announcement on Twitter/X where he thanked Trump and presented the development as something “fantastic for everyone”. It would be interesting to see what American taxpayers think about the fact that their money will be invested in more death and destruction instead of restoring America’s crumbling infrastructure.
As previously mentioned, the first official $1 trillion for the US military was only a matter of time, as the troubled Biden administration announced it two years ago, when it pledged to double the Pentagon’s budget. The latest increase is in line with this plan, as the actual US DoD spending has been well over $1 trillion for years (many of its expenses are distributed to other departments). In addition, the Biden administration’s 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) was officially $895 billion, so the latest increase is nothing out of the ordinary and is in line with regular spikes in military spending with every US government in recent history. This certainly breaks the Trump administration’s attempts to present itself as “anti-establishment”.
In addition, the move can only exacerbate America’s debt crisis, particularly after it reached $35 trillion last year and is expected to go over $40 trillion next year. Experts are warning that the latest increase in military spending will likely add at least another trillion to the already rapidly growing debt and that budget cuts are yet to affect the Pentagon, adding that the US military “does precisely nothing to defend the USA” and that it “exclusively interferes in other countries”.
And indeed, Trump’s reshuffling at the Pentagon was largely political and never affected its financing. Worse yet, he also supports continued US aggression in the Middle East, where a war with Iran is looming. In addition, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wants to expand the US nuclear sharing policy.
Drago Bosnic is an independent geopolitical and military analyst. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).
